In the Shadow of the EU: How NGOs Build a (European) State in Kosovo

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In the Shadow of the EU: How NGOs

Build a (European) State in Kosovo

Master Thesis in Political Science: European Politics and External

Relations (MSc)

Written by Lisa Marchon lisamarch@protonmail.com Student Number: 12757136 Submitted to

Supervisor: Dr Dimitris Bouris Second Reader: Dr Imke Harbers

University of Amsterdam Graduate School of Social Sciences

June 2020

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Acknowledgement

Since growth is the characteristic of life, education is all one with growing; it has no end beyond itself.

- John Dewey1

Intellectual efforts and educational growth often appear as a solitary journey, though in reality they are nourished by constant dialogue, exchange of ideas and shared experiences. In this spirit, I wish to thank everyone who provided feedback, encouragement, thoughts and opinions to make me grow as a researcher.

1_{Dewey, J. (2009) Democracy and Education An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education. S.l: The Floating}

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Abstract and Keywords

Abstract

The aim of this research is to examine the interplay between EU member state-building and NGO practices in state-building within the case study of Kosovo. EU member state-building – as a spinoff of the concept of Europeanisation – is an essential part of Kosovo’s accession process to the EU. However, its connection to non-institutional actors, such as NGOs, is under-researched at the time of writing. The pivotal question of this research is, how does EU member state-building impregnate state-building practices of external NGOs in Kosovo? To answer this question the empirical analysis is supported by interviews with NGO representatives. Juxtaposing EU member state-building with the practices of NGOs allows for a close comparison of their respective mechanisms and mutual influence. The author comes to the following conclusions: neither the individual relations between NGOs and the EU in terms of counselling or lobbying nor the different domains of activity of NGOs impact their attitudes towards EU member state-building or their use of EU mechanisms significantly. Moreover, the analysis shows that NGOs align with fundamental European values but do not actively transfer EU rules and laws. Lastly, NGOs encourage Kosovo’s accession to the EU but rather via intrinsic political maturity than through outside influence.

Keywords

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List of Abbreviations

CDU Christlich Demokratische Union [Christian Democratic Union] CEE Central and Eastern European [states]

CRD Civil Rights Defenders CSO Civil Society Organisation ENP European Neighbourhood Policy

EU European Union

EULEX European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo EUSR European Union Special Representative

ICB International Community on the Balkans ICJ International Court of Justice

ICO International Civilian Office

ID Independent Diplomat

IR International Relations

KFOR The Kosovo Force

KLA Kosovo Liberation Army

MDSD Most Different System Design MEP Member of European Parliament MSSD Most Similar System Design NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NGO Non-Governmental Organisation PLAY Play International

SAP Stabilisation and Association Process

SPD Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands [Social Democratic Party of Germany]

UN United Nations

UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNMIK United Nations Mission in Kosovo

UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution

US United States

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1. Introduction

Since the end of the Balkan Wars at the turn of the century, Kosovo has been a prominent (and complex) case of state-building. Ethnic tensions, weak state capacity, economic clientelism, internationally contested statehood and security concerns have only been a few frontline challenges to any actor invested in making Kosovo a peaceful, emancipated and sustainable state. The EU first engaged in Kosovo to establish security in its immediate neighbourhood and later set-up an extensive state-building plan to strengthen state-capacity and construct a potential future member state (Keil 2013). NGOs, on the other hand, mainly focus on representing local interests, resolving ethnic tensions and giving marginalised groups a voice. The presented research proposes to explore the crossroads between the EU’s state-building agenda in Kosovo – also called EU member state-state-building – and state-state-building efforts of external NGOs. Overall, research around state-building in Kosovo is not novel and has been studied from several angles before. Yet, by directing the looking glass on how NGOs build a (European) state in Kosovo and asking to what extent their work aligns with the EU, this research brings a fresh perspective into a topic that should certainly not be dismissed as passé.

There is no need to look further back than 6 May 2020, when the long-awaited Zagreb Summit between European and Western Balkans leaders as well as international stakeholders proved that this research’s topic is still burning bright and maybe ever so relevant in contemporary times. The summit brought some unexpected and yet not particularly surprising results. Three main outcomes are worth highlighting as the high-level event reflected pivotal aspects of the here presented research. First, next to official representatives from EU member states, from the Western Balkans and from the EU institutions, the EU (who likes to wave high the flags of multilateralism and inclusion) also brought to the table “regional and international stakeholders” (Council of the EU 2020a). However, the attempt would have been more valuable if those stakeholders would not have turned out to only include “representatives of the European Investment Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the World Bank, and the Regional Cooperation Council” (Council of the EU 2020b), while no institutional or civil society actors were invited to the summit. The increasing role of non-institutional actors – such as NGOs – is crucial in the development of the Western Balkan as

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Kosovo visa liberalisation (Nikaj 2020) as the country has fulfilled all required criteria since July 2018 (EU Commission 2018). Yet, with the closure of the Schengen borders due to the Covid-19 pandemic, the timing was bad for an opening towards Kosovo. While the feeling of persisting isolation is not unfamiliar to Kosovo, keeping the country at arm’s length by not granting long due rewards further nurtures local Euroscepticism. Third, the EU “welcome[d] the pledge of the Western Balkans partners to uphold European values and principles” and promised support as well as cooperation but made no mention of enlargement at any point in the final declaration of the summit (Council of the EU 2020a). This demonstrates how the EU tends to give precedence to values over actions because it has the hierarchical power to export its principles, a subject that will be touched upon below. In a nutshell, the 2020 Zagreb Summit lacked inclusivity of non-institutional actors, displayed shortcomings in the EU’s promises related to EU accession, hence affecting the credibility of membership, and in line with that exposed the EU’s tendency to frontline its values before granting concrete rewards.

The Zagreb Summit is a flagship event in the Western Balkans-EU relations and mirrors the broader issues underlying EU member state-building in Kosovo. This research builds on these realities by explaining EU member state-building and linking it to different NGOs and their contribution to state-building in Kosovo. The aim is to identify causal mechanisms and offer new findings for theory innovation in the domain of member state-building and by extension Europeanisation. Thus, the leading research question is, how does EU member state-building impregnate state-building practices of external NGOs in Kosovo? This brings about a series of follow-up questions. First, in terms of active interaction with the EU: how do external NGOs’ relations to the EU – counselling, lobbying, etc. – impact their alignment with EU member state-building? And how does the domain of activity of an NGO – human rights, governance, etc. – impact its use of tools that the EU itself uses within its member state-building strategy? The second series of questions relates to positions and point of views: do NGOs perceive EU member state-building as a positive strategy overall? And do they view their own work as a contribution to EU member state-building? Further, are they in favour of Kosovo’s potential accession to the EU? And in what terms? In this, the research will scrutinise both active and passive interactions of NGOs with EU member state-building. To reach conclusive answers the research analytically relies on a series of interviews with NGOs.

