Justification in Deontology, Consequentialism and Virtue Theory:
The role of moral criteria in argument schemes for justifying an ethical
standpoint
Student: Rik Maassen, 11020733 rikmaassen@hotmaill.com
University of Amsterdam, 26-6-2017
Communication and Information Studies: Rhetoric, Argumentation Theory and Philosophy Supervisor: dr. J.H.M. Wagemans
Table of Contents
1 Introduction 3
2 Argumentative characteristics of ethical discussions 6
2.1 Types of standpoints
2.2 Standpoints in ethical discussions 2.3 Types of arguments for defending ethical standpoints and criticisms 3 The role of moral criteria for justification in argument schemes 10 3.1 The most prominent ethical theories and their moral criteria
3.2 The role of moral criteria in arguments
3.3 Criticisms of the reconstructed argument schemes
4 A case-study of justification in ethical discussions 19 4.1 Her Majesty The Queen vs. R. Dudley and Stephens
4.2 Same-sex marriage
5 Conclusion 24 References
1 Introduction
Ethical discussions can be found in many different contexts. Examples of ethical discussions are a speech where a politician argues that it is unfair that the poor are suffering
disproportionately, or that righteous friend who is trying to convince you during an informal conversation that you have to donate money to a certain charitable institution. Every day we deal with all kinds of argumentation that is aimed at convincing us of the acceptability of ethical standpoints. Unfortunately, most of these evidently important discussions lead rather fast to a dead end or end up unresolved. Pointing out the undesirable consequences of accepting a large number of refugees is presumably not going to convince a person who claims it is our duty to help the disadvantaged no matter what. The parties speak of a ‘unresolvable difference of opinion’.
Aside from such disagreement in ethical discussions, we encounter a lot of indecisiveness regarding what we are ought to do in moral dilemmas as well. A famous example is 'Sophie's Choice', where a Nazi-officer in a concentration camp forces a mother to choose which of her two daughters has to be killed. To make it even more cruel, if the mother does not choose either of them, both daughters will get killed. These hypothetical cases mostly push the boundaries of ethics and can seem rather artificial or even far-fetched, but they do highlight the two most important things of ethics and ethical discussions in general: the inescapable demand for a choice to be made and simultaneously, almost paradoxically, the seeming indecisiveness.
Moral philosophy is the area of philosophy that deals with such moral dilemmas and the justification of ethical standpoints. These beliefs are justified with reasons in the form of arguments for an ethical standpoint. Within the field of moral philosophy, numerous theories have developed particular moral criteria to justify an ethical standpoint. Each of them bring forward different moral criteria which one should respect in order to perform morally worthy actions. For example, according to Immanuel Kant an action is morally good when it can be willed universally (Rohlf, 2016), while John Stuart Mill stresses the fact that an action should produce cumulatively more good (Macleod, 2017). Recent discussions regarding refugees follow similar structures. Those who are willing to accept refugees, refer to our duty to take care of our fellow human-beings. Antagonists refer to the negative effects the acceptance will probably bring about.
Because of the differences between these argumentative criteria underlying each ethical theory, there has been an on-going discussion regarding which moral criteria are in
fact the most appropriate for justifying an ethical standpoint. That is, the same situation can be seen from different viewpoints and each theory has its own moral criteria to justify an ethical standpoint which are all quite convincing but simultaneously seem mutually exclusive. This variable nature is without a doubt characteristic and maybe essential for ethical discussions, because it is precisely these different stances regarding what we ought to do what causes
moral discussions and moral dilemmas. However, it
also leaves us with a fundamental problem. As said before, ethical discussions seem to lead rather fast to a dead end when one party cites the discordance with moral norms and the other one cites the effects of an action. The practice of justifying ethical standpoints has barely been studied from an argumentative perspective. A better understanding of justification of ethical standpoints depends on a clear conception of how the moral criteria found in the most prominent ethical theories, function as arguments and how these arguments can be analyzed and evaluated. My aim is to provide the building blocks of a tool in order to analyze ethical discussions and reconstruct the role of moral criteria in the most prominent ethical theories in argument schemes. This results in the main research question: How to analyze the
justification of ethical standpoints in ethical discussions and reconstruct the role of moral criteria from an argumentative perspective?
In order to answer the research question, I shall first explain a few key concepts from argumentation theory which are necessary to analyze the justification of ethical standpoints. First of all, in section 2 I will identify the type of standpoints that are commonly found within ethical discussions in order to determine which type of argumentation is appropriate to defend such a standpoint and the possible criticisms of those types of argumentation. I will make use of the pragma-dialectical theory to reconstruct the standpoints and the types of argument schemes and formulate the accompanying critical questions for each argument scheme. After having identified these argumentative characteristics of ethical discussions, in section 3 I will turn to the rich history of moral philosophy and make an inventory of the most prominent ethical theories and make their moral criteria for justifying an ethical standpoint explicit. I will connect these results with the argumentative characteristics of ethical
discussions I found in chapter 2 and reconstruct the role of these moral criteria in argument schemes. Once these schemes are completed, I will have the building blocks of a tool to analyze and evaluate the justification of ethical standpoints in ethical discussions. In section 4, I will illustrate the working of the developed tool with the help of two case studies and
be able to identify the standpoints and the arguments in ethical discussions. I will be able to pinpoint the disagreement in argumentative terms and identify which part of the
argumentation is not accepted. Furthermore, the case studies are meant to show the
argumentative differences amongst the most prominent ethical theories. In the conclusion, I will provide a brief outline of the paper and discuss the implications of the results for studying ethical discussions from an argumentative perspective and argumentation theory in general.
