The Impact of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Transformation on China

(1)

The Impact of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

Transformation on China

To what extent has NATO’s transformation since the end of

the Cold War contributed to an assertive China?

Student Name: Ed Bevan Student Number: s2007991

Programme: MA International Relations Thesis Supervisor: Michiel Foulon Word Count: 14,990

(2)

2

List of Abbreviations

ADIZ Air Defence Identification Zone

CENTRASBAT Central Asian Battalion

DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

EAPC Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council

FDI Foreign Direct Investment

IPCP Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme

MRBM Medium-Range Ballistic Missile

NAC North Atlantic Council

NAPC North Atlantic Partnership Council

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NRC NATO-Russian Council

PfP Partnership for Peace Programme

PLA People’s Liberation Army

PLAN People’s Liberation Army Navy

PLAAF People’s Liberation Army Air Force

PRC People’s Republic of China

ROK Republic of Korea

SAM Surface-to-Air Missile

SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organisation

SRBM Short-Range Ballistic Missile

U.S. United States of America

(5)

5

Timeline

Period Event

December 1991 Dissolution of the Soviet Union, end of the Cold War

and the creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council

July – November 1992 NATO Operation Maritime Monitor – Naval Blockade of

international waters off Serbia

October 1992 – April 1993

NATO Operation Sky Monitor – Implementation of no-fly zone over Bosnia and Herzegovina

January 1994 NATO establishes Partnership for Peace Programme

August – September 1995

NATO Operation Deliberate Force – Bombing of Serbian forces to protect UN safe areas in Bosnia

December 1995 – December 1996

NATO Operation Joint Endeavour – NATO led peacekeeping force in Bosnia

April 1996 Creation of the Shanghai Five with the signing of the

Treaty on Deepening Military Trust in Border Regions

May 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations,

Cooperation and Security

March – June 1999 NATO Operation Allied Force – Air campaign against

Serbian forces in Kosovo

(6)

6

July 2001 Russia-China Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and

Friendly Cooperation

December 2001 – December 2014

NATO International Security Assistance Force – NATO combat operations in Afghanistan

November 2010 NATO Adopts new Strategic Concept

March – October 2011 NATO Operation Unified Protector – Enforcement of

no-fly zone and air campaign in Libya

March 2012 Mongolia-NATO Individual Partnership and

Cooperation Programme

September 2012 ROK-NATO Individual Partnership and Cooperation

Programme

April 2013 NATO Secretary General Rasmussen visits ROK and

Japan

May 2014 Japan-NATO Individual Partnership and Cooperation

Programme

October – November 2017

NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg visits ROK and Japan

(7)

7

Introduction

Following China’s emergence as the world’s second largest economy and military, many have begun to describe its recent behaviour on the international stage as assertive. Historically, China pursued a restraint foreign policy based on five

principles of peaceful coexistence, which included mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-aggression, and non-interference in internal affairs (Ministry of Foreign Affairs PRC, n.d.). Consequently, China initially focused on economic

development, maintaining a low profile, favouring bilateral relations over multilateral frameworks, and upheld military primarily for self-defence (Yan, 2014). However, recently, China has begun to demonstrate increased assertiveness; expanding and modernising its military capabilities, increasingly clashing with rival states over territorial and maritime claims, becoming more vocal on international and economic issues, and enhancing bilateral and multilateral cooperation.

Several analysts have determined China’s increased assertiveness reflects its new status as a global power, responding to U.S. actions it perceives are targeted at weakening and dividing China to maintain its hegemonic position (Mearsheimer, 2014a). Indeed, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S. has sought to enhance its influence in the international system by utilizing multiple tools to

consolidate its hegemonic status, which China has opposed. In particular, the U.S. expanded multilateral frameworks, including international security institutions. Most notably, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was transformed by

expanding its membership and enhancing its scope of military operations. Subsequently, this thesis will carry out research into the impact of NATO’s

transformation on China, namely its expansion of membership and bilateral relations, and the advancement of its military operations regarding humanitarian intervention. More specifically, the research will seek to establish whether the transformation of NATO has contributed to a more assertive Chinese foreign policy, by analysing China’s behaviour in response to NATO’s actions. Hence, the research question for this thesis is as follows: To what extent has the transformation of NATO contributed

(8)

8 Originally conceived as a defensive security alliance against the Soviet Union, NATO persisted in spite of the Soviet Union’s collapse. Since the end of the Cold War, NATOs membership has expanded from twelve to twenty-nine member states (NATO, 2018a), and has extended cooperation with non-member states. NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme and bilateral partnerships has enabled NATO to develop relations with states in Central Asia and the Asia Pacific. However, to date, China has been excluded from any formal partnership or bilateral relations with NATO. Instead, China has observed NATO expansion, led by the U.S., incorporate states surrounding its territory, heightening long-held fears of encirclement.

Additionally, NATO has transformed from a collective defence alliance to a proactive multilateral military force; increasingly willing to intervene in global conflicts. NATO intervened militarily in conflicts in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Libya, at times acting unilaterally without UN Security Council approval. While these interventions often occurred outside China’s periphery, NATO’s willingness to militarily intervene in state’s internal affairs to prevent human rights abuses has heightened fears within China. They perceive NATO as a U.S.-led alliance seeking to overthrow regimes who oppose U.S. hegemony, unrestricted by international law or state sovereignty.

Subsequently, China fears the precedent set by NATO interventions could be a precursor to military intervention in China over disputed territories Taiwan, Tibet or Xinjiang, or more dramatically, to overthrow the governing Communist Party.

Thus, since the end of the Cold War, NATO has successfully transformed to become a truly global alliance, given the broadening scope of its operations beyond the Euro-Atlantic Area, and the increased bilateral relations with states across the world. China has evidently opposed this transformation, fearing encirclement, containment, and military intervention. Several analysts have previously identified NATO’s

transformation for causing increased global instability. Notable realist scholars, including Mearsheimer (2014b), identified NATO’s expansion into Central and Eastern Europe for causing an assertive response from Russia, demonstrated by its invasion of Georgia and Ukraine as they feared encirclement from a U.S.-led alliance. With China’s opposition to NATO well-established, and evidence demonstrating the possibility of NATO’s action’s causing an assertive response, it is therefore possible to determine the assertiveness demonstrated by China has similarly been in

(9)

9 assertiveness demonstrated following key NATO actions. NATO’s most notable transformative policies, and ones posing potential greatest threat to China, has been the expansion of bilateral relations with states contiguous to China, and the military interventions it led in the Former Yugoslavia and Libya. Consequently, the thesis will be divided into sections that analyses these aspects.

For the purposes of this research, I will define NATO’s actions since the end of the Cold War as NATO transformation, and the term will include its expansion of

membership, partnerships, bilateral relations, and the broadening scope of its military operations. Additionally, while the term assertive often carries connotations of

aggressiveness, it is used in this context to describe China’s increased willingness to secure its interests through increasingly proactive measures. This includes

confrontational measures such as military clashes, but also diplomatic means such as vocal opposition in international institutions, developing bilateral and multilateral relations, establishing competing international institutions, and enhancing economic dominance over other states.

