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Victims or victors?
Women’s political empowerment during
Yemen’s crises, 2011-2018
Fleur van Lit Researchmaster Middle Eastern Studies
1355414 Leiden University, 21 May 2019
Wordcount: 32.711
Abstract
Since 2011, Yemen has been torn apart by two subsequent crises: the 2011 uprisings which sought to overthrow the Saleh-government, and the current conflict between the Houthis and the government of president Hadi. Although women are often portrayed as primary victims of these crises, such moments of profound change can also offer possible positive changes for women. In this thesis, I analyse the impact of these two crises – the 2011 uprisings and the current conflict – on women’s political empowerment in Yemen. Did women get more opportunities to participate in politics due to these crises? Two important conclusions follow from this research. Firstly, there is a notable difference between women’s participation in informal politics and formal politics during and after crises; although women might be empowered in informal politics, this does not necessarily lead to empowerment in formal politics. And secondly, different crises have different impacts on women’s political participation. The nature of the subsequent formal political process determines the likelihood of women’s formal political empowerment.
Index
Introduction
1. Definitions: crisis and political empowerment 8
2. Methodology 10
3. Structure of thesis 12
Chapter 1 – Literature review: empowerment, women and crises
1. Empowerment: definitions and debates 14
Academic debates: (political) empowerment Empowerment of women
Empowerment during and after crises
2. Theoretical Framework 19
3. Women in Yemen: empowerment during crises 22
Chapter 2 – Yemen’s History
1. Divided: North versus South and Houthis versus government 26
2. Politics: patronage, elites and military 27
3. Poverty and Islam 29
4. Women in Yemen 30
Chapter 3 – The 2011 uprisings
1. The uprisings: women in informal politics 32
Background
Women’s ‘political awakening’: an influx of eligible candidates Progressive tendencies and erosion of gender norms
Women’s political utility
Informal political empowerment?
2. The transitional process: women in formal politics 42
Background
Women’s inclusion in the transitional process Women in the NDC
Formal political empowerment?
Chapter 4 – The Current Conflict
1. Background 52
2. Consequences of the conflict: women as victims 53
3. Present in protests: women in informal politics 56
Defying gender norms in protests
Political utility: both a burden and a benefit Informal political empowerment?
4. Absence and tokenism: women in formal politics 62
Arguments used for women’s inclusion Reality of women’s inclusion
Formal political empowerment?
5. Conclusion: political empowerment? 67
Chapter 5 – Comparison: democracy as the determining difference
1. Previous experience 69
2. Lack of political will 70
3. Democracy: the dependent variable 72
Chapter 6 – Conclusion: crises as opportunities for women? 76
No politics or crisis ‘in general’ Prospects and personal note
Acronyms
CDC Constitution Drafting Committee
GCC Gulf Cooperation Council
GPC General People’s Congress
INGO International Non-Governmental Organisation
JMP Joint Meeting Parties
NDC National Dialogue Conference
OSESGY Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary General to Yemen
PDRY People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen
UN United Nations
UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution
US United States of America
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Introduction
The Chinese use two brush strokes to write the word ‘crisis’. One brush stroke stands for danger; the other for opportunity. In a crisis, be aware of the danger but recognise the opportunity.
- John F. Kennedy (Former US President, 1961-1963)
When searching for images of Yemen on the internet, one encounters two types of images: one of men fighting and one of women and children suffering from the consequences of the fighting. These pictures mirror the traditional gendered way we perceive crises; women are seen as the primary victims of social and political upheaval. However, notwithstanding the horrors they face during crises, such crises can also be moments of positive change for women. When, for example, men are off to war, women get more responsibilities and get a chance to enter the public space (Hughes 2009, 180; Kumar 2001, 7). As counterintuitive as it may seem, crises may work ‘empowering’ for women, particularly in terms of politics, it is argued (Arostegui 2013, 536; Hughes 2009, 175). In this thesis, I analyse this counterintuitive idea of crises as moments of positive change for women in politics, focusing on Yemen.
Since 2011, Yemen has experienced two major crises with subsequent peace processes. In early 2011, people went out on the streets to protest against the regime of former president Ali Abdullah Saleh (1947-2017) and this period of upheaval was concluded with the transitional process of 2012-2014. Shortly after, the conflict between the Houthis and the government of president ‘Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi (1945-) commenced and this is still ongoing. Despite several rounds of peace negotiations, peace has not yet returned to Yemen. Because of these enduring crises and its historically bad position of women (see Chapter 2 – Yemen’s History), Yemen provides an interesting case study to scrutinise the idea of crises being ‘empowering’ for women. Analysing two different crises within the same country and in a similar time period – i.e. the 2011 uprising and the current conflict – I seek to broaden our understanding of the different impact different crises have on women’s political empowerment.
In academic literature on women’s political empowerment during crises, little distinction is made between different sorts of crises. Moghadam (1997) focuses for instance on revolutions and Arostegui (2013), Bauer & Britton (2006) and Hughes (2009) analyse the impact of armed conflicts on women’s political empowerment, yet all conclude crises in
general may have positive effects on women’s political participation (Arostegui 2013, 536;
Bauer & Britton 2006, 11; Hughes 2009, 178; Moghadam 1997, 152-157). Although one might expect different outcomes with different crises – a revolution might for instance be less violent
than an armed conflict and hence has different effects on women and their political participation – there is little theoretical understanding of the different impact different crises have on women’s political empowerment and what causes this difference. As I show in this thesis, the 2011 uprisings indeed had a different outcome in terms of women’s political empowerment than the current conflict in Yemen. The main question of this thesis is therefore: how can we explain the different outcomes in women’s political empowerment between the 2011 uprisings and the current conflict in Yemen? After having argued how these two crises are similar in crucial variables, I show how their outcomes on women’s political empowerment are different. Both were empowering for women in informal politics, but this did not automatically translate in empowerment in formal politics. I argue the crucial difference between the two crises – the uprisings and the current conflict – which caused the different outcomes is the nature and circumstances of the subsequent transitional process.
The position of women in crises is a difficult and challenging matter, but also one of great importance in current-day societies. With this thesis, I seek to contribute to the knowledge of women’s problems, possibilities and potential during crises. My underlying personal interest is in looking how we can improve women’s position and is thus a rather subjective stance. Although my own position is normative, this thesis is an analytic exercise, not a normative one. It is an old mistake to think women in other cultures are ‘oppressed’ or ‘subjugated’ by men or their culture/politics/religion. Western feminists often argued for the need to ‘save’ Muslim women from this oppression (Abu-Lughod 2013). Writing as a Western feminist about empowerment of women in Yemen is thus a dangerous exercise, liable to many prejudices, mistakes and false sentiments. I am aware of the risk of wishful thinking on the one hand – seeing things that did not happen – or downplaying agency on the other hand – arguing something is not empowerment because it does not meet my personal standards. Being aware of this and using a combination of objective and subjective methodologies (see Methodology section), helps me neutralise my own partiality.
