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Green Militarism and its
Effects on Local Inhabitants
___________________________________________________________________________Master Thesis Political Science: International Relations
22, June 2018 Word Count: 17,582
Author: Flynn Nash Supervisor: Michael Eze Student Number: 1159885 Second Reader: Luc Fransen
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Contents
Acknowledgements: ... 3 Abstract: ... 4 Abbreviations: ... 5 1. Introduction ... 6 2. Literature Review ... 9 3.0 Theoretical Framework ... 13 3.1 Conservation ... 14 3.2 Neoliberal Conservation ... 15 3.3 Conservation Security ... 19 4. Research Design ... 20 4.1 Methodology... 20 4.2 Case Selection ... 22 4.3. Data ... 24 5.0 Case Study ... 245.1 Historical Overview of the Conflict in the DRC ... 24
5.1.2 Belgian Congo 1885-1960 ... 25
5.1.3 Independence ... 26
5.1.4 Congolese Wars ... 27
5.1.5 Present Day Crisis ... 28
5.2 International Involvement and Influence ... 29
5.3 Natural Resources ... 30
5.4 Virunga National Park ... 31
5.4.1 History ... 31
5.4.2 Funding ... 32
5.4.3 Militarization and Legitimization ... 33
5.5 Neoliberalizing Conservation in Virunga National Park... 35
5.6 Militarization and Increase in Displacement, Refugees and Attacks ... 36
6.0 Analysis ... 38
6.1 Creation of Virunga brought Profound Change ... 38
6.2 Present Resistance and Growing Distrust ... 41
6.3 Local Inhabitants and Armed Groups ... 43
6.4 Further militarization ... 45
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7.0 Conclusion ... 49 8.0 Bibliography ... 51
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Acknowledgements:
I would like to express my gratitude to my Professor, Michael Eze, for his support, patience, knowledge and invaluable feedback throughout my studies. I am also grateful to my fellow classmates in the African Renaissance research project, for their support and friendly advice. Lastly, I would like to thank Mom for her unrelenting love and encouragement, without her my studies abroad would not have been possible.
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Abstract:
In response to the loss and destruction of biodiversity, we have witnessed an rise in green militarization, also known as armed conservation, which refers to an increase in the use of military tactics and methods by nature conservation groups in 'defense of the
environment'. Green militarization primarily takes place in protected areas that are already experiencing internal conflict and violence. Yet, how does this ongoing militarization affect local inhabitants and communities? This thesis examines the historical and contemporary drivers of the conflict in the eastern region of the Democratic of the Congo, and what led to the militarization of Virunga National Park. I follow up with an in-depth analysis of the adoption of green militarization undertaken by Park management in response to conflict with various armed militia groups, as well as the consequential impacts this has had on local inhabitants in and around the Virunga area.
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Abbreviations:
AFRICAN CONSERVATION FUND (ACF) ALLIANCE DES FORCES DÉMOCRATIQUES POUR LA LIBÉRATION DU CONGO (AFDL) ALLIED DEMOCRATIC FORCES
(ADF) DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
(DRC) EUROPEAN COMMISSION
(EC) FORCES ARMÉES DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE DÉMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO (FARDC) FORCES DÉMOCRATIQUES DE LIBÉRATION DU RWANDA (FDLR) INSTITUT CONGOLAIS POUR LE CONSERVATION DE LA NATURE
(ICCN) INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
(IO) INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE
(IRC) MÉDECINS SANS FRONTIÈRES
(MSF) NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION
(NGO) PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP
(PPP) PROTECTED AREAS
(PAS) RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT
(RPF) RWANDAN ARMED FORCES
(RAF) UNITED NATIONS (UN)
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1. Introduction
In response to the destruction of biodiversity, green militarization, also known as green violence, armed conservation or the militarization of conservation, has been increasing at an unparalleled rate, especially in Africa (Verweijen and Marijnen, 2016; 1; Lombard, 2015; Lunstrum, 2014). Green militarization refers to the increase of military tactics and methods used by nature conservation groups in defense of the environment (Lombard, 2015; Lunstrum 2014; Duffy 2014). However, we have seen a shift in these conservation groups, from
‘defenders of the environment’, to a war by conservation, in which an evolved militarized response has put these groups on the offensive instead of the defensive (Duffy,
2014). Scholarly descriptions of green militarization often show two distinct groups of people involved. The first group is comprised of militarized actors or protectors of
biodiversity, such as Park guards or other armed forces, who use varying kinds of authority and violence in pursuit of ‘saving the environment’. The second group consists of local inhabitants who are usually the victims of this control; they are uprooted from their homes and lands and are forced to face new inexplicable challenges (Duffy, 2014; Lombard, 2015). This aggressive militarized response has expanded beyond protected areas (PAs), into the local communities that surround it (Duffy, 2014). In such descriptions, the effects of armed conservation on local inhabitants is devastating, and only reinforces a prevailing narrative that prioritizes the livelihood of biodiversity to the lives of local inhabitants (Lombard, 2015).
Engagement between these militarized actors and local inhabitants generally include descriptions of use of force, dispossession of land and resources, the redrawing and
enforcement of borders and other objectives relating to control and power that connect economic benefits to conservation practices (Lombard, 2015). Green militarization draws upon techniques from imperialism, in which a militarized response to conservation is
normalized and justified through a narrative of security and through establishing control over military matters (Marijenen et al, 2016).
My research aims to answer “how and why are local populations affected by a green militarized response to conservation?” To answer the main question, I will also seek to answer supporting research questions:
a) How did green militarization emerge?
b) What actors are involved in green militarization? d) Who benefits from green militarization?
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e) How is a militarized response to conservation legitimized?
The study of green militarism is relatively new literature that has gained more traction and interest amongst scholars, however, it remains a much-needed area of academic
exploration and analysis. As such, an in-depth review of green militarization literature will be undertaken, including its counterinsurgency strategies, training tactics, and its
implementation and enforcement of borders. I will present my theoretical framework, building upon the neoliberalization of conservation and what it means for conservation practices and approaches. I will also introduce conservation security, which can be seen as a way to legitimize and justify green militarization. My methodology will then be presented, including its conceptualization and operationalization. This will be followed by an elaborate case study, where I will examine the historical and contemporary drivers of the conflict in the eastern region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Subsequently, I will undertake an in-depth evaluation of the adoption of green militarization by Virunga National Park management in response to the conflict, as well as its consequential impacts on local
inhabitants in and around the Virunga area. I will present my findings in the analysis section, in which I will show how green militarism has negatively affected the livelihood and security of local inhabitants and their communities. I will specifically analyze how local inhabitants respond to and resist militarized conservation practices, and how their opposition stems from lack of access to land and resources. Lastly, I will conclude.
This research is important for a variety of reasons. First, conservation success is often dependent on local support, which is deeply contingent on the perceptions of the negative or positive impacts of conservation practices experienced by locals. Local communities who perceive conservation practices to be harmful to their livelihood, may resist or refuse to cooperate with conservation authorities nor engage in their practices (Holmes, 2013). Second, it has been researched elsewhere (Lunstrum, 2014; Lombard, 2015, 2016; Verweijnen et al, 2016) that the green militarization response to biodiversity destruction further fuels violence and conflict in protected areas. This not only has negative consequences for the environment, but also for local inhabitants’ safety and well-being. Furthermore, the effects green
militarization has on local inhabitants can provide insight and knowledge for improving conservation practices and policies on a global level.
