1 The Revival of the Anti-FCFA movement by the Francophone African Diaspora through a cultural
remittance:
the pan-African identity embedded in the social movement
By Natacha Aka
Supervisor: Anja van Heelsum Second reader: Michael O. Eze June 2018
2 Abstract
This study features the anti-FCFA franc (social) movement and the implications of the Francophone African diaspora in the fight against an African currency. It investigated this dynamic through three theoretical concepts namely, social movement, diaspora, and cultural remittances.
The twentieth century saw the emergence of a social movement against the CFA franc (FCFA) currency. This currency is still used by fourteen West and Central African countries. Most of these countries happen to be former French colonies. This latter fact is noteworthy as the currency they use was created by France back in 1945 (under the French colonial empire) as a way to back up its own economy post-bellum. Fast forward to 2017, a year wherein an African NGO, Urgences panafricanistes (URPANAF), which is arguably reviving the anti-FCFA movement, calls on the (Francophone) African civil society in the continent, as well as the (Francophone) African diaspora, to demonstrate against the CFA franc. The leader of the anti-FCFA movement and president of the NGO is part of the Francophone African diaspora. He is French by jus soli and grew up there. Notwithstanding his French nationality, he also has the Beninese nationality by jus sanguinis. His experiences with his dual identity, his membership to the Francophone African diaspora, racism, and other aspects and events made him the man he is today: a pan-African political activist for the African cause. He founded the NGO Urgences panafricanistes that initiated and oversaw the anti-FCFA round of demonstrations in 2017. His background and experiences are shared by an unmeasurable number of Africans, especially in France. This research is also concerned with sharing that experience.
The anti-FCFA movement is not only concerned about fighting an economic situation. The very existence and current use of the CFA franc, with its mechanisms, its governance, and management, and French implication in them, question the independent status of the CFA franc states. Not only that, but its existence touches upon other elements. Through the fight against the currency, the anti-FCFA movement also seeks to open up the discussion on broader issues such as the Françafrique, that is, the existing relationship between France and its former sub-Saharan African colonies (which are mostly the CFA franc states). Some have qualified that relationship as a neocolonial relationship. Finally, since these realities are often ignored by the general public, and especially by the African population living in the CFA franc countries and using the currency, as well as by the African diaspora, the anti-FCFA movement is also concerned with transmitting knowledge on the different challenges surrounding the currency. This results in spreading knowledge on the broader issues. By raising awareness on the different issues and by building an African historical consciousness, the intention is to trigger and promote change in the FCFA countries, as well as in Africa.
3 One element is worthy of clarification at this point. Just as the anti-FCFA movement does not limit its fight to the economic realm, this research shall not be confined to the sole report of the actions of the movement as intended by Kemi Seba’s NGO, nor the analysis of the organization. In other words, if the readers’ goal is to learn exclusively about Mr. Seba’s URPANAF, may they refrain from reading further, but rather, buy Kemi Seba’s new book “L’Afrique libre ou la mort” (“Free Africa or death”). Release date: June 29, 2018.
4 “Knowledge is like food. It’s nourishment for the brain. If I don’t have it, I’d starve to death”
- Cyril, a supporter of the anti-FCFA movement, Paris, 2018
“When you don't know where you are going, look back at where you came from” - African proverb
5 Table of contents Abstract ... 2 Acknowledgments ... 7 1. Introduction: ... 8 1.1. Historical background ... 8
1.2. Research aim and objective and relevance of the research ... 11
2. Definition of concepts (Theoretical Framework) ... 13
2.1. Social movement ... 14
2.2. Diaspora ... 17
2.3. Social/cultural remittances ... 19
2.4. Social media ... 23
2.5. Conceptualization of the theoretical framework ... 28
3. Methodology ... 30
3.1. Method ... 30
3.2. Operationalization of the theoretical concept ... 32
3.3. Ethics ... 33
4. Results: Social movement ... 29
4.1. The anti-FCFA movement as social movement fighting to promote change ... 29
5. Results: Diaspora ... 38
5.1. The Francophone African diaspora identity: A strong ethnic group consciousness based on shared history and culture ... 38
5.2. The Francophone African diaspora and the idea of solidarity: A sense of empathy, co-responsibility with co-ethnic members in other countries of settlement ... 50
5.3. The Francophone African diaspora and their relationship with their (collective) identity ... 53
6. Results: Cultural Remittance: The Anti-FCFA movement as a cultural remittance ... 58
6 .1. The creation of the cultural remittance ... 59
6 6 .3. ... 68 7. Conclusion ... 71 8. Bibliography ... 73
7 Acknowledgments
I would like to thank all of those who helped me with this research project by supporting and sustaining me financially and emotionally (Mummy and Daddy); by helping me to gather data (all my interviewees who were amazing and willing to take some time off of their schedule, sometimes even at the last minute. I would like to say a special thank you to Kemi Seba, Jahi Muntuka, and Cyril Gogo. Moreover, I would like to thank those of you who helped me by being a constant source of motivation and help (my family and friends: Tata Awa and Lorianne, the Sano sisters, Guillaume Cotton). Some of you who have helped me in an unimaginable way, but who have asked to stay anonymous: thank you. And last but not least, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor Anja van Heelsum. Without her assistance and supervision, this research would not have been possible.
8 Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Historical context
For decades, a discussion on the controversial nature and mechanisms of an African currency, the CFA franc (FCFA) has been taking place. Arguably, it is because most of the states using it are former Sub-Saharan French African colonies. The countries using it are eight in West Africa (Bénin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinée-Bissau (former Portuguese colony), Mali, Niger, Sénégal, and Togo (former mandate under the League of Nations; half of the territory was under French control), and six in Central Africa (Cameroun (former mandate under the League of Nations; half of the territory was under French control), Gabon, Guinée équatoriale (former Spanish colony), République Centrafricaine, République du Congo and Tchad). They share a currency that was pegged to the French franc (FF) and is now pegged to the euro (Monga & Lin 2015). The CFA franc – initially the franc of the Colonies Françaises d’Afrique (or the franc of the French colonies of Africa) and now – the franc of the communauté financière en Afrique in West Africa and cooperation financière en Afrique centrale (or the franc of the financial community in Africa and the financial cooperation in Central Africa, respectively) is the currency fourteen African countries use to this day. These West and Central African countries, part of the CFA franc zone (CFA FZ), are organized into two monetary unions with their respective CFA franc (ibid.). Although the two monetary unions are legal tenders in their respective West African and Central African region, they are considered as one currency zone because of the guaranteed convertibility into the euro, the fixed parity both francs have against the euro, and the free capital mobility each one has with France, amongst other of their characteristics (Monga & Lin 2015). Since its creation during the French colonial empire, although the Franc zone adapted to the international context, its features such as the guaranteed convertibility of the CFA franc by the French treasury and the free movement of capital within the zone stayed the same.
