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Jonathan van den Hurk
Studentnumber: 10476660
University of Amsterdam
International Relations
Masterproject: Geopolitics, Borders and Conflict
Supervisor: Dr. Polly Pallister-Wilkins
Second Reader: Dr. Said Rezaeiejan
Master Thesis
24-6-2016
Words: 12554
Title:
The Putin Era: Building a Strategic
Culture For Ukraine?
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Contents:
- 1. Introduction
- 2. Relevance
- 3. Theoretical Framework
- 3.1 What is Strategic Culture?
- 3.2 Russia’s Strategic Culture
- 3.3 Despotism and Imperialism
- 3.4 Russia’s New Identity
- 4 Methodology and Data
- 4.1 Symbol Analysis
- 4.2 Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly
- 5. Analysis
- 5.1 Content Analysis
- 5.2 Discourse Analysis
- 6. Conclusion
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“We are renewing our country and our society.”
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1. Introduction:
The Russian history is characterized by the creation of empires. Empires are the creation of an enormous ‘Reich’ through expansionist policies. To contain political autonomy in an empire, Russian history shows that strong leadership is essential for an empire to survive. The Russian Empire was characterized by the reign of Tsar Peter the Great and the execution of Tsar Nicholas II and his family by the Bolsjewiek revolutionists in 1918. This created the next empire, the Soviet Union. This communist federation which was established by Lenin, consolidated by Stalin, and destroyed by Gorbatsjev in the early 90’s, was not only characterized by its communist ideology, but also by its expansionist policies. The direct post-cold war era seems to have been characterized by a state of ‘empire fatigue’. A period where Russia is not brought in association with any expansionist policies because the breakup of the Soviet Union had severely weakened its successor state, Russia. But for how long? Under Putin’s presidency expansionist policies and the strive for a ‘Greater Russia’ seem to be high on the agenda again. The conflicts in the Caucasus, the annexation of Crimea, and the ongoing struggle in eastern Ukraine and Moldova show a willingness of Russia to restore the geopolitical ambition to be a Great Power or even, an empire.
More interesting is how these three Russian ‘empires’ justified their expansionist policies. In Tsarist times the most relevant justification for expansionist policies was Orthodox Christianity. This is the same justification as missionary missions in colonial times by the western colonizers. In the Soviet Union the justification for expansionism can be found in the basic assumptions of communism. Communism predicts a socialist revolution all over the world, giving the power back to the working class. So, communism is inherently imperialist. Russia in the post-cold war era is in desperate need of a new identity where it can build its foreign affairs on. This new identity is taking form under the leadership of Putin. This new identity creates a new Grand Strategy, and a new Strategic Culture to accomplish this. Due to the Russian annexation of Crimea and the conflict in East-Ukraine, a tangible expansionist policy can be identified. But, how is this policy in this time period justified? What strategic considerations are at the basis of this conflict? In this research the focus will be on Putin and Medvedev as individual and powerful actors regarding the Ukrainian conflict. From which follows: How did the Russian presidents, Putin and Medvedev, build a ‘Strategic Culture’ for Ukraine, and how is this formulated in their presidential addresses to the Federal Assembly?
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2. Relevance: Why this research question?
The direct motive for this research question is the Russian annexation of Crimea and the following ongoing struggle for independence and territory in East-Ukraine. After reading more about this topic it became very clear that Russia under Putin is desperately creating, or wanting to create, international organizations within its former sphere of influence wherein Russia could act as a hegemon. Through this way Russia tries to restore its grandeur and ‘feelings of greatness’. These feelings of greatness are created through strategic culture and can be perceived as a direct threat to countries bordering Russia. In Ukraine the point where it was only perceived as a threat has passed since Russia’s involvement in destabilizing the country after the colored revolution in 2014.
In a huge country as Russia, with a rich history of expansionism, a close look at its strategic plans is of great importance for its direct neighbors. After nearly a decade of ‘empire fatigue’, Russia’s willingness to restore the grandeur it once had is more alive than ever since Putin is in charge. In other words, in very recent history a former world power built a new Grand Strategy and strategic culture to accomplish their ‘new’ strategic goals.
Many researchers have analyzed this creation of a new strategy by the Russian political elite through analyzing strategic policy documents (Eitelhuber, 2009, Wilhelmsen, 2005). In this research I will not focus on these documents but on Putin’s presidential speeches. To look at presidential speeches, regarding the Ukrainian conflict, is a new way of seeing how a strategic culture is built. In my opinion, a successful strategy is a publicly known strategy. The effect of a strategy is dependent on who the audience is, and especially how big the audience is. Strategic policy documents are mostly way too long, and written in an unreadable fashion what limits its audience to scholars and government officials. Presidential speeches on the other hand have a huge platform from where it can spread its strategic objectives domestically and internationally. In this way the strategic culture formulated in presidential speeches is more interesting to analyze than strategic policy documents.
This research will be done in the following way. First I will explain in the theoretical chapter what strategic culture is, focusing on the academic work of Alastair Johnston. After this, I’ll summarize what the academic world thinks Russia’s strategic culture is. In the next paragraphs I go into the realist-constructivist foundation of the concept strategic culture, and the link between despotism and imperialism. Finishing the theoretical chapter with Russia’s new ideology, as researched by Marcel van Herpen.
After the theoretical chapter I will give insight in the method of symbol analysis, and how I will execute the analysis. I will also give more insight in the data used, the presidential addresses to the federal assembly.
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The analysis will be a combination of content and discourse analysis, within the scope of symbol analysis. The content analysis is a count of all the strategic and symbolic references made in the presidential addresses to the federal assembly between 2000 and 2015. The discourse analysis will focus on the themes which are most related to the strategic and symbolic references. These themes are: culture, compatriots abroad, critique on U.S. and NATO, Armed Forces, Crimea, the educational system, the demographic problem, and some additional findings. After this I will formulate my conclusion and limitations for this research.
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3. Theoretical Framework:
3.1 What is Strategic Culture?
Firstly, its necessary to understand what a strategic culture is. How the political power of the outside world is regarded and addressed is a fundamental question to this concept. There is no common definition of strategic culture. According to Snyder strategic culture is “a set of semi-permanent elite beliefs, attitudes, and behavior patterns” (Snyder, 1977: 8). Later, Duffield noted that a state’s strategic culture defines the basic foreign policy goals and objectives that are to be pursued (reflecting state interests and identity) and shapes elite and public perceptions of the international environment (Duffield, 1999: 23). According to Eitelhuber, today, most political scientists define strategic cultures as the “property of collectivities rather than simply of the individuals that constitute them” (Eitelhuber, 2009: 4). The most extensive work on strategic culture has been done by Johnston in his 1995 article Thinking about Strategic Culture. This is why I will use the definition of strategic culture, and the additional thoughts on the matter, by Johnston for this research.
