Commodification of “Migrants”: the Paradoxical Relation
between Neoliberal Freedom and Racial Oppression
A critical discourse analysis of Dutch politicians on “migration” during the campaigns of the 2017national elections
Author: Supervisor:
Rikki Hendriks Dr. Luis Manuel Hernández Aguilar
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science Sociology
Migration and Ethnic Studies July 6, 2020
ABSTRACT
As migrant-hostile discourses with overt racist statements persist in the Netherlands, neoliberalism is often presented as an objective equalizer. However, this research shows that although neoliberalism is often thought of as solely located in economic sites, the centrifugal forces of neoliberalism can also be present in sites of individuals, where it functions as a cover-up and as a justification for racism. The literature on migration in the Netherlands either focusses on neoliberalism or on racism. This critical discourse analysis fills this gap in the literature by focusing on the intersection between neoliberalism and racism in migration discourses, while examining the discourses of Dutch politicians during the campaigns of the 2017 national elections. This research views “migration” as a floating signifier (Hall, 1996); discourses on migration can thus be sites where racism can emerge. In the same vein,
politicians often talk about “migrants” while implicitly indicating those who not belong, such as Muslims, or migrants from specific regions. This research shows how neoliberal commodification is examined with politicians who attribute value and utility to migrants, while creating a distinction between groups of migrants and placing them on a hierarchy based on their perceived utility to society. Unequal treatment of “migrants” at the bottom of this hierarchy is justified by the accusation that they are not “autonomous” enough; a character trait that is highly valued in a neoliberal age. However, because integration obligations are solely placed on certain groups of migrants, and these integration demands are hard, if not impossible, the concept of autonomy is used as an excuse for their exclusion. Furthermore, the neoliberal belief in a meritocratic society prevents policies to combat the persistence of racism in Dutch society.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
List of abbreviations ____________________________________________________________ 4 1. Introduction ________________________________________________________________ 5 2. Literature review _____________________________________________________________ 9
2.1 Differential racism _________________________________________________________ 7 2.2 Who makes the population? _________________________________________________ 11 2.3 State violence and the state of exception _______________________________________ 13 2.4 Communitarianism and autonomy ____________________________________________ 15 2.5 Post-racialism and racial capitalism ___________________________________________ 19
3. Methodology _______________________________________________________________ 21 3.1 Methods ________________________________________________________________ 21 3.2 Data ___________________________________________________________________ 23 3.3 Procedure _______________________________________________________________ 24 3.4 Trustworthiness __________________________________________________________ 25 4. Results ____________________________________________________________________ 27
4.1 Commodification: the hierarchy of migrant labels _______________________________ 27 4.2 Commodification intersects with racism: state of exception ________________________ 30 4.3 Autonomy: self-sufficiency and independency as desirable traits ____________________ 33 4.4 Autonomy intersects with racism: communitarianism _____________________________ 33 4.5 Meritocracy intersects with racism: post-racialism _______________________________ 38 4.6 Instrumentalization as a vital link between neoliberalism and racism _________________ 40
5. Conclusion ________________________________________________________________ 42 Bibliography _________________________________________________________________ 46
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
CDA CDA is short for “Christen-Democratisch Appèl”, which translates in “Christian-Democratic Appeal”. CDA is a Christian party and can be labeled as center-right and conservative.
D66 D66 is short for “Democraten 66”, which translates in “Democrats 66”. The “66” refers to 1966, the year that the party was established. D66 is a progressive, social liberal party.
GroenLinks GroenLinks is the only party that does not use abbreviations but is still included in this list for the benefit of giving an overview of the political parties. GroenLinks translates in “GreenLeft”. It is a progressive left party that has environmental issues as its main pillar.
NOS NOS is short for “Nederlandse Omroep Stichting”, which translates in “Dutch Broadcasting Foundation”. NOS traditionally hosts the debates between political leaders the night before elections.
PvdA PvdA is short for “Partij van de Arbeid”, which translates in “Labour Party”. The party expresses a center-left ideology.
PVV PVV is short for “Partij Voor de Vrijheid”, which translates in “Party for Freedom”. It is a populist and nationalist party that is known for its negative view of Islam and “migration”.
VVD VVD is short for “Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie”, which translates in “People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy”. VVD is known for its economic liberalism. Their leader Mark Rutte has been the prime minister of the Netherlands since October 2010.
1. Introduction
This study investigates the intersections between neoliberalism and racism by focusing on the migration discourses of Dutch politicians. During the last couple of decades, many political debates surrounding migration have led to heated arguments wherein racism becomes clearly visible. I aim to uncover racism in discourses of Dutch politicians by researching its intersection with neoliberalism. I operationalized neoliberalism by focusing on the concepts of autonomy, commodification,
instrumentalization, and meritocracy. Several intersections between racism and neoliberalism are found; these concepts are used to create, justify, or cover-up racism in migrant-hostile discourses.
Much of the literature on migration (Joppke, 2007; Van Houdt, Suvarierol & Schinkel, 2011) pays attention to a shift whereby neoliberalism is replacing racism in policies and discourses on migration. The study aims to investigate if and how neoliberalism intersects with racism in migration discourses of Dutch politicians. Neoliberalism is often thought of as solely related to economic values that have nothing to do with racism and exclusion. However, there are multiple ways in which
neoliberal values can spread out to non-economic sites, and can thus intersect with racism. As a consequence, the literature on migration discourses in the Netherlands focuses explicitly on either racism or neoliberalism. This study hopes to fill a gap in the literature by investigating the intersection between these two concepts.
Racism embodies a multitude of concepts. To narrow down and define racism in the context of this research, I have used aspects of racial capitalism and differential racism. Moreover, cultural essentialism and cultural fundamentalism are important concepts: subsequently, this entails the belief that cultures are bounded and homogeneous (Grillo, 2003), and the belief in a hierarchy and
incompatibility amongst those cultures (Siebers & Dennissen, 2015). These aspects are relevant because they relate to the migrant-hostile discourses in the Netherlands. For example, Islamophobia can be justified when it does not include aspects of biology-based racism. This justification contributes to the belief that post-racialism, and with this, a meritocracy, is an already achieved reality in the Netherlands. In this vein, according to Rachel Simon-Kumar (2015, p. 1180): “The modern, neoliberal society that transcends societal constraints purportedly negates race but, in reality, masks the
emergence of new forms of racism.” Furthermore, the belief in a post-racialism society can cause a lack of policies that combat institutional racism and discrimination in Dutch society and a disbelief in experiences with racism in daily life.
To expose the intersection between neoliberalism and racism, I choose to study the migration discourses of Dutch politicians—specifically, the discourses prior to the Dutch national elections of March 15, 2017. Elections are a highly performative time wherein discourses such as racism and neoliberalism can more easily be studied. The party programs of the five biggest parties are studied: CDA, D66, GroenLinks, PVV, and VVD. These data are supplemented with debates between the
leaders of these parties, broadcasted the night before the elections by Dutch public broadcaster NOS, and a television interview with PVV-leader Geert Wilders.