For decades, these different elements were part of a debate that could be considered as an elitist debate, that is, as an elite-driven debate. This means that partaking in the debate was a privilege reserved to academics, intellectuals, and politicians, in both France and the aforementioned African states. The first Guinean president, Sékou Touré, wanted a real political and economic independence for Guinea (Conakry), thereby exiting the franc zone and creating the Guinean franc in 1960. Sylvanus Olympio, the first president of Togo, shared the same vision for his country but he will never be able to make it a concrete event due to his assassination. Another politician, the former president of the then two-decade-old Republic of Burkina Faso, Thomas Sankara (1985), during an interview for a review called “Peuples noirs, peuples africains” (“Black peoples, African peoples”) declared that:
9 “the CFA franc, linked to the French monetary system, is a weapon of French domination. The French capitalist merchant bourgeoisie built its fortune on the backs of our peoples through this bond, through this monetary monopoly. That is why Burkina [Faso] is fighting to put an end to this situation, and the struggle of our people, [in an attempt to] build a self-sufficient and independent economy. How much longer will this last? I cannot say”
(Mongo Beti – Peuples Noirs Peuples Africains n.d.).
Moreover, feu French economist and former president of the French association Survie, François-Xavier Verschave, denouncing the maintenance of policies inherited from the “theft of African independence”, argued that the CFA franc was a colonial currency, and now a neocolonial one (L’Humanite 2002). The West and Central African elite, as well as the French one, were the most involved in the matter, at the expense of the general public – the one using the currency, unaware of either its origins or mechanisms.
In the twenty-first century, however, founded by Kemi Seba, a French of Beninese origins, Urgences panafricanistes is, according to their website, an African-led NGO, whose main goal is to provide medical and educational help in conflict areas in Africa, and tackle the multiple challenges the African population and the diaspora face, thusly presenting itself as an alternative to Western NGOs, as well as to the African Union. According to their website, it is a continental African citizens’ movement (Urgences panafricanistes: Our story 2018). Nevertheless, and concomitantly, it has also become a political platform for social mobilization. At the beginning of 2017, it urged the African civil society to join the NGO in its fight against the CFA franc. January and February 2017 saw several French and Francophone cities, across Africa, Europe, and the Caribbean, populated by demonstrations from the African diaspora against what they consider to be the (monetary) colonial relic. Moreover, later in August, the same NGO called on the Francophone civil society of the African continent to mobilize against what they define as neocolonialism, that is, against Françafrique (Apres le FCFA, Urgences Panafricanistes appelle a la mobilisation contre la Françafrique 2017). Led by this individual, Kemi Seba, part of the Francophone African diaspora, the newly-formed NGO URPANAF allows the discussion, as well as the fight, to take place amongst the people. The implication of the Francophone African diaspora in the fight is a core element of this study. As a result, it is important to address one event that is part of the French history: colonization and the cultural assimilation policy.
When it came to colonization, France had a very distinctive colonial policy in Africa than other powers. It is only after the collapse of the monarchy, after France regained its democratic status under
10 the Third Republic (1870 – 1940), that the concept of civilizing the peoples became associated to colonizing (Conklin 1997; Aka 2017). France believed to have the superior culture, to represent the perfection of mankind, and thus believed to have a mission to civilize the indigenous peoples and elevate them from their primitive state (Aka 2017). This is summarized in its mission civilisatrice (Conklin 1997; Aka 2017). Therefore, during the colonial era, France developed a cultural assimilation policy that led to political, economic, military, and cultural control over its African colonial territories (Aka 2017). Assimilation meant that France forced its culture and civilization on the people with the intention of suffocating the culture and practices of the colonized peoples (Sıradağ 2014; Aka 2017). It was a process by which the primitives were to become French through an acculturation process (McNamara 1989; Aka 2017). The assimilation policy in Africa aimed at exploiting the territory and increase France’s international prestige (Fenwick 2009; Aka 2017). Since France saw its colonies as an extension of France, the indigenous peoples needed to be francisé, or turned as French as possible. French culture and identity became the culture and identity of the colonized (Aka 2017). As a result of forcing a culture on a group of people, thereby, as a result, not to say, as a response of losing one’s own culture, cultural movements may arise, and indeed have arisen when it comes to the African diaspora. Pan-Africanism, commonly defined as “the perception by people of African origins and descent that they have interests in common has been an important by-product of colonialism and the enslavement of African peoples by Europeans” (Adi & Sherwood 2003). Essentially a movement of ideas and emotions, Pan-Africanism has its roots in the diaspora, thus by definition, a group of widely-dispersed Africans who felt themselves physically, economically, socially, culturally, politically, and so on, distant from their homeland (Legum 1965). It strives for African unity and the regain of the dignity as a person of African ancestry (ibid.). Pan-African key features include a feeling of alienation, ambivalence towards the West, Black solidarity, feelings of inferiority, and subsequently, their rejection, resulting into a newly self-proclaimed pride in the African identity, and a desire to see an “Africa for the Africans” to take place (ibid.). While Pan-Africanism with the capital letter refers to the formal movement: the five Pan-African Congresses (1919 – 1945), pan-Africanism, without it, refers to the phenomenon itself in the broader sense of its use (Shepperson 1962; Walters 1997).
Following Adi and Sherwood (2003 vii)’s definition, when talking about the major pan-Africanist figures, this study will refer to the men and women of “African descent whose lives and work have been concerned [– to a certain extent –] to the [sociocultural] and political emancipation of African peoples and those from the African diaspora, [struggling against oppression and for liberation]”. These include, but are not limited to, Marcus Garvey, Cheick Anta Diop, Thomas Sankara, Modibo Keita, and Sylvanus Olympio.
11 Keeping away from racial discourses, this research will, however, use the term ‘Black’ and ‘White’ to refer to people from African and European descent, respectively. It recognizes the existence of one human race with varying degrees of a skin pigment content (melanin). But it will use them for the purpose of being somewhat direct. Nevertheless, because this research seeks to have a somewhat anthropological perspective, and this is due to the anthropological sensibilities this study is affected by, by no means will it disregard the obvious meaning that these labels carry out but will however recognizes the power of words and stands against such labels because of their divisive character and consequences they have to this day.
1.2 Research aim and objective and relevance of the research
As previously mentioned, the ongoing debate over the current existence and use of the CFA franc currency seems to be moving from an elite-driven debate to a people-centric discussion and fight. This research seeks, among other of its objectives, to investigate the dynamics surrounding that shift and provide an explanation for it. It argues that understanding the focal role of Kemi Seba’s NGO Urgences panafricanistes “front anti-franc CFA”, or anti-CFA franc movement, is key to understanding the dynamics surrounding the debate on the currency and the fight today, in this twenty-first century. It is because it is well-known that diasporas have a significant effect on their countries of origin and may indeed partake in their development that this research’s purpose is to study the implications of the (Francophone) African diaspora in what a supporter of the movement has come to define as an economic warfare (Koser 2003). That is why this research seeks to understand:
“In which ways is the Francophone African diaspora bringing the anti-FCFA movement into the twenty-first century and changing an elite-driven fight into a fight featuring the African civil society?”