1. Definitions: crisis and political empowerment
For this research, two concepts are of central importance: ‘crisis’ and ‘political empowerment’. In this thesis, I analyse how two crises – the 2011 uprisings and the current conflict in Yemen – have impacted women’s position in politics and I seek to explain the different outcomes.
Prima facie, these crises might seem rather different in nature yet they both fit the definition of
‘mass violent conflicts’ by Brück & Schindler (2009). They argue crises have three dimensions: there must be 1.) Action that is destructive, non-cooperative, widespread and persistent.
Non-cooperative here must be understood as not willing to cooperate with the government or actively opposing it; 2.) Actual or perceived violation of property rights over assets, persons or institutions; and 3.) Instigation through some degree of group activity (Brück & Schindler 2009, 292). Both the 2011 uprisings and the current conflict fulfil these criteria: in 2011 large masses took the streets, blocked roads and camped in public spaces. People from all over the country participated in these protests lasting for several months. The protests were non-cooperative towards the government, destructive towards the working of people’s property rights and instigated through group activity. The current conflict fulfils these criteria as well: the conflict started in 2014 and is still enduring, the entire country is affected by its consequences, property rights are almost absent, different groups are fighting each other and economic and political life has been destroyed. Both the 2011 uprisings and the current conflict thus fit the broad definition of ‘crisis’ and hence are comparable. In Chapter 1 – Literature review, I further elaborate on the similarities to show these crises are similar in crucial variables. For now, it is important both can be defined as ‘crisis’.
Political empowerment is the second central concept on which this thesis builds. There is great academic debate on how to define empowerment and whether it can be defined at all (see Chapter 1 – Literature Review). One of the most often-used definitions is that by Naila Kabeer, Professor of Gender & Development at the London School of Economics, who defined empowerment as “the process by which those who have been denied the ability to make choices acquire such an ability” (Kabeer 1999, 437). In this thesis I focus on political empowerment: the process of gaining the ability to make political choices and act upon them. People who were formerly excluded from politics, such as women, now gain access to politics. This empowerment has three dimensions: women’s civil liberties and rights, women’s civil society participation and women’s political participation (Mosedale 2005, 250). The first refers to the extent to which women’s (human) rights, and women’s issues specifically, are honoured by political institutions and law. It means that women have equal civil and political rights to men, but also that women’s specific interests, such as for instance regulations on maternal leave, are represented. My focus in this thesis is, however, primarily on the other two dimensions: women’s civil society participation, or informal political participation, and women’s political participation, or formal political participation. Formal political participation means the inclusion of women in official political structures, such as parliament and peace processes. Informal political participation entails women voicing their demands outside of the official political structures, for instance in civil society, i.e. social movements and organisations. In this thesis I focus on both formal and informal political participation of women during the 2011 uprisings and the current conflict. However, for political empowerment mere participation in
politics (informal or formal) is not sufficient. As Kabeer’s definition stated, one must have the ability to make choices. Hence, it is about meaningful participation. Women have to be able to think and act independently in the process and be able to influence the decision-making process substantially (Al Naami & Moodley 2017, 12). Simply put, an increase in meaningful (informal or formal) political participation thus points at political empowerment.
2. Methodology
This thesis takes the form of a most-similar-systems comparison. The 2011 uprisings and the current conflict are similar in crucial variables (as explained in Chapter 1 – Literature Review) yet have different outcomes. The different outcomes can be explained by the one dependent variable which is different in the two cases. In order to be able to make this comparison, I first have to argue how these two crises are similar. Subsequently, I have to show their different impacts on women’s political empowerment. When researching (political) empowerment, the main question is: how to ‘measure’ it? In her seminal 1999 article ‘Resources, Agency, Achievements: Reflections on the Measurement of Women’s Empowerment’, Kabeer argued three factors facilitate empowerment: the access to human and social resources, the agency to think independently and act upon one’s decisions, and the achievements of these two factors combined (Kabeer 1999, 437-439). To be able to ‘measure’ the process of empowerment, one would thus have to look at these factors.
Richardson (2018) argues it is best to look at agency. Resources only show the possibilities women have and what they might possibly do with these resources, but do not show whether they have made decisions independently. Women can also be hindered in using these resources by structural factors or decide not to act to empower themselves at all (Richardson 2018, 546). Resources thus only show the possibilities and not the process of decision-making. Achievements, on the other hand, only show the outcomes but do not show whether this outcome is a result of actual empowerment or of for instance external pressure, luck or coincidence. Richardson therefore argues agency, the ability to define one’s goals and act upon them, is the crucial factor in measuring empowerment (Richardson 2018, 542).
In my definition of political empowerment, women are empowered politically when they are able to participate in (informal and/or formal) politics. Focusing on agency in political empowerment would imply women can be politically empowered by internally thinking political things without necessarily showing this to the outer world by participating in politics. This would not be helpful in analysing political empowerment as I defined it. Achievements, i.e. being present in politics, on the other hand, can provide direct evidence of women’s political
empowerment. When women are not active in politics, there is no political empowerment and vice versa. Therefore, in this research, I focus on the achievements-factor in empowerment.
Furthermore, there are two ways of conceptualising progress in women’s political participation (Kabeer 2017, 650), the what I call ‘outsider perspective’ and ‘insider perspective’. The insider perspective looks at changes in women’s lives and the value women themselves attach to these. The merit of this approach is that it limits – though not completely eliminates – bias from the side of the researcher. If the women in question experience something as progress, it can be seen as empowerment; women themselves determine what empowerment means. The problem, however, is that women sometimes have incorporated their own subjugation: they might consider a certain state of affairs unproblematic whereas it is in fact a state of disempowerment (Kabeer 2017, 650). The outsider perspective, on the other hand, takes an externally developed framework about empowerment and tests whether women’s experiences match this framework. Whether something is empowerment or not is not determined by women’s own experiences of the change, but by its match with the developed framework. This approach solves the problem of internalised subjugation, but it also tends to discount women’s own experiences about change and progress (Kabeer 2017, 650). In this research, I combine these two approaches, using a dual perspective. In formal politics, there are certain national and international standards which bind Yemen. The United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 (2000) states, for instance, that women should be included in all stages of the peace process (UN Security Council 2000). Since Yemen is signatory to this Resolution, this can be used as an outsider perspective to test whether Yemen fulfils its duties in women’s political participation and whether women are empowered in formal politics. By looking at what women’s movements and individual women have wished to achieve and what they have achieved in the end, I analyse what women themselves value and hence use the insider perspective. This dual perspective allows me to use both objective standards of women’s political participation and subjective experiences of this participation.