Migration discourses are a good fit for this study because migration was among the key issues during the 2017 elections. Migrants escaping from the Syrian conflict, later labeled as the “migration-crisis” of 2015, still influenced the political debate at this time. The gravity of this topic was also visible in the first formation attempt after the elections—the attempt backfired due to different
opinions on migration topics. In addition to this, migration discourses have the ability to highlight new forms of racism. This has been argued by Encarnación Gutiérrez Rodríguez (2018), who demonstrates how racism can emerge through hostile migration discourses in contemporary Europe:
Thus within the media rhetoric of the “refugee crisis,” the signifier of the “refugee” works as a “floating signifier” representing the anxieties and fears of what the media conceived as the majority of the population, regularly imagined as white, German, abled, cis-gendered, national bodies (Gutiérrez Rodríguez, 2018, p. 19).
Stuart Hall (1996) argues that race can take on many forms and the places where racism emerges therefore constantly evolve. His line of thinking shows the primary relevance of this research: for the benefit of combatting and exposing racism, one must always be on the look-out for new discursive sites where racism can emerge. In addition, studies on racism in the political discourse mainly focus on populist parties, such as the PVV in the Netherlands. But racism is more complex than the racism found in these populist discourses; thus, in this study, different forms of racism are found in the data on the other parties. Uncovering racism by studying its intersection with neoliberalism in migration discourses fulfills these goals.
This study aims to address the following research question: “How do neoliberalism and racism intersect in the migration discourses of Dutch politicians during the campaigns of the 2017 national elections?” Sub-questions complementing the main line of inquiry are:
- How are the neoliberal concepts of autonomy, commodification, instrumentalization, and meritocracy visible in the migration discourses of Dutch politicians during the campaigns of the 2017 national elections?
- How do the neoliberal concepts of autonomy, commodification, instrumentalization, and meritocracy intersect with racism in the migration discourses of Dutch politicians during the campaigns of the 2017 national elections?
- How are different migrant labels constructed through the migration discourses of Dutch politicians during the campaigns of the 2017 national elections?
By and large, neoliberalism is a rather broad term, which has to be narrowed down to outline the research field. The terms autonomy, commodification, instrumentalization, and meritocracy, are used to define neoliberalism within the migration discourses, because they are broadly used to identify neoliberalism in migration and citizenship literature. Subsequently, these terms are further explained in relation to migration and neoliberalism.
• Autonomy: To be autonomous signals being able to independently contribute to society and to “integrate” into society without the help of the government.
• Commodification: The process of attributing financial values to individuals, turning people into interchangeable commodities.
• Instrumentalization (of the law): The process of states using their power for their own benefit or the suspected use of power and laws with another intent than the intent that states
communicate.
• Meritocracy: A political system that attributes goods and power to individuals solely based on their merit. This relates to the idea that every individual in a society has the same chances of achieving upward mobility.
The different terms that politicians use to indicate different “migrants”1 play a significant role in the
intersections between neoliberalism and racism. To signify that the political discourse constructs these groups of “migrants”, I use the term “migrant label”. The neoliberal concept of commodification is vital in the creation of these migrant labels and their placement on a hierarchy of desirability. The perceived social or economic utility of migrants guides their level of desirability. This hierarchy can be identified through the context in which these migrant labels are placed. For example, strict integration demands are solely discussed when labels such as “refugees”, “asylum seekers”, Muslim “migrants”, or “migrants” from certain regions are used. The commodification that creates this hierarchy is significant for the intersection between neoliberalism and racism. Moreover, the
justification for this hierarchy displays another intersection: both fears of social dissolution and fear of terrorism are used to justify this commodification of individuals. The fear of social dissolution is constructed of a strong sense of communitarianism, that can operate as an excluding mechanism when autonomy comes into play; migrants who are obliged to integrate often have to meet unfeasible
1 I use the terms “migrant” and “migration” with inverted commas when appropriate; in this research, the
“migration” operates as a floating signifier, as elaborated by Hall (1996). Moreover, Dutch citizens who are, for example, Muslim, are included in migration discourses, although not being a migrant. The inverted commas are only used when appropriate.
requirements, such as “getting rid of your own identity” (PVV, 2016). Subsequently, politicians blame so-called failures of integration upon the migrant for not being autonomous enough. Besides, linking specific migrant labels to fear of terrorism causes xenophobia directed to these groups. An
instrumental way of governing is vital in the process of intersecting neoliberalism and racism. For example, only the migrant labels at the bottom of the hierarchy need to integrate, whereas others are exculpated from the requirement. Because this division is irrelevant to the purpose of integration, these integration discourses are used in an instrumental way—to exclude the unwanted citizen. These discursive intersections show how the neoliberal concepts of meritocracy, autonomy,
instrumentalization, and commodification are used to create, cover-up, and justify racism.
Furthermore, in order to uncover the intersections between neoliberalism and racism, I use critical discourse analysis. This method has the ability to uncover power structures by studying the language that constructs these structures. In the benefit of critically approaching political discourses, I use some elements of the “What’s the problem represented to be?” approach (Bacchi, 2012); this research focusses on how politicians construct and represent a problem, instead of the actual problem itself. Studying migration discourses can expose bigger power structures such as racism, by critically assessing the negative framing of certain migrant labels by the political discourse.
In the first section of this thesis, I give an overview of the literature on differential racism and neoliberalism while focusing on migration discourses in the Netherlands. In this section, I address the gap in the literature on citizenship, migration, and racism, which illustrates the relevance and urgency of this research. In the methodology section, I justify the choices on methods, data, and the procedure of this research. Thereafter, the main findings are discussed. In the conclusion, I present an overview of the study findings and discuss possible venues for further research on these topics.
2. Literature review
In the literature on neoliberalism, a culturalization of racism and citizenship is identified. In order to define and narrow down the concept of racism, I present different aspects of differential racism in the first section. The commodification of migrant labels relates to Foucault’s (2007) view on “statistics”, which I elaborate on in the second section. The third section shows how a state of exception2 can be
one of the consequences of a hierarchy of migrant labels. Communitarianism, a form of population management that emphasizes the connection between the community and the individual (Rose, 1999), and the neoliberal concept of autonomy are touched upon in the fourth section. The final section shows how elements of racial capitalism and a post-racialism society intersect with meritocracy. 2.1 Differential racism
Several definitions of racism have been proposed in the literature. Since the definition of racism varies among researchers, it is important to clarify how the term is constructed in a way that fits best for this research. The view on racism in this thesis is partly lent from the concept of differential racism, or cultural racism. I adopt differential racism because it can relate to the migrant-hostile discourse, which is the focus of this work. Moreover, the culturalization of race is argued to be characteristic of post-racialism, which is said to belong to a neoliberal age (Lentin & Titley, 2011). Post-racialism is discussed in a later section of the literature review. In this section, I review the literature on differential racism with a particular focus on migration and the Netherlands.
