1
Russian Propaganda in British Newspapers:
Framing of Russia in the Coverage of MH17 Flight Crash
Master’s Thesis
Yuliia Verbunt
Student number: 11181338
Graduate School of Communication
Master’s Programme Communication Science Political Communication Track
Supervised by dr. Jasper van de Pol
2 Abstract
Russian government has launched a massive propagandistic campaign in Western
informational environment to ameliorate European public opinion and to justify its annexation of Crimea, invasion into Eastern Ukraine, and especially the shooting down a civilian flight MH17. As little is still known about the impact of Russian propaganda onto Western media, I use a quantitative framing analysis to reveal how Russia was presented in the coverage of MH17 case by six daily British newspapers of different nature (quality and sensationalist) and ownership (owned by Russian Alexander Lebedev, international News Corp and purely British companies). The coverage of MH17 case in the UK is characterized by a decline of negative tone towards Russia as well as the decline of responsibility and Russian responsibility frames over time, weak conflict frame, absence of fake news frame and absence of critique while citing Russian sources. Ownership and newspaper nature played a significant role in the frame-building process: Russian owned newspapers and sensationalist newspapers were framing Russia in a more favourable manner, which could be the indication of their susceptibility to Russian propaganda.
Key words: Russian propaganda, MH17, frame-building, organizational level of influence.
3 Russian Propaganda in British Newspapers:
Framing of Russia in the Coverage of MH17 Flight Crash
Introduction
Officials of the European Union officially acknowledged the presence of Kremlin’s propaganda in the European media environment which aims to influence European public opinion and to create political support for Russian actions undermining the coherence of the EU foreign policy (EP, 2016). On the 23rd of November 2016, the European Parliament adopted a Resolution “EU strategic communication to counteract propaganda against it by third parties” (2016/2030(INI), which states the following (Article 8) :
“Russian Government is employing a wide range of tools and instruments, such as think tanks and special foundations (e.g. Russkiy Mir), special authorities
(Rossotrudnichestvo), multilingual TV stations (e.g. RT), pseudo news agencies and multimedia services (e.g. Sputnik), cross-border social and religious groups, … social media and internet trolls to challenge democratic values, divide Europe, gather domestic support and create the perception of failed states in the EU’s eastern neighbourhood”. Nevertheless, despite massive Russian attempts to influence opinions of EU citizens, polls show a clear deterioration of Russia’s image throughout the EU countries over the last years. Pew Research survey (2015) shows that 66% of UK citizens, 70% of Germans and French, and 80% of Poles have an unfavourable opinion about Russia. Still, widespread distrust of the Kremlin does not necessarily mean that Russian information activities are ineffective, as they also aim to confuse the audience and destabilize the political landscape (Russel, 2016).
The majority of existing studies on Russian media warfare are focused on finding the evidence of Russia’s spreading propaganda, misinformation, fake news, lies and confusion in the
4 EU informational environment. For example, already in 2011, Borchers found the proofs of propagandistic nature of the coverage of Russo-Baltic relationships (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia) by RT channel; the same style was confirmed in the coverage of Russia’s military intervention to Syria (Imamgaiazova, 2016) and to Ukraine (Evans, 2015), including the case of MH17 downing (Oates, 2014; Lopatynska, 2015).
An increasing amount of disinformation, forged telegrams and fake news items have been detected in the Finnish (Aro, 2016) and Swedish (Kragh & Åsberg, 2017) informational
landscapes, especially in at least two important areas: Swedish–NATO cooperation and Swedish/EU support for Ukraine.
So far, little is known about the effects of Russian media warfare onto European media outlets. Lelich (2014) states that Russian propaganda is sometimes picked up and rebroadcast by legitimate news outlets and more often by social media, for example, German news sources rebroadcast Russian disinformation about atrocities in Ukraine in early 2014. Similarly, Kragh and Åsberg (2017) declare that wittingly or unwittingly Swedish newspapers have performed a role of interlocutors of the disinformation. Aro (2016) says that some international media outlets had to close the comment sections on their websites because of the attacks of Russian Internet trolls.
Aro (2016) came to the conclusion that aggressive pro-Russia propaganda trolls in social media had an impact on Finnish citizens as some of them had stopped discussing Russian politics online or became really confused about what was true or false about the war in Ukraine. Kremlin is also conducting aggressive slander campaigns against oppositional journalists and media; “both in Finland and internationally there have been various cases in which pro-Kremlin
5 Russian info-war tactics.” (p.127). She is of the opinion that Russian propaganda is a threat to the national security of Finland and other countries, especially those where the system of education and public broadcasting tradition are less developed than in Finland.
These conclusions are made based on qualitative academic or empirical research. Meanwhile, there is still no quantitative academic research focusing on the effects of Russian media warfare and detecting if the content of Western media outlets was sensitive towards Russian destructive informational efforts. De Vreese (2005) states that framing is an effective tool to study media content because framing is focused on the presentation of issues and the salience of different aspects of these issues. Studying the content through the evolvement of various frames around Russia (like responsibility frame, conflict frame, etc) could provide a more comprehensive picture of Russian image in Western media and thus reveal if there is an influence of Russian propaganda on democratic outlets.
In this research, I will make the first academic attempt to examine through a quantitative content analysis if the presentation of Russia and frames around it were influenced by the Russian position in the British coverage of MH17 flight crash.
British newspapers were chosen for several reasons. Firstly, the main broadcasting language of all Russian own foreign media is English, and the Headquarters of Russia Today and
Sputnik are located in London. Secondly, British citizens were among the victims of MH17crash.
Thirdly, British media landscape represents a rich variety of newspapers of different nature (tabloids and broadsheets) and of various ownership including Russian owned newspapers. The ownership and the nature of newspapers are important for this study as they are proved to influence a frame-building process (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996; Semetko & Vakenburg, 2000).
6 The case of downing the Malaysia airlines flight MH17 Amsterdam – Kuala Lumpur matches perfectly the purpose of this research. According to Oates (2014), Russia immediately developed an alternative strategic state narrative about MH17 crash shifting the blame to Ukraine. It launched global broadcasting and expensive online propaganda to dominate international debate surrounding MH17 crash (Sienkiewicz, 2015). Moreover, the ongoing investigation about the crash which lasts for almost three years gives a possibility to examine frames in a longitudinal perspective.
I hypothesize in this paper that absence/decline of some frames as well as favourable tone towards Russia or citing Russian sources without any criticism could be an indication of Russian propaganda influence. Comparative analysis across different types of ownership and nature of newspapers should reveal which types of outlets were more favourable towards Russian position.
The goal of this research is to answer the question of how has the framing of Russia been
evolving in the coverage of MH17 downing across different British newspapers?