Member state-building is a niche within the wider concept of Europeanisation, an academic term that describes the EU’s ability to draw states closer to its own policies and values and

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ultimately Europeanise them. Academic studies on Europeanisation have exposed its main mechanisms as well as faults. Since the end of the Balkan Wars, scholars applied Europeanisation patterns to EU strategies aimed at Europeanising Kosovo within its state-building efforts and termed it ‘member state-state-building’ (Keil 2013, Denti 2014). This makes Kosovo a fruitful case study, as it is an infamous case of a ‘contested state’ and as such its state-building process has been well documented in existing academic literature on the EU and beyond (Papadimitriou & Petrov 2013, Börzel 2013, Sörensen 2013, Chandler 2019 to name a few).

With growing multilateralism and inclusion of non-institutional actors in the global power network, NGOs have increasingly contributed to state-building alongside traditional actors. Yet, a lack of attention for their contribution and interaction with the EU has left a research vacuum that generates a variety of questions both within and beyond the ivory tower. This research looks at the cross-sections between the NGOs and the EU and modestly aims at providing answers where lack of information on the subject has raised overdue questions. The contribution NGOs provide to state-building is not self-explanatory because they do not engage in overall state-building. Rather, they are active in specific domains such as governance support, human rights defence or ethnic reconciliation projects. Those are subcomponents of the state-building process, which leads NGOs to contribute in fragments to state-building. In other words, launching a project targeting the enhancement of a state’s governance structure helps building state capacity on the whole, which ultimately contributes to state-building.

The argumentation below is structured as follows. To begin with, a brief overview of the historical background sets the context of the case study. Next, a discussion around the literature displays how far existing research has come and exposes key concepts – liberal peace and Europeanisation. Thereafter, the theoretical framework opens up the perspective on two specific theories: member state-building and its interplay with NGOs. Both allow this research to generate hypotheses and build the empirical components. The theory is followed by the research design, which gives an explanation of the methodological approach of the analysis. Finally, the results are presented, subsequently discussed, and the conclusion draws lessons from the research overall.

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2. Context Setting

2.1. A Brief Overview of External State-Building Efforts in Kosovo

To truly understand the importance of this research it is vital to begin by tracing a path to the larger history of state-building in Kosovo. This chapter certainly does not claim to paint a complete picture but merely to give a brief insight.

Before external actors were actively involved in Kosovo, at the end of the 1960s, the individual republics of the Yugoslavian Federation started to gain more rights. Kosovo received autonomy as a province of Serbia, however, without the right to secession (Sörensen 2013, p. 270). This was an important preamble to the protests of the Kosovan Albanian majority later during the 1980s. At which point, they demanded Kosovo become a detached Yugoslav Republic (Sörensen 2013, p. 270). The response of the Serbian minority – supported by Serbia – to the uprisings was explosive and disagreements escalated into a lasting conflict between the two camps until Serbia abolished Kosovo’s autonomy in 1989-90 (Sörensen 2013, p. 270). A move that fuelled international solidarity with the Albanians, not least in financial terms (Sörensen 2013, p. 270). With the collapse of Yugoslavia, the Kosovar society remained deeply divided, leading the Albanian majority to start to build its own institutions inter alia funded by Western European states (Maliqi 1998, p. 110). In 1995, the non-inclusion of Kosovo in the Dayton Agreement was a catalyst for aggravating tensions (Sörensen 2013, Halili 2018). The fact that the international community had intervened following the violence of the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina led to anger amongst the Albanians majority, who felt foreign actors were not noticing them and their non-violent strategy. This sparked a series of violent actions to attract attention, that eventually escalated into a conflict between the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and the Serbian forces.

When international diplomatic attempts to establish a ceasefire through the Rambouillet negotiations failed, Serbia invaded Kosovo, which triggered the infamous NATO intervention. The Kosovo Force (KFOR)2_{intervention of 1999 lasted 70 days. For Kosovars, the NATO}

mission was undoubtably the most visible and impactful international intervention in their

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to-day life (Dérens 2012). Eventually, Serbia signed the peace plan drafted by the international community (Greiçevci 2008, p. 195). Thus, the KFOR mission ended with the UNSC’s 1244 (1999) Resolution, whose mandate officially granted Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo and unofficially placed it under UN rule (Sörensen 2013, p. 273). The resolution was succeeded by the establishment of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)3_{. As the international}

community was deeply divided on Kosovo’s fate and the latter was never invited to the negotiation table, UNMIK created division from the beginning on. Both the NATO invention and later UNMIK, aimed at establishing security and stability in Kosovo. Yet, these missions were also the beginning of a long-lasting footprint of international involvement in Kosovo as the country became the international community’s playground or as Chandler (2019, p. 545) phrased it: “[t]he installation of an international protectorate in Kosovo, in 1999, marked the highpoint of confidence in the international statebuilding project”.

Since the beginning of state-building in Kosovo, all undertaken institutional or economic changes were followed by international political disagreements. In the short-term aftermath of the NATO intervention, the international community engaged in election monitoring, helped local NGOs establish projects, privatised state-owned businesses, introduced the Euro and reduced restrictions on the free flow of capital and trade (Korovilas 2002, p. 110). These first steps in Kosovo’s state-building relied on the 1999 UNSR Resolution 1244 that should ensure Serbian sovereignty, but the Albanians viewed the state-building missions as the pillars for constructing their independence (Sörensen 2013, p. 277). Consequently, state-building efforts in Kosovo have not only divided academic scholars but also the UN, the EU member states and the Kosovars themselves (Sörensen 2013, p. 269).

Between 1999 and 2008, Kosovo underwent a process of democratic change growing towards independence, proving that to some degree democratic transition can take place outside the state system (Tansey 2007, p. 145). In a second (long-term) state-building phase, the international community pivoted away from immediate security measures to focus further on Kosovo’s statehood. The 2007 Ahtisaari Package – backed by the US and the EU – also known as ‘Comprehensive Status Proposal’, projected a supervised independence of Kosovo by the international community. While the Albanian leaders accepted the proposal, the Serbian minority did not as they feared Albanian domination and the loss of advantages from Serbia

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(Borgh et al. 2016, p. 8). The UNSC did not approve of the plan either. Consequentially, Ahtisaari’s vision was never backed by an international legal framework. Nevertheless, despite international disagreements and geopolitical tensions on the country’s statehood, the process culminated in the declaration of Kosovo’s independence.