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2. Literature Review
According to Duffy, we are currently witnessing a new phase of conservation, which she refers to as a ‘war by conservation’ (2016). This phenomenon merges concerns about the loss of biodiversity with distresses about global security (Duffy, 2016). War by conservation, is notably not an entirely new occurrence, as the use of violence against local communities to protect biodiversity and the militarization of endangered areas has been well recorded and observed throughout history (Duffy, 2014, 2016; Pelusa and Vandergeest 2011; Crosby, 1986). It is instead, indicative of a more forceful response to the endangerment of
biodiversity; as the threat to wildlife has increased, so has the sense that conservation groups need to engage in a more assertive approach to protect it, which has become widely known as “a war to save them” (Duffy, 2016; Pelusa et al 2011; Lunstrum 2014). Military roots have been embedded in conservation throughout history, however, an intensification of militarized methods occurred during the 1980s due to an increase in heavily armed poachers (Lunstrum, 2014). Many African governments began supplying park guards with more stringent
militarized training, more deadly weapons, and allowed the use of more lethal force (Büscher, 2013; Lombard 2015). Although the militarization of protected areas is not completely
unique, an escalating pattern of militarization of conservation practices has evolved
throughout the world (Lunstrum, 2014). National armies, rebel groups, and some other armed forces have taken on a key role in launching conservation practices, which often involve use of force and violence (Lunstrum, 2014).
Green militarization was first coined by Lunstrum in 2014 (p. 817), in reference to “the use of military and paramilitary (military-like) actors, techniques, technologies, and partnerships in the pursuit of conservation.” Green militarization is most prevalent and intense in protected areas (PAs) (Verweijen et al, 2016), where armed conflict, wildlife poaching and other illegal activities, that lead to further endangerment of the environment exist (Duffy and Büscher, 2015). Many of these PAs are national parks in Africa, where Park guards and other armed forces (including rebel groups and national forces) play an important role in protecting the vulnerable biodiversity. Increasingly, Park guards and armed forces in PAs are taught and trained by Western foreign military actors and private security companies (Verweijen et al, 2016). This provides guards with a multitude of weapons and surveillance equipment and in some cases, allows cooperation with other armed rebel groups who are similarly dedicated to a war in the name of conservation (Duffy et al, 2015).
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As various scholars have pointed out, these developments have resulted in an ever-increasing connection between conservation and paramilitary methods and tactics, which have strengthened a connection between environmental authority and military governance (Verweijen et al, 2016; Pelusa et al 2011; Lombard, 2015). The strengthening of this link fosters conflict, that in turn reinforces and subjects local inhabitants to “violent enclosures” (Dressler and Guieb, 2015). Specifically, when park guards use military authority and environmental governance to manage land and resources in PAs that also host conflict and suppression, the prospect for violent enclosures increases; these enclosures restrict access to land, redefine social relations, and promote a power struggle over access to resources that are central to the livelihood of local communities (Dressler et al, 2015). In PAs where resources are abundant, military actors typically redefine boundaries, as mutual reinforcing enclosures, increasing distress, intimidation and violence to control the area and its resources (Peluso et al, 2011). In other words, PAs have evolved into areas of violence, where human rights violations and violence against humans is accepted “in defense of the environment”, legitimizing and normalizing the militant response (Neumann, 2004; Pelusa et al, 2011).
The literature relating to green militarization examines various facets of the conjunction of counterinsurgency methods and conservation. Green militarization and counterinsurgency methods and tactics share violent discourses, in which practices such as “shoot to kill”, property demolition, intimidation, displacements, dispossession, surveillance and coercive patrolling are frequently utilized (Verweijen et al, 2016; Büscher and
Ramutsindela, 2016; Dunlap and Fairhead, 2014). It is important to note, there exists a distinction between hard and soft counterinsurgency approaches that are used in relation to green militarization. A hard counterinsurgency approach to conservation refers to overt violence carried out by military actors or other armed forces committed to the war for
biodiversity (Dunlap et al, 2014). This approach consists of violent campaigns, arrests, armed conflict, and other enforcement tactics that fund ‘community-based policing’ (Lombard, 2015). A soft counterinsurgency relies on the camouflage of positive social investments, or more accurately described as ‘development schemes’ propelled by private investment
(Verweijen et al, 2016). This soft approach is characterized by ‘community- based programs’, such as an allocation of goods through NGOs that build hospitals and schools, or providing foreign aid to conspire with elite actors (Dunlap et al, 2014). These programs are aimed at extending control over local communities and encouraging them to internalize hegemonic values (Verweijen et al, 2016). The ultimate goal is to create a consciousness toward wildlife,
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in which local communities will not object to the management, securitization, development and control of natural resources by Western actors (Dunlap et al, 2014; Lombard, 2015).
Four key similarities between counterinsurgency and green militarism methods and practices have been highlighted by academics (Lunstrum, 2014; Verweijen et al, 2016; Duffy, 2014). First, the spatial aspects that lay the foundation for militarization, specifically the drawing and enforcing of borders, labelling of actors, and methods used to securitize a defined area, are also implemented in conservation efforts in PAs (Dressler et al, 2015). For instance, Verweijen and Marijnen note that “both counterinsurgency and conservation are driven by framings that draw boundaries between legitimate and illegitimate forest dwellers, legitimate and illegitimate resource and land use, and legitimate and illegitimate forms of violence” (2016, p. 3). This multifaceted boundary drawing results in distinct areas where different moral codes can be applied, and the use of violence and force becomes validated (Pelusa et al, 2011). Second, green militarization and counterinsurgency both control local communities and their movements, including access to use of land and natural resources (Hochleithner, 2017; Lunstrum, 2014). PAs have a strong influence and connection to the livelihood of local inhabitants, which is commonly accompanied by displacement and limitations on cultivation, hunting, fishing and farming (Hocleithner, 2017). Whatever the ultimate objective, altruistic or not, this tactic generally relies on blocking local populations from their homes and resources, which has many direct consequences relating to their
livelihood. Third, green militarization and counterinsurgency similarly use violence, whether it be a minimalist conception of violence, tangible violence, or the broader definition of violence, structural violence (Verweijen et al, 2016; Büscher et al 2016). For example, in response to an increase in poaching in South Africa’s Peace Parks, Büscher shows how this militarized response of Park guards and other armed forces has resulted in a social and linguistic form of violence (2011). A fourth commonality, is that both counterinsurgency and green militarization have evoked resistance from local inhabitants, due to loss of access to land and resources, as well as issues with legitimacy of actions (Verweijen et al, 2016).
