Fear appeal as a strategic manoeuver in plenary debates on initiative bills in the Dutch Parliament

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Fear appeal as a strategic manoeuver in

plenary debates on initiative bills in the

Dutch Parliament

Lucy Helder

MA thesis

Discourse and Argumentation Studies

Humanities

University of Amsterdam

Student number: 10354603

Supervisor: dr. C. Andone

Second reader: dr. B. J. Garssen

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Chapter 1 Introduction

“When Mexico sends its people, they're not sending their best. They're not sending you. They're sending people that have lots of problems, and they're bringing those problems with us. They're bringing drugs. They're bringing crime. They're rapists. And some, I assume, are good people.”(http://time.com/3923128/donald-trump-announcement-speech/). This is a quote from the presidential announcement speech of Donald Trump, now one of the most influential populists of our time and the president of the United States of America. The appeal to the fear of the audience is a widely used rhetorical strategy among politicians to win the vote of the mass public. In the Netherlands the politician that is currently most known for the use of this strategy is Geert Wilders; the party leader of PVV, a one-issue party that focuses on the topic of immigration (and in particular the aversion to the Islam). “If we don’t stand up now against the Islamisation of the Netherlands, we will relive the 30’s of the previous century. Except back then it was Hitler, and now Mohammed” (http://www.volkskrant.nl/binnenland/wij-zullen-nooit-zwijgen~a848633/). This is an extreme example of the fear appeal, published in a column on the website of De Volkskrant, a daily Dutch newspaper. But it is not only in political speeches and columns in newspapers that the strategy of fear appeal is used.

This thesis describes the fear appeal in plenary debates on initiative bills in the Dutch Parliament. In order to be able to make an analysis of this argumentative move in the context of the type of argumentative discourse it appears in, I will make use of the pragma-dialectical argumentation theory that was originally developed by Van Eemeren and Grootendorst in 1984 and then extended by Van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2002) with the introduction of the concept of strategic manoeuvring. In this view, an argumentative move is deemed reasonable or fallacious based on ten rules of a critical discussion. If one of the rules is violated that means that it is not a reasonable contribution to the resolution of the difference of opinion. On the other hand, it may be effective in persuading a particular audience. Every argumentative move that is made in an argumentative discourse is a way of strategic manoeuvring between being reasonable and being effective in persuading the counterparty. This strategic manoeuvring is constrained by the institutional context that the difference of opinion takes place in. This study is conducted in order to gain insight in how and with what purpose politicians might use fear appeal in plenary debates on legislation in the Dutch Parliament, in the light of the conventions and institutional constraints that are imposed by this specific

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activity type. The pragma-dialectical analysis is the most useful tool to do that. The extended pragma-dialectical argumentation theory already proved its worth in researches to other argumentative patters, for example in gaining insight in argumentative patterns in the legal domain (‘A pragma-dialectical approach of the analysis and evaluation of pragmatic argumentation in a legal context’ by Feteris in 2002) and in the political domain (‘Getting an issue on the table: A pragma-dialectical study of presentational choices in confrontational strategic manoeuvring in Dutch parliamentary debate by Tonnard in 2011). The pragma-dialectical argumentation theory enables us to explain certain choices of argumentation by integrating rhetorical insights in a theory about solving a difference of opinion in a reasonable way, and placing the argumentative strategy in institutional context. In order to reach the main objective of this thesis, the following two research questions will be answered:

(a) Which constraints does the institutional context impose on the strategic manoeuvring in the communicative activity type of the plenary debate on initiative bills in the Dutch Parliament?

(b) How is the appeal to fear imposed by these constraints of the institutional context?

This thesis contains five chapters, of which the first is an introduction, and the fifth a conclusion. A number of steps are taken in the process of answering the two research questions. Chapter 2 is a characterization of the institutional context in which the argumentative move of ‘fear appeal’ appears. The first part of the characterization of the institutional context is a description of the political domain, in which the communicative activity type of the plenary debate on initiative bills in the Dutch Parliament is established. The second part is a description of the activity type itself, according to the four dimensions of strategic manoeuvring that Van Eemeren (2010) distinguishes: the initial situation, the procedural and material starting points, the argumentative means and the outcome of the argumentative discourse. This chapter forms the answer to the first research question.

Then, in chapter 3 I will describe how the use of fear appeal is imposed by the institutional constraints that are discussed in chapter 2. Chapter 3 starts with a definition of the appeal to fear, followed by an explanation of the use of fear appeal according to two dimensions of strategic manoeuvring: topical choice and the adaptation to the audience demand. This chapter answers the second research question. Chapter 4 is a case study that demonstrates the use of fear appeal in the initiative bill called the ‘Black Pete-law’ that was proposed by Wilders and Bosma, two members of the Dutch political party ‘PVV’.

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Chapter 2 Plenary debate on initiative bills in Dutch Parliament as an argumentative

activity type

2.1 Introduction

This chapter gives a characterization of the plenary debate on initiative bills in the Dutch Parliament as a conventionalized activity type – a communicative practice that can be both formally and informally constrained by the institutional context. In ‘Strategic manoeuvring in argumentative discourse’ (2010) Van Eemeren extends the pragma-dialectical argumentation theory, and explains how specific communicative activity types are conventionalized in (amongst others) the legal, political, medical and academic domain. These communicative practices are dependent on the institutional context. Within these institutional contexts, according to Van Eemeren, the communicative practices fulfil a certain role in realizing the institutional point of that specific practice (or communicative activity type). The choice of argumentative moves that an arguer can make, is restricted and conventionalized by the context-dependency of the argumentative practice. For example, in the political domain the arguer aims to reach the institutional point by making use of deliberation. The fact that this communicative activity type has a specific institutional point, and that there is only one way to realize that goal, imposes constraints on the strategic manoeuvring of the arguer.

So in order to understand the choice of certain arguments – and in particular pragmatic argumentation and the closely related appeal to fear – in plenary debates on initiative bills, it is important to first give a description of how the institutional context constrains the activity type. First, it will be explained in what domain the activity type at hand takes place, what its institutional point is, and what genre is implemented to reach that point. Then follows a description of the deliberative procedure divided over the four stages of a critical discussion: the confrontation stage, the opening stage, the argumentation stage and the concluding stage. 2.2 The political domain

The communicative activity type of a plenary debate about an initiative bill in the Dutch Parliament takes place in the political domain. This means that the activity type is conventionalized by the constraints that are entailed by the political domain. The formal procedure of these plenary debates creates institutional preconditions for the argumentation that is put forward in the debate. Most communicative activity types in the political domain

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have the same general institutional point, according to Van Eemeren (2010, pp. 140), which is to ‘preserve a democratic political culture’. In each domain, a specific genre is implemented in order to reach the institutional point. In case of the political domain, the genre of deliberation is implemented to reach the general point of preserving a democratic political culture. The use of deliberation to achieve the general institutional point thus naturally imposes constraints on the argumentation advanced in the debate, but besides the general institutional point, there is also a specific goal of a plenary debate about an initiative bill in the Dutch Parliament. The specific institutional point is to reach a decision about whether or not the bill should be adopted. The goal is (typically for activity types that are established in the political domain) reached by means of deliberation as well.

