Dmitry Rogozin: The Struggle for Power. Riding the Russian nationalist wave.

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Dmitry Rogozin: The Struggle for Power

Riding the Russian nationalist wave

Ruben Eijkelenberg 12104411

Master thesis History University of Amsterdam (UvA)

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Table of contents:

Preface: 5

Chapter 1: The Rise and Fall of Dmitry Rogozin 13

Political awakening 13

Addressing the nation 13

(Re)defining politics 14

Constructing the political spectacle 15

Formative elements 17

Elite self-interest prevails 19

Loyalty and ambition 21

Building a platform 21

A failed attempt to regain control 24

The Kremlin improved its game 25

An inglorious retreat 29

Generating prominence in a changing political reality 30

A rising star 30

Reconstructing Russia’s greatness 31

Centralizing power 32

Rodina 33

Leading the Opposition 39

Taking control 39

Opportunities gone sour 40

Chapter 2: Rogozin’s great return 46

Political revival 46

A changing ideological reality 47

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Russia’s path 48

Modernism versus post-modernism 50

Relationship based on equality 50

Alternative reasoning 51

A new approach 51

The unipolar principle under attack 54

Defending the rights of Russians abroad 56

National idea 56 Transnistria 58 A window of opportunity? 59 European disdain 61 Changing dynamic 63 Political intermezzo? 64 Ambassador to NATO 66 A significant appointment 66 Russia-NATO relations 67

Putin’s reinvigoration of Russia-NATO relations fails 69

An (un)expected comeback 71

Calling for support 72

The Georgian War 73

Serving international and domestic interests 77

Chapter 3: Rising to power 80

Rogozin’s return to Moscow 80

Public protest 80

Russia’s changing identity framework 82

State managed nationalism 83

Legitimizing power 85

A worthy competitor 86

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Rogozin’s ever recurring political ambition 91

Rogozin’s role in the Ukraine crisis 91

Conclusion 95

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Preface:

Right after the annexation of Crimea, the West1 started to impose sanctions on Russian and Ukrainian officials as punishment for Russia’s support of Crimea’s referendum. The

sanctioned individuals were the ‘key ideologists and architects’ of Russia’s Ukraine policy.2

Among them: Dmitry Rogozin, Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation. A member of Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev’s government, responsible for the armed forces and arms industry. Known for his hawkish attitude and outspoken nationalist-patriotic rhetoric3,

Rogozin strongly rejected the effectiveness of the imposed sanctions during an interview with Rossiya-1 television channel and pointed at the true cause for the sanctions. The Ukrainian crisis was only an excuse to issue the sanctions and a tool to exert pressure on Russia:

‘The real cause was the assumed course towards the independent development of our country, the course towards the independent political policy, the course towards the restoration of the economic might of our country.’4

Despite the fact that Rogozin’s statement hints towards Russia’s increasing assertiveness in foreign politics, the reference to its independent political course and the restoration of the country’s economic might reflects upon the internal development Russia’s political system and society went trough during the last two decades. It touches upon one of the crucial problems of contemporary Russia – the ability to determine the boundaries of its political community.5 After the dissolution of the Soviet Union the image of the so-called ‘we’ has become distorted; Russia was confronted with problems of state-building and nation-building, and the ‘Russian people’ experienced difficulties in getting used to the new borders and their new social identification.6 Russia went trough an ‘identity crisis’ and had to find new

foundations for its political existence. A quest that continues today.

1

Starting from March 2014 the United States, European Union, Canada, Australia, Norway and a number of international organisations sanctioned individuals, businesses and officials from Russia and Ukraine as a punishment for their role in the Ukrainian crisis.

2

Background Briefing by Senior Administration Officials on Ukraine (2014), The White House – Office of the Press Secretary, available on: https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/03/17/background-briefing-senior-administration-officials-ukraine (Accessed on: 27 May 2015).

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Rogozin has provoked the West by commenting on the annexation of Crimea via his Twitter account. ‘Crimea. Every stone, every square metre of this land is soaked with Russian blood. That’s why it’s ours’ and ‘Sevastopol.. A city of glory of our fathers & mothers, our great ancestors, as V. Putin said “returned to the home harbour, -to Russia”’, Dmitry Rogozin’s official Twitter account, post of 17 July 2014. Available at: https://twitter.com/drogozin, (Accessed on: 18 June 2015).

4

Russia’s independent political course real cause for Western sanctions — Russian deputy PM (2015), TASS – Russian News Agency (2015), available on: http://tass.ru/en/russia/773254 (Accessed on: 27 May 2015).

5

Viatcheslav Morozov, ‘Sovereignty and democracy in contemporary Russia: a modern subject faces the post-modern world’ in: Journal of International Relations and Development, Vol. 11 (2008), 174.

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Russia’s political system has been labelled by Vladislav Surkov7

as a ‘sovereign democracy’: a regime, which carries two simultaneous messages to Russian society. The first message being that we are a party wielding state power and a sovereign elite, and the sources of our legitimacy are found in Russia, not in the West, like it was during the ‘guided democracy’ of the Yeltsin era. Second, being a power-wielding force, we are the guarantors of Russia’s sovereignty and survival in the context of globalization and other external super-threats.8 This new ideological horizon is generally conceived as a hypocritical screen9 constructed as a means to galvanize the electorate in the run-up to the parliamentary and presidential elections. However, instead of dismissing the new-found ideology as utter nonsense unable to find support of both the political elite and the general public, it should be conceived as one of the most characteristic manifestations of Russia’s current political nature. The foundation of the ‘sovereign democracy’ is an attempt to secure autonomy of the domestic political space, to protect it from outside influences and to guarantee the sovereignty of Russian democracy.10 The independent political course mentioned by Rogozin.

Russia’s identity debate on the national composition of the country and in particular the question ‘who belongs?’ – ethnic or civic nationalism – has taken central stage over the past decade. Putin clearly understood that ethnic nationalism could seriously endanger Russia’s unity and therefore chose to support the establishment of civic nation.11 Nevertheless, the tide changed and ethno nationalism gained prominence over its civic alternative. After the

Kremlin had dealt with the liberal opposition – the fifth column responsible for the

antinational reforms of the 1990s – while constructing its ‘vertical of power’, the regime was confronted with a much more powerful and vocal nationalist opposition that found broad support in society. United Russia was well aware of the challenge they were facing and started changing both United Russia’s tone of voice by fitting in the inclusive civic version of patriotism and the composition of Russia’s political system.

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Vladislav Surkov is often characterized as the ‘gray cardinal’ - a behind-the-scenes manipulator. For more than a decade, he has helped shape the ideological message of Russia’s leaders, its governing party, United Russia, of parties in opposition to United Russia, its youth movements, and virtually anything widely published or broadcast in the country. (Ellen Barry,

Operating in the Shadows of Power in Russia (2011), The New York Times, Available at:

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/05/world/europe/after-putin-and-medvedev-vladislav-surkov-is-russias-power-broker.html?_r=0 (Accessed on: 27 May 2015).

8

Sovereign Democracy: A New Russian Idea or a PR Project? (2007), Russia in Global Affairs, Available at: http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/n_9123 (Accessed on: 27 May 2015).