Scholars have also given attention to the relationship between green militarization and poaching (see Lunstrum, 2014; Duffy, 2014; Lombard 2015). Poaching teams have become highly militarized and arrive heavily armed, with a multitude of weaponry that would not typically be used for illegal wildlife tracking, such as automatic weapons and other weapons used for combat (Lunstrum, 2014). As poaching teams have become increasingly more aggressive and militarized, so have ‘protectors’ of PAs, which encompass national defense forces, park rangers and guards, foreign actors, foreign states and NGOs. More simply put, as
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commercial poachers become more heavily armed and advanced in their methods, protectors of PAs follow suit, rinse and repeat (Lunstrum, 2014). Both state actors and poaching teams enter a PA ready and inclined to engage in deadly use of violence and force, which produces a vicious cycle of military buildup where soldiers, wildlife, local inhabitants, poachers, rebel groups, and other armed forces are in constant contention with each other (Dressler et al, 2015). Furthermore, as both sides become increasingly more forceful and aggressive, the value of wildlife parts (such as ivory, rhino horn, mountain gorillas), increases
correspondingly, creating even more reason to poach and to fight using violent tactics,
ensuing further militarization from state actors, resulting in more conflict and death (Pelusa et al, 2011).
Despite this militarized response state-side and an increase in arrests and killings of poachers, a stubborn fact remains: poaching across Africa continues to intensify and increase (Welz, 2013). Although wildlife would of course be at greater risk without anti-poaching efforts, other facets concerned with improving biodiversity have been ignored, such as
improving justice systems, and initiating efforts to weaken demand for wildlife (Welz, 2013). Several scholars have also analyzed the linkage between poaching, the loss of wildlife and global security matters (see Duffy, 2016; Pelusa et al, 2011; Lunstrum 2014). Poachers are typically framed as terrorists, creating a link between poaching and organized crime, in which worries and distresses about the environment are voiced by various powerful global actors, that include nation states, armed forces, private security companies, militaries, IOs and NGOs (Neumann, 2004; Duffy, 2016). Additionally, the relationship between poaching and terrorism has influenced decisions about a suitable response to the loss of wildlife; this creates a discourse in which powerful states and Western actors can call for a more forceful course of action (Duffy, 2016). For instance, Duffy notes in her 2016 study, there exists mounds of evidence that wildlife trafficking and poaching is being funded by armed rebel groups, including groups such as Al Shabaab, Boko Haram and the Janjaweed “which threaten the stability and security of many countries in Africa” (p. 242). She goes onto argue “the discursive link between poaching and terrorism is used to further the interests of the US-led War on Terror and has meant that conservation has been integrated into much wider sets of policy debates and initiatives linked to global security” (p. 242).
Scholars have paid close attention to the rationalities that lay the foundation for legitimizing and normalizing the process of green militarization (Duffy, 2014; 2016;
Neumann, 2004). The evidence of a connection between poaching and terrorism is becoming a vital point in legitimating the arguments of green militarism for policy networks,
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specifically within powerful Western government circles; it normalizes and legitimizes the militarized response to the loss of biodiversity and wildlife, which in turn allows the use of heavy weaponry, further surveillance and use of deadly force (Duffy, 2016). The discourse surrounding the association between poaching and terrorism, allows one to exploit concerns about global security threats, and legitimizes military action for identified targets for the ‘War on Terror’ (Duffy, 2014; 2016; Neumann, 2004). Authors have also suggested green
militarization further fuels violence, by contributing to its normalizing and legitimization (Hochcleithner, 2017; Neumann 2004; Lunstrum 2014). This can be seen through a poaching vs. anti-poaching narrative in which a kind of ‘arms race’ has ensued, contributing to further destabilization of relations between park guards and locals (Lunstrum, 2014).
Until now, scarce attention has been paid to the direct and indirect effects of green militarization on local inhabitants’ communities and livelihoods. While some academics have explored green militarization effects on local inhabitants’ access to resources and
dispossession of land (Lombard, 2015; Verijwen et al 2016; Büscher and Whande, 2007), it seems an over-emphasis has been placed upon the convergence of conservation, violence, and poaching and not enough attention has been given to the ways in which local communities are affected over a long period of time. The intensive dual militarization by both park guards and poachers creates a space in which innocent bystanders, caught in the middle, become incidental victims (Lunstrum, 2014). I argue that more attention needs to be given to the direct and indirect effects green militarization has on local inhabitants in and around PAs.
3.0 Theoretical Framework
This section presents a theoretical framework for thinking about how neoliberal conservation and conservation security have helped not only produce green militarization, but also to legitimize and justify it. Furthermore, through a critical analysis of a neoliberalist
conservation framework I aspire to answer the central research question in this thesis: “how and why are local populations affected by a green militarized response to conservation?” By examination of the theory of neoliberal conservation, I will explore: what is conservation? What actors are involved in conservation and green militarism? Who economically benefits from conservation practices? How has neoliberal conservation been a driving force behind militarizing conservation? I will subsequently move on to conservation security, which
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examines how green militarization is a normalized and justified response to conservation loss.
3.1 Conservation
Environmental conservation refers to “the protection, preservation, management, or restoration of natural environments and the ecological communities that inhabit them” (WDFW, 2018). Generally, conservation is thought to encompass the control and management of human access and consumption of natural resources (Morrison, 2014). Conservation efforts emerged as early as the 1600s, but conservation knowledge and
practices gained profound Western traction in the early 19th century (Morrison, 2014). Since then, we have witnessed the evolution of conservation knowledge, practices and strategies.
According to Foucault, knowledge is generated between human actors, through rhetoric, narratives and discourses (Singh and Houtum, 2002). In this context, various disciplines of conservation knowledge should then be seen as an outcome of environmental discourse and narratives, which are influenced by the beliefs and ideologies of researchers (Singh et al, 2002). Discourses and narratives connect ideas and methods, and can be used to influence various branches of power. Expert knowledge through discourses, generate ‘truths’ that influence policies and regulations that not only empower states, but also empower the one’s producing the knowledge (Sing et al, 2002).
Producers of environmental knowledge (biologists, conservationists, ecologists), have long corroborated ‘truths’ for powerful states and other Western actors (NGOs, transnational institutions, etc.). As such, Western and European environmental ideas and practices have been used to understand and control the ‘developing’ world (Snow, Rochford, Worden and Benford, 1986). One of the indirect effects of this process is that local inhabitants’
environmental knowledge and authority is disregarded, which leads to the marginalization of the very people who are in need of ‘developing’ (Snow et al, 1986). By placing conservation knowledge in the nexus of Western academic groups, institutions, NGOs and transnational organizations, conservation has marginalized non-western knowledge, so that these ‘other’ knowledges become discredited and incorrect (Singh et al, 2002). This has expanded Western powers reach of control, through conservation interventions. These conservation interventions and practices include the controlling access to land, natural resources and controlling local communities (Igoe, 2010). More recent evolution of conservation practices
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incorporates neoliberalist ideas, that marketize, privatize and commodify ecosystems, biodiversity and its goods and services (Igoe, 2010).
