Date: 26-6-2015
Word Count: 17553 [without Appendix, Bibliography]
Social Media During Times Of Conflict: a Content
Analysis of Facebook and VKontakte During the
Ukrainian Crisis
Source of image: Branco. Crimea Invasion. 7-5-2014. 30-4-2015 <http://blog.similarweb.com/ the-unprecedented-growth-of-social-media-usage-in-russia-and-ukraine/>.
Keywords
Facebook, VKontakte, Social Network Analysis, Arab Spring, Mariupol, Siege of Mariupol, Euromaidan, Ukraine, Russia, Cross platform Analysis, Cross language analysis , Fposts.com, Content Analysis, Separatists, Pro-Russian Rebels, Activist groups, Online discussion, Online identity forming, East-European studies, Post-socialist States, Soviet Union studies, European Union, , Propaganda studies, Putin, Cameron, Crimea Annexation, NATO, World War II, Cold War, Memory Studies, Digital Memory, Collective Memory, Stalin, Communism.
Abstract
In former research on the different uses and effects of social media platforms during times of political unrest it is argued that these online platforms have played a significant role in the spreading of information and the mobilization of groups of protesters [Mazaid 2011]. In Tunisia for example, the appearance of the words ‘revolution’ and ‘liberty’ was measured in the
Tunisian blogosphere in the weeks just before the actual revolution took place, and it seemed that during the period when those words were used most, there was also a peak in protesters on the streets (40,000 to 100,000). Furthermore, it can be argued that social media platforms like Twitter and Facebook offer an online space where new media users can have a dialogue or discussion with each other about the situation in the nation where the unrest takes place [Mazaid 2011, Samin 2012, Shirky 2012]. In this sense, social media can be seen as important
‘tools’[Shirky, 29] to enhance democracy. In my thesis I will try to build further on this literature by applying social media content analysis on Facebook posts and posts of the Russian social network site VKontakte during the current situation in Eastern Ukraine, where tensions are rising since it is believed that Separatist- and Russian forces will break the peace agreement of Minsk in February 2015 by an assault on the city of Mariupol. Former research on social media use in Ukraine showed that the claim that it has an effect on off line events was also true in the case of the Euromaidan protests: It is argued that Facebook and VKontakte have played a significant role in mobilizing protesters and anti-protesters during these Protests in February 2014 in Ukraine [Etling 2014, Soztek 2015]. In my thesis I will argue that – as claimed before – social media are indeed enhancing democracy, but the claim that it can cause on the ground effects is in the case of Mariupol not entirely relevant, since it is a different kind of conflict. Building on methodologies already applied in Social Network Analysis like cross- platform- and
language analyses, I will also contrast and compare the narrative that both parties are telling via social media, using the specific case of the tensions in Mariupol and focusing on the content of posts that can be found containing the keywords [Mariupol] and [Mariupol crisis]. An unexpected finding is that the social media platforms are also used for elaborate storytelling by users, which opens up the possibility for digital- and cultural memory studies, which will in the end give insight in the way that Russian new media users make sense of the multiple versions of their nation’s history in different ways.
Index:
1. Introduction
2. Research question and sub questions
3. Literary review
4. Research method
5. Results and discussion
6. Conclusion
7. Bibliography
8. Appendix
The role of social media during the Arab Spring thaof 2010 was critically analyzed by many different authors [Eltantawy & Wiest 2011, Howard et al. 2011, Mazaid et al. 2011, Samin 2012, Shirky 2011]. In academic debates it is argued that social media might have played a significant role in the happening of events during the uprisings by protesters in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Algeria [Mazaid et al. 2011]. Often associated with the promise of more democratization, the use of social media has been described as a major force that ‘shaped political debates’ and spread ‘democratic ideas’ [23], while other authors are more skeptical about the promise of democracy, and emphasize that we should not forget the nation-specific ‘underlying dynamics’ [Samin 2012] that condition the way in which an uprising is developing. For example, while the government of Mubarak in Egypt was overthrown, an uprising in Saudi Arabia that was promised on social media platforms never happened. The critique here is that social media platforms are not an independent ‘driver of social change’ [1], but that the underlying social- and political dynamics must always be taken into account.
Still most authors agree that social media platforms at least played an important role in mobilizing protesters and spreading information [Eltantawy & Wiest 2011, Howard et al 2011, Shirky 2011, Samin 2012], and in more contemporary uprisings like the Euromaidan Protests in Kiev, this claim about the significance of social media in the process of developing events is reconfirmed [Etling 2014, Soztek 2014]. My thesis is based on the literature about these claims -which will later be explained in more detail- and I hope to expand the the literature and critical researches on social media by arguing that platforms like Facebook and the Russian VKontakte must be considered as powerful tools in order to analyze the discourses that are formed not only online but that are also a reflection of cultural identity forming of people within post-socialist societies. Furthermore I hope to make a contribution by zooming in on the different narrative forms that are mostly told either from a Western European Union - or an Eastern Pro-Separatist and Russian perspective. I will not limit myself by trying to discover the political preferences of the many users who post comments, react on other comments and that are liking comments by others; I will also take a broader look on the different uses of the platforms by new media users, for example citizens who want to survive and that warn others for violence in order to survive [Sonne, n. pag. 2015], or the practice of citizen journalism. In the end the narrative forms that are used to argue about the crisis in Ukraine on and VKontakte will be compared with
each other in order to investigate and contrast any differences. Instead of performing social media analysis in order to visualize network structures of online groups [Duvanova et al. 2014] , I want to stay closer to the actual content and put the findings in a historical- and cultural context in order to understand the stories that are being told by new media users.
When Putin, Merkel, Hollande and Poroshenko met in Belarus with the aim to find a solution for the ongoing conflict in Eastern Ukraine1, a milestone was hoped to be achieved in the
unrest in Ukraine; Ukraine was willing to agree on greater autonomy for the Eastern Ukrainian regions in exchange for a restoration of a demilitarized zone and a partial retreat of the separatist forces. Russia on the other hand demanded that the separatists could hold all the territory that they conquered. But with the failed ceasefire that was agreed upon in September 2014 in Minsk2,
the territorial gains of the separatists forces and the growing evidence that the Kremlin is sending military aid to the separatist – which Putin even admitted in the case of the Crimean Annexation [Dougherty, 4] - mutual distrust between the leaders has grown. Although Merkel and Hollande still seemed to believe in a solution by considering the peace talks as ‘one of the chances to avoid a wider war (...)’3. In the end, a ceasefire was indeed agreed upon, but until today there are still
reports of shelling from both sides.
From this short introduction to the crisis it seems clear that the conflict in Ukraine is different than most other cases that were treated in the literature on social media use in times of unrest. A difference with the uprisings during the Arab Spring is that instead of mostly an internal conflict, two nations are blaming each other here. Even though the conflict could be seen as an uprising of activists just like during the Arab Spring since The pro-Russian separatists are ‘rising up’ against the government, it seems clear that the war is also between two nations, and a
difference with a conflict like during the Arab spring is that in Ukraine and Russia a majority of both populations support their own regime instead of wanting to overthrow it.