Characterizations of the superpowers’ strategic predispositions have been examined under the analytic category of ‘strategic culture’. As the concept implies, there seems to be a relationship between strategy and culture. In short, a certain culture influences the strategy of a state, and a certain strategy influences a culture of a state. There are at the same time top-down and bottom-up mechanisms at play in building/creating a strategic culture.
A more extensive argumentation on what strategic culture is, starts with the term ‘culture’. According to Johnston, “most of those who use the term ‘culture’ tend to argue, explicitly or implicitly, that different states have predominant strategic preferences that are rooted in the early or formative experiences of the state, and are influenced to some degree by the philosophical, political, cultural, and cognitive characteristics of the state and its elites. Ahistorical or “objective” variables such as technology, polarity, or relative material capabilities are all od secondary importance. It is strategic culture, they argue, that gives meaning to these variables. The weight of historical experiences and historically-rooted strategic preferences tends to constrain response to changes in the “objective” strategic environment, thus affecting strategic choices in unique ways. If strategic culture itself changes, it does so slowly, lagging behind changes in “objective” conditions” (Johnston, 1995: 34). Most important is that strategic culture a product is of historical experience. This also explains why different states have different strategic objectives, they all have had different historical experiences.
Strategic culture also contains the premise that there is a vast difference between what leaders think or say they are doing and the deeper motives for what in fact they do. In this way, strategic culture is seen as a tool of political hegemony in the realm of strategic decision-making; it establishes “widely available orientations to violence and to ways in which the state can legitimately use violence against putative enemies” (Johnston, 1995: 39). This premise focuses on a top-down approach to strategic culture.
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Interestingly, can a political elite rise above strategic cultural constraints which they manipulate themselves? Elites, too, are socialized in the strategic culture they produce, but also in a strategic culture created by their predecessors. This stream of thought raises the possibility that elites cannot escape the symbolic discourses they manipulate.
After these considerations Johnston formulates a definition of strategic culture: “Strategic culture is an integrated system of symbols (e.g., argumentation structures, languages, analogies, metaphors) which acts to establish pervasive and long-lasting strategic preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy of military force in interstate political affairs, and by clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the strategic preferences seem uniquely realistic and efficacious” (Johnston, 1995: 46).
Why is strategic culture so interesting for analysis? First of all, it focuses on the history of a state which seemingly is planted in the brain of its people, this creates a certain culture which influences strategic considerations. Secondly, the concept of strategic culture is an interesting addition to the debate on a realist/constructivist synthesis. Putting structure in realism, as culture and history are the concepts which create a geopolitical strategy. Johnston has called this form of structural realism ‘Cultural Realism’. Lastly, and very important, the analysis of strategic culture is supposed to provide decision-makers with an uniquely ordered set of strategic choices from which we can derive predictions about behavior. This behavior can be observed in strategic cultural objects and its transmission can be traced across time (Johnston, 1995: 45-46).
3.2 Russia’s Strategic Culture
In this part the focus will be on how academics frame what Russia’s strategic culture looks like. Russia has a strategic culture that is deeply rooted in its history and geography, one that is fairly stable with respect to the prevailing threat perception of Russia’s quest for great power status (Eitelhuber, 2009: 2). Some of the main threats to Russia are the U.S.’s “desire to get a foothold in regions where Russia traditionally is present,” along with NATO enlargement, the Alliance’s involvement in local conflicts near the Russian border, and hostile information on Russia’s policies. The Russian leadership clearly fears that it will soon be encircled by American military bases.
“There are regions in which Russia has privileged interests. These regions are home to countries with which we share special historical relations and are bound together as friends and good neighbors” (Medvedev, 31/08/08). The importance of a country as Ukraine becomes clear from this quote. According to a former British ambassador to Moscow, the West can expect “that Russia would exert itself mightily, risk a great deal and pay a high price to prevent Ukraine from becoming, as Russians would see it, a platform for American power” (Lyne, 2008).
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A strategic culture becomes even more clear in quotes as: “to promote good neighborly relations, and to provide comprehensive protection of Russian citizens and compatriots abroad” (Foreign Policy Concept 2008). According to Eitelhuber, todays strategic culture of Russia is an attempt to revise the entire post-Cold War settlement of the 1990s which it resents. The concept of strategic culture can help explain why states might act in ways that are, by realist standards, irrational (Eitelhuber, 2009: 3).
Academics are in consensus on where Russia’s strategic culture is built on. Russia’s strategic culture is built around the threat perception of the bi-polar era, arguing that NATO enlargement and unilateral out-of-area operations by America would threaten Russia in its traditional zones of influence (Wilhelmsen, 2005: 389). Although the Soviet Union collapsed in 1990, the successor state Russia still tries to keep a hegemonic influence in the region by creating multiple trade and integration organizations like the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Eurasian Union.
Because the bi-polar era is history, Russia is desperately aspiring and demanding respect for its international status. The self-perception of Russia is that of a Great Power, from which follows that they consider themselves to have the right to act in a certain way on the international stage, and exercise privileged interests in certain regions (Eitelhuber, 2009: 28).
It is clear that promoting feelings of greatness are fundamental to Russia’s security culture and identity. But where is this perception of being a Great Power build on? First, Russia sees itself as a Great Power in the global war on terror. Secondly, Russia is the biggest country in the world and has enormous natural resources and is hereby a global energy supplier. Thirdly, Russia is one of the five official nuclear weapon states. Due to the arms race between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, Russia is of huge importance for the policy of non-proliferation. Fourth, Russia is undoubtedly the leading power in the post-Soviet space and the driving force of integration in this region (Igumnova, 2011: 257).
More interesting is if Russia is building a strategic culture for Ukraine. Did the annexation of Crimea came out of the blue, or has there been a strategy for this action? One of the most interesting quotes suggesting such a strategy comes from former minister of defense, Sergey Ivanov: “One should not absolutely rule out the preventive use of force, if this is required by Russia’s interests or its allied commitments.” This quote suggests that Russia is willing to intervene if it is not satisfied with the policy of its neighbors (Igumnova, 2011: 265). In the same speech Ivanov emphasizes a new security threat for Russia, “the instability of neighboring countries caused by the weakness of their governments.” These two quotes can both be linked to the situation in Ukraine where the colored revolutions are seen as a threat which would create a bigger distance between Russia and its former Soviet republic. The emphasis on preventing a possible political change in a neighboring country shows that Russia itself is more than scared for such revolutions within its own borders.
