Targeting the Other: Explorative Study of Cumulative Extremism in the Netherlands

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Targeting the Other

Explorative Study of Cumulative Extremism in the Netherlands

Leiden University - Campus The Hague Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs

MSc in Crisis and Security Management

Master Thesis

Name: Sacha de Wolf

Student number: s2424185 Supervisor: Dr. Tahir Abbas

Second Reader: Dr. Yannick Veilleux-Lepage Word count: 16.363

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Abstract

This thesis entails an explorative study of the concept of cumulative extremism in the Dutch context. The combination of rising right-wing extremism and the concerns about Salafist mosques has been the motivation to start this research. This thesis will look at the interaction between Pegida and the Salafist Muslim community in the Netherlands. The aim of this thesis is to get an understanding of the interaction between two opposing groups, and to get a grip on people’s motivations for supporting one of the groups. By doing qualitative research, based on ethnographic elite interviews and content analysis, the researcher attempts to answer the question; to what extent does the process of cumulative extremism influences the support for extremist groups in the Netherlands?

The findings show that it is, first of all, hard to label these groups as extreme. They are extreme in their thoughts and sayings but not in their actions. Secondly, the findings show that in the Netherlands so far, only two violent events happened as result of an encounter between these two groups. Therefore, the idea of a spiral of violence; when a situation gets worse and worse, is not applicable within the Dutch context. Overall, the researcher concludes that there is no reason to believe that the Netherlands is dealing with forms of cumulative extremism. Nevertheless, there are some serious concerns within Dutch society. A polarizing climate is growing and groups such as Pegida and the Salafist Muslim community respond to that. In the end, this lead us to an increasing field of tension, in which it is hard to foresee what will happen. There may be no fear for cumulative extremism, but for the Dutch more relevant, we should be aware of cumulative polarization.

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Acknowledgements

In front of you lies a thesis shaped by my curiosity for the co-existence of different, whether or not, opposing groups in society. How do people from different groups live together, and more important why can they not live together. What are the security implications coming out of this? And does it pose a threat to Dutch Society? These questions came to mind when starting to think about my thesis subject. I was quite sure that I did not want to follow the majority and write about the booming world of cybersecurity, because as an anthropologist my interest lays more with the people.

When studying such a sensitive topic as extremist and polarization, it is hard to find people willing to talk. Therefore, I want to thank my participants for their stories and their courage to open up and involve me in their situation. I admire their perseverance to fight for their thoughts and beliefs. Secondly, a big thanks to my supervisor Dr. Tahir Abbas. Since the beginning of my CSM journey I really felt inspired by him. Within different courses he encouraged my curiosity to look at the field of crisis and security management from a more social perspective. His - sometimes chaotic - but overall positive attitude gave me a lot of inspiration to write this thesis. Finally, I want to thank my loved ones, whose unconditional support brought me to where I am now.

This thesis brings me to an end of my academic journey. A journey that took me seven years. A journey where I switched studies four times, but eventually ended up with a bachelor’s degree in Cultural Anthropology and a master’s degree in Crisis and Security Management. A good combination for entering the work field, if you ask me. But overall, a journey that was not always that easy for me. With all the additional setbacks and highlights, I am proud to submit this master thesis and in doing so end my academic journey and start exploring what is out there.

Sacha de Wolf

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§1: Introduction

“Reviving right-wing extremism puts the Netherlands under pressure” headlines an article in Dutch Newspaper De Volkskrant on November 5th, 2018.1 The article summarizes the findings

of a new report by the Dutch National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (NCTV). According to the NCTV, renewal of ideological thoughts, use of new internet possibilities and the increasing polarization in Western Europe have given the right-wing extremist movement a boost (NCTV 2018: 34). The refugee crisis and the long living grievances about Islam and Jihadism form a catalyst for right-wing extremist violence. In some countries, a violent reaction already followed the series of jihadist attacks in Western countries. Such as the attack in Christchurch, New Zealand killing 49 people.2

The Netherlands also experienced a rise of right-wing anti-Islam populism as a result of 9/11 and the murders of Dutch politician Pim Fortuyn in 20002 and filmmaker Theo van Gogh in 2004. These developments lead to a scenario where the Islam and especially the Salafi movement is problematized and categorized as the ultimate “other” (De Koning 2013: 72). Beliefs, practices and public manifestations of Islam are perceived as a threat to national security, social cohesion and national identity. This process is called; the securitization of Islam, based on the assumption that religion should only be expressed within the private sphere and on the idea that migrants pose a threat to the homogenizing of the nation-state (Cesari 2012; De Koning 2019). For the national security agenda, it is important to keep an eye on the increase of right-wing extremism, since it could potentially pose a threat to endanger the social and political stability and therewith the physical safety of the Dutch (NCTV 2018: 35). This thesis will address questions about the topic of right-wing extremism in the Netherlands, such as; what are the reasons for the revival of right-wing extremism? Where does this comes from? What are the indicators? And why did it happen now?

Simultaneously to the rise of right-wing extremism, Europe has faced an upheaval of Islamist extremism in the last couple of years, with the establishment of the Islamic State in Syria and the beginning of the terrorist organization ISIS. In 2014 the organization proclaimed their worldwide Caliphate, and provided a political and religious vision on a global scale (Marsili 2016: 86). The institution of ISIS has global ramifications, resulting in supporters of

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https://www.volkskrant.nl/nieuws-achtergrond/nctv-oplevend-rechts-extremisme-zet-nederland-onder-druk~bf07da8f/(Accessed on May 13th, 2019).

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the extreme Islamist ideology all over the world, including the Netherlands. According to the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD), the jihadist movement in the Netherlands has approximately 500 supporters.3 This shows that, jihadism in the Netherlands

does not seem to be very threatening. However, there is a growing concern about Salafist mosques in the Netherlands. According to Pall and De Koning (2017), Salafism has become a strong Islamic trend which has established itself in many European countries over the last 30 years (Pall & De Koning 2017: 76). In some countries Salafism represents a strong alternative for Muslims in Western European countries. Another headline, this time by the NOS, states; “Major concerns in Parliament after investigation Salafist mosque schools” on September 10th,

2019.4 The article summarizes the finding of a research commissioned by Dutch news program

Nieuwsuur and newspaper NRC Handelsblad. The report mentions that children at Salafist

mosque schools learn that people with a different religion or belief deserve the death penalty. In doing so, they turn away from Dutch society and the according principles of equality and freedom. This idea was confirmed by a report of research institute Verwey-Jonker, who commissioned a research on the alFitrah mosque in Utrecht. The report states that the message of the mosque is fundamentalist and propagated in an authoritarian and sometimes intimidating manner. The researchers conclude that the negative influences overshadow the positive influences. On macro level, the researchers foresee a risk for the social cohesion and the core institutes of Dutch society. They state that alFitrah could contribute to the movement of participants to the extremist side of Salafism (Hamdi, Pels, Day & Achahcah 2019: 4). Even though, this report gained a lot of critic by Dutch media it does give an insight in what is happening within some Salafist mosques.

