Lisa Jansen, 10559809 Academic Year 2016/2017 Research Project: Who belongs where?
21.460 words
Supervisor: Dr. Darshan Vigneswaran Second reader: Dr. Anja van Heelsum
Master’s Thesis for International Relations (Political Science) at the Graduate School of Social Sciences
Making the ideal citizen
Street-level bureaucrats as moral gatekeepers of
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Table of contents
1. Introduction ... 3
2. Literature review ... 5
2.1 The construction of (nation-)states and their boundaries ... 5
2.2 Citizenship as a means for in- and exclusion ... 6
2.3 Development of the Dutch integration system to a communitarian model ... 8
2.4 The communitarian model in practice ... 11
2.5 The role of racism in civic integration ... 14
2.6 Scientific and social relevance ... 15
2.6.1 When do street-level bureaucrats not act as moral gatekeepers? ... 19
2.7 Conclusion ... 20
3. Theoretical framework: moral gatekeepers and problematic Otherness ... 20
3.1 Conclusion ... 27
4. Methodology ... 27
4.1 Research methods ... 28
4.2 Ethics ... 31
4.3 Case selection ... 33
4.4 Research quality indicators ... 34
4.4.1 Reliability ... 34
4.4.2 Representativeness ... 35
5. Empirical analysis: Street-level bureaucrats as moral gatekeepers of Dutch society ... 35
5.1 Street-level bureaucrats and their role as moral gatekeepers ... 35
5.2 The Other framed as a problem for Dutch society ... 41
5.3 Stepping out of the moral gatekeepers’ role ... 44
5.4 Conclusion ... 48
6. Research conclusion and recommendations ... 48
7. Bibliography ... 51
8. Appendixes ... 56
Appendix A: Interview questionnaire ... 56
Appendix B: Interview 1 – teacher from Hogeschool van Amsterdam ... 57
Appendix C: Interview 2 – teacher from Hogeschool Utrecht ... 68
Appendix D: Participant observation – ROC van Amsterdam day 1 ... 81
Appendix E: Participant observation – ROC van Amsterdam day 2 ... 88
Appendix F: Participant observation – ROC van Amsterdam day 3 ... 93
Appendix G: Participant observation – ROC van Amsterdam day 4 ... 100
Appendix H: Participant observation – ROC van Amsterdam day 5 ... 104
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Appendix J: Participant observation – ROC van Amsterdam day 7 ... 109
Appendix K: Participant observation – ROC van Amsterdam day 8 ... 111
Appendix L: Participant observation – ROC van Amsterdam day 9 ... 113
Appendix M: Participant observation – ROC van Amsterdam day 10 ... 117
Appendix N: Participant observation – Totaal Inburgering day 1 ... 122
Appendix O: Participant observation – Totaal Inburgering day 2 ... 131
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1. Introduction
For the last couple of years issues relating to the integration of non-Western migrants (further referred to as immigrants) and their children have been central in many debates in the Netherlands (Huijnk & Andriessen 2016: 6). The influx of asylum seekers in 2015, with 43.090 initial claims for asylum, has caused much commotion among the Dutch society (Huijnk & Andriessen 2016: 6; IND 2015). This influx, and the, by native Dutch citizens deemed, problematic bond the immigrants have with the Netherlands is cause for concern among several groups of Dutch citizens (Huijnk & Andriessen 2016: 6). Where on the one hand some immigrants feel treated as second-class citizens, some native Dutch citizens on the other hand see the presence of these immigrants as a threat to important Dutch norms and values (ibid.).
This concern of immigrants as a threat to Dutch society is also voiced in a letter written by the Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte from the conservative liberal VVD (People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy) in anticipation of the 2017 parliamentary elections:
‘We [Dutch citizens] feel a growing discomfort when people abuse our freedom to spoil things here, while they have come to our country [the Netherlands] for this particular freedom. Those who refuse to adapt, do not care about our habits and reject our values. Who harass gay men, hooting at women in short skirts or calling ordinary Dutch people racists. I understand that people think: if you so fundamentally reject our country, I would prefer you leave. I got the same feeling. Act normal or leave’ (Rutte 2017).
[Author’s translation from Dutch]
This citation from Rutte’s letter shows that there is this idea of a norm (i.e. Dutch values) in Dutch society that immigrants or people with a migrant background, must adhere to. To become accepted by the Dutch population the immigrants must embody or internalise the Dutch norms. If they do not behave in accordance with these norms, they are seen as “not normal” and having to leave the Netherlands. Thus, there is this dominant idea of how the immigrants who enter the Netherlands should integrate or even assimilate to become accepted as a part of Dutch society. To help these immigrants integrate they are obligated to take part in the Dutch civic integration process where they, amongst other things, will learn the Dutch norms Rutte is talking about.
The management of diversity has become a much discussed subject in governmental institutions, such as municipalities, social security offices and schools (Hagelund 2009: 80).
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To deal with this diversity most Western European states have adopted civic integration policy for immigrants (Joppke 2017: 1) Via civic integration courses the immigrants become informed with society’s history and culture (Joppke & Eule 2016: 344). In the Netherlands the dominant idea is that Dutch society can only function if everybody, who is staying in the country for a longer period of time, is participating and sharing the basic principles of this society (Asscher 2013: 1). By embodying these norms (and passing the integration exam) the immigrants become members of a collective identity or “imagined community”.
This research will specifically focus on civic integration courses in the Netherlands. The Dutch integration system opened up to the “free market” in 2006, making private companies the providers of integration courses. The civic integration teachers, working for these private companies, are concerned with teaching, among other things, the Dutch norms to the immigrants and making them part of the Dutch “imagined community”. It will be argued that while these teachers reproduce the idea of a problematic Other who is framed as incompatible with Dutch society, they also act as moral gatekeepers and try to take away this problematic Otherness. In their interaction with the immigrants the teachers use different teaching strategies to help the immigrants internalise the Dutch norms and values. Following Lipsky (2010) these teachers will be referred to as street-level bureaucrats. This leads to the following research question: How do street-level bureaucrats, working in the field of civic integration, act as moral gatekeepers of Dutch society? This research therefore specifically focuses on the teachers who, are employed to, deal with the civic integration of immigrants on a professional level. In researching this question this thesis contributes to the academic literature concerning civic integration and how this is used as a means to “protect” the receiving society (Belabas & Gerrits 2017; Bonjour 2010; De Leeuw & Van Wichelen 2012; Goodman 2011; Gutekunst 2015; Suvarierol 2015). It looks at the topic of moral gatekeeping form a socio-cultural perspective by discussing how newcomers to society are formed to become ideal citizens by embodying the dominant norms.
