Diasporas, transnational activism & third country politics : a constructivist explanation of engagement in the Syrian conflict

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Diasporas, Transnational Activism &

Third Country Politics

A Constructivist Explanation of Engagement in the Syrian Conflict

Iris Koper

Student ID: 6069886

Master Thesis Political Science – International Relations Graduate School of Social Sciences

University of Amsterdam Supervisor: Dr. J.M.J. Doomernik

Second reader: Dr. A. de Jong 27 June 2014

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Foreword

The risk of writing a thesis about an ongoing event, such as the Syrian civil war, is that real world developments during, or just after the process of writing, may affect your findings and conclusions. The content of this thesis was written in the months April and May of the year 2014, just before it was announced that the attack on the Jewish Museum in Brussels was most likely carried out by a returned Syria traveller. Because of this time frame, the Brussels incident is not taken into account in this research. Besides, it must be noted that while this event seems to be highly relevant for my thesis, this is in fact not necessarily the case. The attack must be considered as a racially motivated hate crime and addresses a different

problem in society; the phenomenon of (new) anti-Semitism. This concept refers to the hatred against the state of Israel and Jews in general. Attitudes of anti-Semitic origin emanate from the political left, the far right, but also from radical Islam. Hence, while there are definitely some linkages between the Brussels shooting and the topic of this study, the assault could perhaps be better framed as a purely anti-Semitic act instead of being directly linked to the conflict in Syria.

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1. Introduction

On 23 October 2013, two men, Mohammed G. and Omar H., were convicted by the District Court of Rotterdam for preparing a journey to Syria. In the first two judgements in this case, also labelled as the first trial of its kind in the Netherlands and Western Europe, the Court held that the suspects made preparatory acts for murder, such as making of flight reservations to Turkey.1 A few months earlier, in August 2013, two other young men, Mohammed El A. and Hakim B. from the Dutch city of Arnhem, were arrested in Germany on suspicion of travelling to Syria. The men were arrested in a car that was stocked with military clothing, Iphones, simcards and a substantial amount of cash. In the beginning of 2014, these two men appeared in front of the judge. The public persecution service stated that they were guilty of preparing terrorist offenses. However, the two men denied wanting to participate in the Syrian civil war and stated that they were only planning to visit their brothers in Syria. The judges eventually decided that the men may remain in freedom while awaiting trial.2

Persons travelling to Syria and possibly coming back from the battlefields is a prominent issue in the Netherlands. In fact, the Dutch National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism, Dick Schoof, raised the terrorism threat level from ‘limited’ to ‘substantial’ in March 2013. One of the reasons was an increase in the number of young people travelling to Syria. According to Schoof, the ‘jihadists’ are a serious concern for countries, because if they return they will be further radicalised, battle-hardened and more closely connected with terrorists and extremist groups.3 On 24 February 2014, the National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (NCTb) stated that the terrorism threat level was still substantial. According to NCTb, the threat level remains high because the Dutch Syria travellers have aligned with al-Qaeda and allied battle groups.4

Based on the fear that the Syria travellers will come back and be further radicalised, irrespective of this being a real threat or not, various Western and European states that are dealing with the phenomenon of Syria travellers have taken security measures. These measures are aimed at preventing their citizens from engaging in the Syrian conflict and to

1_{C. Paulussen, ‘The Syrian Foreign Fighters Problem: A Test Case From the Netherlands’, ICCT, 2013, available at:}

http://icct.nl/publications/icct-commentaries/the-syrian-foreign-fighters-problem-a-test-case-from-the-netherlands.

2_{NOS, ‘Rechtbank laat Syrië gangers vrij’, available at:}_{http://nos.nl/artikel/606079-rechtbank-laat-syriegangers-vrij.html}_{, last accessed on 2}

June 2014.

3_{D. Schoof at London Security Conference, 2013.}

4_{NRC, ‘Terrorismebedreiging blijft hoog door Syriëgangers’, available at:}

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counter their return to national territory. Britain, for example, has revoked the passports of 37 Syria travellers since May 2010. These people who have left for Syria are having their

citizenship stripped in order to prevent their return to the UK and to protect the public. A British Home Office spokesman said: ‘Citizenship is a privilege, not a right’.5_Moreover,

several Belgian municipalities have removed Syria travellers from the population register, meaning that they have lost their right to social benefits. In the city of Antwerp, not only the Syria travellers lose their social welfare entitlements, their wives as well. Moreover, the parents of underage Syria fighters, living in Antwerp, lose their child benefits.6

In the Netherlands, security measures have been taken as well. In order to prevent citizens from travelling to Syria, the passports of eight possible Syria travellers have been revoked. According to Schoof, it is the first time in history that the Dutch government has used the so-called passport law. In practice this means that someone will not be able to travel to foreign countries.7 While this measure is aimed to prevent people from engaging in the Syrian conflict, there is not yet a directive for depriving Syria travellers of their Dutch citizenship. However, several politicians, such as Geert Wilders from the Freedom Party (PVV), have been advocating for stripping off their Dutch citizenships.8

Because most of the men and women who are present in Syria have left in secret, we know little about these individuals. What we do know, or at least what is expected, is that most of the Europeans participating in the conflict have their roots outside Europe. They are mostly migrants or second generation migrants, some of which enjoy double citizenship, meaning that they attain the nationality from their country of origin and from the host-land they have been residing in. More precisely, they can be considered as diaspora individuals, meaning that while they have been living in the host-land (the Netherlands) they identify themselves also as members of their homeland community.

States generally do not encourage double citizenship. While there is nothing new about diasporas offering support to their homeland – as is often done by ‘ethnic lobbying’,

5_{Mirror, ‘British jihadists who fight in Syria having their UK citizenship stripped’, available at:}

http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/british-jihadists-who-fight-syria-2954402, last accessed on 2 June 2014.

6_{Volkskrant, ‘Belgische gemeenten schrappen uitkering Syriëgangers’, available at:}

http://www.volkskrant.nl/vk/nl/2844/Archief/archief/article/detail/3495055/2013/08/20/Belgische-gemeenten-schrappen-uitkering-Syriegangers.dhtml, last accessed on 2 June 2014.

7_{NOS, ‘8 Syriëgangers zijn paspoort kwijt’, available at:}_{http://nos.nl/artikel/603117-8-syriegangers-zijn-paspoort-kwijt.html}_{, last accessed}

on 2 June 2014.

