East West, Home’s Best: kin-state
politics and ethno-national belonging in
post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina
Sandra Pudja 12286419
Master Dissertation for the Degree of Political Science Specialisation in International Relations
University of Amsterdam
Supervised by Dr. M. Medeiros Second reader Dr. J. Krause
2 Želim se zahvaliti svojim roditeljima koji su mi bili najveća podrška u svemu, što su me uvijek podržavali da težim ka boljem i što su uvijek vjerovali u moj uspjeh. Table of contents
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Abbreviations ... 4
Figures ... 4
1. Introduction ... 4
1.1 Research problem and research question ... 5
1.2 Academic and social relevance ... 6
1.3 Overview thesis ... 7 2. Theoretical Framework ... 8 2.1 Kin-state politics ... 8 2.1.1 Kin-state involvement ... 10 2.2 Triadic Nexus ... 12 2.2.1 National Minority ... 14 2.2.2 Nationalizing state ... 15 2.2.3 Critique ... 16 2.3 Identity ... 17 2.3.1 Nationalism ... 19 2.3.2 Religion ... 20 2.4 Post-conflict politics ... 22 3. Methodology ... 25 3.1 Choice of method ... 25 3.2 Unit of analysis ... 25
3.3 Data collection and analysis ... 26
4. Context: the nationalizing state - Bosnia and Herzegovina ... 28
4.1 Bosnian identity ... 28
4.2 Nation-building in Bosnia and Herzegovina ... 29
4.3 Kin Minority and kin majority ... 32
4.3.1 The national minority: Bosnian Croats ... Error! Bookmark not defined. 4.4 The International Community: an external actor worth mentioning ... 33
5. External National Homeland: Croatia ... 35
5.1 Tudjman... 36
5.2 Post-Tudjman ... 36
5.3 Final words on the future ... 40
6. Conclusion ... 41
6.1 Further research ... 43
Bibliography ... 43
Documents and Online publications ... 48
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Abbreviations
BiH Bosnia and Herzegovina
RS Republika Srpska (Serb Republic) FBiH Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina IC International Community
OHR Office of the High Representative HDZ Croat Democratic Union
HDZBiH Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina EU European Union
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization SFRY Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
Figures
Figure 4.1 Political map of BiH Figure 4.2 Cantonal system of FBiH
1. Introduction
5 We live in the borderland between two worlds, on the border between nations, within everyone's reach, always someone’s scapegoat. Against us the waves of history break, as if
against a cliff
- Mesa Selimovic in Dervish and Death1
1.1 Research problem and research question
On December 14 1995, together with the involved negotiators and the former presidents of Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Dayton Peace Agreement was signed. This meant the end of the four-year long violent conflict in the most ethnically diverse country of the former Yugoslav Republic, Bosnia and Herzegovina. The country was arranged in such a way that it existed of a Serb dominated political entity: Republika Srpska, and a
Croat/Bosniak shared political entity as consolidated in the previously signed Washington Agreement (1994): the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Inhabited by three different ethno-religious groups, Bosnia and Herzegovina found itself is a more complex position than its neighbouring countries. The idea of peaceful co-existence between the Serbs (predominantly Orthodox), Croats (predominantly Catholic), and Bosniaks (predominantly Muslim) living in Bosnia and Herzegovina slowly disappeared after the death of Yugoslav leader Tito in the eighties.
Competing interests and violent mobilization that took place during the 90s, however, were based along ethno religious lines. This meant that the three aforementioned groups were divided in their understanding of Bosnia and Herzegovina – its statehood, political
organisation, and territorial arrangement. Given their ethnic and national identity, both Croats and Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina were brought under the supervision of their respective kin-states: Croatia and Serbia. Consequently, both neighbouring kin-states found themselves involved in Bosnian domestic affairs due to the presence of their kin community. Unlike Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs, Bosniaks did not held special relations with a trans national kin-country as Bosnia and Herzegovina was their only home country.
The so called ‘interventionist’ stage in the period of the early 2000s was significant amount of effort has been done by the international community under the leadership of Paddy Ashdown with regards to state building measures that have been most prominent. This is also in the same period where the two neighbouring countries and kin-states Serbia and Croatia made significant steps in their political development. This means that not only Bosnia, under
1
Quote from Bringa, T. (1995). Being Muslim the Bosnian Way: Identity and Community in a Central Bosnian
6 the supervision of international actors, both Croatia and Serbia have undergone major
institutional changes in facing challenges in the process of democratization and EU integration in the Western Balkans.
Given the particular high involvement of kin-state political elites in times of conflict, and the divided ethno-religious identities that still characterizes this country to this day, the research question of this project is as follows: How has neighbouring kin-state Croatia
influenced ethno-national belonging of Bosnian Croats in post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina?
The territorial arrangements as consolidated by the Dayton Peace Agreement are important to consider in the study of kin politics of this particular case. Bosnian Serbs found themselves in a favourable position in a dominant Serb entity (RS) in which they enjoyed a much more centralized system compared to the other entity (FBiH). On the other hand, Bosnian Croats are a minority on the entity level that is shared with the other ethno national group, the Bosniaks. Underrepresentation and competing interest between the two often causes ineffective decision-making. It is exactly this difference in administrative system that makes the Croat kin community an interesting unit of analysis.
1.2 Academic and social relevance
The presence of kin-states is not limited to Bosnia and Herzegovina only. In Europe alone, numerous cases can be considered where ethnic minorities consider themselves part of another state as their ethnic home land or mother land. Northern Ireland is a well known case that clearly shows conflicting dynamics between the two constituent groups belonging to the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. However, what is quite unique to the particular case of Bosnia and Herzegovina is the significant involvement of kin state Croatia in current domestic affairs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. With being both an EU and NATO member, Croatia has politically developed since the death of prominent Croat president Tudjman in 1999.
The results following the most recent state elections in 2018 showed a disappointing, yet not surprising result: the ethno-nationalist parties have won in the majority. This leads to the question of why this results is a repetitive outcome since the 90s, and more specifically how particular political elites keep holding on to this dominant position. Following this view, personal observations of academic literature, as well as publications and online political
7 analyses on the topic of Bosnia and Herzegovina when discussing the matter ‘political
instability’ has disregarded these two important actors, that are the kin states. Is it impossible to address political, and even civic issues without considering the involvement of relevant trans border actors.
With that being said, the aim of this paper is to shed light on the issues regarding competing ethno-national belonging in Bosnia and Herzegovina, focusing on a specific kin community. This phenomena will be examined according to the dynamics of the triadic nexus presented by Brubaker (1996) which includes the nationalizing state, national minority, and external trans border homeland. By doing so, kin politics of Bosnian Croats in relation to the question of ethno-national belonging will make more sense. Moreover, as is argued by
Brubaker as well, much can be said by looking at how the triadic relationship works when kin communities are relevant and active political players in the host-state.
