How individuals can be influenced to become
agents of change in modern society:
A revision of the model of Spaargaren and Mol by critique of a one-sided view on human motivation
A Master thesis in Political Science, political theory Global Environmental Politics and Governance
By: Rutger Lith (6161863) Date: 30/4/2015 Number of words: 25.000 First reader: Robin Pistorius
Foreword
The thesis that you are about to read is the product of an academic period that in its final years progressively has been focused on social psychology. After first being primarily occupied with political texts like those of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and Marx, I became fascinated with trying to find out why all of their views were so completely different, even opposite, and still had the same iron logic. How could theories completely opposite of each other both seem right? When I started to study philosophy next to political science I found out that where you end is dependent on where you start. It all has to do with the first premise you put on paper, and in old political texts the first premise concerns human nature. The biggest contradictions are however found in human nature and logic doesn’t like contradictions, something can’t be true and false at the same time so man can’t be originally good and originally bad at the same time either. The reason that both sides of the argument seem logical is because both take a piece of the truth and fill the other half with societal influence. Born bad, society makes you good. Born good, society makes you bad. Luckily for me other sciences have a more nuanced view on human nature. Sociological and psychological theories seem to be years ahead concerning their views on the individual. We, the political scientists and philosophers, just have to peek over the other side of the fence every once in awhile. That is what I tried to do in this article.
Inhoud
How citizen-consumers can be influenced to become agents of change in modern society: ... 1
Forword ... 1
Introduction: Time for an attitude change... 5
The model of Spaargaren and Mol ... 6
Biases towards agency in the model of Spaargaren and Mol ... 6
A revision of the model of Spaargaren and Mol ... 7
Thesis outline ... 8
Modernity as constitutive to the three spheres ... 9
Control, the driving force of rationality ... 9
Reflexivity, how rationality destroys social structures ... 9
New structures based on individuality ... 9
Democracy, the political organization in modernity ... 10
The nation state, the cultural sphere in modernity ... 10
Capitalism, the economic pillar in modernity ... 10
Technical innovation as globalizing force ... 10
Summary ... 11
Critique on existing ideas on human nature ... 11
Structuration theory as the theoretical foundation to Spaargaren and Mol ... 11
Model of human action ... 11
Model of features that prompt the individual to action ... 12
The language analogy: ignorant of constraint ... 12
Giddens’ stratified vision on Freud’s division of the psyche ... 13
Shift towards an intermixed model ... 13
How the different components interact ... 13
An existentialist context, structure based on rationality ... 13
Bauman and Beck, existential sociologists ... 13
How choice leads to new (market) structures ... 13
Creating the individual out of social context ... 14
The problem of an one-sided view on human motivation ... 14
Summary ... 14
An intermixed model of social life ... 14
Bourdieu’s fields and Spaargaren and Mol’s spheres ... 15
Belongingness: the group as purpose in itself ... 15
Distinctiveness: climbing the social ladder ... 15
Back to spheres: from inside to outside influences ... 16
The market sphere: rationalizing power on the will to be distinct ... 16
The political sphere: disciplinary power and the fear of being different ... 16
The national culture: habitual power to organize daily life ... 16
Summary: ... 16
Conclusion: a revised model of Spaargaren and Mol ... 17
0.1 Introduction: overview
This thesis revolves around the question ‘what the relation between structure and agency is, and how from that relation social behaviour arises’. More specifically, it entails the analysis of the theory of Spaargaren and Mol (2008), which provides an answer to these questions. In this theory, they explicitly strive for a balanced theory that gives equal attention to structure and agency as a source for social behaviour. However, this thesis argues, that their theory is primarily focused on agency and can be improved by putting greater emphasis on the influence of structures. The thesis therefore entails the suggestion for a revision of the theory of Spaargaren and Mol (2008) regarding the relation between structure and agency and their influence on social behaviour. This suggestion for revision will be done on the basis of wider literature on the structure-agency debate with a focus on the influence of structure. As the theory of Spaargaren and Mol (2008) is represented by an often cited model, this thesis will take that model as a guide for revision and present its own model that represents the relation between structure and agency, now with an emphasis on structures as influence on social behaviour.
The central research question is: ‘What improvements can be made on the image of how individuals and structure interact in Spaargaren and Mol’s model (2008) on social, economic, and political influences that steer the behaviour of so called citizen-consumers?’. This question will be answered in four chapters. This first chapter will provide information on the theory of Spaargaren and Mol (2008), and the context in which their theory is made. In the other three chapters, will the model of that represents their theory be decomposed into three parts, each chapter will then analyse one of these parts and provide suggestions for improvements.
1) The introduction will provide information on the account given by Spaargaren and Mol of structure-agency relations concerning behavioural change. It therefore constitutes a summary of their theory, the context in which it was made, and the reasons why it can be improved.
2) The first chapter focuses on the image of the agent in the model of Spaargaren and Mol (2008) in which the sub question ‘what improvements on the depiction of human agents in the model of Spaargaren and Mol (2008) can be made to better acknowledge the constraints to agency?’ needs to be answered. Since Spaargaren and Mol (2008) primarily support their account by the ‘structuration theory’ of Anthony Giddens, this chapter will mainly be an analysis and adjustment of Giddens’ account of agency-structure relations.
3) The second chapter focuses on the overall context of social relations, that in the model of Spaargaren and Mol (2008) lies in the interpretation of the concept of modernity and
globalization. The sub question central to this chapter is: ‘What is the impact of the context of modernity on the relation between agent and structure?’, which will be answered by comparing different accounts on the driving forces of modernity. Three main structures will eventually be discerned, in the form of three spheres, that are constitutive to social life in modernity.
4) The third chapter focuses on the three spheres that were discerned in the second chapter, and analyse how those spheres influence individuals. The sub question: ‘What improvements on the depiction of structure can be made to better acknowledge the constraints to agency?’, will be answered by using Bourdieu’s ‘field theory’, to analyse the three spheres.
0.2 Spaargaren’s analysis of previous theories on behavioural change
With the apparent visible increase of a need for environmental protection, mainly because of the obvious inherent risk for human safety in food and climate (Giddens, 2009) the policies directed on durability can also be expected to intensify. Spaargaren analyzed previous policies on durability and concluded that, so far, the importance of human beings as driving force of environmental changes traditionally has been conceived in terms of individual, market based actors, who may rationally change their consumption and lifestyles when they are provided with the right information by their governments. This perspective, that has its focus on individual, rational agents who consciously choose for structural change is called the individualistic paradigm. Despite of the dominance of the individualistic perspective in the policy debate on behavioral change, research by Beckers, Spaargaren and Bargeman (2000) revealed that previous policies organized in the context of this perspective didn’t provide sufficient changes. The alternative to the agency-centered individualistic, capitalist theories would then be those theories that are directed at the structures of human conduct. However, research into policies organized in the context of the structuralist perspective shows that change can be said to be organized ‘behind the back of ordinary citizen-consumers’, and therefore doesn’t bring about internal motivational change (Van Vliet, Chappels, and Shove, 2005) Spaargaren concludes that both the individualist and the structuralist paradigm fails “in providing the deep understanding necessary for breakthroughs towards more sustainable consumption” and therefore “there is a need to find a more balanced approach which pays attention to both agency and structure” (Spaargaren, 2011:815).