Differential racism is different from biology-based racism in the sense that racism is found in cultural elements, instead of natural or biological elements (Lentin & Titley, 2011). Alana Lentin and Gavan Titley (2011) argue that this form of racism exists through the experience of too much
uncomfortable proximity through immigration. The belief that cultures can be superior to one another, and that some cultures should not co-exist in the same state, relates to differential racism (Lentin & Titley, 2011). According to Hans Siebers and Marjolein Dennissen (2015), differential racism is mainly ascribed to migrant-hostile discourses in Europe, which are “based on assumed cultural and religious differences between non-migrants and migrants, particularly Muslim migrants” (Tyrer & Sayyid, 2012).
Siebers and Dennissen (2015, p. 483) argue that scholars must be wary of using the concept of differential racism: “The absence of any evidence of biology-based racism cannot serve as a confirmation of its presence [differential racism].” The scholars studied migration discourses in the Netherlands and claimed to have found little evidence of differential racism. They argue that differential racism is not an appropriate term for these discourses because it assumes a “similarity in
2 A state of exception is a concept introduced in Nazi Germany, to indicate a form of power wherein the state can
acts of exclusion and oppression with colonial racism and antisemitism” (Siebers & Dennissen, 2015, p. 483). In their data, that consist of interviews with Moroccan migrants, they found no connection between these biology-based and culture-based forms of racism. They argue that biology-based racism was evident until World War II, but the forms of exclusion that emerged after this period had too little to do with biology-based racism to be labeled as cultural-based racism (Siebers & Dennissen, 2015). Siebers and Dennissen (2015) further argue that the concepts of cultural essentialism and cultural fundamentalism are a better fit to describe these forms of exclusion. They use the definition of cultural essentialism from Ralph Grillo (2003), who coined the term and described it as: “a system of belief that maps the world into reified homogeneous, bounded and static cultural communities, existing side by side, defining the essence of an individual’s identity as belonging to such a community” (Grillo, 2003, p. 473). There is no hierarchy between cultures involved in cultural essentialism. Exclusion and hierarchies are visible in cultural fundamentalism, which is defined as a belief that these homogeneous groups of cultural communities are incompatible (Siebers and Dennissen, 2015).
However, the literature on differential racism shows various arguments in favor of a
connection between biology-based racism and differential racism. This enables seeing migrant-hostile discourses as differential racist. The first argument relates to the “motility of race” (Stoler, 1997) or “race as a floating signifier” (Hall, 1996). Secondly, some scholars (Goldberg, 2009; Lentil & Titley, 2011; Young, 1995) argue that biology-based racism always contained elements of culture; thus, a “shift” from biology-based racism to differential racism never took place. Lastly, some scholars (Lentin & Titley, 2011; Philips, 2007) argue that many of the consequences of these “older” forms of racism have stayed the same in differential racism.
In Race as a floating signifier, Hall (1996) argues that “race” can be seen as a system with which society can give meaning and organize the differences that are found among individuals:
It is only when these differences have been organized within language, within discourse, within systems of meaning, that the differences can be said to acquire meaning and become a factor in human culture and regulate conduct, that is the nature of what I’m calling the discursive concept of race. (Hall, 1996, p. 10)
Hall (1996) argues that various concepts can take the place of “race”. Thus, racism can be found in a variety of sites. Building on Hall’s theory, Encarnación Gutiérrez Rodríguez (2018, p. 19) argues that in contemporary Europe, the “refugee” has become the “floating signifier.” Ann Stoler (1997) calls these transformations the motility of race; she argues that race has the ability to take on various forms on its own. In the same vein, Celine-Marie Pascale (2008) elaborates on the fluidity of the meaning of race. In her research, she asks American respondents what they think “race” entails; they shift between explanations related to blood, nationality, culture, skin color, and other physical appearances (Pascale, 2008). Pascale (2008, p. 733) argues: “The “self-evident” nature of race is evidence that race has
meaning, rather than that it has any particular meaning.” This view is supported by Lentin & Titley (2011 p. 62), who argue that race is no objective category, “but has come to signify a host of differences, or ways of distinguishing between people.”
Secondly, in line with previous arguments, it is argued that a shift between biology-based racism and differential racism never took place. Several scholars (Goldberg, 2009; Lentil & Titley, 2011; Young, 1995) state that the concepts of race and culture have always been connected, or how Young (1995) puts it: “the racial was always cultural.” In the same vein, Lentil and Titley (2011, p. 69) state that “racism has always been theorized in relation to, and on the basis of, the perceived behavioral and cultural characteristics of human groups.”
The last argument in favor of a connection between biology-based racism and differential racism is found in their shared consequences; many of the consequences of biology-based racism and differential racism are the same (Lentin & Titley, 2011; Philips, 2007). Commenting on the
consequences of this so-called “shift”, Lentin & Titley (2011, p. 62) argue: “A language of culture and values has almost completely supplanted one of race, but the effects of such a language, couched though it often is in relativist terms, produces racial dividends: division, hierarchy, exclusion.” In the same vein, Anne Philips (2007) argues: “That the discourse employs the language of culture rather than the language of race does not ensure its innocence.” Thus, power relations between groups of people are found in both forms of racism.
The various views on racism have consequences for this thesis; differential racism emerges through a different language than biology-based racism. The literature and visions of differential racism, cultural essentialism, and cultural fundamentalism are taken into account in answering the research question.
2.2 Who makes the population?
Politicians use a wide variety of words to indicate “migrants”, such as “high-skilled migrants”, “refugees”, “expats”, “illegal migrants”, “allochtoon3”. Moreover, the political discourse uses the
terms “Moroccans” or “Muslims” in migration discourses to indicate that they are not “from here” or to “other” them. These identities are used to separate those who belong from those who do not belong in a state, and subsequently to legitimize different treatments and discriminatory practices. The Foucauldian take on “statistics” (Foucault, 2007) is used to describe how information on individuals informs state-making and is used to legitimize a state’s actions. In migration discourses, the neoliberal concepts of instrumentalization (Brown, 2006) and commodification (Agyemang & Lehman, 2013) are identified. In the next section, theories on the state of exception are used to locate their intersection with racism, exclusion, and xenophobia.