Due to the still ongoing war in Yemen and the accompanying travel restrictions (both by Leiden University and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs), I was not able to travel to Yemen for this research. This thesis is thus based on qualitative desk-based research. For the outsider perspective, the main data is extracted from policy documents from both the Yemeni government and the United Nations (UN). Security Council Resolutions on Yemen, reports of the Office of the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary General to Yemen (referred to as OSESGY) and documents of the Yemeni government help explain the official structures and aims of the formal political processes, both in 2011 and in the current peace attempts. These documents give insight in the role officially attributed to women in formal politics.
This image is however sometimes contradicted by women’s lived experiences, the insider perspective. For this insider perspective – which is used for both informal and formal politics – getting access to women’s experiences was crucial. Blogs and social media proved to be an important source, where women could express themselves free of government censorship. The main blogs I have used are from Afrah Nasser (blog called ‘afrahnasser’), Atiaf Alwazir (blog initially called ‘womenfromyemen’ and when moved to a new website ‘atiafalwazir’) and Noon Arabia (blog called ‘notesbynoon’). All three women were occupied with the 2011 uprisings and the current conflict; Afrah Nasser and Atiaf Alwazir lived in Sana’a during the 2011 uprisings but now live in respectively Sweden and France. Noon Arabia – which is a pseudonym – has lived in the Yemeni diaspora during both the 2011 uprisings and the current war but has been occupied with the Yemeni women’s movements from a distance. Besides these three much-read blogs, I have analysed some smaller ones from Rasha Jarhum, Safa Mubgar (blog called ‘saphsaf’) and Sam Waddah (blog called ‘proudyemeni’). In addition to this, I have conducted five interviews with Yemeni women who have been occupied with either the 2011 uprisings, the current war or both. These women were selected based on their experience with one or both of these crises. All women come from different places in Yemen – spread over North and South Yemen – and together they give a rather complete picture of the situation in Yemen. These interviews were conducted either via phone in a semi-structured manner and lasted for about an hour or were done via email correspondence with written questions and answers.1 These women’s experiences serve as anecdotal evidence for the insider
perspective for both informal and formal politics. Lastly, I used secondary sources such as newspaper articles, speeches and interviews done by others (both written and on video) to broaden the scope of this research.
3. Structure of thesis
This thesis is organised in six chapters. The first chapter gives an overview of existing literature and debates on the topics of (political) empowerment, women, crises and Yemen. This chapter elaborates on the theory that crises are empowering for women. In the literature contradicting arguments are given why crises may or may not work politically empowering for women. Causal mechanisms which would facilitate women’s informal and formal political empowerment during crises are mentioned, yet they are not sufficiently tested in different situations. Consequently, there is little accurate knowledge which are determining factors for
1 All the interviewees were offered anonymity, but they declined it in a written statement and consented their names be used in this thesis, even in case of publication.
women’s political empowerment during crises and what different effects different sorts of crises may have on women. Therefore, in the second section of this chapter, I build a theoretical framework which I use to research political empowerment of women during the 2011 uprisings and the current conflict in Yemen. In this theoretical framework, I show how the 2011 uprisings and the current conflict are similar and comparable in crucial variables, arguing for the possibility of a most-similar-systems comparison. Chapter two gives a short history of Yemen. Pinpointing the central themes throughout Yemen’s history which play an important role in the researched crises, this chapter serves as background for the following chapters.
Chapter three to five form the core of the research. Chapter three and four discuss respectively the 2011 uprisings and the current conflict. In these chapters I use the theoretical framework to analyse factors that contribute to or hinder women’s political empowerment. I show how the 2011 uprisings worked politically empowering for women in informal politics but how an automatic translation of this to formal politics was lacking. When women were included, however, women’s participation in formal politics was meaningful and empowering. In chapter four, I show that although women are still active in informal politics, the current conflict has less opportunities for women in formal politics; women are mere ‘token women’ and are hindered in their meaningful participation. In chapter five, I analyse the variables that may cause the differences in outcome between the 2011 uprisings and the current conflict. Why were the 2011 uprisings politically empowering for women and is the current conflict not? I conclude by arguing that the presence of democracy is the determining dependent variable that causes the difference in formal political empowerment between the 2011 uprisings and the current conflict.
1.
Literature review: empowerment, women and crises
The main question of this thesis is how the 2011 uprisings and the current conflict have impacted women’s political empowerment and how the different outcomes between these two crises can be explained. Central in this research is the concept of ‘empowerment’, but what is empowerment? In the first part of this literature review, I elaborate on the concept of empowerment and the current academic debates on it. Following these debates, I explain the theoretical framework I use in this thesis. In the third part, I analyse academic debates on politics, women and empowerment in Yemen, showing the relevance of my research.
1. Empowerment: definitions and debates
The concept of empowerment was first coined in the 1980s by feminists from the Global South who wanted to challenge the dominance of women from the Global North in feminist debates (Elliott 2008b, 6). They demanded to be able to participate in the debates; they wanted to be ‘empowered’. Ever since, the concept has become a topic of much contention. Although it has become a central feature in foreign policy and development aid, in academic circles there is still no consensus on the meaning of empowerment.
Academic debates: (political) empowerment
In academia, many different definitions of empowerment are used. One of the most influential definitions is that of Kabeer who defines empowerment as the “process by which those who have been denied the ability to make choices acquire such an ability” (Kabeer 1999, 437). Although this definition is often used in academic and policy circles, many other definitions have been offered as well. Batliwala (1994) defines empowerment for instance as the process of challenging existing power relations and gaining greater control over sources of power (Batliwala 1994, 130). Elliott (2008b) focuses more on the individual, arguing it is about an individual’s capacity to take control over her life and resources (Elliott 2008b, 7). Definitions on empowerment thus have a slightly different emphasis, but they agree on three elements. First of all, it is a process of change: one must first be disempowered before one can be empowered. Empowerment means a positive change in one’s position and abilities and hence is an ongoing dynamic process without a definite end-goal (Chopra & Müller 2016, 1; Cornwall 2016, 344; Elliott 2008b, 7; Kabeer 1999, 437; Mosedale 2005, 244; Richardson 2018, 541). Secondly,
power is a central feature of empowerment: it is about gaining more power and challenging and changing power relations. An often-used notion of power is again one of Kabeer, who defined it as the “ability to make choices” (Kabeer 1999, 436). Important is that these choices are not mere luxury choices, but so-called strategic life choices: choices that are crucial to be able to live the life you want to live. Empowerment is about the ability of people to make decisions on matters which are important to them and to carry these out (Batliwala 1994, 130; Elliott 2008b, 7; Kabeer 1999, 437; Mosedale 2005, 244). The third common aspect in definitions of empowerment is that it is an internal process. True empowerment is about a change in an individual’s thinking and consequently in their behaviour. Third parties can help facilitate this empowerment by for instance providing resources and creating favourable conditions, but they cannot bestow empowerment. It is an individual, internal process. Consequently, when outcomes seem to point to empowerment, but no change within individuals has happened, there is no empowerment, it is argued (Cornwall 2016, 343; Elliott 2008b, 8; Mosedale 2005, 244). Considering these three crucial aspects present in almost all definitions of empowerment, we can draft a general definition most would agree on: empowerment is an ongoing, internal process that gives someone who did not have it before the power to independently make decisions and act upon them.