Following Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 2008, the EU launched the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX)4_{under UNSR Resolution 1244, in}

accordance with its commitment to “play a leading role in strengthening stability in the region in line with its European perspective” (Council Joint Action 2008, p. 1). Concretely, EULEX should establish stability, reinforce rule of law by advising the Kosovar government, police and judiciary, tackle corruption or unwanted political interference as well as promote democracy and economic prosperity (Council Joint Action 2008, p. 1). These are clear steps in state-building. Yet, given EU internal and UNSR disagreements on Kosovo’s status5_{, the EU}

was conditioned to act neutrally towards Kosovo’s independence. Leading to a perplexing mission that became a prominent case of state-building in an area of contested statehood.

At the same time as the launch of EULEX, the international community introduced the International Civilian Office (ICO) to supervise Kosovo’s independence. An occupation that was merged with the responsibilities of the EU’s Special Representative (EUSR). Again, resulting in a puzzling task as its representative, the Dutch diplomat Pieter Feith, had to ensure Kosovo’s independence when wearing his ICO hat and simultaneously respect the EU’s neutral position when wearing his EUSR hat (Dérens 2012). In 2012, the ICO mission officially came to an end, having been the only foreign presence that recognised Kosovo as a state, this marked a significant symbolic shift for Kosovo.

With 3000 staff members at its maximum, EULEX remains the most ambitious EU rule of law mission to date (Mahr 2018, p. 77). In recent times, the mission has updated its tasks to focus mainly on “increased effectiveness, sustainability, multi-ethnicity and accountability, […] and has limited executive functions” (EULEX 2020). Meanwhile, since 2011 the frontline element constituting European state-building efforts in Kosovo is the facilitated dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade that encourages normalised relations between the two countries and

4_{For further information:}_{https://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/}

5_{EU member states that do not recognise Kosovo: Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia, Spain}

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fosters cooperation in order to advance their respective journey towards EU membership (EEAS 2020).

To conclude, this brief summary on the beginnings of external state-building efforts in Kosovo clearly demonstrates the ‘Kosovo as a playground of international actors’-narrative that countless critical journalists and scholars have pointed out over the past 20 years. The state-building approach of the EU and other international actors led to immediate security and the absence of personal violence on the aftermath of the conflict. Yet, they also left a large footprint (Edelstein 2009, p. 86), crippling the country with tensions between mono-ethnic elites, global players and civil society actors. Amidst this cacophony, the 2019 Kosovo parliamentary elections resulted in a victory for ‘Vetëvendosje’, a party that notoriously opposed all foreign intervention and presence in the country (Dérens 2012), sending a new signal of the Kosovars’ will to international actors.

3. Literature Review and Central Concepts

Building a discussion around the literature has two specific purposes. First, outsourcing concepts from previously published academic studies and delineating their relevance allows to collect and introduce each individual element that constitutes one’s own research. Second, it helps to identify precise gaps in the literature that shall be completed by a new research question.

In order to carry out the analysis on NGOs and their connection to EU member state-building, it is vital to collect data on two main concepts. First, introducing the discourse around liberal peace and state-building will help understand Europeanisation in a broader context. Second, the concept of Europeanisation itself and its numerous ricochets will be explained, whereby the final goal is to understand the transition from Europeanisation to member state-building and its impact on NGOs in the theory. Analysing how NGOs respond to member state-building as well as how they perceive and use it will be the empirical enquiry. However, highlighting Europeanisation mechanisms is explanatory and will be discussed in this chapter, which will later allow to formulate a theory around member state-building and NGOs, and generate hypotheses for the empirical part.

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3.1. A Picture of the Existing Literature and Central Concepts

3.1.1. The Emergence of State-Building

Peacebuilding and later state-building as both ‘on-the-ground’ practices and academic concepts developed on the aftermath of the Cold War (Paris & Sisk 2009). The ideological divide between East and West and their subsequent materialised conflicts left behind a fragmented and polarised world – not polarised as it had been for decades between communism and capitalism, but polarised in a new way between the wealthy, democratic, globalised winners and the rest. As a result of this cosmic shift, several regions globally were left with roaring conflicts, which brought to the fore an urge for global peace and security (Sisk & Chandler 2013). From this developed the field of peacebuilding (Sisk & Chandler 2013). Peacebuilding practices were first led on by the Agenda for Peace (UN 1992), which called for preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping and peace-making. However, several early cases – Cambodia, Mozambique, El Salvador – proved that peacebuilding efforts were not sufficient to upkeep lasting security and structural stability as they solely focused on the immediate absence of violence rather than strong and sustainable institutions.

To fill this vacuum, state-building missions multiplied with the aim to forge state institutions and services. “State-building has become the antithesis of state weakness, or ‘fragility’”, say Sisk and Chandler (2013, p. xx). Peacebuilding and state-building are largely interconnected and yet distinct in their respective definitions. In scholarly research the definitions and usage of both terms are oftentimes blurred and overlapping, yet it is crucial not to use them interchangeably. While Paris and Sisk (2009, p. 14) argue that state-building is a subcomponent of peacebuilding, this research rather argues that the former is a logical consequence of the initially highly flawed peacebuilding missions. At its beginnings, peacebuilding focused on establishing immediate security and stability in post-conflict territories (ceasefires, mediation, early warning, etc.). However, those initial missions lacked long-term success and the practices evolved towards broader human security, good governance structures, and conflict prevention (Balthasar 2017, p. 475). Thus, the new peacebuilding agenda became an “incubator” for building efforts that were directed towards securing independent and sustainable state-structures and services (Balthasar 2017, p. 475). As Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1996, p. 89) claims, fragmentation can lead to state failure, which in turn, requires more profound actions

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than peacebuilding alone. Rather, when the absence of tangible violence is secured, state-building can build a pathway towards a fully functioning state (more on the connection between state-building and the Weberian notion of the state in the next chapter). This shows that although it is important to differentiate peacebuilding and state-building, the two terms cross paths, often strive for the same goals, and are not seldom interdependent. However, forming sustainable and locally owned governance structures is a highly complex undertaking in which global actors – UN, US, EU – have faced countless challenges, not least of legitimacy, authority, and capacity. Thus, state-building has been a controversial subject ever since it emerged and did not only attract scholarly attention but also criticism.

3.1.2. The Liberal Peace and State-Building Discourse

As state-building describes external interference into national governance structures and public services, it has put a big question mark on state sovereignty. This is well demonstrated by the concept of ‘liberal peace’. Said concept foresees dominant international players that introduce their visions of democratic governance, a free-market economy, and rule of law as pillars for operational state capacity (Sisk & Chandler 2013). Before explaining ‘liberal peace’ in detail, it is important to understand the label liberal in itself. In international politics, it can, on one hand, be contrasted with conservatism, a line of thought that envisions the sovereign state as the centrepiece of power; whereas liberalism rather advances interstate cooperation (Jönsson 2014, p. 105). On the other hand, liberalism can be contrasted with socialism: while socialism symbolises the classless world order, liberalism envisions cooperation and peace between liberal states (Jönsson 2014, p. 105). How does this translate into the ‘liberal peace’ construct’?