3.2 Neoliberal Conservation
Neoliberalism is currently a hot topic of debate for many scholars, however, it remains very rarely talked about in relation to conservation on a global level, much less the militarization of conservation (Brockington, 2008). Yet, conservation, specifically in Africa, has
increasingly revolved around “ways for nature and wildlife to pay their way so that local and global communities can benefit from their sustained conservation” (Büscher, 2011, pg. 85). This ‘imposing conservation’ has continued, no longer through colonial force, but through the market (Neumann, 1998; Büscher, 2011). This process is embedded in imperialist thinking, as conservation discourse revolves around the subjugation of the so-called ‘developing’ world by the ‘developed’ world. The narrative of ‘underdevelopment’ allows the ‘First World’ to retain and strengthen their control and power over the ‘Third World’ through obtaining land and resources via the market for conservation. Neoliberal conservation both finances and supports violent approaches to conservation, such as green militarization (Marijnen et al, 2016).
In the last 30 years we have seen the expansion of neoliberal conservation reflected in the proliferation of conservation groups and donors, as well as in the increase and rapid growth of protected areas (Duffy, 2016). Protected areas have become symbols for
neoliberalism’s metaphor of the world as a never-ending pie, a world that has the potential for a win-win-win solution, no losers, and little necessity for compromise (a trifecta win, for the environment, investors and locals) (Igoe et al, 2007; Büscher, 2011). Increasingly, the militarization of conservation is presented as a desirable solution, and as argued by Marijen and Verweijen, “as they become part of publicity and marketing, and are anchored in everyday consumer practices, the narratives productive of marketization and
commodification become ‘normalized’, thereby contributing to transforming social relationships, identities and worldviews” (2016, pg. 275).
In the neoliberal conservationist world, every environmental problem becomes a chance to profit or an opportunity for financial growth for corporations, national economies, environmentalists, conservation groups, Western consumers and local inhabitants (Igoe et al, 2007a). However, juxtaposed to this promising scenario, a much more complex situation arises. Due to conservation regulations, local inhabitants are increasingly stripped of their
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land and property, even when those commodities are protected under the law (Igoe et al, 2007a). Another example of the problems these regulations pose for native inhabitants, is exhibited in Igoe’s study in Tanzania, which found various problems surrounding a community-based nature reserve, including the arrest and jailing of a group of local
inhabitants on suspicion of attacking a tourist camp; the charges were later dropped, but the sour taste it left in the local community never wavered (Igoe et al, 2007). Büscher and Dressler also investigate the unlawful displacement of local communities in Mozambique near Limpopo National Park, where corporations from South Africa were allowed land usage which economically benefited them under the guise of a business venture, camouflaged as a “community-based wildlife management area” (Dressler and Büscher, 2008).
Issues of this kind are mostly masked by the “discursive blur” (Dressler et al, 2008), or the process of obscuring and convoluting local problems and grievances to the higher ups of development policy organizations (Dressler et al, 2008; Igoe et al, 2007; Duffy, 2016). This process of communication usually contains information and intel that is oversimplified, not understood, or simply incomplete; this makes the communication between global,
national and local levels incredibly inefficient (Igoe et al, 2007, 2010; Duffy, 2016; Lombard, 2015). Furthermore, Igoe and Brockington argue “this blur has a value of its own, as ideas such as participation, sustainability, and win-win-win solutions are used by competing networks of people to mobilize resources as efficiently and quickly as possible” (2007, pg. 435). However, this win-win-win scenario doesn’t reflect local realities, and there is minimal incentive to explore the negative effects of conservation in relation to local inhabitants in their actual environments (Igoe et al 2007, Dunlap et al 2014).
Yet, negative impacts of neoliberal conservation regulations mostly affect local inhabitants, and are usually accompanied by “eviction and exclusion from customary land and natural resources such as grazing land, firewood, bushmeat, medicinal plants, timber, and culturally important resources and places, with implications for both monetary income and non-monetary livelihoods, health and physio-psychological wellbeing, as well as culture and cultural survival” (Holmes and Cavanagh, 2016, pg. 200). Similar to the use of green
militarization as a conservation strategy, regulations too are sometimes enforced in a violent, corrupt and unjust way, and result in proclamations of human rights abuses (Holmes et al, 2016; Marijnen et al, 2016). Other negative effects are more indirect. They include social disturbance and upheaval precipitated by a rapid increase in tourism and its services (Holmes et al, 2016).
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Most of these negative impacts are intertwined with and “imbricated within Eurocentric notions of ‘wilderness’, and the corresponding desire to territorialize conservation spaces that are insulated from human impacts, habitation, and influence” (Holmes et al, 2016, pg. 201). These spaces are imposed through boundary-drawing and ‘territorialization’ and have resulted in the proliferation of new protected areas around the world. Under neoliberalism, territorialization has expanded, as seen in the spread of PAs (Igoe et al, 2007).
The boundary drawing or territorialization, puts a price on sovereignty, making it an available and worthy asset which can be used to orchestrate alliances and deals with investors and other actors (Dressler, 2015). This then contributes to the legitimization of Western led interventions that involve land appropriation and natural resources (Igoe et al, 2007). Westerners bring money and assurances of jobs, which officials from poor states are in desperate need of, a form of silent but powerful oppression. This process creates an acute urgency for impoverished states to produce PAs so that they can gain a competitive
advantage in the tourist economy, which is more consistent with a neo-protectionist agenda; nonetheless, it creates a dynamic of dependence of impoverished states on Western actors and countries (Büscher, 2011; Dressler, 2015). An additional cause for concern are the
‘environmental’ networks in place. For instance, corporations who consistently break environmental regulations (such as Monsanto, Exxon or Chevron), can be environmental donors, and many of the higher ups in these companies sit on major conservation projects as members of the Board of Directors (Igoe et al, 2007a). Conservation groups, corporations and financial groups are increasingly entwined by money, individuals and ideas (Holmes et al 2016; Igoe, 2010). Neoliberal conservation has made war by conservation possible;
conservation organizations collaborate with private military and security companies due to such strong relations with the private sector (Duffy et al, 2015). Additionally, while most conservation organizations present themselves as courageously fighting to save the
environment and protect biodiversity from the growth of human activity and economies, most conservationists certainly have more political ties, resources and finances than the local and adjacent rural communities whose lives they directly impact (Holmes et al, 2016).
Furthermore, present day conservation practices increasingly result in violence, as seen in the case of green militarization, which continues to be permitted and justified through this boundary drawing and territorialization, or neoliberalization of conservation (Neumann 1998; Dressler, 2015). This boundary drawing of PAs reflects an imbalance of powers aiming to control African wildlife and biodiversity worth (Büscher, 2011). Neumann (2004)
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argues that the increase in discursive practices used in militarized conservation relies upon a narrative of African ‘Otherness’. Such notions are driven by discourses of conflict, civil war and the illegal exploitation of natural resources, however such actions are usually explained by using terms like ‘greed’, ‘poverty’ or ‘scarcity’ through video narratives and other
productions (Marijnen et al, 2016). These terms and descriptions contain neo-colonialist and imperialist undertones, which portray a narrative of wrongdoing and ‘Othering’ of African actors, which in turn lowers the moral bar for violence (Marijnen et al, 2016; Neumann, 2004). The controlling of Others, becomes more important and urgent when there is a crisis that threatens the way of life for the morally ‘superior’ class, thereby justifying extreme measures including the postponement of standard moral code (Neumann, 1998). Here we see, how neoliberalist conservation has affected the discursive practices and methods of
militarized conservation, and how it is deeply intertwined in imperialist thinking. Further, very few local inhabitants actually have success in taking part and
economically benefiting from external conservation interventions; rather, the majority simply become ‘disposable’ with no place for them in the conservation free-market economy
(Büscher, 2011). They become displaced, and often roam near and far as they look for a feasible place to live and economic fortuity, as they are no longer permitted to fish, hunt or cultivate the land. The majority of locals, increasingly find themselves being criminalized, and are constantly being told where they cannot go (Reynolds, 2010).