This research forms a realist interpretation of international relations, understanding China’s behaviour as a rational response to security threats posed by encirclement and military intervention. The research contributes to the understanding of

behaviours between great powers, in particular the behaviours of contemporary great powers the U.S. and China. Moreover, the research will contribute to further

understanding of how U.S. expansion of multilateral security frameworks has affected rising powers excluded from these arrangements. However, the research differs from previous work by focusing specifically on the links between Chinese assertiveness and NATO, shedding light on the specific impact of NATO.

For the design, this thesis will utilise process tracing method to conduct the research. Process tracing provides an effective model of analysing the dependent variable of Chinese assertiveness with the independent variable of NATO transformation. This method will enable analysis of NATOs activities in chronological order and determine the causal implications of these events. Moreover, this method recognises the

existence of several causal variables for contributing to increased Chinese assertiveness.

(10)

10 The thesis is organized into seven chapters, with the next chapter providing an

extensive literature review of existing arguments, while Chapter Three outlines the design for the ensuing research. Chapter Four analyses China’s relations with former Soviet Union states following NATO’s actions in Russia and Central Asia. Similarly, Chapter Five analyses China’s relations with bordering states in North and East Asia after NATO established relations with states within the region. Chapter Six analyses China’s policies for counterintervention, determining the impact of NATO’s global campaigns, in particular the conflicts in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Libya. Finally, Chapter Seven provides a conclusion to the research.

(11)

11

Literature Review

Assertive China

As China gained greater prominence on the international stage, several analysts have observed its changing foreign policy, leading some to identify China’s actions as assertive. The term assertive can often be interpreted as aggressive, with Jerdén (2014: 49) defining assertiveness as states securing their interests through

“confrontational, as opposed to diplomatic means.” Yet, academics have identified various events in China’s foreign policy as examples of increased assertiveness; including confrontations over maritime disputes in the South China Sea, military escalation over Taiwan, vocal criticism of states receiving official visits from the Dalai Lama, and greater intolerance of questions concerning human rights (He and Feng, 2012; Shirk 2014; Christensen 2011; Harris, 2014). However, Harris (2014) cleverly broadens the concept of China’s assertiveness to include economic issues, such as stronger responses to criticism of China’s trade surpluses and currency valuation. Some scholars have taken exception to labelling China’s foreign policy as assertive. Johnstone (2013) extensively demonstrates China’s foreign policy remaining

relatively unchanged in recent history, and argues examples illustrating Chinese assertiveness are instead actions expected from states in those circumstances. Jerdén (2014), who agrees China’s foreign policy has remained unchanged over the period often identified as portraying China’s assertiveness, supports this viewpoint. Yet, while Johnstone and Jerdén make compelling arguments, many scholars sharing this viewpoint have often focussed analysis on assertiveness demonstrated from 2009 onwards. However, evidence demonstrates increased Chinese

assertiveness within its foreign policy since the end of the Cold War, demonstrating more proactiveness in securing its interests. As Shambaugh (2004), He and Feng (2012), and Yan (2014) all highlight, China’s interests have extended beyond internal economic development and regime survival, and therefore its foreign policy has inevitably become more assertive.

Consequently, with China identified as more assertive, several academics have proposed several causes for this phenomenon, often divided between internal and external causes. Shirk (2014) and Christensen (2011) both highlight internal factors including the insecurity of the Chinese leadership, growing nationalism within the

(12)

12 Chinese populace and national media, and ineffective decision-making within the Chinese foreign policy process. Alternatively, other academics have given greater attention to external factors, with Ross (2012) identifying the U.S.’s decision to pivot to Asia as increasing the possibility of causing an assertive response to China

through a security dilemma. Yet, all of these factors demonstrate short-term changes to foreign policy, and are insufficient in establishing the causes of increased

assertiveness over a longer period.

Realism and NATO

Indeed, on a larger scale, analysts have concluded China’s increased assertiveness is an inevitable consequence of its emergence as a great power in the international system (Mearsheimer, 2014a). Many realists argue as great powers emerge, they challenge existing great powers in the international system (Mearsheimer, 2014a; Waltz, 1977). Therefore, China’s assertiveness reflects this great power rivalry, with China challenging the existing great power, the U.S. Indeed, China has remained critical of U.S. hegemony since the end of the Cold War, and condemned U.S. actions following the collapse of the Soviet Union for seeking to extend its global dominance (Liu, 2015; Harris, 2011; Shambaugh, 2013a; Zhang, 2010),

demonstrating a clear opposition to U.S. hegemony. Moreover, China has identified the U.S.’s continued enhancement of international institutions and alliances in its criticism towards U.S. hegemony.

Indeed, NATO is one of the most prolific international institutions China has remained sidelined from. Analysts began to debate the future of NATO at the end of the Cold War. Realists including Mearsheimer (1990) and Waltz (1993) predicted the

dismantlement of NATO, given the absence of an existential threat to justify its

existence. Carpenter and Conry (1998) concluded an enlarged NATO would threaten states excluded from the alliance, and increase the likelihood of conflict, while Kober (1998) criticised the potential inclusion of Russia into NATO for increasing the

possibility of a hostile response from China, with all UN Security Council members except China part of the same military alliance. Several scholars have drawn on these criticisms of NATO enlargement increasing instability by exemplifying Russia’s invasions of Georgia and Ukraine. Both of these states were courted for NATO membership following the success of previous former Soviet states inclusion into

(13)

13 NATO. Fearing encirclement, Russia responded with military action in both Ukraine and Georgia, preventing their accession to NATO (Mearsheimer, 2014b; Wolff, 2015; Art, 2016). Thus, rather than increasing cooperation within the international system, international institutions such as NATO have contributed to further instability. If Russian assertiveness has been caused by NATO transformation, then it may be possible to apply the same theory to understanding China’s increased assertiveness.

Liberalism and NATO

Alternatively, liberal institutionalists argued the need to maintain NATO to ensure peace within Europe and promote democracy in former Soviet states (Keohane, 1995, Ruggie 1992). With states cooperating in international institutions, it creates greater interdependence, reducing the likelihood of conflict (Ikenberry, 2000). Consequently, the United States led the expansion of NATO eastward to include former Soviet states such as Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, deeply opposed by Russia. Certain realists, such as Glaser (1993), even argued NATO remained the best form collective security in the post-Cold War era to hedge against any possible resurgent Russia, and prevent conflict in both Eastern and Western Europe. Hence, many scholars advocated the inclusion of Russia into NATO as the best possible means for achieving long-term peace and stability in Europe (Hunter, 2000; Kupchan, 2010). Significantly, Russet and Stam (1998) surmised that Russia’s involvement within NATO would prevent a Sino-Russian military alliance, capable of challenging the Atlantic alliance, from forming.

This commitment to NATO demonstrated liberals’ belief in international institutions and the international order, who in contrast to realists believe China has benefitted from the international order through economic interdependence and participation in international institutions (Keohane, 2005; Ikenberry, 2008; Haggard, 2014).

Subsequently, liberal scholars exemplify China’s increased willingness to enhance economic relations with states, establish multilateral frameworks, and increase participation within international institutions for explaining China’s assertiveness. Therefore, many advocates of this position argue NATO remains the most effective means of establishing security ties with China, and should be included within NATO’s framework to further security cooperation and increase stability within the

(14)

14 areas of potential cooperation between NATO and China, including counterterrorism, counterpiracy, and drug trafficking (Weitz, 2012; M. Chacho, 2013; Bechná and Thayer, 2016).