The end of the Cold War left many failed or weak states outside the developed Western countries with deficient state capacity, which consequentially sparked several violent conflicts – Somalia, Kosovo, Cambodia, East Timor are only a few examples (Fukuyama 2004, p. 18). Peacebuilding and later state-building were the international community’s reaction to the emerging chaos that spread not only through direct violence but also via AIDS, drug trafficking and terrorism (Fukuyama 2004). External actors understood that the incapacity to build institutional pillars and public infrastructure were at the heart of these problems and assumed

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that they would be cured with foreign assistance. State-building missions were thus driven by powerful international actors, whose inherent nature is to promote security and subjective visions of a liberal state (Visoka and Richmond 2017, p. 110).

The principal torchbearers of liberal peace practices are believed to be “leading states in the global north, leading international organisations, and the international financial institutions” (Mac Ginty 2011, p. 20). One of the founding fathers of the liberal peace concept, Oliver Richmond (2001, 2004, 2005), conjured up a post-Weberian understanding of the state by claiming that the creation of new states might be facilitated by peacebuilding and state-building practices of international actors because their approach relies on “the liberal, neoliberal and functionalist school [of thought]” (2001, p. 318). Accordingly, the liberal peace theory refers to peacebuilding and state-building efforts shaped upon (neo-)liberal norms such as market freedoms and economic development, rule of law and democracy, as well as liberal constitutions. As a consequence, liberal peace presumes that global governance and development prevail over regional culture and social norms (Richmond 2011a, p. 96).

Initial research on liberal peace was ground-breaking as it captured the essence of early peace and state-building missions. However, with growing implication of non-institutional actors and local voices, liberal peace was in need of revision and unavoidably unleashed criticism: Fukuyama (2004, p. 19) questioned whether the modernity of liberal societies from the west were achievable for other countries and whether liberal constructs are universal. Lake (2016, p. 2) followed suit by saying that the stronger the external interests, the more unlikely was a long-lasting and fruitful state-building project. In his opinion, exporting policies, ideas and institutions is “astounding in its audacity” (Lake 2016, p. 197). Yet, simultaneously the abundant flow of critical analysis on liberal peace equally increased the demand for its defence. Paris (2010) warned against the illegitimate and destructive hypercriticism of liberal peace, that creates misconceptions by drawing close comparisons between state-building and imperialism. In a milder defence, Chandler (2015) introduced a string of literature that shed light on pragmatic approaches of liberal peace, arguing that modern state-building entails a combination of the liberal peace baggage alongside ‘practical learning’, proving that they must not necessarily exclude one another.

Influenced by the developing criticism and research of his academic peers as well as shifting state-building practices towards locally-owned processes, Richmond himself added critical

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reflection to his previous research. First, he argued for the cruciality of critical analysis in peacebuilding and state-building (Richmond 2007). Later, he addressed the issues of ‘peacebuilding’ and ‘state-building’ (although not directly mentioned in the statement below), claiming that if not questioned and adapted to local standards and needs, liberal peacebuilding and state-building advocate foreign interests and their inherent need to build ideal partner states instead of sustainable and independent states, which further digs global power discrepancies:

If individuals’ direct physical needs are not dealt with, any expression of interest in culture and its implications for peacebuilding and international intervention in post-conflict zones, is merely an example of the instrumentalist approach of neoliberalism – and internationals who value their own interests more than the local identities and dignity of the recipients of liberal peacebuilding. This unmasks the darker side of the Western liberal peacebuilding project. It relies on the distancing and depoliticisation of the local, to ignore responsibility for its needs and to validate itself as the only plausible local that can be universally constructed. In essence, liberal peacebuilding romanticises the West’s own local, and legitimates the international asymmetries as they currently exist rather than encouraging their investigation and redressal (Richmond 2011a, p. 98).

With this, Richmond established the notion of “post-liberal peace” as a form of hybrid peacebuilding and state-building that demands shared responsibilities between local and international stakeholders in order to foster inclusiveness (2011a). The concept of hybridity was introduced to frame criticism of the liberal peace theory and describes how responsibility and actions are to be shared between international and national as well as institutional and non-institutional stakeholders.

So, how did liberal interventionism develop under criticism in realpolitik? Richmond’s (2011a) ‘post-liberal peace’ translated into real practices when the UN defined it as a combination of elements of both liberal and contextual peace that should lead to security as well as inclusive states (UN 2015, p. 13). As state-building started as a rather idealist transmission of liberal values in the 1990s and later mutated into a more ‘realist’ and pragmatic approach (Chandler 2019, p. 548), failing missions showed the need for more inclusive practices. The critical voices of academic scholars resonated with the UN itself, who strongly judged its past missions in 2015 by maintaining the following:

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The international approach is often based on generic models that ignore national realities [...] Efforts to sustain peace must build upon [local] institutions and the resilience and reconciliation processes of local communities, and not undermine them [...] When countries set out their priorities and they enjoy strong national support, they must be respected. Too often they are not (UN 2015, p. 48).

The inequitable, interventionist state-building approach transformed into more ‘hybrid’ forms of state-building. Concretely, hybrid state-building “is often a gradualist, everyday process whereby entities (actors, structures, norms) negotiate and renegotiate their own place in the social, political, and economic spheres, and negotiate and renegotiate this place with each other” (Mac Ginty 2011, p. 72). Thus, elite-domination, negative external influence, and ethnic tensions are escaped more easily (Visoka & Richmond 2017, p. 111).

The wide criticism on the international (liberal) state-building agenda has also heavily impacted the use of the term state-building. As inclusion and reconciliation gain ground in the state-building priorities of the international community (UN 2015, p. 12), the word “state-building” is no longer common language in UN and EU documents (Chandler 2019, p. 550). The disappearance of the term ‘state-building’ does not mean that its technicalities are gone too. However, goals and practices related to state-building have been incorporated in a more holistic manner into the Sustainable Development Goals of the UN (Chandler 2019, p. 551). Naturally, this channels thoughts on whether the UN did this merely for face or not. Wrapping the same liberalist, exclusionist practices into a new shiny box won’t change the reality of the game on the ground. However, the UN’s (2015, p. 13) bold admission of its own mistakes demands “more realist and contextualised political strategies” and points towards effective changes on the international state-building agenda. The fact that state-building went from rapid development in the 1990s, to strong criticism and scrutiny and nowadays is questioned in its fundamental (terminological) existence, shows the profound concerns around the process.