Spaargaren and Mol (2008) have constructed a theory, represented by an often cited model, that provides such an agency-structure balanced approach. This theory is further explained in an article by Spaargaren and Oosterveer (2010). In this thesis will be argued that although the model of Spaargaren
and Mol (2008) depicts an authoritative starting point for understanding social behavior, it can be further improved and/or adjusted by taking into account the constraining influences of structures on agency. The next section will give a summary of the theory of Spaargaren, Mol and Oosterveer.
0.3 The model of Spaargaren and Mol
Spaargaren and Mol’s model (2008) depicts three ideal typical roles of citizen-consumers (as agents) in global environmental change. The three roles that agents have and three sources of recognized influence (or authorities) in different social spheres (see Figure 1). Each role is thus a depiction of an interaction between an agent and structure.
Roles Spheres Sources of influence (Authorities)
Ecological citizenship Politics/State participation (rights and responsibilities) Political consumerism Economics/Market Buying power
Lifestyle politics Civil society/Moral Identity choices
The role of ‘Ecological Citizenship’ primarily refers to “the participation of citizens in, and their orientations toward, political discourses on sustainable development” (Spaargaren and Oosterveer, 2010:1891). More generally, Ecological Citizenship refers to the democratic rights and responsibilities individuals have as the member of a group, vested in the (nation) state, and how these rights can be applied to demand sustainable development for the public domain. The agent as a citizen is thus able to use its political power to make changes to the public realm.
The role of ‘Political Consumerism’ refers to the power individuals have as a consumer in which consumption is a way of revealing “to the providers of products and services their specific ethical and political preferences” (Spaargaren and Oosterveer, 2010:1892). Especially the influence consumers can exercise on global consumption-production chains is deemed important. The agent as consumer is thus able to use its economic power to make changes to the market structure.
Finally, the role of ‘Lifestyle Politics’ refers to the “cluster of habits and storylines that result from an individual’s participation in a set of everyday life routines that they share with others” (Spaargaren and Oosterveer, 2010:1893). In civil society individuals are connected by shared routines that can be changed by a change of behavior. Since acts reflect our moral identity an agent as member of a community is able to use its identity choices to make changes to behavioral routines.
(Figure 1: Model of Spaargaren and Mol of different roles of change for the citizen-consumers in modernity)
0.4 Room for improvement in the model of Spaargaren and Mol
Spaargaren and Mol’s model of 2008, and Spaargaren and Oosterveer’s 2010 publication emphasizes the ability of agents to change structures. However, the model nor the publication do explain how structure and agency interact, or more precisely, how structures can constrain actors in their choice making. In this section will be argued that their focus on agency comes from their reliance on the theories of Giddens, Bauman and Beck as the theoretical foundation of their theory.
Although both agency and structure are incorporated into Spaargaren and Mol’s model, the explanation of how the two are interrelated is primarily based on Anthony Giddens’ 'structuration theory' (1984) (Spaargaren and Oosterveer, 2010:1895). In chapter 1 it will be argued that this reliance on structuration theory hinders the understanding of how agency and structure interactions defines individual behaviour. In this chapter critics of Giddens will be cited an analyzed, in particular Mestrovic (1998) and Cohen (1989), that accuse Giddens of (a) an overly optimistic view on human capabilities to induce structural change, (b) his assumption that individuals are fully aware of the structures that guide their behaviour, (c) his assumption that individuals are merely rational in their decision making, (d) and his neglect of structural constraints due to differences of power.
A second contribution to the work of Spaargaren, Mol and Oosterveer, lies in analysing their interpretation of the concepts of modernity and globalization, the authors they rely on (notably Anthony Giddens, Zygmund Bauman, and Ulrich Beck), as well as critiques on these authors in terms
of the new role of individuals verses existing and evolving structures. These authors are mainly focused on rationality and the absence of a determining background in modernity, which is why they overlook the importance of emotion in human decision making and the power of hidden influences on individuals.
1.0 Revising Giddens’ idea on human nature
In this thesis it is argued that because the model of Spaargaren and Mol (2008) is strongly influenced by Giddens (sect. 0.4), a revision of his view on agency is needed to better account for power and emotion in the relation between agents and structures. The aim of this chapter is therefore to analyze Giddens’ view on agents, search for possibilities of improvement, and provide an alternative to his view.
As described in the introduction (0.3), the model of Spaargaren and Mol (2008) is centred on how agents are able to change structures by changing behavioural routines. An accurate depiction of agency is therefore needed in making policy that accomplishes such behavioural changes. In the publication of Spaargaren and Oosterveer (2010) it becomes clear that the relation between agents and structure is supported by the theories of Giddens, who deploys a new look on the agency-structure dichotomy (Spaargaren and Oosterveer, 2010:1895-1896). In this chapter it is however argued that he is overly focused on rational decision-making, which results in underlining the enabling side (agency) of the relation between agent and structure and neglecting the constraining side (structure). The question that therefore needs to be answered is: ‘what improvements on the depiction of human agents in the model of Spaargaren and Mol (2008) can be made to better acknowledge the constraints to agency?’
This question will be answered by discerning the difficulties in Giddens’ view on the relation between structure and agents, which will be done in section 1.1-1.5. In these sections extra emphasis is put on the lack of power (sect. 1.2, 1.4), and lack of emotion (sect. 1.3, 1.5) in Giddens’ theories, which is mainly done by use of the critique offered by Stjepan Meŝtrović (1998) and Ira Cohen (1989). From their critique improvements can be made to better account for the role of emotion and power in social conduct, which will be done in section 1.6-1.7. Also, an alternative will be given for Giddens’ view on fundamental motivational drives (introduced in sect. 1.3) in section 1.8-1.10.