NATO and China

Yet, while liberal academics provide a strong argument for the unlikelihood of conflict between the U.S. and China due to its enthusiasm for the international order, and the potential NATO has in collaborating with China, this fails to explain other elements of Chinese assertiveness, such as policies to enhance and modernise its military

capabilities, use of military to clash with rival states over territorial or maritime

disputes, or establishment of opposing institutions. Indeed, while there exists a gap in the literature on any detailed analysis of NATO’s impact on China, several authors have at least identified elements of NATO transformation which have been perceived negatively within China.

To begin with, many authors have acknowledged China’s aversion to military

alliances, preferring bilateral relations and maintaining an independent foreign policy (Shambaugh, 2000; Chan et al, 2013), and hoped the onset of the post-Cold war era would actualize a multipolar world (Garver, 2005). However, the maintenance and expansion of Cold War instruments such as NATO led China to fear the U.S. was seeking to enhance its hegemonic position in the international system, and shape the international order in its own interests (Zhang, 2010). Moreover, China has similar anxieties of encirclement by the U.S. to Russia, with key Chinese military officials stressing the U.S. aims to build a C-shaped encirclement, comprised of Japan, South Korea and Mongolia in the north and following through to India via the South China Sea, which will lead to the final “carving up and destruction of China” (Garver and Wang, 2010: 238). Hence, several authors have noted NATO’s decision to expand its memberships and partnerships with states across the globe have heightened these encirclement fears. Ong (2007), Harris (2011) and Hoslag (2016) have identified NATO’s establishment of cooperation with former Soviet states, through its Partnership for Peace programme, as heightening encirclement fears by pushing NATO’s presence up to China’s Western borders. More recently, and currently considerably overlooked within the existing literature, NATO has expanded further with bilateral relations in the Asia Pacific, establishing close cooperation with

(15)

15 Mongolia, Japan, and South Korea, all neighbouring states to China. If fears of

encirclement caused increased Russian assertiveness, then it is possible the same theory can be applied to explain China’s assertiveness.

NATO Military Interventions

Additionally, since 1991, NATO has transformed to become more capable of

conducting military operations anywhere in the world (Daalder and Goldgeier, 2006). The most notable cases of this transformation is NATO’s military interventions in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Libya. In NATO’s military intervention in Kosovo, scholars have noted NATO’s willingness to act without authorisation from UN

Security Council heightened fears within China. Wang (1999) describes how China’s fervent views on sovereignty and non-interference in state’s internal affairs have made it increasingly dedicated to the UN Security Council to protect its own sovereignty. Therefore, the decision for NATO to intervene in Kosovo by circumventing the UN has heightened fears within China, who have concluded military intervention in Kosovo set a precedent in the international system (Zhang, 2010). In particular, with interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo justified on the basis on protection of ethnic minorities in a specific territory, China fears the same justification could be provided for intervention within China over disputed territories of Tibet, Xinjiang and Taiwan (Shambaugh, 2000).

Additionally, scholars have noted China’s fears over military intervention to instigate regime change. NATO supported U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq which overthrew governing regimes (Ong, 2007), and led military operations in Libya, which resulted in the deposition of Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi (Engelbrekt et al, 2015). The decision for NATO to conduct military campaigns against sovereign states to instigate regime change has increased insecurity amongst the Chinese leadership, who believe the U.S. and its allies have consistently sought to eradicate its communist governing regime (Zhang, 2010).

Nevertheless, many analysts reject the overemphasis of NATO’s military

interventions and ability to threaten China. While China remains committed to the notion of sovereignty, it does recognise the need for military intervention through international institutions under certain conditions, at times voting in support of NATOs

(16)

16 interventions (Chan et al, 2013, Zheng, 2016). Moreover, military interventions by NATO have demonstrated inherent limitations within the alliance, weakening NATO’s ability to conduct future military campaigns. During the Kosovo conflict, the complex decision-making process hampered military operations, leading the U.S. to act outside of NATO when initiating military operations in Afghanistan (Kashmeri and Hunter, 2011). Furthermore, divisions between the U.S. and European states over the Iraq war in 2003 demonstrated the limitations in NATO being utilised for the U.S.’s security interests (Pond, 2004; Menon, 2007). Nevertheless, while these critics make an important contribution in highlighting NATO’s limitations, China continues to emphasize the importance of sovereignty and rejects intervention in internal affairs, consistently opposing NATO’s operations. This therefore suggests China continues to perceive NATO as posing a potential threat to its interests, and therefore may have contributed to China’s increased assertiveness.

Thus, the literature reviewed demonstrates that while China may have benefitted from the international system, it remains suspicious of U.S. hegemony and perceived attempts to weaken or divide China. Analysts have observed various instruments the U.S. has utilised to extend its hegemony and the resulting impact on China, yet what remains neglected is the impact of NATO, a key instrument of U.S. hegemony in the post-Cold War era. While many scholars maintain international institutions are essential for mitigating conflict in the international system, and areas exist for NATO-China cooperation, the literature has demonstrated how NATO’s transformation has potentially been viewed as a threat within China, and therefore, the following

(17)

17

Research Design

The research will seek to establish whether NATO has contributed to a more

assertive China. With the research focusing on the specific case between China and NATO, the research will primarily form a within case design. While a between case design may have been beneficial, for example comparing the impact of NATO on both Russia and China; vast, political, social and geographical, differences between NATO, China and Russia mean a within case design provides the best method for analysis. However, there will be some comparison of case studies to reflect the general trends presented from different aspects of NATO transformation and resulting impacts on China.

Specifically, process tracing through qualitative observations will be employed to determine if NATO’s transformation since the end of the Cold War has contributed to a more assertive China. Process tracing seeks to solve the puzzle of “What X’s caused Y in case Z?” by making causal inferences through sequential analysis (Mahoney, 2015). By establishing a sequence of steps, it is possible to determine if an independent variable, such as NATO transformation, has either caused or contributed to the dependent variable of Chinese assertiveness.

As process tracing determines how X caused Y in case Z, analysts can interpret X in various ways, establishing X as either a necessary or contributory condition

(Mahoney, 2015). For this research, X, the transformation of NATO, is regarded as a contributory condition. A contributory condition describes the cause identified for research as one of numerous factors that either contribute or increase the likelihood of an outcome (Mahoney, 2015). The literature review outlined several possible causes for China’s increased assertiveness. Removing a contributory factor does not eliminate the outcome; however, the inclusion of it makes it more likely (Mahoney, 2015). In other words, it is possible that China’s increased assertiveness still occurred even if NATO had been dissolved. However, NATO’s transformation may have contributed to increasing Chinese assertiveness alongside other factors. Thus, this demonstrates the benefit of using this method for this research, with process tracing enabling the testing of one independent variable while acknowledging the existence of others (George and Bennett, 2005).

