The Depoliticization of Dutch Planning
Legislation
A Critique on the Post-Political Characteristics of New Dutch Spatial
Development Legislation
Robbie Willems, student number: 11256710 robbie.willems@outlook.com
MSc Urban and Regional Planning June 11th 2018
Supervisor: prof. dr. Tuna Tasan-Kok Co-reader: prof. dr. Maria Kaika
2 The Depoliticization of Dutch Planning Legislation: A Critique on the Post-Political Characteristics New Dutch Spatial Development Legislation
Word count = total (17.251) – bibliography (1.811) = 15.450
Robbie Willems, student number: 11256710 robbie.willems@outlook.com
University of Amsterdam
MSc Urban and Regional Planning
Master Thesis (24 ECTS), catalogue number: 7354102004
Supervisor: prof. dr. Tuna Tasan-Kok Co-reader: prof. dr. Maria Kaika
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“The Omgevingswet requires a very different way of working and thinking for governments, citizens and businesses. Open, coherent, flexible, inviting and innovative are the key words. We want to achieve this through fewer and clearer rules, more room for initiatives and local customization, and by giving and asking for
trust. The aim of an initiative in the physical environment must be central to this, instead of the question 'is it allowed’?”
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a. Abstract
The 2008 financial crisis has sparked the wish to change Dutch legislation on the physical living environment. The current legislation is deemed inflexible, too complicated, fragmented, and incapable of accommodating economic growth. As such, the national government announced a complete system overhaul, accumulating into one new overarching, multidisciplinary law: the Omgevingswet. This act institutionalizes a ‘new’ way of participatory, multidisciplinary, flexible and initiative-oriented form of urban development. This thesis criticizes this form of techno-managerial planning for being post-political. It argues that the Omgevingswet suppresses antagonism through post-political planning strategies; the Omgevingswet favors heavily stage-managed ‘rational debate’ focused around win-win situations over dissensus, disagreement and antagonism. It does this suppression through the use of local consensus-building strategies, in which ‘fuzzy concepts’ are used to build consensus around, and in which ‘neutral’ expert reports are favored over political decisions.
However, while the Omgevingswet shows many post-political characteristics, local practices tell a different, more positive story. Based on an empirical study of three cases, this research argues that at the municipal and provincial level the Omgevingswet is used to finally put sustainability on the map, and to empower citizens in developing their own demands to government. As such, this research argues that while the planning strategies institutionalized in the Omgevingswet work depoliticizing on a national level, the same strategies are also used positively on a local level and are thus not necessarily post-political. As such, this questions our knowledge of localism in the context of post-politics.
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b. Acknowledgments
In case you are not my supervisor or second reader: welcome! I am glad you found this thesis. I sincerely hope that it is what you are looking for; may it be to find an introduction to post-politics, the Omgevingswet, or just general thesis-things.
In case you are my supervisor, prof. dr. Tuna Tasan-Kok, then I thank you; I thank you for our discussions, for making me feel respected and listened too, and for making time for me despite your full agenda. I did not only learn from our meetings, I also enjoyed them. Thank you for inspiring me. In case you are my second reader, prof. dr. Maria Kaika, then I thank you too for taking the time to read this thesis, I hope (and genuinely believe so myself) that it is adequate enough to warrant an invitation to my thesis defense.
I do not want to bother you, the reader, with too many (unnecessary) semantics. However, I do wish to take this moment to thank my fellow MURPees, as Lea calls us. Two years ago I set off, together with these 6 people, on a 2 year process. Today I am proud to say that I consider them friends for life. And hopefully, in a few weeks, I will be proud to say that we can all call ourselves alumni of the MSc Urban and Regional Planning programme at the University of Amsterdam.
My final step in this process appears before you; my master thesis.
All the best, Robbie Willems
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c. Table of contents
a. Abstract ... 5 b. Acknowledgments ... 6 c. Table of contents ... 7 1 Introduction ... 81.1 The Dutch context: New Spatial Development Legislation (Omgevingswet) . 9 1.2 Research question and structure ... 10
2 Post-politics as a form of depoliticization ... 12
2.1 Post-politics ... 13
2.2 Post-politics and planning ... 15
2.2.1 Transferring the political ... 15
2.2.2 Deferring the political ... 17
2.2.3 Displacing the political... 18
2.3 Post-politics; and then what? ... 18
3 Research design and methods ... 21
3.1 Argument and research design ... 21
3.2 Research approach ... 22
4 The Omgevingswet in practice ... 27
4.1 The Omgevingswet ... 27
4.2 Zuidasdok, Amsterdam ... 30
4.3 Omgevingsvisie North-Holland ... 32
4.4 Omgevingsvisie Uden ... 34
4.5 A positivists critique ... 36
5 Conclusion, discussion, reflection ... 38
5.1 Conclusion: the post-political planning strategies of the Omgevingswet ... 38
5.2 Discussion: some nuance to the Omgevingswet and to post-politics ... 39
5.3 Methodological reflection and future research ... 40
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1 Introduction
The 2008 financial crisis sparked many urban social movements in cities across the world. Think of the Occupy movement in New York, London and Amsterdam, and the Indignados in Spain. Demonstrations, strikes and protests erupted globally. Mitt Romney, at that time Republican Presidential Candidate, called these acts of violence “dangerous” whereas the American people supported the “coup” of Wall Street (Cooper, 2011). Using Foucault’s words, one might call it an act by the people
“who refusing to be the population, disrupt the system” (Foucault, 2007, pp. 43-44). These acts were a manifestation of disagreement and antagonism with “the unsustainability and destructiveness of neoliberal forms of urbanization” (Brenner, et al., 2012). These acts were imagining a radically different ‘political’, a new utopia, if you wish. Protesters were criticizing the order of things and they fought for a new and better one that looks beyond neoliberalism as a structuring principle of political, economic, and spatial organization. The protests were also recognized by the global economic elite and named “dominant issues of concern” that, if not “managed well”, could lead to “greater social unrest and instability in the years to come” (World Economic Forum, 2012, p. 16).