2.3 Four stages of the deliberative resolution process of a plenary debate on initiative bills in the Dutch Parliament

In order to give a characterization of the activity type, in the next four sections the deliberative procedure of a plenary debate on initiative bills in the Dutch Parliament will be discussed, distinguishing the four focal points: the initial situation, the starting points, the argumentative means and the outcome of argumentative discourse. These are the ‘empirical counterparts of the four stages of a critical discussion’ (Van Eemeren, 2010 pp. 159): the confrontation stage, the opening stage, the argumentative stage and the concluding stage. 2.3.1 Initial situation

In the confrontation stage of a critical discussion both parties take a position towards the proposition; the nature of the difference of opinion in determined. The initial situation in a plenary debate on an initiative bill in the Dutch Parliament is a single, mixed or non-mixed difference of opinion (Van Eemeren and Snoeck Henkemans, 2016). If one or more of the members of the House of Representatives or ‘Members of Parliament’ propose a bill, the rest of the House of Representatives has to vote to adopt, reject or adjust the initiative bill before it is submitted to the Senate. Before the House of Representatives votes on the adoption of the new law, the Members of Parliament that propose the bill have to defend it in a plenary debate. In this debate the defending MPs explain the initiative bill, and after that the other members of the House have the opportunity to ask questions. This is always the same procedure, which is described on the website of the Dutch Parliament (https://www.houseofrepresentatives.nl/). So the MPs that propose the bill are the protagonists of the standpoint – that the bill should be adopted – and the other MPs can agree with it,

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doubt it or advance an opposing standpoint. In practice it is unlikely to ever happen that all members from every political party immediately agree with adopting the bill. At the least there are MPs casting doubt on it by asking critical questions, and often there is one or more parties that argue against it. The nature of the standpoint is always prescriptive; it’s a policy statement. For example, on October 3rd_{of 2016 Carla Dik-Faber, a member of the political} part CU (Christen Unie) proposed a law called the ‘Law for recognition of Dutch sign language’. This is a policy statement; in the plenary debate Dik-Faber puts forward arguments in favour of the new policy of recognizing Dutch sign language in the future as an official language.

A plenary debate on an initiative bill is always a single difference of opinion (mixed or non-mixed), since there is only one bill discussed each time (Van Eemeren and Snoeck Henkemans, 2016). An example of a mixed difference of opinion is the plenary debate on a law proposed by MPs Rog and Bisschop that says that the government should not oblige schools to take a diagnostic test (House of Representatives, parliamentary year 2016–2017, 34 598, nr. 3). Beertema takes an opposing standpoint, and argues: ‘An obligated diagnostic test can be necessary to enhance the learning process’. An example of a non-mixed difference of opinion is between Kuzu, who defends the initiative bill about the determination of maximum prices of medicines (House of Representatives, parliamentary year 2012–2013, 33 703, nr. 3) and a member of the political party CU, who just expresses doubt by asking how Kuzu thinks the new law would save all the money he says it will save.

This paragraph made clear what the initial situation is in the difference of opinion between the MP that proposes the bill, and the other Members of the Dutch Parliament that have to vote in favour or against the initiative bill. But in argumentative discourses in the political domain, there is another (implicit) ‘difference of opinion’ that occurs between the MP that proposes the bill, and the audience that watches, reads or listens to the debate; the people that are the potential voters for the MP in question (Van Eemeren, 2010 pp. 154). This implicit difference of opinion is single and non-mixed, because this ‘second audience’ can only be assumed to doubt the MP’s arguments. This notion of second audience and how it is of importance for the characterization of this specific communicative activity type, will be further discussed in chapter 3 of this thesis.

2.3.2 Procedural and material starting points

In the opening stage of a critical discussion it is established which starting points are agreed upon. When the Members of the Dutch Parliament enter the debate, they are all assumed to

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act according to the shared procedural and material starting points1_{that are inherent in the} activity type. Some of them might be implicit, but some starting points are formalized. In the Dutch Parliament there is no ‘Code of Conduct’, like is the case for example in the European Parliament (http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdf/meps/201305_Code_of_conduct_EN.pdf), the British Parliament (https://www.parliament.uk/mps-lords-and-offices/standards-and-financial-interests/parliamentary-commissioner-for-standards/code-of-conduct-and-rules-of-thehouse/), the South African Parliament (https://www.parliament.gov.za/code-conduct) and the German Bundestag

(https://www.bundestag.de/blob/195006/a1232d4a394f7cdee1b9bccc2f374880/code_of_cond uct-data.pdf). However, there are regulations specified in the ‘Rules of Procedure of the Parliament’ (Dutch: ‘Reglement van Orde van de Tweede Kamer’). The procedural starting point is that all the MPs that participate in the debate follow those rules. On the basis of the Rules of Procedure, the President of the House leads the plenary debate. The President decides when an MP is allowed to take his turn to speak or to interrupt another speaker, and corrects an MP when his comment is off topic. Also, when a speaker makes an insulting statement the President of the House can deprive him from his turn to speak2_{. Although} captured on paper, these conventions do change through the years, as A.J. Nieuwenhuis (2010) observes. According to him nowadays freedom of speech is valuated more than it was fifty years ago. Insults are more often tolerated by the President of the House now. Not all conventions are defined in fixed rules; sometimes they stay implicit. Maybe it’s even possible to say that the shared goal to ‘preserve a democratic political culture’ is one of the starting points, since it is an underlying premise or rule of the discussion that the MPs tacitly agreed upon.

2.3.3 Argumentative means

In the argumentation stage argumentation is provided by the protagonist, and in a mixed difference of opinion the other party expresses doubt or disagreement. The MP who initiates the bill has the obligation to explain and defend it in the Explanatory Memorandum. In the writing process the MP gets advice from the Council of State, which for example checks the bill for any contradictions with the constitution. It’s not obligatory for the MP to follow the advice (https://www.raadvanstate.nl/the-council-of-state.html). After a Standing Committee 1 ‘The point of departure consists of mutually accepted procedural starting points regarding the division of the burden of proof and other aspects of the conduct of the discussion and also material starting points regarding the premises of the discussion, which can be viewed as “concessions” that may be built upon in the discussion.’ (Van Eemeren, 2010 pp. 44)

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of the House of Representatives has taken a look at the bill, a plenary debate takes place. The defender of the bill and opposing parties have a discussion about whether or not the bill should be adopted3_.