Context
In March 2014, Russia annexed Crimea in the south of Ukraine and started an undeclared “hybrid” war in the eastern Ukraine (Hoskins & O'Loughlin, 2015). NATO is describing Russian tactics in Ukraine and the hybrid war as: “a new form of warfare ... combining an intensive information campaign, cyber warfare and the use of highly trained Special Operation Forces” (NATO STRATCOM, 2014, p. 4). As of 2017, Russia was still denying the presence of its troops in Ukraine, describing the conflict as a civil war. There are elements of both indirect (propaganda) as well as direct Russian involvement in the Ukrainian conflict, which are
manifested by the constant presence of thousands of Russian troops and by arming, training and equipping Ukrainian insurgents (Gibney, 2015).
7 In the midst of this war, Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 flying from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur was shot down on the 17th of July, 2014 from the territory of eastern Ukraine, which is under the control of separatists. This crash is one the deadliest airliners shoot down, taking the lives of 298 people (193 Dutch citizens, 43 Malaysian, 27 Australian, 10 British and others).
At the same day, Ukrainian authorities declared that the aircraft was shot by Russian military Air Defence Forces, possibly BUK system, as neither Ukraine (in that area) nor separatists possessed the weapons able to shoot jets on such a height. The final report of Dutch Safety Team confirmed that the aeroplane was struck by a warhead launched by a BUK surface-to-air missile system (DST, 2015). In February – May 2016, British open source investigation team Bellingcat identified a Russian military division and its location in Russia, from which BUK system was transported to Ukraine through the uncontrolled border. They also identified the names of at least 20 military Russian officers who gave the order to shoot the aircraft and those who were executing it.
“The shoot down persuaded European governments to join tough economic sanctions on Russia which had been proposed by the US. Moscow’s response to this tragedy was to deny any involvement and launch a disinformation campaign arguing that Ukrainian jets had downed the aircraft.” (Rutland & Kazantsev, 2016, p. 401). Military invasion to Ukraine and further shooting of a civilian MH17 flight marked the biggest confrontation between Russia and the West since the Cold War times (Lopatynska, 2015).
Theoretical background
The coverage of catastrophes, like MH17 crash, terrorist attacks, disasters, military conflicts and wars are popular subjects for a framing analysis (Cottiero et al, 2015; Heywood,
8 2014; Kolmer & Semetko, 2009; Papacharissi & Oliveira, 2008; Dimitrova & Strömbäck, 2005; Entman, 2004; 1991). The most widely used definition of framing is the one introduced by Entman (1993) saying that “To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make
them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem
definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the
item described” (p.52). De Vreese (2005) and Gamson and Modigliani (1988) describe frames as “a central organizing idea or story line that provides meaning to an unfolding strip of events, weaving a connection among them. The frame suggests what the controversy is about, the
essence of the issue” (p. 53).
Dimitrova and Strömbäck (2005) refer frames to the ways in which mass media organize
and present issues and events, and De Vreese (2005) calls a frame “an emphasis in salience of
different aspects of a topic”(p.53). These definitions are the most applicable for my research as I will focus on how Russia and its involvement in the shooting down of the civilian flight MH17
was emphasized, organized and presented in the media coverage.
Generic and issue-specific frames
A deductive approach to content analyzing the frames is used. I define a priori four
frames: two generic frames – conflict frame and responsibility frame; and I will further elaborate
two new issue-specific frames – Russian mention frame and fake news frame.
Generic frames do not depend on the topic of the coverage; they keep their relevance
over time and can be used in different cultural contexts (De Vreese, 2005). Responsibility frame
followed by the conflict frame are the most identified generic frames in reporting news (Semetko
9 Responsibility frame “presents an issue or problem in such a way as to attribute
responsibility for its cause or solution to either the government or to an individual or group” (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000, p. 96). This frame was earlier researched in a similar study on
shooting down two civilian aircrafts by Entman (1991) and in other studies by Iyengar (1991),
Semetko and Valkenburg (2000), Dimitrova and Strömbäck (2005), and others. In this paper,
responsibility frame emphasizes on the indication on the responsibility of various parties and
governments for the shooting down of MH17 civilian plane. Responsibility frame is further
specified for Russian responsibility frame. Russian responsibility frame is attributing
responsibility for the crash to Russia.
Conflict frame “emphasizes conflict between individuals, groups, or institutions as a means of capturing audience interest (p. 95). A definition of conflict frame suggested by De
Vreese (2005) is more appropriate for this paper; he refers it to the journalistic practice of
reporting stories of clashing interpretations. In this research, I will look if there is a conflict
between Russia/Russian position and other countries, and their positions. Russian position could
be though presented as a journalistic norm of a second opinion; that is why conflict frame will be
checked for its association with a positive or negative tone to define if British journalists were
critical towards Russian propagandistic narrative.
Issue-specific frames are the frames which are pertinent only to specific topics or events
(De Vreese, 2005). The first issue-specific frame is a Russian mention frame. This frame
indicates if Russia is mentioned in an article or not. This frame should reveal the salience of
Russia’s visibility in the general coverage. Entman (1993) highlights salience as a key
characteristic of framing. Salience makes some issues more meaningful and noticeable for the
10 case of MH17 crash, the salience of Russia might help the readers to form their opinion about its
role in the shooting down of the plane. Russian mention frame is a central organizing frame
providing the space for the development of all other frames in this research: the presence of all
other frames is not possible if Russia was not mentioned in the article.
Fake news frame is a newly introduced issue-specific frame, which should be specific to
the coverage of MH17 crash. Fake news frame reveals and emphasizes Russia’s spreading fake news, misinformation, confusion, and lies about MH17 case. According to Khaldarova and Pantti (2016), fake news is the main constituent of Russia’s strategic narrative developed by Russian authorities and mass media to shape the perceptions and actions of international audience about
the conflict in Ukraine and MH17 shooting down specifically. They believe that the purpose of
Russian fake news narrative is to support already-constructed identity claims and positions rather
than to report on events. The presence of this frame should reveal if British journalists are aware
of Russian fake reporting onMH17 issue.
Frame setting: influences on framing
According to Schuefele (1999), frames can be studied as independent or dependent variables, and the process of framing consists of the following stages: frame building, frame setting, individual and societal consequences of framing. This research is focused on a frame-building theory examining frames as a dependent variable. Frame frame-building refers to the factors that influence the structural formation of news frames; the outcome of the frame building process is the manifest of frames in the text (De Vreese, 2005).
