Finding the Human in the Posthuman Body
A Phenomenological Posthuman approach to Embodiment in S.F. Film
Thesis rMA Media Studies University of Amsterdam
Graduate School of Humanities
Tess Voormeulen 11083735
Supervisor: Prof. Patricia Pisters Second reader: dr. Marie-Aude Baronian Date of submission: 02-07-2018
And you want to travel with her And you want to travel blind And you know that you can trust her For she's touched your perfect body with her mind
Leonard Cohen ‘Suzanne’
As this thesis considers the relationship between film and viewer at heart, I would first like to acknowledge the medium itself and what it does to me. Film makes me feel both curious and excited, which I will never take lightheartedly, I love submerging myself in the in-between.
In addition to the department of Media Studies as a whole, I would like to thank my supervisor, Patricia Pisters, for the amount of time and effort she was willing to put into discussing my ideas and providing me with spot-on feedback. I have always left our meetings invigorated.
I want to thank my friends and family for their support on days I needed my study-buddies, cinema-breaks and patience, as well as my parents for their time and words of encouragement. Most of all, thank you Rex, for bearing with me.
Abstract
This thesis combines posthuman theory with a phenomenological approach to film analysis, with a focus on embodiment in contemporary SF films. Although combining posthumanism and phenomenology seems far fetched at first, the analyses show that combing the two practices allows for a more complex and nuanced reading of the affective relationship between the film’s body and the viewers body, supported by the bodies on screen. Relying on Jennifer Barkers’ notion of the haptic quality of film in her book the Tactile Eye, the research combines her more subjective human-centered notion of the bodies’ three levels, namely; skin, musculature, and viscera, with the notion of non-human cyborg bodies on screen. Here, the relationship between the viewer and film’s bodies are central.This relationship manifests in what is conceptualized as the in-between, a space or event in which the boundaries between the viewer and film’s bodies are diminished, which is aided by the affective relationship between them.
Following posthuman subjects, the thesis deals with three major themes: the Cartesian mind/ body divide in Tarsem Singh’s Self/Less, which shows that from both a posthuman and phenomenological viewpoint, the body and the mind cannot be separated, which is both established and challenged in the film. Second, gendered cyborg bodies as Others in Ex Machina and Under the
Skin. Whilst depicting a classic femme fatale narrative, both film’s deal with the tension between
what it means to be human and female in a posthuman context, which is complicated by reading them as cyborg femme fatales. Lastly, Her depicts a sincere relationship between a man and an OS, thus moving from the seduction discussed in the previous chapter to intimacy. This chapter shows how a virtual body, or a dis-embodied voice, is still able to express embodied cues, and therefore affect the viewer’s body without showing a body on screen.
The research concludes that combining posthumanism and phenomenology results in a fruitful and more nuanced reading of SF tropes, and is able to uproot conventional ideas on what it means to be human in a technological posthuman era. To keep rediscovering the human in the posthuman body is therefore imperative to the analytical framework that is needed in this context.
Keywords: posthumanism, phenomenology, embodiment, the body, science fiction, in-between,
Posthumanism and Phenomenology: Going Beyond the Body 6
1. Defining the (Post)human Body 12
2. Where is my Mind?: The Mind/Body divide in Self/Less 27
3. Gendered & Dangerous: Ex Machina & Under the Skin 38
4. Virtual Intimacy: Her 59
“She's not just a computer”: Do Posthumans need a Body? 71
Works Cited 75
Posthumanism and Phenomenology: Going Beyond the Body
In an article written for the New York Times about his film Ex Machina (2015) and artificial intelligence, director Alex Garland says that AI, technological bodies and anxiety about these technological developments are to be considered part of our current zeitgeist. Although robots and cyborgs have been popular subjects since early cinema, the more recent focus on technological development in cinema—as well as television—is difficult to ignore. As Garland continues to explain, this infatuation with technology and AI goes hand in hand with anxiety about the future of humanity. What if we would be able to build actual AI’s? Would the rise of the robot mean the end of humanity as we know it? In his view, Garland is supported by creator of the popular ontological series Black Mirror, Charlie Brooker, who explains how technological development always goes together with the rise of the question “what if…?”, because minor mistakes can have dystopian-like consequences. 1
For example, Black Mirror’s episode The Entire History of You (Brian Welsh, 2011), shows how the use of an implanted eye lens connected to a memory device, which is able to film everything the owner experiences, has severe consequences for the way the users handle social situations. As a result, they become shells of the people they once were, completely engaged with the little details of everything that they have recorded. Because they can film all communication, they stop actually communicating with each other. 2
This dystopian imagination of how technology can have a detrimental effect on our social lives may seem farfetched, but technologies such as these are not as much fiction as we might think. In fact, in 2016, Sony patented a lens very similar to the one depicted in Black Mirror. The notion 3
of “what if…” thus revolves around technological progress that is easy to imagine, but the possible dire consequences can be imagined as well. In film, this is a recurring topic, especially in Science Fiction. Stories about robots or computers taking over mankind, alien life threatening humanity, technologies turning our world into wasteland and so on, are staples in the SF genre.
In these examples, the relationship between humans, non-humans, and technology is essential. A depiction of a cyborg or an android with artificial intelligence immediately raises
Garland, Alex. "Alex Garland of 'Ex Machina' Talks About Artificial Intelligence." The New York Times, The New 1
York Times Company, 22 Apr. 2015, Accessed 6 Mar. 2018.
Brooker, Charlie. "Charlie Brooker: the dark side of our gadget addiction." The Guardian 1 Dec. 2011: n. pag. Web. 6 2
March 2018.
Starr, Michelle. "Sony Patents Contact Lens That Records What You See." CNET, CBS INTERACTIVE INC., 3
2 May 2016, www.cnet.com/news/sony-patents-contact-lens-that-records-what-you-see/. Accessed
questions, such as to what extent they can be considered human, and, as an extension to that question, what it then means to be human. Effectively, we are always looking for the human in the machine, the humanity of the alien, and the tender human heart of the cyborg. It is no surprise that the AI’s, or replicants, in the famous Blade Runner (Ridley Scott, 1982) accredit themselves as being more human than humans, for example. These themes are central to posthuman philosophy and theory. As Donna Haraway states about machines:
“Late twentieth-century machines have made thoroughly ambiguous the difference between natural and artificial, mind and body, self-developing and externally designed, and many other distinctions that used to apply to organisms and machines. Our machines are disturbingly lively, and we ourselves frighteningly inert.” 4
Here, Haraway touches upon the technophobia that both Garland and Brooker describe, but also introduces how classical distinctions are to be reconsidered, which is central to the posthuman Paradigm.