1.3 Overview thesis
This thesis is structured as follows. The theoretical framework proves both a
conceptualization as well as a literature review on the relevant topics of ethnicity, nations, political elites and kin-state involvement. In this section, an overview of Breakers’ (1996) is provided as a way of perceiving the research question according to the authors’ presented triadic nexus of nationalizing states, national minorities and external homelands. Next, the methodology section describes the arguments behind the decision on a qualitative content analysis in combination with in person interviews that were conducted in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the month of May. Then a relevant contextual background of Bosnia and Herzegovina is given before the analysis is presented. Finally, the thesis ends with relevant remarks on the future of BiH, and a conclusion that includes a detailed summary and answer to the research question, as well as suggestions for future research.
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2. Theoretical Framework
The central subject of this study revolves around the politics of states and
kin-communities. The rather broad spectrum of this specific focus within political science can be studied from multiple perspectives, linking several disciplines with each other. It was
especially with the establishments and developments of modern nation states that the issue of external kin-states and their kin-community became interesting. Questions of nationalism, self-determination, conflict, external and internal policy implementation, identity, citizenship, and nation-building are prominent topics within research that discussed this phenomenon. Essentially, the understanding of kin-state politics requires the consideration of more than just one state, making it a central topic within the study of international relations.
2.1 Kin-state politics
International relations is dedicated to understanding dynamics and interactions between different politically relevant units. Examples are international actors, external or neighbouring states, and foreign governments, and their role with respect to others actors, states or
governments. The majority of scholars discussing kin-state politics have taken the perspective of the kin state as an external actor and examined its role and/or influence in domestic politics of the state where its kin is located. Though kin-states, geographically and legally speaking, are to be perceived as external actors, their special status and linkage with their community makes them an exceptional case. Essentially, kin states refers to those countries whose ethno-national kin-community is located abroad, or another ‘host’ country (Brubaker, 1996; van Houten, 1998; Kemp, 2006). This implies that there are only specific cases in which ethno-national communities are separated from their country of ethnic origin. However, other terminologies used throughout research are ‘reference state’, ‘patron state’, ‘home state’, or ‘homeland’.
As described earlier, the relationship between states and their ethnic kin abroad demonstrates to be a special one. Moreover, commonality in descent are in most cases
characterized by particular aspects that are of ethno- national, cultural, or religious origin and in some cases a combination of them. When the existence of a trans border kin-state is
present, ethnic conflict in the host state - whether violent or not - becomes more complex. This is mainly due to its transnational element as well as deepened relationships that become apparent in such circumstances. This differentiates from cases where involvement of other
9 (non-kin) external actors are present, and relationships are absent. In cases where kin
communities do claim kin-states , thus, ethnic conflict should be analyzed by its transnational dimension (Gleditsch, 2007).
As the different terminologies suggest, kin-states are to be considered the true ‘home’ of such communities. Furthermore, the presence of such specific linkages is especially important for the positioning of its kin towards involved co-nationals in host-states, and consequently the given support during the occurrence of (violent) conflict. This is most likely to be in the form of resources and moral justification, which is most notably between the relationship of kin-states actors and outside kin-community local elites (Brubaker, 1996; Kemp, 2004; Gurses, 2015). As such, the presence or absence of kin states greatly determines the dynamic of conflict within a host state, and more generally (non-violent) political
interactions between relevant actors. Besides their ethnic linkage, geographical proximity should also be taken into account considering the territorial advantage and greater
communicative ties (Cederman et al., 2009; Gurses, 2015; Gleditsch, 2007).
Various academic work has been dedicated to the understanding of kin states in greater detail. Both national identity and interests make the kin state relevant in the involvement of their kin groups abroad. Increase in interest has been notably higher during the period of 1980s and 1990s due to developments within the wider global political sphere. With the emergence of intergovernmentalist organisations like the European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), certain guidelines were expected to be followed for the admission to membership accordingly. More so, diasporic and kin groups became a subject of study within the wider international framework, existing of specified agreements concerning transnational communities. This meant that one part of states’ domestic political domain was to be regulated beyond its borders (King & Melvin, 2000).
Additionally, the emergence of sovereign states by which this period was
characterized, made the rise of transnational interested not surprising. Focusing on diasporic politics, King and Melvin (2000) mention how ‘’newly independent states have been engaged in tortuous processes of defending statehood and defining nationhood, staking out unique claims to ethnic proprietorship over lands that are home to manifestly heterogeneous populations’’ (p. 113). While not the topic of this research, considering security issues and instability as a consequence of transnational interests and interactions is worth mentioning as well.
These kinds of connections can vary from obvious ones, to less visible forms of support and interests. Kardos (2006) mentions how the protection of minority rights become
10 relevant for the role kin-states with regards to its transnational minority kin. International bodies become important on matters of human rights. Consequently, kin-state can insist on the protection of their minority kin by appealing to bodies such as the European Convention on Human Rights, which has been active in similar cases of minorities in Austria, Cyprus and Northern Ireland.
2.1.1 Kin-state involvement
With regards to kin-state involvement, Wolff (2003) mentions a list of issues that must be considered when studying states, as these greatly determine the actions and stance kin-states will take. The interest structure, availability of resources, and commitment are mentioned as the most relevant and important ones. Thus, interests differ per kin-state and more so depend on contextual factors as well: the type and strength of affinity between state and group, but also the involvement of the international community are factors that influence kin-state dynamics. Nevertheless it is important to mention that intra-group differences within kin communities itself can exist, meaning that kin-state involvement in itself is not
straightforward as
More so, transnational kin-states can play a defining role in the pursuit of kin group interests, The presence is relevant for two different reasons. On the one hand the presence of a kin state can cause the kin group in the host state to pursue moderate objectives (Gurses, 2015; Nagle, 2013). On the other hand, there can be unwillingness on behalf of the kin state to interfere due to a number of reasons. Foreign Involvement or interference abroad brings risks and should be performed strategically. Pressure of international actors, multilateral units or important partners, as well as the relationship with them can be at stake. Lastly, the can be a fear that ideas or actions spread, which consequently threaten the regions stability
(Horowitz, 1985; Ambrosio, 2001).
Another case are secessionist movements in host-countries. Nagle (2013) examines the developments of several separatist movements of kin groups where the trans border kin state is present. Nonetheless should be noted that involvement in separatists desires specifically is not limited to the relevant kin states only, but can be initiated or supported by other external actors as well. However, focusing on this kin relationship solely allows for a better
understanding of the role kin state have in the pursuit of kin interests due to or despite of this linkage, and whether it heightens or diminishes the longing of secessionists aspirations and eventually (violent) mobilization.
11 Furthermore, Nagle (2013) finds that homeland secessionism, which differentiates from other types of secessionist movements without the presence of a neighbouring kin-state, is not a common phenomena from the data extracted period of 1989-2011. Irredentist notions, at first glance being more of a case of the existence of a kin-state, can in some instances be transformed by the pursuit of secessionist movements by kin-state due to its ineffectiveness in policy implementation as historic examples have shown that ethnic relations are the primary bond through which such claims are made (Nagle, 2013; Horowitz, 1985).