Shoemaker and Reese (1996) developed a hierarchy of influence model on the coverage of news and frames formation, which includes the following levels: individual level (personal characteristics of journalists), media routines level (professional habits at newsrooms),
11 organizational level (organizational features of the news company: ownership, broadcasting or printed media, sensational or sober outlet, etc.), extra media level (influence of the government, advertisers, investors etc), and ideological level (ideological boundaries set by the larger
society). Schuefele (1999) summed up five main factors that impact the structural qualities of frames: “social norms and values, organizational pressures and constraints, pressures of interest groups, journalistic routines, and ideological or political orientations of journalists” (p. 109).
As MH17 case became a very prominent international event attracting the attention of many governments and international organizations, extra media level, like the position of British government, should influence the framing of MH17 case. The coverage of military conflicts and wars is normally affected by the position of domestic government and political elites (Hallin, 1986). Similar opinion is supported by Bennett’s (2003) ‘indexing’ theory (journalist are indexing the reporting according to the views of politicians, especially if there is an agreement between different parties on a specific issue) and Entman’s (2004) ‘cascading network
activation’ theory, stating that administration and other elites are the most influential in shaping a frame of an issue.
London took a very tough position against Russia’s invasion into Ukraine and MH17 shooting, and as the result, tough economic sanctions were introduced against Russia. Political relations between Britain and Russia have dropped to their lowest level since the 1980s
(Gromyko, 2016). That is why, theoretically, British journalists should copy the schemas introduced by their government and thus be rather negative towards Russia, actively addressing to the four frames identified in this research.
According to Shoemaker and Reese (1996), organizational level factors have a critical impact on media content; especially an ultimate power lies in ownership. Brüggemann et al.
12 (2014) classify media system of the United Kingdom to Central model, which is distinguished by the highest level of media ownership regulations. British media landscape is represented by a variety of different companies, which own leading British newspapers, including international companies, like News Corporation and foreign owners, like Alexander Lebedev.
In 2009 and 2010, former Russian KGB officer, an oligarch Alexander Lebedev bought two loss-making famous British newspapers The London Evening Standard and The Independent for 1 pound each. That was the first time in the history of The United Kingdom that the media outlets were owned by a representative of the intelligence of a foreign state. There was a lot of scepticism about this purchase, especially because the deal was approved by Kremlin, but Lebedev promised not to interfere into the editorial policy (Van Herpen, 2015). There were no signs of direct interference of Alexander Lebedev and his son into the editorial policy; they became respected members of the British media establishment having a direct access to the British Government and even personally to the Prime-Minister David Cameron (Van Herpen, 2015).
Alexander Lebedev co-owns another newspaper – Russian Novaya Gazeta, which is known to be the only truly oppositional newspaper in Russia; 6 journalists were killed over the last years because of their professional activities, several survived after murder attempts, many were threatened. “His proprietorship of Novaya Gazeta means he has lent his wealth and protection to the most radical oppositionists among Russia’s journalists. He has offered the equivalent of £1m for the capture of the assassin of Anna Politkovskaya, the paper’s famed writer on Chechnya” (Van Herpen, 2015, p.103). The paper has deviated from the official Kremlin position in its coverage of MH17 crash, in July 2015 they published an article on the
13 front page titled in Dutch "Vergeef ons, Nederland" ("Forgive Us, Netherlands") (Mineyev, 2014).
I hypothesize that Russian-owned newspapers, due to their organizational closeness to Russian oppositional newspaper Novaya Gazeta, will be more aware of Russian propaganda, and therefore they will use all studied frames more often than newspapers belonging to international or British companies.
H1. Newspapers owned by Alexander Lebedev mention Russia and use the conflict,
responsibility, Russian responsibility, and fake news frames more often than the newspapers
owned by News Corporation or British owned newspapers.
Another dimension of organizational level of influence is the division of newspapers between serious broadsheets and popular soft news tabloids. Boykoff (2008) is describing British tabloids (including The Sun and The Daily Mirror) as those with a greater emphasis on surface-level topics such as entertainment, sports and personal lives, domestic topics and sensations, and thus deemphasizing international politics and economy, in-depth analyses and deviating from the objective or straight news reporting tendencies. Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) argue that the nature of an outlet (sensational versus sober) is the key factor defining the usage of such frames as the conflict and the attribution of responsibility. They found that conflict and responsibility frames were more inherent for serious newspapers than for tabloids. Being guided by these findings, I hypothesize that British broadsheets will refer more often to the promoted frames than British tabloids.
H2.British quality newspapers mention Russia and use the conflict, responsibility,
14 If there is a conflict between a frame promoted by the domestic and a foreign
government, journalists are likely to follow the domestic frame. But there are situations when foreign frames are picked up by national media (Strömbäck et al., 2008). This can happen when a foreign government is promoting its version of a frame more actively than the domestic government, or when a covered event is geographically or culturally distant from the country, in which a medium operates. Moreover, Scheufele (1999) is of the opinion that interest groups are able to influence a frame-building process for a relatively new issue where any frames have not been yet established. As Russian media (including English speaking media) where the first to report about the crash and further Russia established an expensive campaign to dominate internationally its narrative surrounding MH17 crash (Sienkiewicz, 2015), I hypothesize that Russia was able to influence the coverage of MH17 case in the first days, but over time the frames shaped by British Government became more prominent.
H3a. Conflict frames, responsibility frames and fake news frames occurred less at the
beginning and were more prominent later, as is the frequency of mentioning Russia.
I develop further hypothesis 3a and test the influence of time on the development of the frames across different types of ownership and newspapers’ nature. I stick to my previous hypotheses that Russian owned newspapers and quality newspapers were more resistant to Russian propaganda than sensationalist newspapers and outlets owned by international and British companies.
H3b. The usage of Russian mention frames, conflict frames, responsibility frames, and
fake news frames was growing even stronger over time within Russian owned newspapers and
15
Tone
Several studies were previously researching frames through the tone. For example, Dimitrova and Strömbäck (2005) found that some of the promoted frames are related to the dominant tone of the coverage: negative or positive. De Vreese and Boomgarden (2003) developed a theory about an inherent valence of frames, as frames are indicative of ‘good and bad’ they can implicitly emphasize positive or negative aspects of an issue. Frames are able to highlight issues from an advantageous or disadvantageous angle and thus influence public support for these issues. That is why I hypothesize that Russian owned newspapers and quality newspapers were picturing Russia from a disadvantageous angle being more negative towards Russia than other types of newspapers.
H4a. Russian owned newspapers and quality newspapers were more negative towards
Russia than the newspapers of other ownership and sensationalist newspapers respectively.
As more and more evidence about Russia’s involvement in the terrorist attack against MH17 flight was provided over time, I suppose that the tone towards Russia was becoming more negative over time, especially within Russian owned and sensationalist newspapers.
H4b. The tone of the coverage is becoming more negative over time. Russian owned
newspapers and quality newspapers were more negative towards Russia over time than the
newspapers of other ownership and sensationalist newspapers respectively.
