The snow dragon : China's activities in the Arctic as a benchmark for the country's boarder strategic ambitions

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The Snow Dragon:

China’s activities in the Arctic as a

benchmark for the country’s broader

strategic ambitions

A THESIS

SUBMITTED IN FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN POLITICAL SCIENCE: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AT

THE UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM BY

ALEXANDRA FULEA

PAUL VAN HOOFT, THESIS SUPERVISOR GEOFFREY UNDERHILL, SECOND READER

AMSTERDAM, THE NETHERLANDS

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Abstract

This thesis examines China’s activities in the Arctic and the implications thereof in terms of our understanding of the country’s grand strategy. In doing so, the thesis departs from the premise that, as China’s stakes in the Arctic region are relatively low, the country is not likely to risk incurring the costs of challenging the Arctic status quo if it intends to adhere to the global order. However, an assessment of the country’s involvement in Arctic governance, in the Arctic economy and in the Arctic security environment illustrates China aims to shift the regional balance of power to its advantage by delegitimizing the Arctic governance regime and by radically altering the distribution of material power in the region. Therefore, considering China is willing to alter the status quo in a region it does not regard as being of strategic importance for the survival of the Chinese state, it is likely the country will also attempt to alter the status quo elsewhere.

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List of Abbreviations

A5-‐Arctic Five (Canada, Russia, US, Denmark, Norway)

A8-‐Arctic Eight (Canada, Russia, US, Denmark, Norway, Iceland, Sweden, Finland) CNPC-‐Chinese National Petroleum Company

CNOOC-‐Chinese National Offshore Oil Company COSCO-‐Chinese Overseas Shipping Company DMU-‐Dalian Maritime University

EEZ-‐Exclusive Economic Zones FDI-‐Foreign Direct Investment

NASA-‐National Aeronautics and Space Administration NSR-‐Northern Sea Route

NWP-‐Northwest Passage OUC-‐Ocean University of China PLA-‐People’s Liberation Army PLAN-‐People’s Liberation Navy PRIC-‐Polar Research Institute of China REE-‐Rare Earth Elements

SIIS-‐Shanghai Institute of International Studies SOA-‐State Oceanic Administration

SOE –State-‐Owned Enterprises

UNCLOS-‐United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

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1. Introduction

As China’s Snow Dragon (Xuelong), the world’s largest icebreaker, prepares for yet another unprecedented Arctic expedition, the country’s prominent involvement in Arctic navigation, among other Arctic affairs, has led some observers to believe Beijing aims to develop the Arctic into a second New Silk Road (Blank, 2015; The Global Mail, 2015). Such a scenario could soon materialize as the region becomes more accessible due to a rapid retreat of the Arctic ice sheet.

According to NASA’s National Snow and Ice Data Center, in 2015, the Arctic has experienced the largest decline in sea ice on satellite record (NASA, 2015). The data suggests the region will experience its first ice-‐free summer in fifteen years from now, sooner than previous forecasts have projected (The Guardian, 2015). As with all major environmental shifts that have occurred on Earth, the meltdown of the Arctic will bring forward both winners and losers for whilst the regions’ ecological systems are about to wither, its politico-‐economic systems are about to flourish. First, the retreat of the ice sheet facilitates the exploitation of the region’s natural resources. According to the United States Geological Survey, the Arctic accounts for 10.5 percent of the world’s undiscovered oil resources, 25.5 percent of the world’s undiscovered gas resources as well as vast amounts of precious metals, minerals and rare earth elements (Gautier, 2009). Second, the retreat of the ice sheet opens up new navigation routes that shorten the journey between the Atlantic and the Pacific by thousands of miles in comparison to traditional routes (Lanteigne, 2014). Considering these circumstances, experts argue the region will develop into an industry and trade hub akin the Mediterranean Sea (Borgerson, 2013). Nevertheless, when it comes to making a region an economic success, the presence of natural resources and shipping possibilities alone does not suffice: a case in point being the Middle East. However, the Arctic’s advantage reaches far beyond the continent’s geology and geography. With the exception of Russia, the A81 states all rank in the top 20 of the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Index due to their strong legal institutions and healthy fiscal conditions (World Bank Group, 2014). As a result, “such cities as Anchorage and Reykjavik could someday become major

1_{The
term
A8
refers
to
the
eight
states
that
have
territory
within
the
Arctic
region:
Russia,}

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shipping centers and financial capitals -‐ the high-‐latitude equivalents of Singapore and Dubai” for “climate change is transforming the Arctic […] into an epic bounty ripe for this century's entrepreneurs” (Borgerson, 2013: 78-‐88).