8_{NRC, ‘Drie ex-militairen mogelijk actief als jihadist’, available at:}

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when diasporas advocate, for example, for more economic support towards their homeland – governments have always been aware of the fact that diasporas might pose a threat to the nation state by engaging in the politics of the country of origin. This is because states see diasporas as harbouring dual identities which raises the question about which of their loyalties, the one towards the homeland or towards the host-state, has priority. Furthermore, states see diasporas as the challengers of the traditional conventions of the state. But what if diasporas do not only feel some sort loyalty towards their country of origin, but do also engage in the politics of a third country (a country that is neither host nor home to the diaspora individuals)? As is mentioned above, this comes with many security concerns. The engagement of diasporas in third country politics seems to be a rather recent and new phenomenon in diasporic activities and can be considered as the result of a globalised world, in which concepts such as mobility, connectivity and communication have taken on a different meaning. The phenomenon of diasporas and their engagement in third country politics has been especially visible since the Arab spring. Think for example about the Moroccan-Dutch, Tunesian-French or Algerian-Belgian men and women who have left their countries to participate in the Syrian conflict. Because diasporas are often only perceived in terms of homeland and host-land relations, the engagement in third country politics brings a whole new dimension to the concept of diaspora.

The problem that stands at the fore of this thesis is that there is no clear causal

mechanism that explains why diasporas might be motivated to engage in the politics of a third country. While a whole body of literature is written on the relationship between diasporas and the home- and host-land, little is written about their connection to a third country. This has to do with the tendency within diaspora studies to think only in terms of the homeland and the host-state. However, in this age of globalisation, in which all kinds of people connect across the border each day, people do not only identify with their local or national communities. What is often overlooked in diaspora studies, is that the attachments, loyalties and affinities of diasporas go beyond the home/host dichotomy of nation-states. This thesis aims to overcome this dichotomy. Besides, by studying why diasporas do not only exert influence on the homeland and host-land but also on a third country, we are able to get a better understanding of diasporas, their aims and motives, their patterns of mobilisation and their political weight in national and international politics. Because diasporas are probably the most prominent actors linking international and domestic spheres of politics, they are important objects to study.

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politics, a lack of clarity regarding this matter might result in (unjust) assumptions about diasporas’ motivations. Especially when it comes to the case of this thesis, the engagement in the Syrian conflict, one should be careful not to jump to conclusions too fast. As mentioned above, the participation of foreigners in the Syrian civil war has received great attention by the international community and is a hot debated topic in local, national and international politics. Because states clearly do have an interest in tackling the phenomenon of Syria fighters/travellers, questions such as ‘what is their motivation?’, and ‘will they return?’ are of paramount importance for policy considerations. Besides, more insight into the causal

mechanisms of diasporas’ engagement in third country politics will contribute to the

understanding of identity and loyalty issues within diaspora communities. This is of societal relevance because it might expose the challenges diaspora individuals have to face with regard to identity and why they make certain choices in life.

Therefore, I examine in this thesis the question: how to explain the engagement of

diasporas in third country politics?. By using IR constructivist theory I aim to establish a

framework through which the phenomenon can be studied. This framework will

predominantly consists of three causal mechanisms, including: (1) imagined communities, (2) strategic collective identity construction, and (3) identity crisis and radicalisation. Because this research relies upon qualitative research methods, the purpose of this research is not to generalise the results. It is rather oriented towards the contextual uniqueness of the social world being studied and to provide more insight into the possible mechanisms explaining the phenomenon.

This thesis starts off with a theoretical framework in which the concept of diaspora is explored and brought into context with the broader literature on transnationalism. Moreover, the theoretical section also provides a linkage between the field of diaspora studies and IR constructivist theory. The subsequent chapter concerns methodology. In this section the case selection will be presented, the research population described and the central concepts

operationalised. Moreover, in this chapter the data collection will be brought into account and the limitations of the used methods will be discussed. In the following section, the results of the data collection will be presented and analysed, in order to link the constructivist theory and causal mechanisms to real world practices. In the last chapter, conclusions will be drawn and a discussion for further research introduced.

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2. Theoretical framework

This chapter provides a linkage between the theory and the problem at hand. It includes definitions of the key concepts used in this thesis, an overview of existing literature on the topic, an explanation of the phenomenon upon which this research hopes to fill the vacuum and a description of the theory that is used for investigating why diasporas engage in third country politics.

2.1. What is a diaspora?

The term ‘diaspora’ is a complex and contested concept. In the study of diasporas, there are many different interpretations of the term and no single definition exists. In order to engage in a more thorough discussion about diasporas and their influence on the global stage, it is important and necessary to delimit and define the concept of diaspora.

2.1.1. Definition of diaspora

The term diaspora originates from the Greek words dia and spora, and can be translated to ‘splitting the seed’ or ‘to sow the seed’. The ancient Greeks used this concept to refer simply to the process of migration and colonisation.9_{Later, the usage of the term was increasingly}

associated with a collective trauma or banishment suffered by a group of people leading to its geographical dispersal.10 Some definitions of the term specifically refer to the Jewish

Diaspora. For example, the Oxford English Dictionary defines diaspora as ‘the Dispersion; i.e. the whole body of Jews living dispersed among the Gentiles after the Captivity; the body of Jewish Christians outside of Palestine’.11

In the academic context, several authors argue that the usage of the term disapora should be restricted to groups that have experienced a traumatic dispersal, such as the Jews, the Africans or the Armenians. Other scholars, like Robert Cohen, argue that diaspora communities do not have to arouse from a traumatic dispersal, but can instead also emerge from other forms of migration, such as economic migration.12 Additionally, some scholars use a quite narrow working definition of diaspora, like Nicholas van Hear, according to whom a

9_{R. Cohen, Global Diasporas: An Introduction, London: UCL Press 1997, p. ix.}

10_{F.B. Adamson, Constructing the Diaspora: Diaspora Identity Politics and Transnational Social Movements, (paper prepared for}

presentation at the 49th_{Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association), 2008, p. 5.} 11_{Oxford English Dictionary}

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migrant community is only a diaspora when it has the following three features: (1) dispersion from the homeland to two or more host-lands, (2) an enduring presence abroad and (3) exchange and communication between parts of the diaspora.13_{Others apply a more broad}

definition of diaspora, such as the definition by Walker Connor, who defines a diaspora as ‘that segment of people living outside the homeland’.14_{Furthermore, while some scholars,}

like Nadja Johnson, see diasporas as a social process in which some migrants actively engage, others only perceive it as a way to group and categorise migrants and reject diaspora itself as a theoretical lens.15

These different views on how the concept of diaspora should or should not be used indicate that the concept is highly contested. However, most definitions are based upon three characteristics: dispersion, identity and homeland orientation. In this thesis, the definition of the concept diaspora comprises these three characteristics and is loosely based on the

definition provided by Shain and Barth. Diaspora refers to a group of people sharing a

common identity, that resides outside the borders of its (real or symbolic, ethnic or religious) homeland, but who identify themselves, or are identified by others, as inside members of the community.16 Because the term identity is central to the definition of diaspora and to this research in general, it is necessary to define the concept at this very stage. In this research, identity refers to social identity, which is a set of meaning that an actor ascribes to itself.17

2.1.2. Diaspora and transnational migrant communities

In the social and political sciences there is much confusion and considerable controversy over the exact difference between a diaspora and a transnational migrant community. Many

scholars have tried to pinpoint the differences and similarities. The complex discussion regarding this problem has been mapped by Hans van Amersfoort in his essay

Transnationalisme, modern diaspora’s en sociale cohesive. Because a thorough discussion

13_{N. van Hear, New Diasporas: The Mass Exodus, Dispersal and Regrouping of Migrant Communities, London: UCL Press 1998, p. 6.} 14_{W. Connor, ‘The impact of homelands upon diasporas’, in G. Sheffer (ed.), Modern Diasporas in International Politics, London: Croom}

Helm, p. 16.