9

Viatcheslav Morozov, ‘Sovereignty and democracy in contemporary Russia: a modern subject faces the post-modern world’ in: Journal of International Relations and Development, Vol. 11, No. 2 (2008), 155.

10

Morozov, ‘Sovereignty and democracy in contemporary Russia’, 163.

11

Vera Tolz, ‘A Search for a National Identity in Yeltsin’s and Putin’s Russia’ in: Yitzhak M. Brudny, Sefani Hoffman and Jonathan Frankel, eds, Restructuring Post-Communist Russia (Cambridge, 2004), 160–78.

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Putin emphasised the importance of the creation of Russia’s ‘we’ in his speech at the 10th

Valdai International Discussion Club while elaborating on Russia’s new foreign policy identity. The question who we are and who we want to be are not only of increasing importance for the Russian society, it moreover gives direction to Russia’s future foreign policy and supports the Russian leadership in defining national interests. What is the essence of Russian identity? What are the key elements of this identity? And last but not least, is the identity restrictive or inclusive to many peoples and countries of the former Russian Empire and the former Soviet Union?12 Central questions in the debate on the construction the Russian ‘we’ in which not only influenced foreign policy, but has also been normative in the creation of Russia’s national political equilibrium. Putin strives to enhance national unity and attempts to install uniformity within the limits of the nation.13

A prominent voice in Russia’s identity debate and someone whose career displays its impact on Russia’s political constitution is Dmitry Rogozin. As one of the protagonists of the

nationalist-patriotic movement in Russia over the last two decades, Rogozin has been actively involved in a number of different political organizations. Rogozin was appointed as head of the nationalist-patriotic parliamentary party Rodina – the party received 9.2 per cent of the votes in the 2003 Parliamentary Duma elections, a remarkable result for a new party – but left the political stage already in 2006. After United Russia pressurized Rogozin because of his increasing oppositionist standpoint towards the party of power. However, in 2008 Rogozin was unexpectedly appointed by Putin as Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and was even recalled by president Medvedev from Brussels at the end of 2011 to serve in the Russian government as Deputy Prime Minister and Head of the government’s Military-Industrial Commission. Positions he still occupies today. After Rodina’s return to the political stage in 2012, Rogozin allegedly resumed his leadership position of the party and was expected to use it as his personal political vehicle like Medvedev had done with Just Russia in 2007. What position Rogozin exactly fulfilled in the political system during his political career and how his nationalist-patriotic standpoints were valued over time, will be discussed in the current thesis. His involvement in and criticism towards Russia’s foreign policy of the last two decades will be embedded in the analysis of his role within the internal political constellation. Rogozin’s

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Vladimir Putin Meets with Members the Valdai International Discussion Club. Transcript of the Speech and the Meeting (2013), Valdai Discussion Club, Available at: http://valdaiclub.com/politics/62880.html (Accessed on: 27 May 20115).

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interference in the foreign conflicts and his assignment as Special Presidential Representative for Transnistria in 2012, are not only of importance to understand the impact of Rogozin’s ideology with regard to foreign politics but also reflect upon the development Russia’s foreign policy went trough as a derivative of Russia’s national political developments.

The current international crisis and the intensifying sense of strategic dissonance between Russia and the West did not occur only recently. It comes forth from a deteriorating process in which a number of wider and longer-term problems became increasingly visible over time. After a period in which Gorbachev, Yeltsin and Putin reached out to the West in order to modernize Russia and reverse its impoverished condition, the leadership realised the West was not willing to modernize its cooperation model with Russia. Despite Putin’s effort to improve the relationship with NATO and other leading Western powers, he was confronted with the Western unwillingness to cooperate on the basis of equality and mutual respect. The relationship started to deteriorate.14 Putin criticized the monopolistic dominance in global relations of the United States. He emphasized that Russia was in favour of a democratic multi-polar world and of strengthening the systems of international law. A dialogue was required, but could only be successful when the equality of both parties’ interests would be

acknowledged.15 Russia’s foreign policy was no longer submissive to its long aspired wish to improve its relationship with the West. Russia regained its self-confidence and conducted a policy that was increasingly assertive.

Russia’s reaction to the formal request of the Crimean government to annex the peninsula is exemplary for the development the country has lived trough in the last two decades. Putin’s statement in which he emphasises that ‘Russia will continue to actively defend the rights of Russians, our compatriots abroad, using the entire range of available means – from political to economic to operational humanitarian law and the right of self-defence’16 is by no means new

and has also been used by predecessor in the mid-1990s. The vigour with which Putin lives up to the statement distinguishes him however from Yeltsin. When Crimea’s president Yuri Meshkov flew to Moscow in 1994 to seek help against Ukraine, shortly after his successful

14 Stanislav Belkovski, Vladimir. De waarheid over Poetin (2014), 166-170.

15 Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy (2007), Kremlin – Diplomacy and External Affairs, Available at:

http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2007/02/10/0138_type82912type82914type82917type84779_118123.shtml (Accessed on: 12-02-2015).

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Conference of Russian ambassadors and permanent representatives (2014), Kremlin – President of Russia, Available at: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/46131 (Accessed on: 27 May 2015).

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election campaign, the Yeltsin government was not willing to receive him officially. Meshkov was told to act with restraint and not hope for Russian support for any moves that would risk conflict with Kiev. Official or military support for Russian secessionist movements failed to occur. 17 Putin on the other hand does not only use Russia’s image as the patron of all Russians as a rhetorical figure of speech, but acts accordingly. A worker of a Moscow archive tellingly remarked in the late 1990s, while discussing a flag burning ritual in front of the U.S. embassy as part of a protest against the situation in the Balkans, that patriotic rhetoric is cheap and no one was willing to sacrifice his interests for the country: ‘Big deal to burn the

flag. I would like to see one person who would burn one American dollar’.18

This situation changed drastically. The Western sanctions, issued after the annexation of Crimea and Russia’s assumed role in the Eastern Ukrainian insurgency, do not only harm the financial interests of the higher echelons of society but are a direct attack on the Russian leadership. After the value of the rouble and the price of crude oil sharply decreased, Russia fears an economic recession of which its economy will only slowly recover over the coming years. However, social unrest failed to occur and the Russian people seem to be prepared to sacrifice some of their interests for the benefit of Russia’s position in the international conflict. Did Putin succeed in creating a mighty nationalistic state that was both respected and feared by the West and in which the Russian people was prepared to pay the price for its international political stance? Or is it the other way around and should the aggressive foreign policy be conceived as a reflection of the nationalistic sentiments that started to dominate the internal political affairs of Russia and the need for Putin to behave accordingly?

The nationalist-leaning forces have been pushed to the forefront of Russia’s political agenda, both within the international as well as the national political spectrum - changing Russia’s political landscape considerably.19 The political factions that were previously regarded as being relegated to the margins of society have become central to Russia’s political discourse. Rogozin’s political career has been exemplary for this development. Instead of being an oppositional figure in the periphery of the Russian political constellation, Rogozin now holds a prominent position in the centre of the Russian political discourse and exercises power. The discourse changed and Rogozin seemed a true asset for Putin’s government to meet the needs of and answer to the nationalist-patriotic beliefs of the Russian people that grew stronger over

17 A. Lieven, ‘The weakness of Russian nationalism’ in: Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, Vol. 41, No. 2 (1999), 59. 18 Dmitry Shlapentokh, ‘The illusions and realities of Russian nationalism’ in: The Washington Quaterly, Vol. 32, No. 1, 179.