Next to that there is also a growing concern by Dutch government on financial support from the Gulf States for Dutch mosques. According to the same research by Dutch news program Nieuwsuur and newspaper NRC Handelsblad, at least thirty Islamic organization in the Netherlands have applied and got funding from the Gulf States, which entails millions of euros from among others Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. This funding is seen as controversial

3https://www.aivd.nl/onderwerpen/terrorisme/dreiging/jihadistische-beweging-in-nederland (Accessed on May

13th, 2019).

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because of the concern that in this way, the fundamentalist variant of Islam, Salafism, is being exported into Dutch mosques.5

The co-existence of these two movements (right-wing extremism and Islamist extremism) already posed a security threat to different European countries such as the United Kingdom, where the rise of right-wing extremism shifted the cohesion in society to a more tensioned and conflicting coherence. The rise and co-existence of right-wing extremism and Islamist extremism leads us to questions on cumulative extremism or reciprocal radicalization6.

The idea of cumulative extremism entails “the way in which one form of extremism can feed

off and magnify other forms” (Eatwell 2006: 205). The concept has been researched a lot within the British context but is not further investigated in other European countries such as the Netherlands. The observation of two already existing and growing extreme groups within the Netherlands and the blurry conceptual definition of cumulative extremism form the basis of this master thesis.

Research Question(s)

The section above shows the puzzle that needs to be solved. There is a growing need for more research on the concept of cumulative extremism and especially in contexts outside the United Kingdom. Therefore, this master thesis entails an explorative study of cumulative extremism in the Dutch context. It will examine whether or not we can speak of cumulative extremism in the Netherlands, and if, and in what way two extremist groups feed each other. The two groups examined in this thesis are Pegida Nederland and the Salafist Muslim community in the Netherlands. The following research question is used; to what extent does the process of

cumulative extremism influences the support for extremist groups in the Netherlands?

To operationalize this research question, it is divided into three sub questions. The first question looks at the interaction of the two groups; to what extent are the two groups (Pegida

& Salafist Muslims) interacting with each other in Dutch context? This question will be

answered by an extensive content analysis, focused on the moments were these two groups came face to face with each other, for example during Pegida demonstrations. Next to that, to study cumulative extremism it is important to look at people’s opinions, feelings and attitude towards their own group and the ‘other’ group. This will be done by answering the following

5https://nos.nl/nieuwsuur/artikel/2252179-onderzoek-naar-financiering-moskeeen-het-drieluik.html (Accessed

on December 4th, 2019).

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questions; on what basis are people dedicating themselves to an extremist group? and what

are people’s opinions/attitudes/feelings towards the ‘other’ group? For answering these

questions, the researcher will use qualitative data obtained through elite interviews. If it can be established that processes of cumulative extremism do indeed emerge between these two groups, then it is also necessary to gain an understanding of how they develop. This will be done by asking questions as; why do some interactions lead to an increase in violence, and others not? And are opposing groups both likely to become radicalized at a similar pace? (Carter 2017: 38).

Academic and Societal Relevance

On an academic level, this thesis provides new empirical data on the concept of cumulative extremism in the Dutch context. Multiple scholars mentioned that the concept is unusable, since it always remains vague and misses empirical data (Busher & Macklin 2015; Carter, 2017). Authors Eatwell and Goodwin state that cumulative extremism could be “more threatening to the liberal democratic order than attacks from lone wolf extreme right-wingers or even al-Qaida-inspired spectacular bombings” and therefore needs further research (Eatwell & Goodwin 2010: 243). According to Julia Ebner, the parallel between far-right and Islamist extremist have been repeatedly explored, but little research is done on their interaction (Ebner 2017: 11). Given the fact that cumulative extremism could potentially pose a new security threat for Western governments and has not been empirically researched within the Dutch context yet, it is important to gain a better understanding of the concept and under what kind of circumstances it develops. Providing new data on the concept, enables the researcher to contribute to enhancing the conceptual clarity of cumulative extremism, and herewith prevent the term from becoming useless.

On a societal level, this research is important because there already are examples of cumulative extremism in the United Kingdom, Germany and Belgium but it has not been determined in the Netherlands yet. Over the last ten years the idea of cumulative extremism has gained more attention as a result of far-right groups and Islamic extremists taking centre stage (Carter 2017: 37). Given the growing polarizing climate and expressed concerns by the Dutch intelligence services and government, more empirical research into this field is highly relevant. Even though, problems such as terrorism, radicalization and extremism may not pose a huge security threat to the Netherlands, there certainly is a huge social concern among politicians and the Dutch population around these problems. The absence of successfully violent attacks (so far) does not mean that the problem is not there. Determining under what

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circumstances cumulative extremism occurs can be very useful for preventing it to become a serious security threat to Dutch society in the future.

Readers guide

In the following chapters an attempt will be made to answer the research questions and to get an understanding of the interaction between the two groups. In the next chapter, relevant literature on the concepts of extremism, radicalization and us-versus-them rhetoric will be discussed. It will explain the difference between these concepts and includes nuances which make these concepts applicable on the case. Then, in the third chapter, the methodology of this research will be presented. The chosen research design, methods and operationalisation of the concepts will be discussed. In chapter four, the first sub question; to what extent are the two groups (Pegida & Salafist Muslims) interacting with each other in Dutch context? will be discussed based on an extensive content analysis. It will provide the reader with a detailed description of the scene and the two groups in the Netherlands. Chapter five entails the data retrieved from the elite interviews. It will give an answer to the sub questions on what basis are people dedicating themselves to an extremist group? and what are people’s opinions/attitudes/feelings towards the ‘other’ group? The last part of this thesis ends with

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§2: Literature and Concepts

In this chapter, the body of knowledge on cumulative extremism is presented. Beginning with stating that the concept of cumulative extremism is often used interchangeably with terms as reciprocal radicalization or tit-for-that radicalization, therefore it is really important to present a clear overview of all these terms and the way in which they relate to each other.

2.1 Cumulative Extremism

The concept of cumulative extremism founds it origin in the United Kingdom around the year of 2006. It touches upon general theories about othering, social movements, political violence, radicalization and terrorism. Author Roger Eatwell (2006) was the first to describe the concept of cumulative extremism as; “the way in which one form of extremism can feed off and magnify other forms” (Eatwell 2006: 205). Eatwell observed changing community cohesion and the rise of ethnic extremism in Britain (ibid.). He poses the concept to understand the rise of the extreme right-wing ideology and describes the rise of the British National Party and their populist counterparts such as the French Front National. According to Eatwell, these parties could rise as a result of the feeling that Britain had become a ‘foreign country’ and that there is a desire to act tougher against Muslims (ibid.). Cumulative extremism therefore can pose a threat to civil society and liberal democracy. Eatwell poses the question; “how different forms of extremism are constructed in discourse by other extremist and how they relate in the more concrete world” (ibid.: 213). He looks at how the interaction between two extremist groups such as Islamist extremism and right-wing extremism could differ, and concludes that the general pattern is one where both groups are fuelling each other rather than understand each other. Overall, cumulative extremism could be seen as a clash of cultures and is about targeting the other as the public enemy (ibid.: 214).