(18)

18 Additionally, process tracing is conducted by analysing events in sequential order to determine causal factors (Mahoney, 2015). Consequently, these events will provide a chain that should lead from the independent variable to the dependent variable, in this case, as follows:

X: NATO Transformation → Y: China Assertiveness

Each step in the sequence between X and Y represents a specific action or event by NATO, and for each one specific evidence is needed to justify its place in the

sequence. Therefore, I will analyse available data from both primary and secondary sources related to China’s increased assertiveness to determine whether they followed a key event or action by NATO. The data will comprise of transcripts of speeches and conversations from Chinese officials, communiques, and policy documents published by the Chinese leadership, foreign office and military. Additionally, I will analyse secondary sources such as newspaper articles and academic literature.

Nevertheless, it must be noted this method of research has some limitations. As aforementioned, for process tracing to achieve successful results, a good amount of knowledge is required. However, process tracing can often expose gaps in evidence. Specifically, obtaining data from China may be difficult given the restrictive access to official Chinese documents. Therefore, elucidated argumentation and educated guesses may be utilised to fill this gap. Furthermore, process tracing can be obscure and conducted informally, with poor technique and lacking execution (Mahoney, 2015). Hence, it is necessary to ensure the research focuses on NATO’s actions specifically and avoid the inclusion of substantial amounts of unnecessary

information.

However, in sum, while limitations exist, this method provides the most

comprehensive method of conducting this analysis. While accessing primary data may be difficult, there is sufficient secondary sources on the subject to provide qualitative data necessary for the analysis. Furthermore, as the analysis seeks to determine the specific impact of actions taken by NATO, process tracing provides the most effective way of determining this by establishing the causal implications of these in a pre-determined order.

(19)

19 For the purposes of this research, I have chosen to focus on NATO’s transformation in its expansion of partnerships and bilateral relations with Russia, Central Asia, Mongolia, ROK and Japan, as these states are contiguous to China, and its military interventions in the former Yugoslavia and Libya, as these were the most extensive international interventions led by NATO.

(20)

20

China’s Relations with Former Soviet States

To begin with, one of the most notable forms of Chinese assertiveness since the end of the Cold War has been the development of relations with former Soviet states. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, China has assertively courted relations with Russia and newly independent states within Central Asia, deepening political,

economic and security ties, while concurrently establishing multilateral frameworks for regional cooperation. Simultaneously, NATO similarly sought to enhance relations with these states. Having formed its existential threat during the Cold War, NATO sought an opportunity to incorporate former Soviet states into its alliance to ensure stability on its periphery and support democratic transition within these states (Kashimeri and Hunter, 2011).

Unsurprisingly, the inclusion of contiguous states such as Russia into a U.S.-led alliance could cause considerable concern within China. With the U.S.’s

well-established alliances with Japan and the Republic of Korea, China has held fears of encirclement, primarily led by the U.S., with aim of weakening and dividing China (Garver and Wang, 2010). In this context, NATO’s actions with states on China’s Western border may heighten these encirclement fears. Subsequently this chapter will seek to analyse whether NATO’s actions contributed to China’s increased assertiveness with former Soviet states.

Russia

With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, China faced several states on its Western border. Having consistently favoured multipolarity, the end of the Cold War and subsequent emergence of multiple former Soviet states presented China with an opportunity to forge relations to further its interests. As Russia remained the largest and most significant state bordering China, the Chinese leadership prioritized enhancing relations with Russia from 1989 (Wilson, 2015: 144).

NATO-Russia Relations

At the same time, NATO publicly published its Strategic Concept, which defined NATO’s purpose in the post-Cold War era, and outlined how NATO would be less focused on collective defence against former adversaries, and instead increase

(21)

21 cooperation and dialogue with former Warsaw Pact states (NATO, 1991). With

several former Soviet states lobbying NATO for membership to guarantee their security (Medcalf, 2012), many speculated Russia would additionally become part of NATO (Palmer, 1991; Brock and Evans, 1991). Indeed, in 1991, Russian President Boris Yeltsin apparently showed enthusiasm towards this prospect, declaring

Russia’s intention of joining NATO in a letter addressed to a NATO summit ahead of the meeting, stating: “Today we are raising a question of Russia’s membership in NATO…regarding it as a long-term political aim.” (Yeltsin, cited in Friedman, 1991). Accordingly, Russia joined various cooperative forums, including the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and the Partnership for Peace programme (PfP) (NATO, 2018b). In 1997, cooperation was further enhanced with the signing of the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security, which sought to reduce rivalries and tensions in the Euro-Atlantic area, establishing a Permanent Joint

Council (PJC) to facilitate dialogue and cooperation, replaced in May 2002 with the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) (NATO, 2018b). Additionally, Russia collaborated with NATO in various military operations, including supporting peacekeeping missions, participating in joint military exercises, and cooperating on various security issues such as counterterrorism and drug trafficking (NATO, 2018b).

China’s Response

Thus, while the inclusion of former Warsaw Pact states such as Poland and Hungary were of little concern to China given their geographical distance, deepening relations between Russia and a U.S.-led alliance would inevitably be detrimental to China’s interests (Nadkarni, 2010: 79). Following the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s, relations between China and Russia had been relatively poor, with conflicts and tensions over ideological differences and border delineation (Wilson, 2015). Faced with the

possibility of Russia forming into an alliance with the U.S., fears of encirclement within China would be greatly increased. Consequently, China became more

assertive in its response to NATO by developing relations with Russia. Following the significant meeting between Deng Xiaoping and Mikhail Gorbachev in 1989, several reciprocal state visits took place by leading political and military officials, including in May 1991, when Jiang Zeimin became the first Chinese Communist Party leader to visit Russia since 1957 (Wudunn, 1991). Jiang’s visit was particularly important to

(22)

22 many, with analysts concluding the visit demonstrated China’s desire to ensure the preservation of international socialism and normalize relations with neighbouring states following international isolationism since the Tiananmen Square incident (Shambaugh, cited in Wudunn, 1991).

However, while Russia continued developing relations with NATO, China reaffirmed its opposition to military alliances and U.S. hegemony. In a report delivered to the 14th_{National Congress of the Communist Party of China in October 1992, Jiang}

welcomed the end of the bipolar structure in the international system, and maintained China would remain independent from international alliances and military blocs, criticizing “hegemonism, power politics, aggression and expansion in any form” (Jiang, 1992). Accordingly, China intensified its diplomatic and political measures to Russia. In December 1992, Yeltsin accepted an invitation for a state visit to China. During the visit, Yeltsin and Chinese President Yang Shangkun signed twenty-four documents normalizing relations (Wilson, 2015: 26). Significantly, in a joint

communique, both leaders addressed the issue of NATO, stating:

“Neither party should join any military or political alliance directed against the other party, sign any treaty or agreement with a third country prejudicing the sovereignty and security interests of the other party, or allow its territory to be used by a third country to infringe on the

sovereignty and security interests of the other party.” (Yeltsin and Shangkun, 1992, cited in Garver and Wang, 2010: 239).

Thus, China may have had several motivations for normalizing relations with Russia, given historic disputes over shared borders and fears of international isolation. However, the explicit reference in the communique to alliances clearly demonstrated China’s concerns over NATO transformation.