The thesis will be structured as follows: first the relevance of this research to the broader academic debate will be discussed. Here, it will become clear why the concept of moral gatekeeping can add missing value to the civic integration debate. Thereafter, a section will be dedicated to the development of the Dutch integration system. Where it will become clear that the Dutch integration system is a communitarian model in which the emphasis is on sharing the national identity in order to become a member of Dutch society. Also, the policy preference has become one of assimilation instead of integration. The idea is that immigrants should internalize the key values of Dutch society.
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This is followed by a theoretical framework in which the concept of “street-level bureaucrats” (Lipsky 2010) is discussed and how the analysis is guided by the analytical framework of moral gatekeeping. The theoretical framework also discusses the concept of “problematic Otherness” (Bonjour 2011) and the teaching strategies Hagelund (2009) proposes, in this research it is argued that these strategies are used by the street-level bureaucrats to act as moral gatekeepers of Dutch society.
The section following this details the rationale for choosing participant observation and semi structured interviews as a means to gather data in order to examine the ways in which these street-level bureaucrats act as moral gatekeepers. The empirical analysis and concluding remarks will be the final part of the thesis which will involve a detailed analysis of the data by linking this to the concepts of problematic Otherness and moral gatekeeping.
2. Literature review
To start, this section will discuss the relevant literature concerning civic integration and how the concept of moral gatekeeping can add value to this civic integration debate. First, there will be a discussion on the boundaries of (nation-)states and how citizenship is not only dependent on membership to the state, but also membership to the nation. Thereafter the focus will be on the development of the Dutch integration system to a communitarian model and how this model works in practice. Lastly, the research gap will be discussed.
2.1 The construction of (nation-)states and their boundaries
According to Van Houdt (2008: 1) migration can be seen as a process of glocalization, these are globalizing processes which have specific local consequences and vice versa, because of the fact that society has become more ethnic heterogeneous. With this, something that Van Houdt calls the nation-state/society differentiation, became problematic (ibid.). This is a relation between the state and society. There are two possible types of nation-state/society differentiation. The first is when society is relatively homogeneous, which means that the nation-state and society are overlapping. The second is when society is relatively heterogeneous, this means that nation-state and society become separated (idem: 2). The idea of a nation-state is one of a sovereign territory of a state, that is being inhabited by people belonging to the same “imagined community” (Anderson 2006: 6).
Few countries today can claim a perfect overlap of state and nation, but this ideal is noticeable in public imagination and political discourse. An example of this political discourse can be seen in a statement written by the Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs and
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Employment about integration of immigrants in Dutch society. The Ministry states that ‘integration means adjusting and letting go. Which is necessary to become part of this society’ (Asscher 2013: 1). Meaning that immigrants have to assimilate to become part of Dutch society. The nation-state therefore combines an effective and affective element (Bloemraad 2000: 11). The concept of a state has to do with effective political decision-making in a certain territory over which sovereignty or control is exercised. The nation, on the other hand, is much more subjective with reference to affective sentiment (idem: 12). Here, cultural similarity can be seen as a basis for nationality, but mutual recognition is most of the time considered as more important (ibid.). Whereas Anderson believes the nation to be an “imagined community”, Weber defines the nation as a “community of sentiment”, and Gellner argues that ‘two men are of the same nation if and only if they recognize each other as belonging to the same nation’ (ibid.). To become part of the “imagined community” one does not only need to have embodied the dominant culture, but also needs to be recognised as a member of this community by the fellow members.
These two elements, nation and state, both can be linked to the concept of membership. In the nation, membership gives one nationality, making one a national. The states of citizen, or citizenship, is granted via membership to the state (ibid.). Within the current idea of membership nationality and citizenship have been merged. This implies membership both to a political community, the state, and to a collective identity or “imagined community”, the nation (ibid.). These two entities become separated when different “imagined communities” live in one state. To make these entities merge again, citizenship or membership can then be used as a means for in- and exclusion which will be elaborated on more thoroughly in the following section.
2.2 Citizenship as a means for in- and exclusion
The term immigrant denotes someone from elsewhere who moves to a new place, usually with some intention of staying (Bloemraad 2000: 11). This person is considered an outsider both legally and socially. This very definition of an immigrant is linked to the concept of citizenship, because of the fact that on the one hand “immigrant” denotes an outsider status and “citizenship” on the other hand implies membership (ibid.). Here, citizenship is linked to membership in a socio-political community, which in contemporary societies is structured as a nation-state. This does not mean that the concept of citizenship is a new phenomenon, it has existed in Western thought in one form or another for thousands of years (idem: 12).
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Since complications arise, because people deviate from the traditional model of having a single citizenship and living in their country of citizenship, the idea is for the immigrant to change citizenship. However, this naturalization process can be quite complicated. Complex legal codes govern who are citizens and on what grounds outsiders can become citizens (idem: 13). Citizenship is then used as an instrument to define which people are included by simultaneously identifying people who are excluded (Goodman 2011: 240).
Van Houdt (2008) argues that citizenship has developed into a multifunctional and multi-layered concept. Citizenship functions as a mechanism of inclusion in a social sphere and at the same time as a mechanism of exclusion. It is also multi-layered since it has a formal dimension of citizenship rights and a moral dimension of active participation in the political sphere (Van Houdt 2008: 2; Schinkel 2013: 1156). When looking at moral citizenship in the Dutch system, one can see that it is built around the idea of “actively participating in society” (idem: 5). This means active participation in the nation-state, as well as active participation in society. In the Dutch civic integration system this idea of “actively participating in society” is embodied in the Dutch Labour Market Orientation exam the immigrants have to pass. In this exam they have to name jobs they would like to do, find vacancies that fit these jobs and name skills they have that would be helpful in the profession of their choosing. Thus, it is important that the Dutch values are internalized by the immigrants in order to find a job so they will not be dependent on (unemployment) benefits and are able to fully integrate.
Van Houdt (2008: 4) further argues that in this contemporary glocalizing world citizenship is used by the nation-state as a mechanism of exclusion. This is because of the fact that the heterogeneity of societies is seen as problematic. To solve this nation-state/society differentiation, states use citizenship with strict conditions (for example passing an integration exam) to form a cohesive “imagined political community” inside this nation-state.