Russia contributed to reversing the colored revolutions in Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, because the Kremlin viewed this as dangerous for Russia and destabilizing for the broader region. The long arm of the
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Kremlin reached so far that in both countries the anti-Kremlin governments brought to power in the colored revolutions were replaced by governments with strong ties with Russia (Tsygankov, 2011: 37). Russia as the regional great power can’t feel secure when it’s surrounded by unfriendly neighbors, and ,as shown above, is willing and able to maintain their regional dominance. According to Bobick (2014: 410) we are witnessing a miniaturized Cold War, in which frozen conflicts in small regions become levers with which Russia can undermine Western political ideologies, challenge unipolar superpower rule, and alter its geopolitical standing with the West.
3.2 Strategic culture as a synthesis between realist and constructivist assumptions:
Strategic culture is a very interesting concept for international relations theorists. The manufacturability of social reality by creating a Grand Strategy and a Strategic Culture definitely supports a constructivist view of international relations.
It is the political elite of a state who create, or even demand such a strategy. More interestingly creating a Grand Strategy and a Strategic Culture is the field of realist international relations. A strategic culture’s goal is to create a geopolitical plan which will be embodied in the elite of the country but also in its population. Therefore, this research will focus on presidential speeches.
In this stream of thought it can be said that structure is of great importance for the realist school. A realist self-enforcing mechanism can be constructed. To successfully execute realist policies, a structure which favors realist policies is needed. This structure itself then creates a demand for realist policies. When the structure needs fine-tuning the process starts over again.
3.3 Despotism and Imperialism, a tight relationship:
Because this research will focus solely on the addresses to the federal assembly during the Putin era (2000 – 2015), I will include and emphasize the relationship between despotism and imperialism. This link is made in van Herpen’s book (2015) Putin’s Wars: The rise of Russia’s new Imperialism. Van Herpen distinguishes five factors that played a role in establishing this link:
1) Territorial expansion gives extra legitimation to the rule of the despot.
2) Territorial expansion functioned as a surrogate satisfaction for the disenfranchised serf population.
3) Because despots tend to reign for longer periods of time than democratically elected leaders, they are in a better position to make long-term projects, especially those concerning imperialist territorial expansion.
4) Despotic and imperial rule are congenial.
5) Despotic rule is not only more apt to generate imperialist policies than non-despotic rule, it also has a tendency – as in dialectical process- to be strengthened, in its turn by the empire, because
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its vast surface and the many different subjugated populations will hamper the establishment of a more democratic rule. Despotism and imperialism are mutually reinforcing processes. Given the state’s vast size and multi-ethnic nature, autocratic leadership seemed to be the type of governance that was best suited to cope with the wide range of external and internal threats that cropped up throughout Russian history (Eitelhuber, 2009: 6).
Putin’s attempt to possibly rule for 24 years must be seen within this perspective. Putin considers this long personal rule as a necessary precondition for his supreme geopolitical goal: the restoration of the lost empire (van Herpen, 2015: 20). As can be seen above, the longer a leader is in charge the better position they have to make long-term projects, and long term projects must be understand as a part of a Grand Strategy and a strategic culture. This link is built on historic evidence and seems to be happening this very moment again.
3.4 Russia’s new ideology:
The concepts of ideology, strategic culture, and grand strategy seem to be very interwoven. They are linked because they build on each other. The search for a new ideology helps to promote the new strategic culture and its bigger grand strategy. Van Herpen (2015) identifies a new ideological triad built on orthodoxy, the power vertical, and sovereign democracy.
Sovereign democracy means that each sovereign country can use the concept of democracy to make it fit in the country’s specific institutions and situation. The regime is, therefore, immune against criticism from international organizations, foreign governments, or human rights organizations (Van Herpen, 2015: 57). The “power vertical” is an euphemism for an authoritarian down government. This top-down way of government is needed when creating a strategic culture. Elitism is a huge factor in Russia’s politics. The third ideological pillar is orthodox religion.
Interestingly, this new ideology focuses purely on Russia’s internal affairs and historically relevant ideological elements as orthodoxy and autocracy (van Herpen, 2015: 58). The lack of an international element shows that the only justification for expansionist policies can be ascribed to Social Darwinism. Might makes right. But is this not a too short-sided representation of reality?
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4. Methodology and Data:
The aim of this research is to show how Russia’s strategic culture is built on its history of being the center of several empires. More specific, this research aims to identify trends in symbolic rhetoric used in Putin’s and Medvedev’s presidential speeches in relation to the Ukrainian conflict. This use of symbolic rhetoric can be seen as the manifestation of a strategic culture. This is why the method of symbol analysis will be used for this research. The symbol analysis will be executed by a combination of content and discourse analysis.
4.1 Symbol analysis:
What is symbol analysis? Symbol analysis is a specific form of discourse analysis, and in this research also elements of content analysis will be applied to symbol analysis. Symbol analysis suggests that symbols are the vehicles through which the political elite and its preferences are manifested empirically, in order to spread, change, and communicate a premeditated culture (Johnston, 1995: 52). A strategic culture may be reflected by symbols about the role of force in human affairs, about the efficacy of certain strategies, and hence about the successfulness of different strategies. Certain symbols can trigger certain repertoires of behavior. These symbols act as ‘mental aids’ to make the difficulties of reality more graspable. According to Johnston (1995: 52), the analysis of symbols in strategic texts, like speeches, may reveal a great deal about how strategic axioms in a text might be interpreted behaviorally.
Elites are the ones who are in charge of using and creating symbols. Through the use of symbols elites create an official language of discourse which excludes alternative strategies, undermines challenges to their authority, mobilizes support and otherwise upholds their hegemony in the decision process. The effect of the use of symbolism by the elite has been the creation of an ideology which justifies the hegemony of security intellectuals, military policy makers and arms manufacturers, and all those who accept a direct association between threats, weaponization, and security (Johnston, 1995: 57).
In this research I will focus on every sentence in Putin’s annual presidential speeches to the federal assembly which contain a symbolic reference to a ‘Greater Russia’ or any other reference to a strategic culture. This can be references to the Soviet Union, but also to the Tsarist empires. As mentioned before a strategic culture is the product of a countries’ specific history. These counts will show different trends in the rhetoric used by Putin, and hopefully give greater insights into the strategic culture of Russia and the build up to the conflict with the Ukraine.
According to Johnston (1995), the analysis of strategic culture suits best to the methodology of symbol analysis. The goal of the analysis of strategic culture is to provide decision-makers with a “uniquely ordered set of strategic choices from which we can derive predictions about behavior; that can be observed in strategic cultural objects; and whose transmission across time can be traced” (Johnston, 1995: 45-46).