This definition is a general definition of empowerment, encompassing its most crucial aspects. Yet it is unspecified for scope and specific areas of life. Kabeer’s definition of power focuses on the ability to make strategic life choices, but does not specify which strategic life choices: personal, political, economic? Individual, within the community or at larger scales? Different areas of life – economic, social, political life – demand different strategic life choices and hence have different kinds of power and empowerment (Mosedale 2005). In this thesis, I focus on political empowerment, which necessarily involves political power. Lukes (2005) has an influential three-fold account of political power (Lukes 2005). Firstly, power means decision-making power. A has power over B insofar as A is able to influence B’s decision against B’s will. This ‘power over’ can be understood as A dominating B, but also as A simply participating in decision-making. This latter is the way I understand it in this thesis. Secondly, power means agenda-setting. A has power over B insofar as A is able to influence which issues come up for decision to begin with and decides who gets to make decisions. Agenda-setting thus means one is able to push issues forward and trigger a discussion about it. Thirdly, power means consciousness-shaping. A has power over B insofar as A is able to shape how B perceives his own preferences and possibilities. This form of power means B simply has no possibility of thinking otherwise. When discussing political power and empowerment in the context of this thesis, particularly the first two forms of power are important. Political power
means being able to participate in decision-making and agenda-setting. Hence, political empowerment can be defined as an ongoing, internal process that gives someone who did not have it before the power to participate in decision-making and agenda-setting.
Empowerment of women
Empowerment is thus a process for all disempowered groups in order to gain power. In this thesis I focus specifically on Yemeni women as such a disempowered group in politics. One crucial question that comes to mind when discussing women’s empowerment is: why does it matter? There are two categories of answers to this question: the feminist perspective and the instrumentalist perspective.
The concept of empowerment originated from a feminist perspective, which argues women gaining greater control over their lives and decisions is a matter of mere social justice. It is a rights-based argument: women are equal to men and hence should have equal rights and opportunities. From this perspective, empowerment demands a thorough revision of existing power structures (Elliott 2008b, 2; Kabeer 1999, 442). The instrumentalist perspective, on the other hand, tends to dominate current debates on empowerment. It argues women’s empowerment is crucial because it has desirable multiplier effects. In poverty reduction empowerment of women is for instance seen as an effective strategy because of the relation between poverty and disempowerment (Elliott 2008a, x; Elliott 2008b, 6-7; Kabeer 1999, 437; Richardson 2018, 540). In current-day development and policy circles, women’s empowerment is presented as ‘smart economics’: it is a rational investment because it leads to effective development outcomes (Beaman et al 2012; Chant & Sweetman 2012; Cockburn 2010; Duflo 2012; Klasen & Lamanna 2009).
Although often used, the instrumental perspective on women’s (political) empowerment is also heavily criticised. Presenting women’s empowerment as a tool to a different end, tends to undermine the strength of the claim because it overlooks the fundamental causes of women’s disempowerment and the need of thoroughly revising existing power structures (Elliott 2008b, 7; Kabeer 1999, 436, 442). More importantly, Olivius (2014) argues the instrumentalist perspective reinforces stereotypes of women and thereby potentially perpetuates their subjugated position (Olivius 2014). In development aid, women are for instance often targeted because they are in charge of nursing the children and hence are assumed to allocate the aid to the benefit of their children. As true as this may be, it also reinforces the stereotype of women as caring, nursing and attributes women their place as mothers and wives in the household (Olivius 2014). The instrumental use of women’s empowerment might thus be attractive for development and policy actors, but it does not necessarily benefit the women in question.
When questioning the importance of women’s political empowerment, these same two perspectives occur. Philips (1998) formulated four reasons for the importance of women’s political empowerment. Firstly, successful women politicians offer a role model for women which can contribute to greater gender equality in society. Secondly, equal representation is a matter of social justice. Thirdly, particular interests of women are better represented when women are represented and, lastly, when women participate in politics, democracy is improved and strengthened (Bauer & Britton 2006, 3; Philips 1998, 228-238; Pospieszna 2015, 1252). These four arguments entail both feminist and instrumental perspectives: women’s political participation is just (the feminist perspective) and useful (the instrumental perspective). In contexts of conflict and crises, the empowerment of women is attributed an additional instrumental role, namely that women bring qualities to peace negotiations that men do not have and otherwise would be lacking. Because women are thought to be more peaceful and willing to compromise by nature, they are assumed to be good peacemakers and hence should be incorporated in peace negotiations, it is often argued (Arostegui 2013, 535; Pospieszna 2015, 1251-1252). In this case, the instrumental argument for women’s inclusion in politics, is to the benefit of women (they are included after all), but it might also harm them since they are only included qua women and for the sake of certain qualities they are assumed to have. As Olivius (2014) argues, if they turn out not to have these qualities or are otherwise undermining the assumptions, they are quickly removed from the negotiation table (Olivius 2014, 5). In Yemen’s crises, both the instrumentalist and feminist perspective occur as well to argue for women’s inclusion in politics.
Empowerment during and after crises
One of the elements of empowerment is, as stated above, that it is an internal process. Nevertheless, it is also showed this process can be facilitated and furthered (or halted) by third parties and circumstances. Crises are often argued to be such a moment of profound change for the position of women (Arostegui 2013, 536; Bauer & Britton 2006, 11; Genovese 1993, 211; Hughes 2009, 175; Kumar 2001, 19). There is however no consensus in academia whether this change is positive or negative; are women during and after crises empowered or disempowered? There are some factors that are showed to contribute to women’s empowerment during crises. Movements seeking to overthrow existing governments often have new visions on society which profoundly differ from existing ones and might be positive for women (Hughes 2009, 178-179). Also, in this movement for change, formerly excluded people – such as women – are perceived as great partners for change and their political utility increases (Hughes 2009, 178). By contributing to the struggle on either side in the conflict, women can gain a positive
image; their utility and efforts are recognised (Bauer & Britton 2006, 11; Hughes 2009, 179). The most important factor, however, that influences women’s position in society during crises is the change of gender norms. Some argue gender norms loosen during crises. Men are often away from home to fight or have died and consequently women have taken over the head of household duties. This way, women get access to the public space and gendered conceptions of duties and jobs erode, which may work empowering for women (Arostegui 2013, 536; Bauer & Britton 2006, 11; Hughes 2009, 175; Kumar 2001, 19, 21). However, this increase in responsibilities is not necessarily experienced as positive by women themselves. In addition to their usual responsibilities of amongst others taking care of children, women now also have to bear the burden of survival. Often this is experienced more as a burden than a benefit of crises (Chant 2008, 176; Kumar 2001, 13). Yet when there is actively pushed for changing gender norms – instead of them changing out of sheer necessity – the erosion of gender norms may also have positive effects. Women can enter the public space more freely, which may facilitate their political activities and consequently their political empowerment (Arostegui 2013, 536; Hughes 2009, 178; Kumar 2001, 22).