According to Van Oers (2010: 53-54) the academic literature identifies three different meanings of the concept of citizenship: (i) citizenship as legal status, which is referring merely to a legal position; (ii) citizenship as activity, the participation of citizens in the life of the state is central here; and, (iii) citizenship as identity, this refers to a social status of membership of a state and identification with it. He then identifies three forms of citizenship. The first is liberal citizenship, principles of freedom and equality are very important here. Membership is considered only a legal status that equals “nationality” (idem: 54). The second is republican citizenship, in this model the perspective of citizenship as activity prevails. A citizen is defined as someone who plays an active role in shaping the community through political debate and decision-making (idem: 56). Foreigners would be encouraged to seek
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naturalization. To be admitted as full and equal citizens, people need to have minimum-required qualities. Future nationals are minimum-required to be familiar with the language through a citizenship test (ibid.). Lastly, the communitarian model, in which states are seen as the legal embodiment of a national community. This community or nation has arisen and grown from a shared history and has a common identity and culture. For the community to continue it depends on a minimum of unity and solidarity (idem: 57). Identity is therefore the most important dimension in the communitarian model. To become a member, an immigrant will need to share the national identity. One does this by absorbing the main values and rules of conduct of the host society. This means that adaptation or even assimilation is required on the part of the immigrant (ibid.).
Nationalisation is considered by the communitarian model as the end point of a completed integration process. The possession of sufficient knowledge of society in order to qualify for naturalisation is a requirement. Immigrants must learn and appreciate the traditions and values of the majority community. A “knowledge of society” test may contain questions regarding the future citizen’s acceptance of the values of the host community. Questions concerning history, geography and culture could be detailed in the test (idem: 58). In addition, there is a language requirement because only speakers of the language can share the national identity (ibid.). Central to the contemporary Dutch integration system is the idea that immigrants have to learn the traditions and values of the majority community, and that they have to make them their own (Asscher 2013: 3). The integration exam contains questions about knowledge of society, concerning history, geography and culture, and language tests. The next part will discuss how the Dutch integration system developed to this communitarian model.
2.3 Development of the Dutch integration system to a communitarian model
Since the late 1990s the dominant approach to immigrant integration across Europe has become something called civic integration (Joppke & Eule 2016: 344). This is not a new phenomenon, since language and integration requirements have been part of many European naturalisation procedures before that (Bonjour 2013: 837). ‘The question of not only who comes but who stays and on what conditions is central to many public debates and governing strategies’ (Fortier 2013: 697). In the early 1990s the Dutch Government was working with the Dutch Nationality Act (Van Oers 2010: 58). Immigrants who spoke Dutch adequately, and who had social contacts with Dutch nationals, fulfilled the language and integration requirement. Written language skills were not demanded (idem: 59).
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In 1998 the Dutch Government accepted the Newcomer Integration Law (Wet Inburgering Nieuwkomers), this was the first of all European civic integration laws, in which inburgering (i.e. naturalisation) became a legal term (Joppke & Eule 2016: 344). This law obliged newcomers to the Netherlands to take an integration course, made up of Dutch language and civics courses. The “Dutch model” was quickly adopted by other European states (ibid.). Especially in more recent years a growing number of European countries made citizenship, entry to the country, and residence rights conditional, meaning that one should first participate in or successfully complete civic integration courses before one could enter the country or become a citizen (Bonjour 2013: 837). The idea and content of these civic integration courses in the different countries is similar: via state-enforced formal obligation immigrants need to acquire the language of the host society and become acquainted with its political institutions, history and culture, i.e. civics (Joppke & Eule 2016: 344).
With the proposition of the 1998 Integration Law, the Dutch Government expressed the importance of acquiring Dutch nationality in ideological, communitarian terms. This is for example noticeable in the 1998-2002 election program of the VVD. The party stated that ‘the Dutch culture has to be the binding element of our society. Immigrants should be making this culture their own as much as possible’ (VVD 1997: 29). A report by the Social and Cultural Planning Office had shown that immigrants obtained Dutch nationality for pragmatic reasons and not because they felt Dutch, which was viewed as something worrying by the Dutch Christian Democratic party (Van Oers 2010: 60-61). The idea was that Dutch nationality should be something to be proud of (ibid.). Future Dutch nationals needed to be able to participate in society. One thought that for being able to participate not only language proficiency was required, but “knowledge of Dutch society” also became important for the immigrants to learn. Job Cohen (PvdA), the Secretary of State at that time, stated that without that knowledge, an immigrant could not be considered integrated (ibid.).
Hence, the Dutch integration policy shifted with the adoption of the 1998 Integration Law to a communitarian model. Herein, the dimension of citizenship as identity plays a central role (idem: 62). In order to become a member of society, the immigrants will need to share the national identity. With the contemporary integration policy, immigrants are obligated to assimilate by letting go of their own cultural habits and absorb the main values of Dutch society. Questions concerning history, geography and culture are asked in the Knowledge about Dutch Society test which the immigrants are obligated to pass among various other exams.
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Although obligatory civic integration policy predates the turn of the century, the current Dutch civic integration policy cannot be understood without considering the political response to electoral successes of populist anti-immigrant parties, such as Lijst Pim Fortuyn and Geert Wilders’ Freedom Party (Bonjour 2013: 841). These politicians rely on universal values to defend their assimilation policy (Van der Brug et al. 2009: 199). Since the electoral successes of these populist parties all political parties have adopted a more restrictive line on migration and integration (Bonjour 2013: 841). With responding to what was interpreted as the electorate’s call for radical change concerning migrant integration, Rita Verdonk (Conservative Liberal Minister of Foreigner Affairs and Integration 2003-2006) presented her plans for a fundamental revision of the Dutch civic integration policy (ibid.). The Law on Civic Integration (Wet inburgering) was adopted in November 2006. With this Law the sanctioning of failing to pass the exam with a fine or denial of a permanent residence permit came into being (ibid.).
Also, this Law on Civic Integration opened the provision of civic integration courses up to the “free market” (ibid.). Any organisation or company was now allowed to provide integration courses. The people obligated to integrate could from then on decide for themselves at which school they wanted to follow the courses. From then on the immigrants had to pay for these courses themselves, for which they could borrow money from the Dutch Government (ibid.). In the contemporary Dutch civic integration system this “free market” system is still incorporated. All state involvement in the Dutch integration system has been removed, except on the control side (Joppke 2017: 5). The final exams are developed and graded by the government.
The question remains who exactly is obligated to integrate according to the Dutch integration policy. The Dutch Government states that people from outside the EEA, Switzerland and Turkey, who are coming to live in the Netherlands for an extended period, are between 18 and 65 years old, and in possession of a residence permit, are obligated to integrate (Nieuw in Nederland, n.d.). Exempted from any civic integration requirement (including at the residence stage) are immigrants from (rich) OECD countries, but also highly skilled immigrants and work-contract holders (Joppke 2017: 6). Which means that they have to take an integration exam. Passing the integration exam ensures that these immigrants can participate in Dutch society, get an education and are more likely to find a job (Nieuw in Nederland, n.d.). Since January 2015 the Dutch integration exam consists of six parts: Writing, Reading, Speaking, Listening, Knowledge about Dutch Society (Kennis Nederlandse Maatschappij) and Dutch Labour Market Orientation (Oriëntatie Nederlandse Arbeidsmarkt)
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(VluchtelingenWerk, n.d.). If someone passes all parts, one is considered to be integrated and gets awarded an integration certificate (ibid.).