13 4.2 Data: Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly
Because this research will be built on the presidential addresses to the federal assembly it’s important to know and understand more about this particular kind of speech. Where is the speech held? Who are in the audience? Answering these questions help to shape the context in which this speech is held, and could clarify a possible ‘tone’ in the used rhetorics.
The presidential address to the federal assembly is an annual speech given by the Russian president in front of the two houses of the Russian Parliament: The ‘Duma and the Federation Council. According to Article 84 of the current constitution of Russia “The president of the Russian federation shall address the Federal Assembly with annual messages on the situation in the country, on the guidelines of the internal and foreign policy of the State” (Art. 84 Russian Constitution). This speech can be compared to the American State of the Union, or even the Dutch ‘Troonrede’, because these speeches also outline the state and condition the country is in, but also shine a light on strategic preferences in the future. It must be clear that this last part is most interesting for this research.
Next to the presence of the parliamentarians the government also invites the chairmen of the constitutional and supreme courts, the head of the central electoral committee, the audit chamber and the public chamber, heads of all Russia’s regions, , other high-ranking officials, heads of Russia’s traditional religious faiths, heads of major denominations and representatives of the media (Kremlin Press Service). More than 500 invitations are sent to journalists representing a multitude of newspapers and magazines, online media, television and radio outlets. Among them are foreign reporters from all over the world. The address to the federal assembly is always broadcasted live on television and radio. Identifying which press is invited and who are not is not within the aim of this research.
The address is traditionally given in the Kremlin’s St. George Hall where more than 1000 people will directly hear the president speak. This hall is the largest hall in the Kremlin palace. The St. George Hall is filled with symbolic art, and is in itself of enormous symbolic value to the Russian people. The might of Russia is shown through a 18 piece colonnade, in which every column stands for the provinces and kingdoms conquered by Russia. Hereby, the St. George Hall is pre-eminently suitable for speeches about foreign policy and grand strategical considerations.
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5. Analysis:
For the analysis of a possible strategic culture in the presidential speeches in the Putin era, its necessary to know what is defined as the Putin era. Putin became acting president in 1999 and held his first address to the federal assembly in 2000. His first term as president of Russia ended in 2008. In the next presidential elections he lost from his opponent Dmitry Medvedev. Medvedev has been president from 2008 to 2012. During this time Putin became Prime-Minister. This construction of power has been criticized throughout the world. Especially because after Medvedev’s presidential term, Putin became president again in 2012, and is still in power when writing this thesis. The critique on the long-lasting reign of Putin is directed to a lack of democracy, and the creation of an authoritarian regime. As mentioned in the theoretical section there is a link between despotism and imperialism. This is mainly characterized by the factor explained above. In the words of van Herpen (2015): “Despots tend to reign for longer periods of time than democratically elected leaders, they are in a better position to make long-term projects, especially those concerning imperialist territorial expansion.”
Because of this, it is interesting to analyze if a strategic culture directed to expansionism can be identified in the addresses to the federal assembly during the reign of Putin. I will analyze all the addresses to the federal assembly from 2000 onwards, even though there is a four year gap where Medvedev was president. It might be interesting if there is a difference in tone and rhetoric between Putin and Medvedev. And if there is, why is there a difference? The amount of speeches totals up to 16, of which 12 given by Putin and 4 by Medvedev. Russia is a big country and this is even represented in the length of the speeches. The 16 speeches analyzed for this thesis add up to over 250 pages and have an average of around 9000 words per speech.
Firstly I will conduct a content analysis. Herein I will show how many symbolic and strategic references are made per speech/year. I’ve done this by counting every sentence which contains a reference to a bigger strategy or sentences that have a symbolic value for strengthening the culture of the country’s people. It must be mentioned that this research is of course highly influenced by researcher effects. The way I interpret these texts might be different from another researcher. Because of this, this research is not generalizable or repeatable.
Secondly I will contextualize the results of the content analysis by conducting a discourse analysis per theme. Numbers themselves don’t tell an accurate story. It’s the story behind the numbers that explains the trends in strategic and symbolic rhetoric. Certain events will increase a strategic/symbolic rhetoric, but can also lead to an absence of an expected rhetoric. It’s not only useful to look at what is said, but also at what is left out. I will get more into detail in the section discourse analysis.
15 5.1 Content analysis:
As mentioned above, the content analysis is conducted by counting the amount of sentences in the presidential speeches which contain a reference to a bigger strategy or which have a symbolic value for strengthening the culture of the Russian people. The results can be seen in the following table and graph.
Table 1: Strategic/Symbolic References per Year.
Year Strategic/Symbolic
References
Year Strategic/Symbolic
References
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 24 28 22 47 17 41 30 52 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 38 36 25 29 71 53 88 18Graph 1: Strategic/Symbolic References per Year
What kind of trend can we identify from this table and graph? The trend seems to be that after a year of many strategic/symbolic references, the next year will have less strategic/symbolic references. The only period where this trend doesn’t occur is remarkably in the Medvedev period, from 2008 to 2011. This can be linked to the despotic nature of Putin’s reign. Overall, there seems to be an increase in strategic/symbolic rhetoric over the years 2000 – 2015.
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 7 2 0 0 8 2 0 0 9 2 0 1 0 2 0 1 1 2 0 1 2 2 0 1 3 2 0 1 4 2 0 1 5
STRATEGIC/SYMBOLIC REFERENCES PER
YEAR
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To give more insight in the graph it’s interesting to mention the averages per presidential term. Putin’s first presidential term rounds up to an average of 33 strategic/symbolic references. Medvedev’s presidential term gives an average of 32 strategic/symbolic references. Putin’s second and ongoing term has an average of 57.5 strategic/symbolic references. This is clearly a break with the previous periods. The obvious explanation for this increase in strategic/symbolic rhetoric is the Ukrainian conflict and the related annexation of Crimea.
What is most striking is the amount of references directly directed to the Ukraine. This research tries to identify a strategic culture for Ukraine but the country is only mentioned 19 times over 16 years, of which 17 times in 2014, and only two times before 2014. Because of this, it seems that there is no bigger strategy for the Ukraine, or at least not formulated in the addresses to the federal assembly. All the references of Ukraine can be related to Russia’s annexation of Crimea. More precise, these references are made after the annexation. This is also a recurring trend, most of the strategic or symbolic references seem to be done in a defensive reaction to certain events. The following discourse analysis will go more in debt regarding this.