2 Argumentative characteristics of ethical discussions
In order to answer the questions at the heart of this research, firstly I have to identify which standpoints do typically occur within ethical discussions. If in argumentative discourse it is not clear precisely which standpoint is at issue, there is no way of telling whether the argumentation that is advanced can lead to a resolution of the difference of opinion that is discussed. According to pragma-dialectics and debate literature, several standpoints can be at the center of a discussion. I will elaborate on these different types in 2.1 and specify the types of standpoints in ethical discussions in 2.2. In 2.3. I will explain shortly the types of
argumentation to defend the standpoints at play in ethical discussions and elaborate on the accompanying critical question for each type of argumentation.
2.1 Types of standpoints
In general, there are three types of propositions that can function as a standpoint in a debate, which are propositions of fact, propositions of value and propositions of policy (van Eemeren, Grootendorst & Snoeck Henkemans, 2002). I will discuss all these propositions in the
presented order and explain the differences.
When argumentation theory originated it was very similar to deductive logic, which has been around since Aristotle. The main goal of argumentation was to find the truth (Smith, 2017). This resulted in the belief that one could only argue for descriptive standpoints, a standpoint which contains a proposition of fact such as “Berlin is the capital of Germany”. In a discussion on a proposition of fact, the affirmative upholds that a certain thing is true, whereas the negative maintains that it is false (van Eemeren, Grootendorst & Snoeck Henkemans, 2002). However, language is used to express way more than merely factual statements. Language is also used to express propositions of value, which can contain
emotions or aesthetical judgments such as “Berlin is the most beautiful city in Europe”, which are known as evaluative standpoints. Evaluative standpoints can also contain moral claims regarding what is right and wrong, where the affirmative maintains that a belief is justified while the opponent holds an opposing view (van Eemeren, Grootendorst & Snoeck
Henkemans, 2002). Propositions of value are mostly judgments concerning a certain fact or action.
Furthermore, language possesses the unique possibility to transcend time. Human-beings are able to make plans for the future and express expectations with words. In
should come with me to Berlin someday”. The affirmative maintains that a policy or course of action should be adopted (van Eemeren, Grootendorst & Snoeck Henkemans, 2002). In discussions these propositions can be found in a mixed order. Propositions of fact can for example function as predecessors or part of debates which involve propositions of value and policy, because such propositions mostly make a certain claim such as a judgment or an advice regarding a proposition of fact. Thus, every type of proposition can either function as an argument or as a standpoint. Regardless of the fact whether the standpoints under
discussion in a difference of opinion are descriptive, evaluative, or prescriptive, in all cases they can be reconstructed as a claim to acceptability (in case of a positive standpoint) or unacceptability (in case of a negative standpoint) regarding the proposition the standpoint pertains to (van Eemeren, Grootendorst & Snoeck Henkemans, 2002).
Argumentation is in many occasions used for gaining approval with evaluative standpoints containing ethical or aesthetic judgments or with prescriptive standpoints involving practical or policy judgments as opposed to merely a definite truth-finding
procedure which has the case when argumentation theory and logic was founded. Due to this understanding, several theories developed in order to deal with the more complex act of argumentation taking the communicative acts in account which are performed when people are actually arguing in real life. One of these theories is pragma dialectics, which takes explicitly into account that argumentation may pertain to “practical” standpoints involving choices of action between two or more alternatives, which is the case in the moral dilemmas. The theory is designed to apply equally to argumentative discourse about descriptive
standpoints involving a claim to epistemic acceptability, evaluative standpoints involving moral or aesthetic judgments, and prescriptive standpoints pertaining to action choices (van Eemeren, Grootendorst & Snoeck Henkemans, 2002).
2.2 Standpoints in ethical discussions
Now I have shown which types of propositions are distinguished within argumentation theory and debate literature, I will analyze which of these propositions are at play in ethical
discussions. Even more importantly, I will consider which of these propositions can function as a standpoint to tell which argumentation is in fact appropriate for defending the standpoint. Despite the fact that ethical standpoints often contain proposition of fact such as numbers of people or historical events, descriptive propositions mostly only serve as an argument for the standpoint, since the main claim is either formulated as an advice or a judgment. An
fact that 6.000.000 – 11.000.000 million people were killed. Thus, in ethical discussions descriptive propositions solely serve as argumentation, because instead of establishing a moral truth, in normative ethics we seek approval for our moral judgments or advices.
It may come as no surprise that evaluative standpoints are common in ethical standpoints, since most of the discussions are in fact centering on an evaluative claim regarding an action or a fact, such as ‘buying a stolen bike is wrong’ or ‘helping the disadvantaged is morally right’. If formulated as a proposition of value, the content of a statement constitutes a proposition where a value is attributed to the persons or things referred to (“It is wrong for people in a relationship to cheat on their partners”). These standpoints are probably easily recognized as ‘ethical standpoints’. Nevertheless, how intuitive and straight-forward that may sound, it is rather hard to decide how one can offer convincing justification in the form of sound argumentation for these standpoints. These matters will be discussed in the next chapter.