An important aspect of cumulative extremism is the question whether or not interaction between two groups can lead to violence. According to Alexander James Carter (2017), cumulative extremism at core is concerned with “how the confrontational relationship between opposing social groups can radicalize those involved, possibly resulting in ‘spirals of violence’ and causing wider trends of social polarization” (Carter 2017: 37). Examples from the United Kingdom have shown that the clash between two groups can indeed lead to violence, as the process of radicalisation of the side of both far-right and Islamist extremis has accelerated and entered in a spiralling violence effect. In which one side’s action increasingly leads to a retaliatory reaction from the other side (Ebner 2017: 152). Literature has shown that there is a

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pressing need for research that focuses on where and why escalation does take place (Carter 2017: 37). If it will not be analysed why these interaction sometimes lead to violence and sometimes not, it is likely that the concept of cumulative extremism will become a “blunt analytical instrument” (Busher & Macklin 2015: 856).

Another way of defining this kind of (opposing) group interaction comes from Bailey and Edwards (2017). They propose rethinking the term radicalisation, and define it in a more holistic way; ‘changes in beliefs, feeling and behaviour in the direction of increased support for a political conflict and accepting its implication that radicalisation is a normal part of human life’ (Bailey & Edwards 2017: 256), they state that radicalisation therewith is not always bad. Their conceptualisation allows us to examine how small conflicts escalate through a process that they call reciprocal radicalisation; ‘in which individual or groups move towards conflict in respond to the movement of others, which can occur at all levels and not just within those conflicts characterised by ‘extremist groups’.’ (ibid.: 257). The authors state that we need to focus less on cumulative extremism but more on the broader term of reciprocal radicalisation. This entails similar forms at each side, in a way that they reinforce each other (ibid.: 273). An interesting characteristic of reciprocal radicalization and applicable on the Dutch context is that it can be driven by perceived injustices arising from differential assessments of threat in which the state has an important role. Similar activities by different groups are being treated differently by the state. When for example a demonstration of one group is restricted and from another group not. There is a difference in the response from society and the state, in terms of the level of condemnation and activity to prevent, which bring people from both groups further radicalized (ibid.: 274).

Enhancing Conceptual Clarity

Cumulative extremism is a relatively new field of study and according to different academics, the concept could use some clarifications, for it to become a useful addition to academic and social debates on extremism (ibid.: 884).More work on the concept of cumulative extremism is done by Joel Busher and Graham Macklin (2015). The authors support the argument of Eatwell; “the interactional dynamics between opposing groups require greater and more detailed attention if we are to better understand the ebb and flow of “extremist” mobilization both in the UK and elsewhere” (Busher & Macklin 2015: 885). Busher & Macklin stress that two particular issues require urgent attention. First, there is a need for a more precise conceptual definition. The current lack of a clear definition increases the chance that academics, policy-makers and practitioners misuse the concept. Secondly, the absence of a concrete effort to

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explain why movement-countermovement interactions between opposing extremist groups can have different trajectories (ibid.). Applying the theory of cumulative extremism on the Dutch case, could contribute to enhancing the conceptual clarity.

Jamie Bartlett and Jonathan Birdwell (2013) also did a review on the concept of cumulative extremism in the British context. They tested four assumptions and made suggestion for further research to increase the practical value of the concept for policy making (Bartlett & Birdwell 2013: 3). The first assumption they propose is the ‘recruiting sergeant’ argument, which entails the idea that activities of one group will result in an increase in the support for the other group (ibid.: 5). The second assumption is the ‘spiralling of violence’ argument, which means that the activities of one group will trigger a violent revenge from the other group (ibid.: 7). In this scenario, the motivations of those already involved can become more radical and as a result more violent. The third assumption is the ‘they both need each other’ argument, cumulative extremism contains the idea of a symbiotic relationship. “The structure, size, and inclination to violence of each group depends on the existence and actions of the ‘other’” (ibid.: 9). The final assumption the authors propose is the ‘they are both as bad as each other’ argument, in this way tackling extremism on one side, requires tackling extremism on the other side (ibid.: 10). Extremist groups therefore should be analysed according to the same measures. The assumptions proposed by Bartlett and Birdwell are very helpful in analysing the process of cumulative extremism between the Islamist extremist group and right-wing extremists. More research needs to be done to explore the different ways of support. Investigating what the different arguments for supporting both groups are, will contribute to answering the main question of this thesis; to what extent does the process of cumulative extremism influences the support for extremist groups in the Netherlands?

2.2 Extremism versus Radicalization

As mentioned before, terms as extremism and radicalization are often used interchangeably. To get the best understanding of the process of cumulative extremism, it is important to make a clear division between these two terms. Important work on this distinction is done by Alex Schmid (2013). According to Schmid both concepts can “be described in terms of distance from moderate, mainstream or status quo positions” but a further differentiation is needed (Schmid 2013: 8). He states that extremists “strive to create a homogenous society based on rigid, dogmatic ideological tenets; they seek to make society conformist by suppressing all opposition and subjugating minorities”. The state of mind of extremists would not tolerate

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diversity. They tend to have inflexible ‘closed-minds’, which allows them to make a simplified mono-causal interpretation of the world, “where you are either with them or against them” (ibid.: 10). Schmid indicates different elements of political programs of extremist groups, these can be helpful in analysing the subjects of study in this thesis. The elements are the following;

o Anti-constitutional, anti-democratic, anti-pluralist, authorial;

o Fanatical, intolerant, non-compromising, single-minded black-or-white thinkers; o Rejecting the rule of law while adhering to an ends-justify-means philosophy;

o Aiming to realize their goals by any means, including, when the opportunity offers itself, the use of massive political violence against opponents (ibid.: 9);

Next to that, on their paths to realizing their political programs extremists prefer; o Use of force/violence over persuasion;

o Uniformity over diversity;

o Collective goals over individual freedom; o Giving orders over dialogue (ibid.).

Their inflexible and closed minds distinguishes extremist from radicals. Who, according to Schmid, historically tend to be more open to rationality and who accept diversity. So in sum, the most important difference between extremism and radicalisation is the difference in their extent of being flexible. Schmid concludes that; “it makes sense to distinguish between (open-minded) radicals and (closed-mind) extremists (ibid.).