Some types of argument are more suitable than others in a particular activity type (Van Eemeren and Garssen, 2013), and this makes that the arguer defends his standpoint according to a specific argumentative pattern4_{. An argumentative pattern can be incidental, but it can} also be prototypical. This is the case when the appearance of the pattern is imposed by the institutional constraints of the activity type. The characterization of the argumentative patterns in plenary debates on legislation in the Dutch Parliament will be based on the knowledge of argumentative patterns in the European Parliament. The procedure is almost the same, but there is more literature available on plenary debates in the European Parliament. I will point out the relevant differences and explain the implications of these differences for the argumentative patterns that occur.

What is already known about the activity type of plenary debate in the European Parliament is that it is conventionalized in such a way that it imposes the prototypical argumentative pattern of pragmatic argumentation (Van Eemeren & Garssen, 2013, pp. 9). Pragmatic argumentation is a type of argumentation based on a causal relation (Van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992, pp. 97), in which the standpoint is defended by mentioning the positive results of the proposed action. In order to clarify: if the standpoint is ‘The European Parliament should adopt this initiative bill’, the pragmatic argument would be ‘The consequences of adopting this law are desirable’. The opposite is also possible; the standpoint can be defended with pragmatic argumentation by mentioning negative consequences in case the proposed action is not performed. These patterns were specifically found in plenary debates on legislation in the European Parliament, but pragmatic argumentation is a pattern that occurs in all kinds of policy debates, since they are all problem-solving debates (Garssen, 2016).

Pragmatic argumentation is based on a causal relation. As Van Eemeren explains in ‘Identifying argumentative patterns’ (2015) it can be classified as a subtype of causal argumentation because the critical questions that are relevant for the causal argumentation scheme are the same as those for pragmatic argumentation:

3 For more information about the procedure, see www.housofrepresentatives.nl

4 “An argumentative pattern consists of a particular constellation of argumentative moves in which in a particular kind of argumentation structure a particular combination of argument schemes is exploited in defense of a particular type of standpoint” (Van Eemeren and Garssen, 2013)

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(a) Do actions of type X lead to results of type Y?

(b) Is result Y really positive (i.e., desirable)/negative (i.e., undesirable)? (c) Does action X not have any major negative (i.e., undesirable)/positive (i.e., desirable) side-effects?

An example of the use of pragmatic argumentation can be found the Explanatory Memorandum of an initiative bill proposed by Members of Parliament Bergkamp, Yücel and Van Tongeren (House of Representatives, parliamentary year 2016–2017, 34 650, nr. 3). The bill is about ‘clarification of the legal status of transgender and intersex persons’ (Dutch: Wet verduidelijking rechtspositie transgender personen en intersekse personen). One of the main arguments put forward in favour of the bill proposal is the following: ‘A group that doesn’t want to conform is not officially recognized and protected, [and] has less chance to make itself visible or to emancipate. That can infringe personal and physical integrity of people, and could facilitate invisibility, discrimination and marginalization.’. In other words, a negative consequence of not adopting this law is that invisibility, discrimination and marginalization of transgender and intersex people could be infringed.

An inevitable consequence of the use of pragmatic argumentation in favour of the initiative bill, is that the argumentation against the proposal will also mostly be according to a pattern of pragmatic argumentation. The opposing party could argue against the bill by stating for example that the consequences mentioned by the defender are in fact not as positive as they seem, or that there are other, negative, side effects that outweigh the positive effects. Moreover, he could argue that the good consequences brought forward by his opponent would in reality never occur. These arguments, that are responses to, or refutations of the pragmatic arguments of the defender, are by definition pragmatic too.

2.3.4 Outcome of the argumentative discourse

The procedure of deciding whether the initiative bill will be adopted by the Parliament is always the same; once the debate is over and possible amendments have been implemented, the MPs raise their hand to vote for or against the bill. The President of the House counts the votes. This is different than the concluding stage of a deliberative critical discussion is described by Van Eemeren (2010, pp. 151 Figure 5.2), which is as follows: ‘Resolution difference of opinion for (part of) 3rd party audience (and/or deliberate return to initial situation)’. However, this is only clearly the case in for example public debates in election time. In plenary debates on initiative bills the Members of Parliament decide how the

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difference of opinion is resolved, but seen the rest of the characteristics (of the confrontation stage, the opening stage and the argumentative stage) it can still be categorized as a deliberative discussion.

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Chapter 3 The use of fear appeal in initiative bills in the Dutch Parliament as imposed

by the institutional context

In the previous chapter the initiative bill in the Dutch Parliament has been characterized as a conventionalized activity type, focussing on four points: the initial situation, the starting points, the argumentative means and the outcome of argumentative discourse. In this chapter I will discuss in what way fear appeals in this specific activity type are imposed by the institutional context. As will be explained, fear appeal is an argumentational strategic manoeuver that can occur in the communicative activity type of a defence of an initiative bill in the Dutch Parliament. This fallacious argumentative pattern will be approached according to two so-called dimensions of strategic manoeuvring. Van Eemeren (2010) actually distinguishes three dimensions, which are topical selection, adaptation to audience demand and presentational choices, but in this paper only the first two will be addressed.

In order to explain the choice to make use of an appeal to fear in the light of the target audience, the fear appeal first needs to be defined as an argument. There is not one exact definition of what a fear appeal is, or what elements it should contain. It is a complicated matter. I will formulate a working definition, based on Walton (2000) who focuses on the content of a fear appeal as a scare tactic, and Van Eemeren (2010) who focuses on the effect of argumentative moves on the resolution of the difference of opinion. I will try to make the characterization of the fear appeal more clear by distinguishing it from other types of arguments that are similar, and by giving examples of variants of the appeal to fear. What is particularly difficult about defining fear appeal is that fear is a difficult term – it can be perceived differently and it is impossible to prove that the intention of the arguer was to scare his audience.