As mentioned above, recent accounts have singled out China as a prominent Arctic ‘entrepreneur’ (Reuters, 2014; The Economist, 2014; The New York Times, 2014). Within this context, Chinese scholars maintain the country’s interests in the Arctic are similar to those of the United States, Canada, and Russia, namely “resources, sea routes, and strategic significance, […] three resplendent jewels” (Xu and Xu, 2010: 20). However, for a non-‐Arctic state, China’s involvement in the region is remarkable and is regarded with apprehension by Arctic states. Whilst high-‐level Russian military officials warn against China’s increased presence in the Arctic (Reuters, 2010), US researchers discuss the perils of China’s activities in the region in studies bearing titles such as ‘The dragon eyes the top of the world’ (Wright, 2011) and ‘China’s Long-‐Con in the Arctic’ (Robinson, 2013). Also, Christensen of Canada’s National Defense Headquarters contends that “there exists in China a distinct group of academics and officials trying to influence leaders to adopt a much more assertive stance in the Arctic […] This could ultimately bring China into disagreement with circumpolar states […] and alter security and sovereignty relationships in the circumpolar region” (Christensen, 2010: 21). This ‘disagreement’ first came to light in 2011, when the Icelandic government suspended the acquisition of a large parcel of land by a Chinese buyer amidst suspicions that the area could be employed strategically by the Chinese government (Financial Times, 2011). Similarly, in 2014, the Norwegian government prevented a Chinese realtor from buying land in Norway’s Svalbald Archipelago amid controversy in regard to the purpose of the purchase (The New York Times, 2014).

These developments reflect the scholarly debate on the character of China’s rise in international relations (IR) and more specifically the issue of whether China will challenge the current order or not (Beeson, 2009; Callahan, 2005; Waldron, 2005). When assessing the implications of China’s rise for the global governance regime, scholars have consistently focused on regions the country considers to be of great significance for its national security, such as Taiwan (Shirk, 2007; Layne, 2008) and the South China Sea (Johnston, 2012; Mearsheimer, 2010). At the same time, very little

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attention has been paid to China’s interest in the Arctic, presumably as it is a recent development. However, the region is an excellent arena for studying the effect of China’s rise on its behavior in IR since it does not represent a core concern for China. Therefore, considering that China’s stakes in the Arctic are relatively low, it is unlikely the country would risk incurring the costs of challenging the Arctic governance regime if it intends to adhere to the global order. Or, as China expert Gang Chen of Singapore’s East Asia Institute puts it: “China’s emerging Arctic strategy is a component of its maritime strategy, which itself is part of the country’s grand strategy” and “there is no wonder that the Arctic strategy the state is still working on and its grand strategy are analogical in terms of guidelines and ultimate goals to be achieved” (2012: 369). Hence, the aim of this study is to assess the nature of China’s rise in the context of its involvement in the Arctic first by determining whether China’s behavior in the region is aimed at challenging the Arctic status quo and second by evaluating how China’s behavior in the region relates to the country’s broader strategic ambitions. The study is structured as follows: chapter 2 presents the theoretical perspectives on China’s rise and formulates expectations in regard to the country’s behavior in the Arctic, chapter 3 describes the research design, chapters 4, 5 and 6 provide an assessment of China’s behavior in the Arctic and finally, chapter 7 addresses the implications of the study for theories on China’s rise in IR and for our understanding of the country’s grand strategy and presents a conclusion.