Since the early 90’s posthuman theory has been apparent across different disciplines including but not limited to philosophy, language studies, cultural studies and gender studies. After Haraway released her famous Cyborg Manifesto, posthuman theory became relevant quickly, leading to what scholars overall regard as a paradigm shift from classical humanist ideas to posthuman reconsiderations. Moreover, since Haraway, the cyborg is often used as the embodiment or representation of posthuman theory, which can also be attributed to the fact that posthuman scholars have often looked at SF literature when discussing technological and cultural developments.
According to Cary Wolfe, posthumanism came to be as a reaction to classical humanism, in which the anthropos is considered the centre of the universe. In contrast, posthumanism is about a displacement of the human, which allows for a reconsideration of everything that is Other to the anthropos. For example, animals are no longer opposed to humans, but rather humans are part of nature just as animals are. In other words, posthumanism aims to move away from classical humanist dualisms and hierarchies. 5
Following the posthuman paradigm shift, several scholars have argued for a consideration of posthumanism in film studies. In 2015, Micheal Hauskeller, Thomas Philbeck and Curtis Carbonell
Haraway, Donna J. "A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in the Late Twentieth 4
Century." Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature, Routledge, 1991, p. 152.
Wolfe, Cary. "Introduction: What is Posthumanism?" What Is Posthumanism?, U. of Minnesota P, 2010, pp. xi-xiv. 5
published The Palgrave Handbook of Posthumanism in Film and Television. All three are members of the UK-based Critical Posthumanism Network, which is aimed at bringing together scholars from different disciplines with an interest in posthuman theory. In their book, they argue that film as a medium is especially suitable for developing posthuman theory, as it is able to present thought experiments on posthuman subjects:
Screened representations translate concepts into moving images, living pictures, and thus make them immediate in a way that an abstract and thus dead (or more precisely not-yet-living) concept could never be. Here, more than anywhere else, and especially in films that belong to the science fiction (SF) genre, we find literally the image of the human transformed into images of the posthuman. 6
They thus argue for film as a medium, and specifically mention SF, because the literary genre has already proven to have contributed to posthuman theories in the past.
In addition to Hauskeller et al., Neil Badminton makes a case for posthuman theory in film as well. In his book Alien Chic, he argues that the shift from humanism to posthumanism opens up new ideas about how we consider ourselves in relation to aliens. These Others, Badminton states, are no longer automatically the invading enemy, but are like humans in many ways, which even results in what he calls ‘Alien Love’; a new appreciation for our trusted body snatchers. In other words, the classic opposition between the human and everything other has shifted, and therefore opens up new ways of looking at the alien in film as well. Here, Badminton shows how posthuman theory can bring alternative perspectives to conventional notions in culture, including cinema. 7
Building on The Palgrave Handbook of Posthumanism for Television and Film, as well as Badminton, I look at film from a posthuman perspective. As Hauskeller et al. argue, moving images can aptly function as a thought experiment for posthuman or futuristic ideas. Furthermore, looking at film through a posthuman looking glass allows for, As Badminton shows in Alien Chic, a new perspective on what meaning can be derived from film texts and how. Moving images can more so function as a visualization of said ideas, which allows for abstract notions to become tangible and concrete. As Stanley Kubrick famously stated: “If it can be written or thought, it can be filmed”. 8
Hauskeller, Michael, et al. The Palgrave Handbook of Posthumanism in Film and Television. 2015. p. 4. 6
Badmington, Neil. Alien Chic: Posthumanism and the Other Within. Routledge, 2005. 7
Ibidem. 8
These reconsiderations of what it means to be human in relation to Others applies to the body as well. Patricia MacCormack argues in Posthuman Ethics: Embodiment and Cultural Theory, that the body is central to posthuman theory. The posthuman paradigm shift has opened up new ways of defining the human body. Consequently, scholars have attempted to redefine and reconsider the body in different ways:
The body, reconfiguring relation and ethical emergences of bodies beyond being received through representation, external and within consciousness negotiating reality through representative perception, is the foundation and the site of the event of the posthuman encounter. 9
As MacCormack states, reconsiderations of the human body also demand a renegotiation of how the body is represented as well as perceived, which is also the case for film studies.
With this in mind, I focus this research on embodiment by combining posthuman theory with a phenomenological approach to film analysis. Combining these two approaches seems conflicting, as phenomenology confines itself to the human body, whereas posthumanism engages with bodies that are non-human and challenges what can be considered a human body in the first place. However, I argue that combining the practices allows for a better understanding of how we can consider the relationships between the human and the non-human, technology, and nature.
These relationships are fundamental to combining posthumanism and phenomenology, as I do not argue for a move away from the human body, which is often seen as part of the posthuman perspective, but rather for a new way of understanding how we can look at the human body in a posthuman era. Here, the phenomenological focus on the human body provides me with the tools necessary to understand and detect embodied cues, as well as definitions of the human body and the senses. Furthermore, I argue that although phenomenology has this focus on the human body, it is possible to make room for non-human bodies as well. Here, posthumanist theory helps me map out what these bodies are, and, in combination with phenomenology how they are related to the human body.
Thus, for both posthumanism and phenomenology, the body as well as the way we define the body are fundamental. Film as a medium, moreover, not only has the ability to function as a thought experiment in which abstract ideas can be made tangible—as I mentioned before—but it has the ability to make us feel things on a physical, or embodied, level. Therefore, as I show in this
MacCormack, Patricia. Posthuman Ethics: Embodiment and Cultural Theory. Taylor and Francis, 2016. p. 1. 9
research, combining the two provides a more nuanced reading of the posthuman body in relation to the human body in film, and allows for new perspectives on the relationship between the human and the posthuman.
For the implementation of a phenomenological approach I look at Jennifer Barker’s work on phenomenology for film analysis. In her book The Tactile Eye, Barker approaches phenomenological film analysis from the body itself. She looks for what she calls tactile patterns from which she aims to convey meaning presented by the films’ body in connection to the body of the viewer. As I elaborate on in the theoretical chapter that follows, she defines the films’ body as a non-human, but lived body. Therefore, her phenomenological approach to film thus considers the relationship between a human and a non-human body, between which the boundaries are diminished. Here, I argue that a connection to posthuman theory can be made, as redefining boundaries between the human and non-human are essential to posthuman theory. Therefore, Barkers way of defining the way the human body communicates with the cinematic body suits this research as an analytical model. 10
Moreover, as Jenny Chamarette states in Phenomenology and the Future of Film, phenomenological film analysis is often met with criticism, as it focuses on subjective experience for empirical research. However, she argues that this approach should be seen as a more fluid way of looking at film, which allows me to not only look at the connection between the film and the viewers body, but also at the bodies in the films themselves and how the way they are represented fits into Barker’s notion of tactile embodiment. 11
Finally, working with phenomenology and posthumanism for film analysis in this research shows that films can indeed function as a thought experiment on different ways the posthuman body can be discussed. Moreover, they demonstrate that for them to function this way, we have to look at how the bodies that are presented in the films function in relation to the film’s body and the viewers' human body as well. The diminished boundaries between bodies, technology, and nature that are imperative to posthuman philosophy, thus exemplify how posthuman bodies indeed function as such, by looking at them from the perspective of our own sensory experiences.