This central question is at the basis of a months-long study on the anti-FCFA movement and is what sparked off this research. To address this research question, this research paper will first discuss the concept of social movement and explain why one can define this movement as a social movement. Then, it will introduce and discuss the concept of diaspora and define what is the Francophone African diaspora. Lastly, it will introduce the concept of cultural remittances to bridge the first two theories. By proceeding in this way and addressing the topic as such, this research seeks to have a new approach to the first two theories (social movement theory and diaspora theory) and move from a broader dynamic of social movement to a specific dynamic – the one generated by, and around, cultural
12 remittances. The three theories complement one another in a way that allows this study to get as close as it can to the depiction of reality. Not only is this reality the one experienced by individuals part of the Francophone African diaspora, who are either part of the movement or simply supporting it, but it is also the reality of the movement itself, which arose out of a desire to defend the interests of people (the ones living in fourteen West and Central African states and using the CFA franc currency) against an antagonist – whether it being the former French colonizer and/or the corrupted African leaders. The anti-FCFA advocates and supporters partake in a fight. One of their main objectives is to promote change in the CFA franc states. Besides, this new approach (the combination of three theories) also allows for this study to be inserted into the broader social movement studies and diaspora (including migration and transnationalism) studies.
Concerned by the lack of knowledge of Africans from the continent, as well as from those part of the (Francophone) African diaspora, on certain issues linked to their African heritage, this research conducted an investigation and analysis of the anti-FCFA movement, with a focus on the Francophone African diaspora. The objective is to share knowledge on the aforementioned dynamics of the social movement and insert its findings in the broader literature on (French) neocolonialism and (Francophone) diaspora activism, as well. Ultimately, this research seeks to understand in which ways is the Francophone African diaspora bringing the anti-FCFA movement into the twenty-first century and changing an elite-driven fight into a fight featuring the African civil society? Subsequently, this research will argue, after looking into the results and data gathered prior, during, and after the period of fieldwork, that this anti-FCFA movement, as a cultural remittance, has the potential to lead to (social) change and development first in the CFA franc states, and perhaps also in Africa.
13 Chapter 2: Theoretical framework
To answer the central question, three concepts will be drawn from the literature on migration, development, and transnationalism. These are social movement, diaspora, and cultural remittances. These concepts will be intentionally addressed in this order. The reason for this is twofold: firstly, it is because this research seeks to describe the anti-FCFA movement by moving from the broader theoretical framework and dynamic of the movement (social movement) to the most specific one (cultural remittance). Secondly, it is to explain the reason this study argues and claims that this social movement is also a cultural remittance itself. This is due to the implication of the Francophone African diaspora in the movement. As a result, the diagram thereafter perfectly illustrates the conceptualization and approach of this study to the dynamics surrounding the cultural remittance that is the twenty-first century anti-FCFA (social) movement:
14 2.1 Social movement
This research argues that the anti-FCFA movement is a social movement. After discussion of the concept, it will draw its conclusions, thereby supporting its argument that the anti-FCFA movement is indeed a social movement because of its nature, characteristics, and function.
The common definition of activism is “the actions of a group of like-minded individuals coming together to change the status quo, advocating for a cause, whether local or global, and whether progressive or not” (Cammaerts, 2007; Kahn and Kellner, 2004; Lomicky and Hogg, 2010; Halow 2011). Indeed, activism can encompass social movements (Harlow 2011). Arguably, the anti-FCFA franc movement is an example of activism performed by individuals belonging to the Francophone African diaspora.
Names like Charles Tilly, Ralph Turner, Melucci, or even McCarthy resonate in the literature on social movement. These scholars’ definition of a social movement each highlights a different aspect of the concept, namely a) the nature of social movements as networks of informal interaction; b) the idea that they are based on shared beliefs and solidarity; that c) there are fueled by a collective action on conflictual issues; and that d) the action undertaken is largely displayed outside the institutional sphere and the routine procedures of social life (Diani 1992: 7). According to Turner and Killian (1987:223), a social movement is “a collectivity acting with some continuity to promote or resist a change in the society”. The emphasis is both on the fact that it is a collectivity, which they intend as a group of individuals who have shifting and indefinite membership, as well as on the end goal of these individuals’ grouping, which is to achieve change (ibid.). They further explain that the legitimate authority of the movement is conferred by the informal response of adherents rather than by formal procedures (ibid.). Likewise, Melucci (1989: 29)’s definition indeed mentions the idea of collectivity; however, it highlights the existence of an antagonist with whom the collectivity engages in a conflict. For Touraine (1981:77), “the social movement is the organised collective behaviour of a class actor struggling against his class adversary for the social control of historicity in a concrete community”. With historicity consisting of the “overall system of meaning which sets dominant rules in a given society” (idem: 81). In the literature and definition of social movement, conflict is indeed a distinctive feature. However, its notion is understood differently by different scholars. While Touraine (ibid.), claims that the conflict takes place because of historicity, other scholars use the term conflict in a looser and more inclusive way. This research chimes with the latter approach to the term and thus will use the term ‘conflict’ in a looser way. It will legitimize its use based on the perceptions of the advocates and supporters of the movement. In other words, it is because the advocates and supporters of the movement perceive and believe to be engaged in a conflict that this research will
15 talk about an ongoing conflict. Social movements are not coterminous with ‘visible’ political conflicts (e.g. mobilizations and campaigns) (Melucci 1985). Nevertheless, this study shall address that public action that is the 2017 round of anti-FCFA demonstrations organized on three different continents (Africa, Europe, and (Latin) America).