Some frames are inherently valenced by their nature, implicitly indicating either positive or negative side of an issue (De Vreese & Boomgarden, 2003). They consider responsibility frame as a frame with a negative valence thus the tone of the coverage is supposed to be negative while this frame is attributed to an issue. On contrary, they classify conflict frame as a frame without a valence as it juxtaposes two opposing views not necessarily offering specific
16 evaluations. In this paper, the usage of conflict frame without supporting it with a negative tone means that journalists were providing propagandistic Russian position as a second opinion but they were not criticizing it. I hypothesize that usage of both responsibility and conflict frames should be associated with a negative tone towards Russia.
Another approach of this study is to look how British newspapers were using Russian sources and especially Russian English speaking media. Sources of information are as important for the framing process as the keywords or stereotyped images, as they also contribute to the reinforcing of facts or judgments (Entman, 1993). According to Gans (1979), journalists seek access to sources while sources are seeking for the access to journalists, but this relationship is asymmetrical: “Although it takes two to tango, either sources or journalists can lead, but more often than not, sources do the leading.”(p. 116). That is why I assume that giving voice to
Russian officials or Russian newspapers without accompanying it with a negative tone could be a sign of Russian influence onto British coverage.
H4c. The tone of the coverage is negatively associated with the presence of
conflict, responsibility, fake news frames and the citing of Russian sources. This pattern is
stronger for quality newspapers and Russian owned newspapers.
Methods
A quantitative content analysis was conducted to test the suggested hypotheses. The unit of the analysis is an individual news article. Six British daily newspapers were chosen for the final sampling: The Independent, The London Evening Standard, The Times, The Sun, The Daily
Telegraph, and The Daily Mirror. The sample consists of three quality newspapers and three
17 owned by an international company (News Corp), two – by British companies (Telegraph Media Group and Trinity Mirror). Each type of the ownership includes one quality and one
sensationalist newspaper. The average total readership of these newspapers made almost 7 million copies per day in 2014 (Wikipedia), see Table 1 for more details.
Table 1.
Type, ownership, and readership of the sampled daily British newspapers
Newspaper Nature Ownership Readership
(copies per day)
The Independent Quality Alexander Lebedev 61 338
The London Evening Standard Sensationalist Alexander Lebedev 805 309
The Times Quality News Corp 384 304
The Sun Sensationalist News Corp 2 213 659
The Daily Telegraph Quality Telegraph Media Group 544 546
The Daily Mirror Sensationalist Trinity Mirror 992 309
LexisNexis database was used to retrieve the articles. The search term is: MH17 OR “MH 17”. The sample consisted of the articles that are focused specifically on the coverage of MH17 case. If the case was mentioned in the context of other topics, like the war in Ukraine or sanctions against Russia, such articles were dismissed as not relevant. The retrieved duplicates of the same articles were deleted. The final sample consists of 351 articles published from July 17, 2014 (the day of catastrophe) till April 1, 2017 (the date when this research started), thus the sample represents the total population of articles devoted to the MH17 crash within the
mentioned six newspapers. Qualtrics on-line survey software was used for the coding process. The research is based on a deductive approach examining frames as dependent variables through a frame-building process. The predefined frames are the following: 1) Russian mention (indicating the visibility of Russia in the coverage); 2) responsibility frame (referring to the
18 responsibility for the shot down); 3) Russian responsibility (attributing responsibility to Russia); 4) conflict frame (disagreement between Russian position and other positions); 5) fake news frame (indication of Russia’s spreading fake news or disinformation).
Each frame was coded on a presence/absence basis within every news article. Firstly, the articles were coded for the presence of Russian mention frame. If this frame was not presented in the article, the coding was finished, if it was present – other variables were coded further. The responsibility frame was coded as who was accused in the shot down (Russia, separatists,
Ukraine or other). When coding was finished, a new dichotomous variable Russian responsibility
frame was created out of the responsibility frame, indicating if the responsibility was attributed
to Russia or not (1/0).
The time is measured through two variables: date when the article was published and the number of weeks since the catastrophe (the sample consists of 142 weeks).
The overall tone towards Russia is measured as “positive” (defending Russia, showing it’s openness for the investigation, promoting its position), “negative” (condemning or criticizing Russia), “neutral or no tone” (neither promoting nor criticising Russia). Further, the variable tone is transformed into a dummy variable tone: “negative” or “neutral/positive” (0/1).
Russian sources and English speaking Russian sources were coded on a presence/absence basis. Russian sources were positively coded when there was a quotation of Russian officials or other people, or if there was a reference to Russian position or opinion. The reference to the Russian owned English speaking media outlets, like RT (Russia Today), Sputnik, and Russia
beyond the Headlines (RBTH) were coded separately from other Russian sources.
RT (founded in 2005) is a multimedia TV channel with an annual budget around $300
19 various European languages; its website claims to have over a billion page views, which makes it the most watched Internet news source in the world (Paul & Matthews, 2016).
Sputnik is a plethora of web sites, news agencies and a radio channel broadcasting from
London, Washington, Beijing, and Cairo in 30 languages for 34 countries (EUISS, 2016).
RBTH is a supplement to elite newspapers in 22 countries covering Russian political,
economic, cultural and other issues; it appears in The Daily Telegraph, The New York Times, The
Wall Street Journal, The Washington Post, Le Figaro etc. (Evans, 2015).
All articles were coded by a single coder, the author of this research. A second coder coded 35 articles (10%) selected systematically (every tenth article) for the further intercoder reliability test. The second coder was thoroughly instructed and provided a detailed codebook (Appendix). Krippendorff’s alpha test was conducted to check the reliability of the main tested variables. KAlpha level of agreement for the tested variables vary from .71 to 1, see Table 2, which proves a high level of reliability for my Codebook.
Table 2.
Results of Intercoder reliability test Variable Krippendorff’s alpha Newspaper 1 Mention of Russia .94 Conflict frame .9 Responsibility frame .71
Fake news frame 1
Tone .91
Results
In general, British newspapers published 351 articles to the crash of Malaysia airlines plane MH17. Internationally owned newspapers were the most active in covering the subject
20 (43%, N= 152); Russian owned newspapers devoted the least attention to the tragedy (23%, N= 79). Sensationalist and quality newspapers published almost the same amount of stories, see Figure 1. Russia was mentioned (Russian mention frame) in 219 articles (62%).
Figure 1.
Distribution of articles and mentions of Russia across different types of newspapers
Frames
All further analyses are using the sample which contains mentions of Russia (N= 219). Responsibility frame was the most widely used frame (77%, N=169) followed by Russian responsibility frame (60%, N=132), conflict frame (56%, N=122), and fake news frame (7%,
N=23), see Table 3. Fake news frame was present in less than 30 articles, which is not sufficient
for further statistical analyses. That is why I further examine only the following four frames: Russian mention frame, responsibility frame, Russian responsibility frame, and conflict frame.