Indeed, Chinese-Russian relations were further enhanced with several bilateral agreements and official state visits. In 1994, Jiang visited Russia, jointly signing several official agreements, including a resolution for establishing a constructive partnership between Russia and China (Wilson, 2015: 147). Moreover, Jiang and Yeltsin appeared to reaffirm their opposition to NATO, issuing a joint communique recognising both states important role in ensuring a multipolar world, reiterating their “intolerance to expansionism” and opposition to “hegemony, power politics, and the establishment of antagonistic political, military, and economic blocs” (Wilson, 2015:

(23)

23 147). Thus, opposition to NATO continued to be identified as a key component of the Chinese-Russian relationship. Indeed, when Yeltsin revisited China in April 1996, the state visit culminated with the signing of Chinese-Russian Joint Statement, which established a “partnership of strategic cooperation” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs PRC, n.d.), upgrading relations from constructive to strategic. Consequently, with the entrenchment of cooperation between Russia and China, and agreements that neither would join military alliances against the other, Russia’s membership of NATO became increasingly unlikely. After the U.S. decided to expand NATO membership regardless, China and Russia drew closer, as both sought to assert its opposition to U.S. hegemony and expansion of military alliances.

This joint opposition to NATO remained an important element of Chinese-Russian bilateral relations. In 1997, China and Russia issued a Joint Declaration on a Multipolar World and the Establishment of a New International Order, in which both parties set out its vision for a post-Cold War world. The declaration signed by Jiang and Yeltsin specifically criticized the continuing Cold War mentality that prevailed in the international arena, and called for the abandonment of military blocs (Yeltsin and Jiang, 1997). Similar sentiment and explicit rejection of military alliances was

articulated in Jiang’s report to the 15th_{Party Congress, opposing the continuation and}

expansion of military alliances, which he criticized as Cold War mentality (Jiang, 1997). Therefore, Jiang’s report suggests China individually recognised the threat posed by NATO, and aligned with Russia to reduce this threat.

Indeed, when both states signed the Treaty of Good-Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation in 2001, they expanded this joint opposition to NATO, with Article 8 stipulating:

“Neither party will participate in any alliance or bloc which damages the sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity of the other party, and will not adopt any similar action, including not concluding a similar treaty with any third country. Neither party to the treaty will permit a third

country to use its territory to damage the national sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity of the other party. Neither party to the treaty will permit the establishment on its

territory of an organization or group that harms the sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity of the other party, and will prohibit such activities.” (Treaty of Good Neighborliness,

(24)

24 Moreover, Article 11 of the treaty prohibited both state’s intervening in either’s

internal affairs, an apparent reference to NATO’s humanitarian intervention in Kosovo (Treaty of Good Nieghborliness, 2001). Indeed, the decision to establish a codified bilateral agreement was initiated by China, fearing NATO’s intervention in Kosovo was a precursor for military intervention in China itself, and concluding closer

alignment with Russia would reduce such threat (Saradzhyan, 2001). The 2001 treaty highlighted the extent Chinese-Russian political relations had developed since the end of the Cold War, and characterised China and Russia’s greater alignment on international issues. Since then, both states have often replicated voting patterns at the UN Security Council and established joint statements on international issues, often in opposition to NATO. Significantly, China refrained from publicly condemning Russia’s annexation in Crimea, despite the action violating China’s principles of non-interference and territorial integrity (Kent, 2014: 151), and even abstained from UN Security Council resolutions on the issue due to the “complex historical and practical factors” of the Ukrainian issue (Qin, 2014).

However, Chinese assertiveness by developing relations with Russia in response to NATO has not been confined to the diplomatic sphere, and since the end of the Cold War, military cooperation has substantially expanded. Beginning in the 1990s, arms sales has become integral to bilateral relations (Qiu, 2013), with China purchasing high-quality military armoury from Russia, including aircraft, naval vessels, military equipment and missiles (Bolt and Cross, 2018). Between 1992 and 2015, Russia exported $32.654 billion worth of arms to China (Bolt and Cross, 2018: 119), resulting in Russia comprising 66% of all China’s weaponry imports (Bolt and Cross, 2018: 118). Moreover, while China has become dependent on arm sales from Russia, the military relations have been reciprocated, with Russia licensing China to produce weapons including aircraft, radars, guns and anti-tank missiles (Bolt and Cross, 2018: 118). Although frictions have occurred between China and Russia regarding arms sales, Russia has continued to export high-quality weaponry, with the recent sale of S-400 SAM providing China with increased missile capabilities, including the ability to reach disputed territories such as Taiwan (Bolt and Cross, 2018: 122).

This military cooperation was extended in the 2000s when Russia and China began military exercises, initially under the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). SCO Peace Mission’s in 2005, 2009 and 2013 exclusively included Russia and China, with

(25)

25 Peace Mission 2005 including 10,000 troops and substantial aircraft and warships, practicing large scale amphibious operations, leading some to interpret the exercise as practice for military operations over Taiwan (Bolt and Cross, 2018: 122). Outside of the SCO, joint naval exercises began in 2012, with China conducting drills in the Mediterranean for the first time in 2014 (Bolt and Cross, 2018: 124). The following year, nine Chinese and Russian ships conducted a military exercise in the

Mediterranean, demonstrating China’s capability to conduct military operations in NATO’s sphere (Bolt and Cross, 2018: 124). Additionally, in 2017, China and Russia held joint naval exercise Maritime Cooperation in the Baltic Sea, with China providing a guided missile destroyer for the drill, and Chinese media stating the exercise taking place in “the heart of Europe” would be “shaking the West’s sense of security”

(Stone, 2017).

Thus, many identified China’s efforts to forge stronger relations with Russia as motivated by China’s desire to reduce international isolationism after the Tiananmen Square incident. Indeed, following arms embargo implemented by Western states, Russia became essential for China’s military modernisation. Nevertheless, China’s policy towards Russia intensified substantially after deepening NATO-Russian relations. The inclusion of a large, bordering state into a U.S.-led alliance would inevitably heighten pre-existing fears of encirclement. Subsequently, China became more assertive in responding to NATO by developing relations with Russia, showing greater willingness to cooperate politically and militarily. A constant in bilateral agreements is its joint opposition to alliances, a clear reference to NATO. By asserting its relations with Russia, China ensured that Russia would refrain from extensively deepening relations with NATO, and significantly reduced fears of

encirclement. While this policy was mutually beneficial, with Russia equally fearful of NATO transformation, the increased enthusiasm within China to enhance relations with Russia that followed many key events by NATO represents the concerns it had over deepening NATO-Russian relations.

Central Asia

While China secured its bilateral partnership with Russia, it sought to assert similar position with former Soviet states in Central Asia. Central Asian states, such as Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, were strategically important for China,

(26)

26 given its geographical proximity, vast energy resources, and ethnic linkages with Xinjiang Autonomous Region in Western China (Blank, 2013). Therefore, as with Russia, any inclusion of these into NATO would potentially heighten fears of encirclement.

NATO-Central Asia Relations

Indeed, after NATO introduced the NACC (known as the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) from 1997) at the London Summit in 1990, political cooperation and diplomatic channels were established between NATO and Central Asia (Moore, 2010: 219). NATO further enhanced cooperation in 1994 with the establishment of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme (Medcalf, 2012: 154), enabling closer cooperation on military measures, including joint military exercises and training.