Lastly, an ethical standpoint can be formulated as a proposition of policy. If
formulated as a proposition of policy, the standpoint becomes prescriptive and will contain a recommendation for a certain course of action (“One should donate money to charitable institutions”). Since ethics is the field mainly occupied with the question regarding what we ought to do, the standpoint can be regarded as a judgment that judges the moral character of an action or fact (proposition of value) or as an advice to perform a certain action (proposition of policy). As said before, the three propositions are often found simultaneously in
discussions. This is also the case for ethical discussions. If there is no approval concerning the most important value, there is no agreement regarding the policy. These propositions are related and both can function as a standpoint. A proposition of policy can function as a standpoint, which results in a prescriptive standpoint (Action X should not be carried out) mostly backed up with an proposition of value as an argument (because, Action X is wrong). One could also argue the other way around, which would result in (Action X is wrong and should therefore not be carried out).
2.3 Types of arguments for defending ethical standpoints and criticisms Now that I have identified which propositions can function as standpoints in moral
discussions, I am able to analyze which argumentation is appropriate to justify such
standpoints according to the pragma-dialectical theory. In the pragma-dialectical approach, a model has been developed in order to analyze and evaluate arguments. I will use the pragma-dialectical typology or argument schemes for the analysis. Argument schemes relate to the
kind of connection between the explicit premise and the standpoint that is established in the argumentation in order to endorse a transfer of acceptability from the explicit premise to the standpoint (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, p. 4). Argument schemes are
conventionalized means of completing this transfer. There are three main categories of argument schemes, namely causal argumentation, symptomatic argumentation and analogy based on a comparison (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, p. 4).
In section 2.2 I explained that in ethical discussions there are propositions of policy and propositions of value which can function as a standpoint. Both a prescriptive standpoint and an evaluative standpoint can be defended with symptomatic argumentation by citing in the argument a certain sign, symptom, or distinguishing mark of what is claimed in the standpoint (van Eemeren, Grootendorst & Snoeck Henkemans, 2002, p. 97). A prescriptive standpoint can also be defended with pragmatic argumentation by referring to an effect of what is stated in the standpoint (van Eemeren, Grootendorst & Snoeck Henkemans, 2002, p. 101).
In pragma-dialectics, the evaluation is based upon several rules. The specific rule which is relevant in this case is the argument scheme rule: “Standpoints may not be regarded as conclusively defended by argumentation that is not presented as based on formally
conclusive reasoning if the defense does not take place by means of appropriate argument schemes applied correctly” (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, p. 194). So one can either criticize the appropriateness of an argument scheme or criticize whether the argument scheme is applied correctly. Each argument scheme has accompanying critical questions. For
symptomatic argumentation the critical questions that can be asked are ‘Are there also other non-Y’s that have the characteristic Z?’ and ‘Aren’t there also other Y’s that do not have the characteristic Z?’ (van Eemeren, Grootendorst & Snoeck Henkemans, 2002, p.98). For pragmatic argumentation the critical question is ‘Does Z always lead to Y?’ (van Eemeren, Grootendorst & Snoeck Henkemans, 2002, p. 101).
3 The role of moral criteria for justification in argument schemes Now that I have identified which propositions can function as standpoints in moral
discussions and the type argumentation which can be used to defend such standpoints from an argumentative perspective, I will continue in this chapter with making an inventory of the moral criteria the most prominent theories use for justifying ethical standpoints. These moral criteria are necessary to reconstruct an argument scheme for each theory in order to analyze the justification given for ethical standpoints in ethical discussions. Such a reconstruction is insightful to pinpoint the commonly found disagreement from an argumentative perspective, because it will be possible to see the differences in the justificatory force and propositional content. It will also become clear how one can criticize such justification based upon the moral criteria found. In section 3.1, I will present which theories can be regarded as the most prominent ones and analyze which moral criteria these theories actually use to justify an ethical standpoint. In section 3.2, I will reconstruct the role of these moral criteria in argument schemes and identify the argument scheme. Furthermore, in section 3.3 I will elaborate on the possible criticisms of such argumentation.
3.1 The most prominent normative theories and their moral criteria
In this section, I will give an outline of the most prominent ethical theories and their
accompanying moral criteria for moral justification. There are many normative theories and subversions of each theory, but consequentialism, deontology and virtue theory are widely considered to be the three major approaches within normative ethics (Hursthouse & Pettigrove, 2016). I will discuss each of these theories briefly in the presented order.