3 Allochtoon literally means “from another area”. Officially, it is a person that is either born outside the
Michel Foucault (2007) highlights the importance of what he calls “statistics”, in order for states to have power over its population. Foucault (2007, p. 275) defines “statistics” as “the secret of power”; it entails the information that states have about their population. This concept relates closely to governmentality: a form of controlling the conduct of individuals in a population (Foucault, 2007), and to biopolitics: the regulations of the population through biopower (Foucault, 2004). Foucault (2004) argues that biopolitics produces mechanisms that control the construction of the population, or in other words, controls who makes the population. According to Foucault (2003, p. 246), these mechanisms consist of “forecasts, statistical estimates, and overall measures”. Foucault (2003, p. 246) further argues that these regulatory mechanisms operate “to establish an equilibrium, maintain an average, establish a sort of homeostasis and compensate for variations within this general population and its aleatory random element inherent in a population of living beings so as to optimize a state of life.” Foucault’s (2007) work on “statistics” is complemented by Theo Goldberg’s (2009) study on how these “statistics” inform state-making; states have to know the individuals that constitute the population, in order to govern them: “Statistics, in short, order the state’s constitution of and relation to population” (Goldberg, 2009, p. 328). In the same vein, Foucault (2003, p.246) argues that the first function of racism is “to fragment, to create caesuras within the biological continuum of biopower.”
Similarly, John Torpey (1998) elaborates on processes whereby the state actively uses their knowledge about its population to control not only the conduct of the individuals, but the formation of these individuals’ identities as well. Torpey (1998) argues that states put much effort into the creation of different identities, which relate to different “papers”, such as passports and green cards (Torpey, 1998). Torpey (1998) highlights the importance of these documents in relation to identities and rights. In academic research, it is thus important to keep in mind that many of these identities are, at least partly, created by states, as argued by Torpey (1998):
Whether substantial numbers of people think about themselves subjectively in these terms is an open, empirical question; that they would not be likely to do so without the institutional foundation provided by the prior legal codification of the terms seems beyond doubt. (Torpey, 1998, p. 246)
Torpey further argues that these identities can be used to legitimize different treatments among individuals. Marcia Annisette Gloria Agyemang and Cheryl Lehman (2013, p. 265) supplement Torpey’s arguments: “Categorization [of migrants] becomes a form of state management and control in creating identities.” The phenomenon of states using their power and laws for their own benefit, is peculiar to how states govern migration-related issues in a neoliberal age (Brown, 2006; Mavelli, 2018; Shachar, 2011). In the literature, this process is labelled as “instrumentalization” (Shachar, 2011) or “tacticalization” (Kóczé, 2018). I use the term “instrumentalization”, as it is more commonly used than “tacticalization”.
Related to these instrumentalization processes is the commodification of individuals (Agyemang & Lehman, 2012). In this commodification process, the various state-created migrant labels are placed in a hierarchy. Agyemang & Lehman use the term “accounting”, which they describe as “a process of attributing financial values and rationales to a wide range of social practices, thereby according them visibility, calculability, and operational utility” (Agyemang & Lehman 2013, p. 262). This neoliberal process of commodification thus places different values on different individuals; this way of governing citizenship can result in a “bifurcated market”; the most-talented or high-skilled migrants profit the most, at the expense of low-skilled migrants (Shachar, 2011). Wendy Brown (2006) warns against the consequences of this way of governing:
Governing for the market means that sovereignty and law become supports for competition, rather than rights. And, as law is tacticalized or instrumentalized, it is radically desacralized, producing the conditions for its routine suspension or abrogation, and paving ground for what Agamben (…) has formulated as sovereignty in the form of a permanent state of exception. (Brown, 2006, p. 66)
This commodification correlates strongly with the previous mentioned concepts, as different names for groups are needed to, for example, label specific groups as dangerous or as violating certain norms and subsequently place them on a hierarchy. In analyzing the data of this research, I especially focus on the different terms that politicians use for “migrants”, and the power relations are attached to these different labels.
2.3. State violence and the state of exception
In this section, I review the literature on the legitimization for the migrant-hostile discourse. Several scholars (Kóczé, 2018; Lentin & Titley, 2011; Melamed, 2015; Sigona, 2015) argue that “fear” is used to legitimize both this hostile discourse and violence against migrants. As reviewed in the previous section, processes of instrumentalization and commodification are peculiar to a neoliberal age. Angéla Kóczé (2018) argues that these processes help to legitimize “a state of exception”. The “securitization of migration”, whereby migration-related issues are increasingly connected with fear and terrorism, also serves as a legitimization.
While laying the groundwork for critically assessing state-formation, Max Weber (1919) shows how the monopoly on violence is essential to the formation of states. Elaborating on Weber’s work, Goldberg (2009) argues that in a neoliberal age, these forms of violence and the legitimization that is used for this violence have changed. Goldberg (2009, p. 335) states that neoliberal states are now “concerned above all with their security”. While the welfare state, as the predecessor of the neoliberal state, is mostly concerned with the welfare of citizens (or social security), neoliberalism takes this “social security” down a different road; social security now applies mainly to “issues of
crime and corruption, controlling immigration and tax-cut-stimulated consumption, social control and securitization” (Goldberg, 2009, p. 335).
Goldberg's theory influenced the work of Jodi Melamed (2015) on “the state-finance-racial violence nexus”. She argues how both the state and the financial sector are dependent on racial violence, and how state-violence is legitimized by labeling certain groups as a threat. Melamed’s (2015) argument can be extended to the mistreating of certain migrant labels (Kóczé, 2018).
Regarding this argument, Kóczé (2018) argues that the mistreatment of “irregular” migrants and the many refugee camps in Europe, can be described as a “state of exception” (Agamben, 2005), where migrants fall outside the rationalities of the law. This state of exception serves as justification for their mistreatment (Kóczé, 2018). Nando Sigona (2015) argues that in the case of refugee camps, this state of exception can also be explained as “campzenship”, which entails a unique form of political membership; the state is allowed to reshape and ignore some of its obligations (Sigona, 2015).
As previously mentioned, the instrumentalization and commodification of individuals can serve as a legitimization of state violence (Brown, 2006; Kóczé, 2018). Kóczé (2018) shows how this is the case with Roma-migrants in Italy; Italian politicians refer to Romani as “nomadic groups” and “illegal and criminal immigrants” (Kóczé, 2018, p. 465). This legitimizes placing them in a permanent state of exception, which in turn, legitimizes various forms of state violence. Moreover, “the
securitization of migration” can also legitimize this state violence. Lentin and Titley (2011) describe this concept as a process whereby fear and security relate to controlling migration and integration. The attacks of 9/11 contributed significantly to this process; a “networked state of exception” (Lentin & Titley, 2011, p. 165) is identified in the American government actions following the attacks. Its justification is mainly found in migration discourses (Goldberg, 2009; Lentin & Titley, 2011). In Europe, these discourses mostly gained strength with the terrorist attacks in Paris, Brussels, and London, that were mostly framed as issues of migration (Goldberg, 2009; Lentin & Titley, 2011). Goldberg notes that through this state of exception, states acquire more power to treat subject “in any way deemed necessary to restrict, restrain, or disappear them” (Goldberg, 2009, p.334). In the same vein, Foucault (2003) labels racism as vital for the power of the state to treat others in any way necessary, and the power in “making live and letting die” (Foucault, 2003, p. 247). Foucault further argues: “It is the precondition for exercising the right to kill. (…) When I say ‘killing’, it also means every form of indirect murder; political death, expulsion, rejection and so on” (Foucault, 2003, p. 256). Lentin & Titley (2011, p. 166) describe another consequence of this securitization of migration: “The border is everywhere, and because (…) the subjects of xeno-racism wear the passports on their faces, the border follows them.” Thus, instrumentalization, commodification, and the securitization of immigration can largely contribute to xenophobic processes in society, and to a state of exception in which the state has significantly more power. In this way, states use their power instrumentally to treat undesired migrant labels as they like.