In the years to come, the Occupy movement slowly died out, and was, using the World Economic Forum’s words: managed well. As such, despite the urban social movements, the 2008 financial crisis provided neoliberalism the opportunity to adapt and evolve into new forms (Peck, 2010), with neoliberalization of social, economic, and political processes still ongoing today. The state is blamed for the ills of the financial crisis, and a more minimalist state is promoted through radical decentralization of power (Allmendinger & Haughton, 2015). In this form of the state, the government’s function changes. As Žižek argues: “government is reconceived as a managerial function, deprived of its proper political dimension” (Žižek, 2002, p. 303). With the term ‘politics proper’ (or the ‘proper political dimension’) Žižek describes acts that challenge existing power relations in society, and the questioning of accepted truths (an example of this is the Occupy movement). As Žižek describes, this new form of government (and by extent politics) is becoming deprived of ‘the political’. Žižek calls this process depoliticization (Žižek, 1999), of which post-politics is the most common form.
“Post-politics emphasizes the need to leave old ideological divisions behind and confront new issues armed with the necessary expert knowledge and free deliberation that takes people’s concrete needs and demands into account” (Žižek, 1999, p. 236), however, as ideological divisions are left behind, these needs and demands have to fit within the current neoliberal ideology. In order to stimulate this form of depoliticization “technologies of government that privilege partnership,
consensus and agreement have displaced debate, disagreement and dissensus”
(Larner, 2014). As such, instead of acknowledging that there is disagreement, or antagonism, within society, wicked problems are being phrased in a non-ideological, pragmatic win-win way in which there are no losers and only winners (Swyngedouw,
9 2009) and that can be solved through consensus-building and ‘neutral’ expert-knowledge. This “output-centred post-political rhetoric has dominated discourses of
development since the late 1970s” (Raco, 2014, p. 25). As such, post-political theory has been adopted by planning theorists to critically access contemporary urban planning practices.
One of the main arguments of post-politics is how technologies of government are being used to depoliticize politics. It is argued that when governmentality changes, so do the institutionalized technologies of government. As a result of the contemporary neoliberal governmentality some of these technologies are showing post-political features, as has been described above. Because of this, the framework of post-politics is exceptionally apt in analyzing planning institutions. The changes in these institutions as a result of neoliberalization have been described in the context of post-politics; for instance in the English context by Allmendinger & Haughton (2012, 2015) and Raco (2014), and also in the Swedish context by Tunström & Bradley (2015). However, it has not been analysed in the Dutch context.
The Netherlands, arguably 10 years behind the UK, is undergoin massive changes to its planning institutions. These changes, as I will describe in this thesis, work in a depoliticizing manner through the mobilization of post-political planning strategies. These changes are in line with the changes already described in the UK, and can be criticized for foreclosing debate, disagreement and dissensus. However, this thesis also argues that while the planning strategies institutionalized in the Omgevingswet work depoliticizing on a national level, the same strategies are also used positively on a local level and are thus not necessarily post-political. As such, this questions our knowledge of localism in the context of post-politics.
1.1 The Dutch context: New Spatial Development Legislation (Omgevingswet)
The Dutch planning system, long regarded as exemplary (Buitelaar & Bregman, 2016), is undergoing regulatory transformations. During the past two decades new laws were added to the regulatory planning system. These laws were added because “decision making regarding new developments is going too slow” (Omgevingswet, 2014, p. 10). The latest addition to these new laws came in response to the 2008 financial crisis. The crisis showed the interconnectedness between planning and the market, and the ineptness of Dutch planning regulation to deal with this insecurity (Omgevingswet, 2014, p. 17). As such, shortly after the 2008 financial crisis the ‘Crisis and Recovery Act’ was announced (Dutch Government, 2009). This act was introduced to stimulate economy by allowing more flexible experimentation with planning regulation, for instance by speeding up the development of large infrastructure projects, such as the Zuidasdok (case study 1 of this thesis).
The regulatory transformations do not stop with the Crisis and Recovery Act. According to the Dutch government “a fundamental revision of the regulatory
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framework is necessary” (Omgevingswet, 2014, p. 18). They base this necessity on a few transformations in society: a growing interconnectedness of different disciplines within the physical living environment, a transition to a sustainable society, regional inequalities and the need to accommodate building initiatives. (Omgevingswet, 2014, pp. 11-13). Additionally, the national government also has some concerns regarding planning regulation from a legal point of view. These concerns are: complex and fragmented laws, imbalance between security and dynamism, and the governance culture and quality of implementation (Omgevingswet, 2014, pp. 14-17). These arguments, as well as the proclaimed success of the Crisis and Recovery Act, laid the foundations for a complete overhaul of Dutch planning regulations. The overhaul of the Dutch planning system will be the largest regulatory transformation in Dutch law since the constitutional revision of 1848 (NOS, 2015). A total of 26 laws will be rewritten into 1 that law that aims to regulate the physical living environment of the Netherlands: the Omgevingswet1. The official transition period from the current regulatory system towards the Omgevingswet is expected to start in 2021, but most aspects of the law are already published. Additionally, the key features of the Omgevingswet are already experimented with through the Crisis and Recovery act. Some of the key features of the law are: a stronger focus on collaborative planning methods, more flexible planning regulation, inter-sectoral cooperation and decentralization (Omgevingswet, 2014). Overarching these planning features is the cultural change promoted by the national government. One example of this new culture is that planning applications have to be met with ‘yes, however’ instead of ‘no, but’. According to the Dutch Government this signals a different way of thinking within the planning profession. The Omgevingswet will be covered more thoroughly in chapter four.
1.2 Research question and structure
This thesis will analyze the ongoing regulatory transformations of Dutch planning law using post-politics as an analytical framework and the Omgevingswet as its empirical evidence. The purpose of this analysis is twofold. First, it helps to gain a broader empirical understanding about the process of depoliticization that is visible across the world. Second, it does so by analyzing the Dutch context, and adds to the ongoing debate regarding the Omgevingswet. This thesis will provide a change of discourse as compared to the predominantly positive discourse provided by the
1 In order to understand what the Omgevingswet is and what it does, we first have to dissect the word
‘Omgevingswet´. The word is hard to translate into English. The Dutch government translated it in a pragmatic way to ‘Environment and Planning Act’ (Teekens, 2017). While linguistically correct, it misses a particular subtlety. The Dutch word ´Omgeving´ can be better translated to ´surrounding´. This is because the law is not solely about environment and planning, it is about our nearby surroundings: our ‘physical living environment’, as the law calls it. This physical living environment can stretch from an oil rig in the North Sea to the attic in your neighbor’s house, and from the soil upon which farmers farm to the quality of our air.