The immigrant has to pass the integration exam within three years after the granting of a residence permit, with an additional extension of two years (Immigratie- en Naturalisatiedienst, n.d.). If one does not succeed within this maximum of five years and has no valid reason for this failure there are consequences. The residence permit might be revoked, or may not be renewed. This person thus loses his right of residence in the Netherlands (ibid.). If this permit cannot be revoked, the immigrant gets a fine. This fine has a maximum of 1250 Euros and a new period of two years to integrate is established (Wet- en regelgeving 2014). This means that every two years one can get a fine of a maximum of 1250 Euros for not integrating (ibid.). If the immigrants do not comply to this integration law, thus learning the Dutch language and internalising the Dutch values, they are given a penalty for this every two years by getting this fine.
To ensure the quality of the civic integration courses given to the students the Stichting Blik op Werk was developed (Algemene Rekenkamer 2017: 33). This company sets requirements for both the process and the performance of the course providers. A course provider is not allowed to have an average passing rate of more than five percent below the national average (idem: 35). Course providers benefit from good rates which entails the risk that the emphasis will be on short-term results instead of students being prepared for participation in society on the long run (ibid.).
Immigrants can search for a certified school via the Blik op Werk website. For lessons at schools that are approved by this company (Blik op Werk) the refugees can get a loan at DUO to pay for their school fees (DUO, n.d.). DUO is an executive organisation part of the Dutch Government which finances and informs students and educational institutions. Also, the fine that the immigrants can get if they do not complete the integration exam on time, will be lower if they follow integration courses at one of the approved schools (ibid.).
In the following section it will be discussed what a communitarian model in civic integration policy will mean in practice.
2.4 The communitarian model in practice
In Dutch integration policy the understanding of integration, where people could still hold on to their own identity, gave way to an emphasis ‘that for successful integration we can [only] build on a foundation of shared values. Immigrants should not only know the key values of Dutch society, they should also internalize them’ (Wekker 2016: 55; Ministerie van Sociale
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Zaken en Werkgelegenheid 2013: 1). The policy preference therefore became one of assimilation instead of integration (Wekker 2016: 56). In the brochure Kernwaarden van de Nederlandse samenleving (Core values of Dutch society (Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid 2014: 3)) liberty, equality and solidarity are named as the core values of Dutch society. Followed by values such as the acceptance of homosexuality, the equality of men and women, and ending forced marriage these are seen as important key values the immigrants should internalize or embrace to become part of Dutch society (Wekker 2016: 55). These values are presented as normative and non-negotiable to newcomers (ibid.). However it is not only about these basic values, immigrants also need to embrace Dutch “culture” and traditions. With this emphasis on values and “culture” within the Dutch integration system ‘the right for citizenship turned into a demand for cultural loyalty’ (De Leeuw & Van Wichelen 2012: 198).
Belonging to the Dutch nation demands that those features that are considered as non-Dutch – for example language, having a colour and non-Christian religions – are discarded as quick as possible and demands that one tries to assimilate (Wekker 2016: 7). According to Wekker (2016: 7) immigrants that are white, and can phenotypically pass for Dutch, are in a beneficial position. Immigrants with a dark(er) skin colour will have a harder time enforcing their claim on Dutchness or having it accepted as legitimate. Even though the Dutch population consist of a mix in terms of racial or ethnic origins, the dominant representation is one of Dutchness as whiteness and being Christian (ibid.). Anyone who deviates from this dominant representation should integrate or even assimilate. Wekker does specifically look at racial or ethnic origins that are phenotypical, meaning that in the public eye these immigrants are seen as deviant from the dominant representation of what a Dutch person should look like. Colour is something that cannot be discarded, which means that these people will probably never be perceived as “fully integrated”. In Wekker’s case it therefore would not matter how good one speaks the language or embodies the Dutch culture, people with a migrant background are never considered to be full members of the “imagined community”. This research shows however that the street-level bureaucrats have the conception that by embodying the Dutch norms the immigrants can become part of this “imagined community”.
Hoekstra (2015: 1801) also argues that the civic integration regime in Western European countries, like the Netherlands, shifted from a multiculturalist regime, which allowed and encouraged migrants to retain their cultural distinctiveness, to a more assimilatory regime. Within the immigrant integration policy there is a “culturistic” discourse in which culture is at the centre of its focus, this is especially emphasized in the idea of moral
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citizenship. Herein a distinction is being made between a “dominant culture” and “another culture” (Van Houdt 2008: 7). There is an essentialist way of thinking, in which culture is framed as a stable and determining set of norms and values. The focus is on problems, which are allocated to the “other culture” (ibid.). This “other culture” is seen as incompatible with the “dominant culture” (Hoekstra 2015: 801; Van Houdt 2008: 7). In order to integrate one has to assimilate and leave the “other culture” behind. If one does not adapt oneself enough this is seen as a failure of integration. Citizenship is here used as social closure, to define itself as a moral space and for purposes of integration and homogenization (Van Houdt 2008: 7). If one fails to meet the end goal of adapting to the Dutch culture one is excluded from membership to the Dutch national community, as national citizenship has become increasingly restrictive (Hoekstra 2015: 1801). Citizenship thus becomes a possibility instead of an actuality (Schinkel 2013: 1156).
That the values of migrant cultures are considered to be incompatible with the dominant Dutch culture is also discussed in Dutch politics, the idea is that the “Islamic way of life” is incompatible with the “Western way of life” (Asscher 2013: 3). Islamic people are considered to have different traditions and views which are considered to be a threat to Dutch society (ibid.). If one holds on to ethnic identity this is seen as resulting in a disconnect from Dutch society and the rejection of the Dutch values (Hoekstra 2015: 1801). There is an idea of a normative end goal in civic integration policy which expects the immigrants to adapt to the dominant Dutch culture (ibid.).
In the Netherlands, the integration of immigrants, mainly Dutch people with a Moroccan or Turkish background, is perceived to be malfunctioning when looking at the socio-cultural aspect (Asscher 2013: 2). This is the result of them not feeling accepted by Dutch society, but also the fact that the dominant values are considered to be very different from their own values (ibid.). The Dutch Government argues that the Dutch values collide with religious beliefs when it comes to achievements the Dutch people are very proud of, such as the acceptance of homosexuality or the acceptance of mixed marriages (ibid.). ‘The starting point is that anyone who chooses to build a future in the Netherlands focuses on Dutch society and the values that apply here’ (idem: 3). It is stated that integration has to come from both sides, the receiving society and the immigrants, but the obligation is mostly with the latter. The dominant idea is that “we” could expect from them that they embrace the rules and values which apply here and make them their own (ibid.). Meaning that the immigrants have to internalise the Dutch norms and values. Below, this idea of a dominant Western culture as opposed to an “inferior” culture will be further discussed in relation to racism.