2.4 Communitarianism and autonomy
Theories on the concept of differential racism, like discussed in previous sections, can be further linked to literature on migration and citizenship. In migration and citizenship studies, several scholars (Duyvendak, Geschiere & Tonkens, 2016; Joppke, 2007; Van Houdt, Suvarierol & Schinkel, 2011) argue that citizenship has evolved from being solely a legal status to a culturalized identity. Christian Joppke (2007), for instance, argues that in the previous decades, a lot has changed in citizenship discourses and the national identities that are articulated by states. According to Joppke (2007), a remarkable turn was, what he calls the “liberalization of access to citizenship”; this entails the process that on paper, states are now no longer allowed to practice forms of overt discrimination in citizenship practices. Joppke (2007) argues that this turn created a new world, and can be dated back to the Second World War. Joppke (2007, p. 47): “Even those who are unhappy about this new world have to phrase their claims in its idiom, which is the idiom of equality and non-discrimination.” He argues that due to this reform, states have to create a new meaning to citizenship; in contrary to before, this meaning now has to be based on a (seemingly) universalistic unity, thus policies that overtly exclude individuals based on, for example, their “race” are no longer legal (Joppke, 2007). However, in order to maintain control over its population and to remain the power to exclude unwanted citizens, states have to find new ways of exclusion (Joppke, 2007). These new exclusionary dimensions can be found in state discourses on unity, integration and autonomy (Joppke, 2007). In the literature about
citizenship and migration, this focus on unity and integration are labeled as “communitarianism” (Duyvendak, 2011; Van Houdt, Suvarierol & Schinkel, 2011). In the benefit of this thesis, a special focus is given to communitarianism in the Netherlands, a country that is said to be a “frontrunner” on communitarianism (Duyvendak, 2011; Van Houdt, Suvarierol & Schinkel, 2011). Communitarianism and autonomy play a significant role in the intersecting of neoliberalism and (differential) racism. Autonomy is elaborated on in the next section.
Communitarianism can be explained as a form of governing that focusses on the community instead of the individual (Van Houdt, Suvarierol & Schinkel, 2011). It is assumed that commonalities between these individuals, also described as cultural commonalities, are essential for the social cohesion of a community. Nikolas Rose (1999, p. 176) explains this form of population management as “governing through community”. In the same vein, Amitai Etzioni (2007, 122) argues: “The essence of communitarianism is that there are social definitions of good, and not merely those chosen by individuals, and that community is essential to human well‐being.” Etzioni (2007) further states that citizens are expected to endorse these shared values.
Jan Willem Duyvendak (2011) uses the concepts of a “thick national identity” and a “thick notion of feeling at home”, to elaborate on this homogenous population. He explains these concepts as common ideas about the identity of a member of the state, and as the wish that all members of a state should “feel at home” in public spaces, respectively. He is inspired by the work of Halle Gorashi (2003), in explain how a thick national identity can operate as an excluding mechanism:
This thick notion of national identity leads to a process of exclusion and sets up a dichotomous relationship between them and us. (...) The consequence is that people from different
backgrounds who are born in the Netherlands, or who have lived most of their lives there and have Dutch nationality are not included as “one of us”. (Gorashi, 2003, p. 255)
In the same vein, Siebers and Dennissen (2015) talk about boundary crossing, which they explain as “moving from migrant “Others” to Dutch citizens” (Siebers & Dennissen, 2015, p. 477). Migrants can theoretically achieve this “boundary crossing” by adopting the correct cultural qualities, but because of this “thick citizenship”, the boundary that migrants are supposed to cross are extensive, if not
impossible to jump over (Siebers & Dennissen, 2015). Autonomy
It has been established that communitarianism has a significant impact on ideas of social cohesion in a community; however, the term applies to a homogeneous society, and not to what precisely this ideal citizen in a society must look like. In line with the exclusionary dimension of citizenship that was mentioned in an earlier section, Joppke (2007, p. 45) argues that this exclusionary dimension entails the “language of liberalism”. Joppke (2007, p. 46): “In terms of the notion that the liberal state is one for liberal people only.” In his argument, Joppke (2007, p. 46) refers to the “liberalism of autonomy”; it can be argued that his vision on liberalism relates closely to neoliberalism.
Friso van Houdt, Semin Suvarierol, and Willem Schinkel (2011) state that communitarianism has a paradoxical relationship with neoliberalism; communitarianism as a population management focusses both on the community and the individual responsibility. They label this form of governing as “neoliberal communitarianism”. Van Houdt, Suvarierol, Schinkel (2011, p. 432): “Under a neoliberal communitarian regime, it becomes one’s responsibility, expressed in the form of ‘earning’ one’s citizenship to convert to a nation that is sacralized as a bounded community of values”.
Autonomy and responsibility are closely related to one another in the literature on citizenship. The overall consensus on the description is “individual responsibility”. According to Van Houdt, Suvarierol, and Schinkel (2011), “responsibility” is a crucial concept in a neoliberal strategy of population management: “Citizens are called to assume responsibility in regulating themselves (Van Houdt, Suvarierol & Schinkel, 2011, p. 411). For the benefit of this research, the next section looks into how this debate plays out in the Netherlands.
The Dutch case: how are communitarianism and autonomy used as exclusionary tools? Several scholars (Duyvendak, 2011; Van Houdt, Suvarierol & Schinkel, 2011) argue that the Netherlands is a frontrunner in terms of communitarianism and neoliberalism in the form of
the American national identity “thick”, meaning that ideas about the Dutch identity are commonly shared among the population. For their part, Van Houdt, Suvarierol and Schinkel argue that, “since the late 1990s, Dutch discourse on integration has increasingly centered on notions of “culture”, “norms and values” and proper definitions of “Dutchness” and of “Dutch society”, but also on “the defense of social identity and loyalty and commitment to the community and its values” (Van Houdt, Suvarierol & Schinkel, 2011, p. 418). Communitarianism in the Netherlands is visible in various discourses: a double nationality, integration tests, and a Dutch National Canon4.