Consequentialism is the view which holds that the normative character of an action does depend solely on consequences. So in order to judge which actions is morally just, we should take the consequences a certain action produces into account. An example that most likely rings a bell for every (former) student in the Netherlands, is the illegal purchase of a presumably stolen bike. If one would buy the bike, the buyer would maintain pilferage and therefore risks that the very bike he just bought will get stolen from him in the near future so it can get sold again. In other words, by buying a stolen item one preserves theft in some way. Therefore, it is morally wrong to buy the bike since the consequence of that action is not desirable. However, in order for this to be a satisfying normative answer to the question, every consequentialist has to postulate why certain state of affairs are or aren’t inherently valuable. According to consequentialism, the state of affairs an action produces are supposed
to constitute ‘the Good’. Only when the good is specified, there is a concrete criterion that can help for judging the moral character of a choice, namely whatever choices increase the Good are the choices which are morally right to perform. (Sinnet-Armstrong, 2015)
The most famous consequentialist is John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), who is also considered to be the founder of utilitarianism, one of the many forms of consequentialism (Macleod, 2017). Utilitarianism is a classic example of a consequentialist moral theory. Utilitarianism upholds the claim that an act is morally right if and only if that act maximizes the good, that is, if and only if the total amount of good for all minus the total amount of bad for all is greater than this net amount for any incompatible act available to the agent on that occasion (Sinnet-Armstrong, 2015). These claims are often taken together in the saying that an act is right if and only if it generates “the greatest happiness for the greatest number”. However, this could be deceptive in some sense since an act can increase happiness for the greatest sum of people but still fail to maximize the cumulative good. If the smaller number of people whose happiness is decreased lose considerably more than the greater number gains, one cannot speak of cumulatively maximized good. That kind of sacrifice would not be allowed by the principle of utility, except when the cumulative good is enlarged overall more than any alternative. It is this overall utility that most consequentialists claim to be the measure of what is morally right or what is ought to be done. (Sinnet-Armstrong, 2015)
Deontology is one of the normative theories regarding which choices are morally required, forbidden, or permitted (Alexander & Moore, 2016). Therefore deontology guide and assess our choices of what we ought to do. We are expected to act in accordance with moral norms, which can require us to perform particular actions, but simultaneously forbid the performing of others. Obviously, there have to be criteria which will decide whether a particular moral norm is indeed the right one to use for guiding behavior. Some deontologists provide us explicit norms, like ‘do not lie’ or ‘love your neighbor like yourself’. Such norms carry a rather authoritative character and are often similar to those found in holy scripts and the negatively formulated norms that forbid actions in laws. Other deontological theories provide us more abstract norms in order to be able to deal with exceptions. For example, Kant his deontological stance makes use of abstract norms without clear content. The only requirement for a moral norm is that it can be willed universally. This includes an explicit norm as ‘do not lie’, because if everybody would lie, there would be no such thing as the truth, which is considered to be undesirable. Of course, one could argue that truth is undesirable and
possibilities of these argumentative moves and the sufficiency of moral justification in general further on in this chapter. (Alexander & Moore, 2016)
Let’s revisit the bike example. What would the deontologist do? Where the
consequentialist focuses on the consequences the buying would produce, a deontologist would argue that the buying of a stolen bike is not in compliance with a moral rule, for example ‘do not buy stolen goods’. The justification does no focus on the consequences such an action produces. While most of the moral norms formulated feel intuitively ‘moral’, this reference to an intrinsic state is not satisfactory to defend the acceptability of the moral norm. Therefore, Kant and other deontologists demand more from a moral norm, namely an explanation why something should be willed universally. Furthermore, deontological theories can be divided into agent-centered (Scheffler 1988) and victim-centered theories (Kamm 2007). According to agent-centered theories, for each person there are permissions and obligations that offer agent-relative motives for action. An agent-relative reason does not have to constitute a reason for anyone else because there are subjective motivations involved. For example, if one has to choose between saving two children or their own child these subjective reasons come into play. These theories pay attention to the fact that things that are considered ‘ours’, can trump or neglect other reasons.
Patient-centered deontological theories are regarded as theories primarily focused on people's rights. The right against being used merely as means is the core right of patient-centered theories. In deontological morality, moral duties are given a central role and this enables the deontologist to not only act in accordance with what morality demands, but also enables a person to perform morally praiseworthy actions. What all these deontological approaches share is that they formulate a rule which functions as a criterion for moral behavior. In order for an action to be moral, it has to be in accordance with that rule. (Alexander & Moore, 2016)
The third and final normative theory is virtue theory, whose founding father is Aristotle (Willows, 2013). Two concepts can be considered to be central within Aristotle’s virtue ethics, namely, “virtue” and “practical wisdom”. Aristotle famously described the right balance, as in absence and presence of a virtue. One who possesses practical wisdom has the ability to weigh virtues and predict rightfully whether the consequences of an action still are in accordance with the moral guidelines (Hursthouse & Pettigrove, 2016).
Practical wisdom is the knowledge ‘to do the right thing’ (Hursthouse & Pettigrove, 2016). Whereas children for example can have the right intention to be honest but lack the
knowledge of consequences, an action can turn out to have morally wrong consequences. Despite of the fact that honesty is a praiseworthy virtue, it has to be treated with great responsibility and it takes a special kind of wisdom to bring a virtue adequately into practice.