3.1.3. The EU and Liberal State-Building

Scholars interested in specific actors and their state-building approach have cornered liberal peace into specific niches to replicate the general ‘liberal peace patterns’ within a specific actor’s strategies. In other words, the liberal peace theory can well be applied to the

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EU and its foreign policy. Concretely, it describes the EU’s tendency to export European rules and norms that are naturally liberal or neoliberal (Richmond et al. 2011b). In transferring liberal norms, the EU not only aligns with the concept of liberal peace. Academics have also argued that the EU ‘Europeanises’ countries in its proximity to create relations favourable to its own politics. This process applies not only to European member states but also to neighbouring third countries (Börzel & Risse 2012). By breaching the boundaries of the domestic and international spheres, the EU’s nature has since been assessed by both IR and European Integration literature (Risse-Cappen 1996).

The EU, alongside its rules and norms, has been established upon liberal democracies. Thus, liberalism runs through the EU’s veins. Since the foundation of the political pillars of the EU, as set by the Treaty on the European Union – also known as the Treaty of Maastricht – the EU has oriented its foreign policy towards the defence of international peace and security, economic development, free market strategies, democracy promotion, rule of law and human rights (Treaty of the EU 1992, Title V, Art. J.1). Strategically, it allows Brussels to compete with global players such as the UN and the US (Richmond et al. 2011b, p. 452). Aforesaid practices have been solidified through the consolidated Treaty on European Union (2012, art. 21), not only stating the safeguard but also the advancement and support of democracy, rule of law and human rights abroad. The difference between safeguarding and advancing is subtle but crucial as it has allowed the EU to develop a state-building agenda that relies on norms unarguably linked to liberal peace (Chandler 2006, Yabanci 2016, Baracani 2019).

The EU’s state-building approach is not always welcomed by non-institutional and local groups, precisely because of its inherent liberalism. Lack of acceptance for imported visions can eventually lead to the complete rejection of foreign actors – including NGOs – and subsequentially to their loss of legitimacy and credibility, which are both essential to any political activity. One might ask why reject undertakings by international actors when the proposed structures work so well in Western societies? Certainly, when growing up in an environment of liberal state structures it might be difficult to imagine a better alternative to our current state model. An illustrative counterexample comes from the justice system in the Western Balkans: many Western Balkans countries still preserve a strong (and positive) collective memory of the social justice provision established under socialist rule (Richmond 2011a, p. 157). When foreign actors in the Western Balkans claimed to represent the wishes of civil society by focusing on “Westernised” liberal rule of law and public services, they actually

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represented a fictional society built on their preconceived ideas of what a civil society should want (Richmond 2011a, p. 157). Another reason why the EU’s influence is often rejected is the high level of dependency it creates. In 2008, following the financial crisis, doubts surfaced as to whether international donors would still be able to provide financial support to Kosovo (Silander & Janzekowitz 2012, p. 44) – a situation of uncertainty that is highly uncomfortable for the local civil society.

3.1.4. Europeanisation and Conditionality

The pivotal model of this research is Europeanisation – simultaneously a concept, a process and a tool box of the EU to Europeanise its neighbourhood. It was first applied to internal EU politics and later extended to EU foreign policy as the latter grew in significance. This research assumes a direct link between liberal peace and Europeanisation as the former is intrinsic in Europeanisation. As abovementioned liberalism is the very foundation of the EU since the Treaty on the European Union. Europeanisation is undeniably coupled to the EU’s foreign policy as defined in the treaty and thus its state-building agenda is linked to liberal peace as well (Chandler 2006, Yabanci 2016, Baracani 2019).

Europeanisation arose in the late 1990s as scholars began to question the effects of European integration on its own member states (Ladrech 1994, Lequesne 1996, Sandholtz & Stone Sweet 1998, Featherstone & Radaelli 2003). As an internal process applied to EU member states, Europeanisation describes how the EU gradually takes over areas of domestic politics and unifies national cultures to an overarching European one. “From this perspective, Europeanization is understood as the emergence of new rules, norms, practices and structures of meaning to which member states are exposed, and which they have to incorporate into their domestic rule structures” (Börzel 2013, p. 177). With the 2004 enlargement wave of the EU, Europeanisation was increasingly connected to EU accession and associated with Central and Eastern European (CEE) states, whereby the dominant medium to promote European standards was termed “conditionality” (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeir 2004, Börzel & Risse 2012), which will be explained below. Later, when EU foreign policy and enlargement theory gained ground, Europeanisation was attributed to EU mechanisms aimed at building future member states in the Western Balkans with the help of other international institutions (Papadimitriou et al.

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2007). Subsequently, this led to a wide array of contributions on Europeanisation within the EU’s enlargement policy in the Balkans (Bieber 2011, Börzel 2013, Yabanci 2016), which will be explained further in the theoretical framework. Since Europeanisation describes EU actions in countless circumstances, its definition remains a point of contention. A notorious early definition of Europeanisation was, however, provided by Radaelli:

Processes of (a) construction (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU decisions and the incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policy (Radaelli 2003, p. 30).

Concretely, Europeanisation describes EU mechanisms to ‘convert’ countries to the EU by encouraging alignment with European standards. Those mechanisms create security in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood as well as stable and favourable relations. Mostly, Europeanisation functions via both intangible and tangible conditions such as the diffusion of European identity and culture, as well as the transfer of EU-laws, regulations and directives (Denti 2014, Yabanci 2016). In this sense, Europeanisation may be viewed as both a process and a policy (Economides & Ker-Lindsay 2015, p. 1028). The ‘traditional’ value-based diffusion of European standards is a European adaption process (Economides & Ker-Lindsay 2015, p. 1039). It relates to norms already introduced in the section on liberal peace, such as democracy support, good governance, rule of law or liberal economic development. Those are complemented by additional ‘European’ (yet equally liberal) norms: gender equality, minority rights, green policies, fight against corruption and organised crime – the last two mainly target security and stability (Council of the EU 2020b). In early accession cases, Europeanisation also appears in the shape of policies and the export of institutions with the purpose of preparing future member states. In reality, the transition between Europeanisation as a process and a policy is fluid and the lines blurred. Europeanisation consistently evolves with the EU agenda that is built upon norms and culminates in individual policies. To give a concrete example: the European Green Deal is one of von der Leyen’s (2019) top priorities as she leads the European Commission since 2019, upgrading green policies to a fundamental European principle. No later than February 2020, the EU Office in Kosovo (2020) announced that the EU would be investing €76.4 million to reduce emissions and improve clean air in Kosovo. Proving that as

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soon as the EU agenda is reformed, it is also exported to enlargement regions and the neighbourhood.