Following the inclusion of Central Asia states into PfP, NATO began to provide assistance for military exercises. In December 1995, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan created a joint peacekeeping unit, the Central Asian Battalion

(CENTRASBAT), carrying out joint military exercises with the U.S. in 1997 (Stein, 2018: 259). Prior to the formation of CENTRASBAT, Central Asian states provided support for NATO peacekeeping missions, with Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan providing battalions for Cooperative Nugget in 1995, 1997 and 2000, and Kazakhstan,

Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan providing military units for Cooperative Osprey in 1996, 1998 and 2001 (Stein, 2018: 260). Additionally, in 1997 Kazakhstan held the first annual joint peacekeeping exercise with NATO in ‘Steppe Eagle’, with the aim of “improving the readiness of Kazakh peacekeeping units to take part in NATO-led operations” (NATO, 2017f).

Although confined to peacekeeping exercises, China remained concerned with these increasing and open-ended military drills between NATO and Central Asian states, with NATO now operating militarily on China’s Western border. As aforementioned, Central Asia has been of strategic interest to China. The region is economically important, containing vital natural resources such as natural gas and oil (Choo,

2003). More importantly, China has remained concerned about support Central Asian states could provide to the ethnic Uighur minorities in Xinjiang; fearing the potential

(27)

27 spread of pan-Islamic and pan-Turkic groups promoting separatist movements

(Fravel, 2008: 151). The presence of NATO in the region would only heighten these concerns, especially with Turkey, sympathetic to the Uighur population, remaining an integral member of NATO, and China believing separatist movements could only succeed if it received international support (Blank, 2013: 100). Subsequently, China began assertively enhancing its influence in Central Asia. They began sending diplomatic missions to various Central Asian states, conducting several state visits, and signing multiple bilateral agreements on border demarcation and economic development (Zhao, 2007). Accordingly, China began significantly increasing its economic cooperation in the region, with trade volume between China and Central Asia increasing from $460 million in 1992 to $30.093 billion in 2010 (Wu, 2012: 59-60). The combination of these tools was seen as essential in limiting U.S. influence in the region, ensuring that the U.S. or its allies would be unable to support secessionist movements in the region to the detriment of China’s internal security (Blank, 2013: 100).

Moreover, China moved to specifically address the security concerns arising from Central Asia. In April 1996, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan signed a security agreement in Shanghai. The agreement primarily dealt with restricting forces stationed in border areas, preventing them from being directed towards each other, but also prohibited signatories from conducting military exercises targeted towards each other (Agreement on Confidence Building in the Military Field in the Border Area, 1996). Following the agreement, the five signatory states became known as the Shanghai Five (Al-Qahtani, 2006: 130). As joint military exercises continued between NATO and Central Asian states, China continued to enhance its influence through these newly established multilateral channels, attending Shanghai Five summits annually (Al-Qahtani, 2006: 130). In 2001, Uzbekistan accepted an invitation to join the forum, resulting in the Shanghai Five being elevated into a codified international intergovernmental organization named the Shanghai

Cooperation Organization (SCO). Interestingly, the SCO Charter specified one of the organization’s priorities was regional security, committing member states to work collectively on regional security issues (SCO, 2001). Simultaneously, the SCO sought to allay fears it was a counter alliance to NATO, with the charter specifying the SCO

(28)

28 was not an alliance directed towards any particular state or region, welcoming

dialogue with any state (SCO, 2001).

Nevertheless, the activities of the SCO since its formation demonstrate China’s assertiveness in restricting NATO’s influence within Central Asia and thus reduce fears of encirclement, and it is no coincidence that security has been an integral part of the SCO. In 2002, SCO member states began conducting joint military exercises, practicing responses to military threats such as insurgency movements and mass protests, with China providing substantial military personnel and equipment (Marat, 2013: 130). SCO member states have also conducted annual military drills, with large-scale military manoeuvres and exercises comprising most of the SCO’s budget (Marat, 2013: 130). The military exercises have been conducted in all SCO member states, with Uzbekistan becoming more involved following the decision to expel U.S. Karshi-Khanabad airbase from its territory in 2005 (Marat, 2013: 138). China has been the most active SCO member, participating in 16 out of 22 military exercises between 2002 and 2014, and contributing the highest number of troops, funds and weaponry (de Haas, 2016). While many of these exercises are described as anti-terror or ‘Peace Missions’, the scale and composition of the exercises resembles traditional war games designed for large-scale combat, rather than smaller operations antiterrorism usually entails (Marat, 2013: 138).

Therefore, it is clear the increasing military collective actions of the SCO have demonstrated the capability of the organization to restrict NATO’s presence in Central Asia. By providing the majority of funds and equipment to both the SCO and military exercises, China has apparently been the most enthusiastic member to develop security ties within the SCO. As engagement in security issues has increased, military exercises between Central Asia and NATO has decreased, declining to mostly dialogue and information sharing. It seems no coincidence, therefore, that with potential increased encirclement by the U.S. on China’s Western borders, it has acted assertively in response through the creation of the SCO, and contributed to the intensifying military drills since its inception.

(29)

29

China’s Clashes in Asia Pacific

Alongside its relations with former Soviet states, China has also demonstrated increasing assertiveness in the Asia Pacific region. China has become more vocal over disputed territories in the South China and East China seas, and with expanded and modernised military capabilities, has shown greater willingness to utilise these methods to extend its claims. With the U.S.’s well-established alliances with the Republic of Korea (ROK), Japan and the Philippines continuing to heighten

encirclement fears, and China seeking to achieve regional hegemony by pushing out U.S. influence in the region (Mearsheimer, 2014a), any enhancement of U.S.-led alliances through NATO in the region would potentially intensify these encirclement fears.

Indeed, in the mid-2000’s NATO began to extend its global partnerships. At the Riga Summit in 2006, NATO announced its intention to extend and enhance its

cooperation with non-member states across the globe (North Atlantic Council, 2006), reaffirmed at both the Bucharest Summit 2008 and Lisbon Summit 2010 (North Atlantic Council, 2008 and 2010). Subsequently, NATO’s Strategic Concept, adopted at the Lisbon Summit, committed to “develop political dialogue and practical

cooperation with any nations…across the globe”, and permitted global partners to have a structural role in NATO-led missions they contributed to (NATO, 2010: 26-27). With the commitment of NATO to expand its global presence established, it

subsequently developed relations with states within the Asia Pacific, most notably Mongolia, the ROK, and Japan. Thus, the subsequent analysis will seek to determine if NATO’s actions with these states has contributed to Chinese assertiveness.

Mongolia

Firmly established in Northeast Asia, and with one of China’s largest shared land borders adjoining autonomous regions of Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia, Mongolia is an important state to China (Rossabi, 2013). Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Mongolia has developed a neutral foreign policy, seeking bilateral relations with several states to prevent dependence on any one state (Rossabi, 2013).

Consequently, Mongolia has engaged large states and international institutions to preserve its sovereignty and national security.