3.2 Defining fear appeal

In 2010 Van Eemeren extended the basic pragma-dialectical argumentation theory by incorporating rhetorical insights into the dialectical framework. In an ideal critical discussion, all participants are viewed as aiming at resolving the difference of opinion in a reasonable way, by criticizing the arguments that are put forward. But this is not how discussions in practice work. Besides the dialectical aim of resolving the difference of opinion in a

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reasonable5_{way, discussants have another – rhetorical – aim of being effective. The MP that} proposes a bill wants the Parliament to vote in favour of it. Every argumentative move that is made in a discussion is a way of strategic manoeuvring6_{between these two conflicting aims.} The term strategic manoeuvring was introduced by Van Eemeren and Houtlosser in 1997 referring to “the efforts that are made in the discourse to move about between effectiveness and reasonableness in such a way that the balance – the equilibrium – between the two is maintained” (Van Eemeren, 2010 pp. 41). However, there is also a possibility that the strategic manoeuvring derails. That means that the arguer in question loses sight of reasonableness, and the effort to reach the aim of effectiveness gets the upper hand. This is the case when one of the ten discussion rules for a critical discussion is violated. The discussant then commits a fallacy. In this theoretical framework a fear appeal is a violation of the fourth discussion rule; the relevance rule. It says that ‘a party may defend a standpoint only by advancing argumentation relating to that standpoint’. The appeal to fear is known as a pathetic fallacy, because the arguer appeals to the emotion of his audience. It is not a relevant contribution to a reasonable resolution of the difference of opinion.

Walton views fear appeals as a ‘scare tactic widely used in the mass media by corporations, government agencies, public relations firms and politicians to influence public opinions and behaviour’ (Scare tactics, 2000). The latter is of special interest for this thesis. Like Walton remarks, it is typical for a fear appeal that it doesn’t consist of a threat (which would be inflicted by the speaker himself), but only a kind of warning about a bad, frightening consequence that will occur if a certain action will not be carried out. This distinguishes the appeal to fear from the fallacy called ad baculum (which would be a violation of the first discussion rule – the freedom rule – which says that parties must not prevent each other from advancing standpoints or from casting doubt on standpoints). In the case of fear appeals in legislative debate, the bad consequence will occur if the initiative bill would not be adopted and the law stayed the same as it already was.

In plenary debates on legislation there are two types of pragmatic arguments. One points out the resulting positive consequences that will occur in case MPs vote in favour of the initiative bill. The other type of pragmatic argumentation points out the resulting negative consequences that occur when the MPs do not vote in favour of (and therefore against) the

5 In this context the term reasonable is used as ‘in an appropriate way’ or ‘well considered’, not to be confused with rational which would mean ‘using reason’ (Van Eemeren, 2010 pp. 29)

6 In this case manoeuvring refers to ‘moving toward the best position in view of the argumentative circumstances’ (Van Eemeren, 2010 pp. 40)

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bill. Both are schematically displayed below (in which action A would be ‘voting in favour of the initiative bill’).

(+) 1 You should carry out action A

1.1 Carrying out action A leads to the consequence Y 1.1’ Consequence Y is desirable

(-) 1 You should carry out action A

1.1 Not carrying out action A leads to consequence Z 1.1’ Consequence Z is not desirable

One could imagine two other possibilities, namely ‘You should carry out action A, because carrying out action A does not lead to consequence Z; and consequence Z is not desirable’ and ‘You should carry out action A, because not carrying out action A does not lead to consequence Y; and consequence Y is desirable’. However, this will not be frequently used as arguments in favour of a bill. They are both more likely to be used as refutations of these pro-arguments.

The appeal to fear is a fallacious counterpart of the negative variant of the pragmatic argumentation. It has a similar structure, but the content of the ‘undesirable consequence’ indicated with ‘consequence Z’ is different. It’s not only a negative consequence, but actually a frightening one. So the argument scheme of an appeal to fear (as it’s a variant of the appeal to negative consequences) is the following:

1 You should carry out action A

1.1 Not carrying out leads to consequence Z 1.1’ Consequence Z is frightening

An example of a fear appeal that is used often in public health campaigns, is ‘smoking can cause a slow and painful death’ (Devlin, Anderson, Hastings and MacFayden, 2005). This is a clear case of a threat; if you don’t stop smoking, there is a chance you will suffer a slow, painful death. However, an appeal to fear is not always this clear. It could sometimes be difficult to differentiate fear appeal to the reasonable appeal to consequences, because the strength of the perceived fear is hard to measure. If, for example, if the statement in the previously mentioned public health campaign would not be ‘smoking can cause a slow and painful death’ but ‘smoking can cause lung cancer’ it would be harder to justify calling it an

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appeal to fear – even though lung cancer is something people might conceive as a plausible threat. This is a problem for the identification of the appeal to fear, that was already recognized by Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992): “As each case then has to be examined on its own merits, the identification and detection of fallacies becomes very much ad hoc and it becomes extremely difficult, if not impossible, to develop a general and workable method for distinguishing between fallacious and nonfallacious arguments”. Every case – that means every argumentative pattern – needs to be evaluated individually in order to determine if it is indeed a fear appeal.

In this thesis an argument is classified as an appeal to fear if the threat is meant to evoke the fear of the audience in a way that just the plain, undisputed facts or assumptions couldn’t accomplish. To clarify: in the example of fear appeal in public health care campaigns, ‘smoking can cause lung cancer’ would not be a fallacy, because smoking is a known cause of lung cancer. However, the argument ‘smoking can cause a slow and painful death’ is aimed at provoking an extra sensation of fear in the audience (on top of the ‘plain’ fact that smoking can cause lung cancer). That is the difference between a pragmatic argument and a fear appeal.

A fallacy that is closely related to the fear appeal is the fallacy of the slippery slope. From the perspective of the pragma-dialectic argumentation theory, the slippery slope is a violation of the seventh rule of a critical discussion (Van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1992); the argument scheme rule (‘A party may not regard a standpoint as conclusively defended if the defence does not take place by means of an appropriate argumentation scheme that is correctly applied’). Specifically, the slippery slope is an incorrectly applied causal argument. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992) describe it as ‘A common abuse of this [causal] argumentation scheme, in which the speculation on unsubstantiated negative consequences is carried to an extreme’. A publicly known example of the slippery slope is explained by Lamb (1988):

“Opponents of voluntary termination of pregnancy and euthanasia frequently employ versions of the slope argument in an appeal to what are seen as the predictable long-range consequences of the legislation of these practices. It has been argued that the legislation of voluntarily terminated pregnancy or euthanasia for humane reasons would open the door to a more callous disregard for human life. Opponents of legalized abortions and euthanasia have predicted that further inevitable steps would include the killing of mentally-retarded children, those whose maintenance is costly, the aged, senile, and those who are socially undesirable.”

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In case the arguer who puts forward the slippery slope believes that the ‘unsubstantiated negative consequences’ potentially provoke fear with the audience, the slippery slope is a variant of the appeal to fear.