In media like Ukrainian television and online news sites the discourse of guilt seems to rule in the discussion. On the one hand, Russia is seen as the aggressor by the west, on the other hand, the west is blamed of not paying attention to traitorous ‘nationalists, Nazi’s and fascists’
1 Polityuk & Pineau, Leaders hold Ukraine peace talks as fighting surges, Reuters Website (11 Feb 2015). 30-4-2015 <http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/11/us-ukraine-crisis-idUSKBN0LF0ZM20150211>
2 Shuster, Cease-fire in Ukraine fails an preparations for war begin, Time Website (5 Nov. 2014). 30-4-2015 <http://time.com/3558451/ukraine-russia-separatists-mariupol-war/>.
3 The Guardian (2015). 29-4-2015 <
[Stratcom Report, 4] under the government of Poroshenko, together with Putin’s spreading of the idea that Russia is ‘surrounded by enemies’ [Dougherty, 24]. I want to emphasize that the ‘truth’ of information that different sides claim to have is by no means the goal of this thesis. Since all sides are using propaganda [Dougherty, 2] and multiple parties have their own narrative of what is currently happening in the military conflict, it is irrelevant to discover the ‘truth’ in order to have a fruitful discussion about the role of media in the happening of events. One thing that is certain is that ‘traditional’ media (television, radio) and digital media are used to actively shape stories, and more interesting would be to compare and contrast those stories instead of verifying the truth of facts told in them.
In the literature section the claims about social media will be explored in more detail and some of the historical- and cultural roots of the conflict will be explained in order to understand the stories that are prevalent in Ukrainian media. After that, a description follows of the method used to extract data from Facebook and VKontakte. Then, the findings will be put in the wider context of the conflict and its media landscape, in order to strengthen my argument that it is important to study Facebook and VKontakte in multiple ways, since the claim that social media play an important role in times of uprisings can also be extended to other types of conflicts, and by studying them they allow us to understand the different kinds of narrative that are shaped on- and mediated by these platforms. Analyzing the content enables us to understand, compare and contrast the stories that media users form and the different ways Facebook and VKontakte are used by multiple parties involved in the conflict.
2. Research question and sub questions.
The overall goal of the thesis is to get an overview of the online discourse about the current crisis in Ukraine that is as accurate as possible. Content analysis on social media platforms was chosen as a method since earlier research on the use of social media platforms in the crisis [Duvanova 2014, Etling 2014, Gruzd & Tsychanova 2015, Soztek 2015] has shown that it allows us to study the dynamics of the conflict, the different stories that are being told, the structures and
several limitations in many of the methods, which I will discuss later. The focus will specifically be on the actual content of posts. The research question of my analysis is: What are the
differences when comparing and contrasting the discourses of Western-leaning content and the Russian-leaning content on the social media platforms Facebook and VKontakte? Since this opens up a large dataset including many different political discussions, it is necessary to narrow the research down to two specific platforms: Facebook and VKontakte. The following sub questions can then be formulated:
1. To what extend does the narrative of the Western-leaning discourse differ from the Russian-leaning discourse on Facebook?
2. To what extend does the narrative of the Western-leaning discourse differ from the Russian-leaning discourse on on VKontakte?
Then I will use my results in order to argue whether the claims by other authors (social media enhances democracy and triggers on the ground-effects) that I will treat in detail in the literature section can be confirmed or must be revised or must be seen as irrelevant for this particular conflict.
3. What claims about the uses of social media from earlier research during times of conflict can be confirmed? And how do they differ in this particular conflict?
Expected results
My first expectation is that just like during the Euromaidan protests and the Arab Spring, also in the case of the military tensions in Mariupol social media are a way to spread information about events in the conflict quickly and effective. With effectivity I mean here that messages reach a considerably large audience or whether messages are even read at all. Relating to this is the issue of accessibility: do Ukrainians even have access to internet? The Broadcasting Board of
Governors’ Gallup Report about media use shows that: ‘About half of Ukrainians overall (50.9%) have Internet access in their households, including 56.0% of Crimeans. Among those who do have household access, 51.8% have a high-speed connection, while 42.6% have wireless access at home.’ [1]. Although only half of the people seems to use the internet, I expected that a large part of these users do use Social Media Platforms, since the report shows that 46 % of Ukrainians say that they have used Social Media Platforms in the last view days [2]. Then it is
also important to know the size of my two platforms. According to the report, 74,5 % says that they use VKontakte, while Facebook has a percentage of 42,9 %.[2]. It is also important to note that 51,8% of the new media users has a high speed connection, which means that they can react fast when a discussion takes place.
A second expectation is that content in Russian is more supportive for the Russian and Pro-Russian Separatist side in the conflict and that English content might be more supportive for the Western pro-Europe side. Earlier research has shown that online communications do not necessarily bridge political divides, which is sometimes hoped or expected from social media [Duvanova et al, 2014]. This ‘casts doubt on behavioral change’ [Duvanova et al, 225], by which is meant that political divides are confirmed by electronic communications rather than replaced by ‘new patterns of social connections, identifications, and behavior’ [225]. One of my research’s possible scenarios is that the content on Facebook in English might be western-leaning and content on Vkontakte in Russian might be Russian and Separatist-leaning. The political divide between Russia and Europe is in that case reconfirmed. A question is then whether social media platforms offer a space for discussion between users with different political views – as concluded in literature on the role of social media during the Arab Spring [Mazaid et al. 2011, Samin 2012] or whether there is no discussion at all.
A third expectation is that the two sides of this political divide will blame each other for the traumatic events that have already happened in the crisis. Especially since the responsibility for the disaster of the MH17 is still controversial, and – although sometimes hard to understand from a West-European point of view but explained in detail by Jill Dougherty- since the Russian and Pro-Russian Separatist side have a different interpretation of who is responsible for the outbursts of violence that are currently taking place in Ukraine. I expect that the two opposing sides and their own narratives can easily be traced, but it could be that the platforms are also used for more pragmatic reasons like citizens who just want to survive.
In the following section, claims there were made about the uses and effects of social media in times of unrest will be explored and I will also investigate the empirical methods that were used in this field. I will also treat some studies on the different uses of social media, and related to one of those uses – one side blaming the other side – some the historical- and cultural roots of the tension between Russia and Western countries will be explored.
Claims of the role of social media
Although most authors of the literature about the role of social media during the Arab Spring agree that a digital place for debating and spreading information was shaped that could escape the control of authoritarian governments, different descriptions of the role of social media are given by which some authors tend to be more positive and others more skeptical about the idea of social media as an utopian space for democracy. Eltantawy & Wiest for example call the role of social media ‘significant’ [1218] and argue ‘that social media played an instrumental role in the success of the anti-government protests that led to the resignation of the country’s dictatorial leader’ [1218].