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 In d ep en d en t E v en in g Stan d ar d T im es Su n Dail y T eleg rap h Dail y Mir ro r R u ss ian In ter n atio n al B ri tis h Qu alit y Sen sat io n al
Newspaper Ownership Type Total
Num ber o f Art icless Articles Mentions of Russia
21
Table 3.
Distribution of frames across different types of newspapers
Ownership Nature Frames Russian owned Internationally owned British owned
Total Quality Sensationalist Total
Russian mention 53 (24%) 95 (43%) 71 (32%) 219 (100%) 123 (56%) 96 (44%) 219 (100%) Responsibility 45 (27%) 71 (42%) 53 (31%) 169 (100%) 99 (59%) 70 (41%) 169 (100%) Russian Responsibility 31 (24%) 54 (41%) 47 (36%) 132 (100%) 75 (57%) 57 (43%) 132 (100%) Conflict 29 (24%) 55 (45%) 38 (31%) 122 (100%) 77 (63%) 45 (37%) 122 (100%) Fake news 7 (30%) 13 (57%) 3 (13%) 23 (100%) 17 (74%) 6 (26%) 23 (100%)
Chi-square comparisons were performed to test if there are differences in the frequency of frames usage between the newspapers of different ownership. No statistically significant difference was found in frame occurrence between Russian owned newspapers and Internationally and British owned, except for the Russian responsibility frame, see Table 4. British owned newspapers were attributing the responsibility to Russia more often, than Russian owned newspapers, χ2 (1, N=219)= 5.87, p<.05. The first hypothesis is fully refuted.
Chi-square comparisons were also performed to test the difference in using frames between quality and sensationalist newspapers, see table 4. Quality newspapers were mentioning Russia (χ2 (1, N = 351) = 5.56, p < .05) and referring to the conflict frame (χ2 (1, N= 219) = 5.4,
p <.05) statistically more often than sensationalist newspapers. There is no statistically
significant difference in using responsibility and Russian responsibility frames between quality and sensationalist newspapers. The second hypothesis is partly supported.
22
Table 4.
Relationship in frame occurrence between newspapers of different ownership, and of different nature Frames Russian vs Internationally owned Russian vs British owned Quality vs Sensationalist N df χ2 χ2 χ2 Russian mention 351 1 .48 1.27 5.56* Responsibility 219 1 2.1 1.93 1.75 Russian Responsibility 169 1 .72 5.87* .77 Conflict 219 1 .14 .02 5.4* Note. *p<.05
To test H3a about the evolvement of all frames and Russian mentions over time, I am conducting 4 logistic regression tests with a number of week since the crash as an interval independent variable and respectively Russian mention, conflict frame, responsibility frame and
Russian responsibility frame as a dependent dichotomous variables. Conflict frame is the only
variable which is not changing over time. Russia is mentioned more frequently over time (b = .02, Exp(b) = 1.02, R2= .08, p< .001). Responsibility frame and Russian responsibility frame evolve in the opposite direction. Responsibility frame is gradually decreasing (b = -.01, Exp(b) = .99, R2= .03, p ≤ .05), as well as Russian responsibility frame (b = -.01, Exp(b) = .99, R2= .04, p < .05), see Table 5 (frames tested in H3a are indicated in bold). The statement about the
evolvement of Russian mention frame is supported; all other statements in H3a are refuted. Further, to test H3b, I conduct the same logistic regression tests separately for each type of ownership and type of newspapers’ nature, which makes 20 tests in total (4 frames x 5
23 and to compare how each frame is evolving over time across each type of newspaper. Table 5 is showing the results of all logistic regressions tests (each subsample is not in bold fonts).
Table 5.
Logistic regression results. The evolvement the promoted frames over time and across different types of newspapers
Frames/ Newspapers type
Constant btime Exp(b) SE R2
Nagelkerke Model, χ 2 Mention of Russia (N = 351) .23 .02*** 1.02 .01 .08 20.5*** Russian owned .44 .03 1.03 .02 .08 4.76 Internationally owned .26 .02* 1.02 .01 .06 5.67* British owned .05 .03* 1.03 .01 .11 10.3* Quality .41 .03** 1.03 .01 .12 16.59*** Sensationalist .08 .02 1.02 .01 .03 4.01 Responsibility frame (N = 219) 1.42 -.01* .99 .01 .03 3.8 Russian owned 2.56 -.03** .97 .01 .25 7.14** Internationally owned .97 .01 1.01 .01 .01 .57 British owned 1.4 -.01 .99 .01 .07 3.46 Quality 1.66 -.01 .99 .01 .03 2.26 Sensationalist 1.21 -.01 .99 .11 .04 2.59
Russian responsibility frame (N=169) 1.5 -.01* .99 .01 .04 4.58*
Russian owned 1.28 -.04* .96 .02 .21 8.19** Internationally owned 1.28 -.01 1 .01 .01 0.48 British owned 1.4 -.01 .99 .01 .07 3.46 Quality 1.3 -.01 .99 .01 .02 1.19 Sensationalist 1.86 -.02* .98 .01 .1 4.59* Conflict frame (N = 219) .14 .01 1.01 .01 .01 1.92 Russian owned .13 .01 1 .01 .01 .16 Internationally owned .16 .01 1.01 .01 .02 1.5 British owned .11 .01 1 01 .01 .04 Quality .52 .01 1 .01 .01 .01 Sensationalist -.3 .01 1.01 .01 .03 2.29 Note. *p ≤ .05; ** p <.01; ***p <.001.
No differences in using the conflict frame were found across different types of
24 Responsibility frame less often over time, while no significant decrease was observed among Internationally and British owned newspapers. All newspapers, except for Russian owned, were mentioning Russia more often over time. These results show that the coverage of Russian owned newspapers differed in many aspects from the coverage of other newspapers.
Sensationalist newspapers were referring to Russian responsibility frame significantly less in later periods of the coverage. There is a significant growth of Russian mentions within quality newspapers. H3b is mainly not supported.
Tone
The tone towards Russia is distributed almost equally within the sample: 51% of the articles were negative and 49% - neutral, see Table 6. According to the descriptive statistics, Russian owned newspapers were the least negative towards Russia (45%) and British owned newspaper were the most negative (59%), see Table 6. The tone of both quality and
sensationalist newspapers was 50/50.
Table 6.