15_{N.C. Johnson, ‘Global Journeys: From Transnationalism to Diaspora’, Journal of International and Global Studies, Vol. 4, No. 1 (2012),}

pp. 43, 44.

16_{Shain and Barth (2003) define diaspora as ‘a people with common origin who reside, more or less on a permanent basis, outside the}

borders of their ethnic or religious homeland – whether that homeland is real or symbolic, independent or under foreign control. Diaspora members identify themselves, or are identified by others – inside and outside their homeland – as part of the homeland’s national community, and as such are often called upon to participate, or are entangled, in homeland-related affairs’.

17_{A. Wendt, ‘Collective Identity Formation and the International State’, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 2 (1994), p.}

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about the difference between diasporas and transnational migrant communities is beyond the scope of this research, I will only refer here to van Amersfoort’s conclusions. He argues that transnationalism should be perceived as the broader, overarching framework of which the diaspora is part of. Furthermore, van Amersfoort explains that transnational migrant

communities comprehend an economical, social-cultural and political dimension. Within the diaspora, all dimensions are present, but the political dimension is of most importance.18

2.1.3. Shift in migration and diaspora studies

In 1991, the inaugural issue of the journal Diaspora was published. William Safran, one of the authors in this very edition, observed that most of the academic discussions concerning ethnicity and immigration devoted very little attention to diasporas.19 In 2005, however, sociologist Rogers Brubaker, presented his critique on the explosive growth of diaspora studies. He pointed out in his article The ‘diaspora’ diaspora that during the 1970s the term ‘diaspora’ appeared as keyword only once or twice a year in academic works, while by the year 2001 this number had grown to nearly 130 times a year.20 What caused this veritable explosion of interest in diasporas?

First, there has been a shift in literature on migration and migration politics. While still much of the literature in migration studies is state-centric, there is a growing set of literature focusing on the transnational dimension of migration.21 It was only in the late 1980s that transnationalism hit the scene of migration studies. Transnationalism, which is, in short, a set of sustained long-distance and border-crossing connections, has provided the social sciences with a new analytic lens making the increasing intensity and scope of circular flows of people, goods and information visible. It allows one to make an analysis of how migrants construct and reorganise their lives in more than one society at the same time.22_{Migration scholars who}

have contributed to this more transnational oriented study of migration are, for example, Faist and his work on transnational social spaces, Portes and his work on immigrant transnational organisations and Bash, Glick-Schiller and Szanton-Blanc and their work on the transnational migrant.

18_{H. van Amersfoort, Transnationalisme, modern diaspora’s en sociale cohesive, Amsterdam: Imes 2001.} 19_{W. Safran, ‘Diasporas in modern societies: Myths of homeland and return’, Diaspora, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1991), p. 83.} 20_{R. Brubaker, ‘The ‘diaspora’ diaspora’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 28, No. 1 (2005), p. 1.}

21_{F.B. Adamson, Constructing the Diaspora: Diaspora Identity Politics and Transnational Social Movements, p. 9.}

22_{A. Cacglar, ‘Constraining metaphors and the transnationalisation of spaces in Berlin’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol. 27,}

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Second, there has been a shift in diaspora studies as the term has proliferated and its meaning stretched. Rogers Brubaker argues that most of the early discussions around diaspora were firmly rooted in the conceptual homeland and were predominantly concerned with a paradigmatic case; the Jewish diaspora. As scholarly discussions of diasporas began to

include other cases, such as the Armenian, African and Palestinian, they were still constructed as a catastrophic diaspora.23 According to Robin Cohen, all scholars of diasporas recognise that at the heart of any definition of diaspora lies the victim tradition. However, as the

definition of diaspora has widened and includes a broader range of groups, it has transcended the victim tradition. Diasporas are nowadays decreasingly considered as victims and

increasingly perceived as challengers of the nation state.24 They are more and more linked to political contexts and have become important political actors with political agendas. Both the shift in migration studies, where there has been a shift from state-centric study of migration to a focus on transnationalism, as well as in the study of diaspora, where the focus has shifted from diasporas as victims to diasporas as challengers, have led to a growing interest in the diaspora phenomenon.

2.1.4. Debate positivists vs. constructionists

Analysing diasporas as (non-state) actors is relatively new in the political science. The study of diasporas emerged first in cultural studies, sociology and anthropology and only in the 1990s political science followed this trend. However, theorising diasporas in political science research means facing a number of challenges. These include the conceptualisation of the term ‘diaspora’ and the accompanying debate between positivists and constructionists.25_The

underlying questions in this ontological debate are ‘what are diasporas?’ and ‘how do they emerge?’.

Positivist ontology, which has dominated the field so far, assumes that there is a real and objective world that exists independently of our knowledge. This means that positivist conceptualisations view diasporas as pre-political and natural entities that have emerged simply out of boundary-crossing processes, like migration and dispersal.26 Positivists view diasporas as multigenerational groups of migrants sharing the same identity and remaining

23_{R. Brubaker, ‘The ‘diaspora’ diaspora’, p. 2.}

24_{R. Cohen, ‘Diasporas and the Nation-State: From Victims to Challengers’, International Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3 (1996), pp. 507-520.} 25_{M. Koinova, ‘Diasporas and international politics: Utilising the universalistic creed of liberalism for particularistic and nationalist}

purposes’, in R. Bauböck, T. Faist (eds.), Diaspora and Transnationalism: Concepts, Theories and Methods, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press 2010, pp. 149-150.

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contacts with their country of origin.27_{Constructionist ontology, on the other hand, assumes}

that there is no real and objective world, but that the world is socially constructed, dependent on our knowledge and determined by a particular time and culture. Constructionist, therefore, will view diasporas as social constructs that have been constructed through discourse,

processes of political mobilisation, or manipulation by political elites.28

Both ontological positions bring forward different research questions forward. While a positivist view gives rise to questions regarding the impact of diasporas on states and state politics, constructionist views of diaspora shed light on how diasporas emerge and how identities affect the political world. This thesis is based upon a constructionist view of

diasporas. This is because in my view a diaspora is not the unavoidable result of dispersal and migration, but is instead a social construct produced by collective human agency and founded on feeling, memory, consciousness, history, narratives, dreams and identity.