11 national government. The Dutch context is particularly interesting because of the size of the transformations. The institutional changes are accompanied by changes to all planning instruments, and as such, many municipalities, consultants and other professional actors in the field of planning are currently trying to make sense of these transformations.
This research will provide a critical analysis of the regulatory transformations accumulating into the Omgevingswet. The following research question is defined in order to guide this research:
‘How do the planning strategies institutionalized in the Omgevingswet contribute towards the depoliticization of Dutch planning?’
This thesis is structured around five chapters. The next chapter will set out the concept of post-politics in depth; it does so by focusing on the theoretical basis of post-politics but more importantly the relation between planning and post-politics. Chapter three describes the research methodology used in this thesis, which is focused around legaland policy documents, as well as interviews. Chapter four will describe the ongoing regulatory transformations using the Omgevingswet as a starting point and moving on to three case-studies: Zuidasdok, Noord-Holland, and Uden. The final chapter will provide a space for discussion and reflection, in which the argument of the thesis will be more carefully developed.
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2 Post-politics as a form of depoliticization
Following the fall of the Berlin Wall there was a belief that a post-ideological and conflict-free era had emerged. Fukuyama claimed this to be the “end of history” (1992); he argued that the fall of the Berlin Wall ended the history of war between left and right, and made these confrontations relics of the past. Instead, society would manage liberal democracy’s triumph through the formulation of collective agendas and by finding consensual win-win solutions to wicked problems by debating them rationally. This post-historical vision was criticized and dismissed by various authors whom based their ideas on post-foundationalist political theory (Rancière, 1999) (Žižek, 1999) (Rancière, 2000) (Mouffe, 2005). These authors problematize the idea of consensus building based on reason, since consensus-building doesn’t properly address the antagonism within human society. They argue that when confrontation cannot unfold politically, the political dimension will play out culturally or morally instead (Mouffe, 2005, p. 72). This stream of literature is embodied in different terms, for Žižek it is politics, for Mouffe it is political, and for Rancière it is post-democracy. While these authors have diverging theoretical ideas about ‘post-politics’ (or any of the other forms), the three different terms refer, for a large part, to the same idea: the repression, disavowal, and foreclosure of ‘the political’ (Wilson & Swyngedouw, 2014).
Post-politics is a form of depoliticization; however, it is not the only form. All these forms are criticizing the idea that all we have to do in modern society is manage our current ideology, based around the bio-political objective of happiness for the population. For Chantal Mouffe, Jacques Rancière and Slavoj Žižek, this process is called depoliticization. It is a process “characterized by the erosion of democracy and the weakening of the public sphere” (Wilson & Swyngedouw, 2014, p. 5). Post-politics is a form of depoliticization in which dissensus, debate and antagonism are supplanted by consensus and rational discussions. Other forms of depoliticization are para-politics, ultra-politics, archi-politics and meta-politics (Wilson & Swyngedouw, 2014). While this thesis is not the place to exhaustively discuss these forms of depoliticization, it is important to note that all these forms of depoliticization diminish ‘the political’ in our society. They do so by framing outsiders (immigrants) as dangerous, or by subordinating politics to a deeper essence such as the economy (Wilson & Swyngedouw, 2014). Post-politics, however is different, and criticizes the new governmentality of ‘governance-beyond-the-state’. Governmentality (short for government rationality) is about the rationalities and tactics of government, and how these are expressed in particular technologies of governing (Foucault, 1984). Or differently put, governmentality is about a process “in which a particular rationality of
governing is combined with new technologies, instruments, and tactics of conducting the process of collective rule setting, implementation, and policing” (Swyngedouw, 2007, pp. 6-7). Governmentality has been used to analyze the neoliberalising state, and how the rationalities and technologies of governing are changing (Lemke, 2002). More recently, Swyngedouw has described the governmentality of governance-beyond-the-state (Swyngedouw, 2009). This form of governmentality and the
13 technologies of government associated with it are being criticized in the context of post-politics, because of their depoliticizing effects.
This chapter will focus on the concept of post-politics. It will do so focusing both on Mouffe’s institutional focused definition, as well as Rancière’s definition centered around space. After this the relation between post-politics and planning will be explored. In order to do so the analytical framework of Allmendinger & Haughton (2015) will be used. They categorize post-political planning strategies into three categories: transferring, deferring and displacing the political. This analytical framework will be used in chapter four in order to make sense of the Dutch case.
2.1 Post-politics
Post-politics criticizes the deliberative representative democracy that is based on “deliberation among free and equal citizens, endowed with the rationality of argumentation and adequate means of communication” (Gualini, 2015, p. 6). In this form of democracy it is argued that through rational deliberation it is possible to reach agreement on what is ‘good’. This agreement was then both deemed rational (understood as a defense of liberal rights) and democratic (as represented by popular rule). However, according to post-political theory, this form of ‘democracy’ works in depoliticizing manners. In order to make clear how this works, it is of importance to gain a clear understand of what post-politics actually means.
At the heart of post-politics lie the notions of ‘politics’ and ‘the political’. Mouffe defines2 ‘politics’ as the “set of practices through which an order is created”, while ‘the political’ refers to “the dimension of antagonism constitutive of human societies”
(Mouffe, 2005, p. 9). In other words, ‘the political’ is the fact that there is always a dimension of antagonism in social relations; this means that there is, and always will be, disagreement in social relations. ‘Politics’ is the notion that ‘the political’ is governed by a set of rules, practices and institutions. The professional field of planning is a clear example of this. In the process of post-politicization contestation and conflict are being supplanted by consensual governance through the mobilization of techno-managerial practices (Wilson & Swyngedouw, 2014). This debate of consensus-based politics is carefully orchestrated around a neoliberal growth agenda. A result of this is that we live in a society in which we “operate within
an unquestioned framework of representative democracy, free market economics, and cosmopolitan liberalism. In post-politics, political contradictions are reduced to policy problems to be managed by experts and legitimated through participatory processes in which the scope of possible outcomes is narrowly defined in advance”
(Wilson & Swyngedouw, 2014, p. 6).
2 Mouffe’s definition of politics and the political is used instead of that of Rancière. Rancière uses the
term ‘politics’ to what Mouffe calls ‘the political’, and Rancière uses the term ‘police’ for what Mouffe calls ‘politics’. To add, Rancière sometimes uses the term ‘the political’ to refer to the middle ground between politics and police.