Possessing a double passport was problematized in January 2009, when Ahmed Aboutaleb, who has a Dutch and a Moroccan passport, was elected as the mayor of Rotterdam. Several politicians argued that he was not suitable for the function unless he disposed his Moroccan passport (Van Bochhove, Rusinovic & Engbersen, 2009). Discourses on this topic are still relevant to this date. Giving up a second passport is perceived as beneficial to the integration into Dutch society, failing to give it up would signal a lack of loyalty to the Dutch community (Van Bochhove, Rusinovic & Engbersen, 2009; Van Houdt, Suvarierol & Schinkel, 2011; Vink, Schmeets & Mennes, 2019). Both communitarianism and a culturalization of citizenship is found in the discourses surrounding a double nationality. It is not so much the legal status, but the perceived cultural threat that plays a significant role in these discourses, as argued by Maarten Vink, Hans Schmeets and Hester Mennes (2019), who researched the discourse in the Netherlands. They explain the link with communitarianism and intolerance towards migrants as: “The stronger one identifies with national traditions, culture or typical customs, the stronger one also distinguishes between people who are part of the in-group and those who are not” (Vink, Schmeets & Mennes, 2019, p. 87).
Communitarianism and autonomy in the Netherlands are also visible in the discourses on integration tests, the naturalization of migrants, and the ceremonies in which migrants have to pledge their commitment to the Dutch society. Regarding integration, Duyvendak (2011) calls this heightened focus on autonomy a break with the “pluralist period”. Previously, the government was deemed responsible for the integration of its citizens. But since the 1990s, the government holds migrants themselves responsible for integrating and “obtaining citizenship status” (Duyvendak, 2011; Van Houdt, Suvarierol & Schinkel, 2011). The Civic Integration Act was passed in 2007; from then on, migrants who are obliged to take the citizenship test, have to learn about the Dutch culture, thus “norms and values”, in addition to basic knowledge about the Dutch language and history (Van Houdt, Suvarierol & Schinkel, 2011). According to Etzioni, the Dutch integration tests can be seen as “neo communitarian”. Etzioni (2007, p. 359): “Hence for the neo-communitarian, a citizen has
responsibilities not merely toward the political entity (e.g., obeying the state's laws), but also toward the national community (e.g., supporting its core of shared values).” Consequently, questions about,
4 The Dutch National Canon is a list of fifty themes that summarizes the Dutch history. It is composed by the
for example, views on homosexuality, or even what gift to bring to new neighbors are included in these tests (Dienst Uitvoering Onderwijs, 2020). Just like discourses on a double nationality, both communitarianism and a culturalization of citizenship, are identified in integration tests.
Instrumentalization plays a significant role in how integration tests can operate as
exclusionary; some scholars (Etzioni, 2007; Groenendijk, 2011) argue that, contrary to the purpose that is communicated by states, the tests are not for the benefit of integration, but function mainly as a tool for migration control. This was visible in, for example, 2007: the level of the language test was raised significantly when too many test-takers passed the test (Groenendijk, 2011). In this way, integration tests are used instrumentally; to keep migrants out. Furthermore, in 2008, a Human Rights Watch report accused the Dutch legislation of discrimination, because the few countries that are exempted from taking the test, like Japan and Australia, seem to have nothing to do with the purpose of the tests (Groenendijk, 2001). In the same vein, Goldberg argues that in Europe, integration tests are an example of Euro-racism: “Europe has long nurtured the civic drive to identify the foreign, to uphold the possibility of keeping the foreign, of permanently foreignizing the (racially) non-European” (Goldberg, 2009, p. 182). The connection to racism can explain this seemingly random exculpation of certain migrants from takings these tests. Moreover, notions of responsibility and autonomy are also visible in the Dutch naturalization ceremonies that take place after these integration tests. Specifically, in the compulsory pledge that the aspiring citizen has to take: “I declare that I will respect the constitutional order of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, its freedoms and rights, and I promise that I will faithfully fulfill my obligations as a Dutch national” (Government of the Netherlands, 2019).
Communitarianism is also found in discourses on a Dutch National Canon and a Dutch National History Museum, in which elements of the Dutch culture are embedded in (Kremer, 2013; Van Houdt, Suvarierol & Schinkel, 2011). The Dutch National Canon is used in the Dutch education system. But the responsible commission thought it would be beneficial for the integration of migrants as well. Regarding this Dutch National Canon, Goldberg (2009, p. 181) argued that it contains a “national profile” of being Dutch, which relates to a “national preference”. Goldberg (2009, p. 182): “(…) reserving jobs, benefits, and rights exclusively and exclusionary to those consistent with the profile.” The national profile applies to a favored homogeneous population of a state. Goldberg (2009) names the code of conduct by a local political party in Rotterdam, as one of the examples of this national profile. These rules, that were set up in 2005, insist on “normal behavior”; it includes not speaking any other language than Dutch in public spaces, respecting the LGBTQ-community, and to exclude anyone with a criminal record or those that cannot support themselves financially (De Volkskrant, 2006). Commenting on these ideas, Goldberg (2009, p. 182) argues that this signals that “Europe is for Europeans only, racially embodied and culturally encoded”. Duyvendak (2011) argues in this regard:
If the ticket into Dutch society can only be obtained by being part of a long national history, people with different backgrounds are confronted with insurmountable obstacles. Dutch society then only becomes accessible to people with deep roots in Dutch soil. Citizenship is reduced to a property one has by birth, one that is unchanged through agency. (Duyenvak, 2011, p. 101)
Thus, Duyvendak shows how a Dutch National Canon operates as an excluding mechanism, which is a big part of Dutch communitarianism.
2.5 Post-racialism and racial capitalism
Some scholars (Goldberg, 2009; Lentin & Titley 2011) argue that the concept of post-racialism is characteristic of the type of racism thriving in a neoliberal age. Lentin and Titley (2011) state that the “era of post-racialism” has two leading causes: firstly, the culturalization of race. Secondly, the privatization of race, which relates closely to the neoliberal concepts of meritocracy and autonomy. In the benefit of this research, I focus on how these concepts are visible in the Netherlands.
Various authors (Duyvendak, 2011; Lentin & Titley, 2011) acknowledge the taboo to refer to race in a discriminatory matter. According to Lentin and Titley (2011), the current era can be
described as “post-racialism”: an era where the existence of racism is at least questioned, if not denied. Thus, discussing racism-related issues has become increasingly difficult. The presumed “shift” from biology-based racism to differential racism is closely related to this problem. Some scholars (Lentin & Titley, 2011; Siebers & Dennissen, 2015) argue that this “shift” took place because of “tactical” reasons; overt racism is no longer acceptable, while racism emerging through the language of culture is still acceptable. Siebers and Dennissen (2015, p. 472) call this the “racism-disguised-as-culture argument.” In the same vein, Lentin and Titley (2011), state that in a neoliberal age, post-racialism is seen not only as an ideal but as an already achieved reality, mainly because capital is said to be color blind. In this way, post-racialism has a direct link to the neoliberal concept of meritocracy; the idea that an individual is solely rated based on their contribution to society, and the idea that every individual has the same chance of achieving upward mobility. Lisa Duggan (2012) describes the privatizing of race in neoliberalism as the concealment of the connections between categories such as race, ethnicity, and economic class. Because every individual is presumed to be having the same life chances, the autonomy of individuals becomes important.