3.3 Two aspects of strategic manoeuvring with fear appeal

Van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2002) distinguish three aspects of strategic manoeuvring. These are adaptation to the audience demand, choice from topical potential and choice of presentational device. In every argumentative move people make, included using appeal to fear, the choice of how to manoeuver strategically is based on these three aspects. The first aspect, adaptation to audience demand, refers to the effort of both parties in the discussion to seek a balance between being as reasonable and effective as possible in each stage of the discussion, by adapting the strategic manoeuvring to the audience whom they address. The second aspect, choice from topical potential, refers to the choice of arguments that the discussant puts forward. The third aspect of strategic manoeuvring is the choice of presentational device. It ‘pertains to the communicative means that are used in presenting the argumentative moves constituting a piece of strategic manoeuvring’ (Van Eemeren, 2010 pp. 118). This paper only focuses on fear appeal as a topical choice and as an adaptation to audience demand. It deals with which arguments politicians choose to put forward in the defence of their initiative bill, and how this choice is influenced by the audience it is directed at. In other words, this thesis focuses on the content of the fear appeal argument, rather than on the presentation of it.

3.3.1 Topical choice

The pragma-dialectical equivalent of Aristotle’s topoi7_{in the argumentation stage is the} argument schemes. So the choice from the topical potential means the choice of which argument scheme you apply in order to support your standpoint. The appeal to fear is a reference to (bad, or scary) consequences – just like its non-fallacious counterpart, which is the pragmatic argument. As has been discussed in the second chapter of this thesis pragmatic argumentation commonly appears in the argumentative pattern typical for plenary debates on legislation in the Dutch Parliament. It is therefore not surprising that fear appeal is a strategy of arguing in this pattern – although fallacious.

7 The concept of topos was originally introduced by Aristotle in his Topica. It refers to a ‘place’ where arguments can be found. It can have a normative function, in which it is a tool to determine if the argument is logically valid, or it can have a heuristic function, namely when you use it to search for arguments that could possibly support your standpoint.

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Over the last decade fear appeals have received a lot of attention, especially by scholars interested in argumentation in the medical field. Witte for example, explains ‘scare tactics’ in health communication. She did empirical research to the effectiveness of fear appeals in public health campaigns. In her ‘Meta-Analysis of Fear Appeals’ (2000, pp. 592) she explains that there are two dimensions of perceived threat, which are the perceived susceptibility to the threat and the perceived severity of the threat. Besides that, there are also two dimensions of the perceived ‘efficacy’: perceived self-efficacy and perceived response efficacy. In other words, the two dimensions determine to what degree one thinks he is able to perform the action that is needed to prevent the ‘scary situation’, and to what degree one thinks the action will actually protect him from the scary situation.

According to the EPPM (Elaborated Parallel Process Model) that Witte developed, these three dimensions (two dimensions of perceived threat and two of perceived efficacy) determine how the ‘perceiver’ responds to the threat. There are three possible outcomes. The perceiver either tries to control the danger, he tries to control the fear or he doesn’t respond at all. The latter happens when the threat was perceived as not severe enough, or not susceptible enough. When the perceived severity and susceptibility are both high, it depends on the self-efficacy and the perceived response-self-efficacy how he handles his fear. If these two are both high, people will try to control the danger (by performing the proposed action) and if one of them is too low, people will try to control the fear (for example by denying it). So all in all, fear appeal can be an effective persuasive means, but only under the conditions that the audience believes that the threat is severe and susceptible, that they are able to perform the action that is required to prevent the frightening situation and that the action will actually protect them from the threatening situation. So in order to be effective in persuading the audience to undertake the required action, it is only recommendable to appeal to the fear of the audience if it is plausible that they will perceive the threat as severe and susceptible, and that they will perceive the self-efficacy and response-efficacy as high. If any of these conditions is not met, the appeal to fear is not an effective strategic manoeuver.

3.3.2 Adaptation to audience demand

In order to be as effective as possible the arguer – which in this case is the Member of Parliament that proposes a new bill – adapts the arguments to the audience he tries to persuade. A prototypical argumentative pattern in the defence of an policy statement is that of pragmatic argumentation; referring to the consequences of the action that needs to be undertaken. In order to be effective in convincing the other MPs to vote in favour of the

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initiative bill, the defender would be likely to try to choose his pragmatic arguments in such a way that they appeal to the other party.

What makes the analysis of strategic manoeuvring in plenary debates about initiative bills in the Dutch Parliament complicated, is that apart from the directly addressed audience (the Members of Parliament that have to vote on the initiative bill) there is another, indirect audience involved. So far in this thesis, the theory about the conventionalization of the communicative activity type of the plenary debate on new legislation was based on the assumption that a plenary debate is an explicit, single difference of opinion between two or more parties: the defender of the bill and the Members of Parliament who are either against the bill, or expressing doubt about the desirability of it. However, there is another difference of opinion to take into account: the implicit, non-mixed difference of opinion between the defender of the bill and a ‘secondary audience’, as described by Van Eemeren (2010, pp. 154). By secondary audience he means the audience that watches, reads or listens to the debate, but doesn’t actually participate. In political discourses, there is always a secondary audience involved. Van Eemeren even claims that this is usually a politician’s primary audience, which means that his strategic manoeuvring is principally determined by the aim to reach this particular audience – rather than the audience he is explicitly debating with.

Important to take into account is that the Members of the Dutch Parliament are directly elected by the people who watch, read and listen to the political debates; the second audience. So according to Van Eemeren (2010) these are the people that form the MP’s primarily addressed audience. This is not the case for the Members of the European Commission, for example, who are nominated by the Council of the European Union and approved by the European Parliament (the commission as a whole – not everyone individually). This means that they don’t have a second audience of potential voters – or at least not one that is equally ‘present’ and even important to take into account. Besides that, even if the Members of the European Parliament are actually the only participants of the plenary debate like Van Eemeren and Garssen suggest (2012, pp. 235), they immediately say the following about it: “the Members of Parliament can be considered each other’s primary audience, since they address in the first place each other and because the European Parliament is operating rather in isolation and its debates are not well-reported there is generally not a lot of involvement to be expected of any other (wider) audience.”

With this aim of reaching the second audience (the people who have the power to elect the politicians) in mind, it’s not inconceivable that the choice of fear appeal in the defence of an initiative bill could be an adaption to the people outside the House of

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Representatives. Although one would initially always assume that an initiative bill is genuinely aimed at changing the laws, sometimes politicians are accused of practicing gesture politics. For example, in 2010 a law was proposed to oblige Dutch elementary schools to accept all applications of new pupils. In the ‘opinion’ column of De Volkskrant (http://www.volkskrant.nl/opinie/acceptatieplicht-is-symboolpolitiek~a2449816/) the initiators of the bill were criticized for having a hidden agenda. The initiative bill would only be presented as an act of symbolic legislation (Wouter van den Berg and Jose van Egmond, DeVolkskrant.nl). And this is not only a theme of the last few years, or just a topic addressed by journalists in the Dutch newspapers. Kees Waaldijk, who wrote the Legislative Guide in 1985 already expressed his concerns about symbolic and ideological purposes that politicians have for proposing initiating bills. He wrote an article called “Can we require legislatures to sate the reasons for their legislative decisions?” (1987) in order to investigate whether or not it would be possible to detect statutes proposed with the wrong ‘legislative intentions’.