14 We can add the ideas of Rancière to go more into depth, as he conceptualizes post-politics in a slightly different manner. Rancière’s definitions are interesting because they provide a clearer idea of what is ‘political’, as well as the importance of space in the context of the post-political. For Rancière, the police refers to “all the activities
which create order by distributing places, names, functions” (Rancière, 1996, p. 173). It is about arranging space where activities are organized and distributed (Rancière, 1998). Through this conceptualization of ‘the police’, it is clear to see the role of urban planning, as well as the role of (physical) space. For Rancière the political refers to the enunciating of dissent and rupture. It is about voicing speech, claiming a place in the order of things (Swyngedouw, 2011). As such, the political is always disruptive. Those who do not have a place within demand equality; they demand that the police stops distributing them to an unjust space. For Swyngedouw (2011, p. 375), the political in this context is a form of emancipatory politics “[It] is the
refusal to be restricted to the places distributed by the police order (the factory/the home/the bar/the shopping mall); it disrupts and declassifies, and claims what is not authorized.” It is in this political act that order of things are being questioned; those who do not have the right to speak claim that they should and they occupy space in order to exercise this right of speech (Swyngedouw, 2011). It is this universal right of speech that sets this post-political theory apart from other theories. In post-politics there is no sociological or political foundation about who can claim ‘the political’. For both Mouffe and Rancière the political is about agonistic differences that cut through society. They claim that because of these agonistic differences ‘the people’ do not exist (Mouffe, 2005). It is because of these ever-lasting differences that ‘the political’ will always arise. While these political differences might be institutionally suppressed, as we will discuss in chapter 2.2, they will always re-arise in the form of a disruptive outburst (Mouffe, 2005). When this outburst will come, where it will come, and who will initiate it is always unknown, and cannot be predicted. Take for example the Occupy movements. It was unknown when these would erupt, where they would erupt, or who would initiate them, but the Occupy movement started with an act in space (a square) signaling disagreement with the place that the police order assigned to those who initiated this political act.
In between the police and the political lies Rancière’s final concept: ‘politics’. In simple terms, for Rancière, politics is the process of emancipation. It is a “space of
dissensus, for enunciating difference and for negotiating conflict, for experimenting with a new (common) sense and forms of sensuous being” (Swyngedouw, 2011, p. 378). This space of dissensus is slowly being supplanted by consensual strategies, based on expert knowledge and deliberation. These types of strategies focus only on policing, and they leave no room for a political act in politics. This is where planning comes in, as it is a profession focused around distributing places to people.
The relation between politics, the political, and planning has already been acknowledged, as planning urges us to intervene in the organization of the territory, and such an intervention inevitably ends up being a form of politics (Metzger, et al.,
15 2015). In more recent years, a growing body of literature has developed the theoretical concept of post-politics in relation to planning. The post-political body of literature is often used to analyze planning institutions, as one of the main arguments of post-politics is that institutions are used to suppress the political. Post-politics criticizes planning as a governmental instrument of depoliticization which is focused on spatial governance practices (Bossuyt & Savini, 2017). These practices are criticized for being highly instrumentalist and problem-solving oriented, while being unreflective of the political, economic and social roots of the urban problems they try to solve (Bossuyt & Savini, 2017). As such, planning institutions can enhance the post-political condition (Allmendinger & Haughton, 2012).
The main critique of post-political thinkers on current planning processes is “that the deep and irresolvable tensions underlying (sustainable) spatial policies are not made explicit, are not discussed through open and discursive reasoning and are not problematized in terms of who wins and who loses” (Bossuyt & Savini, 2017, p. 5). A
few of the concrete strategies that post-politics criticizes are: the use of ‘fuzzy terms’ such as ‘sustainability’, ‘smart growth’ and ‘zero carbon development’ (Swyngedouw, 2007), the consensus-building approach of collaborative planning (Allmendinger & Haughton, 2012), and localism (Baeten, 2009). All in favor of a pro-growth neoliberal agenda (Oosterlynck & Swyngedouw, 2010). The following sections will set out these strategies in a more structured manner.
2.2 Post-politics and planning
Allmendinger and Haughton (2015) categorize post-political planning strategies in a conceptualized and structured manner. They name three categories of post-political planning strategies: transferring the political, deferring the political, and displacing the political. Strategies that transfer the political take away conflict from the immediate community and representative processes and transfer it into new fuzzy communities of interest and democratic processes; strategies that displace the political displace the political to other arenas and groups; and deferring the political refers to strategies that defer conflict to a future point in time (Allmendinger & Haughton, 2015). These categories can be used to gain better insight in the different post-political planning strategies. As such, the categories and strategies defined in the following sections will be used to analyze the Dutch case in chapter four and five.
2.2.1 Transferring the political
The first and most elaborative category of post-political planning strategies is the category ‘transferring the political’. These strategies are aimed at transferring conflict from the immediate community towards fuzzy communities of interest (Allmendinger & Haughton, 2015). The first strategy to do so is that of consensus-building planning practices (Allmendinger & Haughton, 2012), the second strategy is to create consensus around ‘fuzzy concepts’ (Swyngedouw, 2007).
As Bossuyt and Savini (2017) summarized, the main critique of post-political thinkers on current planning processes is “that the deep and irresolvable tensions underlying
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(sustainable) spatial policies are not made explicit, are not discussed through open and discursive reasoning and are not problematized in terms of who wins and who loses” (Bossuyt & Savini, 2017, p. 5). The collaborative planning approach which is based on consensus-building is essential in relating this post-political critique to planning. Collaborative planning theory was introduced in the 1990’s, following the ‘communicative turn’ in planning (Healey, 1992). Collaborative planning was inspired on the broader model of participatory-deliberative democracy, theorized by Habermas and others. Collaborative planning approaches are grounded in communication and argumentation (Healey 1993, 1997; Innes 1995, 1996), as well as power relations and conflict (Forester, 1982). These collaborative planning approaches argue “that more robust, feasible, just, and even more rational outcomes
could be achieved through collaborative planning or pragmatic joint inquiry … than by relying on a neutral analyst” (Innes & Booher, 2015, p. 198). They do so by overcoming conflict through transparent deliberation and negotiation. Not only do collaborative planning approaches argue that their approach can resolve conflict; it is argued that it also is a means to community-building and democratization by building social, intellectual and political capital (Innes, et al., 1994). It is because of these benefits that consensus-building and conflict are seen as productive resources for change.