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time. The current research will focus on the life and career of Dmitry Rogozin, with the upsurge of nationalist-patriotic sentiments and the consequences of its dominance for the internal political constellation as central themes. The central question in the broader

perspective is pointed at the extent to which the current events should be regarded as the start of a new tendency in Russia’s political discourse? If so, where did it come from and when did it start? Is it a consequence of Russia’s regained self-confidence and self-awareness as a super power during the Putin-era? And how does it relate to Russia’s identity debate and the new ideological horizon of the sovereign democracy? And more specifically with regard to Rogozin, what did his appointment as Permanent Representative to NATO and his

appointment as Deputy Prime Minister and Head of the Military-Industrial Commission truly mean? Did the government sincerely intend to give a stronger nationalist-patriotic voice to its own image, or was his appointment a way to eliminate Rogozin by co-optation or by

entrusting him an impossible task to perform in order to prove his incapability and eliminate him as an actual threat to Russia’s political power balance? Or with regard to the his alleged re-instatement as leader of Rodina in 2012, did the government need Rogozin and Rodina as a means to provide an alternative for Alexei Navalny’s Progress Party (former: People’s

Alliance) after the Bolotnaya demonstrations of 2012 to diffuse its support in Russian society? In general, what does the development of Dmitry Rogozin’s career tell us about the evolution of Russia’s political system and to what extent has the upsurge of nationalist-patriotic

sentiments influenced Russia’s internal political constellation in general and Rogozin’s career in particular?

Rogozin’s biographical delineation will be subdivided in three chapters, in which the division between the different chapters has been determined by combining the defining moments in his personal and professional life and key moments in Russia’s contemporary political history. The first chapter starts with Rogozin’s political awakening and ends with his premature disappearance from the political stage in 2006. Since the sources on his political activities in the late ‘80s are limited, Rogozin’s involvement in the coming to power of Yeltsin and the collapse of the Soviet Union has been chosen as starting point. Subsequently his involvement in the Union of the Russian Revival, the Transnistria secession movement, and the Congress of Russian Communities will be discussed. The 1993 constitutional crisis has been chosen as the next historical demarcation to provide an insight in Yeltsin’s internal political affairs, his attempt to dismiss parliament, his way of dealing with the political opposition and the use of

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Chechnya as a political instrument. Subsequently I switch over to the next defining moment in contemporary Russian history: the election of Vladimir Putin as president of the Russian Federation. Here I will not only elaborate on the change that was implemented in the internal political system, but once again on the way the war in Chechnya played a role in politics and how the ties with the US deteriorated. Finally, Rogozin’s involvement in Rodina, the

relationship of the party with the party of power, the 2003 parliamentary elections, the protests surrounding the monetisation law and his disappearance from the political stage will be discussed.

The second chapter will mainly focus on Rogozin’s appointment as Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which

effectively meant a turning point in his political career. The Russo-Georgian war, which redefined Russia’s relationship with the West, played a major role in this particular

timeframe. Rogozin suddenly held a prominent position in the centre of the Russian political sphere and exercised real power. These defining moments in Rogozin’s personal career took place during the changeover of Putin and Medvedev. What this effectively meant for the political constellation of Russia and the upsurge of nationalist-patriotic sentiments in society will be elaborated upon. Important to note is that this chapter will not focus on Rogozin’s daily work in Brussels, but mainly on the political timeframe he was appointed in and the role he played in it. The final chapter addresses the current developments, starting with Rogozin’s appointment as Deputy Prime Minister in 2011 and his position as Head of the government’s Military-Industrial Commission, all within the framework of Putin’s presidential election campaign of 2012 in a period of severe popular protests and the deteriorating relations with foreign powers with the annexation of Crimea and the role of Russia in the Eastern Ukrainian insurgency as its climax. His alleged position as leader of Rodina after the party returned in the national political arena in 2012 and the consequences of his re-alignment will also be discussed in the final chapter.

It is of importance to clearly emphasise that the current thesis is not intended as an indicator for future developments. No one knows what the future holds for Russia. The decision to study the development of Russian nationalism by writing a biographical piece on Rogozin has been made for a reason. To write a scientific account on such a contemporary theme is already a challenge. I therefore do not intent to speculate on things I cannot foresee and will therefore restrict my research solely to Rogozin’s biographical sources. By embedding them into the

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contemporary Russian political history I will explain what caused Rogozin’s rise to power. Besides studying scientific accounts on Russian nationalism, Russia’s foreign policy, its relationship with NATO and of course accounts on Russian domestic politics and its multi-party system, I will also use articles and interviews in international newspapers, television items and statements made via social media. Rogozin wrote several books and articles on different topics, his autobiographical account ‘The Hawks of Peace. Notes of the Russian Ambassador’ (2012) will however take centre stage in my thesis. The book is not only of interest because Rogozin extensively elaborates on his ideological motivations for his political actions, it is above all an account of its time worth studying for the topics mentioned but maybe even more for the topics not mentioned by Rogozin. Rewriting history with a reason: establishing a legacy in the contemporary Russian political arena. Rogozin’s life story will enable the reader to get a deeper insight into the development of Russia’s political system and society, an insight that has not been provided yet. Rogozin is a topic worth studying and a story worth telling.

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Chapter 1: The Rise and Fall of Dmitry Rogozin Political awakening

Addressing the nation:

‘On the balcony everything was set up for ‘revolutionary leaders’ to address the crowd. In a mere two years these ‘leaders’20_{would be ripping at each other’s throats over the division of}

power and would flood the streets of Moscow in puddles of blood of their supporters.. But on that day, 20 August 1991, they stood together, and the human sea beneath them moved and hummed. ... I cannot remember exactly what the freshly resigned Minister of Foreign Affairs was saying but I do remember what happened after his speech. The spokesman said good bye to the “Great Georgian”, turned around, spotted me and inquired, barely hiding his

annoyance, “So, are you going to speak, or what?” ... That day saw the awakening of a politician in me.’21

Dmitry Rogozin’s political awakening coincided with one of the key moments in Russia’s contemporary history: the August coup of 1991. Determined by the need to prevent the Union Treaty22 from being signed, the coup was regarded as the last chance to prevent the Union from disintegrating. The indecisiveness and incompetence of the conspirators against

Gorbachev, however, greatly hastened the outcome they wished to avoid: the collapse of the Soviet Union.23 Boris Yeltsin was the major victor of the botched coup. While Gorbachev’s resistance to the coup had been hidden from the world, Yeltsin seized the moment. He made his way to the White House, climbed one of the tanks strategically positioned by the

conspirators and addressed the nation in the presence of foreign media. Yeltsin emphasised that regardless of the reasons given for the removal from power of the legally elected president, methods of force were unacceptable. Although Yeltsin underlined the importance of the return of Gorbachev as the legally elected president, the relationship between both leaders had changed considerably after the putsch. Gorbachev was increasingly willing to cooperate with Yeltsin in order to secure the Union Treaty and therewith the Soviet Union.