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2.5 The role of racism in civic integration
Schinkel (2013: 1145) calls this discourse in which a hierarchy of a dominant and inferior culture is constructed a “culturist discourse” and states that ‘culturism can be regarded as a functional equivalent of racism’. In his eyes culture has become a synonym for race. Contemporary Dutch civic integration policy is in a culturist phase in which emphasis lies on cultural differences, he states. Immigration policies became harsher and there is much hostility towards cultural Others who are seen as non-compatible (idem: 1144). Within culturism the cultures from non-Western immigrants are claimed to be incompatible with the dominant culture of the receiving society, and should therefore not be mixed. It constitutes the negative evaluation of cultures different from what is deemed to be the dominant culture (idem: 1146). In this research it is shown that the street-level bureaucrats also emphasis the cultural differences between them and the immigrants and how they teach them to discard their deviant norms and embody the Dutch norms instead.
Hall (2002) researched the role race played in immigration applications for citizens in the United Kingdom who married South Asian women and wanted them to live with their spouses. It shows that despite the ideals of an equal immigration application system the immigration officers used lenses of race, colour, religion and gender through which they saw different categories of applicants (idem: 55). These restrictions that were put on applications, because of for example race and religion, were framed around a discourse in which preserving Britain’s ethnic makeup from those immigrants whose lives are perceived to be incompatible with the British was dominant (idem: 57).
According to Hage (2014) White racists and White multiculturalists share a conception of the nation as a space structured around a White culture. Non-white ethnics are conceived to be mere national objects who can be moved or removed according to a White national will (idem: 26). These white people belief themselves to be masters over the nation, this is what Hage calls the “White nation fantasy”. It is a fantasy of a nation governed by White people, a fantasy of White supremacy (ibid.).
In his research Hage talks about the practice of cultural nationality, i.e. belonging to the nation. Cultural nationality is synonym for what Bourdieu calls cultural capital (idem: 58). It is about embodying looks, accent, taste, nationally valued social and cultural preferences, behaviour, etcetera, in order to become part of this cultural nationality (ibid.). The Whiteness Hage talks about is linked to cultural possessions which allow the person who owns them to claim certain forms of dominant national belonging (idem: 59). Whiteness does not only refer
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to skin colour, although this is a valuable capital in claiming one’s national belonging to the nation. One can accumulate Whiteness through accumulating cultural capital (idem: 61).
The concept of a White nation fantasy Hage poses can in this research observed by the way the immigrants are obligated by the government to learn the Dutch language and norms. However, the idea that immigrants can only stay in or function in the Netherlands if they speak the Dutch language and share the dominant cultural values is also supported by a part of the dominant White population. By teaching these immigrants how to behave and what the dominant cultural preferences are they accumulate cultural capital and thereby Whiteness. This cultural capital can be used to claim national belonging to the nation or “imagined community”. The street-level bureaucrats also act on this idea of a White Dutch nation, to which the immigrants and their “incompatible” culture are considered to be a threat. The immigrants therefore have to conform to the dominant White culture of the receiving country. As shown in the empirical analysis, the immigrants’ religion or ethnicity can play a role in the behaviour or opinions the street-level bureaucrats expect them to have. An example is the idea that most Eritrean and Syrian immigrants often struggle to accept homosexuality. This has to be changed in order to belong to the nation.
The next part will establish the scientific gap this research contributes to.
2.6 Scientific and social relevance
As noted above, civic integration policies for immigrants have been adopted by most Western European states since the late 1990s (Joppke 2017: 1). Mandatory integration requirements such as citizenship tests, naturalisation ceremonies, and state-facilitated integration courses with civic and language training have appeared across Western Europe under the umbrella of a new civic integration agenda (Goodman 2011: 235). In most countries this means that integration is attempted to be brought under conscious state control (Joppke 2017: 1). This development of obligatory civic integration, goes beyond the typical civic status. The very definition of naturalisation implies a degree of transformation or even assimilation. These requirements and expectations of integration are moved by policy-makers to earlier barriers of establishing legal status (Goodman 2011: 236). Hereby integration is also promoted before entering the receiving country. These obligatory requirements at the pre-entry stage most clearly serve to limit immigration, specifically family-forming migrants (ibid.). Simultaneous to the formalisation of these tests and integration programmes for citizenship, evidence of integration also began to matter for settlement (ibid.). Civic integration combines measures that further the integration of immigrants with measures for their selection and control.
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Integration and immigration policies are therefore no longer separate domains (Joppke 2017: 1).
Civic integration is nowadays practised in at least nine Western European countries, such as the Netherlands, France and Germany. Among these Western European countries there is a great variety of civic integration policies, which are complex and change over time, generally in a more restrictive direction (idem: 4). This civic integration stretches over three phases: pre-entry (integration form abroad), post-entry and citizenship acquisition (ibid.).
Much has been written in academic literature about the way in which civic integration is used as a means to “protect” the receiving society (Belabas & Gerrits 2017; Bonjour 2010; De Leeuw & Van Wichelen 2012; Goodman 2011; Gutekunst 2015; Suvarierol 2015). When scholars talk about gatekeeping, or moral gatekeeping more specifically, the role of gatekeepers is mostly understood as controlling access to government agencies or access to the territory of a state, i.e. state’s borders (Pellander 2015; Satzewich 2013; Wray 2006). This can be linked to the fact that integration policy is increasingly used as a means of immigration control or selection mechanism. Bonjour (2010: 300) for example focuses on civic integration abroad policies, specifically looking at the immigrants that want to enter France and the Netherlands via family reunification. They are to learn about the language and customs of the host society, before they are being admitted to the country. Her conclusion is that the Dutch Government specifically presents its civic integration abroad criterion as a selection mechanism (Bonjour 2010: 306; Bonjour 2011: 57). Showing, as an immigrant, that you have the “motivation and perseverance” that is needed to integrate successfully in the Netherlands will help you get admitted to come to the Netherlands (Bonjour 2010: 304).