2.2. Relationship between diaspora and relevant actors

When analysing diasporas, there are traditionally three sets of actors relevant. These are the diaspora community itself, the host-land and the country of origin. In this thesis however, a fourth actor is of importance: the third country. What is the relationship between these actors and the nature of the diasporas’ engagement politics?

2.2.1. Diaspora and homeland politics

Though the homeland itself, as an actor, is not of great importance in this thesis, it might still be helpful to get an understanding of the relationship between a diaspora and its homeland. In this thesis, the concept of homeland does not necessarily relate to the state where the diaspora individual was born. Instead, it refers to the country where one’s roots lie. In this case, the homeland could also be the country where only the parents of the diaspora individual have been born. Diasporas may engage in homeland politics in a variety of ways. Diasporas may, for example, achieve leverage at home by investing in national projects. Moreover, diasporas may also be a source for recruitment, arms or funding for violent activities and thus can play a fundamental role in homeland’s decisions to continue war or insurgencies.29_{In some}

instances, the engagement of a diaspora in homeland politics might be considered as

27_{M. Koinova, ‘Diasporas and international politics: Utilising the universalistic creed of liberalism for particularistic and nationalist}

purposes’, p. 150.

28_{F.B. Adamson, p. 7.}

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troublesome by the homeland government. This is because diasporas sometimes harbour more radical and aggressive ideas and politics than homeland politicians consider appropriate.30

However, it should also be noted that although there is a tendency to highlight the role of diasporas as peace wreckers, there is increasingly attention in literature on the role of diasporas as peace makers.

Diasporas may wish to exert influence on the homeland for different reasons.

According to Shain and Barth, there are four possible motivations for diaspora’s engagement in homeland politics. First, they argue that diasporas might view the homeland’s policy as having an impact on the interest of the entire community (both inside and outside the

homeland). Second, diasporas might have a strong interest in the ways the homeland’s policy affects the future of the homeland. Third, Shain and Barth argue that diasporas may view the homeland’s policy as having an effect on the interests of a specific community. Finally, diasporas might view the homeland’s policy as affecting the interests of their organisations.31

2.2.2. Diaspora and host-land politics

Besides engaging in homeland politics, diasporas also try to exert influence on the politics of the host-land. Host-land refers in this thesis to the country where the diaspora individual is residing. Engagement in host-land politics is especially relevant when the host-land’s foreign policy is of importance to the homeland. One of the ways in which diasporas engage in host-country politics is by ethnic lobbying, meaning the attempt to exert influence on political decisions through different forms of advocacy on behalf of a person, group or organisation. Diasporas campaign, for example, to democratise autocratic homeland regimes, for

ideological support, for military assistance or for economic aid towards the homeland’s economy. According to Shain and Barth, the nature of the host-land regime determines the ability of diasporas to organise. States with democratic regimes, where civil society

organisations are encouraged, are most advantageous to diasporas.32

2.2.3. Diaspora and third country politics

In this thesis, a fourth actor is brought forward in the study of diasporas: the third country. In diaspora studies, there is a tendency to think only in terms of the homeland and host-state. However, what is often overlooked is that the attachments, loyalties and affinities of diasporas

30_{G. Dijkink, I. van der Welle, ‘Diaspora and Sovereignty: Three Cases of Public Alarm in the Netherlands’, Tijdschrift voor Economische}

en Sociale Geografie, Vol. 100, No. 5 (2009), p. 624.

31_{Y. Shain, A. Barth, ‘Diasporas and International Relations Theory’, p. 454-456.} 32_{Ibidem, p. 450.}

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go beyond the home/host dichotomy of nation-states, for example to include a larger diaspora community that is spread around the world.33_{Only by escaping the homeland/host-land}

dichotomy it becomes possible to see diasporic activities in third countries.

Third countries are states that are neither host nor home to the diaspora individuals. They can, however, be host to members of the larger diaspora community or home/host to members of another community to which the individual might feel part. In this thesis, ‘engaging in third country politics’ refers to the act of diasporas to get involved and

participate in the politics of a third country in order to challenge the existing order. There are many situations that can trigger an engagement in politics, for instance, a civil conflict, violation of human rights, environmental issues and so forth. In today’s world, there are several examples of diasporas engaging in third country politics, including the presence of diasporas in the states of Iraq, Somalia, Afghanistan and Syria. The purpose of this thesis is to understand why this phenomenon occurs.

2.3. Multiple loyalties and host-state security

As mentioned before, what characterises a diaspora community is its strong attachment to an earlier culture and to the homeland it has left. Most individuals who have migrated from the one country to the other, hold, in the broad sense of the word, a dual citizenship. What does dual citizenship mean and what are the implications of multiple loyalties for the host society? 2.3.1. Dual citizenship and loyalties

The term dual citizenship is, like citizenship, a contested concept and has no single definition. Citizenship can be defined as a status, where one is either a citizen of a state or not, as a set of rights, which are not automatically dependent on official citizenship, or as an identity.34 This thesis focuses on citizenship as an identity. The main reason for this has the following logic: although formal citizenship is most likely linked to something one might call ‘forced loyalty’ to a state (for example in the form of military service), it is not necessarily linked to a greater sense or feeling of loyalty, which is of greater importance in this thesis. The other reason is that by focussing on dual citizenship as a status, a significant amount of diaspora individuals is excluded from the analysis. Being part of a diaspora community is not limited to dual citizenship in the narrow sense.

33_{D. Abdelhady, ‘Beyond Home/Host Networks: Forms of Solidarity among Lebanese Immigrants in a Global Era’, Identities: Global}

Studies in Culture and Power, Vol. 12 (2006), p. 433.

34_{T. Brøndsted Sejersen, ‘“I Vow to Thee My Countries”: The Expansion of Dual Citizenship in the 21}st_{Century’, International Migration}

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Dual citizenship is inherently connected to dual loyalty. Loyalty is also a complex and contested concept. In its most straightforward definition, loyalty means the associational attachment of a person to an object. However, in this thesis the term loyalty will be deployed in the context of culture and politics. Cultural loyalty is here defined as the faithful adherence to one’s cultural identity and political loyalty as the faithful adherence to political power. When speaking of dual citizenship, being a citizen of two countries means being politically loyal to both a homeland and host-land (whether this is forced loyalty or a the feeling of loyalty). It could however also occur, as we will see later in this thesis, that someone feels some kind of cultural or political loyalty towards the people in another country.