In the chapters that follow, I first look into posthuman and phenomenological literature, in order to set out a framework for the film analyses. Chapter 2, then, functions as an introductory argument about why embodiment is relevant when discussing posthuman bodies, and shows why
Barker, Jennifer M. The Tactile Eye: Touch and the Cinematic Experience. U of California P, 2009. 10
Chamarette, Jenny. Phenomenology and the Future of Film: Rethinking Subjectivity Beyond French Cinema. 11
the body should still be considered in my analysis on the film Self/Less (Tarsem Singh 2015). This chapter is build around the posthuman reconsideration of the classical mind/body divide. Chapter 3, focuses on the gendered cyborg body, which is an important topic in posthumanism as well as phenomenology. In this chapter, I look at Ex Machina (Alex Garland 2015) and Under the Skin (Jonathan Glazer, 2013). The analysis shows how the female cyborg can be depicted as a classical femme fatale, but is complicated by the tension between their implicit human explicit and non-human sides. The chapter shows how the phenomenological approach combined with postnon-human theory allows for a more nuanced reading of the films. Lastly, in chapter 4 I discuss how the virtual body, or lack of a body can still be expressed as embodied in the film Her (Spike Jonze, 2015). This chapter focuses on intimacy and the virtual body.
1. Defining the (Post)human Body
As I stated earlier, considering both posthumanism and phenomenology for film analysis of the body seems farfetched at first. However, Barkers notion of the film’s body as a lived body, opens up posthumanist notions of looking at the relationship between the human body and film. Barker’s focus on how the film’s non-human body is able to connect to the viewer on an embodied affective level asks for a consideration of the question of how this body is in a relationship with the human body. Thus, by combining posthumanism and phenomenology, I maintain that we should not take the human out of the equation. As phenomenology as a practice is overtly subjective and in itself very human, I argue that it supports my view on posthumanism, that it is not post human, but rather about what it means to be human, and where we can place the human in a posthuman narrative. Simply said, when conducting phenomenological research, the aspect of the human body is always present. We read films through the embodied senses that are inherently human. This does not mean, however that the posthuman body is opposed to, or not suitable for, such a reading. More so, reading the posthuman cyborg body from a phenomenological perspective, opens up new ways of understanding what it means to be a human in relation to the non-human in all it’s forms. In other words, I consider the posthuman condition as very much human, as well as embodied, as Pepperell states:
The mind and the body act together to produce consciousness. If one is absent consciousness ceases. There is no pure thought isolated from a body. In order to function the brain must be connected to a body, even if the body is artificial. Consciousness is an effect that arises through the co-operation of a brain and body; we think with our whole body. 12
The above quote from Robert Pepperell’s Posthuman Manifesto clearly articulates one of the notions central to posthuman philosophy when it comes to the body; the mind and the body are interconnected and are not to be seen as two separate entities. Moreover, he mentions the artificial body, which shows that artificial bodies and body parts are not necessarily distinct from the human body. These ideas can be considered universal amongst posthuman scholars, but because posthuman philosophy inherently opens up negotiations on classic humanist definitions of the body, the
Pepperell, Robert. The Posthuman Condition: Consciousness Beyond the Brain, Intellect, 2003, 178. 12
question arises how we can redefine the human body. As a result, the human body is defined in different manners amongst posthuman scholars.
Furthermore, Pepperell states that “we think with our whole body”. This is related to his moving away from the classical Cartesian mind/body divide, but it also shows that perceptions made by the mind and the body through the senses are interlinked. In other words, our bodily senses are inherently connected to our minds, which resonates with a phenomenological approach to film studies. 13
Phenomenology: (non-)Human Bodies Beyond the Skin
Phenomenology in film studies is mostly based on Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s work on phenomenology and the senses, and further developed for film by Vivian Sobcheck, as well as Elena del Rio and Laura Marks. Building on the aforementioned scholars, Jennifer Barker places focus on the haptic quality of a phenomenological approach in The Tactile Eye. Moreover, Barker engages with a clear methodology that is based on bringing patterns to the surface that reveal meaning:
Phenomenological analysis affords us a glimpse at embodied, tactile structures that slide, bleed, vibrate, and circulate between film and viewer, moving aIl the way through the body; it is by means of these structures and their reverberation between cinematic and human bodies that, in Sobchack's words, "the fIlm has the capacity ... to not only have sense but also to make sense ….” 14
Phenomenology can thus be described as an engagement with the senses on a conscious level. Consciousness, in this case, surpasses the notion of the consciousness of the brain, but extends to the body. As Peperell’s earlier quote underlines, our bodies are inherently part of our consciousness. In effect, when we watch a film, we watch with our entire bodies. For example, Barker explains how contemporary action films invite the body of the viewer to move with the film, which means literally swerving in the seat, jumping up when startled and grip the seat in excitement.
As Sobchack states in Carnal Thoughts, of all the senses, vision is the most privileged when discussing cinema. However, it is not unusual to say you have been touched by a film, or that a specific scene shook you to the core. In other words, in addition to vision, all the senses are apparent and relevant for the cinematic experience. Moreover, Sobchack argues that the lines
Pepperell, Robert. The Posthuman Condition: Consciousness Beyond the Brain, 178. 13
Barker, Jennifer M. The Tactile Eye: Touch and the Cinematic Experience, p 160. 14
between the senses are blurred, which means there is not a clear distinction to be made between vision, touch, hearing, smell, and taste. Furthermore, Barker argues that “vision is always fully embodied” and “vision is married to touch”, which again emphasizes the ambiguity of the different senses, and at the same time the inclusion of the entire body for cinematic experience. 15
This experience can best be explained as an event that takes place between the film and the viewer on an embodied level. Here, Barker defines this relationship as inducing “meaning and significance through fleshy, muscular, and visceral engagement between film’s and viewers body.” 16
She thus focuses on the connection between the human body and the film’s body. Phenomenology in this regard, concerns itself with what happens between the two bodies; the body of the viewer and the film’s body on a tactile level, because viewing and touching are inherently connected, and tactility is essential to this form of connection between the viewer and the film:
Tactility is a mode of perception and expression wherein aIl parts of the body commit themselves to, or are drawn into, a relationship with the world that is at once a mutual and intimate relation of contact. 17
Barker also notes that the relationship between the viewer and film is mutual. In other words, film does not merely affect the viewer, the viewer affects the film’s body as well, on which I will expand later.