Europeanisation – however voluntary of the EU – should be viewed with some scrutiny regarding its top-down nature and tendency to hegemonic interference. Rather than relying on mutual adjustments it molds outsiders and newcomers to existing EU structures. Börzel and Risse (2012, p. 2) call it the “shadow of hierarchy” – the closer to the EU, the stronger Brussels’ influence. Even though, Europeanisation takes place between the supranational and national level, implying an inherent power discrepancy and interdependence in favour of the EU, one might ask how Europeanisation strategies are successful and why partner countries comply. Europeanisation is mainly driven by EU leverage power in terms of the attractive incentives and conditions it sets (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2011). In other words, the EU uses the ‘sticks-and-carrots’-method to incentivise countries. In academia, said practices are called “conditionality”:

Conditionality implies a bargaining process in which an international actor uses selective incentives in order to change the behaviour of actors in the target country. These target actors are assumed to weigh the benefits they derive from democratic change against the costs and to comply with international conditions if the benefits exceed the costs (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2011, p. 890).

The bargaining process is not always sufficient for countries to comply. Europeanisation is only effective when four criteria are fulfilled. First, concerning tangible transferred EU rules, they must replace dysfunctional national laws or fix gaps in the national legislation of the ‘host’ country – a concept that Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeir (2004, p. 662) have called “reinforcement by reward”. As such, laws must not only be adopted but also effectively internalised, which requires the transferred rules to coincide with existing national values but be more effective than the replaced law (Schimmelfennig 2003, pp. 83). The second criterium is the ‘more-for-more/less-for-less’-principle also called positive and negative conditionality (Hüllen 2012, p. 118). The more the receiving country complies, the higher its reward. For the Western Balkans specifically, the EU states:

Increased EU assistance will be linked to tangible progress in the rule of law and socio-economic reforms, as well as on the Western Balkans partners’ adherence to EU values, rules

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and standards […] The Western Balkans should transform into functioning market economies able to fully link to the EU’s single market […] and to promote the rule of law (Council of the EU 2020b).

Material rewards might come in the form of financial assistance or market access, while intangible rewards are recognition and praise (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2011, p. 893). For example, in the fight against Covid-19, the EU welcomed the Western Balkans’ readiness to cooperation and the mutual solidarity amongst Western Balkans countries and subsequently rewarded it with a €3.3 billion package for the whole region (Council of the EU 2020b). Similarly, non-compliance can lead to punishments like the interruption of financial aid, market access, democracy support or visa liberalisation. The third criterium claims that compensation for implementing EU rules must be credible and the requirements formulated concretely (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeir 2004, p. 673). Finally, the fourth criterium explains that even if conditionality is inherently power-asymmetric, the EU cannot enforce rules where states are reluctant to build relations (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeir 2004). Domestic actors actively assess and choose to implement the laws into their national system or not to cooperate (Denti 2014, p. 15). This makes Europeanisation equally a bottom-up process as countries choose to comply when the prospect of being European is more lucrative then their current situation. If the law is accepted and successfully implemented, the transfer is usually rewarded by the EU. In authoritarian states, such as Belarus, incentives to comply with the EU’s liberal standards are often unsuccessful because Minsk has little interest in moving closer to Brussels (Bosse 2011, p. 441). In a nutshell, conditionality works where it reinforces the national legislation for the better and where the reward is substantial, credible as well as desired. Although, in potential candidate countries – such as Kosovo – the EU often fails at the third criterium because the prospect of membership seems too far-fetched and unattainable.

To sum it up, in academia there seems to be a consensus on the dysfunctionality and power asymmetry of the EU’s ‘actorness’ through Europeanisation in its foreign policy. This opinion is partially funded on the assumption that the EU has a tendency to export liberal norms (democracy, rule of law, economic development) and policies so as to achieve its strategic interests.

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3.2. Concluding Remark

This thesis is written at a time when the World faces one of its biggest challenges in modern times: the Covid-19 pandemic. Having slowed down the basic functioning of our societies as well as our ways of communicating, it has also impacted the quality of the presented work. As libraries are closed, this literature review is restricted to publication that are available online, which excludes a handful of books. Missing works are inter alia Fagan’s (2009)

Europe’s Balkan dilemma: paths to civil society or state-building? and Chandler’s (2002) From Kosovo to Kabul: human rights and international intervention.

4. Theoretical Framework and Personal Contribution

4.1. Theory Innovation Derived from Liberal Peace and Europeanisation

A good research contribution can only be made when finding a missing puzzle-piece and adding it to the big picture so as to help scholarly successors get a better understanding of what they are looking at. This research contributes to an emerging and under-researched string of literature on EU member state-building and focuses on its connections to external NGOs in Kosovo’s state-building. The conceptual foundation on liberal peace and state-building as well as Europeanisation in the literature discussion provide a jumpstart to analyse NGOs’ state-building efforts in Kosovo. However, it creates the need for further explanation on two central theories that fuel the research question(s). First, EU member state-building, which is the EU’s tailored state-building approach in the Western Balkans and a ricochet of Europeanisation as it links directly into the EU’s Europeanising foreign policy mechanisms. Second, this research needs to open up EU member state-building to non-institutional actors outside of the EU and its institutions, hence introducing the interplay between EU member state-building and NGOs. The empirical aim of this research, thus, being to explore causal mechanisms between EU member state-building and NGOs in Kosovo.

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4.1.1. Member State-Building

Member state-building emerged in a document by the International Commission on the Balkans (ICB) in 2005. Around the same time the concept of Europeanisation was expanded to new enlargement regions after the accession of CEE states to the EU. The ICB (2005, p. 177) writes that the EU should develop “functioning state administrations using the instruments of the accession process, […] creat[e] a common economic space in the region, [and engage in] constituency-building through an improvement in the quality of political representation and ‘smart visa’ policies”. Later, in academia ‘Europeanisation’ and EU actions in the Western Balkans have been pigeonholed by Keil (2013) and Denti (2014) as “member statebuilding”. Denti (2014) argues that member state-building should be detached from ‘normal’ Europeanisation to avoid a conceptual overstretch as member state-building escapes liberal peace and contrarily to EU member state-building, Europeanisation does not usually aim at building new member states (Denti 2014). This research departs from the priorly established understanding of member state-building and offers a fresh perspective. Unlike Denti (2014), this research views member state-building as the logical continuity of Europeanisation in contexts of limited statehood and/or potential future accessions to the EU and thus allows for a precise description of Europeanisation in the case of Kosovo. Thus, it is treated as a niche within the concept of Europeanisation. The tools and mechanisms the EU uses in member state-building in the Western Balkans show strong resemblance to those used within Europeanisation in the wider European neighbourhood. For this reason, from here on the term member state-building will be used to describe EU state-state-building via the Europeanisation of Kosovo. Where the action to Europeanise is described, the noun ‘Europeanisation’ may still be used but not to describe the concept, only the action.