However, as Mouffe argues: “every consensus is based on acts of exclusion” (Mouffe, 2005, p. 11). As such, by building a consensus, you are always excluding. This means that antagonism is never fully resolved. It is on the core concepts of antagonism, conflict and consensus that the post-political critique meets collaborative planning. While collaborative planning theorists advocate for consensus-building in planning, post-politics advocates for the exact opposite. Post-political thinkers see consensus only as an outcome of articulation, and not as overcoming differences (Mouffe, 2000). As such, a divide in discourses is clearly visible. Allmendinger and Haughton (2012) have named this a “crisis of consensus”. They argue that a consensus building approach is a “system focused on carefully
stage-managed processes with subtly but clearly defined parameters of what is open for debate” (Allmendinger & Haughton, 2012, p. 90). In these processes wicked problems are being phrased in a non-ideological, pragmatic win-win way in which there are no losers and only winners (Swyngedouw, 2009). This non-ideological phrasing of problems is a clear example of depoliticization, as it emphasizes a world in which ideological differences are a thing of the past.
The political is transferred through consensus-building approaches. These approaches transfer the political discussion into a consensus-building setting in which political discussion is minimalized and antagonism is never fully resolved. It does so even more by focusing only on the local, by relying on ´neutral´ expert knowledge or through creating partnerships. These three aspects will be more thoroughly explained throughout the following paragraphs.
17 Another post-political strategy used in collaborative planning approaches, is the use of ‘fuzzy words’ to describe problems or goals. Swyngedouw (2007) has argued that policy-makers use universal themes which command agreement as a result of their broad framing. Examples of these themes are ‘sustainable development’, ‘circularity’, ‘zero carbon development’, and ‘smart growth’. Swyngedouw names these sorts of concepts ‘fuzzy concepts’. He argues that people do not disagree with these terms, because nobody would prefer dumb growth over smart growth (Swyngedouw, 2007). Allmendinger and Haughton (2012) encountered the use of these concepts in English planning regime. There, the term ‘sustainable development’ was often used as an all-encompassing and feel good notion to build a consensus around. However, the notion was particularly vague, and in order to define it the New Labour government used overwhelming volumes of technical, expert-based, analyses (Allmendinger & Haughton, 2015). These types of analyses are often presented in a unbiased, neutral way, but don’t always have to be. Section 2.2.3 will elaborate on this.
2.2.2 Deferring the political
Planning strategies aimed at deferring the political attempt to change the point of conflict to a future point in time. This includes strategies which are aimed at suppressing conflict and antagonism, because, as Mouffe (2005) argued, it is inevitable that antagonism will unfold. As such, suppressing antagonism is a way of deferring it.
Allemendinger and Haughton (2015) name different strategies in English planning regimes that defer the political. The first strategy they name is integrated multi-sectoral partnerships. These partnerships are open-ended processes in which responsibilities and accountability are blurred. These partnerships invite more unauthorized actors into the planning process, which dilutes the influence of political representatives (Clarke & Cheshire, 2018). This is not only true for partnerships based on multi-sectoral coordination and integration, but also public-private partnerships (Raco, 2015). These partnerships are open-ended projects in which the political is never fully discussed, and thus often deferred to the future (Allmendinger & Haughton, 2015).
A second form of deferring the political is through strategies that aim to encourage communities and neighborhoods to resolve their planning issues locally. First of all, this process is exclusionary because not all neighborhoods have the knowledge-capacity to do so. Another aspect of this is that the ‘problems’ that the communities are supposed to resolve are often prescribed and centrally imposed (Allmendinger & Haughton, 2015). To add, finances are often another issue with these community strategies. As soon as the community has developed their own strategies, they are met by central government that the strategy is the responsibility of the community, and that government has little or no money to fund it (Allmendinger & Haughton, 2015). Baeten´s (2009) criticized the regeneration on the London South Bank for being too local. He argued: “by centering regeneration policies on the ‘local
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community’, regeneration policies are depoliticized: community wish-lists are by definition local, particular (safe streets, schools, swimming pool) and do not transcend the local” (Baeten, 2009, p. 248). By focusing regeneration demands on the local the project is disconnected from universal demands for welfare or justice. This is in accordance with Žižek’s (1999) work on post-politics. He argues that the focus is only on managing the local consequences of global capitalism, without questioning it. The strategy of focusing on the local can be combined with collaborative planning strategies. Citizens can be asked to participate, but they can only demand locally. This neutralizes the demands, as they have no relevance beyond the local. This is another example of deferring the political, as focusing on the local defers the discussion of the issues present on the national or global scale.
2.2.3 Displacing the political
Strategies aimed at displacing the political “are concerned with shifting the political to
other arenas and groups” (Allmendinger & Haughton, 2015, p. 44). In this category of post-political planning strategies Allmendinger and Haughton describe one example using the English planning regime; the changing role of planners and their loss of influence in the planning process, whereas other experts and self-interested communities gain a greater role in the process. Various instruments and methods were developed which displace political issues, for example the strategic environmental assessment, sustainability appraisals, cost-benefit analysis, and retail impact statements. These assessments, appraisals, analyses and statements are often outsourced to consultants, with legitimacy and accountability outsourced as well (Raco, 2014). The consultancy reports were represented as expert scientific analyses, and therefore politically neutral. However, consultants can be carefully chosen, instruments can be carefully designed and draft reports critically scrutinized, all of which tempers the ‘neutrality’ of these reports (Allmendinger & Haughton, 2015). These instruments work in a self-policing way by limiting what can be said and what cannot be said. Swyngedouw (2009) criticized this way of technocratic environmental management for being post-political as these instruments replace debate, disagreement and dissensus. As such, the political is shifted away from planning towards expert consultants writing ‘neutral’ reports. Besides shifting the role from planners towards other experts, the self-interested community also enjoys a greater power in the planning process (Allmendinger & Haughton, 2015). Again, this makes it harder for planners to acknowledge political outcomes of various planning interventions.
2.3 Post-politics; and then what?
The literature on post-politics is rather pessimistic. For Rancière and others, optimism can be found in radical politics, which is about repoliticizing the “space for
dissensus, for enunciating difference and for negotiating conflict, for experimenting with a new (common) sense and forms of sensuous being” (Swyngedouw, 2011, p. 378). Political dissent can be expressed through spatial practices, such as the Occupy movement mentioned in the introduction. However, the Occupy movement,
19 and the Greek Indignants alike, failed to institute a proper democratic politics. (Kaika & Lazaros, 2014).