The film’s body is, in phenomenological terms, a lived-body. This means that it uses modes of embodied expression and behaviors similar to biological (human) bodies, but mechanically. It is constructed differently, but is able to express the same embodied behaviors. It is those behaviors that affect the viewer, as the actual film’s body is not visible. In other words, the viewer is affected by how the film expresses certain embodied dispositions because they can be related to our own body. For example, quick and chaotic camera movement may express haste, a sudden sound or flickering of the image may express fright or shock, similar to the way our muscles spasm and breathing quickens. As Barker explains:
…the film's gestures provoke a response from its viewers, who reflect and react ta them with gestures of our own. Stealthy tracking shots at the beginning of a suspense film, for example, subtly encourage our own feelings of unease, long before the suspense story gives us a reason for feeling uneasy. We in turn express
Sobchack, Vivian C. Carnal Thoughts: Embodiment and Moving Image Culture. U of California P, 2004, p 64-5. 15
Barker, Jennifer M. The Tactile Eye, 74. 16
Ibid., 3. 17
that unease with our own gestures: perhaps we tense our bodies, cross our arms protectively over our chests, or warily sink lower into our seats. 18
Thus, because this affect on the body is exemplified in the connection between the viewer and the film’s body, there is a form of contact. As Sobchack explains, when sitting in the theater, there is no physical contact between the film and the viewer. However, the haptic quality of the image entices our body to connect trough immersion. More so, according to Barker, embodiment does not end at the skin. Rather, the skin is the surface on which one part of this affect takes place. Through immersion, the relationship between the viewer and the film’s body creates a space in which the two work together as, in Barkers words: “co-constituted, individualized but related, embodied entities.” Thus, the viewer's skin extends beyond his or her own body; it reaches toward the film 19
as the film reaches toward them. 20
When looking at film from this perspective, it is this connection in which meaning can be found, which can then be related to several aspects of the film as object. As Barker summarizes:
A phenomenological approach to the cinematic experience, then, focuses neither solely on the formal or narrative features of the film itself, nor solely on the spectator's psychic identification with characters or cognitive interpretation of the film. Instead, phenomenological film analysis approaches the film and the viewer as acting together, correlationally, along an axis that would itself constitute the object of study. 21
From this, we can derive three types of bodies that are relevant to phenomenological film analysis, namely: the viewer’s body, the film’s body, and the bodies of the characters on screen. In order to break apart this engagement between bodies, Barker defines the human body and bodily experiences by setting apart three categories; skin, musculature, and viscera. Accordingly, she makes similar distinctions for the film’s body and the bodies on screen.
Firstly, Barker describes skin as the surface of the body, but not as an impenetrable boundary between the body and the outside world. Rather, she looks at skin as a mode of perception and expression. More so, the skin is a surface that connects the body to everything around it, including other beings. It is able to express what happens within the body, on an emotional as well
Barker., 80. 18
Ibid., 79. 19
Sobchack Vivian C. Carnal Thoughts: Embodiment and Moving Image Culture, 66. 20
Barker, 18. 21
as a physical level. For example: the skin can show goosebumps, which either express a cold sensation or a shudder as an emotional reaction to something that is perceived or imagined. The skin thus keeps the outside world out, but also functions as a mode of expressions that provides the outside world with information, bringing the outside in. Furthermore, through touch, the skin functions as a physical mode of contact with the outside world. According to Barker, when skin touches skin, the inner world and the outside world merge together, which allows for a connection with both oneself and the other with whom the contact takes place. 22
When watching a film, this means that an intimate connection between the viewer and the film’s body takes place. About this, Barker argues that the skin of the film’s body should not be defined to the screen or celluloid, but is as complicated as the human skin. The film’s skin expresses, conceals, and reveals to the outside world just like the human skin does:
The film perceives the world, but that act of perception is concealed, invisible to and untouchable by the viewer. The film also expresses the world and reveals it, in a way that the viewer can see and feel. The revealing and concealing functions are enacted with every touch of my skin upon the film's skin and vice versa. In the moment that my skin and the film's skin press against or envelop one another, the film becomes accessible and transparent to me. 23
As Barker eloquently states in the above quote, the skin thus functions as a surface that both separates the viewers and film’s body from the outside world, and at the same time expresses and reveals what happens inside. At the moment of contact, we can truly connect and have a haptic experience.
Barker quotes Laura Marks when she argues that in this connection with the film’s body, the self is not lost, but rather the boundaries between the two bodies have been diminished. In a way, the viewer both experiences their own body as well as the body of the film separately, but together. We might look at a thrilling scene that has us scoot to the edge of our seat, but we never leave the seat nor do we think it is no longer there. We might forget the seat for a second, but our body never stops feeling its own weight on the surface of the seating. About this, Sobchack even argues that 24
this can be seen as an expansion of the sensorial affect; as the connection between the film’s body and the viewer’s body allows the viewer to feel oneself, but also what is felt by the film’s body. In other words, the viewer feels touched but touches at the same time. Here the skin can again be seen
Barker, 26-38. 22 Ibid., 30. 23 Ibid., 36. 24
as a point of contact, where the viewer is able to engage with both sides of the surface. What is exemplified here, is how the film’s body and the body of the viewer form an relationship in which they affect each other. 25
Moving deeper into the bodies, musculature directly relates to movement and pressure. As our muscles contract, they help our body move as an embodied response to what happens on screen. In a way, musculature functions as a body language by using gestures to communicate and express. As a result, Barker argues, the embodied cues that are expressed by the film’s body have the ability to confront the viewer with their own body. For example, Barker states the following about the use of slow-motion:
Tethered to the film's body, we may be slowed down or even immobilized by it, kept from getting where we need to be. Like the faster-moving scenes, these scenes thrill and terrify us with the discrepancies between our body and the film’s [body]. 26
Musculature thus takes the viewer, and invites the viewer to move with the film whilst at the same time it is able to push the viewer away. By going too slow or too fast, the viewer becomes conscious of the limitations as well as the possibilities of the human body. Moreover, Barker argues that the film is able to communicate these cues because although they are expressed by a different kind of body (the film’s body) they remind us of our own muscular movements. For example, she describes tracking shots as “the film's muscular means of performing the act of investigation, by tracking its subject as we would do on foot if we were following someone.” 27
These movements work on a temporal level as well, which Barker focuses on when she moves onto viscera. Motion as well as stillness in the cinematic image can cause what she calls a “gut reaction” , meaning that on an unconscious level, cinema affects very basic human reactions 28
that are then brought to the surface. We are not conscious of the movements our organs make, but when we are frightened we suddenly become aware of our heart beating, followed by a contraction of the muscles and our palms that become sweaty. Furthermore, she describes that a “gut reaction” also constitutes an emotional response. As opposed to the subtlety of the organs, emotions and feelings can come to the surface quickly, and evoke a powerful response to the film, which is essential to the cinematic experience. As Barker states:
Sobchack, 66. 25 Barker, 118. 26 Ibid., 109. 27 Barker, 122. 28
The viscera, be they cinematic or human, serve a similar function: they sustain life, animate us, and regulate themselves without our notice in order to maintain the continuity of our movement and activities at the middle and surface of the body. For us, this role is played by the heart, lungs, liver, and other vital organs. 29
The viscera are the final step in the embodied relationship with the film’s body. The embodied cues expressed by the tactility of the film’s skin, and the movements of the musculature reach the body of the viewer through the skin and muscles as well, then reaching what Barker calls the “murky insides”, on which the viewer is no longer in control. The feelings that are stirred up in the viscera are then again expressed through the muscles and skin, to the outside world and back to the film’s body. This quite literally explains how the lived body of film affects the body of the viewer and vice versa, using embodied gestures as language. 30
Because Barker defines the film’s body as a lived body, she thus implies a certain vitality to the matter that constitutes the body of the film, which is a non-human body. Therefore, as the film’s body is a non-human but vital body, I consider it a posthuman body. The question that arises here is how the film’s body as a posthuman body can be considered vital, and how it can connect to the human body of the viewer. This brings me to the posthuman view on the body, both human and non-human, and how they are able to connect.