A virtue is usually defined as an excellent trait of character (Hursthouse & Pettigrove, 2016). An excellent trait of character is defined as acting in accordance with a virtue without serving any other purpose than to bring the virtue into practice. One who is acting honestly because he fears to get caught otherwise (or to burn infinitely in hell), is not considered to be virtuous. If one does not practice racist behavior because it is forbidden by law, one cannot be considered to have respect for every human-being despite of its race. Admittedly, to fully possess a virtue is considered to be quite rare and therefore possessing a virtue is considered to be a matter of degree. A virtue is expressed in one’s cumulative actions instead of solely one. (Hursthouse & Pettigrove, 2016)
Instead of empathizing rules or consequences, virtue theory focuses on the moral character of a person. For example, from a deontological view you ought to act in accordance with a moral rule and if you do so, you can be considered as a charitable person. In virtue theory, it is the other way around. One should be a charitable person, in what manner this is brought into practice is more or less secondary. Whereas consequentialists will describe virtues as traits that produce good consequences and deontologists will define virtues as traits possessed by those who fulfill their duties, virtue ethicists won’t define virtues in ‘terms of some other concept that is taken to be more fundamental’ (Hursthouse & Pettigrove, 2016). Virtues will be foundational for virtue ethical theories and other normative notions will be grounded in them. (Willows, 2013)
3.2 The role of moral criteria in arguments
Now that I have shown which moral criteria are used in the most prominent normative theories, I will analyze the role of these moral criteria in the arguments used for moral justification in argument schemes. I will reconstruct for each normative theory an argument scheme for moral justification for an evaluative standpoint and a prescriptive standpoint and identify the type of argumentation which is appropriate to defend each standpoint according to pragma-dialectics. The three moral theories all have a different take on what the "morally good" is made up of, which gives us valuable information concerning the moral criteria that are used for moral justification. The criterion for the morally good found in consequentialism it that an act has certain effects, in deontology an action has to comply with a moral rule and in virtue theory actions should show specific characteristics. These moral criteria can be used
to construct an argument scheme for the single arguments used as moral justification for each normative theory. All of these forms of justification can be reconstructed as an argument scheme. The consequentialist criteria for justifying a prescriptive ethical standpoint can be reconstructed as pragmatic argumentation, because the criterion for the morally good focuses on the effects. As stated in section 2, Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004, p. 97) have described pragmatic argumentation as a sub-type of causal argumentation, in which one points out the consequences of a suggested course of action or measure. In consequentialism the effects of a certain action are pointed out. When reconstructed as an evaluative standpoint, the argumentation should be reconstructed as symptomatic argumentation because the effect now functions as a sign for the morally good.
Figure 1. Consequentialist criteria
Evaluative standpoint Prescriptive standpoint
1 Action X is morally good 1 Action X should be carried out 1.1a Action X leads to cumulatively more
good
1.1b Cumulatively more good is desirable 1.1a-b’ If action X leads to cumulatively more good, and if cumulatively more good is desirable, then that is a sign that action X is morally good
1.1a Action X leads to cumulatively more good
1.1b Cumulatively more good is desirable 1.1a-b’ If action X leads to cumulatively more good, and if cumulatively more good is desirable, then action X should be carried out
According to deontology an action has to be in compliance with a moral rule. This
deontological criterion can be identified as symptomatic argumentation, because there is a claim that being in compliance with a moral rule is a sign for morally good action.
Symptomatic argumentation can also appeal to a desirable principle or maxim (Ihnen, 2012, p. 16), which is characteristic for deontology.
Figure 2. Deontological criteria
Evaluative standpoint Prescriptive standpoint
1 Action X is morally good 1 Action X should be carried out 1.1 Action X is in compliance with a moral
rule
1.1’ If an action is in compliance with a moral rule, then that is a sign that an action
1.1 Action X is in compliance with a moral rule
1.1’ If an action is in compliance with a moral rule, then that is a sign that an action
can be considered to be morally good should be carried out
Finally, virtue theory demands that in order for an action or event to be morally good, it has to display specific characteristics. Once more, this can be reconstructed as symptomatic
argumentation because showing virtue and practical wisdom is claimed to be characteristic for morally good action.
Figure 3. Virtue theoretical criteria.
Evaluative standpoint Prescriptive standpoint
1 Action X is morally good 1 Action X should be carried out 1.1a Action X shows virtue X
1.1b Action X shows practical wisdom 1.1a-b’ If an action shows virtue and practical wisdom, then that is a sign that an action can be considered as morally good.
1.1a Action X shows virtue X
1.1b Action X shows practical wisdom 1.1a-b’ If an action shows virtue and practical wisdom, then that is a sign that an action should be carried out.
3.3 Criticisms of the reconstructed argument schemes
Based upon the reconstruct argument schemes, one can criticize the argumentation. As shown in 2.3, there are two forms of criticism possible. One can either criticize the appropriateness of the argument scheme or the correctness of the argument scheme (van Eemeren &
Grootendorst, 2004, p. 98). I will focus on correctness since I am interested in reconstructing the critique one could utter with regards to the justificatory force and the propositional
content. The formal rewriting of the moral criteria found in consequentialism, deontology and virtue theory makes the argument scheme and the hidden premises of moral justification explicit. The reconstruction exposes that only consequentialism makes use of pragmatic argumentation when the standpoint is reconstructed as a prescriptive standpoint. Deontology as well as virtue theory argue symptomatically for supporting an ethical standpoint and when reconstructed as an evaluative standpoint, the argumentation from an consequentialist view is symptomatic as well. This has important consequences for the way one can criticize moral justification from an argumentative perspective. If you want to point out that something has a particular effect, which is the argument for moral justification according to consequentialists, then the opponent is able to criticize the offered argumentation in two ways. Namely, either that it does not have the consequences which are brought forward or that if it does have the
consequences, it does not mean that it is morally good. This is precisely where the moral dilemmas occur. All theories try to defend the standpoint that an action is morally good, however they do not agree on what constitutes the morally good. The mutual conflict is based on the conception of what the morally good contains. Effects are not relevant for the morally good according to the deontologists, whereas the consequentialist disregards the moral criteria that a moral action has to be in compliance with a moral norm. So it is not merely the
propositional content, but also the justificatory force of an argument that is not accepted or at least criticized by the opposition. This means that an argument is considered to be valid for justifying the standpoint (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004). For example, if one wants to argue for the standpoint that ‘Buying a stolen bike is wrong’ the protagonist can advance an act of single argumentation containing the propositional content ‘Buying a stolen bike is wrong’. The justificatory relationship between the proposition stated in the standpoint ‘Buying a stolen bike is wrong’ and the proposition expressed in the act of single
argumentation, for example the consequentialist his argument that ‘Buying a stolen bike has undesirable consequences’, can in this example be given as ‘Buying stolen things has undesirable consequences’.