17 5.2 Discourse Analysis:
In this section I will contextualize the numbers shown in the above graph by using the method of discourse analysis. Why are these numbers the way they are? What events can be linked to the trends in the graph? What topics are related to strategic culture? These kind of questions are crucial to get a good understanding of the presence, and strengthening, of a strategic culture in Russia during the Putin era. I will analyze the most discussed topics regarding a strategic culture, but also topics where a reference to strategic culture might be unexpected. This will be done by using the most telling quotes per topic. The topics include: Russian culture, compatriots abroad, critique on the U.S. and NATO, reform of the armed forces, the annexation of Crimea, the educational system, the demographic problem, and some additional findings.
Reminder, the presidential addresses to the federal assembly are speeches about the country’s wellbeing. Domestically and internationally. This explains the in debt passages in the speeches about political reforms, the state of the economy, the demographic problem, the schooling system, etc. Although it’s clearly not all about foreign affairs, or the place Russia should have on the international stage, all subjects can be used to strengthen the strategic culture of one’s country. Examples as mentioned will follow.
18 Culture:
When analyzing strategic culture, it might not come as a surprise that it’s necessary to take a closer look at the concept ‘culture’ in the presidential speeches during the Putin era. As mentioned in the theoretical chapter, a strategic culture is a top-down approach to strengthen the country and its culture for its strategic objectives. So, how is this done in the speeches analyzed?
The topic of culture is omnipresent in the presidential speeches. First of all the need for a strong country is emphasized and backed by Russia’s own history. “Our entire historical experience shows that a country like Russia can live and develop within its existing borders only if it is a strong nation. All of the periods during which Russia has been weakened, whether politically or economically, have always and inexorably brought to the fore the threat of the country’s collapse” (Putin, 2003). He dives even further into the topic: “I would like to recall that throughout our history Russia and its people have accomplished and continue to accomplish a truly historical fate, a great work performed in the name of our country’s integrity and in the name of bringing it peace and a stable life. Maintaining a state spread over such a vast territory and preserving a unique community of peoples while keeping up a strong presence on the international stage is not just an immense labor, it is also a task that has cost our people untold victims and sacrifice. Such has been Russia’s historic fate over these thousand and more years. Such has been the way Russia has continuously emerged as a strong nation. It is our duty never to forget this, and we should remember it now, too, as we examine the threats we face today and the main challenges to which we must rise” (Putin, 2003).
These quotes relate highly to the chapter ‘Despotism and Imperialism’. Although there is no mentioning of an expansionist policy, referring to the thousand year old history of Russia as a strong state, is referring to a history of autocratic and dictatorial rule. Because despotism and imperialism are mutually reinforcing mechanisms, its necessary to give a careful look at the rhetoric focusing on ‘a strong state’. It seems that Putin himself is aware of the link between a strong state and its geopolitical ambitions, this is why he also tries to comfort the international community by focusing on cooperation. “The only real choice for Russia is the choice of a strong country. A country that is strong and confident of itself. Strong not in defiance of the international community, not against other strong nations, but together with them” (Putin, 2000). Although he emphasizes the importance of a strong country, at the same time he uses softer rhetoric emphasizing its willingness to cooperate. This mix of hard and soft rhetoric within the same quote is a recurring phenomenon, it will also lead to some contradicting statements, examples will be given in the upcoming pages.
Next to showing a willingness to cooperate with other states, Putin also emphasizes that Russia has a strong connection with the European countries: “Above all else Russia was, is and will, of course, be a major European power. Achieved through much suffering by European culture, the ideals of freedom, human rights, justice and democracy have for many centuries been our society's determining values”
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(Putin, 2005). Through this quote Putin tries to show that the European countries have more in common with their Russian counterparts than they might be aware of, especially in times where framing is done in extremes instead of in nuance.
Strengthening the country is done by promoting unity and patriotism through emphasizing the shared history and traditions of the Russian peoples. Or in the words of Putin: “The unity of Russia is strengthened by the patriotism inherent in our people, by cultural traditions and common historic memory” (Putin, 2000). The unity of the Russian people is even formulated as a strategic objective. [The Russian people] “They will remember and respect our great history. This is our strategic objective. But if we are to achieve this objective, we must consolidate, we must mobilize our intellectual forces and unite the efforts of the state authorities, civil society and all the people of this land. (Putin, 2000).” The rhetoric used here makes it very clear, strengthening the country by uniting the people and mobilizing the intellectual forces is part of Russia’s strategic culture. But for what goal?
The importance of the spiritual unity of the Russian people is formulated in the following quote: “The spiritual unity of the people and the moral values that unite us are just as important a factor for development as political and economic stability. It is my conviction that a society can set and achieve ambitious national goals only if it has a common system of moral guidelines. We will be able to achieve our goals only if we maintain respect for our native language, for our unique cultural values, for the memory of our forebears and for each page of our country’s history” (Putin, 2007). To promote unity is to place this idea of a unique, great, cultural country in the minds of the population. It demarcates who belongs to the nation and who doesn’t. Especially in a big country as Russia, unity is crucial to maintain sovereignty. This link between uniting the people and sovereignty is made in the following quote: “It is my conviction that our country will take its deserved place in the world, and we will be able to preserve our statehood and our sovereignty, only when our citizens see and feel for themselves and are confident that all of the state’s endeavours aim at protecting their vital interests, at improving their lives and bringing them greater prosperity and security. Only when our people are able to feel proud of their country. Each citizen should feel that he is a part of the nation, involved in its fate” (Putin, 2007).
This last quote obviously relates to stirring up patriotic feelings in the country. Patriotism not as a bad thing, but as an unconditional love for one’s country. This is also formulated in one of the presidential speeches: “There is patriotism, along with the most sober and critical look at our country’s history and our far from ideal present, belief in Russia that shines through no matter what the circumstances, deep-rooted love for our native land and our great culture. These are our values, the foundations of our society and our moral beacons. To put things more simply, it is these self-evident things that we all understand that are what make us a single people, what make us Russia. These are the things that we
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will never give up no matter what the circumstances” (Medvedev, 2008). It shows that Russia’s culture is worth fighting for.
For this reason, the presidency emphasizes the need not to lose their own identity and not to copy foreign models: “…the absence of cultural beacons of our own, and blindly copying foreign models, will inevitably lead to us losing our national identity. As Dmitry Likhachev wrote, “State sovereignty is also defined by cultural criteria” (Putin, 2007). This is only a warning that the Russians should not lose their idea of national identity, but a few years later Putin also criticizes its own people: “It is painful for me to say this, but I must say it. Today, Russian society suffers from apparent deficit of spiritual values such as charity, empathy, compassion, support and mutual assistance. A deficit of things that have always, throughout our entire history, made us stronger and more powerful; these are the things we have always been proud of” (Putin, 2012). This means that the supposed Russian culture, with all its values and morals, is crumbling away, and this needs to be stopped and reversed.