Posthuman Bodies: Boundary Breakdowns
As Cary Wolfe points out in What Is Posthumanism, the ontology of the term posthumanism is not linear, which applies to how the human body is defined as well. As I mentioned earlier, the cyborg has been picked up by scholars as the embodiment of posthuman philosophy. This later resulted, however, in a split between posthumanism and transhumanism. Although often used as interchangeable, the terms have come to differ substantially. Namely, the transhuman is often referred to as a technological body that is a grave improvement from the biological human and usually utopian. 31
It can, for example, be a body from which the mind can be downloaded and put inside a technological avatar that cannot physically die. This focus on technology makes sense, as one of the main critiques on humanist philosophy is that there is no place for technology and its influence on
Barker, 126-7. 29
Ibid., 122-5. 30
Wolfe, Cary. "Introduction: What is Posthumanism?" What Is Posthumanism?, pp. xi-xxxiv. 31
the anthropos. Thus, defining the cyborg, or technological body, as strictly transhuman implies a moving away from the human, the end of humans and the birth of enhanced versions, focused on technology—which for example Hausdekker defines as a…
…hatred of the flesh-and-blood body, which is usually portrayed as messy, control-defying, limitative, and deadly. It is associated with nature, which is almost per definition bad. Getting rid of the organic body is a primary goal for all those who wish to leave the human condition behind. 32
This way of defining the technological (human) body is problematic, as it foregoes looking at how we define the relationship between the human body and technology. Firstly, transhumanism here re-emphasizes the mind/body dualism in which the mind and body can be separated, on which I will elaborate in chapter 2. Secondly, it involves ending the biological human body and displays an aversion to nature at large.
According to MacCormack, there is no hierarchal order to humans and others from a posthuman perspective, which means that the transhuman notion of creating a ‘better human’, using technology, does not comply with a philosophy that aims to renegotiate this hierarchy. Rather, posthumanism defines the human body as part of the environment and as not opposed to inhuman and nonhuman bodies. Furthermore, As Pepperell argues as well, this renegotiation of the 33
transhuman hierarchy is not limited to the human-other divide, but also to the relationship between humans and nature, as well as nature and technology. This again negates the transhuman utopian vision of a better, technological posthuman at the top of the hierarchical chain. 34
Consequently, following MacCormack and Pepperell, my focus lies on the diminishing boundaries between humans, technology, nature, and how we can redefine notions of the human body in this respect. For this reason, I argue that we can look at the technological body—or cyborg —as posthuman, by looking at how technology, nature and flesh interact and are connected. In this regard, as Wolfe states, transhumanism is inherently opposed to posthuman philosophy when it comes to embodiment. 35
Therefore, I look at how the body can be defined in posthuman terms, for which I draw on Badminton’s approach to a theorization of posthumanism when looking at film. I therefore will not look at the inhuman body from the transhuman perspective where we forego of the human body—
Hauskeller, Michael. Sex and the Posthuman Condition. Palgrave Pivot, 2014. p. 5. 32
MacCormack, Patricia. Posthuman Ethics: Embodiment and Cultural Theory. pp. 1-2. 33
Pepperell, 16-18. 34
Wolfe, Cary, pp. xi-xxxiv. 35
which Badminton refers to as apocalyptic language, or, a posthumanism that is truly post human. When engaging with film on a phenomenological level, it does not make sense to truly move away from the human, as the senses we experience and are central to phenomenology are human. Moreover, fundamental to both phenomenology and posthumanism in this context, is the relation between the human body of the viewer and the non-human body of the film. From that, posthuman bodies can be seen as expansions of the human body. The posthuman reconsideration of the human body does not negate the end of the human body, but rather opens up the notion of the body for expansion or multiplication. Posthumanism looks at new relationships between the body and the outside world, as well as the outside world and the body as connected, or rather, not separate. This boundless human body is no less human than the humanist notion of the human body is in its core. But in contrast, the posthuman human body is inherently inclusive, which allows us to further investigate how the films non-human body and the viewer’s body affect each other.
In Posthuman Bodies, Ira Livingston and Judith Halberstam define the posthuman body as a human body that is influenced by postmodern cultural context. Moving away from the classical hierarchy of the arthropos in humanism, they engage with the human body as what would classically be regarded as an Other. They define the body in their introduction quite famously:
The posthuman body is a technology, a screen, a projected image; it is a body under the sign of AIDS, a contaminated body, a deadly body, a techno-body; it is, as we shall see, a queer body. The human body itself is no longer part of “the family of man” but of a zoo of posthumanities. 36
They thus place the body in a cultural and political context, but more so emphasize how the posthuman body be defined by everything the anthropos is not. This definition is focused on self-indentity whilst rejecting the humanist hierarchy in which the anthropos is situated at the top. In the example of the cyborg, for instance, the cyborg is neither placed above or below the body of the human, it is reconsidered in relation to the human. As Halberstam and Livingston state:
The posthuman does not necessitate the obsolescence of the human; it does not represent an evolution or devolution of the human. Rather it participates in re-distributions of difference and identity. 37
Halberstam, Judith, and Ira Livingston. Posthuman Bodies. Indiana UP, 1995. p. 3. 36
Idem., 10. 37
Here, they thus emphasize that the posthuman does not surpass the human, as it would in the case of transhumanism, but stresses the renegotiation of the self-identity connected to the (post)human body.
Similar to Halberstam and Livingston, MacCormack focuses on the Other as posthuman as well. She argues for a consideration of the human body that is inclusive as well, but more so, she emphasizes on the diminishing boundaries between the human and the environment. Her approach here is similar to how Barker and Sobchack define the relationship between the human body and the film’s body as a space that in itself is the object of affect. That is to say, MacCormack speaks of an “in-betweenness” when she describes connections between the human and the environment:
…the affects of interrelative action rather than the reflective meaning of being, thus always considering a between-ness, or existence as only valid within an assemblage rather than dividuated. 38
MacCormack here also seems to imply that human identity, or what it means to be human, is mainly derived from this relationship with the environment.