Distribution of tone across different types of the newspapers Newspapers Ownership Type Tone General sample Russian owned Internationally owned British owned Quality Sensationalist Negative 111 (51%) 24 (45%) 45 (47%) 42 (59%) 62 (50%) 49 (51%) Neutral 108 (49%) 29 (55%) 50 (53%) 29 (41%) 61 (50%) 47 (50%) Total 219 (100%) 53 (100%) 95 (100%) 71 (100%) 123 (100%) 96 (100%)
The tone is examined similarly to frames: frequency across different types of newspapers, evolvement over time but also association with some frames and Russian sources. No
25 statistically significant difference in tone was found between the newspapers of different
ownership or nature. H4a is fully refuted.
Logistic regression test was conducted to test the evolvement of tone over time with a
number of week as an interval independent variable and tone as dependent dichotomous variable.
The tone is becoming less negative over time, b = .02, Exp(b) = 1.02, R2= .09, p < .001. H4b is fully refuted, see Table 7 (bold fonts for general tone).
Similar logistic regression tests were conducted for each type of newspaper ownership and nature (5 tests), see Table 7. All types of newspapers, except for the Russian owned, showed a statistically significant decrease of negative tone. Russian owned newspapers were the least negative to Russia from the very beginning of the coverage and did not show a significant shift in tone over time. H4c is fully refuted.
Table 7.
The evolvement of tone over time and across different types of newspapers Tone/
Newspapers type
Constant btime Exp(b) SE R2
Nagelkerke Model, χ2 Tone (N = 219) -.36 .02*** 1.02 .01 .09 15.64*** Russian owned -.15 .02 1.02 .01 .11 4.63 Internationally owned -.23 .02* 1.02 .01 .09 5.91** British owned -.72 .02* 1.02 .01 .1 5.34* Quality -.38 .02** 1.02 .01 .1 9.16** Sensationalist -.36 .02* 1.02 .01 .09 7** Note. *p ≤ .05; ** p <.01; ***p <.001.
Phi association test was performed to test the association between the tone and Russian sources and frames. Weak to moderate negative association was found between the tone and conflict (phi = -.24, p< .001) and responsibility frame (phi = -.23, p< .01), see Table 8. All newspapers were negative while referring to the responsibility frame. No association was found
26 between the tone and the conflict frame for Russian owned newspapers and tabloids. This means they were providing Russian position as an alternative to the position of British or other
governments but they did not criticize this alternative position.
No association was found between the tone and the reference to Russian sources. While giving a word to Russian officials all British newspapers were not always critical towards this position. H4c is supported only partly. Association test between the tone and the reference to English speaking Russian newspapers was not performed as British newspapers were referring to it in 8 articles only.
Table 8.
Association between the tone and conflict frame, responsibility frame, and citing the Russian sources, as well across different types of newspapers
Tone/ newspapers types
Conflict frame Responsibility frame Russian sources
Phi Phi Phi
Tone(N = 219) -.24*** -.23 ** .01 Russian owned -.21 -.28* .07 Internationally owned -.21* -.16 .03 British owned -.32** -.31** -.07 Quality -.34*** -.21* 0 Sensationalist -.13 -.25* -.02 Note. *p< .05; ** p <.01; ***p <.001.
In general, British newspapers were quite neutral in their tone towards Russia, especially during later weeks of the coverage. Conflict frame did not show any evolvement over time or across different newspapers. The usage of responsibility and Russian responsibility frames is gradually decreasing, especially within Russian owned newspapers. Russian owned newspapers differed from other newspapers in terms of mentioning Russia, tone, responsibility and Russian
27 responsibility frames. Sensationalist newspapers referred to conflict frame less often and
attributed the responsibility to Russia less often over time than quality newspapers.
Conclusion and Discussion
This study compared the evolvement of frames and tone over time and across different types of newspapers in their picturing of Russia in the coverage of MH17. It aimed to reveal a more favourable positioning of Russia across newspapers of different ownership and nature. Differences between the newspapers might serve as an indication of newspapers’ susceptibility to the massive Russian propaganda.
In general, some noteworthy trends were observed among British newspapers in their favourable picturing of Russia in the context of MH 17 crash. The decline of negative tone as well as the responsibility and Russian responsibility frames over time, weak and not dynamic conflict frame, and almost the absence of fake news frame are the main characteristics of the coverage of MH17 tragedy by the leading British newspapers.
In this research, the organizational level of the hierarchy of influence model was found to play a significant role in the frame-building process: contrasting patterns of coverage were found between the newspapers of different ownership and nature.
The narrative of Russian owned newspapers did differ from the narrative of other newspapers but, surprisingly, in an opposite direction to my expectations: Alexander Lebedev’s outlets were depicting Russia in a more favourable manner than the newspapers owned by international or British companies. The Independent and The London Evening Standard devoted the least amount of articles to the MH17 crash, they were the least negative (not significantly) towards Russia; they used responsibility frame and attributed the responsibility to Russia less
28 frequently, and less frequently over time than, for example, British owned newspapers. Unlike other newspapers, Russian owned media did not show a growth of Russia’s mentions over time and they were not always critical while providing Russian position or quotes.
Quality newspapers, in line with previous findings (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000), were using conflict frame more often than tabloids. But unlike previous findings, no difference was found in the frequency of using the responsibility frame or attributing the responsibility to Russia frame.
Sensationalist newspapers, similarly to Russian owned newspapers, did not mention Russia more often over time; the frequency of attributing the responsibility to Russia was also decreasing over time and they were not always negative in tone while referring to the conflict frame. These results might indicate that sensationalist newspapers, as well as Russian owned newspapers were less resistant to Russian propaganda than quality newspapers and the outlets owned by international and British companies.
Moreover, the patterns found in the coverage of MH17 by British Russian owned newspapers remind the coverage of other international conflicts by different outlets in Russia. Media in Russia are known for their techniques of the omission of disagreeable information and the avoidance of sensitive topics (Lopatynska, 2015; Brown, 2015; 2014, Heywood, 2014). Brown (2015; 2014) found some significant contrasts in presenting the war in Syria and chemical attacks by Russian newspapers (including Novaya Gazeta, co-owned by Alexander Lebedev) and Western media (including The Daily Telegraph). He found that Russian media were often
avoiding the Syrian topic, they devoted the least amount of articles to the key events, some events were not mentioned at all; some frames, like responsibility frame, were less used; the length of Russian articles was shorter etc. Similarly, looks like Russian owned newspapers were
29 avoiding Russia and frames around it in the coverage of MH17 crash, as well as escaping the topic itself, which is another way to build a frame. According to Entman (1993), framing is not only about the salience of a frame but is also about its omission; “the omissions of potential problem definitions, explanations, evaluations, and recommendations may be as critical as the inclusions in guiding the audience” (p.54).