Other interesting definitions of extremism in line with this research comes from Julia Ebner and from the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD). According to Ebner extremists can be described as; “anyone who deliberately incites hatred and fears to exploits existing or provoked tensions for their political agenda” (Ebner 2017: 13). The AIVD describes extremism as; “the active pursuit and or support of profound changes in society that could endanger (the survival of) the democratic legal order, possibly with using undemocratic methods”. These undemocratic methods can be violent or violent and examples of non-violent undemocratic methods are systematic hate speech, dissemination of fear, dissemination of disinformation and intimidating other people (AIVD 2018: 4).

How Like Minds Unite and Divide?

More extensive work on extremism is done by Cass R. Sunstein (2009). In his book Going To Extremes. How Like Minds Unite and Divide? Sunstein offers interesting insights into why and

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when people start moving towards extremism. According to Sunstein, political extremism is a product of group polarization and there are three explanations for polarization; the spread of new information, increased confidence and social comparison (Sunstein 2009: 26).

First of all, talking to other people with the same ‘extreme’ opinion catalyses extremism. According to Sunstein, key to extremism is the exchange of new information. Group polarization arises after people start telling each other what they know in a predictable direction (Sunstein 2009: 21). Secondly, it has been shown that people’s opinion became more extreme, simply because their initial views have been confirmed and they became more confident after learning of shared views from others (ibid.: 23). Third, polarization can be seen as an effect of social comparison, which begins with the claim that people want to be perceived favourably by other group members. Social networks operate as a polarization machine since they help to confirm people’s antecedent views (ibid.: 24). Sunstein describes this process of polarization as; “from corroboration to confidence and from confidence to extremism”. When people start out at an extreme point and are placed in a group of like-minded people, they are likely to get especially far in the direction towards which they started (ibid.: 40).

2.2 “Us” versus “Them”

Another approach for looking at the interaction between Islamist extremism and right-wing extremism in the Netherlands is by using theories on polarization and us-versus-them rhetoric. Authors Esteban and Ray describe polarization as “a population of individuals that may be grouped according to some vector of characteristics into clusters, such that each cluster is similar in terms of the attributes of its members, but different clusters have members with very dissimilar attributes” (Esteban & Ray 1994: 819). They state that polarization is closely related to the era of social tensions, the possibilities of revolution and to the existence of social unrest in general. They discuss basic features of polarization as that there must be a high degree of homogeneity within each group and there must be a high degree of heterogeneity across groups (ibid.: 824). Interesting work on polarization in Dutch society and politics is done by Annemarije Oosterwaal. She describes the growing polarization in the Netherlands and the fact that a systematic measurement of polarization is missing thus far. She states that polarization characterizes a conflict in which there are two groups of opinions that are directly opposite each other. She makes a division between social polarisation and political polarization and states that a high rate of polarization in society increases the chance of rebellions and social unrest (Oosterwaal 2009: 370).

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Polarization can lead to ideas of “us” versus “them” rhetoric and othering. These ideas are based on the conscious or unconscious assumption that a certain identified groups poses a threat to the favoured groups. This can be explained according to the social identity theory of Henri Tajfel and John Turner. They introduce the concept of a social identity as a way to explain intergroup behaviour. Their basic hypothesis, is that pressure to evaluate one’s own group positively through in-group/out-group comparisons lead social groups to attempt to differentiate themselves from each other (Tajfel & Turner 1986: 284).

2.4 The Vicious Circle of Islamist and Far-Right Extremism

Extensive work on the dynamics between far-right and Islamist extremist is done by Julia Ebner. In her book The Rage, Ebner explores the interaction between the ‘new’ far-right and Islamist extremist and considers the consequences for the global terrorism threat. According to Ebner the extremes are increasingly feeding off and escalating each other, which effective creates a vicious circle which we need to interrupt. She argues that the narratives of both extremists complement each other perfectly (Ebner 2017: 12). She describes how the rhetoric and modus operandi of the extreme right English Defence League (EDL) and Islamist extremist group Hizb-ut-Tahrir are strikingly similar. They both feel under attack in their collective identity and dignity, they both accuse the other side of lacking respect for their women and finally, they share a call for action against the corrupt or incompetent politicians and the rigged media (ibid.: 10). Where EDL fights against the Islamisation of the West, Hizb-ut-Tahrir fights against the Westernisation of Islam. Ebner describes it as two sides of the same coin.

Ebner introduces the “leaning tower of Jenga” as an interesting metaphor to describe the current situation between far-right and Islamist extremism. She states that the world we live in today is more divided than ever before, she mentions examples such as left and right, Muslim and non-Muslim or Remain and Leave camps, but overall an increasingly divided and xenophobic Europe. She states that the current political situation in Europe can be compared to one of the final rounds in a Jenga game “where the tower is already leaning so badly that removing one more block will most likely lead to its collapse” (ibid.: 16). Building bricks such as international consensus, economic integration and the presence of a strong political centre aimed at providing a stable foundation have already been removed.

Next to that Ebner provides a success recipe of extremist stories that include five basic ingredients. First of all, simplicity. Extremists provide an answer to people’s desires for simplicity within the immense complex global environments we live in today. Secondly,

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consistency. Consistency in the narrative itself and between the narration and action. Thirdly, responsiveness. Which includes responding to the population’s grievances and desires. Fourthly, identification. The most straightforward way of appealing to an audience is by evoking empathy for the protagonist and their supporters. This can be done by victimisation of the “us” and the demonization of the “other”. The final ingredient of extremist stories is inspirations, which entails stories about creating the desire to resolve a real or perceived conflict between protagonists and antagonists (ibid.: 23-28). These five ingredients can be useful in analysing the groups examined in this research and to figure out to what extent we could say that Pegida and the Salafist Muslim community indeed are extremist groups.

Ebner states that if we do not interrupt, the war between far-right and Islamist extremist will eventually turn into a war between the West and Islam. She states that we need to reduce the societies overall vulnerability, since extremism is about grievances and ideologies and the two opposing groups reinforce each other’s grievances (ibid.: 197). It is important to challenge the worldviews from both sides and to create a stronger sense of collective identity that reunites rather than divides society.

To fully grasp the process of cumulative extremism between the two groups studied in this thesis, it important to fully understand both movements. Therefore, in the section below literature on both Salafism and extreme right-wing will be presented.