To create and promote unity is to acknowledge there is diversity. Russia would cease to exist when all the different peoples in Russia would make a claim to independence. Therefore it’s crucial to have a good and peaceful understanding between all the different peoples inhabiting Russia. “Harmonising interethnic relations within our country remains an absolute priority. Russia is inhabited by representatives of more than 180 peoples that speak 239 languages and dialects. This multicultural world is also Russia’s unique advantage, a world in which representatives of different nationalities and faiths have lived together for more than a thousand years” (Medevedev, 2011). More interestingly, after talking so much about promoting unity for the Russian people, it almost seems contradictory to emphasize the strength of the diversity of Russia’s peoples. Even though the diversity is always linked to the unity of the peoples. “For centuries, Russia developed as a multi-ethnic nation, a civilization-state bonded by the Russian people, Russian language and Russian culture native for all of us, uniting us and preventing us from dissolving in this diverse world. We treat and will continue to treat with great care and respect every ethnic group, every nation in the Russian Federation. Our diversity has always been and remains the source of our beauty and our strength” (Putin, 2012).
21 Compatriots Abroad:
One of the most interesting topics mentioned in the addresses to the federal assembly is the recognition of compatriots abroad. Although there is no direct indication of an expansionist strategy in the presidential speeches analyzed, the topic of compatriots abroad conceals a possible expansionist strategy. The dilemma is introduced in Putin’s 2001 address to the federal assembly: “Another problem that it is my duty to mention here at this tribune is the defense of the rights and interests of Russians abroad, our compatriots in other countries. The hundreds of thousands of Russians living and working outside this country must be sure that Russia will not abandon them should they find themselves in a difficult situation, that we will protect their personal rights, protect their families from possible violations of the law and from unlawful pressure and help uphold their human dignity. No one should be allowed to apply a selective version of human rights and freedoms based on people's passports, and our diplomats should be not only active in such cases, but should show professional firmness and take effective action” (Putin, 2001).
The problem of compatriots abroad is closely related to the problem of citizenship. The procedures for obtaining Russian citizenship are difficult and outrageously bureaucratic, even for Russian compatriots, according to Putin (2012). For this reason Putin asks the parliament to “develop a simplified procedure for granting Russian citizenship to our compatriots, the bearers of the Russian language and Russian culture, the direct descendants of those who were born in the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, for those who want to take up permanent residence in our country and, therefore, to give up their current citizenship” (Putin, 2012). A simplified procedure is already being implemented for those citizens from the Commonwealth of Independent States who want to serve in the Russian army, citizenship will be received after completing a three-year contract service (Putin, 2003).
Even one of the most famous quotes of Putin relates to the topic of compatriots abroad: “Above all, we should acknowledge that the collapse of the Soviet Union was a major geopolitical disaster of the century. As for the Russian nation, it became a genuine drama. Tens of millions of our co-citizens and compatriots found themselves outside Russian territory. Moreover, the epidemic of disintegration infected Russia itself” (Putin, 2005). Putin received a lot of critique on saying that the collapse of the Soviet Union was a major geopolitical disaster. The critique focused on a possible nostalgic rhetoric by Putin, not on the problem of compatriots abroad.
Why is this topic so high on the agenda? Although the Cold War belongs to the past, the rivalry between the Soviet Union’s successor state Russia and NATO never ended. Russia has to deal with an expanding NATO and EU, even within the considered sphere of influence of Russia. The Baltic states became members of NATO in 2004, Georgia is an aspiring member since 2011, and Ukraine is being torn apart since the Orange Revolution in 2004 because of the internal political divisions regarding this topic. More EU and NATO, or more Russia? One thing is clear, Russia wants to defend the rights of its people and
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compatriots abroad when NATO is encroaching further and further in Russia’s sphere of influence. “We consider international support for the respect of the rights of Russians abroad an issue of major importance, one that cannot be the subject of political and diplomatic bargaining. We hope that the new members of NATO and the European Union in the post-Soviet area will show their respect for human rights, including the rights of ethnic minorities, through their actions” (Putin, 2005).
23 Critique on the U.S. and NATO:
As mentioned in the previous paragraph, tensions between NATO and Russia never really ended. These tensions lead to critiques and discussions on the policies of NATO and the U.S by Russia. “It is a matter of principle for us that our international partners also respect and consider our national interests. This applies completely also to discussion of questions regarding strategic stability, disarmament, NATO expansion and forming the foundations of the world order in the twenty-first century. Our efforts to activate work within the CIS are dictated not only by our historic closeness but also by obvious practical considerations” (Putin, 2001). Not only does Putin point out what topics create the most tension, he also shows that further integration with the CIS countries is not solely based on historic and cultural ties, it’s also based on strategic considerations. Every action has its reaction. NATO enlargement causes that Russia feels the need to set up alliances and international organizations themselves, where it can function as the hegemon.
The strongest critique on NATO is directed to the lawfulness of the use of force by the organization: “We think that this organization often ignores the opinion of the international community and the provisions of international legal documents in its decision-making process, and this is the biggest problem. The future of our relations with NATO therefore depends on how closely the basic principles and norms of international law will be respected in questions of use of force and threat of the use of force. Our position is clear: the only organization with the right to authorize the use of force in international relations is the United Nations Security Council” (Putin, 2001).
Russia criticizes the military operations executed by the U.S. under the guise of humanitarian interventions: “These are attempts to infringe on the sovereign rights of nations in the guise of “humanitarian” operations, or as they say nowadays, “humanitarian” intervention, and difficulties in finding a common language in issues which represent a regional or international threat” (Putin, 2000). Why does Putin criticize these operations? Because Russia doesn’t see these interventions as humanitarian interventions, but as purely in the own interest of the U.S. Later on Putin indirectly mocks the terminology of humanitarian intervention by using it for his own interventions in Chechnya and Georgia. “There are still many social and economic problems in the republic, and peaceful life is disrupted by attacks by bandits who remain there. However, an entire people should not have their rights taken away because of this. We cannot allow this. All inhabitants or natives of Chechnya should feel themselves to be full citizens of the Russian Federation” (Putin, 2002). The sentence, ‘an entire people should not have their rights taken away’, shows the humanitarian argumentation for the intervention in Chechnya. When the U.S. intervenes in another state’s domestic affairs its justified by humanitarian reasons. When Russia intervenes in the affairs of neighboring states it is framed as an act of authoritarianism. In the words of Putin: “Our efforts to strengthen our state are sometimes deliberately
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interpreted as authoritarianism” (Putin, 2004). Russia doesn’t feel like they are treated equally to the U.S., or with the respect it deserves for its international position as an aspiring Great Power.