A possible intention that an MP – in the name of his political party – could have with using fear appeal is to evoke the feeling of fear by making the audience believe that there is a threat that is both severe and susceptible, while at the same time showing that the party has the ability to actually do something to prevent the frightening situation. After all they have the power to adapt or change the law. By actively proposing a new bill the MP tries to convince the audience that the response-efficacy is high. The audience knows that the more seats the party has in the parliament, the more influence it will have. The only thing the frightened audience has to do is vote for this party, which he is very well capable of. That means the self-efficacy, the last condition for the audience to try to control the danger, is high as well.

The research question that was aimed to be answered in this chapter was ‘How is the appeal to fear imposed by the constraints of the institutional context?’. In the previous chapter it has been explained how the argumentative pattern of pragmatic argumentation is opposed by the deliberative procedure according to which initiative bills are debated in the Dutch Parliament. The fear appeal is a fallacious counter part of the pragmatic argument. The reason for putting forward a fallacy is the rhetorical aim to be effective in persuading the audience. In a plenary debate on an initiative bill in the Dutch Parliament the audience that could be expected to be persuaded by a fear appeal is the indirect audience; the potential voter for the parliamentary elections. Therefore it is supposable that the addressed audience in case of a fear appeal is not the MPs that participate in the debate, but the indirect audience. The next chapter is a case study of an initiative bill proposed in 2014 in the Netherlands. It will demonstrate what the communicative activity type discussed in the last two chapters looks

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like in practice, and how the specific fear appeal used in the Explanatory Memorandum of the bill is opposed by the institutional context.

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Chapter 4 A case study: the use of fear appeal in the Explanatory Memorandum of the

‘Black Pete law’

The previous two chapters have described how the argumentative pattern of pragmatic argumentation and the use of appeal to fear in plenary debates on initiative bills in the Dutch Parliament are imposed by the communicative activity type and the political domain that it is established in. It is shown how the deliberative procedure of the defence of an initiative bill and the second audience that is involved in activity types within the political domain can impose the use of fear appeal. In this chapter I will analyse one case in which a fear appeal is indeed put forward in the Explanatory Memorandum of an initiative bill in the Dutch Parliament, as a way of demonstrating the theoretical findings in practice.

First I will give a short introduction of the initiative bill that is studied in this chapter, and provide the background information that is relevant for the analysis of the case. The argumentation that was advanced by Bosma and Wilders in the Explanatory Memorandum in the defence of the initiative bill is schematically displayed in an argumentation scheme. Based on this argumentation scheme, the argumentation (and especially the appeal to fear) will be analysed. In order to show how the fear appeal is opposed by the constraints of the institutional context, I will apply the theoretical insights gained from the previous two chapters with the practical findings of this case study.

This chapter is a case study of an initiative bill in the Dutch Parliament by the Members of Parliament Bosma and Wilders to protect the cultural tradition of the ‘Sinterklaas festivity’, or Black Pete law (Voorstel van wet van de leden Bosma en Wilders ter bescherming van de culturele traditie van het sinterklaasfeest, of Zwarte Piet-wet). It was proposed on the 13th of November, 20148_{by Bosma and Wilders, two members of the Party} of the Freedom (Dutch acronym: PVV). The PVV is a one-issue party that focuses on the topic of integration. Black Pete has been a much debated topic over the past few years in the Netherlands. It is part of the holiday Sinterklaas, which is the Dutch equivalent of Santaclaus. Black Pete, who is a black-skinned man with golden earrings, curly black hair and red lips, plays the role of Sinterklaas’ ‘assistant’. It has become a very controversial character. A lot of people (especially with a Surinam background) feel offended because of the strong 8 www.tweedekamer.nl > kamerstukken > wetsvoorstellen > wetsvoorstel 34078

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association with slavery, and every year there are demonstrations against it. Bosma and Wilders proposed the Black Pete law ‘in order to protect the cultural tradition of the Sinterklaas holiday’.

This bill describes in detail which physical characteristics Black Pete should have in Sinterklaas celebrations that are organized or somehow supported by a governing body. It was not adopted by the House of Representatives. In fact, some of the other political parties reacted by making jokes about the proposal (the SP, the Socialist Party, asked why there was no input at all from Sinterklaas himself), or simply rejected it saying that ‘it’s about tradition, and traditions cannot be enshrined in law’ (VVD, People's Party for Freedom and Democracy). One of the main arguments for adopting the bill that they put forward was that changing the character of Black Pete would damage the Dutch culture and identity. The MP’s who were supposed to vote for or against the initiative bill didn’t take it very seriously. Nevertheless, the PVV gained a lot of attention from the media with the proposal. The national broadcasting organization NOS and national newspapers like NRC, De Volkskrant, De Telegraaf all reported about it. And besides that a lot of opinion articles were published on websites, in magazines and on social media.

The argument in favour of the proposed bill about the Dutch culture and identity being damaged is an example of fear appeal as described in the previous chapters of this thesis. It will be discussed in detail in this case study using a pragma-dialectical analysis of the Explanatory Memorandum of the initiative bill, in which the initiators of the bill explain to the House of Representatives why it is important that the bill is adopted. To give a clear overview of the arguments that are put forward to defend the bill, they will be displayed in an argument structure of the most important arguments, and a more detailed and complete argument structure of the appeal to fear.

4.2 The Explanatory Memorandum of the Black Pete law as a communicative activity The Explanatory Memorandum of the initiative bill proposed by Wilders and Bosma is, like all parts of plenary debates on initiative bills, conventionalized by the political domain in which it is established (Van Eemeren, 2010 pp. 130). The general institutional point is to preserve a democratic political culture, and at the same time the specific institutional point is to reach a decision about whether or not the bill should be adopted. The aim of the Explanatory Memorandum is in other words to convince the MPs that have to vote on the bill that they should vote in favour of it – while also making sure that the democratic political culture is preserved. The way to reach that aim is through the deliberative resolution process.

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Like in the previous two chapters, the four focal points of the process will be discussed separately: the initial situation, the procedural and material starting points, the argumentative means and the possible outcome of the argumentative discourse.

4.2.1 Initial situation

The Explanatory Memorandum starts with an introduction of the bill:

This proposal of this bill aims to preserve Black Pete for the Netherlands. The wonderful Sinterklaas tradition, in which Black Pete plays a prominent and indispensable role, is threatened to be affected. The Dutch Sinterklaas tradition is part of the national identity and an attack on Black Pete is much more than a subtle adaptation of a tradition; it’s an attack on the Dutch identity.