Wolff (2003) distinguishes between two types of policy strategies that are implemented by kin-states in relation to transnational ethnic kin policy: cooperation and confrontational vis-a-vis the host-state (p. 27). These change according to the stage of conflict and international involvement as well as domestic politics of the kin-state itself determining the perceived opportunity structure for the kin state. Policy choices falling under the first category aim at reaching settlement, ensure moderate influence in relation to its external kin. The second category mirror the opposite: support for territorial claims that does not respect the legal borders and territorial integrity of the host state. Furthermore, policies can range in terms of their active engagement.
Bilateral agreements and joint declarations are examples of actions reflecting the aforementioned relationship. Indicating that host states are most responsible for the preservation of minority rights within the respective borders. As mentioned in the Venice Commission:
The potentialities of bilateral treaties in respect of reducing tensions between kin-states and home states (tensions which can rapidly escalate when those in power regard minorities as unreliable and minorities fear that the home states will not respect their identity) appeared to be significant, to the extent that they can procure straight commitments on sensitive issues, while multilateral agreements can only provide for an indirect approach to those issues. Furthermore, they allow for specific characteristics and needs of each national minority as well as of the peculiar historical, political and social context to be taken into direct consideration.
This is in line with Brubaker’s line of reasoning. Bilateral relations are meant as a two way agreement between the homeland and host-state, in which on the one hand, cultural practices and traits belonging to the ethnic group are preserved in the host countries. On the other hand, is the same homeland respects the homelands’ sovereignty and territorial integrity that has
12 been set up in its official contestation. (Venice Commission, 2001; Brubaker, 1996).
Following the logic of kin states as protectors of their ethnic kin, it seems to be important to consider foreign policies. Domestic legislation as stated by Kardos (2006) ‘’Constitutional regulations and policy statements lead, or could lead, to specific domestic legislation providing a wide range of preferential treatment to the members of the kin
minorities’’ (p. 134). Preservation of components belonging to the ethnic kin remains to be an important argument coming from the homeland. Thus, ethnicity, more precisely transnational ethnic kin groups, become the main component in foreign policy making (King & Melvin, 2000). More specifically, Van Evera (1994) emphasizes that the risk of conflict escalation is higher in circumstances where diasporic communities and host states become the main subjects of the kin-states’ foreign policymaking.
Having pointed out the significance of kin-states during conflict, it seems no surprise to consider these linkages to developments beyond conflict, as has been acknowledged by Caspersen (2008) as well. Kocadal (2016) discusses the role of kin-states in the mediation process, and maps out four different categories in which these can act as third-party intervention in conflict: promotor, quasi-mediator, powerbroker and enforcer. Though the general assumption would be that biased kinship leads to unfavourable outcomes in the peace process, Kocadal (2016) demonstrates the opposite in some instances. Quasi-mediation, through its non intrusive approach, increases its legitimacy and as such are ‘’extending the mediation process beyond the disputants and the neutral third party’’ (p. 178). Byrne (2006) refers to these kinds of mediators as ‘’external ethno-guarantors’’ and acknowledges the stabilizing effect these can have in the mediation process when the quasi mediator approach is taken and as such prioritizes de-escalation. Both stress the importance of cooperation between the involving kin-states during this crucial period.
2.2 Triadic Nexus
The twentieth century has been marked by a series of events that eventually led to the
emergence of newly independent states. The end of an imperialist era, the end of the cold war and its east/west divide, and transition from communist regimes are some to name a few. At the same time, scholarly attention became more relevant and needed to understand the world and these transitions that affected global dynamics and societies worldwide. New ways of viewing and solving problems developed, leading to previously dismissed or unknown topics to be identified.
13 One of these was the occurrence of nationalizing political spaces that left communities ‘on the wrong side of the border’ as a result. It was particularly during the nineties that
conflict was characterized by this phenomenon as emphasised by Brubaker (1996). In order to make sense of issues regarding identity, trans border interactions, and communities, Brubaker developed a model that would fit three relevant units that must be considered when
studying this particular section of nationalism in political science. Moreover, the presented model of triadic relational nexus includes the national minorities, nationalizing states, and the external national homelands addressing the problem of cultural and political boundaries. He says that such states:
[..] must contend not only with political and economic reconfiguration and dislocation but also with two mutually antagonistic nationalisms - the "nationalizing" nationalisms of the states in which they live, and the "homeland" nationalisms of the states to which they belong, or can be construed as belonging, by ethno cultural affinity though not (ordinarily) by legal citizenship (pp. 56)
More specifically, this triadic relationship becomes significant to consider in cases that can be labelled according to the three previously mentioned characteristics. As being relatively ‘’new’’ nationalizing states, that is, after the fragmentation of a greater type of political body,
ethnically heterogeneous population, national minorities that are, in one way or another, not
in line with the nationalizing states, and the external national homelands. Then, why is this relationship important to consider? As stated by Brubaker (1996):
National minorities, nationalizing states, and external national homelands are bound together in a single, interdependent relational nexus. Projects of nationalization or national integration in the new nation-states, for example, "exist" and exercise their effects not in isolation but in a relational field that includes both the national minority and its external national homeland (p. 58).
An Instrumentalist view of nation, with its emphasis of actors such as leaders, political parties using nationalist rhetoric in its ability to mobilize masses and gain support. Furthermore, by means of challenging interests in which secessionist and autonomist movements. Practices used to legitimize such claims. The dynamics in Croatia with a significant ethnic Serb minority is used by Brubaker to illustrate this point.
14 Focusing on Croatia, Koska (2012) uses the triadic nexus to analyze the issue of Croatian citizenship from their independence in 1991 after the breakup of Yugoslavia, until 2011. He states that: ‘’Croatia has managed to establish a distinctive citizenship regime marked by stable citizenship legislation and changing boundaries of recognized rights to different categories of Croatian citizens’’ (p. 389). Important aspects to this establishment, are, amongst others the strong feeling of an imagined community regarding its ethnic kin in the wider region that implies an ethnocentric conception of the Croat nation.
Also considering Post-Yugoslav states, Krasniqi and Stjepanović (2015) bring up a notable point to the Brubaker’s triadic nexus. Namely that the ‘relational’ mechanism that characterizes this framework can be unidirectional, using Aromanians (Vlachs) in Albania and Bunjevci in Serbia as examples. Moreover, it is stated that:
In the case of claimed co-ethnics, as he argues, the external national homeland or the self-declared kin-state unidirectional perceives and accords citizenship to a population that does not consider itself a part of that nation necessarily or whose identifications varies, most often in relation to that state’s citizenship (p. 118).
As such, the external national homeland can also ‘force’ a certain policy towards its trans border minority kin, despite the lack of political willingness.