For others, optimism can be found in the micro-level of post-politics. Larner (2014) argues that there is too little attention paid to the neoliberal initiatives, ideas and techniques that are being criticized by post-political theorists. Özdemir and Tasan-Kok argue that we should not see “expert knowledge devoid of its human
possessors” (Özdemir & Tasan-Kok, 2017, p. 13). It are these sorts of ideas, that question (to some extent) the pessimist critique of post-politics, that are interesting in the context of this research. They bring back a particular sense of nuance into the discussion. While Larner, Özdemir and Tasan-Kok do not deny the existence of post-politics, they do question aspects of it. For all these authors, the main argument can be found in the role of the planner, who is, in the end, just a human being. Experts are also people with different ideologies, worldviews and backgrounds (Özdemir & Tasan-Kok, 2017). As Larner puts it: “their strategies do not involve the competitive comparisons and top-down partnerships that feature in technocratic management; rather they involve the fostering of relational forms of governance premised on alternative conceptions of leadership, courage, willpower and fortitude.” It paints an image which is supported by Özdemir and Tasan-Kok that ‘enlightened experts’ don’t go out to reinforce the neoliberal agenda by suppressing antagonism. Instead, these experts can look for disagreements, and accommodate them. They can fundamentally question the status quo, or seek political alternatives (Larner, 2014). It is with this more positive view of consensus-building in mind that we conclude this chapter and move on to the research methods used in this thesis. The three categories used in this chapter (transferring, deferring and displacing) will provide us with a path to follow.
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3 Research design and methods
This chapter will elaborate on the research methods that are used in this research. It does so in two parts. The first part will more carefully specify the scope of this research by proposing the argument and a research design. The second part will elaborate on the specific empirical research methods used for data gathering and data analysis.
Chapter one already introduced some of the core aims of this research, centered around the research question as it was formulated in section 1.2: “How do the planning strategies institutionalized in the Omgevingswet contribute towards the depoliticization of Dutch planning?” This research aims to gain insight into how
different planning strategies, institutionalized through the Omgevingswet, contribute to the process of depoliticization, particularly focusing on the previously established categories of post-political planning strategies: transferring, deferring and displacing the political. The previous chapter was already concerned with laying the theoretical foundations on how planning strategies can contribute towards the process of depoliticization. It was argued that contestation, conflict and dissensus are being supplanted by consensual governance through the mobilization of managerial practices. It became clear in the previous chapter that these techno-managerial practices are to be found in the field of planning. They defer, displace or transfer the political. However, we also have to remain positive and acknowledge that there is positivity to be found in local initiatives and ideas. Using the above mentioned research question, as well as the foundational knowledge built up in the previous chapter, it is possible to make an argument. This argument will be tested in the following chapters, using the empirical evidence gathered based on the research methods discussed in the following sections.
3.1 Argument and research design
This research argues that the ongoing regulatory transformations in the Netherlands, accumulating to the Omgevingswet, have post-political characteristics, and that the planning strategies named in the newly formed institutions work in a depoliticizing manner. This argument can also be presented schematically, as can be seen in Figure1. The concept of governmentality, as it has been introduced in chapter 2, will be used to give structure to the sub-questions. Political rationality and technologies of government will be used in the context of post-politics and the Omgevingswet. These Foucauldian governmentality concepts (Gordon, 1991) can be used to make sense of how technologies of government can be used to keep the order of society, and which political rationality is associated with the preferred order. Governmentality is a logical analytical tool in the context of this research, as this research seeks to understand why the Dutch government is institutionalizing particular technologies, and how these technologies work in a depoliticizing manner. These concepts are more often used in the context of planning studies, as planning can be seen as a tool of government to create order on society. As such, this research has, in part, the goal to understand how the Omgevingswet is used to giver order to society
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Figure 1: Conceptual framework (Source: Author)
A couple of sub-questions have been defined in order to proof the argument:
1. What is the political rationality behind the current (pre-crisis) Dutch planning regulations?
2. What is the political rationality behind the Omgevingswet in the Netherlands?
3. Through which kind of planning strategies are these rationalities regulated?
4. How are these planning strategies used on a local level?
The first sub-question will be concerned with the current Dutch regulatory framework. The role of this sub-question within the large scheme is to provide a base, on which to judge the regulatory transformations. The rationalities behind these transformations will be uncovered in sub-question two. In order to uncover these rationalities, Foucault’s concept of governmentality (Gordon, 1991) will be explored in order to guide these sub-questions. The third sub-question will be looking into the particular planning strategies that are part of the Omgevingswet. Again, using Foucault’s concept of governmentality, and how technologies of government can be used to keep the order of society (Foucault, 1977, p. 74). Finally, the fourth sub-question will be looking into case studies on a local level. These case studies show how the planning strategies institutionalized through the Omgevingswet are visible in practice, and if they indeed work post-politicizing.
3.2 Research approach
This section will elaborate on the research methodology applied in this research. To start, the use of a qualitative methodology will be justified. This will be followed by
23 the methods of data collection. In doing so, we will also touch upon the three case-studies that are used in this research. To conclude, we shall touch upon the analysis of data.
A qualitative research approach will be used to answer the above mentioned sub-questions. A qualitative approach is chosen because the research focusses on a social process, in which human interaction and governance is key. As Hohn & Neuer (2006) have pointed out it is important to focus on qualitative aspects such as values, norms, communication, distribution of power and assignment of roles when analyzing governance culture. As the above mentioned research questions will be concerned with the influence of the Omgevingswet on practices of governance, a qualitative research approach is well-suited.