The arguments put forward after the introduction are represented in the following argumentation structure:

(1 The MPs should vote in favour of the Black Pete law) (1.1 Black Pete should be preserved)

(1.1’ If you vote for the initiative bill, then Black Pete will be preserved) 1.1.1a Black Pete is originally not meant to be racist

1.1.1a.1 Black Pete in its current form originates in 1850 by writer and illustrator Jan Schenkman

1.1.1a.1’ Jan Schenkman combined several versions of Black Pete that existed before 1850

(1.1.1a.1’.1 If you just combine several versions of a character that already existed, and not made it up by yourself, it’s not racist)

1.1.1b If you change Black Pete, you damage the Dutch culture // When you change Black Pete in favour of a very limited group of people, the Dutch identity is put aside

1.1.1c It’s desirable to have this tradition captured in the law, even though that’s not usual

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1.1.1c.2 89% of the respondents of a survey thought Black Pete should not change 1.1.1d The bill is an effective way to preserve Black Pete

1.1.1d.1 The social impact of the minority that wants Black Pete to change can be reduced (or even nullified)

1.1.1e The opponents of Black Pete have no arguments

1.1.1f It’s hurtful that this wonderful tradition is renounced as racist.

1.1.1g Changing Black Pete could bring along a risk that children won’t believe in Sinterklaas and Black Pete any more

The standpoint that the arguments are aimed to defend is The MPs should vote in favour of the Black Pete law. This stays implicit in the Explanatory Memorandum, but is made explicit in the argumentation structure. Since there is only one issue (or proposition) that is debated, this is a single difference of opinion. It is mixed, because the other party (the Members of Parliament) not only cast doubt on the desirability of the bill, but also put forward counter arguments (‘it’s about tradition, and traditions cannot be enshrined in law’ – VVD, People's Party for Freedom and Democracy). This paper only focuses on the pro-arguments put forward by the protagonist in the Explanatory Memorandum.

Besides this single, mixed difference of opinion between the proposers of the bill and the MPs that have to vote on it, there is another – implicit – difference of opinion. Namely between the proposers of the bill (Bosma and Wilders) and the ‘public’ or the ‘second audience’ (Van Eemeren, 2010 pp. 154). This is also a single difference of opinion, but it is non-mixed. The second audience does not actively participate in the debate, and the proposers can only anticipate on possible doubt about the initiative bill.

4.2.2 Procedural and material starting points

According to one of the members of D66 Bosma and Wilders don’t act according to the conventions with this bill proposal: ‘For D66 this PVV-proposal is not how we in The Netherlands deal with traditions, it is not how we deal with public discussions and is it not how we want to deal with each other’ (Tweede Kamer, Zwarte Pietwet, 54-6-7). In other

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words, his main argument against the bill is that it is not according to the starting points that Members of the Dutch Parliament agreed on.

4.2.3 Argumentative means

In the general argumentation structure, the main arguments in favour of the Black Pete law are displayed. The standpoint (1) is The MPs should vote in favour of the Black Pete law. The first level of argumentation (1.1) is Black Pete should be preserved. The bridging argument (1.1’) is If you vote for the initiative bill, then Black Pete will be preserved. These three propositions stay implicit in the Explanatory Memorandum – indicated with the brackets. The rest of the main arguments are subordinate to number 1.1, all on the same level and all coordinative. Some arguments are further supported with subordinate argumentation in the argumentation structure.

The first level of argumentation is pragmatic. The preservation of Black Pete is a positive consequence of the action of voting in favour of the bill. There is a causal relation between the standpoint and the argument, which is made explicit in the argumentation structure as a bridging argument. The first-level pragmatic argument 1.1 is supported by arguments of different natures. Numbers 1.1.1b and 1.1.1g are both pragmatic arguments that refer to a negative consequence in case the MPs vote against the bill: the Dutch culture will be damaged, and children won’t believe in Sinterklaas and Black Pete any more. Argument 1.1.1d.1 is an example of a pragmatic argument that refers to a positive consequence in case the MPs do vote in favour of the bill: the social impact of the minority that wants Black Pete to change can be reduced (or nullified). The rest of the arguments are not pragmatic.

4.2.4 Outcome of argumentative discourse

On February 21st_{2017 the House of Parliament voted on the Black Pete}9_{. All MPs voted} against – except the ones that are member of PVV, which is the party that proposed the bill. 4.3 Appeal to fear in the Explanatory Memorandum of the Black Pete law

Argument 1.1.1b of the general argumentation structure can be defined as an appeal to fear on the basis of the characterization given in the previous chapters of this thesis. It is further elaborated in a separate argumentation structure:

9 The results of the voting can be found on the website of the House of Parliament: https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/detail?id=2014Z20543&did=2014D41591

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1.1.1b If you change Black Pete, you damage the Dutch culture // When you change Black Pete in favour of a very limited group of people, the Dutch identity is put aside

1.1.1b.1’ Attempting to dismantle a unique national feast that creates so much connection and joy is a very bad thing to do

1.1.1b.1a The celebration of the Sinterklaas festivity is a special cultural expression 1.1.1b.1b Especially in a changing world it is important that there are symbols and habits

from which the Dutch can derive their identity and that collect to solidarity 1.1.1b.1c Sinterklaas might be the most Dutch feast there is

1.1.1b.1c.1 Celebrating Sinterklaas is a strong expression of the Dutch nationality, the connection with The Netherlands and the Dutch cultural traditions

There are two propositions: (1) ‘If you change Black Pete, you damage the Dutch culture’ and (2) ‘When you change Black Pete in favour of a very limited group of people, the Dutch identity is put aside’. In the structure they are counted as one argument, because the second is just a specification of the first, and the arguments given could refer to either of the propositions.

The damaging or putting aside of the Dutch culture is put forward as a threat for the audience, that can be avoided by voting for the initiative bill that preserves Black Pete as he is now. Bosma and Wilders appeal to the emotion of fear that is evoked by the perceived risk of losing the Dutch identity and culture. To revert to chapter 3.2 of this thesis (defining fear appeal) – the line between reasonable pragmatic argumentation and a fallacious appeal to fear is not always easy to draw. Every case needs to be evaluated individually. In this particular argument (‘If you change Black Pete, you damage the Dutch culture’ / ‘When you change Black Pete in favour of a very limited group of people, the Dutch identity is put aside’) the negative consequence of not voting for the initiative bill is that it will eventually lead to damaging or putting aside the Dutch culture. So the question now is if this is a plain, undisputed fact. It doesn’t seem like a direct consequence of the act of changing the colour of the character Black Pete. In fact, this argument shows resemblance with the slippery slope argument, which was also discussed in chapter 3.2 of this thesis. What Bosma and Wilders

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want their audience to believe is that if this small change is made to the character of Black Pete, there will be made other changes to other aspects of the Dutch culture as well, which eventually lead to the damaging and putting aside of the culture. However, it is not a given fact that this change will eventually damage the whole culture and identity of the Dutch people. There is a large gap (a slippery slope) between the change of colour of Black Pete and damaging the culture.