2.2.1 National Minority
According to Brubaker (1996), a national minority is not to be referred to as a demographic group within a given country, but instead understands them as ‘’a dynamic political stance, or, more precisely, a family of related yet mutually competing stances, not a static ethno
demographic condition’’ (p. 60). Furthermore, three different elements are identified that characterize these kinds of groups:
(1) the public claim to membership of an ethno cultural nation different from the numerically or politically dominant ethno cultural nation;
(2) the demand for state recognition of this distinct ethno cultural nationality;
(3) the assertion, on the basis of this ethno cultural nationality, of certain collective cultural or political rights
15 Claims that stem from the perspective of a certain national-identity vary across different cases, and as such can include a range of possibilities. This also applies to the stance taken by the national minority with regards to the ‘’host state’’ they are believed to be in.
‘’designation for a field of competing stances, and that die "stakes" of the competition concern not only what stance to adopt as a national minority but whether the "group" (or potential group) in question should understand and represent itself as a national minority’’ (p. 62). Thus, whether or not the group is considered a national minority greatly depends on the content of the claims of collective right being made: inter as well as intra ethnic stances, also emphasizing that it is not to be thought of as static in which internal unification among the minority is directly assumed.
2.2.2 Nationalizing state
Preferring over the often used concept of ‘nation-state’, Brubaker (1996) describes a nationalizing state as:
[..] an "unrealized" nation-state, as a state destined to be a nation-state, the state of and for a particular nation, but not yet in fact a nation-state (at least not to a sufficient degree); and the concomitant disposition to remedy this perceived defect, to make the state what it is properly and legitimately destined to be, by promoting the language, culture, demographic position, economic flourishing, or political hegemony of the nominally state-bearing nation (p. 63)
In other words, Brubaker views the nation-state as something that has completed in the sense that it denotes the finishing result that a nationalizing state eventually aims to reach.
Moreover, it indicates the position of the state that is, for the most part, dependent on the perception of the groups that make up the state. Homelands perception of nationalization of representatives and nationalizing projects. This becomes relevant when such perceptions are to be ‘’validated or socially sustained’’ as Brubaker states. Furthermore, Brubaker continues:
[..] one can impose and sustain a stance as a mobilized national minority, with its demands for recognition and for rights, only by imposing and sustaining a vision of the host state as a nationalizing or nationally oppressive state. To the extent that this vision of the host state
16 cannot be sustained, the rationale for mobilizing as a national minority will be undermined. (p. 64)
Thus, perception or vision that the national minority holds with regards to nationalizing (not complete) will reflect in its stance in which it determines a conflict or not to some extent as it sustains as well as justifies the political stance of group representatives, and may translate to competing nationalizing projects. Particularly present in cases where groups identified and belonged along and to only one ethno cultural nation that has been solidified through certain nationality policies, historical beliefs or institutional arrangements. Instances mentioned by Brubaker are Soviet and Yugoslav legacies, eventually leaving groups of people ‘’at the wrong side of the border’’.
Competing nationalizing stances among groups in a given state can manifest itself in a range of issues that affect intergroup relations. The presence of national minorities or even broadly stated, social pluralistic society, is able to fold itself as a threat to the identity and conceptions others hold of the country of residence (McRae, 1997; Hehman et al., 2012). Medeiros (2019) illustrates this issue with the case on the linguistic matter with regards to the Canadian identity, that consequently influences intergroup attitudes between Francophones and Anglophones.
Thus, a nationalizing state, according to Brubaker’s view, is not defined by a fixed policy orientation or standardized set of practices between groups but rather by the ever-changing dynamics that are articulated by competing groups and their representatives, organisation, political parties in order to achieve their envisioned version of a real nation state.
2.2.3 Critique
The triadic nexus proves to be an applicable framework to understanding this particular case of Bosnia and Herzegovina. As mentioned previously, scholars have used it before.
Nevertheless Brubaker’s framework received criticism as well.
In his work, Kuzio (2001) touches upon every aspect that has been presented by Brubaker in his book. His main point of critique regards the dichotomy (or Western bias) between Western civic ‘nation-states’ and Eastern ethnic ‘nationalizing states’ which results into a negative connotation of the latter within the scholarly literature on nationalism. More so, Kuzio (2001) argues that this division creates ‘’theoretical and terminological confusion’’
17 (p. 150), and suggests that both ethnic and civic states promote nationalizing polities alike. Homogenising (nationalizing) policies exists in Western liberal democracies too. and as such, should be acknowledged as well. Emphasizing this by stating that ‘’Civic states also possess `cultural baggage', need a `rich legacy of memories' and the identity of the governed people is defined nationally, not universally’’ (p. 144). After all, ethno-cultural components are present in all states. Alternatively, Kuzio (2001) classifies only two, with Yugoslavia (Kosovo case) being one, as ‘nationalising states’ that provided populations with citizenship, and denied polytechnic rights to others, while all other are ought to be considered as civic states. Though less critical, Kemp (2006) states a similar point of critique and provides an additional a fourth dimension to the triadic nexus: international community and law for the reason that ‘’national minority issues are no longer confined to domestic politics or bilateral relations’’ (p. 119). Essentially, Kemps (2006) argument is grounded in the idea that the rights of national minorities are ought to be promoted and protected under international law. At the same time this implies a certain limitation when it comes to the involvement of external national homelands (kinstates) and their ethnic kin abroad.
Additionally, the role of the international community, despite not always equally present, must be taken into account. Though it is not to be considered as a player, the
international community ‘’provides a framework, standards and potential mediation in cases when the actors have exhausted domestic and bilateral means of resolving their differences’’ (Kemp, 2006, p. 123). However, Kemp (2006), rightfully so acknowledges that it is not always clear which ‘actor(s)’ of the international community deals with which issues, aiming for improvement of such involvement – as there are present cases in which kinstate and neighbouring states are relevant.
2.3 Identity
The notion of identity itself it a complicated phenomena, and one of the central topics in the study of social sciences. As social beings, humans acquire and develop several different identities throughout their lives. Additionally, it implies the fluidity of identity itself, and as such identities are more inclined to be understood as dynamic than a consolidated one (Conversi 2004; Connor, 1994). Connor explains its irrational character by stating that ‘identity does not draw its sustenance from facts but from perceptions, perceptions are as important or more than reality when it comes to ethnic issues’ (Conversi 2004, p.33).
18 Ethnicity, as marker of belonging to a certain ethnic group, is a way of identification of
oneself that can be done through one or several components that mark boundaries between who is, and who is not from the same ethnic group. Just as the Greek origin of ‘ethos’ suggests, it implies the linkage of individuals by common descent.
Moreover, it has the ability to influence a great deal of an individual's decisions and understanding depending of what ethnic identity one has. Even more important is the distinction that is made between members of the same ethnic group and those who are not: the outsiders or ‘’other’’. Van den Berghe (1987) refers to this phenomena as ethnic nepotism, that is described as a way of legitimizing group affirmations and exclusivity which is believed to belong only to members from the same origin or ancestors. When approached by a political oriented lens, Wolff (2006) states that:
Ethnicity acquires enormous power to mobilize people when it becomes a predominant identity and means more than just a particular ethnic origin; it comes to define people as speakers of a certain language, belonging to a particular religion, being able to pursue some careers but not others, being able to preserve and express their cultural heritage, having access to positions of power and wealth or not (p. 31).