Thus far, we have highlighted three elements to be considered as defining a social movement, namely the goal which is to produce change, by a group of people, who are in conflict with an antagonist in their society. Whereas Turner and Killian (1987:223) argue that a collectivity acts in concert to promote or resist change, thereby turning change (or the desire for change) into the potential motivation to join the movement, Polletta and Jasper (2001) bring forward identity as an incentive. Before delving into this discussion, it is noteworthy to clarify that the literature on social movement uses this following concept of collective identity to explain, amongst other, how social movements use collective identity to mobilize and recruit people (Taylor & Whittier 1992; Benford & Snow 2000; Polletta & Jasper 2001; Jasper & McGarry 2015). Indeed, collective identities may be constructed in a way that “allows organizers to persuade others to engage in action” (Jasper & McGarry 2015: 6). It is “a banner under which people can be mobilized for political, military, or other collective action” (idem: 1). Nevertheless, this research will not follow this approach to the concept. This is neither the main focus of the research nor does it seek to allude to this idea of leaders mobilizing people through a collective identity. Instead, this research seeks to understand the experience of a group of like-minded individuals who belong to the (Francophone) African diaspora: what is the experience they have with the(ir) collective (Francophone) (African) identity? Consequently, to account as best as it can, for this experience, the attention will not be on how so-called diasporic entrepreneurs deploy identity categories and frames to generate and maintain a – transnational – social movement (Lodder 2017). Rather, it will be on how these individuals perceive their identity by analyzing collective identity as an incentive for them to join the movement. To account as best as they can, for the formation of a social movement and participation in it, Polletta and Jasper explain how collective identity “captur[es] better the pleasures and obligations that actually persuade people to mobilize” (idem: 284). This means that the existence of affective bonds is, for some people, incentive enough to join a movement. Consequently, they define collective identity as “an individual’s cognitive, moral, and emotional connection with a broader community, category, practice, or institution. It is a perception of a shared status or relation, which may be imagined rather than experienced directly, and it is distinct from personal identities, although it may form part of a personal identity” (idem: 285). Not only does this definition highlight three more elements, but it enables to move to one of the core features of this research: the individuals behind the movement, the diaspora. In effect, the definition puts forward the notions of identity, sense of belongingness, and solidarity. Unsurprisingly, they are
16 notions that dovetail with the definition and different characteristics of a diaspora. These elements shall be discussed in the following section of this theoretical framework. Lastly, it is important to mention that “‘collective identity’ does not imply homogeneity of ideas and orientations within [the] social movement […].” (Diani 1992). This means that it is not because people are part of a movement that they all share exactly the same opinion on each issue or the same approach to them. Admittedly, identity is a social construction. This will be further elaborated in the subsequent section of this theoretical framework.
By following a certain logic, with identity and sense of belongingness come solidarity and commitment (Polletta & Jasper 2001: 291). In a specific context, according to Taylor and Whittier (1992), as well as Melucci (1984), collective identity and solidarity can be considered synonymous “[insofar] as it is hard to conceive the former without the latter [; it is hard to conceive] the sense of belongingness without sympathetic feelings associated with the perception of a common fate to share”. For individuals to engage in a collective behavior (e.g. simply joining a movement), there is a certain need to recognize themselves as sharing bonds, which, as argued by Fireman and Gamson (1979), increases the likelihood of solidaristic behavior. Therefore, a synthetic definition of social movements may run as follows: a social movement is a collective action by individuals who share a connection based on identity, sense of belongingness, and solidarity, and who engage in a fight against an antagonist in an attempt to promote or resist (social) change in the society. This leads to the second sub question of this study: what is the force driving and reviving this twenty-first century anti-FCFA movement?
17 2.2 Diaspora
In order to address the second sub question, it is important to define the concept of diaspora. Polletta and Jasper (2001) speak of an individual’s connection with a broader community. This broader community can as well be an organization, a kinship, an informal network, and so on. It could also be what Martin Sökefeld (2006: 267) defined as a transnational community, or a diaspora. This study will borrow and discuss this latter concept because it fits best with this case study.
Before discussing the main subjects of this research, that is, the Francophone African diaspora, one needs to know what a diaspora is and what significance the term holds to understand whether we can apply this concept to the people associating with or supporting the anti-CFA franc movement. Subsequently, if applicable, this research will then proceed to elaborate on its own conceptualization and definition of the Francophone African diaspora.
The term and concept of diaspora has slightly shifted over the years from its original meaning. From its classical and biblical use to its modern conceptualization made possible by globalization, when used, the term diaspora is synonym with dispersal of subjects from their place of origin (Cohen 2008: 1). Moreover, it also refers to an (out)look back to the (original) homeland. It was first used in reference to the Jewish experience, however, in the last century, it was “stretched to accommodate the various intellectual, cultural and political agendas in the service of which it has been enlisted” (Cohen 2008: 9). This classical definition does not apply to this case study, that is why the following step shall be to look into the literature developed in the sixties and seventies. In effect, this period is of relevance for this research because of the extension the term underwent to describe the dispersion of Armenians, Irish, and Africans – referred to as a ‘victim diaspora’ (Cohen 2008: 1). The term describes a dispersion of a group who experienced victimhood by a cruel oppressor (ibid). As a result, one can distinguish ‘two’ African diasporas, namely the ‘first’ one that was set into motion by the forcible transshipment (African slave trade) of millions of Africans, and the ‘second’ one (twentieth century), by decolonization and independence. This research shall consider both when talking about the Francophone African diaspora. The wave of decolonization created that ‘second’ category of diaspora, which was also prompted by post-colonial factors (e.g. civil war, political instability, and economic failure, amongst others). Still, “this ‘new’ African diaspora is more likely to identify with its post-colonial independent states”, which is the case for most subjects of this study (Cohen 2008: 123). Therefore, when talking about the Francophone African diaspora, this research considers the second generation of West Europeans (French and Belgian) whose origins (their parents’) are found in Francophone sub-Saharan Africa, that is, in former French colonies. In stretching the vital importance of the original homeland as key characteristic of a diaspora, professor and academic William Safran (1991: 83–4)’s contribution to the discussion on diaspora is significant. According to
18 him, one can speak of a diaspora when members of an ‘expatriate minority community’ share several of the following features:
“They, or their ancestors, have been dispersed from an original ‘center’ to two or more foreign regions;
they retain a collective memory, vision or myth about their original homeland including its location, history and achievements;
they believe they are not – and perhaps can never be – fully accepted in their host societies and so remain partly separate;
their ancestral home is idealized, and it is thought that, when conditions are favorable, either they, or their descendants should return;
they believe all members of the diaspora should be committed to the maintenance or restoration of the original homeland and to its safety and prosperity; and
they continue in various ways to relate to that homeland and their ethnocommunal consciousness and solidarity are in an important way defined by the existence of such a relationship”
(Safran 1991: 83 – 84).