For this argument to be an actual fear appeal, of course the negative consequence should be potentially perceived as frightening to the addressed audience. The PVV is known for being a one-issue party, focused on immigration. The slogan of PVV is ‘The Netherlands ours again’ and their policy is described in the election program as ‘instead of financing the whole world and the people we don’t want here, we spend the money on the ordinary Dutchman’. In the Dutch media Wilders (the party leader of PVV) is often described as a populist – for example in the daily newspaper NRC (https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2017/03/18/is-het-populisme-van-wilders-gestopt-of-slechts-verplaatst-7431864-a1550928). Since with this populism the party has won twenty seats in the Parliament, there are quite a lot of people who are afraid to lose the Dutch identity and culture. But it is doubtful that the other political parties in the Parliament will be convinced by this appeal to fear. Most parties have an at least more moderate view on immigrants and the Dutch culture. VVD for example indicated in the party program that the safety of refugees is an important issue for them10_{, and that is one of} the right-wing parties in the Netherlands.

An explanation for the fear appeal used in the defence of the initiative bill could therefore be that the strategic manoeuvring is not (only) adapted to the direct audience that is formed by the MPs that participate in the plenary debate, but to the so-called secondary audience; the audience that watches, reads or listens to the debate but doesn’t actually participate (see chapter 3 of this thesis). A proposal for a bill is not only fuel for a public debate on the topic of Black Pete, but also demonstrates to the public that Wilders and Bosma take action to provide a solution for the threatening situation.

From the aspect of topical choice, the fear appeal is a move that could be expected in this communicative activity type. Pragmatic argumentation is prototypical for plenary debates on initiative bills (see chapter 2 of this thesis), and fear appeal is a fallacious form of pragmatic argument. The strategic manoeuvring is derailed; the reasonableness is reduced at the expense of the effectivity. The Elaborated Parallel Process Model (Witte, 2000 pp. 592) can be applied to the argument ‘if you change Black Pete, you damage the Dutch culture’ in 10 For the party program of VVD see the website: https://www.vvd.nl/pijlers/immigratie/

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order to predict the effectiveness of the fear appeal. The first two variables are severity and susceptibility. The Sinterklaas feast is a very popular celebration in the Netherlands. The discussion on the internet is fierce, and various public figures have participated in the past years. That indicates that there is quite a large group of people that sees the change in the character of Black Pete as a severe and susceptible threat of the Dutch culture.

The other two variables are self-efficacy and response-efficacy. The ‘solution’ for the threatening situation is to vote for PVV in the next elections. This is a very easy thing to do, so the self-efficacy is high. The response-efficacy, or in other words to what degree the audience thinks the action of voting will actually protect him from the threatening situation. This might be high, because Bosma and Wilders show the audience that they are able and willing to take action – after all they took the effort of submit an initiative bill and defend it before the entire Parliament. If the perceived self-efficacy and response-efficacy are indeed high, as well as the perceived severity and susceptibility of the threat, then the ‘secondary’ indirect audience would respond with danger-control (by voting for PVV) and not with fear-control.

The Members of Parliament (the direct audience) however, don’t seem to be convinced that the threat is indeed severe or susceptible. Many MPs did not respond in a serious manner in the plenary debate (see chapter 3 of this thesis). In theory it’s possible that they did perceive the threat as both severe and susceptible and that they responded with fear control, but seen the fact that the MPs themselves have the ability to change the law, that is not likely to be the case. So this is a reason to believe that the primary audience of Wilders and Bosma in case of the Explanatory Memorandum of the Black Pete law is not the Members of the Dutch Parliament, but the indirect audience; the potential voters in the Dutch Parliamentary elections. After all, the aim of the argumentation provided in the Explanatory Memorandum is for it to be effective in convincing the audience, which is not likely to be the case for the MPs, but it actually is for the indirect audience. So this raises the question if this initiative bill by Wilders and Bosma could be an example of the gesture politics Waaldijk expressed his concerns about.

From this case study appears that the fear appeal in the plenary debate on the Black Pete law is not particularly effective for the direct audience of MPs that participate in the debate, but that it could actually be effective in convincing the potential voters for the parliamentary elections. So presumably without the ‘presence’ of the secondary audience the fear appeal would not be effective at all, and the use of a fallacious fear appeal in the defence of the initiative bill could not be explained from the pragma-dialectical perspective. After all,

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in that view the arguer has the rhetorical aim of being as effective as possible in convincing his audience.

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Chapter 5 Conclusion

5.1 Main findings

The aim of this thesis was to gain insight in how and with what purpose politicians might use fear appeal in plenary debates on legislation in the Dutch Parliament. Therefore I have posed two research questions:

(a) Which constraints does the institutional context impose on the strategic manoeuvring in the communicative activity type of the plenary debate on initiative bills in the Dutch Parliament?

(b) How is the appeal to fear imposed by these constraints of the institutional context?

In the attempt to answer the first question, I made a characterization of the political domain in which the activity type of the plenary debate on initiative bills in the Dutch Parliament is established. The political domain determines for an important part the institutional context that imposes constraints on the strategic manoeuvring, as it always entails the implementation of the genre of deliberation to reach the institutional point of the activity type (in this case, to reach a resolution of the difference of opinion about whether or not the initiative bill should be adopted). After the characterization of the domain, I have made a characterization of the communicative activity type itself, on the basis of the four stages of the deliberative resolution process of a plenary debate on initiative bills in the Dutch Parliament – the initial situation, the procedural and material starting points, the argumentative means and the outcome of the argumentative discourse. The specific procedure of the plenary debate on legislation imposes constraints on the strategic manoeuvring as well. As has been shown in chapter 2.3.3 the argumentative pattern of pragmatic argumentation is prototypical in the defence of an initiative bill in the Dutch Parliament.

The second research question was answered by using the insights from the first chapter about the constraints imposed by the institutional context. I described how an MP can manoeuver strategically within the boundaries of these constraints, by appealing to the fear of his audience. In order to be able to describe the fear appeal as a strategic manoeuver, a working definition was required. This thesis is based on the pragma-dialectical argumentation

Fear appeal as a strategic manoeuver in plenary debates on initiative bills in the Dutch Parliament