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2. Theoretical framework

2.1 Literature review

In order to address the effect of China’s rise on its behavior, and more specifically whether China will contest or adhere to the international governance regime, scholars have aimed to determine the country’s orientation toward the status quo in IR. This endeavour has however not been easy, as conceptualizing a country’s status quo orientation has challenged scholars for decades. Over time, distinct terms have been employed when referring to a status quo state2_{.
Morgenthau,
for
example,
distinguishes} between a status quo and an imperialist state and provides one of the seminal descriptions of the dichotomy by arguing that “a nation whose foreign policy aims at acquiring more power than it actually has, through a reversal of existing power relations, pursues a policy of imperialism,” whilst “a nation whose foreign policy tends toward keeping power and not toward changing the distribution of power in its favor pursues a policy of the status quo” (1962: 39).

In addition to focusing on a state’s behavior, more recent definitions also address the degree to which a state is satisfied with the existing international governance regime (Kugler and Lemke, 1996; Levy, 2008). Buzan, for example, considers “first, whether a country is happy with its status or rank in international society, and second, whether it accepts or contests the institutions that compose international society” (2010: 17). Similarly, Organski and Kugler conceptualize a non-‐status quo orientation as “a general dissatisfaction with its [a country’s] position in the [international] system, and a desire to redraft the rules by which relations among nations work“ (As cited in Chan, 2008: 32). As illustrated above, there are two elements to a country’s status quo orientation: its degree of satisfaction with the position it holds in the global order and its behavior toward the global governance regime. Within this framework, there are however different perspectives on the relationship between ‘satisfaction’ and ‘behavior’.

Neoliberal institutionalism holds there is no causal relationship between ‘satisfaction’ and ‘behavior’ for, even as states are dissatisfied with their position in the international

2_{Carr,
for
example,
refers
to
a
satisfied
state
and
contrasts
it
to
a
dissatisfied
state
(1947),}

Schuman discusses about satiated and unsatiated states (1941) and Kissinger differentiates between status quo and revolutionary powers (1957).

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state system, the benefits of abiding by the system’s rules outweigh the costs. The theory departs from the idea that states refrain from engaging in mutually profitable relationships due to uncertainty. In replacing an inefficient transaction between states with an internal transaction, institutions reduce the transaction cost of uncertainty and provide an answer to this collective action problem ((Holsti, 2004; Keohane, 1984; Krasner, 1983; Stein, 2008). Keohane and Nye develop the argument and claim that, as globalization creates conditions under which states are dependent on one another for their security, interactions between states will increasingly be characterized by cooperation as opposed to power maximization (1989). Consistent with this line of reasoning, Ikenberry addresses China’s rise and concludes that “the nature of the regime and the degree of dissatisfaction with the old order are critical […] but even more decisive is the character of the international order itself -‐ for it is the nature of the international order that shapes a rising state's choice between challenging that order and integrating into it” (2008: 27).

In contrast, offensive neorealism argues there is a positive causal relationship between a powerful state’s dissatisfaction with its position in the system and its behavior toward the global governance regime. According to the theory, under conditions of international anarchy, uncertainty about the motives of other states drives states to maximize their power as to remain secure (Layne, 1995; Mearsheimer, 1995). In doing so, a state’s endeavor toward becoming more secure alters the distribution of power in IR and therefore decreases the security of contender states hereby prompting these to increase their power as well. Scholars refer to this situation as the security dilemma. Within this context, dissatisfaction with the status quo is a given and “the ultimate goal of every great power is to maximize its share of world power and eventually dominate the system“, hereby leading to a situation in which the security dilemma is heightened (Mearsheimer, 2006: 160). However, considering the fact that the costs of achieving global hegemony often supersede the benefits, the theory asserts powerful states will settle for regional hegemony (Mearsheimer, 2010). In order to achieve the goal of regional hegemony, Mearsheimer argues China will attempt to drive the US out of the Asia-‐Pacific region, hereby inevitably challenging the global governance regime, and regards the country’s military build-‐up as proof hereof (2010).