1.1 Structuration theory as the theoretical foundation of Spaargaren and Mol
As stated in the previous paragraph, Spaargaren and Mol (2008) use the theories of Giddens in their image of agent-structure relations. More specifically, they use Giddens’ theory of structuration, as is most clearly explained in his ‘The Constitution of Society’(1984). This structuration theory is composed of three models that together form an alternative to the agency-structure dichotomy and is therefore an important nuance to the individualistic or the systemic theories, as described in the introduction (0.2) of this thesis. Very generally it can be said that these models are ordered in range of scope. 1) The widest scope is a model of societies structures which in the current society means a model of the
structures in what Giddens calls ‘late modernity’, this concept will be explained in the next chapter and carries little significance to this chapter. 2) The second model (figure 1, p.12) is that of ‘social action’, which is representative of Giddens’ focus on rationality and awareness. It is this model that ties agency onto structure and therefore probably the most important in relation to the model of Spaargaren and Mol (2008). The notion of agency that Giddens visualizes in this model is very broad and therefore on of the reasons for objecting to the use of his theory in the model of Spaargaren and Mol (2008), because it neglects the power that constraints agency (sect. 1.4). 3) The final model (figure 2, p.15) pictures the features that prompt the individual to action and, like the second model, has an emphasis on an aware state of being. It is the last model that demonstrates the neglection of emotions as a source for motivation in Giddens’ theory and therefore important for revising Spaargaren and Mol’s depiction of individuals, to a view that incorporates the importance of emotion in social conduct. The next two sections will analyse the second model (sect. 2.2: model of human action) and the third model (sect. 2.3: model of features that prompt the individual to action) of Giddens’ structuration theory, and by doing so grants greater insight into the theoretical foundation of the model of Spaargaren and Mol (2008). After being analysed the difficulties of both models will be addressed in section 1.4 and 1.5 which will lead to an alternative ‘theory of the agent’ in sections 1.5-1.7.
1.2 Giddens’ model of human action: neglecting power
Beginning with the just announced analysis of the second model of Giddens’ structuration theory, the model of human action. This model shows how an action comes into being by a structural loop in which behaviour and structure are intertwined (Figure 1, p. 12). According to Giddens, action shouldn’t be seen as just coming from structure, nor should structure just be seen as the aggregate of human agency (Giddens, 1984:xxi). This claim seems to strike a balance between the importance of agency and structure, but when looking closer at the model and reading the explanation of Giddens with it, what will become clear is the deviating view Giddens has on the concept of ‘agency’.
Going back to the model one sees that human action begins with the ‘motivation of action’. However, Giddens adds “motivation is not as directly bound up with the continuity of action as are its reflexive monitoring or rationalization” (Giddens, 1984:6). In other words, action is usually a structural phenomenon coming from a rational and reflexive agent, whose actions aren’t really motivated. The agent does however understand it’s action, the ‘rationalization of action’ means that actors “maintain a continuing ‘theoretical understanding’ of the grounds of their activity” in daily routines (Giddens, 1984:5). Individuals also reflexively monitor the consequences and circumstances of their action, but not only of their own activities, “they also routinely monitor aspects, social and physical, of the contexts in which they move” (Giddens, 1984:5). In sum, the model shows that, an action comes from an agent
that understands its action (rationalization of action) and is able to understand the wider consequences of that action (reflective monitoring of action), but it says nothing about the reason why an action is taken (motivation of action). When examining the structural loop (Figure 1, p.12), the words that stand out the most are ‘unintended’ and ‘unacknowledged’, the way an agent is perceived to make changes to a structure is thus not even intentional, it is accidental. This brings us to what Giddens thinks it is to be an agent, which simply is someone who acts and by doing so makes a difference to the structure in which those acts are performed. Or put in his own words “action depends on the capability of the individual to ‘make a difference’ to a pre-existing state of affairs” (Giddens, 1984:14). Agency thus refers to any act that changes structure.
When the that was just described is put into the wider context of modernity, Giddens states that in modernity there are no more prescribed roles, which forces the individual to choose his own path and doing this rightly requires awareness of what is happening now, what has happened in the past and what will probably happen in the future (Giddens, 1991:70-72). Every decision made is thus placed in a longer line of decisions and together they form a narrative of the self of which the individual is the sole author.1 That narrative becomes and is who you are, which means that every decision is a reflection of your identity, because we are all observing each other’s and especially our own actions. What we wear, what we eat, how we conduct ourselves, who we meet, it all contributes to our self-identity (Giddens, 1991:76). We are writing the book that is our life in which every decision is a sentence and, according to Giddens, with every sentence we put down we think of who we are and want to be (Giddens, 1991: 243). (Giddens, 1991:70-88)
(Figure 1: model of human action (Giddens, 1984:5))
According to Meŝtrović, the image Giddens creates in the model that is described in the previous paragraphs, is one of individuals that lack any kind of serious restraints on human capabilities.2
1 “It is made clear that self-identity, as a coherent phenomenon, presumes a narrative: the narrative is made
explicit” (Giddens, 1991:76)
2As Meŝtrović points out: “Giddens key claims for structuration theory are that human agents are skilled and
knowledgeable, (…) they overlook the irrational forces at work in the psyche, the boundedness of the
knowledge that agents may possess, and, above all, the strict limits of where and how agents may behave like in a world that is becoming increasingly monitored, controlled, and controlling” (1998:23)
Giddens even states that this way of thinking is especially significant in our day-to-day routines, which would mean that individuals think of all of their past experiences (reflexive monitoring) and what they want to be (rationalization) with everything they do. Not only has the individual an unrealistic sense of his surrounding and his own identity, the knowledgeability of actors is also thoroughly exaggerated (Meŝtrović, 1998:21-23). In sum, if Giddens is correct then individuals do not only know what they are doing and how it is done, they also know precisely why they made a certain decision. This is noteworthy to find in a model that gets a lot of its assumptions from psychoanalytic theory that is known for their emphasis on irrational forces working within the individual.3 I could not find any psychological theory currently in use that pictures individuals in such a highly rational way (Anderson et al., 2011), and found that even most other disciplines now agree on a more ‘bounded rationality’ (Marsh and Stoker, 2010: 52).
Next to the just explained focus on rationality, is the notion of power absent in his model of human action. This absence of power is relevant in relation to the concept of ‘lifestyle politics’ and the general emphasis on practice theory in the model of Spaargaren and Mol (2008), because it leads to an overestimated influence of individuals in changing structures. As is explained in the introduction (sect. 0.3), the agent is tied onto structures by his “participation in a set of everyday life routines that they share with others” (Spaargaren and Oosterveer, 2010:1895), in other words, practices. These shared routines mean that when an agent alters his behaviour, others are affected by this, and, as can be seen in the model, continuingly monitor the circumstances of the change. However, the routines in which agents are bound to other agents aren’t easily broken for the very reason it isn’t just an individual breach (Cohen, 1989:218). By changing behaviour an impact is exercised on shared life routines, which may very well entail a negative effect for different agents in that routine (Cohen, 1989:154). The notion of power in these structures Giddens hardly explains beyond the point that structures are indeed the result of a certain power balance, but that the subordinates in that structure always have the power to “act otherwise” and by doing so change the state of affairs (Giddens, 1984:14-15). Agency here refers to the capacity to “make a difference”,4 which should be interpreted very broadly, because as the model shows, structures are mostly influenced by unintended consequences of action. Intent is subjugated to simply acting, meaning that every decision is a case of agency (Giddens, 1984:7). Cohen argues that power and agency are therefore seen in an overly optimistic and exceedingly broad
3“The postulate of the “unconscious is accepted by all sects of psychoanalysis, (…) to reject the concept of the
“unconscious” is to reject psychoanalysis in total.” (Dunlap, 1945:331)
4 “action depends on the capability of the individual to ‘make a difference’ to a pre-existing state of affours or
perspective, because as long as a person is able to act, that person is able to transform the social reality and thus has power (Cohen, 1989:149).5
The same lack of attention on restrictions to agency by structures, as explained in the previous paragraph, is transferred to the model of Spaargaren and Mol (2008) when they do not take into account the power that is being distributed in these daily practices. The very fact that practices are shared routines means that they cannot just be changed, especially when is not explained why an agent would want to change his behaviour. Furthermore, it is difficult to see how an all-encompassing concept of agency is able to make rigorous changes to behavioural practices. For Giddens, every act constitutes agency as long as it is able to make a change, this includes very marginal changes, unintended changes, or changes that are seen as negative by the individual. In relation to the model of Spaargaren and Mol (2008), agency refers to the intended change made by an agent relying on the power a certain structure gives that agent. This section therefore shows that although Spaargaren and Mol use Giddens’ theory as foundation for the relation between agent and structure, the concept of agency that belongs to his theory is very different from the concept of agency as is used in their model.