20

President Yeltsin, Vice-President Rutskoy, Chairman of Congress Khasbulatov, Atafiev, Shevardnadze, and many more.

21

Dmitry Rogozin, The Hawks of Peace. Notes from the Russian ambassador (London, 2013), 59-60. The content of Rogozin’s speech is impossible to trace back.

22

The New Union Treaty (Russian: Новый союзный договор) was a draft treaty that would have replaced the 1922 Treaty on the Creation of the USSR and thus would have replaced the Soviet Union by a new entity named the Union of Sovereign States, an attempt of Mikhail Gorbachev to salvage and reform the Soviet state. A ceremony of the Russian SFSR signing the treaty was scheduled for 20 August 1991, but was prevented by the Soviet coup attempt of 1991 a day earlier. The

preparation of this treaty was known as the Novo-Ogarevo process, named after Novo-Ogaryovo, a governmental estate where the work on the document was carried out and where Gorbachev talked with leaders of Union republics.

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Yeltsin however was no longer interested in sharing power. The whole political context had changed24. The events of August 1991 had a profound influence on the course of Rogozin’s life; it was his first political experience and.

(Re)defining politics:

The political transition Russia went trough at the beginning of the 1990s had a big impact on the constellation of its future political system. The manner in which Russia’s ‘instable’ and ‘(dys)functional’ contemporary multi-party system25

came into being and the motivations of the political elite involved in its creation, will be discussed in the current chapter. It is the starting point in getting a better understanding of the development of both Russia’s political system as well as Rogozin’s position in it.

Exemplary for the dynamic and development of Russia’s multi-party system is the manner in which the first elections were initiated when Russia was still part of the Soviet Union. As part of the Soviet Union’s ‘reform from above’26

, Gorbachev called for elections in 1989 for the USSR’s Congress of People’s Deputies. The elections were officially intended as an

endorsement for reform, but in reality reflected the elite’s desire to stay in control. Instead of conducting competitive elections to stimulate the diversification of the political spectrum, all candidates needed to be members of the CPSU. No other political parties were allowed to participate. Next to that, by letting the voters choose between several candidates Gorbachev enabled himself to eliminate CPSU hardliners who resisted Perestroika and Glasnost. Reform in this sense meant the party leadership tried to enforce its grip on politics and secure their dominance. Candidates and reform movements abstained from creating political parties, which was the reason why the Russian parliament was not constituted along party lines.27 Nevertheless, the fact that Gorbachev called for elections signalled a promising start of a transition in Russian politics.

The collapse of the Soviet Union however disturbed the process considerably. Despite the fact that no other political parties except for the CPSU were allowed to participate in the elections of 1989 or even had been established, there was an increasing number of societal movements

24_{Brown, The Rise and Fall of Communism, 571.} 25

Jonathan W. Riggs and Peter J. Schraeder, ‘Russia's political party system as an impediment to democratization’ in:

Demokratizatsiya, Vol.12, No. 2 (Spring, 2004), 26.

26

Riggs and Schraeder, ‘Russia's political party system as an impediment to democratization’, 266.

27

Michael M. McFaul, and Sergei Markov, The Troubled Birth of Russian Democracy: Political Parties, Programs, and Profiles (Stanford, 1993), 21.

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that potentially could be transformed into real political parties. A diversification of the

political system was under way, which signalled an increasing connectedness between society and the political realm. This development was cut short and even reversed when the Soviet Union ceased to exist. Jonathan Riggs and Peter Schrader emphasize that it ‘severed the connection of the party system to society and left it to be reconstituted from above by elites in circumstances that limited its connections with the society and the political system’.28

Under these circumstances, the parties started to be dominated by the old elite again; a development that was reinforced in the following election cycles. With the societal circumstances being increasingly hardened by the austerity of the economic reforms, the Russian people retreated from political involvement. The political party roots in society became shallower rather than deeper, which made the party system even more vulnerable to elite interests.

Closely related to the limited connectedness between the civil society and the political realm is the marginal role of political parties in Russia. Neither Yeltsin nor the parliamentary members owed their political positions after the dissolution of the Soviet Union to party connections. They legitimized themselves on the basis of being popularly elected, although under the old system.29 ‘Politics became the province of technocratic elites applying

democratic formulas from above’.30

The parliament and the president were also not linked to each other by party affiliations. The creation of the Russian presidency in March 1991 was a move by Yeltsin and his allies to secure his hold over power by providing him with a direct electoral mandate in order to protect him from the increasingly conservative Congress of People’s Deputies of the Soviet Union.31

The collapse of the Soviet Union highlighted the confrontational relationship between the Russian president and the Soviet parliament. The ill-defined constitution did not clarify who was the dominant force. Only after the bloodshed of October 1993 it became clear that the president prevailed. All of these developments turned the proto-parties32 into pseudo parties33 in the period prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union up to the renewed Constitution of December 1993.

Constructing the political spectacle:

28_{Riggs and Schraeder, ‘Russia's political party system as an impediment to democratization’, 266.} 29 Ibidem, 267. 30 Ibidem, 267. 31 Ibidem, 267. 32

Proto-parties: parties in an early stage of development.

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The increasing ability of the political elite to (re)construct Russia’s political landscape is a central theme in the current thesis. To be able to properly understand the political system and the way in which the increasing dominance of the political elite is translated into real political power, I will first discuss the delineation of the political system by Richard Sakwa and

Andrew Wilson in order to construct an analytical framework which supports my analysis of the development of Russia’s political system. Important to note is that the applicability of the framework increases as we get closer to the present time.

Richard Sakwa makes a subdivision between two systems. According to him, ‘contemporary Russian politics are characterized as a struggle between the ‘formal constitutional order’, what we call the normative state; and a second world of informal relations, factional conflict and para-constitutional political practices, termed as the administrative regime.’34 Sakwa uses the term ‘para-constitutional’ because the political regime and its factions do not repudiate the formal constitutional framework but operate within its institutional constraints while subverting its spirit.35 Although this subdivision is not solely restricted to the Russian case and is also applicable to the political system in other countries, the fervour and openness with which the Russian elite employs itself of para-constitutional practices is exceptional. This was the reason why the democratic movement of the early 1990s was quickly marginalized, the development of independent parties frustrated and the elite was able to reaffirm its position. Wilson characterised Russia’s political system as a ‘many-layered pie’: that is, ‘running a variety of ancillary projects to the main ‘party of power’ under various forms of disguise. The pie project gives the authorities more than one throw of the dice. It allows more controversial aspects of official politics to be contracted out, opprobrium to be shared or placed elsewhere, and plausible deniable preserved. Conversely, it also allows various opposition functions to be subcontracted to actors whose covert links to the authorities mean their opposition will never be particularly vigorous. Finally, the pie principle provides the governing elite with a virtual chorus, a supposedly autonomous plurality of opinion that in fact echoes the main priorities of the elite.’36

The many-layered pie principle is closely related to Vladislav Surkov’s definition of Russia’s political system as a ‘sovereign democracy’, in which the government carries two

34

Richard Sakwa, ‘The Dual State in Russia’ in: Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 26, No. 3 (2010), 185.

35

Sakwa, ‘The Dual State in Russia’, 185.