Despite the fact that more and more evidence about Russia’s involvement in the crash is provided over time by official and private investigators, responsibility and Russian responsibility frames are decreasing over time and the overall tone towards Russia is gradually warming up, which could possibly be explained by the success of Russian propagandistic campaign. Seems like over three years, British newspaper were becoming more confused about Russian role in MH17 terroristic attack and the explanation of such behaviour might be found in the report of European Parliament (2016). It states that Kremlin’s apparent intention is not to report about the events but to create confusion by presenting various alternative versions of the 'truth', including the conspiracy theories about the downing of a Malaysian airliner.
Alternatively, there might be other explanations of such an evolvement of the promoted frames. Hänggli (2012) defines three key factors of the frame building process: agenda building, media attention, and political communication. She is of the opinion that it is the political actors who introduce the most important frames into the public discourse; and this is the government officials that set the media agenda (Bennett, 2003). Dutch government as an issue owner of the international investigation is often criticized for its hesitation and extreme diplomacy in pointing on the guilty party. Almost three years after the tragedy, none of the suspects was called. This could explain why the topic of the crash and the frames around it are disappearing from the media agenda. The promoted frames might have evolved across the media attention cycle from
30 the “alarmed discovery and euphoric enthusiasm” (Downs, 1977) stage just after the tragedy happened to “gradual decline in public interest” stage over three years.
As the Dutch and other European governments did not manage to provide new information in order to maintain the presence of the promoted frames, British journalists, according to the ‘cascading’ (Entman, 2004) and ‘indexing’ (Bennett, 2003) theories, where reflecting this decline of schemas in their coverage, meanwhile, going more neutral in their tone. On the other hand, this explanation could support the success of Russian propaganda influence as Strömbäck’s et al. (2008) are of the opinion that national media are picking up the frames
promoted by foreign governments only when domestic government is promoting a frame less actively than a foreign government.
British media system and its normative ideals might be an alternative explanation for the gradual shift from negative towards neutral tone. Neutral coverage is a normative ideal of a Liberal Model of a media system, to which Great Britain belongs. Within this model, journalists see themselves as impartial observers or neutral chroniclers (Hallin & Mancini, 2004), which is reflected in the coverage of MH17 crash by British reporters. Other studies on tone in the coverage of accidents and disasters also found that tone-of-voice was negative and rich in emotional content only in the first days, but it was growing more distanced and intellectualized as time went by (Kuttschreuter et al., 2011). Moreover, British newspapers preserved a tempered tone even in the coverage of 9/11 terrorist attack (Papacharissi & Oliveira, 2008).
This study is limited by a purely British sample, a comparative analysis of British newspapers and newspapers representing the same media system (USA) and different media systems (for example, the Netherlands) has to be conducted to compare the development of frames and to make it clear if Russia was salient enough in the coverage and how critical was the
31 tone towards it. Another limitation is a research design which is not able to reveal direct effects of Russian propaganda. In my research, I compare the coverage of different newspapers and assume that my findings could be an indication of the Russian influence, while alternative explanations and interpretations of the obtained results are still quite possible.
Though the coverage of the newspapers owned by Alexander Lebedev differed in many respects from the coverage of internationally owned or British owned newspapers, still these findings are not enough to state clearly that The Independent and The London Evening Standard are promoting Kremlin’s position at its pages. This paper represents the first quantitative
research in examining the Russian influence onto Russian owned newspapers in Great Britain. More studies examining the coverage of sensitive topics, like Russia’s intervention into Ukraine and Syria or Russian connections with Donald Trump’s presidential campaign, have to be done to draw the final conclusion about the impartiality of the media outlets owned by Alexander Lebedev.
In the newly adopted Resolution on EU strategic communication to counteract anti-EU propaganda by third parties (2016), Members of the European Parliament stress on the
importance of political communication, empirical and academic research, awareness and media literacy campaigns in order to reveal the effects of Russian propaganda and to protect Western European societies from it. This research adds to the existing body of studies on Russian
informational warfare and represents the first attempt (known to me) to discover the influence of Russian propaganda on Western media through a purely quantitative research design.
32
References
Aro, J. (2016). The cyberspace war: propaganda and trolling as warfare tools. European
View, 15(1), 121-132.
Bennett, W. Lance (2003) News: The Politics of Illusion, 5th edn. New York: Longman. Borchers, N. S. (2011). “Do You Really Think Russia Should Pay Up for That?” How the
Russia-Based TV Channel RT Constructs Russian-Baltic Relations. Javnost-The
Public, 18(4), 89-106.
Boykoff, M. T. (2008). The cultural politics of climate change discourse in UK
tabloids. Political geography, 27(5), 549-569.
Brown, J. D. (2014). ‘Better one tiger than ten thousand rabid rats’: Russian media coverage of the Syrian conflict. International Politics, 51(1), 45-66.
Brown, J. D. (2015). “A Nightmare Painted by Goya”: Russian Media Coverage of the Syrian Chemical Weapons Attacks in Comparative Perspective. Problems of
Post-Communism, 62(4), 236-246.
Brüggemann, M., Engesser, S., Büchel, F., Humprecht, E., & Castro, L. (2014). Hallin and
Mancini revisited: Four empirical types of western media systems. Journal of
Communication, 64(6), 1037-1065.
Dutch Safety Board. (2015). Crash of Malaysian Airlines Flight MH17. The Hague, NL.
www.safetyboard.nl.
De Vreese, C. H. (2005). News framing: Theory and typology. Information design journal+
document design, 13(1), 51-62.
De Vreese, C., & Boomgaarden, H. (2003). Valenced news frames and public support for the
33 Dimitrova, D. V., & Strömbäck, J. (2005). Mission accomplished? Framing of the Iraq War in
the elite newspapers in Sweden and the United States. Gazette (Leiden,
Netherlands), 67(5), 399-417.
Downs, A. (1996). 2.1. Up and Down with Ecology: The" Issue-Attention Cycle. The Politics of
American Economic Policy Making, 48.
Entman, R. M. (1993). Framing: Toward clarification of a fractured paradigm. Journal of
communication, 43(4), 51-58.
Entman, R. M. (2004). Projections of power: Framing news, public opinion, and US foreign
policy. University of Chicago Press.
European Parliament resolution of 23 November 2016 on EU strategic communication to
counteract propaganda against it by third parties (2016/2030(INI)).
European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS). (2016). EU strategic communications
with a view to counteracting propaganda. Directorate-General for External Policies,
European Union.
Evans, D. (2015). Russian soft power cultivation in the United States of America: a media
content analysis of Russia beyond the headlines (Doctoral dissertation, Tartu Ülikool). Gamson, W. A., & Modigliani, A. (1989). Media discourse and public opinion on nuclear power:
A constructionist approach. American journal of sociology, 95(1), 1-37.
Gans, H. J. (1979). Deciding what's news: A study of CBS evening news, NBC nightly news,
Newsweek, and Time. Northwestern University Press.