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Similarly, defensive neorealism contends there is a causal relationship between a powerful state’s dissatisfaction with its position in the system and its behavior toward the global governance regime. However, the theory departs from the premises of offensive neorealism in arguing the relationship is not invariably positive. Within this framework, anarchy provides an impetus for power maximization only under certain conditions and therefore a states’ aim is not power maximization, but rather the attainment of a sufficient amount of power as to ensure security. Here, intentions can be gauged, and threat assessments are not based on the distribution of power but are rather broken down into factors such as technological advancement, geographic proximity and offensive capabilities (Walt, 1995; Glaser, 1995). As a result, the security dilemma plays out differently for “a state will be more secure when its adversary is more secure because insecurity can pressure an adversary to adopt threatening policies” (Glaser, 2011: 82-‐83). In China’s case, the country’s sheer size, location, military might and nuclear arsenal form deterrent capabilities that cannot be threatened by the US regardless of its relative power. Hence, China does not need to maximize its power by pursuing regional hegemony in order to be secure. In fact, attempting to drive the US out of the Asia-‐Pacific could increase the security threat faced by China as Japan and South Korea, deprived of the US’ security umbrella, are likely to strengthen their military capabilities. Considering these conditions, Glaser argues that, in spite of being dissatisfied with the status quo when it comes to issues such as Taiwan, China is not willing to endanger its security by claiming regional supremacy and therefore “the risks posed by China’s growing power and military capabilities should not be exaggerated” (2011: 91).

The above-‐discussed theoretical perspectives are part of a larger academic debate over the nature of China’s grand strategy – which consists of policies that “bring together all of the elements, both military and non-‐military, for the preservation and enhancement of the nation’s long-‐term best interests”3_{(Kennedy,
1991:
5).
Within
this
context,
the} Chinese leadership has declared the country “will transcend ideological differences to strive for peace, development and cooperation with all the countries of the world”

3_{Kennedy’s
definition
is
consistent
with
conceptualizations
of
grand
strategy
employed
by
other}

experts in the field. See, for example, Gaddis (1982), Luttwak (1987), Mead Earle (1943) and Posen (1984).

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(Zhang, 2005: 22). Some regard Beijing’s official position along with the country’s increased participation in international institutions as an indication that, consistent with the premises of neoliberal institutionalism, the country does not aim to change the global order irrespective of its degree of satisfaction with it (Foot and Walter, 2011; Ikenberry, 2011; Larson and Shevchenko, 2010).

Whilst defensive neorealists agree with the above-‐mentioned conclusion, they consider other explanations as to why the country will conform itself to the status quo despite being unsatisfied with its position in the international system. Shiping, for example, states that China’s peaceful settlement of its territorial disputes illustrates how the country’s foreign policy is directed toward alleviating the regional security dilemma as opposed to exacerbating it (2008). Following the same logic, Johnson asserts that China employs a defensive security outlook (2009) and Burman claims the country will not aim to expand its sphere of influence at sea for its strategic identity is that of a land power and regards China’s creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as proof hereof (2008). These arguments are consistent with the premises of defensive realism, for they assume that intentions can be derived from past behavior (see Shiping) and that variables such as geography mitigate the security dilemma (see Burman).

In contrast, in line with the premises of offensive neorealism, scholars such as Swaine and Tellis (2000) argue China has been implementing an assertive but covert grand strategy aimed at changing the international status quo. Friedberg, for example, describes China’s grand strategy as one of incremental advancement in which the country abides by Deng Xiaoping’s adagio of ‘hiding its capabilities and biding its time’ in the short run whilst preparing its bid for global hegemony in the long run (2011). Similarly, Schweller and Pu regard China’s grand strategy as one of manoeuvring within the current order on the one hand whilst strategizing beyond that order on the other (2012). They describe China as an unlimited-‐aims revisionist, a state that aims to fundamentally change the international system and rejects the legitimacy of the existing governance regime and contrast it to the limited-‐aims revisionist, a state that does not aim to fundamentally alter the international system and does not contest the legitimacy of the existing governance regime.