2.5 Salafism

When writing about Salafism it is important to pay attention to the complexity of the concept and its nuances. Writing about Salafism can be very hard since there is no universal agreed definition of the concept, people from different angles interpret the concept in different ways. A good starting point when studying Salafism comes from Quintan Wiktorowicz, who states that all Salafi’s share “a puritanical approach to the religion intended to eschew religious innovation by strictly replicating the model of the Prophet Muhammad” (Wiktorowicz 2005: 207). Next to that Wiktorowicz, states that there are three different subgroups within the Salafi community; purists, politicos and jihadis. Purists are, as the name suggests, mainly concerned with maintaining the purity of Islam as outlined in the Qur’an and the Sunna. People in this group believe that the primary emphasis should be promoting the Salafi creed and combatting deviant practices. Following the example of the Prophet, who fought polytheism, human desire and human reason (ibid.: 217). The second group; politicos, are more politically minded Salafi scholars, who argue that they have a better understanding of contemporary issues. They are

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highly critical of the current regimes (ibid.: 221). The final and most ‘dangerous’ category of Salafism are the jihadis. People in this group support the use of violence to establish Islamic states. These three categories show how diverse the Salafi community is and stress the importance of being nuanced when talking about this community. Wiktorowicz concludes that the anatomy of the Salafi movement and its internal divisions are based on differences over contextual interpretation and analysis rather than belief.

Extensive work on Salafism in Dutch context is done by Martijn de Koning. Among other things, he writes about experiences of Muslims within the Salafi movement. Together with colleague Zoltan Pall (2017) they define Salafism as; “a global Islamic trend comprising scholars, preachers and lay people who aim to revitalize Islam based upon their utopian perceptions of how the Prophet Muhammad and the first Muslims led their lives” (Pall & De Koning 2017: 78). Muslims within this group are being taught to live according to the idealized vision, based on a literal interpretation of the foundational texts of Islam, Qur’an, “the only way to lead a pure and authentic life, and to inherit paradise, is to return to the days of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions and emulate their religious practices and morality” (ibid.). According to the authors, the Salafi movement gained a strong presence in the Netherlands since 1985, when they developed a movement focusing on purity, personal authenticity and social relevance (ibid.: 92).

More work by the De Koning (2013) stresses that an important part of activities of the Dutch Salafi movement is establishing “a good, harmonious and united moral community by convincing and educating Muslims to share a common life and a common vision, and in the practices that constitute a good life” (De Koning 2013: 73). An interesting finding by De Koning is that Muslim sometimes refuse to call themselves a Salafist because the terms is often equated with labels such as violence, terrorism and Al-Qaeda (ibid.: 76). According to De Koning (2019), the Dutch debate on Salafism cannot be understood without considering the Dutch Islam debates in which Salafism often appear as the example of ‘radical Islam’. These debates have been so omnipresent, that is it difficult to avoid politics of identity, Islamophobia and stigmatization (De Koning 2019: 75).

Another extensive study of the Salafist community in the Netherlands is done by Roex, van Stiphout and Tillie (2010). They collected data for their study in three ways; fieldwork in the Salafist community in The Netherlands, a network analysis of Salafist organization and a survey among Dutch Muslims studying their degree of orthodox Islamic thought. They define the core of Salafist thought as; “aiming at a moral revival by interpreting the Koran and Sunna in a strict way. The religious sources have to be freed from al innovations and every decision

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in daily life has to be legitimized by the religious sources” (Roex, van Stiphout & Tillie 2010: vi).

The Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) follows the definition of Salafism posed by Wiktorowicz. They divide Salafism in the categories a-political, political and jihadis (AIVD & NCTV 2015: 5). First of all, a-political Salafism is characterized by an aversion to chaos, division and revolution and emphasizes personal religious life and the seclusion of non-Muslim society. This sub division aims to reach the ‘Pure-Islamic society’ primarily through dawa (preaching) and by giving the good example. The second sub category is political Salafism, which promotes greater social involvement and has a stronger political commitment. This sub division actively focuses on achieving its religious inspired political and social goals, also by doing dawa. The final and most extreme sub category is Jihadi-Salafism. This sub division is characterized by the denouncing of non-believers and the approval of the use of force. It is important to stress the division between the Jihadi-Salafism on the one hand, which approves use of violence and a-political and political Salafism on the other hand, which disapproves use of violence (ibid.).

2.6 Right-Wing Extremism

Right-Wing extremism is also a contested concept within academic literature. Author Elisabeth Carter states that there are some conflicting thoughts about the existence of a unified definition of right-wing extremism. On the one hand she states that there are frequent warnings about the lack of an unequivocal definition. On the other hand, she states that there is a high degree of consensus amongst the definitions by different scholars (Carter 2018: 157). Carter explains that the consensus is based on five characteristics that are common and dominating in all definitions of right-wing extremism. First of all, authoritarianism. Which entails ‘the belief in a strictly ordered society’ and where violations of authority need to be punished (ibid.: 162). Secondly nationalism, which Carter describes as the idea that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (ibid.: 164). Thirdly racism, the belief in ‘natural and hereditary differences between races’ and the thought that one race is superior to others. Fourthly, xenophobia, described as ‘fear, hate or hostility regarding foreigners’ (ibid). The final common characteristic of right-wing extremism is anti-democracy, which entails ‘a rejection of the fundamental equality of the citizen’ (ibid.: 165).

“A spectre is haunting Europe”. Ulrike Vieten and Scott Poynting (2016) did research on far-right racist populism in Europe and state that it is not the first time that right-wing racist

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movement are on the march across Europe (Vieten & Poynting 2016: 533). They state that nationalist, anti-immigrant and Islamophobia movements are on the rise. Some examples of right-wing (political) parties are the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), National Front in France, the protest of Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the Occident (PEGIDA) in Germany and beyond and the Party for Freedom (PVV) in the Netherlands (ibid.). According to Vieten and Poynting, history tells us that economic crisis with casualties of restructurings provide conditions in favour of growing right-wing populism using important strategies such as ‘othering’ and blaming of out-groups (ibid.: 534).

The Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) describes right-wing extremism in the Netherlands as a “phenomenon in motion”. They describe how the right-wing extremist movement previously has been dominated by neo-Nazi, fascist and anti-Semitic sentiments but that now, the anti-Islam position can be seen as the most important motive. This happened as a consequence of two events; proclaiming of the Caliphate by ISIS and the increasing refugee flow. This anti-Islam idea often comes in combination with ideas about national identity, which includes for example the annual discussion about ‘Zwarte Piet’ (AIVD 2018: 7). People with right-wing sentiments feel that their identity is being threatened by the arrival of foreigners and therefore take extremist stands. Pegida, the right-wing movement this research is touching upon, can be seen as a ‘hybrid form of a populist right-movement’, since they connect different non-traditional streams of activism from the radical right (Schmidt 2017: 105). According to Schmidt, this type of populism emerged in the gap between conservative and right-wing voters. Some main findings of research on Pegida showed a differentiation in main motivation for participants, political profile, attitudes towards migrants, the dissatisfaction with the national government or other political decision-makers (ibid.: 107). Overall, Pegida exists of a differentiation of activists on basis of their political profile and attitudes towards migrants.