Mazaid et al. argue that social media are one of the causes of the Arab Spring by ‘putting a human face on political oppression’ [2]. First, they argue that digital technology made it possible for a young urban well educated generation to have online political conversations in Tunisia and Egypt [2]. The second argument is that while digital media were already used some years before the Arab Spring, they can prove that a spike in ‘revolutionary conversations’ can clearly be seen in their dataset just before the uprising took place [3], which would mean that a peak in amount of conversations about political and social change would have immediate effect on ‘reality’ or ‘the streets’. In Tunisia, the appearance of the words ‘revolution’ and ‘liberty’ was measured in the Tunisian blogosphere in the weeks just before the actual revolution took place, and it seemed that during the period when those words were used most - there was also a peak in protesters on the streets (40,000 to 100,000). The third argument is that digital media made it possible to let the message for more democracy cross international borders [3], which means widening the political debate about democracy to an international level.
In the article of Mazaid et al. argue that the part of the population crucial to the revolution is the ‘Tech Savvy Democrats’ of Egypt and Tunisia [5], because these young well-educated
people know how to deal with technology. This can be seen as nation-specific factor of context that has been crucial to the success of social media; by this I mean that in other countries in North-Africa or the Middle East where an uprising was expected, social media might be used by civilians but the lacking of the crucial group of ‘tech savvy democrat’ youngsters might mean that social media might have less impact on ‘the ground’. Every nation has its own context or ‘underlying dynamics’ [Samin, n. pag.], from which the effect of social media can not be seen apart. Examples of this are effective actions of governments to restrict freedom of expression, or even to chase the persons that posted the content considered controversial, like the Egyptian blogger Nabil Seliman [Mazaid et al, 7]. Another important factor in this nation-specific context is the wealth of the population and related to that, the willingness to actually overthrow their government. As Samin compares Saudi Arabia with Egypt, he points to the fact that Saudi Arabia is rich while Egypt is poor, which makes Saudis less willing to demonstrate in the streets and instead would like ‘softer’ ways reforming. This is just one of the examples of context that Samin gives; his larger critique is that although social media are important in the process of social and political change, we should realize that they do not produce the same ‘outcome’ [n. pag.] in every nation during times of political unrest.
It has been argued that digital media has played a significant role in gathering groups of protesters during the Euromaidan protests [Etling 2014, Soztek 2015]. In the article of Etling a research is done on whether there is a difference in sentiment in use of English media and Russian media, and the question is asked what this says about the political divide in the country. Is the content in Russian overall more supportive of the Kremlin and is the English content pro- European integration? Etling’s research is based on several different digital sources, like blogs and several news forums. Although this is interesting to form an overall idea of what is going on the internet, I would like to focus my research specifically on two social media platforms: Facebook and VKontakte. Furthermore, a limitation that Etling mentions in his ideas for further research is that he focuses on Russian, and Ukrainian is not included. As he admits: “Ukrainian-language content and Russian-“Ukrainian-language content” [12] are used among sources within Ukraine proper.” In my thesis I hope to build and further expand the work of Etling by taking over the cross language analysis but this time also include Ukrainian in it.
Soztek argues that the importance of the role of the internet as discussion forum was not only limited to the short-time peak of increased social media use. In this line of though it could be
said that ‘online communications’ [6] are tending to grow fast in Ukraine, especially since the beginning of the Euromaidan protest [Tuchinsky, n. pag.]. As Soztek argues: “Once the protests were in progress, the internet predictably continued to serve as a crucial resource for the anti-government demonstrators in a multitude of ways. [6]. So the use of social media is not just a temporary phenomenon, but stays important over a longer period of time than just a peak of activity during a revolution. Soztek then also points to the difference with traditional media like television and radio that could be controlled easily by the government:
“The inability of Yanukovych and his circle to effectively stem or control online communications constitutes the second important weakness in their information defenses. Social media helped to diffuse basic logistical information about the protests to potential participants. In one survey, 40 percent of respondents said they had learned when and where to go from Facebook messages, although TV was credited by 48 percent (Onuch 2014). When violence was perpetrated against the protesters, social media were utilized to identify the individuals responsible and hold them to account (e.g. Facebook 2013a). Opposition community-building and creativity flourished online (BBC Monitoring 2013c). [6]”.
Again the important notion of diffusing or spreading information is mentioned here. Digital media are in that sense faster and more effective when used for the purpose of gathering protest participants. Also the possibility to identify ‘responsible’ individuals for acts of violence points to the fact that it is harder for governments to censor information like this on the internet, which is a difference with television and radio that are censored more easily. The platforms Facebook an VKontakte were two of the most used in the media landscape during the protests [6]. The activity of groups and communities during the Euromaidan protests should also not be underestimated. Pro-Russian protest groups were created, and even anti-protest groups: ‘Anti-protest groups were set up too, but these were in the minority’ [6].
Until now I have mainly focused on the idea that digital media – and more specifically social media platforms – can be used for political purposes. But as showed by many journalists who record material ‘from the ground’, there are many other uses of the platforms. Here I do not want to focus on daily personal conversations between Ukrainians that are irrelevant for this research via Facebook- and VKontakte chat possibilities, but uses that come into existence as a result of the act of violence and war in general. Social Media Becomes Lifeline for Civilians Under Fire in Ukraine is the name of an article by journalists Paul Sonne, in which he argues that civilians can keep each other alive by warning each other for outbursts of violence that can occur in specific areas. Although my focus will be on the narratives being told, I think it is important to also investigate these other uses, since it will give a more complete overview of the digital discourses during the crisis. Since I want to focus specifically on how social media are used by Ukrainians themselves during the unrest in Mariupol, the work of Paul Sonne was an important inspiration for this research, since he manages to discover how social media are actually used by citizens. A question to be asked here is how pragmatic the use of social media then is, as opposed to telling narratives from a certain ideological- and political point of view.
One of the reasons why the conflict gets widespread media attention is that it is not only a dispute between Russia and Ukraine, but part of a much larger political tension between Russian and European countries that has its roots in World War II – called ‘The Great War’ by many Russians and the period of the Cold War. The ideology that is formed by Putin and the Kremlin is for a great deal based on the paradigm of the ‘hypocrite’ western world [Dougherty, 3] versus a Russia that is pushed into the corner [15] by other nations. Although it could be argued that the narrative of the paradigm of West versus East that was characteristic of the Cold War- is in some sense returning, Dougherty argues that there are also important differences: first of all, Russia is not using a ‘global ideology’ that has the aim to cross the national borders - like the Marxist-Lenin promise of a revolution for the whole world – because nowadays the rhetoric from Putin and the Kremlin is based on a strict ‘nationalist’ ideology for only the country of Russia and the states that according to the Kremlin historically belong to Russia. Secondly, the media strategies of governments to have a tight grip on the traditional television and newspaper are not sufficient anymore today since the proliferation of information that has been going on on the web: The battle is being waged with a dizzying array of modern weapons, including electronic media, digital communications, blogs and social media’ [Doughtery, 2].