Smith (1991) describes this as an ethnic conception of the nation because the membership to a (ethnic) community is characterized by its ancestral past or ‘’presumed descend’’ (p. 12) that fits the ‘’imagined nations’’ conception as presented by Anderson (1991). As such, it implies an instrumentalist view for the understanding of ethnicity, which focuses on the mobilization of ethnicity used by actors in power used for different purposes. The primordial school argues the origins of ethnicity as part of human nature, while in stark contrast, constructivist view it to be a rather fluid, dynamic concept that is dependent on various factors. This view regards common descent as the basis on which a nation exists, for there must be communities before there are nations. Frankly, this is called the ‘’ethnic’’ model for understanding the nation. This is done in a similar way by Brubaker (1996) for describing the ‘non Western’ ethnic
nationalizing process of states which some may perceive as a Western bias.
Ethnicity remains to be an important component for the occurrence of conflict across the globe and throughout time. Various examples can be given of where ethnicity illustrates to be one of, if not the main source of clashes and struggles between different groups. Conflict along ethnic lines itself is a complex phenomenon (Horowitz, 1985). Wolff (2003) provides a more detailed definition and describes ethnic conflicts as ‘’a type of group conflict in which at
19 least one conflict party has its primary focus of identity in distinct ethnicity’’ (p. 13). In his study on the duration of civil war, Fearon (2004) concludes how ethnicity, more specifically ethnic diversity, poses to be an important factor that affect this. In explaining recurrence, Walter (2004) finds that ethnicity dimension heighten the chance of escalating.
2.3.1 Nationalism
As complex ethnic identity is and can be understood, so is the concept of nationalism that comes in various different types. The concept of nationalism is widely discussed throughout academia and certainly not a foreign concept in political science. In literature, nationalism is referred to as being an ideology, political movement, a form of identity or rhetoric (Norman, 2006; Wolff, 2006). This broad spectrum only illustrates the complexity of how nationalism is being approached.
Furthermore, a distinction can be made between two types of nationalisms. Civic nationalism, which puts a greater emphasis on territorially-based understanding as state and ‘a citizen of the nation x’ (Brown, 2000). Ethnic nationalism, on the other hand, has is grounds in belonging to a shared commonality that usually includes cultural aspects such as ancestry, religion and language (Muller, 2008; Wolff, 2006). Connor (1994) however, explains that the latter is the only kind of nationalism, and that civic nationalism is equivalent to patriotism due to its rational nature.
In order to emphasize this distinction, Connor states that nationalism ‘’denotes both the loyalty to a nation deprived of its own state and the loyalty to an ethnic group embodied in a specific state, particularly where the latter is conceived as a ‘nation-state’’’ (Conversi, 2004, p. 2). Thus, it implies the broad sense in which nationalism can be applicable. Essentially, being a ‘nationalistic Dutch citizen’ has a different connotation than being a ‘nationalistic Serb’ in Bosnia and Herzegovina as the first one does not necessarily implies religion while the latter certainly does.
Group affinity Identity with regards to a certain loyalty also much be distinguished: while a patriot refers to state, on the contrary, nationalism does to the nation (Conversi, 2004). It is exactly this distinction, between state and nation, that was explicitly discussed by Connor (1994) as ethno-nationalism. Moreover, Lebow (2012) describes identities as being “created, transmitted, revised and undermined” (p. 46) by the use of narratives. Powerful narratives that are laid in ethnicity or other cultural aspects in the nation-building processes and ethnicization
20 within the political sphere. Particularly present in ethno-religious narratives, the concept of a nation is perceived as something that existed
The reinforcement of unified national identity can be both intended in the promotion and support of a certain one, of which education illustrates to be a prime example of. On the other hand, however, Norman (2006) points out the unintended effects through policy and institutional arrangements legitimized by the understanding of what is just and what is not.
Having a national identity pervasive within a community enables another manifestation of nationalist politics, namely the attempt to rally support for political causes and policies by appealing to this identity and the sentiments that go along with it
Most famously discussed by Anderson (2006) in his book Imagined Communities, who considers an anthropological perspective on the understanding of a nation. Namely, as an ‘’imagined political community’’ (p. 6). Imagined for the reason that each individual member of a nation ‘’will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion (p. 6). Similarly, Deutsch (1966) interpretation of national identity being ‘’a characteristic of each individual, but it can only be exercised within the context of a group’’ (p. 97) as a form of membership.
Political causes have the ability to vary from smaller cases that are more symbolic of nature, to bigger ones such as demanding a greater form of self-determination in the form of autonomy. That being said, national identity is thus not fixed; but are fluid and are shaped under het mom van ‘national interest’. Norman (2006) identifies two ‘projects’ ought to be pursuit by nationalist. First, the proposition of self-determination of a given nation, which is more likely to be desired by minorities. Second, the notion of nation-building as ‘’ the attempt to determine the ‘self’ of the nation’’ (p. 23).
2.3.2 Religion
Mitchell (2006) religious identity is a marker for ethnicity (p. 1138). ‘’When ethnic identity is confusing or ambiguous, religious resources sometimes offer a more solid framework for identity’’ (p. 1140). (Levitt, 2008; Levitt, 2004) The transnational character of religion and thus the ability to foster transnational ties. (Jenkins, 2008) mentions classification as a relevant understanding of religious differences. Religion to be a crucial component of one's
21 ethnic identity (Brubaker, 1996).
If religion is the main component of which communities are able to differentiate from each other, it is no surprise then, that exactly this becomes important in the formation of national identities. The connection between religion and ethnicity has been examined in the field of ethnic studies (Ruane & Todd, 2011). One important aspect of ethnicity lies in the understanding of ethnicity that is bound to some specific territory (Conversi, 2002; Smith, 1989; Laitin, 2007; Mitchell, 2006).
With regards to neighbouring kin states, territoriality and collective identity and group formation where religion and ethnicity merge are important to consider. Divisions have
consequences for a much broader sense: cleavages along ethno-religious groups that is present in decision making, governance, political interests, cultural practices and so on (Ruane & Todd, 201; Mitchell, 2006). Largely homogeneous kin states with their ethnic kin located in a heterogeneous neighbouring country. Connor (1972) that religious ideas prevail in imagined kinship. Given kin states, as a relevant political actor, ethno-religious mobilisation.
Religious dimensions in ethnicity can take different forms. Examples show how ethnicity is often tied to a specific religious ideology that helps to differentiate between groups, which is particularly when there is a conflict between two or more groups
Additionally, ethnic distinctions can also be made on grounds of religion: Albanian Muslims vs. Orthodox Serbs in Kosovo for example, but also the identity formation of the French Canadians such as in the case of the Protestant Anglophone versus the Catholic Francophones (Ruane & Todd, 2011). Furthermore, the nationalization of religious ideologies is another way in which countries secure their national religious identity from others as their primary ethnic identity. Religious identities were merged into ethno-national mobilisation.