Afshar (2007) and Elliott (2008), on the other hand, state the contrary, arguing gender norms do not loosen but instead become stricter during crises. Women are used as symbols of national and cultural integrity and as a consequence, gender norms become stricter. This has severe negative impacts on women: they are confined to the roles of wives and mothers of heroes and the dignity of a movement/society/country is directly related to the adherence to these strict gender norms (Afshar 2007, 238; Elliott 2008a, xi; Elliott 2008b, 6, 15). During crises, women thus have less possibilities and are increasingly constrained, Afshar and Elliott argue. Moghadam (1997) takes a middle way between these two opposites – whether crises loosen or restrict gender norms – arguing it depends on the nature of the revolution. She argues there are two kind of revolutions, each with its own consequences for women. On the one hand, there are so-called ‘women-in-the-family’-revolutions, which indeed confine women to the realm of the household and often adopt negative laws concerning women’s position in society. On the other hand, there are the ‘women’s emancipation’-movements in which women’s emancipation and empowerment is a central component. According to Moghadam, the negative consequences for women are not universal to crises, but just characteristic for one specific type of revolution (Moghadam 1997).
As these debates show, there is no consensus on the impact of crises on women’s empowerment. There are empowering factors of for instance having women’s political utility recognised, but gender norms may also become stricter and women bear the burden of survival. More importantly, there is little understanding of the differences in impact on women’s
empowerment between different sorts of crises. Moghadam distinguished two types of revolutions, but she did not expand this distinction to for instance armed conflicts. In this thesis I seek to fill this gap in knowledge. Analysing the impact on women’s political empowerment of two different crises, the 2011 uprisings (equivalent of a revolution) and the current conflict (which can be characterised as a non-international armed conflict2), I argue the nature of the
subsequent formal political process is crucial in determining women’s political empowerment. 2. Theoretical Framework
In analysing women’s political empowerment during Yemen’s crises, I use two ‘tools’: the causal mechanisms translating informal political participation in formal political participation, and the meaningfulness of women’s participation in formal politics. The latter is about the way in which women are able to participate in formal political processes. In order to participate meaningfully, women have to be able to think and act independently in the process and be able to influence decision-making processes substantially (Al Naami & Moodley 2017, 12). They should for instance not be mere ‘token women’ who are present for the sake of being present but be able to address and push for specific women’s issues if they think these important. Meaningful participation is a crucial element of political participation; when women are not able to participate meaningfully in the political processes, there is little political empowerment.
The second tool are the causal mechanisms which may come into play during a crisis and – when present – contribute to women’s political participation. Reviewing debates on women’s empowerment during crises, Hughes (2009) developed a framework of seven causal mechanisms that translate women’s informal political participation in formal political participation. If some of these causal mechanisms are present in informal politics, she argues, this will lead to women’s inclusion in formal politics (Hughes 2009, 180). In Figure 1, the seven causal mechanisms are specified. In this thesis, I test these causal mechanisms for both the 2011 uprisings and the current conflict. Did these causal mechanisms occur? Did they indeed lead to inclusion of women in formal political processes? Why (not)?
In the following two chapters, I use these tools – the presence of causal mechanisms and the meaningfulness of women’s political participation – to analyse women’s political
2 Following the standards of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the Yemeni conflict can be characterised as a Non-International Armed Conflict. For this, there must be an armed conflict with a minimum level of intensity, all parties to the conflict must be organised and at least one of the parties must be a non-state actor. The main warring parties in the Yemeni conflict are the Houthis, which is a non-state actor, and the Hadi-government, which is a state actor. Although both parties are supported by other international actors, these international actors are not an active party to the conflict and hence the conflict remains non-international (International Committee of the Red Cross 2008).
Figure 1 (Hughes 2009, 180) empowerment. Using a most-similar-systems comparison, I show which dependent variable determines the different outcome of the two crises. But first, I must show the similarity between the 2011 uprisings and the current conflict. In the Introduction, I already argued both fulfil the criteria for ‘crisis’ as formulated by Brück & Schindler (2009). Both can thus be labelled ‘crisis’ and hence can be distinguished from mere local upheavals or low-profile demonstrations. Furthermore, the two crises are similar in four variables which determine the nature of crises and their similarity: time, contestation, size and internationality (Hughes 2009, 181). Time
Structural factors:
1. Influx of qualified female candidates. Women are politicised and more eligible, politically active candidates due to their activities and ‘political awakening’ during the crisis. They were for instance active as combatants, in women’s organisations or social movements.
2. Demographic change. During the crisis, many men were killed or have left home. This has led to women outnumbering men and hence women being more likely and eligible to enter public office.
Political factors:
3. Regime change. Former politicians are pushed out of office, the regime changes and the new regime might create space for women’s participation.
4. Overhaul of the political system. Internal or external pressure creates profound regime changes, leading to more open politics and chances for women.
5. Progressive revolution. A ‘women’s emancipation’-revolution can empower women politically. Any revolution seeks to tell a new story, opposite to the story of the former regime and hence might improve women’s position.
Cultural factors:
6. Changing gender roles. During the crisis, women have taken on new
responsibilities as head of the household and political actors. This challenges perceptions on women’s roles and capabilities.