2.3.1. Shifting perspectives on transnational ties

Though diasporas and their transnational ties are nowadays often considered to be a threat to the host society, this has not always been the case. In fact, many receiving states encouraged migrants to maintain ties with their country of origin. After the Second World War, a huge demand for labour in rich West-European countries caused large migration flows of foreign workers. As it was intended that these migrants were only staying temporary in the host-society, their commitments and loyalties to the country of origin were considered nothing but normal. Transnational ties were even regarded positively as it was believed that strong cultural ties would facilitate an easy return to the homeland.35

In the 1990s this outlook on migration and transnational ties changed. A strong cultural engagement was no longer encouraged but challenged. Why did this shift from encouraging to discouraging transnational ties occur? In the Netherlands, for example, the changed occurred as a result of what was believed to be a failure of multiculturalist and integration policies. The cultivation of one’s own cultural identity, earlier seen as the solution to social disadvantage, was now perceived as the cause for that same disadvantage.

Integration of migrants had increasingly become marked as important and a strong cultural identity or orientation to the homeland increasingly linked to failed integration into Dutch society. Integration came to be labelled as the result of migrants’ choices and

responsibilities.36 Furthermore, according to de Haas and Fokkema, the change in attitude to transnational ties can be found in the development of communication and transportation technologies. These advancements have enabled migrants to maintain intensive links with the

35_{N. Bouras, ‘Shifitng perspectives on transnationalism: analysing Dutch political discourse on Moroccan migrants’ transnational ties,}

1960-2010’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 36, No. 7 (2013), pp. 1219,1220, 1229.

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homeland’s society via the telephone, fax, television and internet. De Haas and Fokkema argue that this has expanded the scope for migrants to foster multiple loyalties and hold dual citizenship.37_{Finally, it could also be argued that the shifting perspective on transnational ties}

in the literature (as mentioned in 2.1.3) had some societal effects. The introduction of transnationalism to migration studies in the 1990s sparked discussions on the integration of immigrants and the shift from a focus on victimizing diasporas to diasporas as challengers of the state raised questions about the desirability of transnational ties. 38

Many states in the world resist dual citizenship because they fear multiple or divided loyalties and believe that a person with a dual citizenship cannot be relied on to fully support the state and nation, especially in times of war. The whole concept of diasporas and dual citizens raises questions about loyalty and to which state or community an individual is most loyal to. This is particularly complex when diasporas do not only engage in host- and

homeland politics, but also in third country politics.

2.4. Transnational activism

Diasporas’ engagement in third country politics can be considered as a form of transnational activism. Transnational activism, as defined by della Porta and Marchetti, is the mobilisation around collective claims that are related to transnational issues, formulated by transnational actors and addressing more than one actor (state, government or another international actor).39 The following paragraphs focus on the organisational dimension of transnational activism and the influence of communications technology on the mobilisation of diasporas.

2.4.1. Transnational activist networks

Transnational activists are generally part of a larger transnational network. A transnational network can be defined as the coordination among different organisations or individuals, based on a shared frame for a specific (global) issue, that develops both protest and proposal in the form of social mobilisation.40 These networks are, according to Hermann Maiba, differently organised today than in the past. Though the historical precursors of the activist

37_{H. de Haas, T. Fokkema, ‘The effects of integration and transnational ties on international return migration intentions’, Demographic}

Research, Vol. 25, No. 24 (2011), p. 758.

38_{T. Faist, ‘Diaspora and transnationalism: what kind of dance partners?’, in R. Bauböck, T. Faist (eds.), Diaspora and Transnationalism:}

Concepts, Theories and Methods, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press 2010, p. 12.

39_{D. della Porta, R. Marchetti, ‘Transnational Activisms and the Global Justice Movement’, in G. Delanty, S.P. Turner (eds.), International}

Handbook of Contemporary Social and Political Theory, London: Routledge 2011, p. 428.

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networks were mainly formal and hierarchical organisations, today they are largely organised in open, fluid, flexible and informal networks, wherein the criteria of membership are vaguely defined. Not only the organisational dimension is fluid, the targets as well. Transnational activist networks respond constantly to new political opportunities that have arisen. Their aims are constructed and subject to constant shifting perceptions.41 The main activities of transnational networks include the exchange and dissemination of information, raising awareness, lobbying and protesting. They are generally characterised by their function of advocating and promoting normative change.42

Diasporas might be perceived in terms of transnational (activist) networks. There are many overlapping characteristics between the two. For example, diasporas fit the definition of transnational networks as a group of individuals that share collective claims. Moreover, both play a role in the development of common identities and, as Sonja Pieck argues, transnational activist networks have come into existence because of the emotions people have. In many cases, feelings of sympathy and solidarity act as the glue that holds the group together.43 However, diaspora individuals might also be recruited by transnational activist networks, as we will see later on.

2.4.2. Activist mobilisation in a digital age

Nowadays, the virtual dimension of networks is very important when analysing transnational activism. The introduction of internet has brought new levels of connectedness, especially global interconnectedness, which, according to Daniele Conversi, often results in the rise of a new global consciousness.44_{While formerly migration meant a fundamental break from the}

homeland, advancements in communication technology have made it possible to return home more often and to maintain continuous contact with home by virtual means.45_{Although no}

virtual community can ever substitute the density of face-to-face interaction, the internet seems to be the utmost tool for dispersed communities wishing to maintain their identity in

41_{H. Maiba, ‘Grassroots transnational social movement activism: the case of peoples’ global action’, Sociological Focus, Vol. 38, No. 1}

(2005), p. 45.

42_{D. della Porta, R. Marchetti, ‘Transnational Activisms and the Global Justice Movement’, p. 429.}

43_{S.K. Pieck, ‘Transnational Activist Networks: Mobilization between Emotion and Bureaucracy’, Social Movement Studies, Vol. 12, No. 2}

(2013), p. 123.

44_{D. Conversi, ‘Irresponsible Radicalisation: Diasporas, Globalisation and Long-Distance Nationalism in the Digital Age’, Journal of Ethnic}

and Migration Studies, Vol. 38, No. 9 (2012), p. 1357.

45_{H.H. Hiller, T.M. Franz, ‘New ties, old ties and lost ties: the use of the internet in diaspora’, New Media & Society, Vol. 6, No. 6 (2004),}

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the host-state and work in solidarity with their community members at home and abroad.46

Furthermore, virtual spaces are also the places where activist mobilisation occurs. Virtual spaces are, like real spaces, the sites where the interchange between network participants takes place. These technologically mediated exchanges include mailing lists, instant messaging, collectively constructed websites, chat rooms and so forth. These channels increase the transnational diffusion of resources, frames, ideas and tactics.47 David Drissel argues that computer-mediated forms of communication are most ideal for framing purposes because of the deliberative and targeted dissemination of material (such as text, images, video and audio) online and has had therefore a profound impact on the formulation of apocalyptic discourses.48 Moreover, the internet also provides, according to della Porta and Mosca, activist movements with cheap and fast means of transnational communication which facilitate and simplify mobilisation. This is particularly true for flexible and fluid

organisational structures. However, they also point out that the internet is a better medium for spreading information and ideas than for building trust and developing coherence.49

Besides its role in facilitating transnational communication and activist mobilisation, the internet and the corresponding virtual community is the place for the construction and development of common identities. In what ways diasporas and identity construction exactly correlate is discussed in the next subchapter.