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a critique of both offensive and defensive realism. While the former regards structure as malignant and, as a consequence, all states as power-‐maximizing revisionists and the latter regards structure as non-‐malignant and all states as security-‐maximizing status quo actors, Schweller and Pu contend a state’s orientation toward the status quo is not only determined by the structure of the system, but also by the agency of the state. In doing so, the authors depart from a proposition established by Schweller over a decade ago: “While all revolutionary [revisionist] states are dissatisfied, not all dissatisfied states are revolutionary [revisionist]. The key question is whether the rising power views the protection and promotion of its essential values as dependent on fundamental changes in the existing international order, or whether it is merely dissatisfied with its prestige and position within that order” (1999: 19). In employing the above-‐mentioned framework, not only do Schweller and Pu overcome the offensive-‐defensive realist debate on the nature of China’s rise in IR, but they also develop it into a conceptual tool based on which inferences on China’s orientation toward the Arctic status quo can be made.

They start from the idea that, whilst under conditions of multipolarity and bipolarity, balancing is associated with preserving the status quo, under conditions of unipolarity, balancing is inherently revisionist for “the goal of restoring a global balance of power requires the overthrow of the existing unipolar structure” (2012: 45-‐46). Therefore, any state attempting to alter security relations by restoring the pre-‐unipolar order is considered an aggressor. As a result, when engaging in balancing behavior under unipolarity, an unlimited-‐aims revisionist power must not only alter the global distribution of power but must also overcome being classified as an aggressor by first delegitimizing the authority of the hegemon through “criticism of the existing order and a blueprint for a new order” (Schweller, 2014: 180). Unipolarity hence requires “both delegitimation and deconcentration […] Delegitimation provides the rationale for […] balancing practices, while deconcentration, by dispersing material power more evenly throughout the system, lowers the barriers to both the discourse and practice of resistance to hegemonic rule” (2012: 47). Hence, whilst both limited-‐ and unlimited-‐ aims revisionists are dissatisfied with their position in the international system, only the latter ones would attempt to alter the global order fundamentally, by engaging in delegitimation and deconcentration.

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As discussed above, there are three main positions China can adopt in IR. First, consistent with the premises of neoliberal institutionalism, the country can adhere to the international status quo. Second, in line with Schweller and Pu’s definition of a limited-‐aims revisionist, the country can adhere to the international status quo but aim to implement certain changes. Third, consistent with Schweller and Pu’s definition of an unlimited-‐aims revisionist, the country can aim to change the international status quo fundamentally. Departing from these positions, several expectations with regard to China’s behavior in the Arctic can be formed. First, if China does not have revisionist intentions, it is unlikely the country will exhibit revisionist behavior in the Arctic, especially as the country does not consider the region of strategic importance for the survival of the Chinese state. Here, the converse does not hold for, even as China does not aim to alter the Arctic status quo, the country can still engage in revisionist behavior elsewhere4_{.
Second,
if
China
has
limited
revisionist
intentions,
it
is
likely
the
country
will} aim to implement certain changes in the Arctic but not to the degree it alters the Arctic order. Third, if China has unlimited revisionist intentions, it is likely the country will aim to alter the Arctic order. Therefore:

Hypothesis 0: If China does not aim to challenge the international system, it will not aim to alter the Arctic status quo.

Hypothesis 1: If China has limited aims in regard to challenging the international system, the country will aim to alter the Arctic status quo, however not fundamentally.

Hypothesis 2: If China has unlimited aims in regard to challenging the international system, it will aim to alter the Arctic status quo fundamentally, by engaging in delegitimation and/or deconcentration practices.

2.2 Conceptual framework

In order to test the hypotheses, and determine the nature of China’s rise in the context of its involvement in the Arctic, it is important to first reflect on the meaning of (fundamentally) altering the Arctic status quo and therefore the concepts of ‘delegitimation’ and ‘deconcentration’ must be operationalized. In line with Schweller

4_{For
example,
in
the
South
and
East
China
Seas,
regions
that,
unlike
the
Arctic,
China
considers}

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and Pu’s (2012) distinction between a limited-‐aims and an unlimited-‐aims revisionist, Johnston (2003) constructs a scale of five indicators of a non-‐status quo actor, moving from the least to the most challenging with regard to the status quo. Here, the limited-‐ aims/unlimited-‐aims dichotomy is transformed into a spectrum of revisionist behavior that moves along the lines of delegitimation and deconcentration of power. According to the author, a non-‐status quo state:

1. Has a low degree of participation in the global governance regime

2. Participates in the global governance regime, but does not accept the global governance norms

3. Participates in the global governance regime and complies to its norms but, when given the chance, aims to change them in ways that defeat the initial goals of the regime

4. Aims to radically alter the distribution of material power in the international system

5. Aims to radically alter the distribution of material power in the international system and, to this purpose, military force is considered instrumental.