Historical context of the blame
In order to understand the reason why two different narratives are told - by Western orientated media and Russia’s media controlled by the Kremlin – and why they seem to clash in Ukraine it is necessary to trace the historical roots of the tensions between east and west. As Dougherty points out: “World War II—which Russians commonly refer to as the “Great War of the Fatherland”— elicits deep, patriotic emotions” [7]. Indeed, the use of the terms Nazis and Fascists seems to fit into the ideology of the Kremlin that Russia is surrendered by enemies that are approaching from the west, which is still most prominent today.
As a next part of Russia’s history, the Cold War area could be seen as another climax of tensions between the Western world and the Soviet Union and its Eastern-European influence sphere. The idea of a ‘foreign threat’ has for a long time ruled in the discourse in Russia, which makes it easy for Putin and the Kremlin to restore this idea that has been in Russian minds for such a long time.
The crisis of which the violence today in Ukraine is still a product, started with the Orange revolution or the ‘Euromaidan protests’. As many protesters were furious that the government of president Yanukovich was steering its foreign policy to choose Russia as a main trade and economic partner instead of the west, the government of Yanukovich was overthrown, but a next step by Russia caused more tensions between the pro-western part of the country and the pro-eastern part: the sudden Annexation of the Crimea. The reason for Russia to do that was that the largest part of the population of the Crimea is Russian. Triggered by these Russian actions, pro-Russian ‘separatists’ in the Donbass region in Eastern Ukraine began to move toward the Russian side in the conflict. Important here is to understand that many Russians never really accepted Ukraine as an independent country [Dougherty, 7], but as still belonging to the original greater Russia, since it has been under Russian rule during the Soviet area and even before that.
The Ukrainian government under Poroshenko argues that Russia took land from a
sovereign state, and is now helping the Separatists in the East of the country. Russia on the other hand, accuses Ukraine of oppressing the Russians in the Donbass region. Many comparisons with the cold war period are being made: the Poroshenko government is compared to Nazis, Fascists, while Putin and the Kremlin are being accused of trying to increase their influence sphere in the world.
It is too much work to fully map out the history of Ukraine and its relations with the European Union and Russia, but some basic knowledge about the historical political relations between these countries is nevertheless necessary to understand the historical background of the conflict; not only historical in the sense of the past view years (the quick escalation) but also relating to the Soviet- and Post-Soviet era of Ukraine. To get an idea of the ideologies of both sides and to understand the narratives that are shaped by them today is the only way to
understand the meaning of the discourses in the media in which spoken or written texts are either conceived of as Pro-western (EU) or Pro-eastern (Separatists and Russian).
Social media landscape
It is important to note that the field of social media platforms in Ukraine can be considered significantly different from other nations in Europe. When using Alexa4’s list of top most used
websites, it seems that in contrast to other European countries that usually rely on Twitter and Facebook, the Russian platforms VKontakte and Odnoklassnikialso hold a large share of the social media landscape in Ukraine. The fact that both English- and Russian social media platforms are used might already show that the country is in the middle of a political and socio-geographical divide: between the ‘western’ world that usually relies on English language platforms and the Russian digital influence sphere. Of course this does not prove that users of Facebook and Twitter are automatically more pro-western, and on VKontakte and Odnoklassniki users tend to be in favor of the Russian ideology, but it is an interesting fact that the social media landscape is fragmented, caused for a large part by the use of multiple languages in the country. The question of language is even further complicated by the fact that VKontakte also has an English version5
Difference with Other approaches
Bruce Etling looks at whether the content of bloggers is negative or positive. But my approach will be different since I am not only interested in whether the content is in favor of one side in the conflict - but I will also analyze the content in more detail to see what is exactly been told and whether there are any patterns recognizable in order to link my research to cultural memory studies. Just as given in Soztek’s article The Media Battles of Ukraine’s EuroMaidan, I will use
4 Alexa.com. 25-6-2015 <http://www.alexa.com/> 5 VKontakte. 1-5-2015 <http://vk.com/club200>
the actual content of the posts. In the thesis itself, only parts are selected, while in the appendix, all the material is added.
4. Research Method
Facebook and VkontakteFacebook and VKontakte were chosen as the platforms to study. First of all since they are two of the most used social media platforms in Ukraine, together with the Russian Odnoklassniki
[Tuchinsky, n. pag]. Furthermore Facebook was chosen because it is an upcoming network in the Russian language sphere, and Tuchinsky argues that the use of Facebook in Ukraine and Russia has raised significantly since the beginning of the Ukrainian crisis. Although VKontakte still holds the largest mark share, it seems that Facebook is gaining territory, which makes it relevant for future research. Also, I wanted to contrast Facebook and VKontakte since they hold many similarities in terms of platform characteristics: ‘The similarity is seen in the reciprocal types of connections (if you are my friend, I am yours) and similar functionalities (e.g., forming a group, leaving comments on friend’s page, etc.)’ [Gruzd & Tsychanova, 4].
Query and Language
To answer my research question I will focus on searching in English, Russian, and Ukrainian in order to get an idea of the conversation that is formed online. I chose Ukrainian since it is one of the main languages of the country of my case study, and Russian and English because they are the second and third most used languages. This does not automatically mean that content on social media networks that is watched by Ukrainians is also either Russian, English or Ukrainian. since for example Facebook is also used in many other languages, and using the query [Mariupol] could therefore also return results in other languages that contain this word. But as is shown in a report on media usage in Ukraine, 93,3 % of Ukrainians (outside the Crimea) consume internet content in Russian [Gallup, 2]. it is said that Furthermore, I believe it is important to use Russian and English since they could represent the two opposing sides in the conflict, and it would be interesting to see whether this opposition is also returning in the comparison of those two
languages online. To choose Ukrainian here might give some insight in whether Ukrainian-language content is more pro-Western leaning or pro-Russian.
Query design
Since the focus will be on the specific case of the military tensions around the city of Mariupol, I used the term Mariupol as a query. Although it is expected that most posts containing the word [Mariupol] will be about the siege that is currently going on – assuming that Facebook in Vkontakte in Ukraine are used for discourses of recent topics in the news -, the term Mariupol could also be used by social media audiences for finding groups or discussions that are not relating to the current tensions at all. To be sure to collect enough relevant material, I also used the query [Mariupol crisis].