1.3 Model of features that prompt the individual to action: accounting for
emotion
Following upon the previous drawn conclusion, that Giddens has not yet provided us with an explanation where choice originates from (sect. 1.2), this section focuses on how Giddens pictures human motivation and the problems of his view.
Giddens answers the question ‘on what grounds the individual makes his choices’ in a model that discerns different degrees of awareness an agent has in decision making, and is portrayed in a hierarchical or vertical way in which the most conscious state is placed on top and the unconscious state at the bottom. 1) The most conscious state of awareness is what Giddens calls ‘discursive consciousness’, which means the ability to put the social conditions into words and their own actions in that environment (Giddens, 1984:374). According to Giddens discursive consciousness can be compared with what Freud would call the ego or I (Giddens, 1984:45). 2) Reversibly, the ‘unconscious motives’ is that which is not able to give verbal expression to the prompting of action, yet again relying heavily on psychoanalytic literature (Giddens, 1984:45). Because Giddens follows Freud in stating that the unconscious is the result of repression, the unconscious is mostly seen as a pathological phenomenon that actively resists coming into consciousness. 3) Finally, ‘practical consciousness’ is one
5“ I have stressed the agency-oriented conception of power in structuration theory (….) is exceedingly broad:
indeed, no instance of social praxis may be regarded as lacking the exercise of power in this agency-oriented sense of the term” (Cohen, 1989:149-150)
of the central themes in structuration theory, it “consists of all the things which actors know tacitly about how to ‘go on’ in the contexts of social life without being able to give them direct discursive expression” (Giddens, 1984:XIII). Even though Giddens doesn’t explicitly speak of any order in which this prompting of action comes into being, concluding from his description it should begin with the unconscious motives that in turn create the need for practical consciousness and is expressed by the discursive consciousness. This order of prompting of action puts enormous pressure on the unconscious part of his model. (Giddens, 1984:41-50; 1991:35-80)
(Figure 2: model of features that prompt the individual to action (Giddens, 1884:7))
One of the often heard comments on Giddens his theory is that he makes complex theories but doesn’t explain them properly.6 Looking at the definitions that were just described of each of the components in the third model tells very little about the grounds on which the individual actually chooses. Being able to explain your choice or having knowledge of your surroundings does not give any explanation on deeper drives or goals, putting the onus, yet again, on the unconscious motives. However, Giddens is not clear in what precisely the nature of the unconscious is.7 The description of “that what cannot be expressed into words” is not a description at all and remarkably enough that is the closest to a definition one can get in any of his major works. It seems like a puzzle that we ourselves should put together from the fragmented things he has written about it.8 Doing just that, one sees that his model states there are barriers between the conscious and the unconscious that are centered on repression. Considering that Giddens is strongly influenced by Freud (Giddens, 1984:42), repression can be regarded in the same manner as is found in the writings of Freud. This means some motives are repressed to the unconscious if they provoke too much anxiety. In other words, some motives or memories are so anxiety provoking that they are banned from the consciousness. (Boag, 2006)
6The general theme in criticism of Giddens is that his theory does not lend itself to empirical research, that his
prose is unclear, that he is evasive and “fox-like” in relation to issues, and that he offers rhetorical solutions to theoretical problems (Meŝtrović, 1998:19)
7“To date Giddens has proposed no account of the nature or development of motives above and beyond the
need for ontological security” (Cohen, 1989:227). “Regarding Freud’s use of the unconscious, transformed into the issue of unconscious motives, Giddens offers no definition, only a polemic with Freud’s insistence that all acts have motive” (Meŝtrović, 1998:82)
Following upon the finding that motivation has to do with preventing anxiety, leads to the question of what provokes anxiety, which Giddens explains on the basis of Erik Eriksons and D.W. Winnicotts notion of ‘basic trust’, but is further supported by reference to Heidegger and Kierkegaard (Giddens, 1991:35-69). Basic trust is the “trust in the continuity of others and in the object-world, derived from early infantile experience” (Giddens, 1991:242). Babies are, according to this theory, not able to distinct themselves from others or the object-world (reality). The mother is then seen as an extension of the self and when the mother leaves this provokes ontological anxiety about what the baby can and cannot control. Obviously it cannot control the object-world, but it has to come to grips with this. Trust in the caretaker coming back is what creates this acceptation which in turn for a good deal relies on routines. The routine makes it possible for the child to expect a returning mother which makes the child confident and able to explore further. The routine in a way becomes the substitute for the mother in which we give confidence, which Giddens tries to prove by adverting to so called ‘breaching experiments’ in which certain routines are breached which leads to anxiety with its test subjects (Giddens, 1991:36-37). Basic trust then becomes “a screening-off device in relation to risks and dangers in the surrounding settings of action and interaction”. (Giddens, 1991:40). Unconscious motives can thus be defined as repressed feelings of anxiety about ontological/existential security.9 Structure, as in routine, becomes the foundation agents can build on but it is as much part of the individual as the external reality. (Giddens, 1991:35-69)
The findings in this section are relevant to the model of Spaargaren and Mol (2008), because it explains where agency, according to Giddens, in the end comes from. As the previous paragraph explains, this stems from the need for ontological security, meaning that the foundational drive for action, according to Giddens, is an existential one. However, because his treatment of motivation is so heavily cloaked in psychoanalytical theory it is unclear how agents can actually break routine, where trust comes from, without being existentially threatened. Such a depiction of human motivation is problematic in relation to the model of Spaargaren and Mol (2008), that is centered on enabling agents to break behavioral routines (section 0.3), because Giddens’ account doesn’t discern any reasons why an individual would break those routines. As indicated in the conclusion of the previous section, “for Giddens, every act constitutes agency as long as it is able to make a change” while in Spaargaren and Mol’s Model (2008) “agency refers to the intended change made by an agent relying on the power a certain structure gives that agent” (p. 14). This section shows that Giddens’ account of agency is not only different from the
9For some reason ontological and existential fears are being alternated by Giddens “To be ontologically secure
is to possess, on the level of the unconscious and practical conscious, ‘answers’ to fundamental existential questions” (Giddens, 1991:47)
account of Spaargaren and Mol, but that his very basis for agency is in opposition to the aim of Spaargaren and Mol’s theory, that is, changing behavioral routines.