Notwithstanding Safran’s step further in laying down the main characteristics of diasporas, it is both Martin Sökefeld’s contribution and Cohen’s, that are relevant to this research. For Cohen, a shared identity is a significant defining element of a diaspora. This, as well as other features will be addressed shortly and throughout the research project. Sökefeld’s addition to the literature on diaspora and its definition includes the diasporic mobilization – with an emphasis on this mobilization process – of a collective identity linked to the original homeland, however, whose sentiments of belongingness and attachment to the homeland is not given but rather intentionally mobilized (2006). This means that, according to Sökefeld (idem: 267), “[m]igrants do not necessarily form a diaspora but they may become [emphasis added] a diaspora by developing a new imagination of community”. In other words, a diaspora is not a given group solely and naturally originating from a distant home (idem: 268). In developing his argument, the scholar introduces the notion of imagined transnational community. He defines diasporas as “as imaginations of community that unite segments of people that live in territorially separated locations” (idem: 267). While he does not dwell on the transnational characteristic of the concept explaining that “the definition of diasporas as transnational imagined communities does not presuppose a high frequency of actual transnational social relationships [and that] the transnational quality of the community may be purely imaginary and symbolic” (idem: 268),
19 this research will briefly do so. Transnational community refers to “communities made up of individuals or groups that are established within different national societies, and who act on the basis of shared interests [of religious, linguistic or territorial nature, amongst others], and use networks to strengthen their solidarity beyond national borders” (Kastoriano 2000: 353). This definition indeed gives a proactive aspect to the diaspora, thereby taking into account the individuals considered part of the Francophone African diaspora, and who are at the epicenter of this research.
This research will not smile upon Sökefeld’s approach to the definition of a diaspora that counters the essentialist conception of a diaspora. This essentialist conception considers the diaspora as a natural consequence of migration, and puts forward the idea of mobilization processes. Rather, it will keep away from it. Nevertheless, it will follow his argument that “[t]here can be no diaspora community without a consciousness of diaspora [. I]n other words, [there can be no diaspora community] without an idea of a shared identity, of common belonging to [said] group” (Sökefeld 2006: 267). Similarly, it will also follow Cohen’s approach in defining a diaspora. For Cohen’s emphasis on collective identity as an essential feature applies to the individuals behind the anti-FCFA movement. Cohen (2008: table 1)’s consolidated list of the ‘common features’ of a diaspora will become the underpinnings of the analysis of the Francophone African diaspora:
20 The first, fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth points are the elements that will be investigated in the interviews. If, and once found to be shared by the subjects of this study, this research will use the term diaspora when talking about the adherents and supporters of the anti-FCFA movement.
One of the common features of a diaspora, according to Cohen’s consolidated list, is the “dispersal from an original homeland, often traumatically, to two or more foreign regions” (2008). Arguably, once a group dislocates from their place of origin and settle more or less permanently in another area, they automatically form a diaspora (Soysal 2000). In addition, there must be a continuing connection maintained with the homeland. This is where the notion of (collective) identity comes into play. The sixth point presents, as a common feature, the “strong ethnic group consciousness […] based on […] a common history, the transmission of a common cultural […] heritage and the belief of a common fate” (2008).
Moreover, not only may the dual identity experienced by the individual whose origins are found elsewhere than where (s)he lives lead him/her to experiencing a troubled relationship with the host society in some situations, but also that this troubled relationship, or “condition [of unacceptance] of the diaspora [by what they consider to be their home community …] may lead to the development of a return movement [such as Pan-Africanism]” (Cohen 2008: 166).
The definition of a diaspora also discusses the existence of a sense of empathy, co-responsibility with co-ethnic members in other countries of settlement (Cohen 2008). Admittedly, identity is an elusive concept. Rightly so as it involves self- and external definition (Diani 1992: 8). Individuals define themselves, but at the same time must be recognized by others as having that said identity. To be part of the Francophone African diaspora, not only must one feel as having an African identity, but they also need to be perceived as being a member of the African diaspora. Once one recognizes his/herself as belonging to that broader community, which has a common homeland, and shares an identity, it is their willingness to engage in their community that will turn them into diaspora members. As explained by Tsagarousianou, (2004: 59) what makes the distinction between ‘ethnic’ and ‘diasporic’ identity is the “readiness and willingness [of this group of people] to engage themselves with the building of a transnational imagination and connections that constitutes the ‘threshold’ from ethnic to diasporic identification”.
To close the discussion on the concept of diaspora, this research will introduce Sheffer (2003: 8)’s concept of “modern diaspora” to describe a community that has its origin in international migration movements while remaining aloof to their host country. In other words, a community formed by individuals whose motivations to leave their homeland were either tourism, studies, seasonal work, or temporary contracts (Cohen 2008: 123). These motivations increase the likelihood of being and remaining distant to the host community. Consequently, in this research, the Francophone African
21 diaspora will also refer to the experiences of individuals who are currently living in West Europe and whose choice and motivations to leave their place of origin are economic or educational (e.g. work or higher education).
Ultimately, to be considered a member of the ‘modern Francophone African diaspora’ in this case study, the subjects of this research shall share the following characteristics: be a second-generation migrant, live in a West European country, feel a somewhat strong ethnic group consciousness, be – to a certain extent – aloof to the host country, and have a sense of empathy and co-responsibility with co-ethnic members in other countries. Additionally, being bi- or multilingual is a feature of the modern Francophone African diaspora member.
Admittedly, identity is a pervasive, yet elusive concept. Rightly so as it involves self- and external definition (Diani 1992: 8). Different fields define and operationalize identity differently. In social sciences, identity includes racial, ethnic, social, religious, group, gender and sex role, cultural, physical, occupational and so forth. Race and ethnicity are amongst the most common category used by human beings to make sense of human reality. In other words, they are the most common category used to identify oneself and others (Cornell & Hartmann 2007: 12). Although it is a difficult task to distinguish race and ethnicity, which end up being used interchangeably, because this research recognizes one single race when it comes to human beings (the human race), it will not delve into any discussion regarding race. In effect, racist scientific research has allowed the distinction of humans based on race. But since this eighteenth/nineteenth century research has been proven to lack any biological basis, the only reason for race to still exist in certain discourses is because it wields monumental power as a social category (idem: 24). Despite and against this background, this research has no interest or intention to discuss it as a social category. For, as previously stated, it recognizes one single human race. Nevertheless, when it comes to ethnicity, it is worthy of discussion due to its meaning, but most importantly, due to its conceptualization and use. Ethnicity has (ancient) Greek roots. Ethnos in Greek means nation. But rather than referring to a political unity, this term refers to “the unity of persons of common blood and descent: a people” (idem: 16). The relevant character of this definition in this study is given by the nexus the research seeks to establish with the concept of diaspora. Clarifications on this matter will be given shortly. On the other hand, and more recently, German sociologist Max Weber (1978: 389 [1921]) posited that ethnic groups referred to “those human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities of physical type or of customs or both, or because of memories of colonization or migration”. The relevant element to be remembered is that whether blood relationship actually exists or not, the belief in that common descent is what matters. This belief is strongly linked to all the different elements
22 that make up what is broadly defined as culture. Shared culture is what makes an ethnic group. This means that an ethnic group is a group of people that distinguish itself from another group based on a common language, religion, practices, behaviors…etc. – commonly known as culture (Cornell & Hartmann 2007: 17). Furthermore, attention must be put on this element of belief in a common descent, due to the subjective character of ethnicity (how do I see myself?), as well as on the fact that if it is not the language that this group of people share, or the religion, it can be common practices, values, or behavior. These latter elements are not necessarily and strictly the same, and they may slightly differ to a certain extent, especially when migration is involved – as it is the case for a diaspora. Since the group has migrated, it has come into contact with another culture. Therefore, the degree of similarity in values, practices…etc. that an ethnic group in a country or place A has with the same ethnic group but in country or place B, will heavily depend on the degree of interaction, and thus integration, that these similar, but geographically distinct, ethnic groups have had with the society they encountered (A or B).