Where Bonjour talks about civic integration as a pre-entry requirement, this research will address civic integration courses meant for immigrants that already entered the Dutch territory and gained a residence permit (for the duration of five years) on the grounds of the 1951 Refugee Convention or subsidiary grounds of protection. With this refugee status they are protected by legal rights and cannot be ordered to leave the Dutch territory and return to their home country (because of the non-refoulement principle), even if they fail the integration exam. This non-refoulement principle entails that a state cannot return a refugee ‘to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion’ (UNHCR 1977). After five years the Dutch Immigrantion and Naturalization Service will determine whether someone still needs protection on the grounds of the 1951 Refugee Convention, they will also check whether someone successfully completed the integration exam (Rijksoverheid,
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n.d.). If this is the case then the immigrant can get a residence permit for an indefinite period (ibid.). Since the possibility exists that these immigrants qualify for an indefinite residence permit, the Dutch state wants these immigrants to integrate, so that they will be able to “function” in Dutch society.
The immigrants need to become “citizen-workers”, as Suvarierol (2015) puts it. The civic integration trajectories in the Netherlands have become a tool of disciplining immigrants in order to educate them about the virtues and skills that are desired from them as Dutch citizens (idem: 708). Civic integration trajectories not only aim to teach practical skills, such as language, but also aim to impose norms and values which are deemed to be “national”, she argues (idem: 710). To integrate does mean that one needs to speak the Dutch language and possess particular skills and norms in order to “survive” or live up to the demands of Dutch society (idem: 711).
This idea of being a self-reliant citizen-worker is brought forward in the Dutch integration law. Which says that ‘the person who is integrating must himself take the initiative to at least speak the language and acquire knowledge that is necessary for participation in society…’ (Algemene Rekenkamer 2017: 5). According to the government’s policy, integration is seen as an essential condition to be able to participate independently and actively in Dutch society (idem: 6). As stated earlier, there is an obligation for the immigrant to deliver results by passing the integration-exam which is supported by sanctions. The dominant idea is that being able to function in Dutch society is dependent on the fact that one speaks the Dutch language and has acquired the necessary skills. The immigrant is responsible for his own integration and has to work at making his settlement in the Netherlands a success (Suvarierol 2015: 714). The Dutch integration system is built around the idea of moral citizenship. This means that actively participating in society is central (Van Houdt 2008: 5). Immigrants have to internalize the Dutch values as well as find a job so that they will be able to take care of themselves instead of being dependent on social welfare payment. Learning the Dutch values will eventually make these immigrants the citizen-workers the Dutch Government wants them to be.
However, when Suvarierol talks about norms and values she does this in relation to the concept of “citizen-worker”. Meaning that the immigrants should learn to be responsible and self-reliant, how they can provide for their own living (je eigen broek ophouden) (2015: 711). In her research she disregards the importance of the norms and values this research focuses on. For the immigrants to become ideal citizens of Dutch society they need to become “citizen-workers” as well as internalize the Dutch norms and values that are deemed central to
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Dutch culture. Such as equality and the acceptance of homosexuality mentioned earlier. If the immigrants do not embody these Dutch norms they will not become part of the “imagined community”, which is needed for them to be fully accepted as Dutch citizens. This is where the concept of moral gatekeeping can shed light on the task these street-level bureaucrats are fulfilling. They are trying to form the immigrants into members of this “imagined community” by creating the “ideal” citizens.
As posed by Lipsky (2010) the role of the civic integration course teachers is mostly discussed connected to the idea of the dilemma’s that arise while working with people of a different ethnic background than the teachers themselves (Belabas & Gerrits 2017; Hagelund 2009). Belabas & Gerrits (2017: 133) look at these tensions that arise between immigrants and the standardized bureaucracy and the behaviour and motives of the street-level bureaucrats working in civic integration towards these immigrants. They dedicate a small part of their research to the dilemma concerning how much emphasis should be put on teaching the Dutch norms and values. The dilemma is whether the street-level bureaucrats respond to the trends in policy that urge immigrants to accept these values, or that they rely more on a flexible interpretation of what it means to be a Dutch citizen (idem: 139-140). They also show that some of the street-level bureaucrats would go beyond their formal task description to achieve underlying policy goals. They spend a significant part of their time educating and motivating these immigrants to embrace “the Dutch way of life” (idem: 145).
Here, a parallel can be drawn to the street-level bureaucrats participating in this research, which will be elaborated on more thoroughly in the empirical analysis. However, Belabas & Gerrits do not thoroughly elaborate on the question why the street-level bureaucrats would go beyond their formal task description and spend this time on educating and motivating immigrants to embrace the Dutch values. Researching how street-level bureaucrats act as moral gatekeepers of Dutch society can be a real contribution to this question, since these street-level bureaucrats, especially in the Netherlands, play a key role in shaping the immigrants into ideal citizens for the Dutch state. They are the ones teaching the immigrants the necessary norms to avoid problems that may occur between the immigrants and Dutch society. The gap that this study therefore will seek to address is the added value the concept of moral gatekeeping can provide while researching civic integration courses and the role of the street-level bureaucrats therein. There could however also be ways in which the street-level bureaucrats do not act as moral gatekeepers, this will be discussed next.
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2.6.1 When do street-level bureaucrats not act as moral gatekeepers?
For the street-level bureaucrats to act as moral gatekeepers they need to implement official policy to integrate the immigrants and maybe even, as Belabas & Gerrits call it, “go the extra mile”. Going beyond these policies to make the immigrants embrace “the Dutch way of life”.
However, the behaviour of street-level bureaucrats may sometimes contradict official policy, because of the dilemmas they have to deal with (Loyens & Maesschalck 2010: 71). This is when street-level bureaucrats cannot be considered moral gatekeepers. Individual interest, professional norms and the processes through which workers construct meaning in their daily work routines have an influence on their decisions. Also, gender, educational background, ethnicity, culture, role definitions and religious beliefs influence the decisions (idem: 72). These factors can play a role in the street-level bureaucrats decision on how they will teach the Dutch values to the immigrants. They might decide to disregard talking about the Dutch norms and values when they think it will create tensions because of religious beliefs for example. In this research this will be linked to the non-interventionist teaching strategy (Hagelund 2009), which will be discussed in the theoretical framework.
According to Loyens & Maesschalck other studies argue that street-level bureaucrats not always consider the client’s needs but rather manage their workflow according to their own priorities (idem: 73). It could be that the street-level bureaucrats are less concerned with the immigrants internalizing the Dutch values, than they are with just being sure that they cover all material the textbooks provide. They might also be more concerned with the students passing the integration exam for the sake of the survival of the private company they work for. The might not see it as their job to make the immigrants internalise the Dutch norms and values, especially since the integration courses are provided by private contractors. One would expect them to only care about their passing rates and have as much “customers” as they could. However, the empirical analysis will show that the street-level bureaucrats go beyond official policy. They do not only help the students pass the integration exam, they “go the extra mile” to convey the Dutch norms and make the immigrants think “Dutch”. This is where they act as moral gatekeepers of Dutch society, since they are especially concerned with the immigrants internalizing these Dutch values.