(30)

30

NATO-Mongolia Relations

As a result, Mongolia began developing relations with NATO in the 1990s, observing the PfP process to explore opportunities for NATO-Mongolia cooperation (Helbig, 2015: 7). Practical cooperation began in 2000, when Mongolian armed forces

participated in the CENTRAZBAT field exercise (Dovchin, 2014). The following year, Mongolian Prime Minister Nambariin Enkhbayar met with NATO Secretary General George Robertson to discuss formalizing and enhancing cooperation (NATO, 2001). Consequently, NATO-Mongolian relations continued to develop, with Mongolia

providing peacekeeping forces in both Iraq and Kosovo, and contributed a platoon for NATO operations in Afghanistan (NATO, 2017a).

Since 2010, Mongolian-NATO relations were further entrenched after Mongolia President Tsakhia Elbegdorj attended the Lisbon Summit (NATO, 2017a). In May 2011, NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General James Appathurai visited

Mongolian capital Ulaanbaatar to begin discussing codifying cooperation into a joint

agreement (NATO, 2017a). As a result,in 2012 Mongolia and NATO signed an

Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme (IPCP), which sought to enhance interoperability, “further developing its capacity to support multilateral peace-support efforts” (NATO, 2012a). The IPCP additionally stipulated both parties would focus on terrorism, proliferation, cyber defence, and “building capacity through exchange, education, and training”, agreeing to develop “mechanisms for crisis prevention and management” (NATO, 2012a). Thus, the IPCP laid out an open-ended framework for Mongolian-NATO cooperation, primarily based on peacekeeping and crisis

management, but open to further possibilities of collaboration.

The possibility of Mongolia becoming incorporated into a U.S.-led alliance would certainly heighten encirclement fears within China. However, arguably, Chinese policy towards Mongolia immediately after the Cold War potentially prevented these fears becoming realised. In April 1994, Chinese Premier Li Peng visited Mongolia, resulting in the signing of the Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation between China and Mongolia (Rossabi, 2013: 180). Possibly viewed by China as pre-emptive action against Mongolia’s inclusion into U.S.-led alliances, the treaty specified

(31)

non-31 interference and peaceful coexistence between both countries, and prohibited either state to use its lands for troops by another country (Rossabi, 2013: 180).

Since then, China increased its diplomatic relations with Mongolia, conducting a flurry of state visits during the 1990s and 2000s, simultaneously increasing its economic dominance over Mongolia. By 2010, China had become the largest provider of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Mongolia, amounting to 51% of all FDI (Reeves, 2013: 178). China similarly became Mongolia’s largest trading partner, with China the destination for 81% of Mongolia’s exports (Reeves, 2013: 178). Additionally, China provided Mongolia’s mining and banking sector substantial loans, providing more loans than Japan, Australia, Germany, the U.S., ROK and the European Union (Reeves, 2013: 179). Indeed, China demonstrated its willingness to use its economic position to assert pressure on Mongolia after it closed trading routes on the

Mongolian border in 2002 following the Dalai Lama’s visit to Mongolia (Reeves, 2013: 183). Thus, China’s willingness to assert its economic position suggests its

development of economic relations has formed part of a strategy to ensure Mongolia becomes dependent on China, and therefore less susceptible to other foreign

influences.

Despite the increased economic interdependence, Mongolia continued to deepen relations with NATO. This was met with opposition from China, who shortly after Mongolia’s participation in NATO peacekeeping operations in Kosovo, staged an extensive military exercise in Inner Mongolia, named Sharpening 2008 (Rossabi, 2013: 183), although the exercise also followed the annual joint U.S.-Mongolian military exercise Khan Quest (Rossabi, 2013: 183). Nevertheless, China continued to oppose Mongolia’s relations with NATO. Following the announcement of the IPCP, Chinese media accused Mongolia of utilizing NATO to counterbalance against Russia and China as part of its independent foreign policy (Zhao, 2012).

Consequently, China has asserted its opposition by consistently rejecting elevating Mongolia’s status within the SCO from observer to full member, in contrast to welcoming the inclusion of other states such as Afghanistan and Uzbekistan. Weitz (2012) specifically identified the Mongolian-NATO cooperation as the main reason for China’s opposition to Mongolia’s SCO membership, fearing its ties with NATO would complicate security collaboration amongst SCO members. Indeed, in August 2014,

(32)

32 China hosted the largest SCO military drill at its military base in Inner Mongolia, with the exercise comprising of 7,000 troops and 500 multiple arms (Hams, 2016: 386).

Thus, Mongolia’s relations with NATO remains significant in assessing China’s assertiveness. Whereas Chinese assertiveness appeared successful in reducing NATO collaboration with Central Asia and Russia, Mongolia has continued to deepen its relations with NATO in spite of China’s willingness to utilize its economic and political dominance. To date, Mongolia’s independent foreign policy and relatively low-level cooperation with NATO have perhaps prevented further assertiveness from China, and China’s success in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War in securing bilateral agreements may have contributed to this. Nevertheless, China evidently remains suspicious of NATO’s actions in Mongolia, asserting opposition through diplomatic channels and multilateral institutions, including the SCO. However, while NATO-Mongolia cooperation has caused angst within China, Mongolia’s small economy and limited military capabilities have perhaps resulted in China refraining from engaging in extensive assertive behaviour in responding to NATO’s actions with Mongolia.

Republic of Korea

In comparison to Mongolia, China has acted much more assertively in responding to NATO’s relations with the Republic of Korea (ROK). After substantial economic development and political liberalisation, the ROK became an influential state in the Asia Pacific, maintaining a military alliance with the U.S. (Snyder, 2017). Hence, any intensification of military alliances with the ROK would potentially heighten

encirclement fears within China.

NATO-ROK Relations

Indeed, NATO and the ROK began developing bilateral relations in 2005. ROK foreign minister Ban Ki-moon visited NATO headquarters and addressed the North Atlantic Council (NAC), identifying “vestiges of Cold War” remaining within Northeast Asia, with concerns over “territorial disputes and problems stemming from a painful past, competition to secure energy resources, as well as the rise of exclusive nationalism.” (Ban, 2005). Subsequently, Ban announced his desire for further cooperation amongst NATO and ROK to cope with “the global nature of new security threats” (Ban, 2005).

(33)

33 Consequently, ROK became a NATO partner in 2006, holding several bilateral meetings between military and political officials, including annual policy consultations since 2008 (NATO, 2017d). In September 2012, NATO and ROK signed an IPCP which formalized cooperation on areas of terrorism and multinational peace support (NATO, 2012b). The IPCP was revised in November 2017 to increase cooperation in cyber security, non-proliferation, counterterrorism and “interoperability and connectivity in political and military affairs” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs ROK, 2017).

High-level meetings continued after the introduction of the IPCP, with then NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen visiting South Korea in 2013. During the visit, Rasmussen described the NATO-ROK relationship as “young” but with “great potential” (Rasmussen, 2013). Interestingly, Rasmussen used the speech to clarify that NATO’s global partnership did not mean it was seeking a “presence in the Asia-Pacific area”, instead preferring to focus on bilateral cooperation with ROK on joint operations (Rasmussen, 2013). The following year, NATO Deputy Secretary General Alexander Vershbow visited ROK, delivering a speech to the Seoul Defence Dialogue. He reiterated NATO was not seeking a presence in the Asia Pacific, but simultaneously praised ROK’s participation in the Partnership Interoperability Initiative, which “increases the number and scale of joint exercises” (Vershbow, 2014). ROK officials have

reciprocated the visits by NATO, with ROK Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se addressing the NAC in October 2016, using the speech to highlight the growing threat North Korea posed (Yun, 2016). In November 2017, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg visited ROK on an official visit, announcing a revised IPCP and the beginning of NATO-ROK military staff talks (Stolenberg, 2017b). Additionally, NATO-ROK has become active in supporting NATO missions across the globe, deploying troops in Afghanistan, providing substantial funds for peacekeeping operations, and participating in NATO’s

counterpiracy operations (Stoltenberg, 2017b).