Within the above-‐presented framework, the first two indicators correspond to Schweller and Pu’s definition of a limited-‐aims revisionist for, although a state has a low participation rate in the global order and does not accept its norms, it does not take any action toward fundamentally changing the global order. Conversely, the last three indicators correspond to Schweller and Pu’s unlimited-‐aims revisionist for they suggest a state takes action toward fundamentally changing the global order. First, in order to change a global governance norm, one must illustrate the global governance community why the norm is no longer adequate and one must provide a viable alternative. This line of reasoning is consistent with the literature on normative change in IR according to which one can change a norm first by delegitimizing it and second by substituting it (Crawford, 2002). Hence, aiming to change global governance norms implies engaging in the practice of delegitimation by providing “criticism of the existing order and a blueprint for a new order” (Schweller, 2014: 180). Second, in order to radically alter the distribution of material power in the international system, one must “disperse material power more evenly throughout the system” (Schweller and Pu, 2012: 47). Hence, aiming to radically alter the distribution of material power in the international system implies

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engaging in the practice of deconcentration. Finally, if the above-‐mentioned indicators do not reflect China’s behavior, the country does not aim to alter the status quo.

The indicators are divided into two sets; the first three indicators refer to an actors’ behavior toward the global governance regime and address whether or not China engages in delegitimation, whilst the last two indicators focus on an actors’ behavior with regard to the distribution of material power and address whether or not China engages in deconcentration. Consistent with Johnston’s first set of indicators, when addressing China’s behavior toward the Arctic governance regime, this study assesses ‘China’s degree of participation in Arctic governance’, whether China ‘Does not accept Arctic governance norms’ and whether it ‘Aims to change the Arctic governance norms in ways that defeat the initial goals of the Arctic regime’.

The first indicator of limited-‐aims revisionism, ‘China’s degree of participation in Arctic governance’, is based on Johnston’s first indicator. Here, Johnston envisioned the least threatening type of a non-‐status quo power as one that ‘Has a low degree of participation in the global governance regime’. This assumption is based on the idea that participation is indicative of adherence to global governance and that therefore a low degree of participation implies a low degree of adherence and vice versa. However, when assessing China’s participation in the Arctic governance regime, the country’s behavior must be measured against regional standards. Here, the A8 have created Arctic institutions that address legal and political Arctic affairs as platforms for regional decision-‐making. Within this context, Arctic states have raised the Arctic governance entry threshold as to discourage non-‐Arctic actors from being involved in Arctic affairs (Borgerson, 2013; Jakobsen, 2010, Jakobsen and Peng, 2012; Lanteigne, 2014; Wright, 2011). Considering these conditions, one would expect a non-‐Arctic actor to have a low degree of participation in Arctic governance on legal and political affairs. Moreover, participation in this type of governance by a non-‐regional state such as China would in itself be somewhat altering the status quo in regard to the regional character of Arctic decision-‐making and could suggest revisionism. In this case, the type of Arctic governance China is interested in participating in, is indicative of its aims. If the country’s presence in Arctic governance is not as much aimed at altering the regional status quo as it is predicated on China being involved in global governance in concordance with its great power status, the country is more likely to show interest in

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low politics Arctic governance platforms dedicated to economic, scientific or environmental issues as these would enable it to engage in Arctic cooperation and/or pursue economic opportunities in the region. However, if China’s presence in the region is aimed at altering the regional status quo, the country is more likely to risk being at odds with Arctic states and show interest in high politics governance forums that address political and strategic issues as these would enable it to accomplish strategic goals. Within this context, China’s degree of participation in Arctic governance does not refer to the amount of governance platforms China participates in for there aren’t many Arctic governance platforms to begin with, but rather to the type thereof. Therefore, if China is not interested in Arctic governance or is interested and participates in low politics Arctic governance, the country does not aim to change the status quo within the Arctic governance regime. Conversely, if China is interested and participates in high politics Arctic governance, the country has revisionist yet limited aims, as it is not fundamentally altering the Arctic order through delegitimation. Hence, the indicator ‘China’s degree of participation in Arctic governance’ is measured by the variable ‘China is interested and participates in high politics Arctic governance’ which can take the values ‘Yes’ and ‘No’.