Lastly, according to expert in conflict management and U.S.–Africa relations and former representative of the United Nations Secretary General on Internally Displaced Persons, Francis Deng (1997):
“Ethnicity is more than skin color or physical characteristics, more than language, song, and dance. It is the embodiment of values, institutions, and patterns of behavior, a composite whole representing a people’s historical experience, aspirations, and world view. Deprive a people of their ethnicity, their culture, and you deprive them of their sense of direction or purpose.”
(ibid.).
His words and intervention interact with the historical event that is the French cultural assimilation policy and its consequences. This nexus will be further explored in the Chapter 5 of this study. Because this research is concerned with analyzing and reporting the anti-FCFA (social) movement and its dynamics, which include the people part or surrounding the movement, the reader will partake in a journey wherein the definition of the African ethnicity/African identity will be constructed, given, argued, and discussed first by the advocates and supporters of the movement. However, with the intervention of the researcher.
In conclusion, a diaspora cannot be confined to the definition of a displaced and dispersed group of people. What makes the concept relevant to use and confers its legitimate use, is an awareness of a shared identity, or strong group consciousness based on historical and cultural elements, with the
23 acknowledgment of a common fate. As a result, we identify a certain involvement from diaspora members in the matters regarding the homeland and a desire to engage, either actively or passively, in a process (or movement in this case) of change. This homeland may also be historical. This means that, in this case study, as second-generation migrants born in West Europe, they consider France or Belgium as their homeland. However, they also identify their parents’ country of origin as home - whether they have lived in it, visited, or not, as well as associate with the post-colonial independent state.
24 2.3 Social/cultural remittances
This study discussed and defined a social movement as emerging to promote or resist change, by a group of people, who are in conflict with an antagonist in their society. This study features the implications of a certain type of migrants, the diaspora, in the transnational movement that is the anti-FCFA movement.
It is now uncontested that migrants have an influence in the matters of their homeland (e.g. during social protests or elections) (Lacroix et al. 2016). This influence is the result of the interactions migrants maintain with their sending society (ibid.). Diasporas are one type of migrants and the migrants featuring this study indeed have a diasporic experience that offers them the space and perspective to comprehend their own individual and collective [identity] (Flores 2007). Indeed, the identity of a diaspora “develops in relation to all communities they are part of” (Levitt 1998). Still, two distinguishing features of a diaspora are their claim to their national or ancestral and cultural heritage – once abroad – as well as their willingness to engage in their original community.
Studies on migration and development demonstrated the significant impact that diasporas may have on their countries of origin through their socioeconomic linkages (Koser 2003). As a result, and following Bercovitch (2007: 33-36)’s distinctions, we can identify three categories of activities that diasporas engage in in conflict, namely economic, political, and social. While this research will briefly discuss the economic and political category, it will be mainly focused on the social one. For one of the objectives of this research is to explain how this Francophone African diaspora is attempting at promoting change in its homeland through a cultural remittance: the anti-FCFA movement.
When it comes to the role of migrants/diaspora in the development of their homeland, the literature on transnationalism, migration and development describe that nexus through economic remittances. In effect, this should not come as a surprise in a world dominated by capitalism. Economic remittances are significant and involve considerable sums (Gubert, Lassourd & Mesplé-Somps 2010). According to the World Bank, migrant remittances and philanthropic transfers amounted to US $338 billion a year globally (2009). Last year remittances to sub-Saharan Africa grew to $38 billion (idem 2018). Indeed, there is a widespread recognition of the role diasporas play in the development of their home areas (Cohen 2008). Yet, remittances consist of both monetary and non-monetary transfers (named financial remittances) as well as ideas, values, and modes of action (named social remittances) (Anghel et al. 2015). In fact, by solely focusing on economics, one might miss out on important factors, dynamics, and change. Included in these non-monetary transfers are political remittances. They are defined by Fitzgerald (2000) as “representing the changes in political identities, demands
25 and practices nurtured by new political ideas and values of returning migrants into their homeland” (see Markley 2011: 367). This concept could as well be applied to the social movement featuring this research. Nevertheless, it will not because the attention is on the implications of the Francophone African diaspora and the sociocultural sensibilities they experience. By observing their implication, this study takes into consideration the diasporic experience lying behind this twenty-first century movement. This study argues that these implications can be best perceived, analyzed, and discussed using the concept of cultural remittances that will be introduced subsequently.
The concept of social remittances was first introduced by sociologist Peggy Levitt in 1998. She used it to describe the local-level, migration-driven form of cultural diffusion. Social remittances represent ideas, identities, values, behaviors, and social capital (knowledge, experience and expertise) exchanged from receiving- to sending- country communities (Levitt 1998). These social remittances are not unidirectional, but rather, they are iterative circulatory exchanges (Lacroix et al. 2016). This means that they circulate between sending and receiving societies, back to the sending societies, and so on so forth.
As previously introduced, remittances consist of both monetary and non-monetary transfers. Social remittances are an example of non-monetary transfers. According to Levitt (1998: 927), they are noteworthy because they play an important role in “transnational collectivity formation [; …] they bring social impacts of migration to the fore [; …] and because they are potential community development aid”. It is this latter element that this research suggests and hypothesizes about the anti-FCFA movement. In which ways this anti-anti-FCFA movement has the potential for community development aid? “[Social remittances] are part and parcel of an ongoing process of cultural diffusion” (Levitt 2005: 3). It is important to distinguish them from global cultural flows. This distinction, as explained by Levitt (ibid.) herself, can be based on four features. They are the identifiable pathways (clear source and destination), their systematic and intentional transmission to a specific group or recipient (“People know when and why they changed their mind about something or began to act in a different way” (ibid.)), the likelihood that their transmission will rather take place between individuals who know themselves, and finally, their timing (ibid.).
Deepening the discussion on the third main concept, this study will now elaborate on the three categories of social remittances, namely the normative structures, the systems of practice, and the social capital (Levitt 1998). The normative structures are the ideas, beliefs, values, as well as identities migrants observe and/or later develop in the receiving countries, which they remit back. Normative structures create the systems of practice. These practices include patterns of civic, civil and/or political participation (ibid.). Finally, social capital is commonly described as social networks
26 (“networks of civic engagement”) and associated norms that have an effect on the productivity of the community, as well as knowledge (Coleman 1988; Bourdieu 1993; Putnam 1993; Grootaert 1998).