A short test was done by using these two queries on both social media platforms and quickly look at the titles of the groups and words in the posts of the four first given results, in order to see whether the results were relevant to the city of Mariupol in Ukraine, and for example not to another place called Mariupol. The queries were translated to Russian via Google Translate ( [Мариуполь], [Мариуполь кризис] ), and Ukrainian ( [Маріуполь], [Маріуполь криза] ). When entering these translated queries on the two platforms, the titles and words of the four first given posts and groups were translated via Google Translate in order to see if the results were relevant at all and not referring to for example another city or word in the languages that are in this case unfamiliar to the researcher.
Posts
As opposed to most research done in this area that focused on the structure of groups and the visualization of friends’ networks [Gruzd & Tsychanova, 12-15], a part of my research will focus on the actual content or what is actually being said in user posts on Social Network platforms. To clarify why I am interested in this second research method it is useful to look at the case of Facebook: a research on Facebook was done by Bruce Etling as a part of the wider research on posts to see whether the content is negative, positive or neutral towards a Western or Russian point of view. It was done on the basis of amount of likes given to activist groups: “Activity on Facebook […] might be better measured by ‘likes’ or the number of links pointing to a
coordination page than by the number of posts.” [5]. This is surely an effective way of gathering the most engaged content, or in other words most ‘popular’ content, which would ideally give a good representation of what social media users engage with most, and in a sense is then the most ‘important’ content to look at for the researcher. But at the same time it should not be forgotten that lots of material are left out when applying this method. In my research I will make a combination of the method Etling used to look at groups (see next paragraph), but I will also apply a method that does not select by amount of likes, but by most ‘up-to-date’. This gives a different picture of the discourse that is evolving on Facebook, since it might not necessarily give the most ‘popular’ content, but it shows the most recent developments in the discourse around a topic. Instead of picking out certain most popular topics of a Social Media Network, it gives a more broad overview of all posts in a certain time frame. The consequence is a very large amount of content. That is why I chose to only pick out the top 10 of most recent posts.
Since the interface of Facebook does not include the option to search for queries in comments and posts on the main posting wall, and since a sophisticated search API for
developers of the platform is quite a task to gain access to, it was decided to find an alternative not associated with Facebook; this was done with the search bar of fposts.com6. Functioning as a
Facebook Scraper, it selects posts on basis of queries. This means it is not bounded to a specific set of Facebook groups, but selects all posts containing the keyword. To clarify why I chose this method method from a website like fposts.com that is not that well known as a digital method for doing research, a comparison could be made to the Digital Method’s ‘Netvizz’ tool: Netvizz begins with a quantitative analysis by exporting data about a specific group on Facebook into an Excel sheet, from which topics like user activity, amount of likes etcetera can be analyzed. Since I am more interested in a qualitative analysis, Fposts offers a faster way to ‘dive’ directly into the content. Later in the method of Netvizz it is also possible to do a qualitative analysis, for example with the option to make screenshots of posts. But then the research is still limited to one group. Of course it is possible to apply Netvizz on multiple groups, but Fposts is in that sense faster and ‘lighter’, since querying for posts on Fposts goes faster than apply Netvizz on multiple Facebook groups. Although Netvizz is more reliable in the sense that it gives the researcher more options to collect data, Fposts ‘does the job’, and is less group-specific which could give an interesting alternative to research that has already been done on Facebook, and maybe also other results.
For analyzing posts on Vkontakte, the search bar of the website itself was used. An important difference with Facebook is that VKontakte allows its users to look for posts
containing a certain query. A query returns results in lists of most up-to-date posts containing the query, most watched videos, and most like groups. Although the algorithm that is used for the VKontakte search bar is not entirely exposed, it is clear that when for example [Mariupol] is typed into the search bar, the top videos are categorized by date when the video was uploaded, the communities by amounts of followers and posts by date.
Communities
Although I explained why focusing on comments, I do by no means mean that it is useless to look at group- or community popularity or behavior. As included in my research question, I also want to discover what social media networks are being used for, and groups and communities with a specific goal or message on Facebook and VKontakte could give interesting insights in that. A research on ‘Tatar groups’ on VKontakte by Suleymanova [2009] was done to clarify identity forming and group behavior in the online sphere. Relating this to my research, it could be said that ‘identity forming’ is one of those uses of the social media platform. But my interest in this research also goes out to more pragmatic uses, like hobby groups or groups related to company or government institution. Therefore, next to the collection of posts, a list is also built of groups on both platforms.
When looking for communities on Facebook that are about the Mariupol and/or the military tensions in Mariupol, the queries [Mariupol], [Mariupol Crisis], [Мариуполь], [Мариуполь кризис], [Маріуполь] and[Маріуполь криза] were entered into the search bar. From the groups, the ones that included most engaged content were selected, just as was done in the research of Gruzd and Tsyganova [2015]. Most engaged content must here be read as ‘most popular (as reflected by the group total number of members)’ [5]. When the queries were entered, the Facebook option of ‘Show more results for [query]’ was selected, and then the five most ‘popular’ as just defined were selected. For VKontakte more or less the same method was used.
Videos on VKontakte
Since VKontakte also has the option to show the most ‘popular’ videos, it was decided to select the top five videos. Since this option - which does not exist on Facebook – is available and it
seemed to return lots of results, it could be useful for the general oversight of all the content that is posted on Vkontakte to analyze the videos. They were mostly accompanied by Russian- and Ukrainian explanations, which was only understood with the help of a Russian native speaker for this research. But also the description and title of the video was looked at, and translate via the Russian native speaker and larger descriptions with Google translate, which might not give the most accurate view but shows at least what it is about.
Limitations
Complexities of language in the study of social media platforms should not be underestimated [Etling 2014]. For example, many Ukrainians speak Ukrainian and Russian [12], which can cause problems when analyzing data, since it raises the question of representation by language: Was the content posted by Ukrainians who speak Russian or by Russians themselves? Furthermore, some Ukrainians might post content in English, for example to reach a wider audience on Facebook.
Furthermore, a limitation of Fposts.com is that only English content can be found; there is no option for Russian or Ukrainian. Although Russian- and Ukrainian-language communities were still found on Facebook Mariupol so that they could be compared to VKontakte, the missing of Facebook posts is a limitation that is taken seriously and therefore the focus of this research is not on comparing and contrasting the two platforms (cross-platform analysis), but rather contrast the languages, as also was done by Bruce Etling, phrasing his research question as following: ‘Given the interests of the EU, the US, and Russia in the outcome of the protests and the direction toward which Ukraine would eventually gravitate, are English-language social and traditional media more supportive of the protests than Russian-language sources?’ [1] Etling used many different tradional- and new media in order to form his argument about a political-linguistic divide. But since a more in depth analysis of the content was done here, the field of research was narrowed down to only Facebook and Vkontakte.
As a third limitation, the fact that most content seems pro-Russian could be influenced by possible censorship of the Kremlin. As Jill Dougherty argues, it is certainly the case that the organization behind VKontakte ‘has been under pressure’ [10]. Contra – argument: Ukrainian-language content can also be accessed, which is all in favor of the Western discourse.