The second indicator of limited-‐aims revisionism, ‘Does not accept Arctic governance norms’, is based on Johnston’s second indicator. According to Johnston, “the most deeply internalized fundamental norm in international diplomacy is sovereignty” (2003: 14). Similarly, within the context of the Arctic region, the idea that legal and political Arctic affairs such as sovereignty claims are to be dealt with regionally and in conformity with the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is considered to be the most important Arctic governance norm (Borgerson, 2013; Jakobsen, 2010; Lanteigne, 2014; Wright, 2011). Considering that China is a defender of a more absolutist concept of sovereignty and is “fighting as a conservative power to reaffirm sovereignty and internal autonomy against challenges from evolving concepts of human rights, domestic governance, and humanitarian intervention” (Johnston, 2003: 15), it is unlikely the country would reject the above-‐mentioned Arctic governance norm and risk undermining its own efforts to assert sovereignty over regions such as Tibet and Taiwan unless it aims to change the status quo in the Arctic. In light of these circumstances, China’s acceptance of the above-‐mentioned Arctic governance norm

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suggests the country does not aim to alter the (normative) status quo in the region. Conversely, China’s rejection of the norm indicates the country is a revisionist; albeit a limited-‐aims one for even if it is dissatisfied with the normative status quo in the region, it does not engage in fundamentally altering it through delegitimation. Hence, the indicator ‘China does not accept Arctic governance norms’ is measured by the variable ‘Acceptance of Arctic governance norm on the regional character of legal and political Arctic affairs’ which can take the values ‘Acceptance’ and ‘No acceptance’.

The first indicator of unlimited-‐aims revisionism, ‘Aims to change the Arctic governance norms in ways that defeat the initial goals of the Arctic regime’, is based on Johnston’s third indicator. As mentioned above, the most important Arctic governance norm regards the regional nature of legal and political Arctic issues. Consistent with this line of reasoning, Schweller and Pu argue China engages in the practice of delegitimation by “denouncing U.S. unilateralism and promoting the concept of multilateralism”, and/or by “participating in and creating new international organizations” (2012: 53) and/or by employing “opportunities and authorized channels within the order to make relative gains and contest particular behaviors of the hegemon” (2012: 50). Applying these delegitimation practices to China’s involvement in the Arctic region suggests the country can aim to gain a foothold in Arctic governance by delegitimizing the regional character of legal and political Arctic issues in three ways. First, China can promote multilateralism in legal and political Arctic affairs as opposed to Arctic state regionalism. Second, China can participate in or create parallel Arctic governance forums on legal and political Arctic affairs as to decrease the legitimacy of existing forums on these issues. Third, China can join the Arctic governance regime in order to gain legitimacy as an Arctic stakeholder only to subsequently use its position as a platform for advancing its interests and contesting the regional character of legal and political Arctic affairs from within. Here, China’s aim to change the norm according to which legal and political Arctic issues are settled between the A8, indicates the country is an unlimited-‐aims revisionist for challenging this norm would fundamentally alter the regional nature of the Arctic governance regime. However, if China does not engage in the above-‐ mentioned delegitimation practices, the country does not aim to change the normative status quo in the region. Therefore, the indicator ‘Aims to change the Arctic governance norms in ways that defeat the initial goals of the Arctic regime’ is measured by the

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variables ‘China promotes multilateralism and condemns Arctic state regionalism in regard to the settlement of legal and political Arctic affairs’, ‘China participates in and creates new Arctic governance forums on legal and political Arctic affairs’ and ‘China participates in Arctic governance forums as to advance its interests and contest current legal and political Arctic governance arrangements’, which can all take the values ‘Yes’ and ‘No’. In this case, if China engages in delegitimation by aiming to change the above-‐ mentioned Arctic governance norm to the degree it defeats the initial goals of the existent Arctic regime, at least one of these three conditions must be met.