National identities are able to be heavily influenced and structures by means of religious beliefs and institutions (Radović, 2013). Nationalist agendas ‘’The introduction of religion into the political sphere signified the power that religion will have for the definitions of membership in new national states.’’ (Radovic, 2013, p. 3) in pointing towards the
developments in Croatia and Serbia. The term to describe ‘religious nationalism’. Religion as a powerful base for the development and understanding of the nations identity in its cultural and political sense.
Membership of a political community and ethno-religious belonging can be deeply embedded. Competing visions can be present in both identity and the conception of space (territory) and as such of national belonging (Wolff, 2006; Norman, 2006). Examples of states in which there are at least one or more groups that considers themselves members of a
22 particular community or nation. In his book Negotiating Nationalism, Norman (2006) takes such cases as the unit of analysis. Instead of using ‘nation-state’, Norman prefers the term ‘multination’ or ‘multinational’ to emphasize the absence of a single nationalist discourse and ‘nation building project’ that is implied with a nation-state. Multiple nation-building or national projects within a single territorial state are the result of a plurality of national
identities through nation-mobilizing by which various domestic identity building agendas are pursuit instead
Of course, there is a variety of examples of such multinational states in which ‘’different communities with competing national self-conceptions sharing the state’’2
with diverging degrees of nationhood including constituent groups with developed the concept of the earlier described national consciousness.
On a broader perspective, Radović (2013) provides a clear overview on Post-Yugoslav States and uses the triadic nexus to illustrate the issue of national identity in the light of political membership and its implications with the emphasis on religion mentioning that:
[..] membership in a specific political community defined by ethnicity (that is often in majority within the entire community based on citizenship as legal status), has been often expressed through religious symbols that became embedded in state symbols (p. 9)
2.4 Post-conflict politics
The post-conflict stage is usually characterized by the formal signing of documents in the form of settlement agreements or peace deals involving the parties in conflict. Though designed to end violent conflict, stability and peace in the long term is not guaranteed by them. Various examples in the Middle East, the Balkans and countries in Africa have shown failure in sustaining stability and peace. This leads to the importance of post-conflict
reconstruction, that is crucial for the transition of countries into an environment that reduces the possible outbreak of another conflict. In examining stages of ethnic conflict, Wolff (2006) mentions how post-conflict reconstruction involves:
‘’building acceptable, accountable, and transparent institutions, to generate self-sustaining economic growth, and to create a civil society with free and independent media, civic
23 organizations, and a general climate in which people once again begin to trust each other and are willing to live together peacefully’’ (pp. 7)
Conflict settlements are more to be seen as the ideal and preferred situation, however, in reality this is rarely the case. Moreover, the post-conflict phase does not indicate immediate expulsion of issues or competing interests that led to conflict in the first place, which can therefore be present long after the implementation of the settlement and/or peace agreements. For post-conflict reconstruction to be successful, it is important to manage the causes of conflict and thus go beyond ending (violent) conflict alone. For this reason, conflict
reconstruction must be implemented in order to achieve effective conflict settlement on the long term with an emphasis on inclusive political structures that to consolidate stability (Bieber, 2004; Wolff, 2006).
As previously discussed, conflicts along ethnic lines bring complexities, which consequently transfers to the period after conflict has formally ended. Various research concludes how conflict characterized by ethnic dimensions remain to be much harder to resolve as supposed to conflict in which ethnicity has not been played a significant role (Wolff, 2006; Kaufmann, 1996; Sambanis, 2004). Essential is the separating ability of ethnicity that is still present during this period (Whitt & Wilson, 2007). Horowitz (1985) extensively discusses the high salience of ethnicity, which has the ability to influence an individual's behaviour towards their own ethnic in-group and differing outgroup in the post-conflict environment.
Deeply divided societies are common in the post-conflict environment, and can be identified along territorial, political, and social lines, and therefore complicates the process of long-term stability and peace in which inclusion and cooperation of relevant groups is crucial (Wolff, 2006). Wolff (2006) elaborates on this transition as well, noting that:
The physical and emotional injuries inflicted on civilians during a conflict not only serve to polarize and radicalize societies during conflict, but they also often prevent reconciliation afterwards and contribute to continued tensions between the (former) conflict parties and their supporters, regardless of any deals that leaders may have struck (pp. 179)
Moreover, challenges with regards to deeply divided societies are a result of ethnic conflict are relevant for various reasons. Primarily guaranteeing the de-ethnicization of politics and other sectors that impact social life (Simonsen, 2005). Bieber (2004) points out the challenges
24 in facing the institutionalization of ethnicity which have been consolidated in the post-conflict agreements in countries located in the Western Balkan region, and complicating the
normalization process between ethnic groups.
Party politics in the post-conflict environment in which these ethnic cleavages play a role as ethnically-based parties claim to represent the interests of their own ethnic group. Reilly (2006) for instance, notes that ‘’it is often easier for campaigning parties to attract voter support by appealing to ethnic allegiances rather than issues of class or ideology’’ (p. 812). Additionally, scholars identify the importance of leaders in their ability of organizing, guiding and mobilize the group to which they belong, therefore affecting transition from a conflicting and hostile environment to a more peaceful one (Reilly, 2006; Wolff, 2006; Simonsen, 2005). For instance, Gurr (2000, p. 66) states that ‘’cultural identities - those based on common descent, experience, language, and belief - tend to be stronger and more enduring than most civic and associational identities’’
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3. Methodology
The following section carefully describes and justifies the steps and procedures chosen which have been deemed as appropriate by means of answering the research question as complete as possible. Furthermore, explanations and rationale for the choice of method, case selection on Bosnia and Herzegovina, type of data analysis and collection are given which is eventually followed by mentioning the reliability as well as the validity of this study in its entirety.
3.1 Choice of method
The main objective of this thesis is to deepen the understanding of the relationship between the nationalizing state, national minority, and the external national homeland in the case of BiH with its two neighbouring kin-states Serbia and Croatia. Furthermore, this study heavily focuses on the complex phenomenon that is ethno-nationalism and the sense of belonging to a group of common descent and religion that it enables. A large part of belonging is embedded in symbolic practices and rhetoric speech, in which actors translate their ethno-national affinity to groups of people. For this reason, qualitative method is chosen as the appropriate line of research as this allows for such a topic to be explored and incorporated in a more complete and detailed analysis.
To understand what how neighbouring kin-states Croatia and Serbia influence a sense of belonging, soft data is needed for the in-depth exploration of the aforementioned research objective. Thus, compared to quantitative, qualitative data allows the researcher to make sense of complex and symbolic expressions in its wider context. (Neuman, 2014). Moreover, the concept of ethnicity and belonging in relation to other relevant groups consists of several elements that have to be considered when analysing, for which qualitative method is more appropriate. Finally, the variety of forms of data that comes from documentation in various forms such as official statements, press releases, and interview transcriptions
3.2 Unit of analysis
As stated in the section of social and academic relevance, researchers and writer that focus on BiH have, in my opinion, not put enough emphasis on these two states despite their significant role and influence throughout the years. Croatia and Serbia have both played a major role in the events that happened in the 90s. Both Serbia and Croatia have dealt with important
26 developments in the last fifteen years. In 2013, the republic of Croatia officially joined the EU as the second country of the Western Balkan region. Serbia, despite facing its internal challenges has held special relations with its kin in BiH. What makes such dynamics more interesting is the fact that the position of the two kin groups differ greatly from each other, in their constitutional organization (FBiH and RS) but also in their size. This reason makes Bosnia and Herzegovina a relevant and interesting subject of study.