The next sections (1.4-1.6) will further analyze the problems in the theory of Giddens for the model of Spaargaren and Mol, after which an option for revision will be given that by acknowledging a greater role for emotion and power, also addresses the constraining influence structure has on agency.
1.4 The language analogy: ignorant of constraint and power
Section 1.2 already touched upon the lack of attention that Giddens pays to the constraints on agency, which comes forth out of a neglect of power. This section investigates the reason for such a neglect. Giddens doesn’t see agency and structure as a dichotomy (Giddens, 1984:xxi). According to him, agency is even helped by structure because it provides a base on which to build and explore, which is further explained by use of a language analogy that coincidently works as a lightning rod by diverting attention away from the speculative nature of the unconscious and onto the discursive part of his model (Giddens, 1984:8). Language use and its acquisition is taken as an example of how the learning of behaviour in general works and given scientific authority by use of a well-known contraposition between Noam Chomsky and Ludwig Wittgenstein (Giddens, 1984:19-24).
Within the opposition between Chomsky and Wittgenstein, Chomsky’s position is best explained by reference to his review of B.F. Skinner’s attempt to explain the learning of language in a behaviourist way. Behaviourism is the idea that human behaviour can be surmised to simple schemes of stimulus and response, which makes all behaviour a completely structural and determined phenomenon, because it makes every action dependent on environmental influences (Gluck et al., 2008:25-26). Chomsky’s answer to Skinner’s attempt to use this idea on the acquisition of language was that it is impossible to do so without some innate knowledge of basic grammar structures (universal grammar). That is, humans have some innate structure inherited in their genes to as it where ‘grow’ a sense of language. That agents need structure doesn’t negate agency for Chomsky, because the system is so rich it provides us with a myriad of options (1959). In the position of Wittgenstein (1953) this structure is placed outside the individual, or at least its use, and states that structure lies in the context of use. Grammar is not abstract or universal, it is situated in the routine activity of daily life. Life is in its turn dependent on culture, history and context (Leezenberg and De Vries, 2012:256-257).
Giddens combines the ideas of Chomsky and Wittgenstein, as described in the previous paragraph, by stating that the rules and resources (structure) of social activity not only constraint our actions, but also makes us capable of learning (Cohen, 1989:97-99). He thus uses Chomsky to use structure as the very foundation of agency while at the same time not taking into account the lack of free will that the
behaviourist perspective entails. Next he uses Wittgenstein to place this structure outside the individual and into a context of use that for Giddens becomes the shared routines between individuals. These shared routines become the basis for not only getting rid of our ontological fears, but also for our power to move past structures. (Giddens, 1984:18-25)
However brilliant the just described theory may be, it is an idea that is characterized by cutting corners and cherry picking.10 Firstly, the falsification of Chomsky towards the behaviourist theory of learning doesn’t mean that there is no such learning in general. It means that the behaviourist theory doesn’t explain everything, which is different from disregarding it all together (Goldstein, 2011:14). Secondly, the structure Chomsky refers to is an innate structure which is the same for every individual, making it universal. It can very well be compared to Immanuel Kant’s categorical imperative, moving past this structure is illogical. Indeed, moving past the structure in Chomsky’s eyes is not only unnecessary, it is impossible (Goldstein, 2011:14). This is a very different idea of structure than the more relativist position of Wittgenstein in which the rules are contextual and change over time. This leads us to the final point, the lack of any real scrutiny into the constraints a shared contextual rule also encompasses (Cohen, 1989:153). Two of the most renowned linguistic philosophers, namely Foucault and Derrida, are barely mentioned in his treatment of language, while in contrast to Giddens they emphasize the normative and hidden aspects that are present in our language use. 11
1.5 Giddens’ stratified vision on Freud’s division of the psyche: leaving out
emotion
In section 1.2 and 1.3 attention was already given to the problem in Giddens’ theory to give an account of the unconscious, the emotional component in his theory, in relation to everyday life. This section focusses on the reason for that problem and the next section (1.6) will offer a solution to that problem. According to Meŝtrović, the reason for a lack of regard to emotions in Giddens’ theory is because of the way he makes a depiction of Freud’s division of the psyche, which acts as the basis of Giddens’ view on an individual’s inner working (Meŝtrović, 1998:80-83). Freud made the distinction between a controlling and balancing ‘ego’, a drive consisting of unruly emotions, mostly centred on sex, called the ‘id’, and finally the moralizing constraint to the id, the ‘superego’ (de Berg, 2003:50-54). However, because the unruly emotions of the id are often thought of penetrating the conscious acting in a
10 Ian Craib’s criticism of Giddens focuses on his use of other theories. According to Crabi, Giddens’ theory is
“not bound together through a logical or rational system” and is “non-partisan in his partisanship”, Giddens’ theory is “drawing all positions together”, without taking notice of the important oppositions between those theories (Craib, 1992:5-6)
11“it is difficult to identify insights Giddens accepts or rejects from the works of specific scholars associated with
the structuralist and post-structuralist traditions: e.g. Saussure, Levi-Strauss, Althusser, Barthes, Derrida, et al.”
pathological way, the model of Giddens is centred around barriers that keep these emotions in the unconscious (Giddens, 1984:7). These barriers are what Giddens calls a ‘stratified model’ of the features that prompt the individual to action, meaning that in daily life the unconscious does not come into play and every action is therefore the result of a conscious decision (Giddens, 1991:35). The only basis that Giddens gives to emotion, the basic security system (ontological security), is therefore removed from daily life. The practical consciousness keeps the existential crisis in check by its focus on daily routines, much like the superego keeps the id in control (Giddens, 1984:44-50). The power society holds over the constraining practical consciousness is however overlooked, which is related to the neglect of power that is present in societal structures and shared habits.