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simultaneous messages to Russian society: the first message states that we are a party wielding state power and a sovereign elite, and the sources of our legitimacy are found in Russia, not in the West, like it was during the ‘guided democracy’ of the Yeltsin era. Second, being a power-wielding force, we are the guarantors of Russia’s sovereignty and survival in the context of globalization and other external super-threats. The foundation of the ‘sovereign democracy’ is an attempt to secure autonomy of the domestic political space, to protect it from outside influences and to guarantee the sovereignty of Russian democracy.37 Formative elements:

Although the many-layered pie principle was only at its initial phase in the early 1990s38, some features can already be distinguished in Rogozin’s involvement in the non-communist patriotic opposition movement in 1990-91 known as the Russian Popular Assembly. Not so much directly with regard to Rogozin’s own position in the political system, but more with regard to the people he was affiliated with at the time. Rogozin had already been politically active since his involvement in the Committee of Youth Organizations in the Soviet Union at the end of the 1980s. However, despite his experience he was not yet in a position to take a leading role in the political system. Nevertheless, his involvement in the period prior to the first free post-Soviet competitive elections has influenced his political career significantly. Especially his ideological stance in politics. The core of the Russian Popular Assembly

Rogozin was involved in during the period between 1990 and 1993, was a coalition consisting of three political groups: the Democratic Platform Party of Russia, headed by Nikolay

Travkin; the Russian Christian-Democratic Movement led by the energetic philosopher Victor Aksyuchitz; and the Constitutional Democratic Party – the so-called Party of National

Freedom – headed by Michael Astafiev.39 The Constitutional Democratic Party and their prominent figures Astafiev, Pavel Milyukov and Pyotr Struve in particular appealed to Rogozin.40

The coalition of the Russian Popular Assembly was a loose coalition and did not make it until the elections of 1993. Conceived as a centrist opposition force, the Russian Democratic Party of Nikolay Travkin was the only one of the former coalition that was able to participate in the 1993 Duma elections. The party focussed on Russia’s sovereignty, development of market

37

Morozov, ‘Sovereignty and democracy in contemporary Russia’, 163.

38

Wilson, Virtual Politics, 120.

39

Rogozin, The Hawks of Peace, 50.

40

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relations, turning government-run enterprises into stock companies, and raising the living standard of the nation.41 Significant for Travkin’s position in the political equilibrium was the fact that he supported Yeltsin’s Decree No. 1400 of 21 September 1993, which effectively dismissed the constitutional reform under discussion and disbanded the Congress of People’s Deputies. The dissolved parliament needed to be replaced with an entirely new federal legislative structure and accommodate president Yeltsin with increased executive powers.42 The development of Travkin’s political career shows a similar picture.

Already in May 1990 Travkin was involved in the split of the Democratic Party of Russia. The party that was potentially ‘the’ party for the urban Russian intelligentsia with an anti-Kremlin attitude. Travkin played his role as ‘the mole from within’ and caused the party to split. The more fundamental anti-communist members such as Lev Ponomarev left the party and in April and December 1991 the party once more went trough two formal schisms. In 1993 the party was able to win 5.5 per cent of the votes in the Duma elections, but soon after split into a pro- (Travkin) and anti-Kremlin faction.43 If we consider the further course of his career we can determine his role in the political system even better. Travkin would become active for Our Home is Russia, Yabloko and finally in the Union of Right Forces, all parties regarded as loyal satellite projects of the Kremlin. Although the numerous switches to different parties is not uncommon, a closer look at the background of the above mentioned parties suggests Travkin’s close relationship with the Kremlin. He served his superiors well and fulfilled his job within the many-layered pie with grace.

The other two parties involved in the Russian Popular Assembly do not provide us with a closer insight in the way the political system functioned, but deserve some attention since they give us a deeper insight in the ideology Rogozin felt connected to right after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Russian-Christian Democratic Movement could be regarded as a representative of the xenophobic and ultra-nationalist streak in Russian politics.44 The group was hardly Christian and definitely not democratic. Party-leader Aksyuchin was not able to gather the minimum amount of signatures to participate in the 1993 Duma elections. The Constitutional-Democratic Party (The Party of People’s Freedom) also failed to qualify for the elections. It was an ultra-nationalist party governed by Russian chauvinists like Mikhail

41

Jeffrey B. Gayner, Natalia Kuznetsova and Ariel Cohen, ‘Who’s who in the Russian elections’ in: F.Y.I. (Washington D.C., 1993), 5.

42

Gayner, Kuznetsova and Cohen, ‘Who’s who in the Russian elections’, 5.

43

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Astafiev, anti-Semitists like Alexander Shafarevich and people with a background in security services like Alexander Nevzorov.45 The party developed from a reform and

pro-democracy position and even as member of the Democratic Russia coalition - until late 1991 - into a nationalist opposition to Yeltsin. After Astafiev decided to join the radical communist-nationalist opposition to the Yeltsin government with the Constitutional-Democratic Party, a number of party members resigned. Both the Russian-Christian Democratic Movement and the Constitutional-Democratic Party were only minor political players. However, with regard to analysing Rogozin they were the first organizations in which Rogozin publicly

demonstrated his ideological stance. Rogozin was mainly concerned with the management and communication strategies of the party and supported the foundation of the first regional branches in Obninsk, Perm, Minsk and Leningrad.

Elite self-interest prevails:

Despite the temporary cooperation between all opposition figures and parties in August 1991 in order to protect the country from the coup, the tension between them rose immediately after the conspirators had been defeated. Like Rogozin mentioned in the opening quote of this chapter. Although parliament had been Yeltsin’s powerbase before 1991 and he had defended it during the coup by calling for the Russian people to protect it from the tanks of the coup pledgers, his relationship with parliament deteriorated quickly. Resulting in the Russian Constitutional Crisis of 1993. The crisis was a political standoff between the Russian

president and the Russian parliament, but above all a tipping point in the development of the political constellation of Russia. The political chaos of the first years of the Russian

democracy ended, power was centralised, presidentialism enforced and the domination of the political spectrum by the elite was increasingly shaped by the role of the political

technologists. Yeltsin had shown how he, as president of the Russian Federation, could dissolve the country’s legislature, although the constitution did not allow him to do so. He made clear that if the parliament was not willing to subordinate to the result of a referendum in order to justify his actions, all within the borders of the legal framework, he was not afraid to use force to support his point of view and storm the Supreme Soviet.