Theories on racial capitalism elaborate further on the neoliberal ideas of meritocracy and autonomy. Kóczé (2018) argues that meritocracy has a significant influence on racism because failures are perceived as personal failures, while bigger power structures are neglected. In the same vein, Melamed argues: “Capital can only be capital when it is accumulating, and it can only accumulate by producing and moving through relations of severe inequality among human groups” (Melamed, 2015, p. 77). Similarly, Nancy Leong (2013) argues that in order for capitalism to function, uneven life
chances and power relations are necessary for the accumulation of capital. Collectively, these theories on racial capitalism depart from acknowledging that life chances are unevenly distributed and thus weaken arguments in favor of the existence of meritocracy (Leong, 2013; Melamed, 2015; Robinson, 2000).
Connecting racial capitalism to migration theories exposes a world system theory. This theory argues that global capitalism produced a division of labor whereby some states exploit other states. Migration is perceived as a source of global inequalities, creating a dependency between states and a system where states exploit labor migrants (Castles, De Haas & Miller, 2013; Wallerstein, 1974). In line with a world systems theory, Lentin and Titley (2011) argue that because of the presumed reality of post-racialism, the produced inequalities are subsequently blamed on the racialized individual’s inabilities. In short, it is argued that the uneven life chances tied to capitalist societies are interpreted as differing human capabilities.
The persistence of a belief in a post-racialism society can partly be blamed on the fact that discussing or talking about racism in the Netherlands is complicated; using the term “race” is frowned upon, or a taboo (Duyvendak, 2011; Siebers & Dennissen, 2015). The main reason for this taboo, dates back to the Second World War (Siebers & Dennissen, 2015). During the war, the Netherlands was one of the countries that collaborated with Nazi Germany the most, creating trauma in Dutch society (Duyvendak, 2011). Talking about race after this trauma means being linked to Nazism and antisemitism (Miles, 1993; Siebers & Dennissen, 2015). Siebers and Dennissen (2015, p. 479) argue that this rejection of race and racism, “has made this discourse and legal system ill-equipped to counter oppression and exclusion that are not based on justifications of biological hierarchy but exclusively on the grounds of assumed cultural incompatibility.” The “shift” between biology-based to differential racism is essential to the discussions on racism in the Netherlands. Because racism is often solely linked to biology, differential racism is hard even to discuss. In the same vein, the migrant-hostile discourse in the Netherlands is often justified when it does not include a biology-based hierarchy (Siebers & Dennissen, 2015). The delinking of body and culture contributes to this justification; individuals are judged based on their culture, which is fluid, instead of the bodies that they are born in. Thus, this hostile discourse often includes insults made to cultures, rather than individuals. According to Siebers and Dennissen (2015), the delinking of racism from biology and the body contributed to cultural fundamentalism becoming dominant, because it is argued that cultural fundamentalism has nothing to do with racism. An example of how racism is hard to talk about is found in the book of Duyvendak (2011) about the “thickness” of a Dutch national identity, and about the trouble that migrants face because of this. His 150-page book on this topic mentions racism once, where it is referred to as “homely racism” (Duyvendak, 2011). Duyvendak (2011, p. 31): “Their “homely racism” (should be understood) as a fearful response to the destabilization, through new patterns of migration, of the privileged link between habit and habitat”. The use of the term “homely racism” is in line with previous arguments: racism in the Netherlands is hard to discuss.
3. Methodology
I used critical discourse analysis to analyze migration discourses of politicians. This method departs from the assumption that language is not innocent, as it can be used to create power structures, such as racism and neoliberalism, in society (Dorsey, 2018; Jäger, 2001). In this qualitative study, I included methods and tools related to the three levels of analysis by Norman Fairclough (1995, 1992), critical discourse analysis by Sigrid Jäger (2011), the notion of floating signifier elaborated by Hall (1996), and the “What’s the problem represented to be?” (WPR) approach by Carol Bacchi (2012). The second-cycle coding process (Saldaña, 2015) was adopted to create broad and abstract coding labels. In order to ensure the trustworthiness of this research, four criteria by Yvonna Lincoln and Evon Guba (1986) are adapted.
3.1 Methods
In line with critical discourse analysis, I perceive neoliberalism and racism in migration discourses as power structures and as sources of inequalities. This method closely relates to concepts such as power and inequality, which are epitomized by conflict perspectives. Conflict perspective derives from the idea that “genuine consensus is not achieved, rather the more powerful in societies are able to impose their conceptions on others and have them accept their discourses” (Dorsey, 2018, p. 70). Critical discourse analysis focuses on revealing structures of power and inequalities constructed and performed through discourse. Furthermore, reality is perceived as socially and politically constructed through language, while language is perceived as not neutral and thus contribute to power relations. Jürgen Link (1983, p. 60) describes the definition of discourse as “an institutionally consolidated concept of speech inasmuch as it determines and consolidates action and thus already exercises power”. Thus, discourses operate as a means to an end, whereby their main goal is to exercise power. In the same vein, Jäger (2001, p. 35) argues: “discourse creates the conditions for the formation of subjects and the structuring and shaping of societies.” Jäger (2011) further states that discourses cannot be traced back to any individual, but instead can be found in structures that multiple individuals “knit together” (Jäger, 2011, p. 37). In this sense, discourses are sui generis and can be studied as such. Neoliberalism and racism are perceived as discourses that can be studied through their construction of language. Three levels of analysis
I incorporated the framework of Norman Fairclough (1995) to investigate how discursive practices emerge out of, and are shaped by power structures and relations. He describes three levels of analysis in critical discourse analysis: text, interaction, and social context, which all relate to three stages (Fairclough, 1995). I began by elaborating on the formal properties of the text in the description stage. In the second stage, I focused on the interpretation, which is “concerned with the relationship between
text and interaction – with seeing the text as a product of a process of production, and as a resource in the process of interpretation” (Fairclough, 1992, p. 26). For a critical discourse analysis to be
complete, Fairclough argues that the final stage should analyze the “sociocultural practice”, which relates to “different levels of abstraction (…) it may involve its more immediate situational context, the wider context of institutional practices the event is embedded within, or the yet wider frame of the society and the culture” (Fairclough, 1995, p. 26). Thus, I focused on explaining the sociocultural practices of neoliberalism and racism in Dutch society.