The previous section already provided some insight in the use of Foucauldian concepts to guide the research. While the concepts of governmentality and technologies of government can be used to make sense of the rationalities and strategies in the Omgevingswet, they do not provide a clear cut way for collecting data. However, an analysis of governmentality in the context of planning often goes hand-in-hand with a Foucauldian discourse analysis, which then has more tangible data collection methods related to it (Sharp & Richardson, 2001). There are different ideas about what discourse analysis precisely means depending on the field of study. More so, even within a particular field of study, discourse analysis can mean different things (Garrity, 2011). Habermas is for example concerned with communication and intersubjectivity, whereas Foucault is interested in how one can speak about anything at all, or is not allowed to speak about certain topics. All these discourse methods have in common that they are concerned with language and text, and the role of the speaker/writer in relation to the text. It is however, important to make a distinction between discourse and language, as these concepts cannot be used interchangeably. For Foucault, discourse is about power relations, and the position of individuals in the context of a group (Sharp & Richardson, 2001). These power relations are then expressed through language (written or spoken). While this research does not aim to set out a complete Foucauldian discourse analysis, it is important to keep the role of power in mind when discussing the discourse data gathered. But first, in order to apply a discourse analysis, language (either written or spoken) has to be gathered.
This data is gathered on three specific case studies, as well as the overarching Omgevingswet. The three case studies on which data is collected are: the Zuidas project in Amsterdam, the Omgevingsvisie in the municipality Uden and the Omgevingsvisie in the province of North-Holland. All the case studies are related to the Omgevingswet. The cases are on three different governance levels: project, municipal, and provincial. Additionally, the cases represent a variety of geographical locations within the Netherlands. Chapter four will explore the case-studies in more depth. For now this chapter will be concerned with the methods of data gathering.
24 Data can either be primary or secondary. Primary data is newly collected data, for the purpose of this research, and not presented before by anyone else; whereas secondary data is data already gathered, and already presented by someone else (Toit, 2014). In both cases, but especially in the case of secondary data, it is important to consider the source of data, and the possible biases of the source. In order to gather the data, two different methods will be used. The first method is desk-research, and the second method is interviewing. Both will be elaborated on below. Desk research is used to gather written data. Some examples of this include academic literature, policy documents, news articles, legislations and reports. Desk research is an important form of data gathering in this research because there are many legislative sources, as well as planning documents. The Omgevingswet and Crisis and Recovery Act were used to gain an understanding about the political rationality behind the legislations. Both of the legislations start off by illustrating the law, and putting it in societal and legislative context. In addition, letters from the minister to parliament as well as reports on which the Omgevingswet is based were used to gain a broader understanding about the political rationality behind the law. The Omgevingswet also describes the planning instruments that it institutionalizes. This information was used as an introduction into the Omgevingswet planning strategies. It is important to acknowledge that the letters from the minister to parliament, and to some extent the law itself, are politically colored. In this context, it is important to note that the Omgevingswet is an initiative by a VVD-minister, and completely developed by other VVD-ministers, as we will see in the following chapter.
All three case studies are well documented online, with various planning documents supporting them. For the two Omgevingsvisie projects (North-Holland and Uden) the Omgevingsvisie themselves are used, as well as some of the documents they were built upon. In the case of Zuidasdok, there is an entire website dedicated to the project, as well as a lot of official planning documentation in the form of zoning plans. The second method of data gathering is through interviews. Interviews will be used to gain more specific insight into the three different case studies. The interviews will not be used for the Omgevingswet itself, as there’s already plenty of written discourse available. To add, potential interviewees for the Omgevingswet would be hard to access. For example, it would be interesting to discuss the rationality of the law with politicians; however, one has to recognize that this is not a feasible idea in the context of this research. Fortunately, there are parliamentary discussions available to study.
To the contrary, it is easier to access potential interviewees for the three case-studies. These interviewees could provide more specific knowledge on the case studies. This would help to form a strong argument. In order to find interviewees, two methods of sampling have been used: purposive sampling and snowball sampling (Bryman, 2012). Purposive sampling is about strategically choosing interviewees and
25 contacting them individually. This is important so that the interviewees are close to the research object and thus knowledgeable about the subject. After these initial interviews, snowball sampling can be used to gain follow up interviews. Snowball sampling is a sampling method in which the first interviewee proposes other interviewees, often colleagues (Bryman, 2012).
For privacy and ethical reasons the interviewees are anonymized. The table below displays how many people were interviewed as well as some of the characteristics of the interviewee/interview.
Table 1 - List of interviews
Interview Case-study Employer Purposive/
snowballing
Date of interview
1 Zuidasdok Zuidasdok Project
team Snowballing 22-5-2018 2 Zuidasdok Municipality of Amsterdam Purposive 16-5-2018 3 Zuidasdok Municipality of Amsterdam Purposive 22-5-2018 4 North-Holland Municipality of Amsterdam Purposive 5-9-2018
5 Holland Province of North-Holland
Snowballing 22-5-2018
6 Holland Province of North-Holland
Snowballing 22-5-2018
7 Uden Rho consultants Purposive 15-5-2018
8 Uden Municipality of
Uden
Purposive 28-5-2018
All interviews were conducted in the style of a qualitative, flexible semi-structured interview. Since every interviewee was unique, every interview guide was also unique. However, the interview guides were often based around the core topics: introduction, participation, inter-disciplinary working, and localism. All interviews started broadly, with the interviewee describing the case-studies as well as their role within it. After this introduction the various topics in the interview guide were
26 discussed. In this discussion, the interviewer allowed the interviewees to lead the conversation.
All the interviews were transcribed and coded. All phrases relating to: consensus-building, fuzzy concepts, multi-sectoral integration, localism, the role of planners, and the role of experts were highlighted. These phrases were then used in the analysis of the case-studies.
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4 The Omgevingswet in practice
This chapter sets out the gathered data and prepares us for the discussion and reflection in the following chapter. In order to do so, the chapter is divided in five sections. The first will focus on the overarching Omgevingswet, mainly using policy, legal and media sources. The consequential three sections will each set out a case study. Each of these case studies are related to the Omgevingswet and show various post-political aspects. The fifth and final section of this chapter will attempt to bring nuance into the discussion, as the final section in chapter two did earlier. The next section on the Omgevingswet will describe the future law that will come into effect in 2021. However, before doing so, we must first consider where Dutch planning comes from. As such, the following paragraphs will quickly introduce 21st century Dutch planning. The most recent restructuring of Dutch planning legislation took place in the years 2000-2008. In 2003, the Dutch parliament proposed the Spatial Planning Act, which came officially into effect in 2008. Barrie Needham provided an extensive review of this act in 2005 (Needham, 2005), and any interested reader is suggested to review his work first. According to Needham’s analysis, the Spatial Planning Act: widened what is ‘spatially relevant’, allowed national and provincial governments to set policy guidelines in which lower levels of government have to act, stimulated the use of collaborative planning, improved cooperation between different horizontal levels of public government, and simplifies and speeds up legal procedures. These changes were based around a government that has a changing role towards private actors and its citizens. The government withdraws from certain activities in order to make room for private actors; and the citizens became increasingly unsatisfied with government’s actions and wanted more influence in spatial planning decisions (Needham, 2005). In the following section it is possible to see some of the same changes again, but amplified.