The result of the election of 1993 was a reflection of the limited capacity in the first democratic period to totally structure the political scene and manipulate the outcome of

45

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elections. Despite the fact that the political elite was familiar with the tradition of political manipulation - also displayed during the Gorbachev era - the post-Soviet elites were unsure how to behave after the events of 1991. It would take the modern political technologists until the electoral cycle of 1995/6 to develop into dominant factors in the political system, after which their dominance only increased. Furthermore, the uncontrolled and unexpected outcome of the elections was fostered by the indecisiveness of the Kremlin officials, who were divided into reformers and statists.46 There was not yet an overall consensus within the Kremlin and both camps were even further subdivided. There was no electoral incentive to unite the ranks or divide the opposition like there would be in 1995. This caused a sheer overproduction of party projects. The Kremlin made its first attempt to create a loyal two-party system by backing both Russia’s Choice and the Party of Russian Unity and Accord – and making sure that eight of the twenty-one parties or blocs that sought to take part were kept of the ballot.47 This so-called democracy by design was not as successful as the directed democracy. Russia’s Choice got 15.5 per cent of the votes and the Party of Russian Unity and Accord only a meagre 6.7 per cent.48 This meant that the Kremlin had failed to construct parties that would be able to control the parliamentary agenda or impose the will of the president on the Duma. Not long after the elections the parties vanished from the political scene. The mixed electoral system too, which required half of the 450 Duma members to be elected by a party list system of proportional representation, and half to be elected as

individual representatives from single-member districts, caused a significant instability since the individual representatives were able to influence the balance of power significantly by switching between parliamentary groups or forming groups of independent deputies.49 It gave way to the political elites to continue defending their personal interest, but caused some difficulties for the Kremlin to control the system effectively. There were already a couple of parties participating in the elections of 1993 with covert links to the Kremlin. However, the Kremlin fell short of coordinating the political spectrum and the political initiatives were too often competitive and therefore ineffective. Not only Russia’s Choice and the Party of Russian Unity and Accord performed beneath contempt, the other Kremlin satellites too performed poorly. The Civic Union received 1,9 per cent of the vote, New Names won 1,25 per cent and Cedar got only 0,8 per cent of the vote.

46

47

48

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Wilson emphasised that there were also parties of the ‘transitional’ type: he did not mean a transition towards proper electoral vehicles in accordance to the Western ideal, but in the transition from acting as fairly independent launch pads to becoming (after the elections) full creatures of the Kremlin (the Agrarian Party, Women of Russia, Zhirinovsky’s Liberal Democrats).50 Despite the elite’s inability to either manipulate or manage the 1993 elections, they were not the complete catastrophe for the authorities analysts claimed it to be at the time. Wilson emphasised that ‘the parties of the potential Kremlin pie won almost half of the vote – or, more exactly, at least half the parties were susceptible to Kremlin influence after the event.’ Although of influence, it was not the shelling of the Russian White House in October 1993 per se but the increasing control of the elite over the political system that determined the often passive behaviour of it successor parliament in 1993-95.51 Riggs and Schraeder point at the constantly changing party affiliations and explain this as an act of self-interest. Party activity became more centred on elite-to-elite, instead of elite-to-society interaction.52 Russian politics is increasingly becoming restricted to private, top-level intrigues. Faction leaders seemed to agree to transform the committee system into a means to serve their own purposes rather than the purpose of governing their country.53 This also meant that the political

structure stayed fragmented, a characteristic that even further increased with the 1995/6 election cycle coming-up. There were parties looking to find a niche, like KRO did.54 Only thirteen parties and blocs were permitted to participate in the Duma elections of 1993, in 1995 the amount rose to a staggering number of fourty-three parties and blocs of which twenty-three succeeded in winning seats. Four parties dominated the political spectrum.55 The

Communist Party continued to be a dominant force in Russian politics. With a total 65 seats in the 1993 Duma elections, a solid third place after Russia’s Choice and the Liberal Democratic Party, and a big victory in the 1995 legislative elections with a staggering amount of 157 seats in the Duma, it was clear the Kremlin had not yet been able to eliminate or even control the communist threat.

Loyalty and Ambition

Building a platform:

50_{Wilson, Virtual Politics, 120.} 51

Ibidem, 121.

52

53 Ibidem, 270. 54 Ibidem, 271. 55 Ibidem.

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The ability to determine the boundaries of Russia’s political community, which has been described in the introduction as the crucial problem of contemporary Russia, and the quest for new foundations for Russia’s political existence, stand at the forefront of the establishment of the Congress of Russian Communities (KRO) in March 1993. The new patriotic organisation was an international union designed to legally protect the rights of the Russians beyond national borders. The ideological base of KRO, a party structured as a network of

independently run local Russian communities with an executive representation in Moscow responsible for the coordination of the network, came forth from the Manifesto of Russian Revival which was written by Rogozin in cooperation with Eldar Kovrighin, Andrey Saveliev and Sergey Pykdrin.56 The manifesto stated that KRO was a platform on which the national patriotic movement had to stand. Its tone of voice was moderate and constructive as if the founders of the party wanted to emphasise the party’s ability to become a real political force and not simply the next oppositionist movements without any influence on the course of events. KRO was instituted as a serious political movement that answered to the tendencies in society:

This is a platform on which the national patriotic movement has to stand, if it aims to affirm ethical and civilised forms of nationalism without demeaning itself by resorting to aggressive and extreme manifestations of patriotism.’57

The establishment of KRO came forth from Rogozin’s grievance after being confronted with the tragic consequences of the cessation of the Soviet Union with regard to the Transnistrian conflict. The impact of this particular conflict on Russian politics is illustrative for the political circumstances the party was established in and the role it played at the time. Although the nature of the conflict – ethnic or political – is still debated, the effect it had on Russian politics was considerable. The fact that Russia was able to intervene in the ‘near abroad’58

without serious criticism from the West pushed the Russian elite towards a stronger interventionist position.59 While the Kremlin had tried to temper the interventionist sentiments in Russian society, the Bendery battle60 fed feelings of ethnic solidarity for the Transnistrians

56

Rogozin, The Hawks of Peace, 90-91.

57_{Ibidem, 91.} 58

The Transnistrian War broke out in November 1990 between pro-Transnistria forces, supported by the Russian 14th Army, and pro-Moldova forces. Fighting intensified on 1 March 1992 until a ceasefire was declared on 21 July 1992. The conflict still remains unsolved.

59

Stuart J. Kaufman and Stephen R. Bowers, ‘Transnational dimensions of the Transnistrian conflict’ in: Nationalities

Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity, Vol. 26, No. 1 (1998), 133.

60

The Bendery battle signalled the re-eruption of the full scale conflict in Transniestria after regular Moldovan forces entered the city of Bendery in an attemt to reestablish the authority of Moldova there.

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that were directed against Yeltsin-Kozyrev foreign policy.61 Minister of Foreign Affairs Kozyrev had publicly denounced the Bendery intervention since he was convinced it would harm Russia’s relationship with the West.62

However, after the Western countries refrained from denouncing the role of Russia in the breakaway of the Transnistrian Republic, his position began to change. Kozyrev up to that point had pursued Gorbachev’s ‘New Thinking’ policy in which military force was dismissed since it created enemies instead of asserting interests.63 It was clear that the impact of the issue of the ‘endangered Russians’ strengthened the position of the neo-imperialist right considerably and accelerated Kozyrev’s loss of influence over Russian foreign policy toward the ‘Near Abroad’.64 ‘Providing further impetus in the direction of interventionism’.65

According to Rogozin the KRO was a thorn in Yeltsin’s and Kozyrev’s flesh. ‘Its actions to protect the rights of Russians both beyond and within the national borders, exposed the total helplessness and irresponsiveness of Yeltsin’s (foreign) policies in protecting the Russian national dignity and human rights of Russia’s citizens.’66

Rogozin as one of the prominent figures of the party met with president Shevardnadze of Georgia to discuss the evacuation of the Russian population from the war zone of Abkhazia67, met with president Kravchuk of Ukraine to discuss an attack on the Russian Culture Centre in Lviv, freed four servicemen of a Russian parachute regiment out of the hands of Moldavian nationalists, and was even able to win a court case in which the Russian community in Sebastopol was sued by the public prosecution office under the instructions of Kiev for their anti-Ukrainian stance in the debate about the legal status of Sebastopol.68 The KRO achieved something the Russian government and Kozyrev in particular had failed to do: to protect the honour and dignity of Russian compatriots abroad. But also in Russia itself the KRO proved to be an efficient organisation capable of protecting the rights of Russian citizens when they stood up against mayor Luzhkov of Moscow and prevented the Neskuchny Garden from being demolished and also prevented a mosque along with an Islamic cultural centre from being erected in the Troparevo

61

Kaufman and Bowers, ‘Transnational dimensions of the Transnistrian conflict’, 134

62_{Ibidem, 134-136.} 63

Gorbachev and New Thinking in Soviet Foreign Policy, 1987-88, U.S. Department of State – Archive, Available at: http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/rd/108225.htm (Accessed on: 28 May 2015).