Gibney, M. (2015). The Downing of MH17: Russian Responsibility? Human Rights Law
34 Gromyko, A. (2016). Following Litvinenko, UK-Russia relations are now at their lowest point
since the 1980s. LSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog.
Hallin, D. C., & Mancini, P. (2004). Comparing media systems: Three models of media and
politics. Cambridge University Press.
Hallin, D. C. (1989). The uncensored war: The media and Vietnam. Univ of California Press.
Hänggli, R. (2012). Key factors in frame building: How strategic political actors shape news
media coverage. American Behavioral Scientist, 56(3), 300-317.
Heywood, E. (2014). Comparative media: Vremya’s manipulation of foreign conflict reporting in Russia in the context of Western news providers. Slovo, 26(1), 2-17.
Hoskins, A., & O'Loughlin, B. (2015). Arrested war: the third phase of
mediatization. Information, Communication & Society, 18(11), 1320-1338.
Imamgaiazova, D. (2016). News framing in different language versions of state-sponsored
international media: A case of Russian and English versions in RT and Radio Liberty.
Khaldarova, I., &Pantti, M. (2016). Fake news: The narrative battle over the Ukrainian
conflict. Journalism Practice, 10(7), 891-901.
Kolmer, C., &Semetko, H. A. (2009). Framing the Iraq War: Perspectives from American, UK,
Czech, German, South African, and Al-Jazeera News. American Behavioral
Scientist, 52(5), 643-656.
Kragh, M., &Åsberg, S. (2017). Russia’s strategy for influence through public diplomacy and active measures: the Swedish case. Journal of Strategic Studies, 1-44.
Kuttschreuter, M., Gutteling, J. M., & de Hond, M. (2011). Framing and tone-of-voice of disaster media coverage: The aftermath of the Enschede fireworks disaster in the Netherlands. Health, Risk & Society, 13(3), 201-220.
35 Lelich, M. (2014). Victims of Russian Propaganda. New Eastern Europe, 12(3), 75-80.
List of newspapers in the United Kingdom by circulation (n.d.). In Wikipedia. Retrieved June 12, 2017, from
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_newspapers_in_the_United_Kingdom_by_circulati on.
Lopatynska, O. (2015). CNN vs. RT: Comparative Analysis of Media Coverage of a Malaysian
Airlines Aircraft MH17 Shooting Down within the Framework of Propaganda.
Mineyev, A. (2014, July 25). Vergeef ons, Nederland. Novaya Gazeta, pp. 1-3.
NATO STRATCOM. (2014). Analysis of Russia’s information campaign against Ukraine. Retrieved from
http://issuu.com/natostratcomcoe/docs/ukraine_research_natostratcomcoe_02. Oates, S. (2014). Russian state narrative in the digital age: Rewired propaganda in Russian
television news framing of Malaysia airlines flight 17.
Papacharissi, Z., & de Fatima Oliveira, M. (2008). News frames terrorism: A comparative
analysis of frames employed in terrorism coverage in US and UK newspapers. The
International Journal of Press/Politics, 13(1), 52-74.
Paul, C., & Matthews, M. The Russian “Firehose of Falsehood” Propaganda Model. RAND Corporation.
Pew Reserach Center. (2015). Russia, Putin Held in Low Regard around the World. 202.419.4372
Russell, M. (2016). Russia's information war Propaganda or counter-propaganda? European Parliamentary Research Service. PE 589.810.
36 Rutland, P., & Kazantsev, A. (2016). The limits of Russia’s ‘soft power’. Journal of Political
Power, 9(3), 395-413.
Scheufele, D. A. (1999). Framing as a theory of media effects. Journal of communication, 49(1),
103-122.
Semetko, H. A., & Valkenburg, P. M. (2000). Framing European politics: A content analysis of
press and television news. Journal of communication, 50(2), 93-109.
Sienkiewicz, M. (2015). Open BUK: Digital Labor, Media Investigation and the Downing of
MH17. Critical Studies in Media Communication, 32(3), 208-223.
Shoemaker, P. J., & Reese, S. D. (1996). Mediating the message in the 21st century: A media
sociology perspective. Routledge.
Strömbäck, J., Shehata, A., & Dimitrova, D. V. (2008). Framing the Mohammad cartoons issue:
A cross-cultural comparison of Swedish and US press. Global Media and
Communication, 4(2), 117-138.
Van Herpen, M. H. (2015). Putin's propaganda machine: Soft power and Russian foreign policy.
37 Appendix
Codebook V1. Article ID
V2. Date when the article was published (yymmdd) V3. Number of a week since the crash
V4. Title of the article
(Copy/paste the first 5-7 words of the title) V5. Newspaper
1. The Independent
2. The London Evening Standard 3. The Sun
4. The Daily Mirror 5. The Times 6. The Telegraph V6. Russia
Is Russia/ the Russian position/ a Russian source mentioned in the article? No
Yes
If there is a mention of only Pro-Russian separatists (or Moscow-backed rebels) or Russian boarder but no mention of Russia itself, then code as “No”.
If “No”, finish coding (press “Submit”). If “Yes”, proceed further!
V7. Conflict frame
Is a disagreement between Russia/ the Russian Government/ the Russian position and other countries/governments/positions mentioned in the article?
No Yes
V8. Responsibility frame
38 No Russia Separatists* Ukraine Others
* “Separatists” – representatives of so called “DPR**” or “LPR***” republics or other organizations/groups from the temporarily occupied territories of eastern Ukraine.
** DPR – Donetsk People’s Republic. *** LPR – Luhansk People’s Republic.
Code “Russia” if there is an indication of Russia’s direct involvement into the downing of the plane, like providing a missile that shot the flight.
If there are indications that separatists did it with the support from Russia (Russia ordered the downing or provided weapons), then code “Russia”, too.
V9. Fake news frame
Is there an indication of Russia’s spreading fake news/ misinformation/ confusion/lies through its media?
No Yes V10. Russian sources
Is there a reference or citing of Russian sources? No
Yes
Consider as a source both direct and indirect speech. Whenever an opinion is clearly presented as such, this is a sufficient reason to code this as a source (“Kremlin denied this”).
Sources could be individuals (officials, experts, militaries, ordinary people etc.) but also institutions, organizations, governments etc.
39 Is there a mention or citation of Russian English speaking media, like RT (Russia Today), Sputnik, RBTH (Russia beyond the Headlines)?
No Yes V12. Tone.
What is the tone of the article towards Russia/Russian sources/the Russian position? Negative
Positive
Neutral/ no tone
Code “Negative” if there is an open critique of Russia or if there is a negative opinion expressed about Russia, or there are words with negative connotation, or if an article is fostering a negative opinion about Russia among its readers.