2.5. Diaspora and constructivism

In order to explain why diasporas engage in third country politics, this thesis draws upon constructivist theory. The following paragraphs give insight into constructivism as IR theory and provide a framework with which the phenomenon can be investigated.

2.5.1. Constructivist theory

From the 1980s onward, constructivism has become increasingly important in the study of international relations. Constructivism, which came into existence as a critique to realism and liberalism, is rather an approach to the study of social phenomena than a theory and is based

46_{A.A. Parham, ‘Diaspora, community and communication: Internet use in transnational Haiti’, Global Networks, Vol. 4, No. 2 (2004), p.}

199.

47_{H. Maiba, ‘Grassroots transnational social movement activism: the case of peoples’ global action’, p. 46.}

48_{D. Drissel, ‘Pan-Islamist Networks of the Apocalypse: Mobilizing Diasporic Muslim Youth on Facebook’, in R.G. Howard (ed.), Network}

Apocalypse: Visions of the End in an Age of Internet Media, Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix Press (2011), pp. 150-152.

49_{D. della Porta, L. Mosca, ‘Global-net for Global Movements? A Network of Networks for a Movement of Movements’, Journal of Public}

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on two assumptions. The first assumption is that material structures are given meaning only through social context and interpretations. The second assumption addresses the basic nature of actors in the international relations, as constructivists emphasise the interaction between agents and structures.50 As a consequence, actors are not assumed to be rational actors seeking utility maximisation, but are assumed to be rule-driven role players, concerned with identity expression. In constructivist theory, identity (both individual and collective) is considered to be the key driver behind the interests and behaviour of states, organisations and individuals. Identity, which is as such one of the central concepts in constructivism, is itself also in a constant state of change.

Identities, like interests, are always in process during interaction. In certain context they may be relatively stable, but this stability is an ongoing accomplishment of processes and practices that represent the self and the other in certain ways. As such, identity and is not a given fact about the world.51 Identity is instead in movement and is continuously moulded through processes and interactions. Kowert and Legro identify three different processes that shape identity: (1) ecological processes, which are the relations between actors and their environment, (2) social processes, which are the relations between the actors themselves, and (3) internal processes, which are the processes that operate within actors.52 In many instances, the construction of identity occurs through discursive practices.

There is a strong link between IR constructivist theory and the phenomenon of

diaspora. For example, constructivism is a theory that does not necessarily sees the state as the most important actor on the global stage. Instead, it shows the importance of non-state actors and their ability to influence international politics. Besides, constructivism is concerned with identity issues and sees culture and history as playing an important role in the motivations, interests and expectations of actors. These traits are held in common with the phenomenon of diasporas.53 Therefore, constructivism seems the most suitable theory for examining how diasporic identities are formed and what strategies are used to facilitate mobilisation among diaspora members. The following paragraphs offer three possible explanations for diasporas’ engagement in third country politics. All are in line with constructivist theory.

50_{J.T. Checkel, ‘The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory’, World Politics, Vol. 50, No. 2 (1998), pp. 325, 326.} 51_{A. Wendt, ‘Collective Identity Formation and the International State’, The American Political Science Review, p. 386.}

52_{P. Kowert, J. Legro, ‘Norms, Identity, and Their Limits: A Theoretical Reprise’, in P.J. Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National}

Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, New York: Columbia University Press 1996, pp. 470-475.

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2.5.2. Imagined communities

From a constructivist perspective, diasporas can be considered as ‘imagined communities’ and as the products of interactive processes of ascription and identification. The term

imagined community was introduced by Benedict Anderson in 1983, when his book Imagined

Communities: Reflection on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism was published. In this

book, Benedict Anderson makes a comparison between the nation and the imagined political community. Anderson argues that the nation is imagined because members of the nation will never know most of their fellow members, meet them or hear from them. Yet, in the minds of each of the members lives the image of their communication. Furthermore, the nation is imagined as a community because it is conceived as a deep and horizontal fellowship, even though practices of exploitation and inequality may be found in each nation.54

According to Anderson, the key driver behind the process of national consciousness and the creation of an imagined community has been print-capitalism. The initial market after the development of the print-as-commodity was literate Europe, a wide but also thin stratum of Latin-readers. Over the course of time, capitalist entrepreneurs started to realise that they could increase their profits by publishing books and other forms of media in vernacular languages instead of Latin. As a result, readers with different local dialects were able to understand each other and form a common discourse. In other words, print-capitalism created the possibility of a new form of imagined community.55 Today, the influence of

print-capitalism on the sense of community is still effective. As Uriya Shavit argues, most members of communities read their community’s newspapers, listen to their community’s radio stations and watch their community’s television channels. The effect of being exposed to this so called ‘primary content’, is cumulative. One example is the public reaction to disasters. If a dramatic event occurs in a small village within a large community, only a very small percentage of the community’s inhabitants personally knows any of the victims from the small village.

However, they soon feel the tragedy as a personal one.56

Arjun Appadurai, whose work is build upon that of Anderson, focuses on the global mass media and the role that it plays in shaping identities. The collective reading, criticism, pleasure and tragedy that is made possible by the mass media, have led to a something that he

54_{B. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (Revised Edition), London: Verso 2006, pp. 6,}

7.

55_{Ibidem, pp. 33-46.}

56_{U. Shavit, The New Imagined Community: Global Media and the Construction of National and Muslim Identities of Migrants, Eastbourne:}

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calls the ‘community of sentiment’, a group that imagines and feels things together.57_{. While}

Anderson speaks in terms of the national state and territory, Appadurai extends the concept of imagined communities and communities of sentiment to groups beyond the nation-state that are freed from the linguistic and territorial imaginary of the national state. These are

communities that have generated ‘postnational identies’, such as the identities of diasporic communities.58 Mass mediation and migration have created ‘diasporic spheres’ that cross the national territorial boundaries and create a sense of transnational discourse.59

It might be the case that diaspora individuals feel, in addition to being part of their homeland and host-land community, also part of a larger, transnational community. This might for example be a religious community, a cultural community, a language based community, an ideological community, a racial community or a gender based community. If so, feeling loyal or connected to fellow members of an imagined community might be a reason for diaspora individuals to engage in third country politics, especially when a dramatic event occurs in the third country.