7. Political utility of women increases. Political actors place greater value on women’s perceived characteristics.
refers to the time period in which a crisis occurs; a conflict in the 1930s differs in its effects on women’s position from a conflict in the 2000s because the moment of crisis and the global circumstances are profoundly different. The 2011 uprisings and the current conflict happened in a condensed time period, namely the last decade. Even more, the current conflict started while the transitional process following the 2011 uprisings had not even ended yet. Little has changed in the time between these two crises and hence they are similar in this respect. The variable of contestation holds what the dispute concerns. Hughes argues there is a difference between governmental disputes and territorial disputes. The latter tend to be about cases of secession and autonomy and hence are not very fundamental nor involve grand changes for women. Governmental disputes, on the other hand, often seek to replace an existing government, draw new constitutions and change the public space. These kinds of disputes involve a new vision on society and tend to be more influential on women’s position in society (Hughes 2009, 181). Although secessionist sentiments play a role in the current conflict (see Chapter 2 – Yemen’s History), both the 2011 uprisings and the current conflict can be characterised as governmental disputes. In both crises, the existing government was challenged and fundamental reforms and new visions on society played an important role. Again, the crises are similar in this variable. The third factor in play is size. Large-scale internationalised wars have different effects on women and their political empowerment than smaller-scale conflicts. Political mobilisation, military activity, ideological change and changes to government structure are factors that are likely to affect women’s outcomes and these things are more likely to happen in a larger war (Hughes 2009, 181). Hence, size matters. Size is a factor that prima
facie may distinguish the 2011 uprisings from the current conflict. The 2011 uprisings were an
internal conflict, of the population against the government, whereas in the current conflict international actors are more actively involved. Nevertheless, both crises remain non-international crises since the non-international actors involved in the current conflict are no actual parties to the conflict but merely supporting the parties (International Committee of the Red Cross 2008). Also, in both crises the aforementioned factors such as political mobilisation, military activity, ideological change and government change occurred. Both crises thus have a similar size in this respect. In addition to this, for both the 2011 uprisings and the current conflict it is the case that the subsequent peace/transitional processes were large-scale and included international actors. The size of the crises and the peace processes are thus comparable. Lastly, the existence of international linkages such as treaty ratification or the presence of international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) is an important variable. Integration in international systems changes the environment and circumstances in which a crisis takes place. During both the 2011 uprisings and the current conflict Yemen was integrated
in international systems: it is for instance signatory to treaties concerning women’s empowerment (for instance UNSCR 1325 (2000)) and many INGOs are working in Yemen on the topic of Women, Peace and Security (UN OCHA 2018b). The environment of international linkages has remained the same in the 2011 uprisings and the current conflict.
The 2011 uprisings and the current conflict both fulfil the criteria of ‘crisis’ as formulated by Brück & Schindler (2009) and, in addition to this, they are similar in the four variables of time, contestation, size and internationality. A difference in the outcome of women’s political empowerment thus cannot be caused by a difference in one of these variables. Therefore, I will argue this difference is caused by the dependent variable of democracy. The circumstances and nature of the formal political process is the determining factor for women’s political empowerment.
3. Women in Yemen: empowerment during crises
In the previous sections, I have discussed the debates concerning empowerment of women in crises in general. In this section, I focus on debates on these issues in Yemen specifically. Interestingly, compared with surrounding countries, there is relatively little research on Yemen. Moreover, existing literature on Yemen focuses primarily on its instability from a top-down perspective, looking at for instance corruption and political elites (For instance: Bonnefoy 2018; Juneau 2013; Lackner 2017; Philips 2011). Less is written from a bottom-up perspective, focusing on women and civil society. One might argue this is because of their limited role in Yemen’s history and the current crises. However, this is simply not true.
The ancient Queen of Sheba was the famous first female ruler of Yemen. And after that, throughout Yemen’s history, women have played important roles in crises and uprisings, both as instigators and peacemakers. In her extensive work on women in Yemen, Maxine Molyneux (1979) shows for instance the role of women’s organisations in the 1967 anti-colonisation independence struggles in South Yemen (Molyneux 1979). Carla Makhlouf (1979) adds to this a similar perspective from North Yemen (Makhlouf 1979). Since the unification of North and South Yemen in the 1990s, women’s legal, social and political position in society has been a topic of political contention (Molyneux 1995). The multiparty competition between Northern and Southern political parties has led to limited roles attributed to women in the public and political sphere (Yadav & Clark 2010), yet still women such as human rights activist Amal Basha remained active in politics (Nasser 17 June 2011) – both in informal and formal spheres. The argument of women’s limited role in Yemen’s history is thus not valid, but it certainly does not work for the 2011 uprisings, since women throughout the Arab world played a pivotal role
in these uprisings. For the 2011 uprisings and the current conflict, this thesis adds a bottom-up perspective for Yemen, looking at how these crises have impacted women’s political participation.
Because the current conflict is still ongoing, it is rather ‘fresh’ and ‘untouched’ in academic literature. Recent literature of for instance Lackner (2017), Heinze (2018) and Bonnefoy (2018) focuses primarily on the international relations of the war, the Houthi movement and security issues. These topics are relatively easy to research from a distance and do not require much fieldwork. Little is written on the role of women in war, primarily because of the difficulties – or even impossibility – of doing field research during this conflict. The information on women in war available comes from development agencies working on the ground. Using reports of these development agencies combined with blogs and interviews as sources, with this thesis I seek to contribute to the understanding of the current war by focusing on women’s roles in war. Touching upon a new debate within the Yemeni context and building on longstanding debates of women in war, this thesis offers new insights on the relation between crises and women’s political empowerment.
As little as there is written on the current Yemeni conflict, as much is written on the 2011 uprisings. There is general agreement in academia that women had pivotal roles in the uprisings throughout the Arab world. Women were among the instigators of the protests and often developed into leaders and spokesmen of the various movements (Shalaby & Moghadam 2016). One of the most well-known women participants in the uprisings is the Yemeni Tawakkol Karman, who received the Nobel Peace Prize in 2011 for her “non-violent struggle for the safety of women and for women’s rights” (The Nobel Peace Prize 2011). Fraihat (2016) argues that the omnipresence of women in the uprisings furthered the uprisings; with all these women out on the streets protesting, men could not lag behind and felt compelled to support the protests (Fraihat 2016, 206). Despite women’s important roles during the uprisings, there is however also consensus that this did not translate in actual improvements for women’s political, social and legal positions in society. Finn (2015) argues that after the 2011 uprisings the need for women’s political empowerment is greater than ever before: women have gone out on the streets, have showed their willingness to participate, now it is important they are enabled to actually participate (Finn 2015). After an extensive analysis of women’s positions after the uprisings, Shalaby & Moghadam (2016) also emphasised the need of empowerment (Shalaby & Moghadam 2016).
Interestingly however, although Shalaby & Moghadam (2016) claim to focus on the aftermath of the ‘Arab Spring’ in general, Yemen is barely mentioned. This is a common feature in academic literature on the 2011 uprisings; this literature often focuses on the uprisings in
Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, and Yemen is mentioned only little or even left out altogether. This lack of attention for Yemen is interesting for two reasons. First of all, Yemen is the only so-called ‘Arab Spring’ country in which the army did not act as a unified entity during the 2011 uprisings. Instead, an intra-elite struggle emerged between loyalists and critics of the Saleh-regime. When the regime staggered due to the uprisings, many in the military thought it wise to abandon Saleh and chose for themselves in order to safeguard their future (Seitz 2014, 64). This fracturing of the military makes Yemen a unique case among countries that experienced the 2011 uprisings. Secondly, Yemen is considered to be the only country which came out of the uprisings through negotiations and which started a democratic transition to solve the problems that caused the uprisings (Alley 2013a, 74; Benomar 2013, 202; International Crisis Group 2012, I; Lackner 2014, 13). Much literature on Yemen’s uprising focuses on this democratic transition and specifically on the National Dialogue Conference (NDC), a large-scale inclusive democratic conference aimed at restructuring the Yemeni state and society. At the beginning and during the NDC, the process was much-heralded. The fact Yemen attempted a peaceful transition was thought to be praiseworthy. However, soon after the NDC ended much criticism came out on the proceedings and outcomes (Alley 2013a, 78; Durac 2012, 168, 173; Hamidi 2015, 30). A central question in literature on the Yemeni uprisings and the subsequent NDC is why it ‘failed’.