The close partnership between NATO and ROK has not gone unnoticed in China, and while NATO has reiterated its aversion to establishing a presence in the Asia Pacific, suspicions remain of a U.S.-led alliance developing close ties with the ROK. However, given ROK’s strong ties with the U.S. and substantial economic development, China has been unable to leverage similar tools to assert itself as it did with Russia, Central Asia

(34)

34 and Mongolia. Rather, it has sought to further enhance its relations with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) as a bulwark against ROK and U.S. influence, and employ its military capabilities over territorial and maritime claims (Chari and Raghavan, 2015).

Indeed, there is evidence to suggest ROK-NATO relations have contributed to an assertive China. Shortly after Ban’s speech to NATO in 2005, DPRK leader Kim Jong-Il accepted an invitation to visit China, touring the country for ten days (Ling, 2006). While it must be noted this formed part of a series of meetings between China and DPRK since 2003, during the 2006 visit Chinese President Hu Jintao called for further advancing of bilateral relations (Ling, 2006). Jintao specifically noted that further

cooperation was in both countries interests and would contribute to stability in the region; given “profound and complicated changes” international and regional situations were undergoing (Hu, cited in Ling, 2006). Indeed, several incidents of Chinese assertiveness regarding the DPRK followed increased NATO-ROK cooperation. Most notably, in 2010, the DPRK attacked ROK military, sinking the ROK Navy ship Cheonan, and shelled ROK forces based on Yeonpyeong Island (Synder and Byun, 2011), the latter coinciding with a NATO parliamentary delegation visit to ROK (Austin, 2010). Yet, China failed to offer condolences to ROK for several weeks, and consistently blocked any international response toward the DPRK in the UN Security Council, refusing to explicitly condemn the DPRK (Synder, and Byun, 2011: 76). China’s assertive defence of the DPRK, despite clear provocations against the ROK, followed several years of deepening ROK-NATO relations, with Chinese media stating during the crisis that “Some Western

countries, like the U.S., may not realise that their…military presence have deepened the complexity of the situation on the divided peninsula” (Global Times, 2010). Chinese military have similarly concluded that NATO’s statements on the DPRK in recent years is evidence of NATO’s desire to interfere and “internationalize Asia Pacific affairs” (Wang, 2017).

In addition to defence of the DPRK, China has demonstrated increased assertiveness regarding territorial and maritime claims, with Chinese fishermen illegally fishing in Korean waters, and killing a Korean coastguard in 2011 (Chair and Raghavan, 2015: 188). While fishing boat clashes may appear a civilian issue, armed fishing vessels have become an important tool for expanding China’s presence in disputed territories

(35)

35 boats rammed and sank a Korean coastguard ship after they were spotted illegally fishing in Korean waters (Volodzko, 2016). China displayed similar assertiveness

regarding its air defence. Shortly after Rasmussen’s visit to Seoul, China announced the establishment of an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the East China Sea, covering regions within ROK airspace, including the disputed island Ieodo (Kuo, 2013). The Chinese defence ministry stipulated any aircraft entering the zone must obey China’s rules or face defensive emergency measures (BBC, 2013). Interestingly,

following Stoltenberg’s visit to the ROK in November 2017, China flew two bombers, two fighter jets, and a reconnaissance plane over the disputed island of Ieodo and into the ROK’s ADIZ (Osbourne, 2017).

Thus, while the ROK has enhanced its relations with NATO, China’s foreign policy has simultaneously become increasingly assertive, with growing support for the DPRK regime, and increasingly willing to use confrontational means over territorial and maritime disputes. There are undoubtedly several causes for China’s assertiveness, including joint U.S.-ROK military exercises and the introduction of the U.S.’s Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD), an anti-ballistic missile defence system (Lee, 2017). However, any enhancement of U.S. presence within ROK would only heighten these concerns, and therefore it seems evident that as the ROK has begun to increase its interoperability with NATO, China has sought to respond to protect its interests as it continues to fear encirclement.

Japan

Perhaps of greater significance, Japan has additionally sought to enhance relations with NATO. A key powerful state in the Asia Pacific, Japan and China have held consistent rivalries due to historical animosities, territorial and maritime disputes, the U.S.-Japan military alliance, and China’s emergence as an economic and military superpower (Kokubun et al, 2017). Thus, any strengthening of ties by Japan with another U.S.-led alliance would evidently heighten fears of encirclement.

NATO-Japan Relations

Indeed, cooperation between NATO and Japan emerged in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War. Since 1990, NATO and Japan have enhanced political dialogue, holding joint security conferences, high-level security consultations and reciprocal

(36)

36 official visits (NATO, 2017c). In 2006, Taro Aso became the first Minister of Foreign Affairs for Japan to visit NATO headquarters. In an address to the NAC, Aso

welcomed NATO-Japan cooperation, and identified China as a key security concern, stating the need to “carefully watch transparency in its military build-up because of the possible implications to the East Asian security environment.” (Aso, 2006). The following year, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visited NATO, reiterating Japan’s concerns regarding China’s increased military expenditure and “continued lack of transparency”, urging the need for cooperation and dialogue with China to reduce tensions, and calling for “partners sharing fundamental values” to “enhance cooperation to this end” (Abe, 2007). In the same year, Japan observed NATO

military exercises Cooperative Longbow/Lancer in Albania to enhance interoperability of forces in crisis response and peacekeeping (NATO, 2007).

The NATO-Japan relations were enhanced in 2010 with the signing of a security agreement on information and material, with both parties agreeing to expand cooperation by exchanging sensitive information and material (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan, 2010). Subsequently, in April 2013, Rasmussen visited Japan and signed a joint political declaration with Japan, confirming both parties commitment to furthering cooperation (NATO, 2013). The following year, Abe once again visited NATO and addressed the NAC, drawing parallels with the Ukrainian crisis to East Asia, stating; “We will not tolerate any change of status quo through intimidation or coercion or force. This is not only applicable to Europe or Ukraine. This is applicable to East Asia and…the whole world.” (Abe, 2014b). At the same time, Rasmussen stipulated, “security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic and Asia Pacific regions cannot be treated separately”, declaring that NATO “will not hesitate to take further steps if necessary to ensure effective defence and protection of our allies” (Rasmussen, 2014).

These statements followed the finalised IPCP between NATO and Japan, which stipulated areas of cooperation would include cyber defence, humanitarian

assistance, maritime security, counterterrorism and conflict management, as well as a vague criteria of defence and security cooperation “of mutual interest between Japan and NATO” (Rasmussen and Abe, 2014). As a result, NATO and Japan held its first joint military exercise the same year, conducting counterpiracy drills in the Gulf of Aden (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan, 2014). In 2015, Japan participated in

The Impact of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Transformation on China