Consistent with Johnston’s second set of indicators, this study also discusses whether China ‘Aims to radically alter the distribution of material power in the Arctic’ or ‘Aims to radically alter the distribution of material power in the Arctic and, to this purpose, military force is considered instrumental’.

The second indicator of unlimited-‐aims revisionism, ‘Aims to radically alter the distribution of material power in the Arctic’, is based on Johnston’s forth indicator. When addressing non-‐military forms of altering the global distribution of material power anno 2015, the World Economic Forum (WEF) reports geoeconomic activity “is transforming the global economy and unraveling global power relationships”5_(WEF, 2015: 4). As a theory of international relations, Luttwak defines geoeconomics as the perpetuation of the geopolitical logic, adapted to the age of globalization and observes how “the methods of commerce are displacing military methods – with disposable capital in lieu of firepower […] and market penetration in lieu of garrisons and bases” (1990: 125). Consistent with the above-‐outlined geoeconomic logic and with the methods employed by geoeconomic studies (Agnew and Corbridge, 1989; Coleman, 2005; Smith, 2003), this study aims to investigate whether China aims to alter the distribution of material power in the Arctic first by assessing whether Chinese SOE are active in Arctic states and second by assessing whether China is using its economic presence in the region geostrategically as to extract political concessions. Within this context, China’s economic presence in the Arctic is approached through the prism of Arctic resource extraction and, more specifically, by providing an assessment of China’s

5_{Within
this
context,
the
WEF
makes
special
reference
to
the
geoeconomic
implications
of} China’s model of state capitalism and argues the country’s projects in key commodity markets “could be as important to the 21st century as America’s protection of sea lanes was in the 20th century” (2015: 10).

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involvement in the region’s energy sector6_{.
However,
this
assessment
is
not
indicative
of} whether China aims to radically alter the distribution of material power in the Arctic. In order to address this issue, Schweller and Pu’s account of China’s practice of deconcentration is employed, according to which the country is “leveraging its financial capability politically and diplomatically and using it as a ‘hedge’ against the excesses of U.S. hegemony” (2012: 55). Therefore, if the findings suggest China is leveraging or aims to leverage its economic activities in the Arctic as to impact US hegemony in the region, the country is an unlimited-‐aims revisionist as it is radically altering the distribution of material power in the Arctic. Conversely, if China is not leveraging or aims to leverage its economic presence in the Arctic as to impact US hegemony in the region, the country is not a revisionist. Hence, the indicator ‘Aims to radically alter the distribution of material power in the Arctic’ is measured by the variables ‘Chinese SOE are active in Arctic states’ and ‘China is leveraging its economic presence in the Arctic politically and diplomatically to the degree it impacts US hegemony in the region’ which can both take the values ‘Yes’ and ‘No’. In this case, if China aims to radically alter the distribution of material power in the Arctic, both conditions must be met and therefore both variables must take the value ‘Yes’.

The third indicator of unlimited-‐aims revisionism, ‘Aims to radically alter the distribution of material power in the Arctic and, to this purpose, military force is considered instrumental’, is based on Johnston’s fifth indicator. Here, Johnston envisions a radical redistribution of material power as one that has come about by military force. As China is not in the possession of military capabilities that can be projected across the region (Rainwater, 2012), this study first assesses whether China is developing this type of military capabilities. However, this is not a sufficient condition for determining whether China would actually resort to force as to alter the distribution of material power in the Arctic and therefore this study also investigates whether the country considers military force instrumental in achieving Arctic goals that go beyond the protection of legitimate activities7_{in
the
region.
When
assessing
the
instrumentality
of} military force, the concept of fungibility of force is useful. Art, for example, argues how

6_{Here,
the
focus
lies
on
Arctic
resource
extraction
and
on
Arctic
energy
because,
as
mentioned}

in the introduction, currently these are the only economic activities that can be pursued in the region.