The popular assumption of neoliberalism is that the free market and the commodification and marketization of conservation will produce results that benefit
everyone, without major social and ecological ills. However, neoliberal conservation does not require local inhabitants to benefit in order to succeed (Frame, 2016). In fact, neoliberal conservation does quite well when locals are displaced, as many neoliberal policies can be controversial for actual conservation objectives and for local inhabitants livelihood
(Reynolds, 2010). As explained above, neoliberal conservation facilitates the creation of new territories, which brings new opportunities for investors and grievances for local
inhabitants. Neoliberal conservation is about the reordering of the world to generate the expansion of the free market through conservation practices, such as green militarization. Neoliberalism in a simple form, puts great emphasis on competition, and local inhabitants do not have the resources to compete effectively (Frame, 2016). Recent literature on neoliberal conservation has investigated how displacement of locals is motivated and encouraged by private actors who work through the state to profit from recently emptied PAs, as we will see in the case of Virunga National Park in the DRC (Lunstrum and Ybarra, 2018).
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3.3 Conservation Security
When conservation regulations are forced upon local communities, and when conservation goals are aligned with international security agendas, this is called conservation security (Holmes et al, 2016). Conservation security, refers to the increase of actors treating PAs as sites of security threats (Lunstrum et al, 2018). Conservation security enables justification and legitimization of more stringent and violent conservation approaches (green
militarization) through an agenda of security (Lombard, 2015). Through conservation security, we see conservation authorities (both state and non-state actors) policing local inhabitants and treating them as if they were the cause of the insecurity to the PA (Lunstrum, et al, 2018). As PAs began to emerge in the late 1800s, we subsequently began to see massive evictions from them (Neumann, 2004). While colonial displacements from PAs have largely been tied to colonial discourses of wilderness and imagery, independent states have also displaced locals in hope that PAs would help increase development (Neumann, 1998). Once an area of land has been renamed and re-territorialized a protected area, conservation authorities are able to evict locals from that area, and limit or completely restrict livelihood activities, including agriculture, hunting, fishing, gathering, or small-scale resource
exploitation (Neumann, 1998).
Increasingly, these displacements and evictions are legitimized through a security discourse. There has been an apparent trend in approaching conservation problems as national and international security issues and responding accordingly (Lombard, 2015). This leads to green militarization and the subsequent buildup of military actors, weaponry and tactics in protected areas (Lunstrum et al, 2018). These military actors and strategies are starting to play a key role in relation to the removal of local settlements and communities from PAs (Dunlap et al, 2014). Land tenure rights are ignored based on the argument that local communities are security threats, direct or potential (Fairhead, 2005). Aside from concerns over the rights and safety of already endangered local communities, the
displacement of local communities can harm to biodiversity. For instance, local inhabitants may be more likely to turn to ecologically damaging livelihood practices, such as poaching and deforestation in the face of rampant poverty, which is only made worse by displacement and removal, or as direct acts of resistance (Lunstrum et al, 2018).
International conservation groups tend to put forth a discourse that promotes participating in conservation practices which can contribute to the US and other Western
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powers’ security and economic interests, because competition over scarce resources leads to conflict, insecurity and eventually failed states (Duffy, 2014). This is emblematic of
conservation security, that there is a connection between “resource scarcity, conflict and instability” (Duffy, 2014, pg. 243). This presents a number of issues. First, merging
conservation practices with security concerns places park guards on the front line, although park guards did not necessarily sign up for being active participants in the fight for Western security concerns and economic issues. For many, this will not be acceptable, and may result in conservation organizations losing money if rangers and guards decide to leave. The shift of conservation practice to a form of military-like intervention (that usually extends beyond the borders of Pas) could raise a multitude of issues for local inhabitants who live in these areas (Marijnen 2017). This could be detrimental for the relationships between conservationists and local inhabitants; feelings of alienation have emerged as well as a reduction in local support for conservation in the long term. There also seems to be profound reputational risks for NGOs collaborating with state security services and companies. This problem is a significant issue to local communities who perceive the state to be an oppressive regime rather than a democratic institution that provides security and welfare (Duffy, 2014).
Overall, neoliberal conservation has led to combatting biodiversity loss through the green militarization approach, and security conservation has helped to legitimate and justify this response. We see a multitude of actors involved in conservation practices, state and non-state actors such as, donors, military and security companies, foreign governments, NGOs, various state institutions and elite individuals and politicians. We also see a multitude of actors benefiting economically from conservation policies, with the exception of local inhabitants. This becomes legitimized through conservation security and the integration of conservation efforts and security concerns and interests.
4. Research Design
4.1 MethodologyTo allow close examination of the effects of green militarization, I have chosen an
exploratory mixed methods single case study for my research design. Yin describes a case study research method “as an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used” (1994, p. 83). Although,
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a case study method can be controversial (Yin, 1994), a case study will permit an in-depth explanation of the social behavior of green militarization and its direct and indirect effects on local inhabitants. This methodology will allow close examination of the community-based problems green militarization poses. Because green militarization is very new literature, quantitative data is quite limited. The examination of reports, interviews, and data of former studies, will permit exploration and a more thorough understanding of the complexities surrounding green militarization.
A case study is sometimes considered controversial because of lack of rigor and precision (Yin, 2003). Additionally, biased judgement is thought to sometimes influence the direction of the case study. Another common criticism of the case study method, is that there is an overgeneralization involved in the study of a limited case. However, case studies also have advantages, such as an in-depth study of a new phenomenon (Baxter and Jack, 2008). As green militarization was first recognized in 2014, the phenomenon is only recently a subject of exploration in contemporary studies. Furthermore, Yin (2003) explains that case studies are an important and necessary research method when:
• The focus is meant to answer “how” and “why” questions
• You cannot change or manipulate the actors or their actions
• You want to cover contextual conditions because you believe they are relevant to the phenomenon under study
• The boundaries are not clear between the phenomenon and the context
My research question is focused on “how” and “why” green militarization affects local inhabitants. I am unable to manipulate any of the actors or any of their actions or behavior, and I must include the contextual conditions of green militarization, as green militarization takes place in mostly violent conflict zones. As my research questions are aimed at and limited to specific events and conditions and their inter-relationships in a newly emerging and fluid context, a single case study is rationalized. I use a qualitative research phase to explore the different facets of my case, and then will support these findings through quantitative data.
I have chosen the exploratory case study because exploratory case studies are meant to open the door for further research (Yin, 2003). Yin (2003), defines an exploratory case study as a “type of case study that is used to explore those situations in which the intervention being evaluated has no clear, single set of outcomes” (p. 15). As the effects of green
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beforehand will allow a more unbiased viewpoint. Additionally, through my exploratory case study I hope to identify and capture the real complexities of the effects green militarization has on local populations, in order to permit a more in-depth study of the phenomenon.