It should be carefully questioned whether member state-building indeed escapes the mold of liberal peace. According to Denti (2014, p. 22), member state-building and liberal peace are disassociated by the EU’s ability to foster ownership and legitimacy in becoming states, which gives them more independence than an international (liberal) state-building agenda would allow. Thus, EU member state-building should not be viewed as hegemonic interference because it creates more independent and sustainable states (Denti 2014). However, this point of view can be contested or at least complemented. The ‘tools’ used in Kosovo are very similar to the tools used outside of EU member state-building; as for example throughout the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Both in the Western Balkans and within the ENP, ‘carrots’ like

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trade agreements, participation in education programmes (Erasmus+) and visa liberalisation are traded for compliance with EU policies in pursuit of security and stability as well as the adoption of European norms (European Commission 2020a). The main difference is that states in the ENP do not ‘benefit’ from the “golden carrot” – EU membership (Börzel 2013, p. 173). Imposing conditions, even if those aim at building a European state, are always based on underlying EU values (democracy, rule of law, economic development, etc.), which are the essence of Europeanisation and by extension liberalism (Héritier 2005). Furthermore, taking the example of Kosovo, the EU struggles to successfully help resolve local ethnic conflicts and economic clientelism because it is bound to liberal interventionism (Vachudova 2005, p. 178). Consequentially, EU member state-building has not prevented weak public services, a limited economy and minimalist state structures that cannot ensure effective national administrations (Denti 2014, p. 23). For those reasons the concept of member state-building is inherently linked to both Europeanisation and by extension liberal peace.

Member state-building describes EU actions that ‘form’ a state to become a future EU member state, such as Kosovo. This approach infringes upon the ‘traditional’ understanding of a state as fully sovereign. Weber’s notorious definition of the sovereign state determines it as an entity holding “[…] the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force with a given territory” (Weber 1948, p. 78). To this Krasner & Risse (2014, p. 545) add that a modern state can join international organisations, sign treaties and has autonomous authority in providing public services. Yet, the EU breaches both understandings with its member state-building practices. For said countries, achieving full sovereignty is no longer the ultimate end of the state-building process and thus the concept is also a departure from the traditional understanding of state-building. Becoming states transform directly from contested or limited state capacities to full EU member states instead of independent states. As introduced above via the concept of Europeanisation, the EU has considerable power over its member states and with member state-building the newly Europeanised states transition directly into this power network. It exposes issues of EU member state-building because of its twofold nature: the EU demands a strong state and a European state. Given the sovereignty impasse, at times the requirements are double-tracked and render the process ineffective.

Since Kosovo is the case study of this research, taking a closer look at its situation provides a hands-on understanding of member state-building and gives useful information to understand the NGOs’ reactions to it later on. Talks about accession of the Western Balkans to the EU

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have been running through European foreign policy since 1999 (European Commission 2016). All Western Balkans countries are in the EU’s Stabilization and Association Process (SAP), which is framed by Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAA) for each country of the region. Based on their respective progresses the SAAs foresee the implementation of the EU’s

acquis communautaire (Keil 2013, p. 343). Initially, the process aimed at ensuring peace,

stability and security throughout the region, which has been fruitful since the end of the Balkan conflicts in 2000 (with the exception of the 2004 riots in Kosovo) (Keil 2013, p. 346). Yet, today member state-building in the Western Balkans reaches far beyond security and stability. It stretches to the EU’s ability to support specific actions or political candidates during elections as during the 2008 Serbian elections when the EU openly endorsed Tadić to be President (Keil 2013, p. 348).

In 2013, Croatia became the first country of the Western Balkans to reach EU membership. Meanwhile, some countries – Serbia and Montenegro – are much closer to the finish line than others. Having received the potential candidate status only in 2016, Kosovo arguably forms the rear guard when it comes to EU accession. Hereby, the main hurdle is the country’s internationally disputed statehood that remains a point of contention in Brussels as well. Five EU member states do not recognise Kosovo’s independence, leading to the infamous asterisk politics, meaning that every official EU document mentioning “Kosovo” contains an asterisk disclaiming that the “designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence” (European Commission 2019). Having EU member states disagreeing over Kosovo’s statehood undeniably hinders progressions in the accession talks, diplomatic exchanges, and state-building.

Three weaknesses can be identified in the EU’s member state-building approach in Kosovo. First, Börzel (2013, pp. 182) argues that the EU cannot conduct successful member state-building in Kosovo because it has no prior experience in member state-state-building and thus its actions remain underdeveloped, superficial and fruitless, especially with regards to informal institutions and ethnic tensions. Second, the lack of success should also be viewed from Kosovo’s perspective. As stated above, the ‘carrot’ in the sticks-and-carrots-method must be credible. In its state-building efforts the EU has displayed a series of conditions, rewards and mechanisms to mold Kosovo into member state shape. For example, it has taken on regulatory functions through the supervision of the Banking and Payment Authority – Kosovo is the only

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country outside the Eurozone to adopt the Euro (Papadimitriou et al. 2007, p. 220). However, given slow processes, lack of rewards and EU-internal disagreements, the initial EUphoria has transitioned into disillusion and unwillingness to comply because membership seems unattainable. The main issue being that the EU doesn’t even grant small but long-awaited steps like visa liberalisation. Third, the EU focuses on elite-collaboration rather than ethnic or social reconciliation because it mainly collaborates with those who have the power to implement its rules (Baracani 2019, p. 5). Those three weaknesses combined result in a high disapproval of EU actors and policies amongst the Kosovar public, although a large majority of Kosovars still approve of the EU in general and trust in its institutions much more than in their own parliament (Riinvest Institute 2014, p. 5). Indicating that the Kosovar are not against the EU itself but would rather path their own way to become an EU member state than with the EU’s input. It also demonstrates that Kosovo needs to improve its own state capacity and public trust in it.

4.1.2. Member State-Building and NGOs

First and foremost, before engaging in the discussion around NGOs, a common misconception that this research wishes to avoid is treating civil society organisations (CSOs) and NGOs as synonyms. The definition of an NGO should simultaneously be viewed as a narrower and larger term than ‘CSO’. On one hand, it is narrower because civil society encompasses groups beyond NGOs including grassroot movements like faith groups, labour unions, sports clubs, social media groups or even street demonstrations (Aart Scholte 2014, p. 323). On the other hand, the power of NGOs spreads beyond civil society because they are actors of global governance and surpass civil society via their “service delivery” function towards global and national institutions (Aart Scholte 2014, p. 323).