Relating to that, the tactics of the Russian government in order to gain control over media are not only censorship, but as the article ‘ ‘7 reveals, there is a sophisticated network of ‘trolls’ at
work in Russa. The Internet Agency from St. Petersburg. When analyzing the gathered data, one should have in mind that part of the data could be coming from this ‘agency’, and could therefore be considered ‘troll’ content not coming from the audience one would expect. On the other hand, it can be argued from my results that there are also many posts that are pro-Western, especially in English and Ukrainian, so apparently the censorship and propaganda of the Kremlin is not fully effecting this research. As Dougherty explains, languages issues could be the reason that troll content is only appearing in Russian for now and not in English yet.
5. Results and discussion
This section consists of two parts: first, I will take a look at findings that were already expected before the research was done and that can now be confirmed. Second, I will interpret the findings that were most unexpected from the dataset I have gathered.
Some queries did not return results in all of the categories that were selected to analyze: for example, for the Ukrainian queries [Маріуполь] and [Маріуполь криза] there were no Facebook groups found at all and no videos or groups on VKontakte. Only posts were found on Vkontakte. This could be explained by the fact that the Ukrainian-language part of the internet is ‘limited to a few portals, blogs and specialized sites, primarily those originating in and/or
targeted at the western region’ [Rutten et al. 74]. The larger part of internet texts in Ukraine is in Russian. Two explanations for this are that 1) Media sources in Ukraine were heavily controlled by the Soviet Union and therefore the Russian language was preferred in media, until the country was separated from it in 1991 - and 2) Russian is still a language preferred by many groups in the Ukrainian society, for example, Volodymyr Kulyk mentions that ‘(…) urban residence and economic well-being are positively correlated with the use of Russian’ [73].
One of my expectations was that social media platforms during the military tensions in Mariupol would be a way to spread information to a large audience in a fast way. As concluded from the Gallup report, a large part of the population of Ukraine (46% of all Ukrainians) does use
7 The Agency. 2-6-2015. The New York Times Magazine 25-6-2015 <http://www.nytimes.com/ 2015/06/07/magazine/the-agency.html?_r=0>.
social media. This part of the internet users can then be considered a ‘networked population’ [Shirky, 1] that has the ability to easily access information [1]and have a discussion about it with their ‘network’ of other social media users. The Gallup report shows that the largest share of social media users are between 15 and 24 years (89,6 %). This networked population accesses a flow of information that is quicker and more interactive in the sense of having the ability to have a discussion than for example state television or radio. When using my data, it is then necessary to look at the amount- and the dates of uploading of views and likes of all posts and groups. In this way, it can be said whether the social media are indeed used by a large audience relating to the case of Mariupol and whether the pace of posts that are posted is slow or fast. The best way to investigate this, is to look at Ukrainian language content, in order to be sure that most users are from the country itself
From my findings it seems that there are quite some differences in size of audiences when depending on the queries. With the query [Маріуполь] the groups found on Facebook vary from an amount of likes between a couple of hundreds and a couple of thousand likes. Since these groups are mostly about organizations or companies that are located within the city, the audience is probably Ukrainians that live in Mariupol themselves. The same query on Vkontakte delivers more or less the same results. For the query [Маріуполь криза] there were no results on both websites. And concerning posts – which is only possible on Vkontakte in Ukrainian – there were 125.565 posts for the query [Маріуполь] and there were only 420 posts containing [Маріуполь криза]. Furthermore there were 4075 videos for [Маріуполь] and no vidoes for [Маріуполь криза].
Another expectation was that English content would be more leaning towards the pro-Western discourse and Russian content more towards the pro-Russian and Separatist discourse. But when looking at the results the divide between two languages and two political point of views does not seem to be so strict. First, a selection had to be made from the data as only the posts are wanted in which a clear political preference seems to be the motive for the writer. By this I mean that I also found a lot of posts that are not written with an explicit political preference but with more pragmatic goals, like sharing information and trying to perform ‘objective’
journalism.
When looking at the English posts and groups it seems that there is support for both sides, but with the query [Mariupol crisis] there seems to be more content leaning towards the Russian discourse. On Facebook, many discussions are found in which both sides are represented in more or less equal amounts. On Vkontakte, there were English-language results but mostly more pragmatic ones. This could be because Vkontakte is mostly used in Russian [Rutten et al. 77] and not in English, so using Russian is really necessary here to trace the political preferences.
To get an idea of the ways in which the political preference is expressed, there are some examples following. The following quotes are from a post by a Russian user of Facebook and are believed to be a quote from a former Prime minister of Russia, S. Stephasin:
“It is the first time, when the head of the government of the one of the leading European powers has urged for war against Russia”
“Respected leaders of the NATO countries, the truth that this crime is exactly result of your actions that have led to this tragedy (…)”
Here the David Cameron and the leaders of the NATO are blamed for the conflict in Ukraine here called a ‘tragedy’, and the writer goes even further by arguing that Cameron ‘urged for war against Russia’.
Other short posts in a discussion found on Facebook show that disapproval of ‘the west’ and especially the United states are expressed in various ways:
“West media = Russian fobia”
“america causes cold wars in mid east, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Central asia and Europe.”
The last comment shows the same style of argumentation as the quote from the text of Stephasin: the blame for multiple violent conflicts is put on America and the west, which makes the west the aggressor. As Jill Dougherty explains this fits perfectly in the ideology of Putin, in which the West is ‘(…) constantly trying to sweep us into a corner’ [22], and the aggressor that threatens Putin’s ‘Russian World’:
‘Yugoslavia in 1999; the Western bombing of Belgrade; the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan; the “color” revolution in Ukraine and Georgia; the “chaos” of the Arab Spring; the United States’ missile defense system: “We
understand what is happening,” Putin said. “We understand that these actions were aimed against Ukraine and Russia and against Eurasian integration.’ [30]
The pro-Russian discourse going on seems to consist of all kinds of different arguments in order to blame the west for starting not only the Ukrainian conflict, but also other conflicts from the past, like mentioned in the last two posts above.
In the pro-western content in English there are also some references used to older conflicts, for example:
“You can do it.
When Russia invaded Aghanistan, Russia was slaughtered. Learn what Afghans did with so little.”
But apart from blaming Russia as the aggressor, the overall style of all comments seems to be less aggressive towards Russia:
“Moscow is already backing down. They may win and keep Crimea, since I doubt anyone is willing to fight for that hunk of land, but in the end this event has only hurt Moscow. It has hurt their economy, and their reputation.”
“Moscow may have won Crimea, but in the long run, it risks losing much more: its once-close relationship with Ukraine, its international reputation, and its plan to draw the ex-Soviet states back together. Historians will one day look back on this crisis as a miscalculation for the Moscow government.”