Pepperell takes this notion one step further. In his book The Postman Condition:
Consciousness Beyond the Brain, Pepperell proposes a theoretical and practical approach to
posthuman philosophy. As a result, he presents several clear definitions of how we can look at certain aspects of culture, nature, the human, and technology from a posthuman perspective. Concerning the relationship between the human body and the environment, he claims that there in fact is no clear separation between the two. In other words, Pepperell not only argues that boundaries between the human and the environment are diminished, but that they are not existent. As he lists in his posthuman manifesto:
[…]
7. Human bodies have no boundaries.
8. No finite division can be drawn between the environment, the body and the brain. The human is identifiable, but not definable.
9. Consciousness (mind) and the environment (reality) cannot be separated; they are continuous.
10. There is nothing external to a human, because the extent of a human cannot be fixed.
MacCormack, 119. 38
11. If we accept that the mind and body cannot be absolutely separated, and that the body and the environment cannot be absolutely separated, then we are left with the apparently absurd yet logically consistent conclusion that consciousness and the environment cannot be absolutely separated.
[…] 39
These statements seem strong, but they do articulate to what extent the human body can be reconsidered in relation to its environment. They emphasize that the posthuman body cannot just be defined by describing a single human body; a body with arms legs, flesh, lungs and skin. More so, the posthuman body overarches all bodies—arthropos and Others—whilst smoothing out hierarchies and blurring differences and at the same time zooming in on this exact process—which is what MacCormack refers to as in-between-ness.
Phenomenology and Posthumanism combined: In-between-ness
Posthumanism is always concerned with a becoming, a transitioning, process, or a transformation. Consequently, when looking at film, I rather look at a process instead of an object. More so, as the space where phenomenology and posthumanist theory meet for this research; in the in-between. MacCormack builds on Deleuze and Guattari’s consistent focus on what is in between as well as Spinoza’s focus on the in-between. From a posthuman point of view, she continuously points out that the object that should be considered is not a singular body, nor a distinction between two opposing views on said body, but what happens between bodies—or the body and its environment. This is not only the case for the actual physical body, but also how the body is defined in a broader sense. MacCormack essentially brings the notion of in-between-ness back to a move away from dualisms. For embodiment specifically, this means that by considering the in-between as opposed to individuated objects, the diminished boundaries between bodies become apparent. For example: MacCormack argues that art, including cinema, is always inhuman when considered as an individual object. Of course, the fact that art is created by humans immediately causes tension because inherently, there is a human aspect. For film, this means that, as Barker states as well, the film’s body is inhuman, but the relationship between the film’s body and that of the viewer is affective. Here, I argue that is this relationship between the film’s body and the viewer is what
Pepperell’s Posthuman Manifesto consists of eight parts that each have their own number of statements. The 39
statements quoted here specifically consider the body, which is why I did not include statement 1-6. The Manifesto in its entirety encompasses statements about several topics that together sum up Pepperell’s definition of the Posthuman Condition. The Manifesto is included in his book The Poshuman Condition: Conciousness and the Brain as an appendix and has also been published online.
MacCormack calls the in-between. Furthermore, the moment in which the viewer engages with the film I consider what MacCormack describes an event in which the viewer is opened up to a reconsideration of their own identification as human. MacCormack argues that this event happens because the art object—in this case the film—is affective, but non-responsive, which means that meaning is formed with the viewer. 40
However, I argue that film as an object with which the viewer experiences such an event can in fact be considered responsive, not in a literal sense in which a film is able to answer any viewer’s individual question at any time, for example, but drawing on Sobchack’s notion of embodied affect, the viewer’s body and the film’s body are in a relationship with each other. During the event— watching the movie—the film’s body and the viewer’s body connect, which means that an in-between as described by MacCormack is formed. It is this in-in-between where meaning is formed, not only with the viewer, and not only sent by the film. In other words, the viewer and the film both influence what happens in the in-between, which means that both influence the embodied affect from which meaning can be derived in the in-between. Therefore, I do consider the film’s body responsive, in the sense that the in-between is formed through what Barker describes as a mutual relationship in-between the film and the viewer. 41
Working with Cyborgs
Similar to the notion of in-between-ness, the cyborg embodies how blurred boundaries between the human body and non-humans can be depicted. Since Donna Haraway’s manifesto, one of the traditional conceptions of the posthuman body is the cyborg. In their article on Cyborg
Anthropology, Downey, Dumit, and Williams state the following:
A crucial first step in blurring the human-centered boundaries of anthropological discourse is to grant membership to the cyborg image in theorizing… 42
They thus argue that the posthuman notion of said blurred boundaries is bound to the cyborg. When considering the body, the posthuman body is a cyborg, a blurred state of technology and biology, of nature and nurture, of man and machine. This body causes us to reconsider notions of gender and color, and on a larger scale of human identity. The posthuman may have a prosthetic limb and
MacCormack, 44-51. 40
Barker, 39-45. 41
Downey, Gary L., et al. "Cyborg Anthropology." The Cyborg Handbook, edited by Chris H Gray, Heidi J. Figueroa 42
wonder: ‘Is this mechanic body part still part of my humanness?’. However, the posthuman is also a person with a hammer, using a tool as an expansion of his biological body. To paraphrase Wolfe, we were born posthuman, we have always been posthuman since the moment we picked up a rock and used it as a tool. In effect, posthuman bodies are not by definition of the future, but of the past and the present as well. 43
However, defining the cyborg merely as a combination of man and machine does not do the cyborg justice. As Donna Haraway has shown in her manifesto, the cyborg is a cultural phenomenon as well, and embodies politics surrounding Others. Everything and every body that is classically opposed to the anthropos can work with the notion of the cyborg, as the cyborg is inherently boundary-less. As Haraway states: “[the cyborg] gives us our politics”. In her 44
discussion on how the cyborg is central to diminishing boundaries, she makes three important distinctions of what she calls “boundary breakdowns” , namely: the distinction between human and 45
animal, the distinction between human-animal and machine, and the distinction between the physical and the non-physical. These three breakdowns together exemplify the posthuman notion of the blurred boundaries between humans, nature, and technology, and also shows how they can function as a tool. As Haraway argues, for example, the boundary breakdown between human and animals in not only limited to the hierarchical boundary between the centralized human and the animal as an Other, but also encompasses human nature that is politically or culturally deemed animalistic. 46
Going back to the body, Haraways boundary breakdown of the physical and non-physical constitutes another important feature of the posthuman body, namely; that it exists beyond the skin. As Pepperell and MacCormack argue, the posthuman body is expansive, as is consciousness. The mere fact that we can sense things that happen outside our bodies but not always what happens on a visceral level problematizes the idea that our skin is the border of our body and existence. We feel connected with other human beings, and their bodies, because we are. As MacCormack argues, posthuman bodies are by definition subject to connectivity through affect. Consequently, a perhaps heightened case of connectivity through immersion causes a film viewer to not only feel, but be connected to and therefore affected by the film’s body and vice versa. 47
Wolfe, xxxi-v. 43
Haraway, Donna J. "A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in the Late Twentieth 44
Century." Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature, Routledge, 1991, p. 150. Ibid., 151. 45 Ibid., 151-6. 46 MacCormack, 105. 47
Additionally, Braidotti argues that in this context, the human body can be defined as a machine as well, simply because any embodied being functions through affect and immersion:
…an embodied entity feeds upon, incorporates and transforms its (natural, social, human or technological) environment constantly. […] ‘we’ are all in this mess together, all other differences not-withstanding. 48
Here, she also shows how, in accordance with the phenomenological notion of the mutual relationship, embodied beings always affect each other, in a constant space of communication and transformation. It is this space, the in-between, in which posthumanism and phenomenology come together for this research.