Social remittances are created from the interaction between the migrant and the host society, thereby becoming the result of that interaction. As a matter of fact, migrants bring with them sets of values, practices, norms, behaviors, and so on, when they move. These sets influence the depth or simply level of exposure of the migrant to the new society, which, in turn, influences what they actually send back home (Levitt 1998). According to Levitt and Lamba (2011), “migrants’ experiences from their home countries have a strong influence on how they settle in the new culture which, in
turn, affects what they subsequently remit back home” (see Markley 2011: 368). Furthermore, according to Levitt herself, “you [cannot] understand what happens to someone in a country of settlement if you don’t consider their enduring ties to their country of origin.” (Grabowska 2015). This is why this research focuses on the experience of these individuals part of the diaspora and who feel part of it. Levitt (1998) argues that migrants who interact more with the host society learn more about different features of the new culture and reflect more deeply on existing practices. The dynamics are worthy of attention when it comes to diasporas insofar as the interaction of the second-generation migrant, for instance, with his/her society is higher than for a regular migrant. The reflections that take place are a result of constant and continuous comparison and contrasting between the ideas, values, norms, and behaviors associated to their culture of origin (whether it being theirs or their parents’) and the ones of the society they currently reside in or were reared in. It is this process that allow them to learn easily, to a certain extent, the new ideas, values…etc. that they remit back to the home communities.
Based on her findings, Levitt (1998) developed and introduced a spectrum. This spectrum organizes the migrants based on their level of contact with the host society. She distinguishes three categories, therefore, levels of contact, namely the recipient observers, the instrumental adapters, and the purposeful innovators. The recipient observers had little to no contact with the host society because of their life’s structure (they stay with their community once they arrive in the host society) that did not bring them close enough to it (ibid.). Instead, the instrumental adapters were more involved in the host society through their work and a more active participation in the new society. Finally, the purposeful innovators, unlike the recipient observers, aggressively searched for new elements to absorb and get ahead in the new society (ibid.).
Nevertheless, in the case of a diaspora, the interaction with the host society is more likely to happen at a deeper level than Levitt’s, (even) more so when the individuals grow up in their parents’ host society, which becomes their home society, until they are reminded that they do not fully belong to
27 it. This leads to this research’s subsequent step to discuss the levels of contact when it comes to diasporas. Based on this research’s findings, this study will suggest its own spectrum of levels of contact. To do so, it uses the aforementioned two categories of Francophone African diaspora members. To align with Levitt’s categories that are based from a lower degree of interaction to a higher one, we will first introduce the second category of Francophone African diaspora members who are individuals who came to Europe because of either tourism, studies, seasonal work, or temporary contracts, also qualified by Sheffer (2003) as modern diaspora. Then, there is the first category who are those who were born in West Europe from parents who come from an African country. We establish the first category as first, and the second as such, as a follow-up of the discussion on diaspora, which distinguished between historical Francophone African diaspora and modern Francophone African diaspora. Admittedly, different levels of contact affect social remittance emergence (Levitt 1998). From these levels, “several patterns of social remittance evolution resulted, most common among, though not restricted to, these three patterns of social interaction” (idem: 931). Either the elements of the migrants’ sociocultural tools remained unchallenged, or added to their repertoire, or even abandoned, respectively.
Entering this debate on social remittances, Juan Flores (2007) coins the term cultural remittances. He believes that in the discussion on social remittances, culture is reduced to behavior. Consequently, it is not examined “in relation to the national ideologies and cultures of either “host” or “sending” countries” (Flores 2007). Thus, he supplements and sharpens Levitt’s concept by what he termed as “cultural remittances” (ibid.). This research will use his terminology as it fits best this case study. For this new concept takes into account the diasporic transnational life. As a matter of fact, to supplement the concept of social remittances, Flores took into consideration the cultural sensibilities and realities of diaspora members, or better, the very nature of this diasporic identity and experience with it. There are questions of identity, authenticity and group belongingness that arise from members of a diaspora. The emphasis is on the relationship that these migrants have with their identity, which, “develops in relation to all communities that they are part of” (Markley 2011: 375). This means that it is essential to consider their national belonging “disengaging it from its presumed territorial and linguistic imperative” (Flores 2007).
Consequently, Flores (2007) defines cultural remittances as "the ensemble of ideas, values, and expressive forms introduced into societies of origin by re migrants and their families […]”. Social remittances exchanges occur “when migrants return to live in or visit their communities of origin; when non-migrants visit those in the receiving country; or through exchanges of letters, videos, cassettes, e-mails, and telephone calls” (Levitt 1998). Similarly, cultural remittances exchanges occur
28 as diaspora members return 'home,' sometimes for the first time, for temporary visits or permanent re-settlement, and as transmitted through the increasingly pervasive means of telecommunications" (Flores 2007). Actual physical proximity is not required for [cultural] remittance transfers (Amin 2002). To account, as best as it can, for the dynamics surrounding the twenty-first century anti-FCFA movement, the exchange will be observed and analyzed looking at social networks as means of communications.
2.4 Social media
According to Bauböck and Faist (2010: 261), “[t]he internet constitutes a new realm and new possibilities for communication, representation and imagination, as migrants are often otherwise excluded from the public sphere or mainstream media”. When considered as a meeting point, it can also reflect the different levels of migrant interaction. They further explain that “[o]nline platforms are used for personal discussions between friends, the organisation of community activities or the publication of alternative information about the home country’s or diaspora’s situation” (ibid.). It is for this reason that this study will consider Facebook, as an online platform, wherein cultural remittance exchanges occur.