It can be concluded that in both discourses the other side is seen as the aggressor, but the pro-Russian content seems to be longer and giving more detailed historical explanations, and is more aggressive then the pro-Western content. Overall, the largest part of the content is leaning
towards the pro-Russian discourse. Another finding is that there are either long discussions going on, or enormous amounts of texts are posted without any comments.
The pro-western and pro-Russian discourse in Russian
when looking at the Russian posts and groups, it seemed that for the query [Мариуполь] there was no clear preference for the Russian / pro-Russian separatist discourse. But with the query [Мариуполь кризис] there was a clear preference for the latter side:
“Exploration DNR learned of the atrocities soldiers "Azov" Ukrainian security forces are terrorizing civilians in Mariupol”
Here the Azov battalion is blamed of hurting civilians, a nationalist battalion that is currently said to defend the city of Mariupol. The longer posts by Russian users that also appeared in the English content are also returning:
“The eternal war of the West against Russia
From the first day of the Great Patriotic War, except Germany fought against Soviet Russia: Romania, Hungary, Italy, Finland, Slovakia, Croatia. On our territory invaded division Spaniards, Belgians, Dutch, French, Danes, Norwegians. In fact, the Soviet Union was attacked by almost the entire united Europe. (…)
‘(…) The answer to these questions will help you understand what is happening in our day. Is it an accident that the countries that supported once Hitler's Russian campaign, are now in a military alliance of NATO?’
Just like in the English content, the West is blamed for being the aggressor, using the historical reference to the Great Patriotic War – by which is meant the second world war. Almost all the content that was found on VKontakte was pro-Russian. This partly reconfirms the expectation that there is still a clear ‘political divide’ online between the two discourses, which is in this case shown by the use of language (English or Russian) [Duvanova et al. 2013]. It is shown by
language because it appears that Russian content is more in favor of Russia, and parts of the English content were pro-western. The English content that was pro-Russian was also mostly posted by Russians. The other way around, there were no media users that posting Russian content that originate from countries other than Russia.
The pro-western and pro-Russian discourse in Ukrainian
It turned out that both queries in Ukrainian returned posts and groups clearly in favor of the Western discourse. This could for example indicate that Ukrainians who are pro-Western use their own language to dissociate themselves from the Russian discourse, while Ukrainians who are pro-Russian might use Russian as their language.
The last expectation was that the two sides will blame each other for the responsibility of the conflict. For this part a more qualitative analysis is required, in order to discover what is being said exactly by social media users. After doing this qualitative analysis it seemed that both sides are not only blaming each other in all languages –which confirms my expectation- but some of the users do this in a way that is more detailed and elaborated then I expected.
Relating to this last point, I want to further elaborate on the unexpected use of social media platforms by some users and the style of argumentation and recognizable patterns that I extracted from the qualitative research. Although much discussions were found, especially on Facebook, a large part of the material of the posts seemed to consists of large texts written by one single person. Most of these larges texts were not commented on in the same numbers as shorter posts, and from looking at the content it seemed that there was no need for discussion at all by the author. Then the questions raises whether these users see Vkontakte and Facebook as really a ‘social’ medium or rather a space for writing down personal thoughts, while discussing their thoughts does not seem a primary goal.
To clarify my observation, take a brief look at the following example:
(Übersetzung: Nadezhda Leonidova )
Have you suddenly learned that there is a conflict in Ukraine, and even civilian aircraft are being shot down? But don't you know that you are exactly guilty for the crash with Boeing?
Don't you understand that you're accomplices of this horrendous crime and the victims are on your conscience? Why so? Why do I think that you are guilty for the death of passengers of Boeing?
1. Because when on the Maidan in Kiev mad armed mob were killing and burning the police, who did not have a firearm, you were silent about it and you said "this is democracy."
2. Because when on the Maidan in Kiev, mercenary snipers shot protesters, staged a provocation to justify the planned bloody and violent seizure of power - you were silent and did not require investigation.
Until now, there was no real investigation and the perpetrators have not been found.
3. Because when Ukrainian fascists, with government support, before the police's eyes, in the afternoon, burned alive more than 100 people in Odessa, you were silent.
And when none of the perpetrators, who are not even hiding, and now write in the social nets about their crime, and proud of it, has been arrested - you said nothing.
Yes, exactly. People burned unarmed women, children and elderly in the afternoon in the city center. And then many days they with pleasure wrote about what a "heroic act they committed." And they were not arrested.
And you did not require to investigate and punish the criminals!
4. When the punishers of Ukrainian junta in Mariupol surrounded the building of the local police, burned alive the local policemen because they did not want to shoot at unarmed people - you were silent again.
5. When the planes, helicopters, tanks, guns of Ukrainian fascist junta were destroying hundreds of the urban residents of Southeast in a day - you were sleeping in your hypnotic sleep like plastic dolls, that lost conscience and the meaning of life! Although the tragedy took place before your eyes.
6. When hundreds of thousands of refugees abandoned their homes, their loved ones and fled from the criminal Kiev fascist junta in Russia, having lost all his possessions, work, place in life, you quietly obeyed the words of the American State Department, imbecile Psaki who said that "these people are the tourists, they go to visit their grandmothers "
And you were not be ashamed of your indifference, and of that you were being so bullied. You did not feel the compassion for people experiencing this pain and tragedy!
7. You do not even move when you had learned that the Ukrainian military sell organs of dead and they are ready to kill wounded in order that the organs won't lost their "commodity quality".
How can this be?
Have you finally lost all your humanity, conscience, sense of life, a sense of compassion and now you live quietly as mindless robots-consumers?
8. Now when the Ukrainian fascist junta shot down a civilian aircraft, you have to realize - you killed innocent people. (not a discussion but blame)
Because only because of your indifference the junta has believed in its total impunity!! You have forgiven the junta, the Nazis, who seized power in Kiev, all their crimes!
You have forgiven them full official legalization of fascism at the state level and have not even paid any attention to it.
You have forgiven the official hunt for people, that was declared by Ukrainian oligarchs, with huge advertising banners in cities announcing a reward for each dead resident of southeastern Ukraine.
You have forgiven all this!
The plane was shot down because the junta is sure that you're like robots, not even able to ask the question - "who benefits"? Junta has shot down the plane, killed nearly 300 innocent people, because junta is sure that you will not require the real investigation, as in other cases of heinous crimes committed by it.
You will believe the words of the Nazis and forgive them this also and much more in the future.
Junta has shot down the plane because it believes that you are so stupid (insulting) that you now will agree with entering NATO troops into Ukraine and you will agree that NATO soldiers will defend the junta and fight for the final victory of the Nazis in Ukraine.
One would expect shorter texts on Vkontakte, since the interface of the platform seems to be– just as with Facebook – designed for shorter messages. Why does this person not use a blog or a another format?