Belabas & Gerrits (2017: 134) show that the street-level bureaucrats they researched on many occasions not only do what they are told, but also do what they can. They are looking for the right balance between compassion and flexibility and on the other hand impartiality. They do not only implement the policies, but also look at the personal situations of the immigrants and handle according to how they feel is appropriate in the situation. An
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example is that immigrants have to attend at least 80 per cent of the integration course and absence may be fined. Being aware of the personal situation of immigrants may then make it more difficult to carry out the integration policy. Belabas & Gerrits use the example of a student who was absent for a long time to solve family problems and the teacher did not write him down, although he was obligated to. The teacher knew that if he would, there could be severe financial problems for the immigrant (idem: 138). The actions of street-level bureaucrats might therefore go against the idea of them being moral gatekeepers when they have a sense of empathy for the immigrants. This empathy towards the immigrants can however also make the street-level bureaucrats act as moral gatekeepers, because they want the immigrants to succeed in Dutch society. They feel responsible for the immigrants and want them to become part of the “imagined community”. By not writing them down they give the immigrants a chance to not be sanctioned by the government and maybe even excluded from Dutch society.
2.7 Conclusion
In this literature review the gap in the civic integration research was defined. It has shown that academic researchers have conducted research in which street-level bureaucrats act as moral gatekeepers of society, to make sure that the immigrants internalise the norms and values of the receiving society. However, these researchers disregard this concept. The concept of moral gatekeeping can therefore add value to civic integration studies by providing a new way of looking at the importance of immigrants internalising the norms of the receiving society. On the other hand this concept can also help to clarify how these immigrants can be excluded from the receiving society if they perform deviant behaviour. The theoretical framework will provide a more thorough understanding of the concept of moral gatekeeping and how this can be linked to the other concepts in this research.
3. Theoretical framework: moral gatekeepers and problematic Otherness
In order to answer the research question “how street-level bureaucrats act as moral gatekeepers of Dutch society” the main concepts used in this research need to be defined. This section will first start by explaining the notion of culture as constructed in a political setting, then the concepts of street-level bureaucracy, moral gatekeeping and problematic Otherness will be discussed. Lastly, this section will introduce five teaching strategies that street-level bureaucrats might use to act as moral gatekeepers of the receiving society.
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In this research the notion of culture is seen as the central concept in the construction of a collective identity. A collective identity depends on special processes of the introduction of the members in the collectivity, ranging from various rites of initiation to various collective rituals (Eisendstadt 1998: 140). Eisenstadt (1998) argues that collective identity is produced by the social construction of boundaries. Via these boundaries an inside and outside is established, the Self and the Other. The boundaries can be crossed, since the Other can become a member of the collective identity, and a member can become an outsider (ibid.). Tempelman (1999) uses this theory to examine how cultural identity is conceived within politics of multiculturalism. Three modes of constructing collective identity can be distinguished. Only the universalist mode will be discussed in this research. Tempelman (1999: 26) states that the universalist perspective is about safeguarding the core principles around which a collectivity is organized. Intercultural contact involves the defending of one’s principles towards the Others. The Others are convinced to accept these values and those who refuse to comply are excluded. Culture is used as a means to create a shared cultural identity. In integration policy culture is seen as identical with community, it is a bounded or territorialised entity. It is an approach in which membership is also dependent on belonging to the collective cultural identity of the nation. The notion of culture must be grasped as a discourse in which actors such as politicians, civic integration teachers and the media participate (Werbner 2012: 200-201). It is therefore constructed in practice, it is about how a “cultural” discourse is established and how this is used in practice to in- or exclude people from the dominant cultural identity, i.e. the nation, and eventually citizenship to the state. In this research the notion of culture is being constructed in a political setting, such as in integration policy but also in the practice of giving civic integration courses. The street-level bureaucrats constitute their own ideas of what is deemed to be central in Dutch culture, and therefore decide what the immigrants need to embody to be able to function in Dutch society. Note here that culture is essentialised as rigid, homogeneous and unchanging with fixed boundaries. There is this assumption of a fixed connection between culture and territory (idem: 198). Especially in the way the idea of culture is used by the street-level bureaucrats. However, current theories in anthropology are based on the idea that cultures are changing and heterogeneous. People in one culture constantly borrow from others and cultures are therefore hybrid (ibid.).
When the concept “Dutch society” is used in this research, it is strongly related to Dutch “culture” and its norms, for example the ones discussed in the literature review. Those norms are deemed central to Dutch culture and immigrants should be willing to learn the
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native language as well as accept local customs and values. If they then fulfil these requirements, they can be accepted by the natives as members of society (Davis & Nencel 2011: 468). If they get accepted they become part of the collective identity.
This thesis builds on Lipsky’s (2010) research concerning the behaviour and motives of street-level bureaucrats who implement and deliver public policies in their direct interaction with citizens. He uses the term “street-level bureaucrats”, when he talks about public service workers who interact directly with citizens in the course of their jobs. These public service workers are, amongst many other public employees, teachers who give access to government programs and provide services within them (idem: 3). People’s lives and opportunities are structured and delimited by the ways in which street-level bureaucrats deliver benefits and sanctions (idem: 4). Lipsky argues that street-level bureaucrats not only implement policy, they can also “make policy”, they usually make decisions on the spot and therefore choose how they will exercise their power (idem: 8). Because of their interaction with citizens on the job, street-level bureaucrats can encounter dilemmas since citizens can respond in unexpected ways. The dilemmas of action may be very intense if clients are for example immigrants or of a different ethnic background than the public employees with whom they interact (idem: xvi). The term “street-level bureaucracy” hints at a paradox in which “bureaucracy” implies a set of rules and structures of authority, while “street-level” on the other hand implies a distance from the place where the authoritative power to compose and influence these set of rules resides (idem: xii).
By privatising the civic integration courses, integration policy has become dependent on private companies who are acting as implementing agencies. The power and authority is therefore not concentrated in the hands of the centralised state. This makes the analysis of these civic integration teachers, as street-level bureaucrats even more relevant (Suvarierol 2015: 708). Following Lipsky’s work the civic integration teachers in this research will be called street-level bureaucrats since they implement and deliver public policies in their direct interaction with the immigrants. They “make policy” by deciding on the spot how they choose to exercise their power. An example is deciding not to write someone down as being late to class, because the street-level bureaucrat is aware of the personal situation, although they are actually obligated to do so (Belabas & Gerrits 2017).