2.5.3. Strategic collective identity construction

Another possible explanation for diasporas’ engagement in third country politics might be their recruitment by transnational activists. As it appears from constructivist theory, identity is not a social fact but a social construct and is in constant state of change. As such, identities may be strategically constructed, articulated, manipulated and deployed by actors that have an interest in doing so. These actors are, for example, political elites, social movements and transnational activist, aiming to construct collective identities in order to mobilise a group of people. A collective identity can be defined as the individual’s moral, cognitive and emotional connection with a broader (imagined) community.60_{Collective identity construction is}

however a complicated process. Collective identities are hardly ever stable and this suggests that they may be as much the starting point, process, or aim of activism.61

Central to successful collective identity construction is the power of strategic

narratives. Strategic narratives explain the world, set constraints and project the images of the

57_{A. Appadurai, Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1996, p. 8.} 58_{Ibidem, p. 166.}

59_{Ibid., p. 22.}

60_{F. Polletta, J.M. Jasper, ‘Collective Identity and Social Movements’, Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 27 (2001), p. 285.}

61_{K.B. Dugan, ‘Just Like You: The Dimensions of Identity Presentations in an Antigay Contested Context’, in J. Reger et. al. (eds.), Identity}

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past, present and future and are used by actors to shape the behaviour of individuals and groups.62_{In existing literature, most analyses of strategic narratives relate to the national state.}

However, also non-state actors seek to use strategic narratives in order to shape the international policy agenda and to mobilise support within states and transnational

communities.63 Strategic narratives are, like identities, social constructs and are interpretive mechanisms through which people represent themselves, to themselves and to others.64 The success of a strategic narrative in mobilisation relies, according to Benford and Snow, on its resonance with already adopted beliefs, values and ideas of the target group.65 While strategic narratives define identities, they also identify allies and enemies and create a dichotomy of ‘us’ versus ‘them’. This confrontation between ‘our narrative’ and ‘their narrative’ takes mainly place through the platform of a worldwide communication network and hence the internet has a key role in promoting activism and extremism.66

Theodore Kemper suggests that the process of collective identity construction also depends heavily on the actor’s ability to invoke solidarity among the participants.67_{It is the}

internal solidarity of the group that reinforces identity and guarantees it. People feel connected with each other not necessarily because they share the same interests, but rather because they need that attachment in order to make sense of who they are and what they are doing.68_{Another important aspect of collective identity construction is the construction of}

boundaries which mark the social territory of the group by pointing out the differences between them and the others. These boundaries help to forge the creation of group consciousness by delineating who is and who is not member of the group.69

Of course, diaspora individuals are not the only actors who might be recruited by

62_{S. Lawler, ‘Narrative in Social Research’, in T. May (ed.), Qualitative Research in Action, London: Sage 2002, p. 242.}

63_{A. Miskimmon, B. O’Loughlin, L. Roselle, Strategic Narratives: Communication Power and the New World Order, New York: Routledge}

2013, p. 31.

64_{S. Lawler, ‘Narrative in Social Research’, p. 242.}

65_{R.D. Benford, D.A. Snow, ‘Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment’, Annual Review of Sociology, vol.}

26, No. 1 (2000), p. 621.

66_{A. Bergin, S.B. Osman, C. Ungerer, N.A.M. Yassin, Countering internet radicalisation in Southeast Asia, (An RSIS-ASPI joint report),}

2009, p.2.

67_{T. Kemper, ‘A Structural Approach to Social Movement Emotions’, in J. Goodwin, J.M. Jasper, F. Polletta, Passionate Politics: Emotions}

and Social Movements, Chicago: University of Chicago Press 2001, pp. 58-73.

68_{A. Melucci, Challenging codes: Collective action in the information age, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996, p. 74.} 69_{J. Reger, ‘Drawing Identity Boundaries: The Creation of Contemporary Feminism’, in J. Reger et. al. (eds.), Identity Work in Social}

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transnational activist groups. However, according to Al Raffie, diasporas appear to be more prone to extremism and more likely to adopt activists’ means and methods of recruitment.70

2.5.4. Identity crisis and radicalisation

A third plausible mechanism for explaining diaspora engagement in third country politics involves the identity crisis of the diaspora individual and subsequent political radicalisation. Radicalisation here refers to the process of growing readiness to support far-reaching changes in society that pose a direct threat to the existing order.71 Studies on radicalisation have found that identity crisis stands at the fore of the radicalisation process.72

One of the possible causes of radicalisation has to do with modernity and

globalisation. Three scholars of the ‘French Sociology’ school of thought – Gilles Kepel, Olivier Roy and Farhad Khosrokhavar – have offered valuable insights into political radicalisation in Europe. They point out that radicalisation is not a reaction to economic deprivation or political repression, but occurs because individuals are seeking to reconstruct their lost identity in the new environments of their host-states. They argue that the overall conditions of modernity and life in their mainly ‘western’ host-states - such as

individualisation and value relativism - stimulate the search for meaning, identity and community.73

Many immigrants, children of immigrants en further generations face conflicting social contexts in the process of constructing their identity. This is especially true for

adolescents who are looking for answers to questions such as ‘who am I?’ and ‘what group do I belong to?’. Often they have problems incorporating ‘here’ and ‘there’ into meaningful sense of self.74_{As culture plays an important role in the formation of identity, a discrepancy}

between the dominant culture of the host-society and the culture that is internalised by the individual can jeopardise the migrants inner integrity which might subsequently lead to an identity crisis.75 Furthermore, studies have shown that members of diasporas usually have a

70_{D. Al Raffie, ‘Social Identity Theory for Investigating Islamic Extremism in the Diaspora’, Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 6, No. 4}

(2013), p. 91.

71_{A. Dalgaard-Nielsen, ‘Violent Radicalization in Europe: What We Know and What We Do Not Know’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism,}

Vol. 33, No. 9 (2010), p. 798.

72_{D. Al Raffie, ‘Social Identity Theory for Investigating Islamic Extremism in the Diaspora’, p. 67.}

73_{A. Dalgaard-Nielsen, ‘Violent Radicalization in Europe: What We Know and What We Do Not Know’, pp. 799, 800.}

74_{H. Zubida, L. Lavi, R.A. Harper, O. Nakash, A. Shoshani, ‘Home and Away: Hybrid Perspective on Identity Formation in 1.5 and Second}

Generation Adolescent Immigrants in Israel’, Glocalism: Journal of Culture Politics and Innovation, Vol. 1 (2013), p. 2.

75_{F.A. Lewin, ‘Identity Crisis and Integration: The Divergent Attitudes of Iranian Immigrant Men and Women towards Integration into}

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feeling of being torn between their attachment to their homeland and their commitment to the host-land. Commitment to universal values, ascribed to an imagined community (such as the Ummah in the case of Muslims), can add to such anxieties.76_{Simon, Reichert and Grabow}

demonstrate in their article, that dual identity can foster political radicalism among migrants. They argue that dual identity is burdened with incompatibility and might become a liability that eventually erodes the overlapping consensus concerning acceptable political action.77 Radicalisation and the support of far-reaching changes in society might generate a motivation for diaspora individuals to engage in political activism. This political activism might involve the home- or host-state, but can also relate to the situation in, and politics of, a third country.

76_{S.A. Hamed Hosseini, ‘”Political Identity” of Muslim Youth in Western Diaspora: Towards an Integrative Research Agenda’, Journal of}

Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol. 33, No. 4 (2013), pp. 470, 471.