Another sneer is made directed to the U.S. in 2003: “Certain countries sometimes use their strong and well-armed national armies to increase their zones of strategic influence rather than fighting these evils we all face” (Putin, 2003). This quote is obviously directed to the U.S., although it’s not mentioned directly. It is the U.S. who is seen as the leader of the NATO allegiance, and it is this organization who is encroaching in Russia’s sphere of influence. Another swing towards the U.S. is made regarding the topic of human rights: “Countries that do not respect and cannot guarantee human rights themselves do not have the right to demand that others respect these same rights” (Putin, 2005). But does Putin, after putting the U.S. in its place, acknowledge in this quote that Russia doesn’t respect human rights? I’ll leave the answer to this question open, because I might be reading into things, but the choice of words is clearly curious.
Overall the tone towards the U.S. or NATO is still far from favorable, but it’s not a one sided story. We like to think that we don’t live in a realist time-period anymore, but according to the above the old bloc mentality is still very much alive. “Meanwhile far from everyone in the world has abandoned the old bloc mentality and the prejudices inherited from the era of global confrontation despite the great changes that have taken place. This is also a great hindrance in working together to find suitable responses to the common problems we face” (Putin, 2006).
Relating to this old bloc mentality are the topics of arms reduction and a global missile defense system. These are remainders of the heydays of the Cold War. Putin insists that the U.S. will contribute to arms reduction, it would make Russia feel more safe and it would discourage a possible arms race. An arms race is enormously expensive, Russia has many other fields in which it would rather invest. “It is time for our partners to also make their contribution to arms reductions, not just in word but indeed. At the moment, they are only increasing arms, but it is time for them to start making cutbacks, if only in Europe” (Putin, 2007). Next to Putin’s worries of an arms race, Medvedev also speaks out his worries about a global missile defense system: “I would add something about what we have had to face in recent years: what is it? It is the construction of a global missile defense system, the installation of military bases around Russia, the unbridled expansion of NATO and other similar ‘presents’ for Russia – we therefore have every reason to believe that they are simply testing our strength” (Medvedev, 2008). Following from this Medvedev sees two possible outcomes of this tension in the foreseeable future: “either we reach an agreement on missile defense and create a full-fledged cooperation mechanism, or (if we can’t come to a constructive agreement) we will see another escalation of the arms race. We will have to make a decision to deploy new attack forces. It is obvious that that would be a very unfavourable scenario” (Medvedev, 2010).
25 Investment in the Armed Forces:
Building on the previous topic, I will now take a closer look at the investment in the Russian Armed Forces. It seems that Russia is almost obsessively trying to reform its army and acquire strategic weapons during the Putin era. Normal reasons for reform are to keep the army modern and well-equipped, but extensive reforms make you question if there is another motive for these army reforms? What country would invest so much in a strong army if it has no bigger plan for it?
So, where do these investments end up? “One of the most challenging and fundamental problems is supplying our troops with new systems, new sorts of weapons and military equipment. There is no need to embark here on some sort of abstract discussion: we simply need to acquire these weapons. In the next year we need to provide the Armed Forces with more than 30 ballistic land- and sea-based missiles, 5 Iskander missile systems, about 300 modern armored vehicles, 30 helicopters, 28 combat aircraft, 3 nuclear-powered submarines, 1 corvette-class battleship and 11 spacecraft. All this simply has to be done” (Medvedev, 2009).
It is clear that if you like to build a strong state, protect your compatriots abroad, and keep your influence in your self-ascribed sphere of influence, a strong army is needed. The reasons to reform, and to invest in, the Armed Forces are not farfetched: “We should secure our country from any forms of military and political pressure and potential foreign aggression. And thus modernizing the Russian Armed Forces remains a very important task, including equipping strategic nuclear forces with the most modern systems of strategic armaments” (Putin, 2004). Another reason for the need of a strong army is given in the following quote: “We also need to make clear that the stronger our armed forces are, the lesser the temptation for anyone to put such pressure on us, no matter under what pretext this is done” (Putin, 2006).
It seems that the threat perception of Russia is really strong, the reasons for this are the enormous size of Russia, but most importantly the expansion of NATO. Remarkable is the attention given to maintaining the combat readiness of the Armed Forces throughout the addresses to the federal assembly. This combat readiness shows how seriously threatened the Russian leaders feel.
26 The Annexation of Crimea:
The aforementioned combat readiness became reality when the Russian army intervened in the ongoing Ukrainian conflict and annexed Crimea in 2014. Something about this conflict threatened the Russian political elite to such an extent that they had to take military actions. A clear reason for this intervention would be the fear of a possible spillover of the conflict to potential breakaway regions within the borders of Russia. A second reason would be to show the world, and particularly the perceived sphere of influence of Russia, that they are still the region’s hegemon. They have the power to control and influence the political stability and landscape of neighboring countries. Although these two strategical considerations seem to be obvious reasons for intervention, there’s no trace of these arguments in the presidential speeches analyzed.
So, what is the story that Putin told to the Russian people about the annexation of Crimea? The explanation given by Putin focuses on the shared history between the people of Crimea and the Russian people. He also emphasizes the importance of Crimea for Russia throughout history. In doing so, Putin doesn’t hesitate to use some strong symbolic comparisons and references: “It was an event of special significance for the country and the people, because Crimea is where our people live, and the peninsula is of strategic importance for Russia as the spiritual source of the development of a multifaceted but solid Russian nation and a centralised Russian state. It was in Crimea, in the ancient city of Chersonesus or Korsun, as ancient Russian chroniclers called it, that Grand Prince Vladimir was baptised before bringing Christianity to Rus. In addition to ethnic similarity, a common language, common elements of their material culture, a common territory, even though its borders were not marked then, and a nascent common economy and government, Christianity was a powerful spiritual unifying force that helped involve various tribes and tribal unions of the vast Eastern Slavic world in the creation of a Russian nation and Russian state. It was thanks to this spiritual unity that our forefathers for the first time and forevermore saw themselves as a united nation. All of this allows us to say that Crimea, the ancient Korsun or Chersonesus, and Sevastopol have invaluable civilisational and even sacral importance for Russia, like the Temple Mount in Jerusalem for the followers of Islam and Judaism” (Putin, 2014).