Giddens’ reading of Freud’s unconscious id and its manifestation as a pathological phenomenon explains why Giddens insists on a stratified model of explaining daily life, because it would mean the individual is usually governed by a pathological and animal like drive just as much as he is governed by the other components. Another reading of Freud, supported by Laplanche and Pontalis (1973) and Ellenberger (1970)(visualized in Figure 3, p. 20), would be one in which the ‘unconscious motives’ are like a will that “exerts a constant pressure on consciousness and is never asleep or “turned off”” (Meŝtrović, 1998:83). By using this second reading, Giddens could still hold the ego or his discursive consciousness as the controlling component of the agent, keeping the rational nature of the individual intact, but would also be able to bring the irrational forces into his model. The practical consciousness would then have the same role as the superego in Freud’s theory and be the restriction on the id taking control. Treating the unconscious as a constant pressure would not only be more in line with Freud’s use of the division of the psyche, but would more importantly improve the intuitive validity of how human action is motivated. Also, if the practical consciousness would be seen as a constraint by a connection based on shared routines this would be able to bring in the notion of societal power, precisely that what Giddens’ theory, according to most of his critics, is so badly lacking (Cohen, 1989:154; Meŝtrović, 1998:86).
(Figure 3: Model of Freud’s division of the psyche) (Figure 4: Adjusted model of Giddens’ motivation to action)
1.6 Shift towards an intermixed model
As suggested in the previous section, making Giddens’ model in line with a reading of Freud’s division of the psyche that allows for the unconscious to have a greater influence by exerting pressure on the consciousness, makes for a view of the agent that is able to take account of emotion and power. In this section an alternative account of features that prompt the individual to action will be presented, that is based on a well-known psychological model on attitudes and will be at the heart of the revision of Spaargaren and Mol’s model, that is focused on the relation between agent and structure (sect. 0.3). This section thus delivers the first suggestion for improving on the image of how individuals and structure interact in Spaargaren and Mol’s model (2008), the main aim of this thesis, by using a different perspective on how and why agents act.
As introduced in the previous paragraph, is the heart of the revised model of Spaargaren and Mol a psychological model on attitudes. An attitude is an evaluation people give of an object, person, idea or anything else they can have an opinion on, called an attitude object (Bohner and Wanke, 2002:4). In other words, an attitude constitutes a relation between the agent and the environment taken from the agents point of view. Research into these attitudes have shown that they can be divided into three components that together form our opinion about a certain topic. 1) The first component is comprised of ‘affective attitudes’, which means that they are based on emotional responses to an attitude object. 2) The second component is that of the ‘cognitive attitudes’, which in contrast to the affective attitudes are based on certain beliefs of the characteristics of an attitude object, in disregard of being actually true or false. 3) The third and final component is that of the ‘behavioural attitudes’, which are based on our practices concerning an attitude object. The theory that attitudes are comprised out of three components is called the ‘tripartite model of attitudes’ and is not accidentally comprised of different fields within psychology that are focused on one of the different components. According to this model, an attitude consists of each of the components, but a single component can be leading concerning a certain attitude. (Aronsen et al., 2011:214-217)
The tripartite model might serve to be a scientific authority, but can only state that an attitude can be divided into three components in which the first is based on emotions, the second on rationality, and the third on behaviour. However, how these attitudes come about and how they interrelate has to be accounted for, which is where the revision of Giddens’ theory (sect. 1.5) comes back into play. The new model based on attitudes will follow Giddens’ motivational model in the discernment of a different degree of consciousness for each component (sect. 1.3), and Giddens’ treatment of shared routines, which will be the foundation of the behavioural attitudes. However, the major deviation from his view
on the psyche is that in the new model all the components intermix and create a kind of equilibrium, like the balance between Freud’s id and superego. An intermixed model means that all the components influence each other. Such an intermixed view on motivation to action makes for a model in which each component is making its contribution on an agent’s decision making, this in contrast to Giddens’ stratified model of motivation of action. The heart of the revised model of Spaargaren and Mol can thus be seen as a combination of the theories of Freud and Giddens, poured into the more scientifically valid tripartite model of attitudes. How the different attitude components interrelate will be explained in greater detail in the next section.
1.7 How the different components interact
After having introduced the theoretical underpinning of the new motivational model to an agent’s action in the previous section, in this section will be explained how the different components are created and the way they are connected to one another (see Figure 5, p. 23).
The first component is that of the ‘affective attitudes’, which come from our immediate emotional response to an attitude object. An emotion is essentially not more than a physiological reaction to a certain stimulus, or a “feeling” (Turner and Stets, 2005:6). These feelings can be both social and biological, but what is important is that they are direct and automatic, which is why agents have very little control over them and are therefore also not “able to give any verbal expression” to their prompting of action (Giddens, 1984:45). Such an automatic response to a stimulus is best worked out in the behaviourist theories, though now strengthened by the cognitive revolution set into motion by Chomsky. The negation of Skinner (sect. 1.4) is here thus revoked and even given special emphasis in the role of (re)creating social structures. This does not entail a fall-back to the idea of a ‘tabula rasa’ however, innate structures and drives are deemed very important to social behaviour in this model, as will be thoroughly explained in the next sections (1.8-1.10). The way behaviourist theories work is by associating an experience to a positive or negative appreciation (stimulus), which is done repetitively. Once the association is made, the prospect of the experience is able to trigger secondary emotions, like joy or fear, making it able to avoid or seek certain situations (Aronson, 2011:215-216). (Bohner and Wanke, 2002:78-81)
As became clear in the previous paragraph, the way emotions are linked to certain experiences is able to steer behaviour. However, it is only because of the repetitive nature of our daily routines that this association becomes a structural phenomenon. The influence Giddens has on the revised model is here seen at it greatest. Although, like Giddens, focussing on the repetitive nature of daily life, the interaction with ‘ontological security’ has been exchanged for the behaviourist conditioning of behaviour, meaning that following routines is positively reaffirmed by community members,
strengthening the incentive to follow routine (Shettleworth, 2010:34-35). The breach of a routine would therefore be valued in an opposite way, because it would be negatively received by community members. This is where the notion of power comes back into play, because routines are an important way for guiding behaviour in a group of people. They are used by individuals to plan their route in daily life and therefore constitutive to the order that is needed to keep a society smoothly running (Cohen, 1989:39-41). When comparing the behavioural attitudes and affective attitudes with Freud’s superego and id, the affective attitudes are expected to lead to the blind search for positive feelings while the behavioural attitudes restrict those actions to those that comply with routine. The breaching of routine is therefore expected to produce feelings of unease, because a subconscious link has been made to the disapproval of the community and the breaching of routine. The superego is here thus seen as the feeling one should comply to behavioural guidelines. (Bohner and Wanke, 2002:81-83)
Finally there is the cognitive component, which in relation to Giddens can very well be compared to discursive consciousness, that is, the ability to put things into words. In neuroscience cognition has to do with all the abilities that have to do with knowledge, or information processing (Gluck et al., 2008:128-129). Here the focus will however primarily be on the memory and reason, being in an aware state of mind. The theory on the cognitive attitudes is mainly inspired by Hume’s emotivism, which is the theory that all knowledge comes through our senses and is therefore subjective (Willemsen, 1992:124). The rationality that is envisioned to lay in the cognitive part of the human psyche should therefore be seen as a personal rationality, that is, dependent on personal experience. The affective attitudes are based on unconscious associations between cause and effect, the behavioural attitudes based on the unconscious expected consequences of an automatic reaction, and the cognitive attitudes are based on an advanced awareness of how cause and effect interact. Because the agent is consciously aware of what a certain action will cause, he is able to avoid or seek a certain outcome. In other words, because of a progressive knowledge on cause and effect, the individual is able to intervene in a certain chain of events (Shettleworth, 2010:40-41). A chain of events can very well be the routines that govern society, the conscious mind is able to make a prediction based on those routines, making the certainty of a favourable outcome greater. However, the agent can also make predictions of what happens when routines are breached, or be aware that the structure isn’t working for him. The focus on cognitive attitudes might serve to create an account of agency that is still based on breaking shared routines by a conscious agent, but also considers the difficulties such a breach would entail for that agent. When such an account would be implemented by Spaargaren and Mol (2008), it might help to represent not only the enabling side of agency, but also the constraints to agency. (Turner and Stets, 2005:269-271)
This section explained how the different attitude components of the revised model of Spaargaren and Mol come into being and are connected to each other. The last paragraph on cognitive attitudes explains how an agent can alter the course he is on by an increased knowledge of cause and effect. This knowledge itself leads to agency, because whether or not the agent decides to follow or break routine, he is able to decide his own course, and thus makes a conscious decision. However, the affective and behavioural components constantly send feelings of ease or unease, pleasure or pain, to the conscious mind, feelings that can be overruled, but not shut off. The conscious mind has no control over the unconscious mind, which is where structure comes in. Structure is the feeling that unconsciously keeps the individual on the paths that are dictated by the repetitive reinforcements of society. A lot of the associations unconsciously made are dependent on the social environment, what individuals are learned to do. Agents therefore have strong incentives to follow routine, since they feel good. Emotion comes from positive or negative association, power from their constricting influence. The next sections will give a treatment on internal motivations, which will add a dimension to the agency-structure dichotomy and serve as an alternative to Giddens’ existential foundation for behaviour as is described in section 1.3.