The degree of inclusiveness is the most contested aspect of the NDC: it is both praised and criticised for its (supposed lack of) inclusiveness. As stated in the transition agreement as drafted by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the NDC was to provide an opportunity for representatives from all walks of life and from all parts of Yemen to voice their concerns (Implementation Mechanism 2011, 7). Among the 565 delegates, there were 30% women, 15% youth and 7% civil society activists, which was an unprecedented inclusion of formerly excluded groups (Fraihat 2016, 206; Heinze 2018, 12; Lackner 2014, 13). Also, the NDC provided chances of participation for other marginalised groups such as the Houthis from the North and the Hiraak from the South (Hamidi 2015, 18). However, others argue this inclusiveness was merely superficial. Alley (2013a/b) states for instance the southern movement was not really represented since the southern representatives were close allies of president Hadi himself, did not represent the full range of opinions in the south and hence could not create any support for NDC decisions (Alley 2013a, 75; Alley 2013b, 725). The second problem of inclusion was the extent to which these formerly marginalised groups actually had a say in these political negotiations, to what extent their participation was meaningful. Alley (2013a) argues the NDC was merely a reshuffling of old political elites. Of course, new political actors were admitted to the negotiations, but they did not have the political clout to actually
establish something. Their inclusion was a mere ticking of boxes by the elite, Alley argues (Alley 2013a, 78; Heinze 2018, 10).
Inclusiveness and the NDC is thus a much-debated topic: it was inclusive in the sense that formerly excluded people could participate but it is not clear whether this inclusiveness was meaningful and changed the political status of these marginalised groups. Many authors mention the (lack of) inclusiveness in the NDC as an accomplishment and failing. However, most literature focuses on the (lack of) inclusiveness of the Houthi and Hiraak movements (Clausen 2015; Durac 2012; Hamidi 2015) probably because these two groups are major players in the subsequent current war. The inclusion of women is mentioned as something special (Lackner 2017, 46) yet little research is done on the actual involvement of women in the NDC. To what extent did they have a say and were their voices heard? Al-Sakkaf (2018) wrote on women’s participation in the NDC yet focuses solely on one working group of which she herself was part (Al-Sakkaf 2018). A broad in-depth view on women’s participation in the uprisings and subsequent transitional process and what this meant for their political empowerment is needed.
In this thesis I analyse women’s participation in the 2011 uprisings and its subsequent transitional process, and in the current conflict and its attempted peace negotiations. With this, I add a bottom-up perspective on Yemeni politics and give a broad in-depth view on women’s roles in both informal and formal politics. Explaining the different outcomes of the 2011 uprisings and the current conflict for women’s political empowerment, I contribute to the knowledge of the impact of crises on women’s political participation. In the following chapter, I first give some essential background to Yemen, its history, politics and the position of women.
2.
Yemen’s History
Yemen’s recent history is characterised by instability, caused by structural factors, which also play important roles in the 2011 uprisings and the current conflict. In this chapter, I discuss Yemen’s recent history, focusing on these factors: its internal divisions, the political system, Islam and poverty. In the last section, I discuss the (historical) position of women in Yemeni society.
1. Divided: North versus South and Houthis versus government
Yemen is a country deeply divided along all possible lines: geographical, political, cultural, religiously. One of the most visible divisions is that between North and South Yemen. After decolonisation in the 1960s, Yemen was split in two separate countries: Northern Yemen, later known as the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) and Southern Yemen, later named the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY). While Northern Yemen was Western-oriented, the PDRY, supported by the Soviet Union (USSR), adopted communism and became the only socialist state in the Arab world (Lackner 2014, 4-8). The two states did not recognise each other, and the relations were regularly hostile (Bonnefoy 2018, 45). When the Cold War ended in 1989 and consequently the support of the former USSR to Southern Yemen stopped, the two Yemen’s decided on unification. In 1990 the YAR and PDRY merged in the Republic of Yemen. It was decided there would be a transition period of two years after which elections would be held. In these elections, southern political parties were overwhelmingly defeated and the northern General People’s Congress (GPC) with Saleh as leader won. This led to unrest among southerners and in 1994 a short secessionist civil war commenced, which was lost by the southern separatists (Lackner 2014, 4-8). As a consequence, the GPC became the ruling party and Saleh the head of state. All rebelling southerners were removed from politics and the military. What was meant to be an egalitarian unification turned out to be more like an absorption, Bonnefoy argues: northerners dominated Yemen’s political and economic life (Bonnefoy 2018, 46).
Since unification, feelings of frustration and oppression have been present in Yemen’s southern parts. In 2007, a group of southern military leaders who had been fired after the 1994 civil war regrouped and started a protest, demanding reinstatement in their military positions or full payment of their pensions. This started as small-scale economic protests but soon turned
into a widespread protest movement against the perceived oppressive regime of northerners ruling Yemen (Heinze 2018, 5; Lackner 2014, 10). This movement, known as Hiraak, has been protesting since and has played an important role in politics: in 2011, they stirred the protests in the South against Saleh, they refused to participate in the NDC and eventually they rejected the outcomes of it (Alley 2013b, 725; Hamidi 2015, 21, 26; Heinze 2018, 14). Now, in the turmoil of the current conflict, they seek to achieve independence again (Brehony et al 2015, 11). This North-South division remains a determining factor in current-day Yemeni politics. However, the north of Yemen is not as unified as it seems either.
In the upmost northern part of the country, in the Sa’da governorate bordering Saudi Arabia, the Houthi movement has caused unrest for a long time. The Houthis are a Shi’a community which has gained much political influence in the northern region since the 1990s. This influence and their autonomy are however not recognised by the central government. Moreover, the largely Sunni dominated government, backed by Sunni Saudi Arabia, fears the Shi’a influence of the Houthis (Heinze 2018, 4). Between 2004 and 2010, the Houthis and the Saleh-regime have fought each other in six subsequent conflicts, known as the Sa’da Wars. In 2010, a ceasefire was established although peace negotiations never succeeded (Lackner 2014, 9). The Houthis participated in the 2011 uprisings and the NDC, but, just as the Hiraak movement, they rejected the outcomes of the NDC arguing it did not do justice to their role, influence and independence in the north. In 2014, the Houthis formed a coalition with the resigned president Saleh and seized the capital Sana’a, with which, it is generally argued, the current conflict commenced (Heinze 2018, 18). The Houthi movement is one of the main players in the current conflict opposing the internationally recognised Yemeni government, and is supported by Iran in this (Fraihat 2016, 49).