64

Kaufman and Bowers, ‘Transnational dimensions of the Transnistrian conflict’, 134.

65

Ibidem.

66

67

Ibidem, 93.

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Park, one of the highest spots in Moscow.69 The reputation of the KRO grew stronger over time and with every achievement in campaigning for civil rights of the Russian compatriots in the former Soviet Republics.

The alleged outrage of Yeltsin and Kozyrev with regard to KRO’s activities and Rogozin’s prominence in foreign and internal political affairs, as described in Rogozin’s book ‘The Hawks of Peace’, is conceivable and doubtful at the same time and should at least be brought into perspective. Kozyrev’s anger is understandable since Rogozin was a true competitor to him who seemed to be more successful in his foreign activities than Kozyrev was at the time. The relationship between Yeltsin and Rogozin is however not as troublesome as Rogozin described it. Rogozin without doubt did not agree with Yeltsin’s political position and many of his decisions regarding the situation of Russian compatriots abroad. However, when

analysing Rogozin’s position in the internal political system a totally different picture appears. A failed attempt to regain control:

Like I have mentioned above, the election cycle of 1995 differed strongly from the Duma elections of 1993. Less rigid registration procedures made political involvement more

accessible, which resulted in a staggering amount of forty-three parties and blocs participating in the 1995 lections, an enormous increase in comparison with the poor number of thirteen parties and blocks permitted to participate in 1993. It seemed as if Yeltsin had encouraged his courtiers to pitch in with their own projects in order to increase the Kremlin’s room to

manoeuvre.70 Although the Kremlin was not yet proficient in controlling the political spectrum, as it would be in the near future, its efforts had already a profound effect on the results. Nearly half of the electorate (49.5 per cent) voted for parties that failed to pass the threshold of 5 per cent, compared to only 13 per cent in 1993.71 Still, the Kremlin was unable to eliminate the Communist threat. The Communist party won 22 per cent of the votes and became the biggest party in the Duma with 157 seats at its disposal. Something needed to be done in order to secure the presidency in 1996.

Exemplary for the Kremlin’s degree of proficiency to control the political equilibrium was the disappointing election results for Our Home is Russia (OHR) and the KRO, which were Kremlin projects expected to take away votes from the Communists and the Liberal

69

70

Wilson, Virtual Politics, 120-122.

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Democrats.72 Our Home is Russia received a disappointing 10.1 per cent of the vote, the result of their supposed partner the Rybkin bloc was even worse with a staggering 1.1 per cent.73 Although KRO’s 4.3 per cent was also unexpectedly low for a party created as a reserve variant of the ‘party of power’74

, it succeeded in a far more important task set by the Kremlin: to draw votes from nationalist parties that were not under Kremlin control. As opposed to 1993 when nationalist movements boycotted the elections, twelve nationalist groups competed in the 1995 elections. The KRO failed to pas the threshold but succeeded in restraining other right parties from winning seats in the parliament: the Derzhava party led by former vice president Rutskoy only won 2.6 per cent of the vote, Power of the People led by Duma deputy chair Sergey Baburin received only 1.6 per cent of the vote and other nationalist parties like the Stanislav Govorukhin Bloc (1.0 per cent), Boris Gromov’s My Fatherland (0.7 per cent) and Nikolai Lysenko’s National-Republican Party (0.5 per cent) received even less.75 The Kremlin initially tried to control the above mentioned parties from within but failed. The KRO was needed to control the political equilibrium and retain the ‘independent’ nationalist parties from getting real political power. The KRO was supposed to negatively influence the growth of the radical right, Rogozin was well aware of his mission. His open aversion of Yeltsin is therefore not so much explained by their ideological differences – Rogozin was an actor in Yeltsin’s political system – but maybe more because of the marginal role granted to him.

The Kremlin improved its game:

Yeltsin’s campaign for the presidential elections of 1996 showed how fast the Russian political technologists improved their game. While not being able to simultaneously develop several of its strands in parliament during the 1995 Duma elections campaign, the Kremlin proved capable of running a satellite project in the presidential election campaign of 199676: former Deputy Commander in Chief of the Russian Ground Forces General Aleksandr Lebed. Rogozin and Lebed met for the first time during Rogozin’s political awakening - the days of the August coup of 1991 - and Lebed would play a significant role in Rogozin’s (political) life. Lebed was one of the patriots who gained prominence in the political scenery due to the Transnistrian dispute. Conceived as one of the most respected and articulate spokesman for

72

Wilson, Virtual Politics, 120-122.

73 Ibidem, 120-122. 74 Ibidem, 122. 75 Ibidem, 122. 76 Ibidem, 120-130.

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the idea of Russia’s need for a more assertive foreign policy in order to regain its self-respect and the respect of the international community, Lebed became one of the leading politicians in Russia.77 His political position is closely related to the role KRO played in a changing political climate in which neo-imperialists predominated. His role in the presidential elections of 1996 is however also of interest and deserves some explanation.

Lebed was already involved in the parliamentary elections of 1995 as KRO’s number two on the electoral list after Yuri Skokov, Boris Yeltsin’s close adviser working as Secretary of the Security Council. Skokov’s real power as party leader was however limited and his close affiliation with Yeltsin and the Kremlin in general seemed to be the prime reason for his leadership position at KRO, a party intended to fulfil its role as a spoiler party and eliminate possible threats on the right side of the political spectrum. In 1995 Rogozin was asked by Skokov to go to Transnistria to facilitate the return of the newly resigned commander of the 14th Army to Moscow.78 Having the popular Lebed on the election list, popular interest in the KRO increased. The internal competition between Skokov and Lebed over the party

leadership had a great impact on KRO’s success in the parliamentary elections. Despite KRO being a spoiler party with Skokov as its ‘manager’, Lebed’s ambition was much bigger than being a puppet of the Kremlin. Lebed’s popular support, the main reason for Skokov to get him involved in the party, convinced Lebed he had real chance to become a prominent political force. An ambition that needed to be encapsulated or at least controlled. The party failed to pass the threshold and Skokov consequently resigned from his post as party leader. Lebed was however by no means willing to surrender and erected the movement ‘Honour and Motherland’ to facilitate his campaign for the forthcoming presidential elections.79 The political coalition of the KRO fell apart right after the failed election campaign of 1995 and Lebed’s participation in the presidential elections provided Rogozin with an opportunity to reinstate the party literally from scratch. On 28 December 1995 Lebed announced his candidacy for the presidential elections.