If the symbolic importance of Crimea is as sacred as the Temple Mount in Jerusalem, why didn’t the Russians annexed Crimea a lot earlier? These exaggerations’ main priorities are to distract the Russian people from what’s really going on, to promote unity, and to justify the recent events for the Russian people.
After this highly symbolic introduction to the case of Crimea, Putin also formulates a more direct reason for the intervention: “It is true that we condemned the government coup and the forceful takeover of power in Kiev in February of this year. The developments we are currently witnessing in Ukraine and the tragedy unfolding in the country’s southeast prove that we were right to take such a stand. How
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can the subsequent attempts to suppress people in Ukraine’s southeast, who oppose this mayhem, be supported? I reiterate that there was no way we could endorse these developments. What’s more, they were followed by hypocritical statements on the protection of international law and human rights. This is just cynical. I strongly believe that the time will come when the Ukrainian people will deliver a just assessment of these developments” (Putin, 2014). This argument lays down the foundation for a humanitarian intervention, but was the humanitarian situation in Crimea that poignant? I don’t believe so, the humanitarian argument is in my opinion also a distraction from Russia’s strategic plan to restore its influence in the region.
What’s even more remarkable is the defensive, and even contradictory rhetoric used by Putin to explain the annexation of Crimea to its people. Defensive in the way that Russia has always helped Ukraine: “It is well known that Russia not only supported Ukraine and other brotherly republics of the former Soviet Union in their aspirations to sovereignty, but also facilitated this process greatly in the 1990s. Since then, our position has remained unchanged” (Putin, 2014). In the following quote it even becomes sad to talk about the money invested in Ukraine: “By the way, Russia has already made a major contribution to helping Ukraine. Let me reiterate that Russian banks already invested some $25 billion in Ukraine” (Putin, 2014). You cannot buy-in your influence in neighboring countries.
A defensive rhetoric can also be found when addressing the imposed sanctions by the U.S. on Russia. “The policy of containment was not invented yesterday. It has been carried out against our country for many years, always, for decades, if not centuries. In short, whenever someone thinks that Russia has become too strong or independent, these tools are quickly put into use” (Putin, 2014). In Putin’s perception, no matter what reason, these sanctions would have been imposed on Russia.
From a more contradictory nature are the following arguments: “Every nation has an inalienable sovereign right to determine its own development path, choose allies and political regimes, create an economy and ensure its security. Russia has always respected these rights and always will. This fully applies to Ukraine and the Ukrainian people” (Putin, 2014). After an intervention in the domestic affairs of Ukraine, this is of course a total lie. Russia did absolutely not respect the path Ukraine was seemingly going to take. The possible partnership with the EU and NATO, and the internal political landscape are exactly what Russia has not respected.
Another argument on the topic of international law also shows the discrepancy between what is said, and what is done. This leads to contradictory statements. “I would like to emphasize this: either we remain a sovereign nation, or we dissolve without a trace and lose our identity. Of course, other countries need to understand this, too. All participants in international life should be aware of this. And they should use this understanding to strengthen the role and the importance of international law, which we’ve talked about so much lately, rather than bend its standards to suit someone's strategic interests contrary to its fundamental principles and common sense, considering everyone else to be
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poorly educated people who can’t read or write” (Putin, 2014). Especially the sentence, ‘rather than bend its [international laws] standards to suit someone’s strategic interests contrary to its fundamental principles and common sense’, shows how Putin tries to create his own version of the truth. It has been Russia who bend the international laws to suit their own strategical interests, there’s no need to warn other countries to do the same in my opinion.
29 The Educational System:
After discussing the topics culture, compatriots abroad, critiques of the U.S and NATO, the Armed Forces, and the annexation of Crimea, which are all clearly related to a strategic culture, I’d now like to discuss a few topics which are normally not related to a strategic culture.
First of all, the strategical importance of the educational system. It is through education that a person’s sense of culture and identity is shaped, and thereby it’s patriotic spirit. In the words of Putin: “Looking after the Russian language and expanding the influence of Russian culture are crucial social and political issues. Genuine art has a serious educational mission, helps to forge patriotic spirit, promotes moral and family values, respect for work and respect for one’s elders” (Putin, 2007). What relates most to a strategic culture is the aspect of shaping one’s identity. It shows that a top-down approach of the political elite has the purpose to educate the Russian people in a certain way that is beneficial for the political elite. “The educational system, in the proper sense of that word, shapes the identity of a person, creates an image of the life of the people. It passes on the values of the nation to new generations” (Medvedev, 2008). Putin, in 2013, emphasizes the importance of shaping the identity of the Russian people again through the education system: ”We need schools that do more than just teach; teaching is very important –most important, in fact – but we also need schools to help our nation’s citizens form their identity, absorbing the nation’s values, history and traditions. We need open-minded individuals with a strong internalized knowledge of culture, capable of thinking creatively and independently“ (Putin, 2013).
In the following quote of Putin he refutes my fear of an educational system which serves the interests of the political elite: “Attempts by the government to encroach on people’s beliefs and views are a manifestation of totalitarianism. This would be completely unacceptable to us and we do not plan to follow that path. We must not follow the path of prohibition and limitations, but instead, we must secure a firm spiritual and moral foundation for our society. That is precisely why issues of general education, culture and youth policy are so significant. These areas are not just a collection of services; rather, first and foremost, they are the environments for creating a moral, harmonious person, a responsible Russian citizen” (Putin, 2012). In my view Putin contradicts himself in this quote. By promoting a patriotic educational system I believe the political elite does encroach on people’s free choice, and on the accessibility of an unbiased version of their own history. The Russian political elite tries to bring up their youngest generations with patriotic feelings, it creates a much needed unity, and the patriotic feelings can be called upon later in life when the state is in need for it.
Another topic regarding the education system is the implementation of distance learning. Although seemingly innocent, a bigger strategy seems to be behind it. “I also ask the Government Cabinet to submit proposals for the implementation of distance learning programs in Russian. It should be available for young people in the CIS and for our compatriots all over the world. It is important
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to support schools in the CIS and in other states which teach in Russian, including by providing support for the teachers, help with textbooks and equipment. We should create a system of international school competitions in the Russian language” (Putin, 2012). It is that Russia sees itself as the cultural, and scientific hegemon in the region. Their language needs to be promoted, and their universities should attract compatriots abroad, all for the higher goal of strengthening the country. In the words of Putin: “We must also make a much greater effort to export quality education services and create conditions for having foreign students and our compatriots abroad, especially from the CIS countries, to study in Russian universities. This is something that can play a very big part in strengthening Russia’s cultural and intellectual influence in the world” (Putin, 2013).