The other party involved in the discussion can reply either positively or negatively to such an act of argumentation. A positive reply to an act of argumentation contains of
accepting both the propositional content and the justificatory force of the protagonist’s act (Popa, 2016). When an antagonist gives this response, the antagonist is said to have been persuaded by the protagonist’s argumentation (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1984, p. 71). A negative reply to an act of argumentation is a critical reply to the protagonist’s argumentation. A negative reply can come in two variants. An antagonist can reply negatively either by expressing doubt or by advancing a rejection (van Eemeren, Houtlosser, & Snoeck Henkemans, 2007, p. 193). In the case of doubt, the antagonist expresses his lack of
agreement with either the propositional content or the justificatory force of the protagonist’s argumentation. In the case of rejection, the antagonist negates either the propositional content or the justificatory force of the protagonist’s argumentation. The two types of negative replies (doubt and rejection), combined with the two propositions towards which this negative response can be directed (propositional content and justificatory force), give rise to four possible replies to an act of argumentation (Popa, 2016). These are:
(1) doubt regarding the propositional content; (2) doubt regarding the justificatory force;
(3) rejection of the propositional content; (4) rejection of the justificatory force.
In the example of the stolen bike in which a protagonist advances the argumentation ‘Buying a stolen bike has undesirable consequences’ in defense of the standpoint that ‘Buying a stolen bike is wrong’, then the four negative replies might be restated as follows:
(1) I’m not so sure buying a stolen bike has undesirable consequences; (2) I’m not so sure undesirable consequences makes something wrong; (3) Buying a stolen bike has no undesirable consequences at all;
(4) Having undesirable consequences does not make something wrong.
Additionally, the accompanying critical questions can be asked as well in order to criticize the argumentation. Consider the following line of reasoning:
1 You should not buy a stolen bike
1.1 Because buying a stolen bike leads to undesirable consequences
1.1’If buying a stolen bike leads to undesirable consequences, then that action should not be carried out.
If one would like to attack the pragmatic argumentation for defending this prescriptive standpoint, one could ask the critical question for pragmatic argumentation and question the causality of the uttered argumentation: “Does stealing a bike (Z) always lead to undesirable consequences (Y)?”. One could also question whether undesirable consequences are in fact relevant for morally worthy action.
?1.1’If buying a stolen bike leads to undesirable consequences, then that action should not be carried out.
If an antagonist advances any of the replies listed above, he has not been completely convinced by the protagonist’s argumentation. The protagonist’s argumentation has
failed to achieve the intended effect. These four possible responses to an act of argumentation can be combined with the argument schemes reconstructed on the basis of the moral criteria and the accompanying critical questions. These are the building blocks of a tool to analyze
exactly which part of the argumentation is not accepted and the tool helps to characterize the argumentative differences among deontology, consequentialism and virtue theory in
argumentative terms.
4 A case-study of justification in ethical discussions
In the previous section I have reconstructed the argument schemes of each normative theory and stated in what possible ways they can be criticized. In this section I will demonstrate the use of the tool and analyze the justification given for a certain course of action in ethical discussions I found in two different cases. These case studies are meant to demonstrate that the analytical tool that I have developed is capable of identifying the standpoint, type of
argumentation and can make the (anticipated) critique explicit. I have showed that ethical discussions either revolve around a prescriptive or an evaluative standpoint and that each standpoint can be defended with either pragmatic or symptomatic argumentation.
Furthermore, I have shown for each argument scheme that either the justificatory force or the propositional content can be questioned or rejected, or the argument scheme can be rejected as a whole. By reconstructing a discussion with the help of this tool, one can immediately point out where the disagreement occurs and even identify further ways to resolve the
disagreement. For example, if one does not accept the justificatory force of an argument, it has no use by offering an argument with a different propositional content but the same justificatory force, but one should return to the opening stage to agree on the use of certain argument schemes. I will demonstrate the use of the tool and use it as a heuristic device to reconstruct two cases. The first one is a monologue where one clearly can see the difference between pragmatic and symptomatic argumentation. The second example is a discussion where I will reconstruct the explicit critique in argumentative terms.
4.1 Her Majesty The Queen vs. R. Dudley and Stephens
The first example centers on the question whether murder is allowed by necessity. In the leading English criminal case ‘Her Royal Queen v Dudley and Stephens’ from 1884. It concerned survival cannibalism following a shipwreck and its claimed justification on the basis of a Custom of the Sea. After a highly publicized trial they were convicted of murder and sentenced to death with a recommendation for forgiveness; the sentence was commuted to six months in prison. The case became famous for the moral questions it addresses. Dudley and Stephens were shipwrecked along with two other men. When one of them, the cabin boy Richard Parker, fell into a coma, Dudley and Stephens decided to kill him for food. The verdict of the court reads as follows:
A man who, in order to escape death from hunger, kills another for the purpose of eating his flesh, is guilty of murder; although he is in such circumstances that he believes and has reasonable ground for believing that it affords the only chance of preserving his life. At the trial of an indictment for murder it appeared, upon a special verdict, that the prisoners D. and S. seamen, and the deceased, a boy between seventeen and eighteen, were cast away in a storm on the high seas, and compelled to put into an open boat; that the boat was drifting on the ocean, and was probably more than 1000 miles from land; that on the eighteenth day, when they had been seven days without food and five days without water, D. proposed to S. that lots should be cast who should be put to death to save the rest, and that they afterwards
thought it would be better to kill the boy that their lives should be saved; that on the twentieth day D., with the assent of S., killed the boy, and both D. and S. fed on his flesh for four days; that at the time of the act there was no sail in sight nor any reasonable prospect of relief; that under these circumstances there appeared to the prisoners every probability that unless they then or very soon fed upon the boy, or one of themselves, they would die upon starvation. Held, that upon these facts, there was no proof of such necessity as could justify the prisoners in killing the boy, and that they were guilty of murder. (Sandel, 2007, pp. 3-4.)