29 2.5 Conceptualization of theoretical framework
There are three strands of social movement theory. One focuses on the political process (Tarrow 1994), the second one on resource mobilization (Edwards & McCarthy 2004), and the third one on cultural aspects. This third strand has a more ‘movement-centric’ approach to social movements and this research shall follow this approach. According to Williams, “the facets that are studied are the movement, the people that are part of it and meanings associated with the movement” (2004: 94-95). As a result, the first result chapter (Chapter 4) will discuss the movement and the people who partake in it. It will feature the analysis of the movement as a social movement based on the definitions of social movements that identify the promotion or resistance of a change in the society, and the concept of a collectivity, or group of like-minded individuals as key features. Chapter 5 will discuss the concept of diaspora with the perception that the individuals themselves have of that concept, as well as their experience with the concept. Moreover, the second subsection shall discuss the Francophone African diaspora and the idea of solidarity, while the third one will discuss the relationship the advocates and supporters of the movement have with their (collective) African identity. This research will define and conceptualize the latter identity in symbiosis and in harmony with the perceptions and experiences of the individuals behind the movement. The intention of this subsection is to further prove to what extent the anti-FCFA movement is indeed a social movement. The last result chapter, Chapter 6, will elaborate on this research’s innovative approach to the anti-FCFA movement as a cultural remittance. That is, by considering the anti-FCFA as a cultural remittance, it considers it as a social movement with the values, norms, ideas, and identity it carries and represents as being remitted back to the home communities (the CFA franc states). We have mentioned a group of like-minded individuals. They are part of what this research claims to be the (Francophone) African diaspora. While the literature on diaspora activism overtly discusses diasporic mobilization, that is, how a diaspora can be and is frequently mobilized through collective identity, this research seeks to understand how a group of like-minded individuals belonging to the African diaspora is engaging in its activism. It seeks to do so by looking at the experience of this group of people in relation to the(ir) collective identity. Consequently, to account as best as it can, the attention will not be on how so called diasporic entrepreneurs deploy identity categories and frames to generate and maintain a – transnational – social movement (Lodder 2017). Rather, it will be on how these individuals perceive their identity by analyzing collective identity as an incentive for them to join the movement. Interviews are a – not to say the best – tool to gather empirical data when it comes to a social research on the behavior, activities…etc. of human beings. The aforementioned experience with the collective identity was unraveled through interviews. Indeed, to account, as best as it can, for the ideas, values, and identities that the anti-FCFA movement transmits back to the home communities, this research
30 conducted a combination of structured and narrative interviews. Østergaard-Nielsen concluded that migrant activities in relation to host and home country ‘must be measured with a finely meshed tool (2002: 200). Kissau and Hunger explained in their chapter (13) “[how] the internet could be just such a finely meshed tool, constituting an appropriate research site for advancing the study and comprehension of migrant networks and influence abroad” (2010: 246). This research espouses that vision, as well as such approach to migration, diaspora and transnational studies. Therefore, its approach to the transnational movement that is the anti-FCFA movement follows theirs. To understand how cultural remittance exchanges occur without physical proximity, this research will look into one of its respondents’ experience with his Facebook post and how it was shared, thereby spreading the information on the 2017 round of demonstrations against the currency.
This research will look into the implications of the diaspora. That is, since it seeks to investigate how the Francophone African diaspora bring the movement into the twenty-first century and change the elite-driven fight into a fight featuring the African civil society, it will now conclude with three sub questions designed to tackle the broader research question:
1) What is essentially the purpose of this social movement?
2) What is the experience of the Francophone African diaspora with its diasporic identity and is African identity?
3) To what extent could the anti-FCFA movement be a cultural remittance? And what are the implications of a diaspora: How is the diasporic identity/ how is the diaspora moving the fight from an elite-driven fight to the people?
31 Chapter 3: Methodology
3.1. Design and respondents
I have chosen a qualitative design with ten interviews. This research aims at observing and analyzing the (dynamics surrounding the) anti-FCFA movement, as well as understanding how a diasporic (African) identity may revive a twentieth century-social movement, thereby making this movement an example of social movement, and simultaneously, an example of how cultural remittances have the potential for change in the home communities.
A combination of structured and narrative interviews was key in gathering the necessary data for this research. These interviews were mainly face-to-face interviews, and were conducted in two West European countries, that is, France and Belgium. Admittedly, the choice of the countries was made on a stereotypical basis connected to where the Francophone African diaspora resides, or in other words, in Francophone countries, on the one hand. On the other hand, it is where most of the coordinators of the movement resided or were present in at the moment of the fieldwork research period (April – May 2018). Only one interview was conducted via Skype to one of the coordinators of the movement who organized the demonstration against the currency last year in Hamburg. He lives in Frankfurt, Germany. Another interview was conducted through WhatsApp exchanges. The difficulty in conducting the interviews arose when attempting to schedule the interviews and make them last an hour. Some were contacted on a short notice, and in spite of that, the interviewees agreed to meet. Others were very busy, but still found some time (e.g. 30 minutes) to devote to this research. The questions that were elaborated and asked were drawn from the literature on social movement, diaspora, and social/cultural remittances, therefore, from the theoretical framework accordingly. In addition, it is essential to mention why the concept of diaspora became a source for investigation and one of the foundations of this study. Stellio Gilles Robert Capo Chichi, a.k.a Kemi Seba founded the NGO URPANAF that initiated and oversaw the anti-FCFA round of demonstrations in 2017. He is part of the Francophone African diaspora. His experiences with his dual identity, his membership to the Francophone African diaspora, racism, and other aspects/events made him the man he is today: a pan-African political activist for the African cause. His background and experience are shared by an unmeasurable number of Africans, especially in France. As a result, some questions regarding both the concept of diaspora, as well as the concept of cultural remittances that were elaborated were also drawn from his experience and autobiographic elements he shared in his book “Supra-negritude” (Seba 2013).
32 A number of people were contacted for this research project, with only 10 respondents whose experiences are shared in the result section. The interviews were conducted to individuals who have been at the forefront of the mobilization (those who have coordinated the demonstrations against the CFA franc or were supervising the unfolding of events) in Paris, Hamburg, and Brussels. Other interviews were conducted to those who participated in the mobilization in the aforementioned European cities or simply support the movement. As already mentioned, the research was predominantly carried out in France and Belgium, over a three-week period of fieldwork. The interviews took place in the cities of Paris, Brussels, and Mons. The interviewees were as diverse in terms of occupation (e.g. from Bachelor students to unemployed young people and from authors to credit controllers in a firm).
33 3.2 Operationalization of theoretical framework
The questions that were elaborated and asked were drawn from the literature on social movement, diaspora, and social/cultural remittances, therefore, from the theoretical framework accordingly. Moreover, when it comes to the questions asked that will be at the basis of the last result chapter that is on the creation and transmission of cultural remittances (Chapter 6), they were elaborated based on Kemi Seba’s experience. The intention was to investigate to what extent those engaged in this movement he founded as a result of his life path, shared a similar experience with their host society (mainly France). These questions include:
- The claims of the movement: what is the movement about according to them? (Ad. 2.2) - Whether the respondents considered themselves part of the Francophone African diaspora?
And if yes, why? (Ad. 2.3)
- Whether they feel accepted in the country they currently reside in? (Ad. 2.2)
- What is their relationship with their dual identity? (e.g. What is their relationship with their African heritage/roots/culture? To what extent they perceive as having received the values of the country they reside in?) (Ad. 2.3)
- How did they first learn about the CFA franc and its mechanisms? About the anti-FCFA movement? (Ad. 2.4)
- Where do they think their engagement toward the movement comes from? (Ad. 2.3)
- How do they interact and communicate with the people back home (for example)? (Ad. 2.4) - Do they think that they have an obligation? Do they feel obliged because of their knowledge,
to teach others or to communicate it and interact with their communities (host and home communities)? (Ad. 2.3; Ad. 2.4)