With this being said, this research does not refer to civil society per see, but rather, as the organization of government is implies, to the different ethno nationalistic based interests of the constituent groups. This also means that not all members of one of the three ethnic groups favours choices taken by the chosen dominant ethnic representative(s) in place.
As a matter of fact, besides there being inter-ethnic divides, there are also intra-ethnic divides between each of the ethnic groups. However, there are only three dominant ethno national political parties that dominate their communities’ political agenda.
3.3 Data collection and analysis
Rasidagic and Koburov (2013) mark 2006 as the beginning of a new crisis which is characterized by a heightening of nationalistic discourse across the political landscape in BiH. Specifically when comparing it to the period prior to 2006, when IC took a strict and active approach. In order to map out the dynamics within the triadic nexus, the timeframe from the negotiating effort in the 90s – up until the most recent dates will be considered.
The primary method of this research is based on content analysis. .Types of data material varies and exists of official documentation, speeches, press releases and policy papers. All documents and publications are talking about either government (officials) or representatives within BiH itself. Additionally, a variety of journal articles and books will be used to describe or conceptualize relevant information. Additionally, four in person interviews have been conducted in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina in the month of May 2019. The following interviewees have been with the following interviewees:
S. Šarić who is a general Manager of Post Conflict Research Centre (NGO). J. Hasić, PhD. Assistant Professor at the Sarajevo School of Science and Technology. D. Kapidžić, PhD. Assistant Professor at the University of Sarajevo. And lastly, D. D’Urso. Political Advisor at the EU delegation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
In order to obtain different views and individual opinions from different backgrounds and fields, these have been included as interviewees. Furthermore, all in person
27 have been recorded with a phone, and with permission as stated in the interview consent form that has been signed by all interviewees. Furthermore, an interview consent form was signed prior to the interview to ensure terms and conditions of voluntary participation and respect the privacy of the interviewees. All interviews were a min of 30 minutes and a max of an hour. Additional interviews are meant as supplementary to the data that has been obtained by content analysis as the primary choice of analysis. Moreover, interviews with interviewees of required expertise in the field of ethno politics, foreign relations of BiH or post-conflict development of BiH were chosen for this research. A semi-structured interview form is chosen as this allows for a clear guideline in terms of needed answers on needed questions from interviewers as well as the follow up questions from answers to clarify, strengthen,. In addition, it allows for new and relevant information and subjects to be introduced in which the interviewee is well informed about.
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4. Context: the nationalizing state - Bosnia and Herzegovina
The following section provides a contextual overview on Bosnia and Herzegovina, and more specifically on why this country can be used as a case for understanding contemporary kin-state politics in the post-conflict environment. Most probably known for the bloody events that happened during the 90s, Bosnia and Herzegovina is one of seven countries that gained their independence since the death of Yugoslavia’s communist leader Josip Broz Tito in 1980. It was particularly in the 80s that ethnically based nationalism began to take a new form, and the idea of a harmonious multi-ethnic society clearly began to fade over the years to come. As the most ethno-nationally diverse out of all former Yugoslavian countries, Bosnia and Herzegovina has been and still is in a rather complicated relationship with its
neighbouring countries Croatia and Serbia. Both countries are moving to what can be considered a positive direction to, amongst others, European integration. However, most current obstacles Bosnia and Herzegovina is facing since the 90s has its roots in the complex demographic composition that exists of three different ethno religious communities. In order to understand these dynamics, two issues are relevant to discuss: what is the Bosnian identity? Perhaps or a more appropriate question could be: is there even a Bosnian identity? And
second, how was the process of nation-building in Bosnia and Herzegovina?
4.1 Bosnian identity
Present day Bosnia and Herzegovina is inhabited by three ethno-national groups, namely the Bosniaks (predominantly Muslim), Croats (predominantly Catholics) and Serbs
(predominantly Orthodox). Besides religion, linguistic differences are present as well. These ethno-national categories, with its emphasis on religious membership, acts as a basis of the political environment and consequently political communities in the country. This was particularly the case after the violent conflict that formally ended with the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) in 1995 (Robinson & Pobric, 2006; Zdeb, 2013; Andjelic, 2003).
As the indications Serb, Croat, and Bosniak suggest, none actually refer to the country or national membership of Bosnia and Herzegovina. During the socialist Yugoslav (SFRY) period (1945-1990), the denotation of Bosniaks did not exist up until its official
documentation in 1971. Meaning that prior to this, Muslims - with the majority living in BiH - were to be identified as Croat Muslims, Serb Muslims, or ethnically undeclared Muslim (Banac, 1988). With all excluding the national membership of Bosnia and Herzegovina (at the
29 time one of the six federal units of SFRY).
Furthermore, territorial imagination and identity of Croats and Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina are linked to specific ‘homeland’ nations, namely the Republics of Croatia and Serbia and the idea of the propagated irredentist idea of ‘Greater Croatia’ and ‘Greater Serbia’. Ethnic identification of both Serbs and Croats has been present even before the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, while the ethnic origins of Bosnian Muslims was believed to be converts during the Islamic majority of the Ottoman Empire. In addition, there is no trans border homeland of Bosnian Muslims. Instead, the Bosnian Kingdom present before the Ottomans appeared in the Western Balkans, remains to be the main point of historic reference for Bosniaks of the Bosnian identity (Wolff, 2006).
Unlike now, a distinct ‘Bosnian identity’ was present during the medieval independent state of the Bosnian Kingdom that lasted from 1180 to 1463 (Malcolm, 1996). Suggesting Bosnia’s identity and history (Velikonja, 2003) seperate from the two neighbouring
countries. The originally Catholic ruling Kingdom differentiated itself from Catholic Croats which is something that is not the case anymore. Thus, there is no such thing as a ‘Bosnian Christian’; he/she is either a Croat or a Serb. For this reason, Bosniaks are also seen to be using the recurring ‘liljan’ (golden lily) symbol3
that refers to the coat of arms used during the Bosnian kingdom; essentially represented the statehood of Bosnia as one, instead of a state divided by three nations (Malcolm, 1996). As such, defining ethnic groups through different religious communities that were present in the region. Furthermore, ethnic categorization by religious affiliation was further consolidated during the Ottoman Empire that, like most empires did, structured and organized its society along religious lines (Andjelic, 2003). To get a better idea of what this divide looks like within the Bosnian population, I will mention one specific example that is a symbolically loaded issue. The use of flags clearly indicate national identity which can be spotted in both cities and suburbs. The red-blue-white flag of RS is seen all over the wider region dominated by Bosnian Serbs. Both the current blue-yellow starred, and the old flag of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina are seen in the FBiH which dominated by Bosniaks. Either the Croatian or former Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna (now the flag of one of the administrative cantons) in the Croat dominated area of Herzegovina.