In this example, there are a lot of propositions of fact which constitutes reasons for the consequentialist to decide whether an action is morally good or wrong. With death breathing in their necks, the chance of dying of starvation becomes more real every second and
therefore there could be a tipping point where murder is allowed if effects are indeed relevant in such cases. Since the discussion centers on this allowance, I reconstruct the standpoint as a prescriptive standpoint. The implication of this is that the argumentation has to reconstructed as pragmatic argumentation.
1 Murder is allowed by necessity in the case of Her Majesty The Queen vs. R. Dudley and Stephens
1.1a Murder by necessity leads to cumulatively more good 1.1b Cumulatively more good is desirable
1.1a-b’ If murder by necessity leads to cumulatively more good, and if cumulatively more good is desirable, then murder by necessity should be carried out
For the deontologist though, all these propositions of fact bare far less meaning. These facts cannot be used for justification ever since killing someone for their flesh is not in accordance with any reasonable moral norm for human-beings. Allowing murder in some cases is
extremely dangerous, since this allowance should not fall subject to some sort of sliding scale and therefore could not be wanted universally. This results in the following argument scheme:
1 Murder is not allowed by necessity in the case of Her Majesty The Queen vs. R. Dudley and Stephens
1.1 Murder by necessity is not in compliance with any moral rule
1.1’ If murder by necessity is not in compliance with any moral rule, then that is a sign it should not carried out
The consequentialist defends his standpoint indeed with pragmatic argumentation while the deontologist focuses on the compliance with a moral rule. Therefore, in this case the
deontologist criticizes the appropriateness of the argument scheme and does not accept pragmatic argumentation for defending this ethical standpoint, or at least questions the hidden premise of the consequentialist reasoning, namely:
? 1.1a-b’ If murder by necessity leads to cumulatively more good, and if cumulatively more good is desirable, then murder by necessity should be carried out
Even if a certain action leads to cumulatively more good, in this example that is not considered to be a good reason to carry it out.
4.2 Same-sex marriage
The second example provides a discussion concerning the allowance of same-sex marriage. The example attests that an ethical discussion does not necessarily has to be a discussion between two different ethical theories. Consequentialist reasons can be offered to refute consequentialist argumentation, and virtues can be brought forward to refute virtues. A good example of such a discussion is the following example which discusses whether same-sex marriage is in line with the purpose of marriage:
Many opponents of same sex marriage claim - and this is the most powerful
argument for the traditional view - that the primary purpose of marriage is procreation. According to this argument, since same sex couples can't procreate on their own, they
shouldn't have the right to marry. They lack, so to speak, the relevant virtue. Marshall takes on this argument directly. She doesn't pretend to be neutral on the purpose of marriage. She offers a rival account of the telos of marriage. The essence of marriage, she argues, is not
procreation, but an exclusive loving commitment between two partners, straight or gay. At this point one might ask how, given two rival accounts of the purpose of marriage, is it possible to adjudicate between them? Marshall's opinion offers a good illustration of how such arguments can proceed. First, she disputes the claim that procreation is the primary purpose of marriage. She does so by showing that marriage, as currently practiced and regulated by the state, does not require the ability to procreate. Heterosexual couples who apply for marriage licenses are not asked about their ability or intention to conceive children. Fertility is not a condition of marriage, she points out. People who have never consummated their marriage may stay married. People who cannot stir from their deathbed may marry. And so, she concludes, "it is the exclusive and permanent commitment of the marriage partners to one another, not the begetting of children, that is the sine qua non of civil marriage." (Sandel, 2006, p. 1309)
The standpoint which Marshall defends in this example can be reconstructed with the help of the tool which is developed in this paper. The standpoint is evaluative in nature, since it makes a clear judgment regarding the purpose of marriage. The argumentation is presented as an attack on the traditional view, which is defended with a reference to the alleged purpose of marriage, namely procreation. The traditional view would take the following form:
1 Same sex marriage is morally flawed
1.1 Same sex marriage does not bare the possibility for procreation
1.1’ If same sex marriage does not bare the possibility for procreation, than same sex marriage is morally flawed.
The argument scheme for Marshall’s reasoning can be reconstructed as the following: 1 Same sex marriage is morally good
1.1 Same sex marriage does show an exclusive loving commitment between two partners
1.1’ If same sex marriage does show an exclusive loving commitment between two partners.
An attempt to define marriage is disproven by refuting the alleged characteristics of marriage. This critique can be seen as a critical question accompanying symptomatic argumentation, namely ‘Aren’t there also other Y’s that do not have the characteristic Z?’. Marshall expresses doubt regarding the hidden premise:
? 1.1’ If same sex marriage does not bare the possibility for procreation, than same sex marriage is morally flawed.