Lebed’s nomination as presidential candidate was surrounded by haziness and provoked political commentators to speculate on his role in the election cycle. Especially the remark that he intended to run ‘in agreement’ with the Communist Party – which would have made

77

78

79

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him the instant front-runner in the presidential election campaign - caused a stir.80 Yeltsin’s political position had severely weakened over the previous years; the political, economical and social reality of Russia was disastrous. Yeltsin’s approval rates were in single figures and had the 1996 election not been manipulated, his re-election had been impossible.81 To win the Kremlin he made a pact with the new business tycoons and together they started to turn Russia into a ‘managed democracy’. The oligarchs were unable to accept the Communist Party to be reinstated into power since it would nullify all efforts that generated their leading position. A power system based on patronage was established and in exchange for bankrolling an overpowering media campaign they were allowed to privatize the most valuable assets of the Russian economy for their loyalty; a system known as ‘loans-for-shares.82 The patronage system did however not only consist of media campaigns, but also strengthened the many-layered pie principle further enabling the elite - increasingly dominated by the oligarchs - to effectively control Russia’s political landscape.

In trying to define Lebed’s position in the system, the announcement to run ‘in agreement’ with the Communists led the political analysts to assume that Lebed would form a strong bloc with the Communists against Yeltsin. It convinced them of Lebed’s probable election as president of the Russian Federation. In a 1995 article by Michael Specter in the New York Times the situation was described as:

‘There is little doubt which way the Communists would like to move. And if they were linked with General Lebed, who has already called for a referendum on the Government's spotty program of reforms, their force would be even more compelling in a country filled with people who are weary of the unrealized promises and harsh realities of their new freedoms.

“They would be a very strong and very dangerous combination for Russia," said Yuri Levada, a poll taker with democratic and reform leanings. "He has a slightly different base of support than the Communists. But if they did unite nobody could be stronger."83

The coalition between Lebed and the Communist Party has in spite of its promising potential

80_{Army Hero Enters Russian Race, Posing a Big Threat to Reformers (1995), The New York Times, Available at:}

http://www.nytimes.com/1995/12/29/world/army-hero-enters-russian-race-posing-a-big-threat-to-reformers.html (Accessed on: 28 May 2015).

81

Judah, Fragile Empire, 23.

82

Ibidem, 24.

83

Army Hero Enters Russian Race, Posing a Big Threat to Reformers (1995), The New York Times, Available at:

http://www.nytimes.com/1995/12/29/world/army-hero-enters-russian-race-posing-a-big-threat-to-reformers.html (Accessed on: 28 May 2015).

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never been realized. The reason for it to fail had nothing to do with possible ideological differences, but above all with the underlying reason for Lebed to participate in the elections in the first place. General Lebed’s candidacy was a satellite project, a dummy candidate project designed by Berezovsky to take nationalist votes away from the Communist leader Zyuganov.84 Lebed’s candidacy was intended as a ‘relay race’ in which a fake candidate more capable of posing as, in this case, an anti-establishment populist first stakes out the electorate and then passes the baton to a covert co-worker, in this case Yeltsin, the intended ultimate recipient of the votes.85 Lebed received 14.5 per cent of the vote in the first round, which was won by Yeltsin with a meagre 35.8 per cent over 32.5 per cent for Zyuganov. Lebed’s

participation had proven to be essential for Yeltsin to win the first round. In the runoff election Lebed endorsed Yeltsin, who eventually received 54.5 per cent of the vote over 40.7 per cent for Zyuganov. In comparison with the Duma elections of 1995, the political

technologists improved their game and succeeded in using Lebed’s popular support to secure Yeltsin’s position in power.

A closer analyses by Wilson of the origin of the administrative resources needed for Lebed’s campaign confirmed not only Lebed’s role in the many-layered pie, but also Rogozin’s involvement. Rogozin does not deny his involvement in Lebed’s presidential election

campaign. He regarded it as an opportunity to reinstate the KRO literally from scratch after it had been wiped away during the parliamentary elections of 1995. However, according to Rogozin Lebed’s decision to accept Berezovsky’s offer to provide him with considerable financial and informational support in exchange for luring voters away from Zyuganov did not meet his approval. Lebed became a ‘Trojan Horse’86

, a dummy candidate project as opposed a true oppositional force Rogozin had envisaged him to be. According to Rogozin Lebed’s soul underwent a big transformation and he got a bigger distance to the man he once so much admired. Rogozin asked Lebed to denounce the deal, to quit urging people to give their vote to Yeltsin and to refuse the posts of Secretary of the Security Council and National Security Advisor to the president out of Yeltsin’s hands, which were offered to him in exchange for his support to Yeltsin.87 Rogozin warned him he would end up covered in dirt and thrown aside. These warnings proved justified. Rogozin emphasized he distanced himself from Lebed after Lebed decided to cooperate with Yeltsin. Though, considering both KRO’s

84

85

Ibidem.

86

87

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and Lebed’s role in the political system and Rogozin’s involvement in both the KRO and Lebed’s election campaign, makes it plausible Rogozin’s attitude towards Yeltsin wasn’t as hostile as he depicted it. Both Rogozin and Yeltsin shared an interest in Lebed: Yeltsin needed his support to weaken his political opponents and win the presidential elections, Rogozin was above all interested in using Lebed’s popular support to gain prominence for both KRO and support his own political ambitions. Furthermore, KRO’s role as a spoiler party in Russia’s political system of the mid-1990s in support of the powers-that-be is also significant in determining the relationship between Rogozin and Yeltsin and the actual meaning of his hostility towards Yeltsin at the time. In order to survive in politics, Rogozin was obliged to play his role and obey the Kremlin’s orders.

An inglorious retreat:

Soon after Yeltsin was re-elected in the presidential elections of 1996, Chubais went after Lebed and politically neutralized him by creating a governing body parallel to the Security Council, by accusing Lebed of forming unlawful armed units under the umbrella of the Security Council and eventually by putting him in charge of the Chechen affairs. Correctly assuming he was bound to fail there.88 Defending Russia’s unity was the main argument of Yeltsin’s public proclamation as to the primary reason for the military intervention in December 1994 which officially started the First Chechen War.89 The eventual outcome of the conflict, a formal ceasefire agreement between General Lebed and General Mashkhadov signed on 30 August 1996, proved to be the exact opposite. The agreement entailed the demilitarization of Grozny and the withdrawal of all federal forces from Chechnya by 31 December 1996. Lebed had not only handed the total control over Chechnya over to the separatists and acknowledged their independence, but also officially recognized that Russia had lost the war.

Rogozin by no means approved the Khasavyurt Accords and issued a statement on behalf of the KRO on 24 September 1996 detailing the measures necessary to formalize the Peace Treaty and in which the KRO distanced itself from Lebed. Rogozin deprived Lebed of his political support and abandoned his former hero. Lebed was elected as governor of

88

89

Anatol Lieven, “The Russian Decision to Intervene and the Geopolitics of Oil,” “The Anarchy of Russian Decision-Making,” and “Russian Strategy in Chechnya,” from Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 93.