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§3: Methodology

This thesis entails an explorative study of the concept of cumulative extremism in the Dutch context. According to Stebbins (2011), an explorative design is chosen when little or no knowledge is available about groups, processes, activities, or situations, but nevertheless there are reasons to believe it contains interesting elements worth studying (Stebbins 2011: 5). Given the social and academic relevance of this subject, the subject of cumulative extremisms is definitely worth studying. The research question of this thesis is as follows; to what extent does the process of cumulative extremism influences the support for extremist groups in the Netherlands? The objective of this research is to test the theory of cumulative extremism, and see if it is applicable on the Dutch context. Cumulative extremism in the Netherlands will be measured by looking at the motivations and beliefs for supporting two opposing groups. On the one hand, the researcher will look at the support for Pegida, a protest-movement of German origin, who is fighting Islam since, - in their opinion - Islam strives for dominance of society. On the other hand, the researcher will look at the Muslim community, and especially the Salafist movement in the area of Eindhoven7, since that is the place where clashes between the

two groups actually arose last summer. Answering the research question will be done by a multi-method approach of qualitative data collection. This is based on the researcher’s interest into the motivations and beliefs of those who are supporting an extremist group and the researcher’s background in anthropology and experience with doing fieldwork. Important about qualitative research is the “understanding of the social world through an examination of the interpretation of that world by its participants” (Bryman 2012: 380), which is the main aim of this research. An interpretive approach to social science is taken, by really trying to understand the phenomenon of cumulative extremism and to gain new insights in what is going on and why this is happening (Maxwell 2013: 8).

3.1 Research Methods

Due to the complexity and sensitiveness of the subject of extremism, it is necessary to gather data via different sources and methods. Therewith, within qualitative research it is best to look at issues such as cumulative extremism as an integrated and interacted whole (ibid.: 4). Therefore, a multi-method approach is taken. First of all, primary data will be collected by

7

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semi-structured elite interviews. Elite interviews are chosen because they provide data of higher quality by interviewing a small number of people. Since there is no clear definition of the concept ‘elite’ and the fact that it is multi interpretable within social science it is important to define these elites (Harvey 2011: 432). Elite respondents as used in this research are influential people that are involved in the interaction between Pegida and the Salafist Muslim community, such as Imams that spoke out on this topic, or people that involved themselves in this debate, such as members of the WEARE1 movement in Eindhoven, who protested against Pegida last summer. Semi-structured interviews were used to gain a better understanding of people’s motivations to support an extremist group. According to Julia Ebner, the first step in tackling extremism is to listen to extremist’ stories, which is best done from within (Ebner 2017: 1). The aim of this research method is to try and make sense of certain events and how this understanding influences the behaviour of the people (Maxwell 2013: 9). The interviewer will take on an ethnographic style of interviewing, aimed at trying to enter the world of the respondent (Leech 2002: 665). The researcher aims for at least five elite interviews. Given the difficulty of finding respondents who are willing to talk about the subject of extremism and their groups, the researcher will make use of a snowball sampling strategy. Which entails finding an individual gatekeeper who has the desired characteristics and uses his network to recruit similar participants. This is especially useful when dealing with a hard-to-reach population such as supporters of extremist groups (Sadler, Lee, Lim & Fullerton 2010: 370).

Next to doing elite interviews data will be gathered by doing fieldwork. Being in the field means talking, listening, observing and participating in a particular place (Stone Sunstein & Chiseri-Strater 2007: 1). Fieldwork will be done by participating in certain events, such as demonstrations of Pegida, going to the mosques and talk to the people available. The data retrieved from doing fieldwork and interviews will contribute to answering the sub questions; on what basis are people dedicating themselves to an extremist group? and what are people’s opinions/attitudes/feelings towards the ‘other’ group?

The second research method for this study entails an extensive qualitative content analysis of online and offline sources. Content analysis is defined as a systematic, replicable technique for compressing many words into fewer content categories based on explicit rules of coding. It can be used to describe the intellectual focus of an individual or group (Schmidt 2017: 108). This method is used as an addition to the interviews and allows the researcher to generate information about groups to which it is difficult to gain access (Bryman 2012: 305).

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This content analysis will be based on multiple sources of data, such as; a) official policy documents by the Dutch government on topics such as extremism, b) news articles about both groups or their interaction and c) social media posts (Twitter and Facebook) of (key) figures within both groups around specific events. A lot of recruitment and support for extremist groups is moving to online platforms. Therefore, it is interesting to study these platforms and how people express their feelings and beliefs online. This method will contribute to answering the sub question; to what extent are the two groups (Pegida & Salafist Islamist) interacting with each other in the Dutch context?

3.2 Limitations of the Research

Inherit to qualitative research is the attention to ethical questions (Maxwell 2013: 4). Given the sensibility and relevance of the topic of cumulative extremism it is necessary to pay attention to the limitations of this research. Concepts on extremism, radicalization and terrorism are currently hot topics within the broader academic field of crisis and security management and therefore hard to study (Schuurman & Eijkman 2013: 3). Difficulties could be experienced when gathering information and finding people who are willing to talk. The sensibility and unwillingness of participants to speak out on these subjects also influences the validity and therewith the integrity of the research’s conclusions. A high rate of social desirable answers is likely in this context, which means that respondents attempt to construct an answer that conform a socially acceptable model of belief or behaviour (Bryman 2012: 716). In terms of reliability it is important to use the same measures to investigate cumulative extremism in both extremist groups.

As a researcher it is important to be aware of these limitations when studying extremism. One of the biggest limitations of this research is the small number of respondents. This had to do with multiple reasons. First it was hard to find people willing to talk within both groups. My respondents told me that they have to fear their safety when talking in public. In the case of Pegida this was the reason why I only talked to one person. They told me that they need to be careful when speaking out since they are being threatened by people from different sides of the society. Secondly, time also played its role. Given the minimal time period we got for this research I was not able to find more people to talk to. Journalist and researcher Nikki Sterkenburg, told me that doing research on these groups takes years. You will first need to gain their trust, before they open up to you. I tried to overcome this limitation by adding an additional way of gathering data; doing content analysis. By using documents from within the

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group itself I tried to get a more detailed idea of what it means to be part of these groups. This leads me to the second limitation of my research; the problem of translation. When doing the content analysis on Salafism in the Netherlands I experienced some troubles with finding texts or speeches I could understand. Given the fact that I do not speak/read Arabic it sometimes was hard to find enough information. I tried to overcome this limitation by using all the available sources in Dutch or English and sometimes even used different translation mechanisms to unravel pieces of text.

Overall, in terms of doing qualitative research on these sensitive and socially relevant subjects it is important to reflect on your own attitude and biases as a researcher. When talking to people with an extremist opinion or view it is important to stay neutral and to not show your disagreement (when applicable). During my interviews I tried to be aware of my own role and attitude as a researcher. With keeping these limitations in mind, I tried to do a good job in contributing to the academic field with a valid, reliable and fair research on cumulative extremism in the Netherlands.