4.1 The Omgevingswet
The Omgevingswet is a Dutch law that comes into effect in 2021. It combines 26 laws into 1, 120 ministerial regulations into 10, and 120 general administrative measures into 4 (Dutch Government, sd). The law itself has already been passed through both the House of Representatives and the Senate. However, some of the general administrative measures and ministerial regulations are not yet finished. Despite the law not being in place yet, it is possible for governments to experiment with it through the Crisis and Recovery Act (CRA); more on the CRA later.
The focus on the ‘physical living environment’ is the first big change in the Omgevingswet in comparison to current Dutch planning regulation. The Omgevingswet concerns itself with our entire physical living environment and not just spatial organization as it is the case in the current Spatial Planning Act. This makes it possible for municipalities, provinces, water boards, and the national government to include (more) environmental and public health aspects in their planning instruments.
28 The Omgevingswet institutionalizes 6 types of instruments (MijnOmgevgingsvisie, 2014). In this experimental phase of the Omgevingswet, the three highest (or most abstract) levels of instruments are relevant and being experimented with: the strategic vision (in Dutch: Omgevingsvisie), the programme used to elaborate on the strategic vision (in Dutch: programma), and the zoning plan (in Dutch:
Omgevingsplan). The strategic vision is a policy document stating long term goals; it is a coherent strategic plan for the physical living environment. The programme can be seen as an addition to the Omgevingsvisie, adding a more concrete 5-year plan related to a particular topic (such as environment, housing or transportation) or location (the rural area, the city center or the industry area). Thirdly, the zoning plan clearly states the function and building regulations of areas. An interesting note is that every municipality can only have one zoning plan, whereas in the current situation municipalities have dozens of zoning plans for different areas (sometimes as small as one parcel). Two out of the other three instruments are different types of permits; the omgevingsvergunning and the projectbesluit. The final instrument are the general administrative measures for the national government, or, in Dutch the
Algemene Maatregelen van Bestuur (AMvB). These will more elaborately develop certain topics, much like the programme is doing on a municipal/provincial level. These AMvBs are “according to the government, not as important as the more
general regulations contained in the act itself. The minister can add and change such orders without the assent of Parliament” (Needham, 2005). The administrative measures can be used to bypass the provincial or national government by developing policy around a certain issue, and not leaving space for lower levels of government to develop policy of their own. These administrative measures are not fully developed yet.
Of course, the Netherlands already has strategic plans, zoning plans, and permits. So in order to understand what is different under the Omgevingswet, we have to look at some overarching aspects of the law. Out of the four goals that the minister states, the first one is already discussed; it is the focus shift from spatial organization towards the management of the physical living environment. This means that the Omgevingswet will aim to combine multiple disciplines, stimulating a “coherent
approach to the physical living environment” (Ollongren, 2018)3. Additionally, the
Omgevingswet aims to increase the predictability and user-friendliness of environment/planning law. Third, the Omgevingswet stimulates an active and flexible approach when trying to accomplish goals in the physical living environment by institutionalizing a ‘proof of participation’; there is however very little said in the law itself regarding participation, and there are no legal requirements on how municipalities or provinces have to organize their participation. The fourth and final goal of the Omgevingswet is to speed up and improve the decision making process of projects in the physical living environment (Ollongren, 2018). These four changes
3 Kajsa Ollongren is the Minister of Interior Affairs, of which the Omgevingswet is a part, since
29 are communicated by the national government as a complete system review (Omgevingswet, 2014), or cultural change (Ollongren, 2018).
This introduction on the Omgevingswet leaves us with three questions that were already stated in chapter three. First, what is the political rationality behind the Omgevingswet in the Netherlands? Second, through which planning strategies are these rationalities regulated? And finally, are the post-political planning strategies visible in practice? The first two of these questions will be treated in this section, whereas the final question will be handled in the upcoming three sections using three case studies.
In 2010 the political parties VVD and CDA stated in their national coalition accord the following: “The cabinet comes with propositions to bundle and simplify legislation concerning the physical living environment, and modernize and consolidate the General Administrative Act” (Coalition Accord, 2010, p. 29). This statement can be seen in the context of a coalition accord that was very much focused on solving the problems that arouse as a result of the financial crisis. More specifically, this quote was in the context of a cabinet that wanted to “speed up and simplify” (Coalition Accord, 2010, p. 29) the decision making of infrastructure projects. As such, almost a year later, the minister of Infrastructure and Environment4 wrote the policy letter “Simply better” (van Haegen, 2011). In this letter she already announced a
fundamental revision of environmental and planning legislation; this legislation would be built with the principles of austerity, modernization, bundling and simplification in mind. The minister gives several reasons for this revision. First of all, she sees an increasingly complex system of legislation, which creates opacity and uncertainty in spatial projects. According to unnamed research, this creates longer project times and higher costs, which is estimated at “10% of the total plan costs” (van Haegen, 2011, p. 1). Additionally, according to the minister, planning practice requires more flexibility and customizable legislation to account for regional differences, as well as changes in the market. Finally, the current system does not provide enough possibilities for multi-disciplinary work, and as such, there are insufficient solutions for the diversity of problems that can be found in practice (van Haegen, 2011).
These above mentioned reasons for the law are developed around practical demands. However, these practical reasons are quite clearly developed around a neoliberal ideology, one in which: the government takes a “reserved and facilitating” (van Haegen, 2011, p. 3) role, law is “economic growth oriented” (van Haegen, 2011, p. 3), there is “more room for private actors” (van Haegen, 2011, p. 3), and the purpose of participation is “considerable time and financial profits” (van Haegen, 2011, p. 5). Additionally, the purpose of the Omgevingswet can be summarized in two words: “less government” (van Haegen, 2011, p. 5). To conclude, quoting the
4 Melanie-Schultz van Haegen was Minister of Infrastructure and Environment in the previous two
cabinets, from 2010 to 2017. During this time the Omgevingswet was still part of the Ministry of I&M. This made van Haegen responsible for the development of the Omgevingswet.