As green militarization is a new area of study, the detailed qualitative accounts and descriptions will be vital. This will help to explore, describe and analyze the data and context, it allows us to see the complexities in a real-life situation which may be overlooked in an experimental or quantitative research method. The qualitative aspect to my case study enables exploration of this phenomenon using a wide variety of data and sources; as Baxter and Jack (2008) observe, this permits the case to be studied through not one lens, but multiple lenses. Thus, multiple dimensions of the phenomenon can be unveiled and understood. As green militarization mostly emerges in response to an ongoing conflict in a PA, it is important to describe and analyze the different facets of the conflict itself, as well as the illicit activities that take place. Additionally, one of the main reasons for utilizing qualitative data, is that the study is exploratory, usually meaning that little has been written about the subject at hand (Creswell, 1998).
While utilizing a qualitative approach, I also to intend to develop context and the depth of the phenomenon’s effects on local populations by reviewing quantitative data where it exists in the literature. My aim is to show external validation, and to indicate consistency across different studies. By comparing different perspectives of both qualitative and some quantitative data I hope to offer a more comprehensive understanding of the effects of green militarism on locals and their livelihood. I will draw upon samples from the same population, civilians located in the eastern region of DRC, from 1996 to 2018. A review of quantitative research will enable a profile target in which certain trends, such as the number of refugees, displaced persons and violent conflicts can be analyzed. While quantitative data can be used to measure certain trends or behaviors, it cannot necessarily explain the why and how of a phenomenon, which is why the majority of my data will be qualitative.
4.2 Case Selection
My case study will examine the effects of green militarization on local inhabitants within the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), specifically, within Virunga National Park area which includes the eastern Congo, Rwindi Plains, Lake Edward and the Rwenzori Mountains. I have chosen the DRC/ Virunga National Park case study for a multitude of reasons. First, Virunga National Park in the DRC is home to many local inhabitants, inside the park and in
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the surrounding areas, and the treatment and standard of living of these inhabitants has been well observed and documented throughout the years (Camm, 2011). Second, the evolution of the militaristic strategies of the Park has been well documented, by academics, news articles and interviews. Furthermore, the transnational actors involved in the militarization of the park merit the exploration of operationalizing through a security agenda.
Virunga National Park, founded in 1925 by the Belgian colonial regime, has adopted a strict militarization approach to conservation (Marijnen, 2017). Park borders have been rapidly expanding, which has had a profound impact on local populations and adjacent
communities for whom land access is vital to their very existence (Marijnen, 2017). This case study, will focus on the local population’s reactions to the militant approach adopted by Virunga Park officials, and how these are deeply entangled with livelihood strategies that are operationalized in a complex conflict environment. This method’s objective is to disentangle the involvement of local and transnational actors, including state and non-state actors and elites, and how locals’ opposition to green militarization can be understood and analyzed, and how local’s actions can sometimes be used in a discourse against them.
Such situations emphasize conflicts over access to land and resources between elites, foreign powers, locals, park guards and officers and Congolese government institutions. Aside from Virunga National Park, similar tensions arise around the world between parks and local communities who live in and around protected areas that are designated for
conservation (Dressler et al, 2008). These conflicts are often embedded in historical
continuities, and involve enclosures prioritizing biodiversity, which result in the eviction of prior users and restrictions to resources and livelihood activities (Peluso et al 2011). The conflict in Virunga is representative of the growing tensions emerging from militarizing conservation practices that marginalize and minimize the impact on local communities enmeshed in protected areas. The consequences of this clash tend to encompass removal of local inhabitants from protected areas and the restriction of access to land and resources.
Furthermore, the case of Virunga is emblematic of the neoliberal policies adopted through conservation practices. The European Commission (EC) is the main financier of Virunga National Park, and has thus been financing its increasingly stringent techniques and militarized approach (Marijnen, 2017). This neoliberal conservation approach takes place when a natural environment or area becomes a commodity (Büscher, 2013). The end discourse gives a more in-depth understanding of the capitalist market that produces and supports the militarization of conservation.
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4.3. Data
This study is mostly based on qualitative material and literature and therefore mostly secondary sources. This includes scientific articles, case studies, surveys, NGO reports, audio files, IO reports, news articles, and questionnaires. The research explores the varying
properties of the green militarization phenomenon and its effects on local communities. The analysis will rely on secondary resources, previous scholarly work on the DRC and Virunga National Park, as well as some primary resources (government and NGO trends). Both my qualitative and quantitative data is from the last 25 years, so as to provide the most up to date information available. I will draw upon interviews and surveys conducted in the DRC by academics since 1992.
5.0 Case Study
5.1 Historical Overview of the Conflict in the DRC
To grasp the size and scope of the conflict, a brief history of the major events that took place in the DRC is warranted. The causes of the conflict in this region, are numerous and
extremely complex. This next section will provide an in-depth examination of the historical complexities and the chronology of key events surrounding the conflict in the DRC, and what led to the subsequent militarization of Virunga National Park.
25 5.1.2 Belgian Congo 1885-1960
The Democratic Republic of the Congo’s history has been dominated by various forms of intervention, violence, and exploitation by internal and external powers. The violent Belgian invasion took place under King Leopold II of Belgium in 1885 (Mathys, 2017). King Leopold II gained control of the DRC by persuading other European powers (Britain, Portugal,
Germany, France) that Belgium should be in control of the Congo for humanitarian reasons, placing himself on a pedestal above competing powers who had pretensions to the DRC’s vast resources (Camm, 2011). King Leopold II presented his intervention on a platform of peacefulness; he would offer a way to ‘civilize’ the Congolese and to help save them from ‘barbarous’ rule (Everill and Kaplan, 2013). Other European powers agreed as Belgium was too small to pose a threat to the interests of the bigger powers, and this would at least avoid going to war over the vast resource rich lands the DRC had to offer. However, the Belgian invasion was far from peaceful, and inhabitants of the Congo were subjected to various forms of abuse, including starvation, torture, chopped limbs, the burning of villages, slavery and
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genocide (Camm, 2011). News of the atrocities committed against the Congolese under King Leopold II spread internationally in the early 1900s, which became referred to as the “Congo Horrors” (Dunn, 2003). The “Congo Horrors” were mostly associated with the stringent manual labor policies that the Belgians used to collect natural resources, such as rubber and copper for export (Dunn, 2003). Every Congolese inhabitant, women, men and children of all ages, had to meet quotas for collecting resources for the Belgians personal economic gain, or face death or torture (Everill et al, 2013). Collectively, with disease, starvation and a
decreasing birth rate, the Congolese population suffered mass losses.
In 1925, under King Albert I, Virunga National Park was founded, the first National Park in all of Africa, formerly named Albert National Park (Virunga National Park, 2018). Created on a platform of once again protecting the Congo’s resource rich land and its people, local inhabitants in this annexed park area were nonetheless continually subjected to many forms of abuse, and resources continued to flow out of the Congo and into Belgium (Camm, 2011). Thus, a pattern began to emerge of systematic exploitation by external powers.