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§4: Detailed Description of the Scene

In the following section the results from the data collection will be discussed. A detailed description of the scene will be presented, based on an in-depth content analysis8 of available

documents, speeches and videos of both groups and how they interact within the Netherlands. As mentioned in the introduction I am mainly interested in the perception of the group and the situation by members of the groups itself, therefore I will describe these scenes by using internal documents from both groups. In doing so, this chapter focuses on the sub-question; to what extent are the two groups (Pegida & Salafist Muslims) interacting with each other in the Dutch context?

4.1 Setting the Scene I: Salafism in the Netherlands

The public opinion on Salafism in the Netherlands is that it is seen as a threat to Dutch liberal society. Some people fear Salafism since it would be in contrast with Dutch traditions, norms and values. There are concerns about Salafist mosques because it would learn young Muslims stories that are not in line with Dutch society and its principles of equality and freedom. But what does Salafism actually entail? In the following section the Salafist scene in the Netherlands will be described according to different sources (see table 1 for an overview), varying from (Islamic) news articles, YouTube clips and articles of the website of Al-Yaqeen, stating to be ‘one of the leading Da’wah institutes in the Netherlands, with the main purpose of informing, teaching, guiding and advising on Islam’.9

Table 1: Used Document for Content Analysis on Salafism in the Netherlands

# Content Type of Source Author

1 Defining Salafism Website Article Al-Yaqeen

2 Eminent Muslim figures talking about Salafism Clip De Nieuwe Maan

3 Report on Salafism in the Netherlands Report AIVD

4 Report on Salafism in the Netherlands Report Roex, Stiphout and Tillie

5 Report on 15 year of Salafism research in the Netherlands Report Verwey-Jonker Institute

Starting with some numbers about the scope of the Salafist community in the Netherlands. A 2018 research report by the Verwey-Jonker Institute states that there are currently two

8 See Annex 1 for the coding sheets.

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estimates available. They vary considerably from 20.000-30.000 Salafists in 2007 and 40.000-60.000 Salafists in 2010. A few years later, in 2015, the AIVD and NCTV stated that it is hard to give estimates because of the high amount of internal diversity (Berger, Kahmann, El Baroudi & Hamdi 2018: 4). Therewith, it is important to mention that studying Salafism means being very explicit about whom you are writing or talking. Salafism can be divided in different waves. An interesting way of dividing different structures of Salafism in the Netherlands comes from Roex, Stiphout and Tillie (2010). They state that there a three different organization levels of Salafism in the Netherlands;

I. Organizations with a Salafistic signature; these organizations explicitly and only profile themselves as Salafist. Such as the well-known As-Soennah mosque in The Hague of the Al-Fourqaan mosque in Eindhoven, the one which will be used in the example below.

II. Organizations with a strong Salafistic influence; these organization and mosques do not explicitly present themselves as Salafists, but do have an intensive connection with a first-level organization, due to lessons or readings by Salafi’s or because a Salafi has a lot of influence in the organization.

III. Organizations under marginal Salafistic influence; these organization occasionally host Salafist lectures or preachers and occasionally have Salafist visitors (Roex, Stiphout & Tillie 2010: 276).

Internal and External Discourse

When talking about Salafism in the Netherlands it could be useful to make a division between an internal and an external discourse. The internal discourse is about how the people within the community perceive Salafism. The external discourse is about how Salafism is perceived by the Dutch society and government. It is quite clear that Salafism is perceived differently from people within the group and people outside the group. People within the group perceive Salafism as an innocent way of practicing pure Islam, people outside the group see Salafism as a big threat to Dutch security and liberal democracy.

A good attempt to define Salafism from within can be done by following the work of Al-Yaqeen, a Da’wah institute, originated in 2003, which proclaims to be one of the most important online knowledge institutions in the Netherlands. According to Al-Yaqeen, the image of Salafism as it is now, is based on people’s thoughts and opinions and not on facts. To overcome a distorted image of Salafism, Al-Yaqeen states that it is important to judge Salafism

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on its content, and not on the behaviour of people who call themselves Salafists. Al-Yaqeen defines Salafism as following;

To be guided and inspired by the Quran and the Sunnah, supported by the explanation and stories of the devout pastors with an emphasis on the first three Muslim generations that have been crowned and purified by Allah and the Prophet.10

They state that Salafism is not a threat, but ‘an enrichment for society’. Since it is not in its nature to undertake activities that are contrary to public order and good morals. According to Al-Yaqeen, it is precisely Salafism that urges people to abide the laws and rules of the country in which they live. In which issues such as intolerance and hatred towards dissidents does not belong. Therewith, the interpretation of Salafism by Muslims itself is based on a normative image of Islam, which is shaped by their own positive experiences with practising Islam and the good people they practise Islam with.11

This interpretation of Salafism is very much in contrast with the external discourse on the movement. As mentioned in the introduction, Dutch society and government has growing concerns about the financial support for Salafist mosques and current Salafist mosque schools that come from the Gulf States. These concerns can be explained by the government’s unease with the close ties that these Salafist mosques or Imams have with their international counterparts. These ties are formed by, among others, the provision of teaching and recruitment material, financial support for Salafist foundations and mosques, the exchange of Imams and sheiks and the facilitation of religious study. A common thought is that events happening in the Middle East often directly affect the Salafist movement in Western countries (AIVD & NCTV 2015: 4). Other allegations against Salafism are that it would lead to intolerance against dissidents, tensions between groups in society and anti-democratic practices. As a result, a highly distorted image of Islam in general, and more particular of Salafism emerges. Muslims within this scene therefore mostly do not call themselves Salafists, but use the more general term of Islamists to overcome wrong connotations (Roex, Stiphout & Tillie 2010: 275).

10https://www.al-yaqeen.com/wie-zijn-wij/ (Accessed on December 1st, 2019). 11https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lPKByjP-ldM (Accessed on December 1st, 2019).

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Salafism: a threat to Dutch society?

Salafism is included in the “Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland” (Threat Assessment Terrorism the Netherlands, see figure 1) produced by the NCTV. According to the NCTV political Salafism can be seen as a threat to Dutch democratic society. Therefore, it is important to question to what extent Salafism does pose a security threat to Dutch society.

This question is hard to answer, since in my opinion the answer is two-folded. When interpreting Salafism in a literal way, and thus see it as a form of practicing the pure Islam, it does not pose a threat to Dutch society. In line with this thought, Al-Yaqeen states that the allegation that Salafism forms a breeding ground for radicalization is remarkable. According to Al-Yaqeen, until now, no evidence has been found to show that a terrorist attack or any form of violence has anything to do with Salafism. Some perpetrators of terrorist acts, mention to be Islam inspired, but according to Al-Yaqeen, these terrorists are often youngsters of other confused people that are not even practising Islam.