According to Barker, affect, or emotional responses are evoked on a visceral level in the viewer. In her chapter on viscera, she makes a direct connection between emotion and embodiment, in the sense that emotions themselves are embodied, and embodied reactions to a certain extent always evoke emotion. Following Barker here from a posthuman point of view, I argue that embodied reactions to film and emotional reactions to film are not inherently different. As viewers, we have an embodied response to emotion, and can have an emotional response to embodied reactions as well. Here, the affective embodied reaction that appears within the relationship between film and viewer is thus not void of emotion, we may not cry every time the film’s body expresses an embodied cue, but, simply said, we always feel something.
Sobchack also makes the connection between embodied response and emotion in Carnal
Thoughts. She quotes Kracauer about the effect film has on the viewer:
The material elements that present themselves in films directly stimulate the material layers of the human being: his nerves, his senses, his entire physiological
substance. 49
Here, Kracauer lists psychological substance as something that is affected by film, which Sobchack relates to emotion. In other words, the affective relationship between viewer and film is constituted in the body, the consciousness, the senses, and emotion. As Pepperell argues, all these separate concepts are not that separate after all. When we experience something, all these elements are involved. In the in-between, the affective relation between the film’s body and the viewer’s body
Braidotti, Rosi. The Posthuman. Polity P, 2014. pp. 139-40. 48
Sobchack, 55. 49
allows for a diminishing of the dualist boundaries between emotion and cognition, as well as the body and the mind. 50
Imagining the in-between as an active and affective event between two bodies, thus asks for a consideration of said bodies as cyborgs, as it is in tune with Haraways boundary breakdowns. The in-between, therefore, functions as a transgression of boundaries as well, which is precisely what the cyborg embodies. Consequently, for this research all posthuman bodies that I discuss in my analysis I consider cyborg. As the term is not limited to the Terminator-like man-machine combination, but an analytical tool with which we can look at bodies that transgress boundaries on a physical as well as a philosophical and political level, and more so, as a form of expansive consciousness.
As a result, the conventional distinction between the human and the non-human body should be reconsidered for a phenomenological approach to film studies. Moreover, Barker argues that in this affective relationship, the senses are inherently embodied. This relates to the posthuman reconsideration of the mind/body divide. As the following chapter will show, a posthuman phenomenological approach to film allows for an understanding of how the mind and body are inherently bound, which complicates the dualistic view in which the mind and body can be seen as separate. Rather, a reconsideration of the boundaries between the mind, the body, and others exemplifies how the body and mind exist beyond the skin. 51
Pepperell, 19-20. 50
Barker, 35. 51
2. Where is my Mind?: The Mind/Body divide in Self/Less
A common theme in Science Fiction is the separation of the mind from the body. In the recent SF Netflix show Altered Carbon (Laeta Kalogridis, 2018), for example, human essence is collected in a chip that can be placed in any body. In effect, bodies are now disposable and called sleeves. Moreover, the death of a body, or sleeve, no longer results in the death of a person, as they can be placed in a new sleeve. The separation of mind and body is thus also connected to imaginations of immortality and eternal youth. This is also the case in Tarsem Singh’s Self/Less (2015). In the film, an extremely wealthy businessman named Damian (Ben Kingsley) is dying of cancer. In order to save his life, he undergoes a cutting-edge procedure in which his mind is transferred to the body of a young male body (Ryan Renolds). After the transplant is complete, however, he finds out that his new body has a past (see appendix for full synopsis). 52
The film thus depicts a situation where it is possible to separate the mind from the body, which is the classic humanist notion of the mind/body divide. In this chapter, I aim to show how
Self/Less initially follows the mind/body divide, but challenges it at the same time. Here, posthuman
conceptualizations of how the embodied mind works, aid in understanding the tension that arises with this subject in the film. Self/Less sheds light on how we might reconsider the mind/body divide, by depicting an embodied experience that functions as a thought experiment on the subject. In other words: it is one thing to think and talk about separating the mind from the body, it is another to show the process and the possible ramifications. As Hauskeller et al. argue, SF films are able to bring to life futuristic ideas like this, and in effect provide a better understanding of what would happen. Or, to paraphrase Charlie Brooker again, they are able to exemplify the ‘what if?’ questions that arise with such ideas. 53
We think with our whole body: the mind/body divide
The idea that the body and mind can be separated is based on the classical Cartesian mind/body divide. In Alien Chic, Badminton explains how for “the Cartesian model, the essence of the human
lies in the rational mind, or soul, which is entirely distinct from the body”. He then clarifies the 54
model with Descartes famous phrase: I think, therefore I am!. In other words, for the Cartesian model, everything that makes a person human, their soul, and thoughts exist solely in the mind—
Self/Less. Directed by Tarsem Singh, Perf. Ryan Reynolds, Natalie Martinez, Matthew Goode. Focus Features, 2015. 52
Hauskeller, Michael, et al. The Palgrave Handbook of Posthumanism in Film and Television. p. 4. 53
Badmington, Neil. Alien Chic: Posthumanism and the Other Within. p. 6. 54
and thus the physical brain. Consequently, Descartes argues that selfhood, or human identity is 55
confined to the mind as well. This Cartesian view on what it means to be human is also strongly hierarchical. As Badminton explains in his reading of Descartes, Descartes places his notion of human identity above anything nonhuman. Moreover, he states that according to Descartes, a true AI, or inhuman could never pass as human, because we, the real humans, would always know and recognize the lack of a true human self, or soul. This anthropocentric and hierarchical vision of the 56
mind/body dichotomy is challenged by Spinozian and Deleuzian notions of a more unified body and mind, or consciousness, which is mostly based on a move away from dualism. Their views have inspired many posthuman scholars in defining the relationship between the mind and body, which has led to, what MacCormack argues are:
…some basic but foundational tenets of the post-human: that there is no body without the mind and that they are not separate, because they are not separate they cannot be ordered hierarchically, that the mind as corporeal thus proves consciousness is not given, thereby will and affects are never entirely accounted for, predictable or discrete. 57
As MacCormack thus states, the idea that the mind and body are inherently separated is simply false within a posthuman framework. In effect, the Cartesian hierarchy that comes with the mind/body divide in which the anthropos is central and placed above non-anthropocentric others is false as well. For the mind and body, it means that, as MacCormack states, they too are not hierarchically separate. Consequently, human essence, or what it means to be human, does not lie in the soul or mind, but is embodied. 58
This embodied soul is what Pepperell considers consciousness. He argues that the notion that the mind resides in the brain is not sufficient. In order for the brain to make sense of the world, we need our bodies. More so, in order to make sense of what we feel, we need our bodies as well:
when I feel unhappiness it is in my chest and arms; when I am frightened it is in my bowels and legs that the sensation is strongest; if I am amused it is my mouth and cheeks that are significantly altered; when I am alert it is my muscles that are
Also see António Damásio’s objection to the Cartesian mind/body divide in Descartes Error: Emotion, Reason and 55
the Human Brain (1994) and further explorations in Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and the Human Brain (2003).