5.1.3 Independence
It wasn’t until 1960, due to rising instability, that the Belgians were forced to leave the DRC, and relinquish control of the country and the Park to the Congolese (Mathys, 2017). During this independence movement, the Congo became known as the ‘Democratic Republic of the Congo’, and Albert National Park became known as ‘Virunga National Park’ (Dunn, 2003). The Congolese proceeded to elect their first Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba, who would only hold power for a year before being overthrown and then violently executed because the United States and European powers sought a more suitable Cold War ally (and access to the resources that would subsequently become available for their use, rather than for the use of DRC’s people and development) (Mathys, 2017). President Mobutu, backed by the US and Europe, came to power in 1965 and would remain in power until 1997 (Dunn, 2003). During this time, Mobutu followed suit and proceeded to make resources from the Congo cheaply available to Western powers, as well as provide a series of political favors (which is why he was backed by Western powers and Lumumba was not) (Everill et al, 2013). Mobutu renamed the Congo ‘Zaire’, and become notoriously known for his corruption, and for keeping Zaire’s resource profits in his personal pocket, and eventually leading the country into a series of economic downturns (Everill et al, 2013). However, in 1969 Mobutu began to take interest in conservation; he created the first Congolese Wildlife Authority “Institut Congolais pour le Conservation de la Nature” (ICCN), which continues to be in charge of the
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Congo’s protected areas to this day (Vogel, 2000). Nevertheless, under Mobutu the region continued to face a series of violent conflicts, the most devastating of which were dubbed the “Congolese Wars” (Vogel, 2000).
5.1.4 Congolese Wars
The First Congo War was prompted in 1994, when fighting between ethnic groups, Hutus and Tutsis, began to spill over from neighboring Rwanda into Zaire (Camm, 2011). The 100-day Rwandan genocide consisted of thousands of Tutsis and Tutsi-sympathizers being killed by the predominantly Hutu authorities, known as the Rwandan Armed Forces (RAF) (Camm, 2011). The fighting slowed when the Hutu government was overthrown by the Tustsi- led Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) (Everill et al, 2011). In the meantime, over 1.5 million refugees fled and settled in Eastern Zaire, seeking the defense of the dense Congolese forest located within Virunga National Park (Dunn, 2003). The refugees consisted of Tutsis who fled the Hutu-led genocide, and Hutus who fled the RFP-Tutsi retaliation; the perpetrators of the genocide were prominent in the latter group. The fighting continued in Virunga National Park as various groups of refugees began retaliation attacks, and President Mobutu began backing the Hutu side of the fight. It was then that the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo (AFDL), the newly formed Tutsi-Rwandan Government and the Ugandan Government together toppled and replaced President Mobutu with Laurent Kabila in 1997 (Mathys, 2017). Kabila reinstated the country’s former name, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in an effort to unify the country. However, the fighting continued, and left the local inhabitants of the DRC, specifically in and around Virunga National Park, in total destruction and disarray (Dunn, 2003).
One year after the overthrow of President Mobutu, conflict was sparked yet again between Rwanda, Uganda and the Kabila-led Congolese government they helped put in power (Everill et al, 2011). Kabila was accused of betraying his former supporters, Rwanda and Uganda, by permitting Hutu armies to rebuild themselves in the Eastern region of the country, specifically in resource rich Virunga National Park. Subsequently, Uganda and Rwanda invaded, and in response Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe also invaded and sent in troops in support of the Kabila DRC government (Everill et al, 2011). At least nine African countries became involved in the conflict and a series of Western actors and interventions, the war became known as ‘Africa’s Great War’ (Dunn, 2003). This resulted in numerous ethnic groups, becoming armed and supported in their local grievances by different governments and actors (Camm, 2011). The role of different actors and their reasons for
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supporting certain groups over others, became fueled by economic incentive and resource exploitation of the Eastern Congo (Mathys, 2017).
Laurent Kabila was assassinated in 2001 and his son, Joseph Kabila, became acting President of the DRC. Joseph Kabila proceeded to mediate a fairly fruitful peace treaty that terminated Rwanda and Uganda’s presence in the DRC (Dunn, 2003). A transitional
government was implemented by the United Nations (UN) until elections could be held. The elections were deemed fair and free by the UN and Joseph Kabila was officially elected President in 2006 (Camm, 2011). As Joseph Kabila appeared to be a leader in support of democracy and democratic freedoms, it was hoped that development and peace would materialize in the DRC. However, Joseph Kabila remains in power today amid allegations and accusations of defrauding two elections since 2006 (Mathys, 2017). Presently, he refuses to stand down or to hold any further democratic elections, while proceeding to attack and imprison those who oppose him (Mathys, 2017).
5.1.5 Present Day Crisis
The current conflict in the Congo involves more than seventy different armed groups, and primarily takes place in the eastern region, encompassing Virunga National Park area (Mathys, 2017). Presently, more than 4 million people are displaced, 46,000 deaths are estimated monthly and there are over 7 million people at risk for food security (UN, 2018). Since the Second Congo War of 1998, an estimated 5.4 million people have died, the most since WWII (International Rescue Committee, 2017). Despite the presence of 20,000 UN Peacekeepers in the DRC, fighting continues (UN, 2018). These astonishingly high numbers would normally be more than enough to attract the attention of media outlets and powerful world leaders, yet we see no real acknowledgement, much less response to the crisis (Everill et al, 2013). As powerful Western countries remain silent, one wonders if they have
something to gain.
In order to attain a more comprehensive understanding of the effects that green militarization of Virunga National Park has had on local inhabitants, I will briefly introduce the international component of the conflict and the resultant impact on the militarization of the Park. This militarization of Virunga Park should be understood in the wider context of violence throughout the DRC, which is why it is important to understand key events and to keep the historical context of the conflict in mind. The transition to a war in pursuit of the environment has become profoundly complex, and is grounded in advancing the security agenda by external actors. The fundamental narratives that are usually associated with
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validations of security, have become operationalized in relation to saving the environment, as we will see below.
5.2 International Involvement and Influence
External interventions and actors have characterized much of the DRC’s development and intensified the present-day crisis. Due to immense natural resources, numerous external powers have sought to gain economic advantage. These include state and non-state actors, such as NGOs, IOs, and private companies. As presented above, external powers since the colonial era have used a platform of ‘saving’ Congolese inhabitants and land as a justification to gain control of the area for their own advantage.
Western international involvement in the DRC supposedly focuses on peacebuilding, peacekeeping, humanitarian aid and development projects, however, the role of natural resource exploitation has become evident. Shortly after DRC’s independence, it became a cold war proxy between the US and the USSR (Dunn, 2003). President Mobutu’s dictatorship was prolonged by Western powers, which subsequently led to further deterioration of the DRC’s development, economic interest and governmental stability (Camm, 2011). This was justified and operationalized through an agenda of global security, ostensibly because of the Cold War. Additionally, the US military and other American companies have covertly been involved in the Congo since the 1950s, searching for economic advantage, as a former military officer reported to the US parliamentary subcommittee (Dunn, 2003). The west kept backing Mobutu as long as the resource wealth continued to flow and the DRC stayed out of Soviet orbit (Mathys, 2017). Throughout Mobutu’s regime, Western powers allowed his regime to borrow billions, which was later stolen by Mobutu, yet today the DRC is still expected to pay it all back (Camm, 2011).