77_{B. Simon, F. Reichert, O. Grabow, ‘When Dual Identity Becomes a Liability: Identity and Political Radicalism Among Migrants’,}

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3. Methodology

This chapter maps out the methods that are used for researching the problem at hand. First, the research problem, research question and sub questions are formulated. Second, the logic behind the case selection is presented. Third, the research population is described. Fourth, the research question and central concepts are operationalised. Fifth, an account is provided of how the data in this study is collected. And finally, the limitations of the used methods are discussed.

3.1. Formulation of the research problem

The problem that stands at the fore of this thesis is that there is no clear causal mechanism that explains why diasporas might be motivated to engage in the politics of a third country. While much is written on the relationship between diasporas and home- and host-land politics, few is written about their connection to a third country. This is problematic since a lack of clarity regarding this matter might result in (unjust) assumptions about diasporas’ motivations. Especially when it comes to the case of Syria, where the participation of non-nationals in the civil conflict is a hot debated topic in local, national and international politics, it might be dangerous to jump to conclusions too fast. Therefore, the following research questions are examined.

Central question

How to explain the engagement of diasporas in third country politics? Sub questions

- To what extent do diaspora individuals feel part of a larger (transnational)

community other than that of their home- and host-land?

- To what extent is their (collective) identity being strategically constructed

by transnational activists?

- To what extent do diaspora individuals experience an identity crisis?

3.2. Case selection

Because the scope of the central research question is rather broad and it is impossible to investigate all diasporas in all host-lands, this thesis will only focus on the Turkish and Moroccan diaspora residing in the Netherlands. Why is this case most suitable? The logic behind this case selection can be found in factors belonging to both the host-land and the diasporas itself.

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First, the Netherlands is host to many diaspora individuals. Though there is no hard number on how many diaspora individuals reside in the Netherlands (because of the contested definition), there were 1.2 million people living in the Netherlands with a dual nationality in 2011, accounting for 7.2 percent of the total population.78 Because diasporas form a relatively large segment of the population, the Netherlands makes an interesting and relevant case. Second, the Netherlands is among the countries with the highest number of internet users, meaning that the internet could indeed play a major role in diaspora mobilisation. Third, the Netherlands is one of the countries that has seen a dramatic shift from encouraging to discouraging transnational ties, suggesting that the security issue of diasporas’ multiple loyalties has found its place in Dutch politics.

Furthermore, there are certain characteristics of the Turkish and Moroccan diaspora that makes them perfectly suitable as case. First, the Turks and the Moroccans form the largest ethnic minority groups in the Netherlands. Second, in both Morocco and Turkey the Islam is the majority religion, making it increasingly possible that diaspora members feel connected to a larger Islamic community, like the Ummah. Third, Turkey is a neighbouring state of Syria, increasing the possibility that the Turkish diaspora has an interest in engaging in the Syrian conflict because of regional spillover effects, or that the Turkish diaspora feels connected to the people of the neighbouring state. Fourth, Morocco can be considered as an Arab state (though this is a controversial statement since a large part of the population is berber-speaking), making it more plausible that the Moroccan diaspora has an interest in engaging in Syria. Finally, there are some indications that among Dutch travellers to Syria, a substantial amount is of Moroccan or Turkish descent.

3.3. Research population

As a consequence of the economic boom after the Second World War, labour shortages demanded a large number of foreign workers. In the 1960s and 1970s the first Turks and Moroccans came to the Netherlands as migrant workers. At that time, it was believed that they were only staying temporarily as it was not their intention to settle in the Netherlands. Things turned out differently. When the oil crises of 1973 and 1975 led to a dramatic decrease in demand, migrants started to think twice before leaving the Dutch welfare state. From the 1980s onward, many workers were joined by their family members and began to settle in the

78_{Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, available at:}

http://www.cbs.nl/nl-NL/menu/themas/dossiers/allochtonen/publicaties/artikelen/archief/2012/2012-3578-wm.htm, last accessed on 24 April 2014.

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country.79_{As a result, the share of female immigrants from Morocco and Turkey sharply}

increased to over 50 percent. When immigration from Morocco and Turkey reached a peak in the mid-1980s, the Netherlands introduced more restrictive labour migration policies, visa requirements and stricter rules for family reunification. While this caused a substantial drop in immigration from both countries, migration from Turkey and Morocco to the Netherlands has continued until this present day.80

At the moment, the Turks form the largest ethnic minority group in the Netherlands. In 2013, nearly 400.000 Turks were living in the Netherlands, making up 2.4 percent of the total population. This number contains Turks from both the first and second generation, meaning both the people that have been born in Turkey and the people with at least one parent who has been born in Turkey. The amount of people falling under the first generation is nearly equal to that of the second generation.81 More than a third of the Turks live in the four biggest cities of the Netherlands: Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht. It stands out that the

Turkish community is a relatively young group compared to the total Dutch population. Furthermore, many Turks in the Netherlands carry dual citizenship. In 2010, almost 75 percent of the Turkish-Dutch population had a dual nationality.82 Most Turks in the

Netherlands come from Central Turkey, the Black Sea Coast and are ethnic Turkish. Only a small minority has a Kurdish ethnic background.83

The second largest minority group are the Moroccans, with a number of nearly

370.000 residing in the Netherlands (both first and second generation), making up 2.2 percent of the total Dutch population. Among these Moroccans, 54 percent has been born in the Netherlands.84 Like the Turkish community, the Moroccans are relatively young compared to the total population. While only 13.6 percent of the total Dutch population is under the age of

79_{J. Nortier, ‘The Moroccan Community in The Netherlands’, in N.H. Hornberger (ed.), Encyclopedia of Language and Education, New}

York: Springer 2008, p. 195.

80_{G. Beets, S. ter Bekke, J. Schoorl, ‘Migration history and demographic characteristics of the two second-generation groups’, in M. Crul, L.}

Leering (eds.), The Position of the Turkish and Moroccan Second Generation in Amsterdam and Rotterdam, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press 2008, pp. 28,29.

81_{Centraal Bureau voor Statistiek, available at:}

http://statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb/publication/?VW=T&DM=SLNL&PA=37296ned&D1=a&D2=0,10,20,30,40,50,(l-1)-l&HD=140425-1316&HDR=G1&STB=T, last accessed on 24 april 2014.

82_{FORUM Factbook 2010, available at:}

http://www.forum.nl/Portals/0/factsheets/Factbook-Turkse-Nederlanders(jongeren).pdf.

83_{M. Crul, J. Doomernik, ‘The Turkish and Moroccan Second Generation in the Netherlands: Divergent Trends between and Polarization}

within the Two Groups’, International Migration Review, Vol. 37, No. 4 (2003), p. 1042.

Diasporas, transnational activism & third country politics : a constructivist explanation of engagement in the Syrian conflict