According to three eminent figures in the Dutch Salafist community12, there are

multiple steps to be made when going from Salafism to extremism or even terrorism. They mention that Muslims are individual people that differ and that it is a shame that they often are framed as one group that potentially could pose a security threat. They say that when a terrorist attack is presumed to be Islam inspired, people automatically frame it as Salafism and that in that process of framing, a lot of steps are missed out. Overall, it is important to keep in mind that the Salafist movement in the Netherlands is very dynamic and diverse. Salafism itself does not seem to pose a security threat to the Netherlands, but accusing the whole Salafist community as a problem, could potentially lead to misunderstanding and resistance among Muslims youngsters. This would lead them to be perceived as a problem and Islam as being problematized. Which eventually could lead to a (further) withdrawal into one’s own circle and a reduction in transparency and openness, which in turn encourages further polarization.

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4.2 Setting the Scene II: Pegida in the Netherlands

In the following part the scene of Pegida in the Netherlands will be described according to different sources (see table 2 for an overview), varying from internal sources such as their website, reports commissioned by the NCTV and clips where we see the leader of Pegida the Netherlands, Edwin Wagensveld.

Pegida, a German originated protest movement, gained momentum in the Netherlands since their first demonstration in Utrecht on October 11th, 2015.13 During this demonstration

multiple speakers addressed the problem of incoming refugees and their fight against the ‘Islamization of Europe’. Since that October in 2015, multiple demonstrations and other actions by Pegida followed. But what do they stand for and what kind of actions are they perpetrating? When looking at their website, Pegida describes their movement as following;

Pegida stands for ‘Patriotic Europeans against Islamization of the Evening Land’. Pegida was originally founded as a civil movement in October 2014 in Dresden, Germany. Following the example of Dresden, Pegida movements have also been established in Sweden, the United

13https://www.volkskrant.nl/nieuws-achtergrond/tien-aanhoudingen-bij-betoging-pegida-in-utrecht~b569ce99/

(Accessed on October 1st, 2019).

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Kingdom, Belgium, France, Canada and the Netherlands. Common characteristics are 1) Islam criticism, 2) Aversion to fascism and 3) Non-violent protest.14

Table 2: Used Document for Content Analysis of Pegida in the Netherlands

# Content Type of Source Author

1 Viewpoints Website Pegida

2 History of Origin Website Pegida

3 History of Origin Article Kafka

4 Program about Wagensveld and artist Tinkebell. Clip BNN

5 Report on the wave movements of right-wing extremist violence in Western Europe Report NCTV

6 Discussion between Wagensveld and Chair of Moroccan Mosques in NL Clip De Nieuwe Maan

The website of Pegida shows five different main themes in which they are active; I. Fighting Islamization of Europe

II. Retain democracy and therewith democratic values such as freedom of speech III. Preserve Dutch citizenship and preserve immigration

IV. Equality, fight against double standards

V. Cherish Dutch culture and their traditions such as ‘Zwarte Piet’

Given the fact that this research is focusing on the interaction between Pegida and the Salafist Muslim community, the first main theme Pegida is focusing on is the most relevant. Pegida states that they want to fight against the further Islamization of Europe. And they will do this by fighting for (among others) the following aspects;

o Stop the construction of mosques o Closure of Islamists schools

o Closure of mosques where (they assume) hatred is preached o Declare and dismantle sharia-courts

o Prohibition of wearing Islamic clothing or equipment in government and semi-government buildings such as schools, public transport, by the army and the police. o Overall prohibition of wearing a niqaab or burqa

o No subsidy or community money for Islamic purposes

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Pegida’s modus Operandi

Pegida aims to achieve these goals by holding provoking demonstrations or actions near mosques or other Islamic institutions. In the next part I will provide some examples of Pegida’s demonstrations or actions to get a better understanding of their message and their modus operandi. In general, these actions are aimed at provoking the Muslim community and to show the public and the media with what kind of Islam we are dealing. Since they think that the Islam is dangerous and that ‘we’ should not want that here.

I. Protesting at construction sites of Mosques

One of the things Pegida does, which is in line with their positions as mentioned before, is protesting at construction sites where future mosques are being build. Figure 2 below shows one of these actions. Pegida transformed this construction site in to a church with a cross, which was being ‘blessed’ by a ‘pastor’ with pig’s blood.15 Which is aimed at provoking the Muslim

community. Figure 3 below shows the place where a mosques was supposed to be build and where Pegida placed crosses. On these crosses are the names of the victims of Muslim terrorism in the cities of Brussel, London, Barcelona and Paris. According to Pegida, the Islam stands for hate and terror and this is their way of showing that.16

15https://nos.nl/nieuwsuur/artikel/2202649-politie-enschede-doet-onderzoek-naar-actie-pegida.html (Accessed

on December 4th, 2019).

16https://nos.nl/artikel/2221595-pegida-plaatst-kruizen-op-bouwgrond-moskee-enschede.html (Accessed on

December 4th, 2019).

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II. Pegida’s Ramadan Tour

Another action by Pegida was their attempt to organize BBQ’s near mosques during the Ramadan in the summer of 2019. Their plan was to roast pork meat next to the mosques to again provoke the Muslim community. They tried to hold a BBQ in multiple cities, under which Eindhoven and Utrecht. But in both cases the mayor refused their request for the demonstration. A few months later, Pegida front man Edwin Wagensveld, was arrested when wearing a pig beanie during a demonstration in Ede. Again he was doing this to provoke the media and the Muslim Community and to get the attention he needs to spread Pegida’s message.

Figure 3: Example 1 - Stop on the construction of mosques

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III. Pegida’s Provoking “Art”

Another way of Pegida in doing their actions and demonstrations is by placing provoking footage near mosques or other Islamic institutions. Two examples are given. Figure 5 shows a self- made doll Pegida has placed next to the As-Soennah mosque in the city of The Hague. The text on the banner reads; prophet Muhammed ‘child fucker’. Pegida did this because they were refused to hold a physical demonstration next to the As-Soennah mosque. They said to continue with this kind of actions as long as they get permission to do so.17

Figure 6 shows the action where Pegida went to the Abi Bakr Issidik mosque in Utrecht. They came to this mosque to show their self-made anti-Islam movie. This movie entails parts of violent and terrorist attacks by perpetrators who said to be Islam inspired. Pegida shows this movie because they consider Islam as a threat and state that it is a dangerous ideology. The demonstration itself went quit calm, but at the end the tensions arose and some Muslims youngsters started some disturbances, such as vandalism and lighting fireworks.18

17

https://www.volkskrant.nl/nieuws-achtergrond/pegida-plaatst-beledigend-spandoek-en-twee-poppen-voor-haagse-as-soennah-moskee~b8f51481/ (Accessed on December 4th, 2019).

18https://www.duic.nl/algemeen/massale-politiemacht-bij-protest-pegida-utrecht/ (Accessed on December 4th,

2019).

Targeting the Other: Explorative Study of Cumulative Extremism in the Netherlands