She offers a lot of propositions of fact as arguments for defending that procreation is not a necessary characteristic for marriage:
Heterosexual couples who apply for marriage licenses are not asked about their ability or intention to conceive children. Fertility is not a condition of marriage, she points out. People who have never consummated their marriage may stay married. People who cannot stir from their deathbed may marry. (Sandel, 2006, p. 1309)
Additionally, Marshall argues that same sex marriage does not interfere with the purpose of marriage, since she does not accept that procreation is the sole purpose or even a necessary trait of marriage, but an exclusive loving commitment between two partners is the purpose of marriage. Thus, it is not the justificatory force that is refuted, but the propositional content.
5 Conclusion
My main goal of this research was to provide the building blocks for a tool, in order to analyze the justification given in ethical discussions and reconstruct the role of moral criteria in the most prominent ethical theories in argument schemes. With the help of this tool, the analyst is able to precisely pinpoint the disagreement in argumentative terms.
analyze justification in ethical discussions. I first identified the type of standpoints commonly found within ethical discussions. If in argumentative discourse it is not clear precisely which standpoint is at issue, there is no way of telling whether the argumentation that is advanced can lead to a resolution of the difference of opinion that is discussed. The standpoints which commonly occur within ethical discussions are prescriptive and evaluative standpoints. The former contains a recommendation for a certain course of action while the latter attributes a value to the persons or things referred to. Each of these standpoints can be defended with specific types of arguments. Prescriptive standpoints can be defended with pragmatic argumentation by referring to an effect of what is stated in the standpoint, or symptomatic argumentation by citing in the argument a certain sign, symptom, or distinguishing mark of what is claimed in the standpoint. Evaluative standpoints can be defended with symptomatic argumentation only. Furthermore, I elaborated on the possible criticisms of each type of argumentation. One can either criticize the appropriateness of an argument scheme or the correctness and for each argument scheme there are accompanying critical questions, questioning the justificatory force of the offered argumentation.
In section 3 I made an inventory of the moral criteria used for justifying ethical standpoints found in the most prominent ethical theories, which are consequentialism, deontology and virtue ethics. I reconstructed the role of these moral criteria in argument schemes. An interesting finding of this study is that all theories argue symptomatically for an ethical standpoint, but from an consequentialist perspective a prescriptive standpoint is defended with pragmatic argumentation. On the basis of the reconstructed argument schemes, I formulated the ways one can criticize the propositional content and the justificatory force of these schemes as well as the critical questions for each scheme. With the help of these
reconstructions, I developed a tool to analyze the justification of ethical standpoints in ethical discussions.
In section 4, I illustrated the working of the developed tool with the help of two case studies and demonstrated how it can be used to analyze ethical discussions in order to pinpoint which part of the argumentation is or is not accepted by the other party. The first case study demonstrated that the participants did not accept each other’s argument schemes. The deontologist did not accept the pragmatic argumentation of the consequentialist and criticized the appropriateness of the argument scheme. In the second case concerning the allowance of same-sex marriage, the participants each brought forward an alleged purpose of marriage for defending an evaluative standpoint. With the help of the tool I reconstructed the argumentation as symptomatic argumentation and the criticism which was brought forward by
the antagonist, could indeed be reconstructed as a critical question related to symptomatic argumentation.
The added value of this research is the focus on the differences of the argumentative form of the moral criteria used in the justification given stemming from a certain normative theory, as opposed to merely the content-related differences, to precisely pinpoint where the
disagreement occurs. A result of the study is that consequentialism is the only ethical theory which makes use of pragmatic argumentation to defend an ethical standpoint. Furthermore, all theories criticize the propositional content as well as the justificatory force of each other argument schemes, but deontology in particular is very critical regarding the acceptability of the pragmatic argument scheme used by consequentialism. More specifically, the
disagreement commonly found between deontologists and consequentialists can be seen as a critique regarding the appropriateness of the pragmatic argument scheme. The indecisiveness usually found in ethical discussions therefore not seems to be located not only in the
argumentation stage (propositional content), but also in the opening stage (justificatory force or appropriateness). With the help of the tool, this commonly found disagreement is
characterized in argumentative terms.
For argumentation theory, this research has shown that it is fruitful to look at existing problems from an argumentative perspective in order to gain new insights. The developed tool enables the analyst to reconstruct ethical discussions more adequately. Reconstructing the argument schemes for consequentialism, deontology and virtue theory and the accompanying critical questions, enlightens new aspects which can be used to analyze the difference of opinion more precisely and even improve the quality of the discussion which is under scrutiny. Since ethical discussions are mostly evidently important discussions, the results are also of societal importance. Whether the discussion centers on refugees or the moral
dilemmas concerning self-driving cars, when one is able to pinpoint the disagreement more precisely, the quality of those discussions will hopefully improve.
Further research could focus on developing the evaluative characteristics of ethical discussions, so one would not only be able to analyze ethical discussions and pinpoint the disagreement, but also improve the argumentative quality of these discussions and deal with the commonly found disagreement. Further research could also focus on the way people argue in reality for ethical standpoints and if they indeed make use of the moral criteria found in the ethical theories, or combine several of these criteria and which one are perceived as
From a more philosophical perspective, further research could also focus on the argumentative differences between the most prominent philosophers instead of the main theories. For example, there are deontologists whom do accept some consequentialist reasoning under specific conditions. These specific conditions could be displayed in
argumentative terms and all these relations could be displayed in an overview. If done so, one could see immediately which consequentialists reject some argument schemes as a whole and which reject only the justificatory force for example.
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