1.8 Innate drives as foundation for all social behaviour
Just like Giddens built his theory around an all-encompassing (existential) motivational drive (sect. 1.3), this thesis will also recognize foundational drives, which will be discussed in the next sections. Much in the likeness of Freud,12 will be argued for two opposing drives in the acknowledgement of the paradoxical human nature that on the one hand is based on competition, and on the other hand based on cooperation (Sherif, 1966:vii). The naming of Freud makes for the connotation of pseudoscience and the designation of innate drives carries the risk of making the entire theory suggestive, but to not acknowledge them would be a major shortcoming in the view of not only individuals but also social behaviour (Gluck et al., 2008:26-30). Indeed after the cognitive revolution, the idea of innate structures or drives are seen as undeniable and necessary for learning.13 The problem however is to give a clear description of those drives which even in the field of neuroscience is yet to be accomplished. In the field of psychology they remedy this by use of statistics and the attempt to find behaviour that is found in every person and every culture (for instance with the idea of 8 basic emotions), making them universal (Aronson et al., 2011:102).
The first drive that is here acknowledged is supported in precisely such a manner as is described in the previous paragraph. ‘The need to belong’ is what this first innate motivational drive is called, which entails the universal desire for interpersonal attachment as a deeper or fundamental drive of human motivation (Baumeister and Leary, 1995:497). The second innate drive is one that balances out with the first drive and represents the very unsocial in human nature, it is ‘the need to be distinct’ which is comparable to Nietzsche’s will to power (1888). Even though there is no scientific literature that supports such a drive as innate to human nature it must be one of the most latently known drives in nature, as well as one that has been recognized by many philosophers and sociologists.
A theory that also acknowledges the drive to belong and the drive to be distinct, as introduced in the previous paragraph, is the ‘optimal distinctiveness theory’ (Brewer, 1991). According to this theory the views on individuals have become overly ‘self’-centred, which is countered by theories based on groups, like social identity theory. Optimal distinctiveness theory offers a model that suggests that individuals always search for the right balance between standing out from the crowd and belonging to a group, therefore rejecting the dichotomy between the individual and society. In this theory the union is even forged in human nature itself, referring to the natural need of group membership as to the
12The definition of a drive is a force, pressure and demand, whose source is somatic. Freud calls for two drives,
the sex and death drive. (Carel, 2006:6)
need to dominate within that group. The essence of optimal distinctiveness theory is, just as this thesis tries to convey, that humans have two innate drives that balance each other out. (Brewer, 1991) With regard to the innate drives there is one important aspect in regard to the different attitudes that has to be pointed out. Innate drives are felt (Turner and Stets, 2005:6, 11-13), which means that they are unconscious drives that assert pressure onto the individual’s consciousness. The drives are subconsciously active and are able to communicate by using physiological feelings, only when felt they come into consciousness. (Schachter and Singer, 1962) They can perhaps best be compared with emotions out of classical conditioning, when a stimulus is given in combination with a certain act, then an association will be formed and the act will after a period of conditioning bring up the feeling of the stimulus automatically (Gluck et al., 2008:18). The innate drives are not the result of any conditioning however, but ingrained into the human psyche by nature. (Aronson et al., 2011:156).
1.9 Belongingness: the group as purpose in itself
As introduced in the previous section, this thesis recognizes two innate drives that are at the basis of social behaviour. This section is a description of the ‘the need to belong’ or ‘belongingness’, which is the hypothesis that “human beings have a pervasive drive to form and maintain at least a minimum quantity of lasting, positive, and significant interpersonal relationships” (Baumeister and Leary, 1995: 497). In practice this means that every person is looking for contact which first of all is frequent and pleasant and secondly takes place in a context of stability and mutuality (Baumeister and Leary, 1995:498). Of course it is most commonly known as the need for love, not just to be loved, but to give love just the same. In Maslow’s pyramid of motivational hierarchy it is placed as the first need after food, safety and other basic needs (Maslow, 2013). Moreover it is deemed more fundamental than esteem and self-actualization. Even though it might seem kind of vague as an academic principle, it is well researched by a great number of influential psychologists and their conclusions are widely supported in their work field (Aronson et al., 2011:303). More importantly, it is a feeling every person would probably agree with looking at their own life, this in contrast to the existential questions that take precedent in the theory of Giddens.