After reading multiple of these longer text, some patterns in the style of argumentation were discovered. Of course it is clear that blaming the other side of the conflict is essential here, but when looking at the arguments more concretely, it can be noticed that the same historical terms and events are repeated over and over again, most referring to World War II, which is in Russia until today still known as ‘The Great Patriotic War’. Then the question raises where this pattern in argumentation style comes from. This is the point where I will try to combine my
research on social media platforms - in which I still looked at medium specific elements – with the study of digital memory.
Collective-, cultural- and digital memory studies
To study digital memory in the case of Ukraine, it is important to understand some of the basic concepts that the academic discipline of memory studies is based on. Three ‘canonical
methodological concepts’ in this field are:
1) The idea of a collective memory first coined by Maurice Halbwachs, by which is meant that apart from individuals with their own memories there is also a group- or collective memory in a society.
2) The concept of sites of memory by Pierre Nora, which are the ‘(…) concrete spaces, people and objects that embody a national memory’ [3]
3) The concept of cultural memory, or the way in which a society is ‘(…) relaying and actualizing cultural meanings which refer to the past, and which are pivotal to social and cultural identity formation’ [3]
From these three ideas it becomes clear that researchers in this field are interested in memories that are produced by a society as a whole, that is why the term collective is used. The sites of memory refer to specific objects that embody such a memory, for example a statue of Stalin. The latter term underlines the importance of cultural identity forming when studying collective memory. The shaping of memories by a society is a way of forming a cultural identity, a social- and cultural process of dealing with the past in order to make sense of the present.
The social processes that are referred to with these three concepts are for a large part affected by mediation processes by different kinds of media, like television, radio, etcetera. This ‘interrelation’ [3] between media and collective memory has intrigued memory scholars, and scholars like Astrid Erll and Ann Rigney even argued that cultural memory’s very existence depends on media [3]. I do not want to discuss here what the amount of influence by mediation on collective memory exactly is, but it is important to be aware of the different ways in which stories are being shaped by different kinds of media with their own specificities. Especially ‘new media’ make available a wide spectrum of different ways in which a story can be told via
different media formats. Many Scholars interested in this mediation process in the field of memory studies have therefore focused on digital media specifically, resulting in the study of
digital memory8, which is a form of studying collective- and cultural memory but then applied
specifically to digital media.
Combining digital memory studies with Social network content analysis touches upon an essential question in the study of digital media: do we study the medium or do we study culture? It is in memory studies agreed upon that the memories are always mediated in different ways by media. This shifts the focus from studying medium specificities that cause a certain mediation – to the study of culture and cultural identity forming.
The method I then used for analyzing the patterns in styles of argumentation is to first look at background information about the use of digital media in ‘post-socialist states’ [Rutte et al.], of which the country of Ukraine is also part. Gathered from the different essays from Memory, Conflict & New media by Rutten et al, I made a collection of the most important discourses, metaphors and references used by media users in posts-socialist states and Russia. I will use examples of my own data and see how the patterns already discovered by these
researches can again be recognized here. As argued in the introduction of Memory, Conflict & New Media: “The highly standardized online debate […] is a good place to start exploring those aspects that are endemic to post-socialist digital memories” [5].
A way to apply digital memory studies on the stories that are being told on Vkontakte and Facebook by certain media users, is to analyze the style of argumentation and choice of words. The same was done by Ilya Kukulyn, but then only in the Russian blogosphere. The method I used is to first look at background information about the use of digital media in ‘post-socialist states’ [Rutten et al.], of which the country of Ukraine is also part. Gathered from the different essays from Memory, Conflict & New media by Rutten et al, I made a collection of the most important discourses, metaphors and references used by media users in posts-socialist states and Russia. I will use examples of my own data and see how the patterns already discovered by these researches can again be recognized here. As argued in the introduction of Memory, Conflict & New Media: “The highly standardized online debate […] is a good place to start exploring those aspects that are endemic to post-socialist digital memories” [5]. With ‘highly standardized’ debates it is meant that multiple patterns in style of argumentation and word choice can be found. After comparing posts with each other and finding the words, phrases and arguments that
8 For example, Rutten et al. mention the Save as … Digital Memories – a collective volume of different authors who seek to ‘unravel “how we embody create and are emplaced within digital memories” (Garde-Hansen et al. 2009: 1)’ [3].
appeared in multiple posts and therefore form indeed form a ‘highly standardized’ debate, the part of the posts were coded with one of the following themes:
- World war 2
- aggressive word choice
- Historical reference (by which is meant all other references to historical events other than the ones named in this list.
- Blame - Pro-Western - Pro-Russian
- ‘Them versus us’ – discourse - Pragmatic use
- Family ties
Thus, this list of codes is a method for extracting the content that is returning in multiple posts and therefore forms a pattern that causes a standardized use of argumentation by internet users. For a large part, the discourses that these codes refers to are described in detail in the articles in Rutten et al. I will explain those discourses in the following section, combining the description of the discourses that I took from Rutten et al. and apply them on my own data.
The Second World War as historical reference and legitimization
The Second World War is the most referred to event in the Pro-Russian content. A couple of English posts on Facebook confirm the historical reference to World War Two –which is
the first result for the English query Mariupol is a post containing a quote from S. Stephasin, former Russian prime Minister:
“Just as it was in 1938, when British Prime Minister Chamberlain exhorted European leaders to bless the German Nazis campaign against the USSR, the present British Prime Minister expressed unequivocal support for the Ukrainian Nazis and angrily convinced his European colleagues to « change the attitude to the Russia
fundamentally» blackmailing us by unleashing a new war. Desiring that this deja vu were not turned into a nightmare of a new world war, we have to respond to the British Prime Minister (…)”[From Appendix I]
Obviously the person who posted this quote is pro-Russian or Separatist, and uses a historical reference in order to draw a parallel with what is going on today, and thereby the idea is given that Western Europe is anti-Russia in an aggressive way, threatening to attack Russia just like during World War II . The historical parallel that is drawn is that the British Prime Minister is provoking a war against Russia, just like Nazi Germany did during the Second World War:
“You really should not have to forget the lessons of the history of Europe, Mr. Cameron. Pushing sweeping accusations and provoking a new war, you consider yourself entitled to fight and pit people and judge the nations, to rule the world by the path of lie and violence. So did your predecessors — Chamberlain and other European leaders, supporting and inciting Hitler against the USSR.”
To make the parallel look stronger the word Nazi is simply taken over to today’s situation, which also returns in many other posts from Russian users:
“The gov't in Kiev is neo-Nazi. Why don't you report THAT, CNN???”
In the following short post the word Nazi is not blindly taken over but there is still a parallel drawn with the ‘nazi’s and ‘fascists’:
“Before it was Nazi and Fascist now it's the new hybrid monster”
To better understand this idea of a constant threat against Russia, Doughtery explains the vision that Putin has created of Russia that is constantly pushed into the corner by the west. The word Nazi is mostly used for foreign threads, but Putin goes even further by warning for a “Fifth Column”—disloyal groups that undermine the nation [28]. The pro-western Ukrainians are also