Lipsky sees street-level bureaucrats as having different interests from the policy makers and their own managers, which he sees as the representatives of official policy. He argues that managers and street-level bureaucrats operate in significantly different ways. According to him they have different job priorities, commitments and values (Evans & Harris
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2006: 450). Following Lipsky’s idea, one would expect the street-level bureaucrats to act via coping mechanisms that are unsanctioned by the agencies or managers (Lipsky 2010: 18). However, street-level bureaucrats ‘are not necessarily simply concerned with making their work tolerable in ways that have negative impacts on users of their services’ (Evans & Harris 2006: 456). Lipsky underestimates the efforts street-level bureaucrats make to develop better services. As this research will show street-level bureaucrats are actually prepared to “go the extra mile”. The street-level bureaucrats go further than just implementing integration policy, they want the immigrants to really become Dutch and become a part of the “imagined community”.
Further, Lipsky states that these street-level bureaucrats work only with segments and not the entire product. Clients are treated only as bundles of bureaucratically relevant attributes rather than as whole persons and the street-level bureaucrats deal with symptoms and capacities, but not with feelings (idem: 76). Examples that Belabas & Gerrits (2017) use in their research show that this depends on the street-level bureaucrats themselves. One of these examples is the counsellor from Rotterdam who had a client which ended up in a centre for women, who experienced domestic violence (idem: 144). This client asked for the counsellors help and even though this person was not a social worker, the counsellor decided to help her. This of course has nothing to do with the job of the counsellor, being only responsible for the integration process of the client. But, knowing about the client’s distress made the counsellor behave in a different way (ibid.). Belabas & Gerrits state that especially when it turns out that the clients do not have a social network the street-level bureaucrats are more willing to adopt a more personal role (ibid.). Working with humans on a regular basis creates a relationship in which personal feelings also play a role. These cannot be turned off easily and sometimes these street-level bureaucrats therefore may decide to also deal with the feelings and not only the segment of the client they are supposed to deal with.
My analysis is besides that guided by the analytical framework of moral gatekeeping. Wray (2006: 303) looks at moral gatekeeping when it comes to deciding whether a marriage is a “marriage of convenience” or “sham marriage”. She states that moral gatekeeping is undoubtedly a characteristic of immigration control. In her research this moral gatekeeping has to do with the sense that the preference is given to those whose marriages comply with majority values in the United Kingdom. Moral gatekeeping is a subcategory of gatekeeping, it focuses specifically on how values and normative frameworks intertwine with formal immigration regulations (Pellander 2015: 1474). The subject of “acceptable marriages” is also discussed by Pellander (2015: 1473). She, among other things, identifies culture as a central
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element of the gatekeeping procedure. The bureaucrats in her research expect immigrants to adhere to the cultural norms of the receiving country. Immigration regulations intersect with the moral understanding of how people ought to live their life (ibid.). This intersection between the regulations and morality can be understood as a process of moral gatekeeping, both Pellander and Wray argue. Moral gatekeeping takes place by defining what is part of “the culture”, and by excluding people who do not conform to it (idem: 1478). Where gatekeepers are often, in migration studies, seen as those who decide on admission requirements and regulations, Pellander (2015: 1474) adopts a wider definition arguing that gatekeeping takes place on multiple levels and in several institutional settings. According to her ‘…all attempts to regulate migration take part in gatekeeping processes’ (Pellander 2015: 1474).
The concept of moral gatekeeping provides a focus on how values and normative frameworks are intertwined with formal immigration regulations (Pellander 2015: 1474). The street-level bureaucrats have an understanding of what they think immigrants should internalize to become part of Dutch society and act appropriately. This goes hand-in-hand with the integration policy set up by the Dutch Government. Pellander’s notion of culture as a central element in the gatekeeping process is useful to the analysis since it contributes to the way in which immigrants get taught how people in the Netherlands ought to live their life. This is where the concept of street-level bureaucrats comes in, the teachers are the people implementing public policy and the ones who act as moral gatekeepers when the immigrants already have a residence permit. The street-level bureaucrats act as moral gatekeepers while implementing this integration policy to shape the immigrants into ideal citizens. They even go beyond their formal task description to achieve the underlying policy goals. They chose not only to plainly implement these policies, but convey the Dutch norms to the immigrants to make sure that they behave correctly and think “Dutch”.
Besides that, this research builds on the work of Bounjour (2011) to make the argument that by reinforcing this idea of immigrants as problematic Others to Dutch society, the street-level bureaucrats act as moral gatekeepers to remove this problematic Otherness as much as possible and thereby let immigrants adapt to the “imagined community”. Bonjour looks at how problematic Otherness is defined, which focuses mainly on what kind of differences are believed to pose problems between the immigrants and the receiving society (idem: 52). To answer this she analysed parliamentary debates about civic integration abroad which took place in the Netherlands and France. The ethnic and cultural diversity of the immigrants are, by the politicians, perceived as a threat to the cohesion of the society of the
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receiving country (idem: 53). This is the idea that the Other culture is incompatible with the dominant culture of the receiving country. The politicians refer to two differences in values and customs they find problematic. They firstly refer to matters related to gender, family and sexuality when they are specifying differences in values and customs. In the Netherlands homosexuality also plays a role in this idea of the Other as a threat (idem: 54). The second thing the politicians refer to are issues regarding religion. Groups of migrant origin – particularly people of Muslim faith – are in these respects deemed most troublesomely different from the host society (ibid.). In the Netherlands this can for example be seen in the statements made by Dutch politician Geert Wilders, who states that the West needs to be “freed” from Islam, otherwise countries like the Netherlands will Islamize (American Freedom Alliance 2017).
Bonjour’s emphasis on the Other framed as problematic to the receiving society is especially useful to the analysis as it allows us to think understand how the Other is established in opposition to the Self. This Other should adapt to the host society and leave behind what is seen as problematic. It is here that the concept of moral gatekeeping fits in. The street-level bureaucrats in this research act as moral gatekeepers by taking away this problematic Otherness and forming the immigrants into ideal citizens. At the same time the street-level bureaucrats reproduce the idea of a problematic Other who is a threat to the receiving society.
This concept of problematic Otherness is closely related to Said’s (1979) concept of “Orientalism”. Said argues that Orientalism is the patronizing Western attitude towards Other societies. There is a collective notion where the “us” Europeans is identified against “those” non-Europeans. The European identity is seen as the superior one compared to the Others’ cultures. These Other societies are essentialised by the West as static and underdeveloped. The Western society on the other hand is imagined as being developed, rational and superior, the complete opposite of the Other (idem: 8). The conception of the Other, the Orient, is nowadays mostly one of danger. The dominant idea is that the Other, in this case the immigrants, threatens the Western culture and must be integrated into the “culture” of the receiving society. In the Netherlands the civic integration system is used to makes sure that the Other adapts to, and internalises, the Dutch norms and values. In an Orientalist discourse both the Self and the Other are framed as homogeneous entities, wherein no distinction is made between mutual differences between countries when talking about religion and culture. In reality these entities are heterogeneous.