Member state-building, like Europeanisation, is usually perceived as a top-down and single-track process only implicating an interaction between the EU and institutional local-level actors that have the power to implement EU rules (Baracani 2019). However, it goes far beyond this narrow perspective. Denti (2014, p. 17) claims that Europeanisation comprises all actors constituting ‘Europe’ by reflecting its norms and practices – private actors, cultural institutions, NGOs, etc. The same applies to member state-building. The rise of international and supranational organisations – such as the EU or the UN – to global power centres has parallelly

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increased their collaboration with non-institutional actors, which have aligned with their strategies (Aart Scholte 2014, p. 322). In other words, with growing importance of multilateralism, alliances formed far beyond states. An example is the interaction between the EU and NGOs analysed in this research. Thereby, the portrait of Europeanisation, and by extension member state-building, painted here through the case study of Kosovo is neither exclusively top-down nor restricted to institutional players.

The connection between non-institutional actors in building and EU member state-building is rarely made in academic literature. Many scholars forget the middle man on the ground that helps ascribe meaning to Europeanisation mechanisms by materialising EU rules and values into tangible outcomes – a step that is non-negligible to scholars who have analysed the framework of legitimacy within Europeanisation (Yabanci 2016). Most researchers who, nonetheless, dived into the interaction between NGOs and Europeanisation, orientated their looking glass on how the EU Europeanises NGOs and how the latter rather passively promote European strategies (Warleigh 2001, McCauley 2008, Kutay 2012). Meanwhile, the active role of NGOs in EU member state-building remains mostly in the dark. With a broader perspective, Krasner and Risse (2014) have reflected on external actors in areas of limited statehood and came to the conclusion that these actors fill the gap between what governments want to accomplish and what they can actually do. Accordingly, NGOs are a magical political weapon as they accomplish tasks that go beyond state capacity; an analysis backed by Brown et al. (2008) and Banks et al. (2014).

While the restricted amount of work on the interplay between NGOs and the EU mostly refers to Europeanisation and usually focuses on how the EU uses the medium of local non-state actors to exert Europeanisation in areas of limited EU legitimacy (McCauley 2008, Fagan 2011, Kutay 2012), this work chooses a different angle. In addition to how the EU is making use of NGOs, this research asks how NGOs use EU member state-building in Kosovo and whether the domain of activity of an NGO influences its ties to member state-building. Of course, the relationship between member state-building and NGOs is a two-way mirror and the EU’s power of influence on NGOs shall not be omitted. However, the goal is to provide the full picture instead of assuming that only the EU benefits from Europeanising NGOs.

Furthermore, contrary to the belief of many scholars (Richmond 2005, Banks et al. 2015) that NGOs are no more than the elongation of institutional actors, this research builds on the debate

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around evolving multilateralism (see Acharya 2014) and questions how NGOs themselves construct legitimacy, while not being able to rely on democratic will. By being prone to European legislation, rooted in European culture, and embedded in EU foreign policy, EU-based NGOs play just as important of a role as institutional bodies do. Shedding light on their member state-building practices and ties to the EU aims at enlarging the theory on member state-building as well as providing a clearer understanding of NGO practices in state-building. In this and as can be deducted from the literature presented above, this thesis defies the initial (realist) approach that mainly states – and state-led institutions – build other states and that influence only flows downwards. Instead, from a neoliberal perspective, the research sees independent non-state actors as “agents” and “principals” in state-building (Forsythe 2014, p. 126).

The interdependence between NGOs and the EU in state-building relates back to the notion of hybridity in liberal peace introduced above (Mac Ginty 2011). Evidently, the concept of hybridity in liberal peace is coupled to multilateralism. The need for inclusive and multiparty forms of state-building led to increasing exposure of NGOs in the sector. In time, the hierarchy of power increasingly unravelled and formed into a spiderweb structure, which engages new players and redistributes power (Fletcher 2016, p. 223). Herein, the political weight of NGOs should not be miscalculated. Take into consideration, Amnesty International (2020) counts 2 million members and 5 million activists. As a comparison, the two biggest German political parties – CDU and SPD – do not quite reach 900’000 members jointly.6_{Moreover, Amnesty’s}

2017 budget was more than twice the budget of the WTO for the same year.7_{This explains}

why Van Leeuwen and Verkoren (2012, pp. 83) argue that for many governments, NGOs became a point of entry to promote policies that are beyond the reach of their own legitimacy.

Counting in the indirect ways in which the EU supports state-building through NGOs opens up the perspective on member state-building. Fagan (2010) claims that while NGOs’ transformative power is not always visible, they act behind the scenes to enhance policy change and state transformation. In Kosovo for example, ‘subcontracting’ NGOs by supporting their projects and attributing funds, allows the EU to engage indirectly where it lacks political

6_{See Statistica (2020) Mitgliederzahlen der politischen Parteien in Deutschland 2018 for detailed numbers.} 7_{Find the detailed data here:}_{https://www.amnesty.org/en/2017-global-financial-report/}_and

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legitimacy for direct actions and thus it avoids internal diplomatic frictions – a “strategic interaction” (Borgh et al. 2018, p. 251). However, this means that NGOs and their values equally have the power to set “the rules of the game” (Fowler 1996, p. 17). NGO values can emerge from personal experience, historical background, political affiliation, social pillars, etc. (Lissner 1977, p. 74). As such, NGOs are not only financed and advised by the EU, they too adopt lobbying and counselling functions that have the power to influence the EU’s agenda-setting. Most meetings between EU institutions and NGOs can be traced back in the European Transparency Register8_.

However, NGOs equally benefit from the EU. With global political order shifting away from traditional actors towards a multitude of ‘outside the room’-actors, those not elected through democratic processes have to justify their political activity and build legitimacy to ‘sit at the table’ elsehow. Affiliating with the EU provides NGOs with legitimacy and also authority. In this, NGO initiatives often align with European strategies but at the same time foster more inclusive and sustainable practices as, for example, through the integration of marginalised communities (Kilby 2006). In this, NGOs have the power to represent specific capacities (human rights, reconciliation, rule of law, etc.) within the larger framework of liberal interventionism (Richmond 2005, p. 138).

Being backed by a global framework, NGOs are often able to bypass host states (Richmond 2005, p. 136). Donors (EU) and their intrinsic norms can consequently affect the “downward accountability” of NGOs towards the host state and local civil society (Banks et al. 2015); hence, minimising their positive impact (Kilby 2006). NGOs’ engagement is often largely donor-driven, which can result in short-lived programmes as they retire from the field once the funds are exhausted (UNDP 2004, p. 54). This implies two crucial problems. First, donor funds are mostly attributed to the same communities, hence falsely representing civil society. Second, there is no continuity between the different projects implemented by different actors (Richmond 2011a, p. 81). An issue that hints at the negative impact of donors because ‘international legitimacy’ (defending human rights, democracy, etc.) prevails over ‘local legitimacy’ (fostering reconciliation and receiving recognition) (Van Leeuwen & Verkoren

8_{European Commission (2020b) Transparency and the EU [online].}

In the Shadow of the EU: How NGOs Build a (European) State in Kosovo