2. Politics: patronage, elites and military
Since unification in 1990, Yemen’s government has largely been made up of northerners and led by Saleh. Although much is to say about actual practice, in its official state structure, Yemen is the only democratic republican regime at the Arabian Peninsula with regular elections and some degree of pluralism (Durac 2012, 163; Lackner 2014, 2; Steinbeiser 2015). However, since the 1994 civil war, political freedoms have been narrowed and the degree of democracy diminished (Lackner 2014, 9). Officially, Yemen has for instance an independent judiciary and a multi-party system, but in practice the judiciary had become an extension of Saleh and
(European Council on Foreign Relations, N.D.) the political system is characterised by patronage (Steinbeiser 2015). Saleh had maintained his power for over thirty years through his extensive system of patronage and corruption. The most trusted officials – often family members or fellow tribesmen – were given the most important and sensitive positions in politics and military. This created a political system dominated by a very small elite, barely representing the Yemeni people (Rabi 2015, 197). In 2002, the main opposition parties merged in the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP), dominated by the Islamist Hizb al-Islah (the Islah party). Yet this opposition coalition had not been able to achieve much until the 2011 uprisings where they supported the protests and subsequently became part of the transitional government. It is however argued that although these opposition parties opposed Saleh, they are still made up of a very small elite and hence fundamentally nothing has really changed in Yemeni politics since the 2011 uprisings (Alley 2013a, 78; Heinze 2018, 10).
Besides patronage and elitism, two other important factors determine Yemeni politics: the military and the country’s relationship with Saudi Arabia. For the past two decades, Yemen has de facto been ruled by a military government. Careers were made in the military and the security apparatus was the backbone of the government (Lackner 2014, 13). In the 2011 uprisings, the military defected; some important generals such as General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar (1945-) aligned themselves with the protesters, creating cleavages in the ruling elite (Seitz 2014, 64). In the current conflict, the Hadi-government does not have sufficient military power to combat the Houthis. Hence, it has called for help from the other fundament of Yemeni government: Saudi Arabia (Lackner 2017, 73). Since the foundation of the Saudi kingdom in 1932, allegedly its aim has been to keep Yemen’s politics as weak and as strong as to not be a threat to Saudi Arabia (Lackner 2017, 71). Saudi Arabia fears the democratic sentiments, poverty and Shi’a tendencies of Yemen to influence its own stability. By actively mingling in Yemeni politics, Saudi Arabia ensures the stability of Yemen in its own interest. Saleh’s regime was closely aligned with Saudi Arabia, some even argue almost to the extent of being a puppet-regime (Bonnefoy 2018, 58; Fraihat 2016, 52) and politicians who advocate for policies favouring Saudi interests are for instance rewarded with stipends from Saudi Arabia (Bonnefoy 2018, 55). During the 2011 uprisings, Saudi Arabia initiated the GCC Agreement resulting in the removal of Saleh, the NDC and the transitional process. After the Houthis seized Sana’a in 2014, Saudi Arabia was ready to intervene even before president Hadi officially requested intervention (Lackner 2017, 54). In the current conflict, Saudi Arabia, as initiator, leader and main financer of the international coalition backing the Hadi-government, is seen as the most important international actor in the conflict (Lackner 2017, 54).
3. Poverty and Islam
Poverty and Islam are two other important factors in Yemen’s recent history. Yemen became widely known in the Western world primarily by the bombing of the American marine ship
USS Cole in 2000 in Aden harbour (Bonnefoy 2018, 61). After the terrorist attacks on the World
Trade Centre in New York in 2001, Yemen appeared to be hosting members of Al-Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which is perceived to be the most dangerous branch of Al-Qaeda and hence is in Western discourse often equated with radical Islam and terrorism (Bonnefoy 2018, 61). As a consequence, foreign policy of Western countries towards Yemen has focused particularly on anti-terrorism; Yemen has turned into a battlefield of the global War on Terror (Carapico 2014, 48; Lackner 2017, 25). However, the ‘jihadi threat’ of Yemen is in reality limited. Most Yemenis subscribe to a conservative interpretation of Islam, but this does
not automatically translate into terrorism. As Lackner (2017) states: poverty is far more dangerous for Yemenis themselves and the outer world than the assumed terrorism (Lackner 2017, 26).
Poverty is a salient aspect of Yemen; it is the poorest country in the Middle East and one of the poorest in the world (UN Development Programme 2018, 24). Yet before the discovery of large oil fields in neighbouring countries, Yemen was richer and more developed compared to them. In the 1960s, Aden was the most modern city in the region (Lackner 2014, 14), but the oil-boom has had negative impacts on Yemen. Yemen could not catch up and descended into poverty, caused by a combination of political crises, limited natural resources and worsening climate conditions (Lackner 2014, 15; Lackner 2017, 25). Due to climate change, Yemen is for instance not able to produce its own food and hence is for about 70% of its food needs dependent on imports. Add to this low education standards and a percentage of 70% of the population being under 25 years of age, and one sees the dangers and prevalence of poverty in Yemen (Lackner 2017, 34, 36). In the current conflict, the situation has even worsened. The largest cholera outbreak in human history occurred in Yemen and about 24 million people (80% of the population) is in need of acute humanitarian aid (UN OCHA 2018a, 4).
4. Women in Yemen
What consequences have these factors causing Yemen’s instability for Yemeni women? What is the position of women in Yemen? Since the start of measuring gender equality by the Global Gender Gap Index in 2006, Yemen has ranked as one of the lowest countries (World Economic Forum 2018, 295). Gender equality in Yemen seems to be a difficult matter. However, this has not always been the case. In the former PDRY, women’s rights were well-served. The 1974 Family Law of the PDRY was one of the Arab World’s strongest pro-women legislations (Al-Sakkaf 2018, 148). It is often argued by southerners that their progress in gender equality has been wiped of the table by the North during unification (Al-Sakkaf 2018, 149). The 1994 unification constitution does guarantee equality for all, men and women, but reality has been different. Women in Yemen are often perceived and treated as inferior to men in many spheres of society; they have limited access to healthcare, economic opportunities and education and are regularly sexually harassed (Nasser 5 March 2011; Noon Arabia 28 December 2012). Generally, there is a strong gendered division of labour, with men providing for the family and entering the public space, and women being confined to the house (Al Naami & Moodley 2017, 7). Politically, this conception of gender roles leads to women’s marginalisation in politics.