The reason for so many different external actors becoming involved in the Congo Wars is complex, but a pattern of economic advantage is seen once again. Rwanda and Uganda were involved from the beginning and claimed to invade due to border security reasons (Hochleithner, 2017). We also see a shift between state alliances throughout the Congolese wars which appears to center around the need to achieve economic exploitation and national interest (Everill et al, 2013). The UN released a report that stated over 125 external companies or individuals contributed to the Congolese conflicts as well, just adding another layer of complexity (UN, 2003). Throughout the Congo’s history, external
interventions have been justified through civilizing missions, through security agendas, or through humanitarian interventions, while the real goals lie in achieving economic advantage
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through control of the DRC and its lands (Dunn, 2003). Unfortunately, Virunga National Park and the surrounding areas lie at the center of this resource exploitation and thus the conflict itself.
By summarizing the international elements of the conflict, I hope to demonstrate the complexity of international actors and their interests. Many international state and non-state actors have benefitted from the chaotic state of the DRC. For instance, had the DRC been peaceful and stable, many actors would not have been granted contracts or agreements (Shah, 2010).
5.3 Natural Resources
The DRC is home to some of the most resource rich lands in the world. Almost every natural resource can be found in the DRC, with an estimated 24 trillion dollars of untapped mineral wealth alone (Shah, 2010). Limitless amounts of water flow through the DRC by way of the world’s second largest river, the soil is rich, and there exists copious amounts of diamonds, cobalt, cassiterite, tin, coffee, coltan and gold (Dunn, 2003). Most of these natural resources are found in the eastern side of the country, specifically in and around Virunga National Park, making it a perfect war zone for resource control (Virunga National Park, 2018).
Human rights groups, such as Amnesty International and Humans Rights Watch, have accused multinational corporations from Western countries of profiting from war and
violence in the DRC, as well as developing elite networks of important individuals to pillage natural resources in and around the Virunga area (Shah, 2010). The practice of resource exploitation and plunder, as well as a lack of accountability was characterized throughout both the Mobutu and Kabila governments (Everill et al, 2013). The mining and forestry departments had been under the control of civilians throughout the DRC until the First Congo War. Subsequently, these departments were taken over by numerous rebel groups and the national army. The militarization of these departments only brought further violence and catastrophe to Congo inhabitants (Dunn, 2003). During the Second Congo War, resource pillaging increased exponentially due to the many different armed groups needing to finance their operations, and of course due to international actors taking advantage of the war ridden DRC (Camm, 2011). Companies from international state actors began to create ‘front companies’, and in an effort to exploit natural resources they worked with armed groups without actively participating in the conflict themselves (Mathys, 2017).
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When we look through the lens of ‘resource wars’, insurgent activity within Virunga National Park becomes criminalized. Because of this ‘criminalization’, the Park becomes situated outside the normal social and moral realm (Lombard, 2015). This causes the violent dimensions of civil-rebel relations to be accentuated, while simultaneously down-playing the livelihood and political facets. For instance, Virunga Park’s chief warden, Belgian Emmanuel de Merode, said in a recent interview the rebel groups were “originally a peasant uprising, which has degenerated into a group that is involved in general banditry” (Verweijen et al, 2016 p. 306). Emmanuel de Merode indicates how insurgency activity and civil-rebel relations are not recognized as being actions that relate to the grievances of inhabitants, therefore they are mostly criminal (Verweijen et al, 2016).
Similar reductionism is found in illegal resource plunder. Virunga National Park is situated in an extremely densely populated area of the DRC; the larger part of these local inhabitants are small-scale farmers (Hochleithner, 2017). Due to a history of rural
governance favoring advancing the interests of elite actors (characterized in both the Mobutu and Kabila regimes), these small-scale farmers are left with a land and resource shortage and poor-quality soils that threaten their livelihood (Reynolds, 2010; Verweijen et al, 2016).
5.4 Virunga National Park
5.4.1 History
Virunga National Park is one of the most resource rich, and biologically diverse places in the world. More than half of all the biodiversity in sub-Saharan Africa exists within Virunga (Virunga National Park, 2018). The park was founded in 1925 as Albert National Park; it contains two of the world’s most active volcanoes and is home to the endangered mountain gorillas (Virunga National Park, 2018). During the 1930s, the park was greatly expanded due to a state of emergency because of sleeping sickness, a fatal parasitic disease (Virunga National Park, 2018). This permitted the Belgian colonial regime to frame the masses of displaced inhabitants as bringing them to ‘safety’; they were then isolated and after they were cured from the sickness, they were not allowed to go back to their lands and were not given any compensation (Marijnen et al, 2016). Other regions of the DRC that were not yet
contagious with the disease were also forced out, so the colonial authorities could ‘control the disease’ (Camm, 2011). This meant that many former inhabitants of Virunga National Park were not allowed to go back to their land, which set the foundation for park officials to adopt
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a ‘fortress model’ approach (Marijnen et al, 2016). The ‘fortress model’ approach, is a conservation model based on the belief that humans and human activity cause destruction to ecosystems, and therefore protection of biodiversity is best accomplished by creating PAs where there is limited human activity and disturbance (Dressler et al, 2015; Marijnen et al, 2016).
Even after the DRC’s independence in 1960, Belgium continued to be meticulously involved in DRC development, conservation and governance. President Mobutu in 1969 appointed Belgian conservationist, Jacques Verschuren, director of the Congo’s state conservation department (Virunga National Park, 2018). Jacques Verschuren praised President Mobutu’s conservation efforts, which included giving the new park management total control and blanket approval to take any necessary measures (Marijnen, et al 2016). Thus, militarized tactics and methods utilized by park guards began, including the creation of one of the first ‘shoot to kill’ policies in Africa (Marijnen, et al 2016).
5.4.2 Funding
After DRC independence, external aid became vital to the park’s sustainability. Particularly, the European Commission (EC) became the dominant aid provider from 1988 onwards (Virunga National Park, 2018). The EC has played a key role in relation to financing the park. Marijnen (2017), estimates over the last 20 years, that at least 30 million euros has been invested (pg. 1574). From 1994 to present, this elite funding and involvement became
justified through a ‘state of emergency’ that was put in place after millions of refugees and combatants fled from Rwanda into the park, during the First Congo War (Marijnen, 2017). The arrival and settlement of so many refugees had destructive effects on biodiversity and security (Marijnen, et al 2016) and armed conflict still takes place in the park. Reflecting on these historical continuities, the ongoing conflict situation in Virunga perpetuates the justification of external involvement and overreach.
During the first and second Congolese Wars, the EC, the ICCN and DRC government worked together to generate a Public-Private Partnership (PPP) with a British NGO, the African Conservation Fund (ACF), which is now named the Virunga Foundation (Virunga National Park, 2018). The PPP runs until 2040 and allows the Virunga Foundation to receive an excessive amount of EC developments funds; these funds continue to be the main financial sponsor of the foundation (Marijnen, 2017). Other conservation NGOs working in the DRC