Indeed if the existential crisis, as described in section 1.3, would be replaced by the need to belong as a foundational drive, it would improve the intuitive logic of his statements about the fear of breaking routine, especially in a time where you don’t automatically ‘belong’ to a certain group.14 The fear of not being accepted by others is something everyone can relate to and has also been marked as the foundation of self-development by many psychoanalysts (Baumeister and Tice, 1990:167). Giddens
14 According to Giddens, Bauman and Beck, in modernity individuals do not automatically belong to a certain
slimmed down his notion of ‘basic trust’ as “trust in the continuity of others and the object-world” (Giddens, 1991:242) (p. 16) to just the object-world, in contrast to the authors he is referring to. Especially Winnicott, but also Erikson, emphasizes the social nature of self-identity by beginning with the relationship between mother and child, the social relationship then precedes the individual. At the very core of his writings are empathy, imagination, and most of, all love between people (Winnicott, 1971). Any existential anxiety is mostly limited to early childhood after which the key to a healthy development of the self relies on “the continuation of reliable holding in terms of the ever widening circle of family and school and social life” (Winnicott, 1971:238). This idea of a need for attachment in order to develop is further elaborated by John Bowlby in his ‘attachment theory’, where he states that the dialectic relationship between attachment and independence is what drives behaviour, the secure attachments provide a base for independence and exploration (Rifkin, 2009: 72). As Jeremy Rifkin concludes: “object relations theorists put a new mirror to human nature, and what they saw reflected a view of our species as an affectionate, highly social animal who craves companionship, abhors isolation, and is biologically predisposed to express empathy to other beings” (Rifkin, 2009:80). When acknowledging this need to belong, then the group could be seen as a purpose in itself, as it provides the individual with an emotional feeling of being part of something greater than himself, something he can’t live without. Before the dominance of the idea of individuality in science and politics, the idea of the group as an inner drive was regarded an undeniable fact, as is best characterised in Aristotle’s notion of man as a political animal which states that humans naturally form groups because they need to in order to survive, because they couldn’t perform their functions without it.15 Evolutionary biologists share the idea of Aristotle of the need to form groups. According to them, human nature should be characterised as being governed by interdependence and even in an age of individuality has the emotional needs of a traditional or even pre-societal environment (Baumeister and Leary, 1995:503). In psychology the importance of the group gained new importance after different experiments showed how quickly groups become cohesive (Baumeister and Leary, 1995:501). For instance in Tajfels social identity theory (1970) the assigning of individuals to arbitrary categories made them to have an immediate in-group bias.
As this section shows, the need to belong makes living in a group an emotional necessity. Regarding the group as necessity contributes to the revision of Spaargaren and Mol’s model, that aims to include the constraints to agency, because it would mean that the barrier to breaking routine would be a lot
15“Society is something that precedes the individual. Anyone who either cannot lead the common life or is so self-sufficient as not to need to, and therefore does not partake of society, is either a beast or a god.” (Aristotle,
harder to overcome, as the fear of being rejected is greater that thought of in an individualized world. However, the next section will explain how the need to be distinct might result in the opposite behaviour.
1.10 Distinctiveness: climbing the social ladder
As the previous section discussed the cooperative side of human nature, which is the need to belong, this section concerns the conflicting and competitive side of human nature. The need to be distinct, or distinctiveness, is a melange of ideas that all encompass a similar spirit, one that represents the sexual competition in which individuals try to become the dominant party. In human behaviour social competition is the never ending struggle for a favourable position on the ladder of social hierarchy, and the view presented here can be seen as a complementation to the steps of Maslow’s pyramid and is very much comparable to Bourdieu’s in-group competition (sect. 3.1). The paradox of any social animal is that the group is a means to an end but at the very same time a restriction to that end (Sherif, 1966:vii). The group is necessary for the provision of certain needs, which is why the need to belong is ingrained into our psyche, but within the group there is always competition about who gets what, when and where, in which your place on the hierarchical ladder is the decisive factor, regardless of what need has to be fulfilled (Turner and Stets, 2005:216-228). This has engrained the second innate drive into the human psyche, the drive to be successful within the group, to rise above the rest. Within the just described drive to be distinct is also the dismissal of being dominated, which is a clear indicator of being outranked in the social hierarchy. Dominance itself is of course a very important way to rise above the rest and dominance in different fields is the most common way for individuals to distinct themselves from the rest. The need for humans to be successful in their own group(s) is especially noticeable in the self-esteem which rises when group members grant them their spot on the social ladder. Self-esteem can even be seen as the cognitive processing of the emotional feelings of worth (Turner and Stets, 2005:46-47). The dominating of others can bring instant gratification when recognized by fellow members, but the finding of personal worth out of self-contributed meaning within society bypasses these emotions that are dependent on others. This would require the psychological strength to put one’s own opinion over that of others however, which usually only will be deemed possible when recognized by others as worthy. Recognition then is the first step towards a positive self-image and self-actualisation is therefore preceded by acceptance within different groups (Wang et al., 2013).
As explained at the end of section 1.9, the need to belong as a fundamental drive has an effect on the image of the relation between structure and agency that enhances the need to comply with society’s rules, or structures. This section discussed a drive that is more ambiguous. On the one hand the
dismissal of being dominated would instil a motivation to refuse to live under any other rule than that of our own, to be one’s own master. On the other hand however, the structures are for many people a way to rise above the rest. There would be little use in changing structure if an individual thrives on those ways of doing. Touching back on the notion of power as discussed in section 1.2 and 1.4, changing structure could have the result that those dominant in that structure would heavily resist, which would be another barrier to breaking routines as is envisioned in the model of Spaargaren and Mol (2008)(sect. 0.3).
Summary
In this chapter the aim was to give an alternative view on agents that better takes into account the emotional side of decision making, and on the relation between structure and agency that better takes into account the notion of power as a constraint to agency (sect. 1.0). As the model of Spaargaren and Mol (2008) primarily uses the theories of Giddens as the foundation on their view on agents and their relation with structures, the revision was made by first scrutinizing and criticizing Giddens’ theory of structuration. I will shortly recapitulate on the findings of this chapter and by doing so explain the revision that has been made to the theoretical foundation of Spaargaren and Mol (2008).
In section 1.1 it was explained that Giddens’ theory of structuration is comprised out of three models of which two were important to this chapter, which were discussed in section 1.2 and 1.3. Section 1.2 concerned the model of human action which is found to be overly occupied with a rational view on agency and mostly neglects the notion of power in shared routines, or structures. Section 1.3 discussed the model of features that prompt the individual to action and was found to have the same focus on a rational view on the agent’s decision making and a neglect of the emotional side of the agent’s motivation.
In the next sections was given attention to the reason that the notion of power and emotion seems to be overlooked in Giddens’ account of the relation between agent and structure. Section 1.4 found that Giddens mainly focusses on the enabling side of the relation between agents and structures and doesn’t properly give account of the constraints to changing route that come from negatively affecting other agents that share the routine. Section 1.5 focussed on Giddens’ ‘stratified’ reading of Freud’s division of the psyche that leads to an underestimation of the importance of emotion in daily life. Section 1.6 and 1.7 therefore posited an alternative account on human decision making that does incorporate emotion and power in the relation between agents and structures. This leads to a new core of the model of Spaargaren and Mol (2008) that is comprised out of three parts, an affective component, a behavioural component, and a cognitive component, which are all interacting with one another. In other words, it is an intermixed model of attitude formation. The affective attitudes are