4.2 Nation-building in Bosnia and Herzegovina
30 An active attempt to unify citizens of BiH by means of nation-building was during its Austro-Hungarian rule As its put a framework to understand the current ideas held by Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Serbs for the most part; of course, keeping in mind that Bosnia has gained its independence in and thus formally ending the idea of partitioning Bosnian territory.
In order to understand claims that have been made by leading Croat and Serb political parties, it is crucial to provide an overview up until the formal end of the war in 1995. The national question of Bosnia and Herzegovina is directly related to both Croatia and Serbia in the pursuit of a geopolitical mission. In uniting their ethnonational that meant the expansion of their nation-state. With regards to the Bosnia and Herzegovina territory, the core idea of expansionist claims has much to do with identity oriented claims and beliefs that were perceived as ‘’true’’. While both expansionist ideologies have a history of their own, for this study it is relevant to know what this meant for the country of Bosnia and Herzegovina that included a third ethnic group: the Muslims – later known as Bosniaks.
Both claims to Bosnian territory were grounded in the perception of Muslims as ‘the other’ and the enemy. Three claims are presented by MacDonald (2003) in constructing the Croat and Serb ‘’Greater’’ ideologies, namely that:
Firstly, the idea of Moslems as either ethnic Croats or Serbs; and Moslem nationalism as invented or constructed; Secondly, the notion that Bosnia-Hercegovina has historically been either Serbian or Croatian; Thirdly, that claims to Moslem national identity and autonomy concealed an Islamic conspiracy to take over Europe4
Numerous scholars have pointed out the nationalistic rhetoric of both Tudjman and Milosevic in their arguments for expansing national territory (Ali & Lifschultz, 1994; Friedman, 1996). As such, a large part was nestled in the fear of Islam. This was especially the case when Alija Izetbegovic – first president of independent BiH, and a Bosniak – published his work Islam
Declaration.
For both political parties, political mobilization was needed in order to pursue such ideas. For as there would be no other way in which Serbs and Croats living outside of their respective homelands would follow and adhere to such beliefs. No surprise, then, that propaganda played a crucial role in doing so (Radidagic, 2011). Šarić 5mentioned that
4
Macdonald, B. (2003). Balkan Holocausts. Manchester: Manchester University Press., p. 221
5 S. Šarić. General Manager of Post Conflict Research Centre (NGO). Interviewed May 20th, 2019 in Sarajevo,
31 religious institutions definitely could have taken a more peaceful and binding rhetoric in their approach to civilians of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Instead of spreading the message of
empathy, harmony, and togetherness, it was often used as legitimizing nationalist agenda. With both Croat and Serb ethnicities being described as ‘tribal’, stark in contrast with the ‘constructed’ identities that belongs to those of the Muslims (Bosniaks)
Thus, the idea of a ‘unified’ BiH is, almost always, linked to a Bosniak-ruled state that is in some way inspired, or characterized by Islamic religious elements and rule of law. The question of territory has been an integral part of the political agenda of both Tudjman and Milosevic. Eventually, the international community began to take action, seeing that the conflict was only worsening by the day and seeing that the central government after gaining its independence was unable to do so (Rašidagić, 2011 ).
Moreover, Bosnia and Herzegovina does not have a dominant identity. Rather, it has three separate ones and they cannot agree on what common identity they want to have for their state. Each group has their own vision of what Bosnia should look like. Identity is a strong factor that.
On December 14, 1995 the DPA was signed by the former presidents of Croatia (Tuđman), Serbia (Milošević) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (Izetbegović – a Bosniak) (Wolff, 2006; Rašidagić & Koburov, 2013). However, this did not mean the end of conflict in the post-war scenario. From the moment of signing, Bosnia entered a new phase. A three presidency system – with joint institutions – based put in place that was based on ethnic belonging: one for each of the three constituent groups. Lasting divided interests among the three constituent ethnic groups regarding the question of statehood have been put forward and mobilized by political elites ever since, and as such further complicated the process of
stabilizing the post-conflict development (Rašidagić & Koburov, 2013).
The state-building process that was implemented by IC was an attempt at stabilizing the country, that was done step by step. First by initiating the reconciliation between the two former allies that are the Bosniaks and Croats. Resulting into the Washington agreement of 1993, a ‘political superstructure’ leaving the Bosnian Croats heavily outnumbered: clashes with regards to political and diverging national interest became visible from the start. For Bosniaks, the strengthening and preservation of their only homeland, that is Bosnia and Herzegovina - as arranged according to the Dayton agreement was their main interests. Thus, Bosniaks’ representatives aiming for the unification of the Bosnian nation and statehood. In contrast were the independence preservation policies of the Croats. Up to his day it can be seen that this difficult collaboration, as stated in Rašidagić (2013) that: ‘’Federation was
32 always something of an unhappy marriage between the Bosniaks and Croats, whose elites have diametrically opposite political goals’’ (p. 70)
Whether or not the Washington Agreement and The Dayton Peace Agreement could have been initiated differently is a never ending discussion on its own. The past years
however, has shown its incompatibility in getting rid of inter-ethnic tensions and never ending dominance of conflict between nationalist political parties – affecting the wider Bosnian society. Opposing this, competing views of the state exist. Bosnian Serbs support the
secessionist agenda since the 90s in the Serb dominated territories in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bosnian Croats, who found themselves to be in a disadvantaged position in the shared
federation with the dominant Bosniaks, have extensively tried to, as quotes by Zdeb (2013) ‘’something of their own’’.
4.3 Kin Minority and kin majority
Whether or not kin communities form a minority or majority in the host country has implications for their position in the host state, in relation to the host country and kin-state dynamics. While the majority of Serbs favouring preserving Yugoslavia, while the majority of Bosniaks and Croats opted for independence of BiH, resulting in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In order to politically re-organize the country was split in two entities:
Republika Srpska (RS), and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) which has been previously consolidated by the Washington Agreement in 1994. This important
difference between the two communities makes the relationship between Bosnian Serbs and Serbia somewhat settled as the establishment of RS in itself was regarded as a favorable outcome.
In contrast to the Croats in BiH, Bosnian Serbs gained territorial autonomy through one of the two bodies in which they are demographically dominant. Institutional regulation over favourable policies with respect to language. Secessionist rhetoric coming from Serb politicians has grown over the years, which go against the previously mentioned DPA It was particularly RS’ president Milorad Dodik who publicly calls for such reforms.
Croats in BiH form the minority on the entity level, and a majority in three out of ten cantons. constitute the minority in BiH and as one of the three ethnic groups is also greatly dispersed throughout the country. Sharing one entity together with the majority group, that is, the Bosniaks, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) is divided into ten cantons, of which three are Croat dominated (Canton 10, Posavina, and West Herzegovina).