Damasio has a strong influence on reconsiderations of dualistic notions regarding cognition and emotions from a neurological standpoint. He argues that emotions cannot be separated from the brain and therefore the body.
Badmington, Neil. "Theorizing Posthumanism." Cultural Critique, vol. 53, no. 1, 2003, pp. 17-8. 56
MacCormack, 1. 57
Ibidem. 58
tense; when I am moved by music it is my whole body which tingles or dances; if I am bored my body starts to fidget. All these apparently ‘mental’ states seem more easily identified by their ‘physical’ attributes. It seems the distinction between mental and physical states might be increasingly dubious. 59
In other words, Pepperell argues that consciousness resides in the entire body and the experience of said consciousness is embodied as well, which takes me back to phenomenology.
When looking at the mind/body divide from a phenomenological perspective, it is problematic as well. As Pepperell states, the notion that the senses are embodied is now possibly the leading theory on sensorial perception, which is what is central to phenomenology as well. As Barker argues, the senses are connected to consciousness, which exists throughout the body, and is not just limited to the brain. Moreover, for phenomenology, classical distinctions between the senses are also diminished. When, for example, Barker states that “vision is married to touch”, I would connect this to the notion that the embodied experience of touch, or tactility, is not limited to touching with the skin. Following Barker here, we are able to experience the sensorial notion of touch simply by looking at a film that expresses tactility. Again, this is where the concept of the in-between comes in. During a film viewing, the event constitutes both an active and affective relation between the body of the viewer and the film’s body. In the in-between, not only are the boundaries between the film’s and viewers body diminished, but between the senses as well. 60
An example of such an affective tactile expression by the film’s body Barker provides in her analysis of David Lynch’ Erasurehead (1977):
…a pot of boiling water in extreme close-up and juxtaposed with the hideous boils on Henry's screaming infant, looks suspect. The link created between the boiling water and the baby's skin also casts doubt upon the child's humanity: this ontological question […] arises from our fingertips, because human skin simply isn't supposed to feel like that. 61
In this example, Barker shows how the film combines vision and touch with the use of close-up and juxtaposition of images. Here, the camera as part of the film’s non-human body expresses sensorial experiences that affect the viewer on an embodied level. Looking at Erasurehead from a phenomenological point of view, Barker explains, she is able to read the film’s tactile expressions
Pepperell, 19. 59
The diminishing of the distinction between senses also refers to Merleau-Ponty’s argument about synaesthesia, in 60
which the senses are experienced as one, or can replace each other. See his book Phenomenology of Perception (1981). Barker, 51.
that traditional analysis would have missed. Moreover, her example is in line with Pepperell’s notion of how consciousness resides in the body. Specifically, Barkers wording here: “this ontological question […] arises from our fingertips” , implies an embodied and sensorial reaction 62
to what is expressed by the film’s body. In effect, I argue that for phenomenology, a separation of mind and body would undermine precisely what it tries to do: to make a connection between the film and viewer on a conscious embodied level.
In the case of the mind/body divide in Self/Less, I argue that a posthuman phenomenological reading is necessary in order to map how the film both reestablishes the divide as a classical SF narrative, but also challenges the divide, which is not shown explicitly in the narrative, but through embodied cues throughout the film.
The Challenge of separating Mind and Body in Self/Less
Early in the film, when Damian’s mind is transplanted from his old to his new younger body, the Cartesian divide is presented as is, but challenged on an embodied level. As Damian undergoes the procedure that transfers his mind from his own body into the body of the young man, he is placed in a large machine that resembles an MRI-machine. His head, covered in tight mesh is placed into the machine. Here, it is already implied that the mind is located somewhere in the brain, as opposed to the entire body, which is in line with the Cartesian mind/body divide.
When the machine is on, the camera switches from a POV-shot to Damian’s face. Here, the viewer is physically connected to his experience (see fig. 1 & 2). According to Barker, the use of a POV-shot places the viewer in the same position as the character, which enhances empathy and also immerses the viewer into the embodied experience of the character. In other words, the viewer is placed inside the machine with Damian, which is established by the juxtaposition of the POV-shot and the close-up. 63
In the case of the mind-replacement of Damian, the use of POV also expresses a challenge to the mind/body divide. During the procedure, our vision is limited to the chaotic turning of the machine and all we hear is the loud noise the machine makes. In this scene, we are quite literally placed into Damien’s mind. All the senses can pick up is chaos, which alienates Damian and therefore the viewer from the concept of space and time and Damian’s surroundings. We never leave this embodied connection with Damian, but when Damian, together with the viewer, is taken out of the machine, he is in the younger body. However, perhaps because Damian has lost
Barker, 51. 62
Ibid., 75-76. 63
consciousness during this moment, the viewer has not seen, or in any other way experienced, the transfer of the mind. Consequently, the process of moving the mind from one body to another is not expressed by the film’s body, and therefore it is not an embodied event. In between the mind’s replacement from old Damian to young Damian, there literally was no place and time, not even the chaos we experienced when Damian was in the machine. This scene thus shows that the experience of a consciousness as expressed in Self/Less is inherently embodied, as the exact moment of disembodiment of the mind is not expressed by the film.
Furthermore, after the procedure, when Damian is now residing in his younger body, the film expresses more challenges to the Cartesian divide, whilst at the same time reestablishing the notion of the divide. When Damian is young again, his old mind has to be accommodated by a new host. Consequently, the mind and body are presented as two separate things and therefore not connected. In order to map the tension between this separation and the presentation of Damian as one body, I look at him as a posthuman cyborg body.