Policy as discourse: What’s the problem represented to be?
Critical discourse analysis is supplemented by the WPR approach by Bacchi (2012). Bacchi’s (2012) work is informed by Foucault’s governmentality theory – her method uncovers the discourses through which governments impose their power. The WPR approach is particularly helpful in analyzing political discourses and the “problems” that politicians communicate in an innovative way. The approach helps to expose how politicians construct and represent problems, instead of researching the problem itself. Policy discourses frame migration negatively by linking “migrants” to discourses entailing fear, such as terrorism and social dissolution. Through these discourses, different groups of migrants are constructed and, based on their desirability, placed in a hierarchy. Through this hierarchy, the power of governments is exercised.
“The migrant” as a floating signifier
To investigate the intersection between neoliberalism and racism, I chose to study the discourses on migration. Officially, a migrant in the Netherlands is any individual who migrated from another country to the Netherlands (Van Dale, 2020). The groups included in the analyzed migration
discourses are referred to as “migrant labels” to indicate that these groups of migrants are created by politicians and do not inherently possess the ascribed characteristics or function as homogenous groups in reality. Individuals who are not officially migrants are also included in the migration discourses analyzed in this study. This applies to, for example, Muslims, who are discussed in relation to migration and integration topics. In the VVD party program, for example, wearing a hijab is seen as conflicting to integration demands. These individuals are not all migrants, yet are included in the political discourses on migration as if they are.
Migration was one of the key issues during the 2017 elections. The first formation attempt after the elections backfired because the parties did not come to an agreement on migration-related issues. Encarnación Gutiérrez Rodríguez (2018) argues that contemporary racism in Europe is articulated by the “migration crisis” of 2015. She elaborated on how the “waves of migration” hitting Europe were constructed as a consequence of lacking government control (Gutiérrez Rodríguez, 2018). Therefore, I argue that different politicians tried to benefit from these critiques, which is one of the reasons why migration was overtly present during the Dutch 2017 elections.
The term floating signifier, as coined by Hall (1996), is used to expose discourses on power. In line with Hall’s vision, sites where racism emerges, are not solid or permanent. Racism can emerge through the construct of race, or through the construct of the “migrant”. In this way, studying racism through the lens of Hall’s theory enables the exposure of differential racism. Thus, what racial difference signifies is never the same, as it is dependent on the systems that are used to organize differences, as argued by Hall (1996):
It’s only when these differences have been organized within language, within discourse, within systems of meaning, that the differences can be said to acquire meaning and become a factor in human culture and regulate conduct, that is the nature of what I’m calling the discursive concept of race. (Hall, 1996, p. 10)
Thus, I used migration discourses to study how differences in society are organized, whereby language plays a significant role in accessing these differences.
Jäger: discourse fragments, discourse strands, and catachresis
I adopted aspects from the step-by-step analysis of Jäger (2011) in my approach to critical discourse analysis. Specifically, I focused on “discourse fragments”, “discourse strands”, and “catachresis” to uncover the intersection between neoliberalism and racism. Jäger (2011) describes discourse
fragments as a text, or part of the text that deals with a specific theme. Discourse strands are described as “thematically uniform discourse processes” (Jäger, 2011, p. 25), that are constituted of different discourse fragments. The discourse fragments can entail neoliberalism or racism. To study their intersection, the concept of “catachresis” is taken into account; this entails a word that is stripped of its original meaning. Jäger (2011, p. 35) argues: “The most important rules regulating these links through which the image of such a societal or political context is produced are catachresis or image fractures.” Multiple catachreses are found in the migration discourses. Jäger (2011, p. 48) uses a migration-related catachresis in her explanation on the concept: “The locomotive of progress can be slowed down by floods of immigrants.” In this case, “locomotive” is a catachresis because it signals progress, and “floods” is a catachresis because it signals a threat from the outside and the feeling of being overwhelmed by large quantities of something you cannot control. In the data, these words are used to describe particular migration flows; catachresis is part of the negative framing of migration issues, such as “floods” and “waves”, which are also used in the Dutch language.
3.2 Data
The data that is analyzed in this study are the party programs of the five most prominent parties in the Netherlands in 2017, a debate that was broadcasted by public broadcaster NOS, and one interview with PVV-leader Geert Wilders on the television program Goedemorgen Nederland. The five parties
that had the most seats in the Dutch House of Representatives at the time of the research period are included. They are VVD (33 seats), PVV (20 seats), CDA (19 seats), D66 (19 seats), and GroenLinks (14 seats). I refer to the list of abbreviations for an explanation on the party’s names and their place on the political spectrum. Between migration-related policies on paper and migration discourses is a big gap; especially in migration discourses, the debates can be tougher than the actual policies (Czaika & De Haas, 2013). It is chosen to analyze the party programs, the NOS debate, and the Goedemorgen Nederland interview because they highlight the discourse, instead of the actual policies. In line with critical discourse analysis, the discourses were studied to uncover power structures.
The party programs are formal sets of goals that are supported by the political party. They are issued in order to persuade potential voters to vote on that party at the national elections of 2017. The party programs of CDA, D66, GroenLinks, and VVD are all relatively similar in size; they vary from 71 (GroenLinks) to 171 pages (D66), wherein only the sections on migration-related issues are included in the research. However, the party program of PVV only consists of one page. In order to approximately have the same amount of data on the different parties, I chose to supplement the data with the interview on Goedemorgen Nederland with Wilders. The NOS debate consists of eight short one-on-one debates, wherein the party leaders of the eight biggest parties, debated with another party leader about a political statement. The total debate lasted for one and a half hours, but only the one-on-one debates of the chosen parties are included. Because Wilders debated with PvdA-leader Lodewijk Asscher, his remarks are also included in the data.
The timeframe of this study is the campaign period leading up to the Dutch national elections on March 15, 2017. The actual day of the elections is not included in the time frame. The NOS debate was broadcasted on the night before the elections, on March 14, 2017. The interview on Goedemorgen Nederland was broadcasted on March 9, 2017. The part programs were published on different data in 2016, namely: October 12, 2016 (CDA), August 26, 2016 (D66), September 14, 2016 (GroenLinks), August 25, 2016 (PVV), and October 7, 2016 (VVD). In the Netherlands, national elections are held every four years, whereby the House of Representatives is elected. The Netherlands has a multi-party system wherein parties must cooperate to form a coalition government. Elections are known as highly performative times, which is why this time frame is suitable for this research.
3.3 Procedure
The first step after establishing the theme and aim of my thesis was choosing the data set. The national elections of 2017 were the best fit to the study aims, given that events framed as a “migrant-crisis” in 2015 were one of the key issues of these elections. To give an overview of the Dutch political discourse, the five largest political parties during the 2017 elections are included in the data.
The NOS debate and the Goedemorgen Nederland interview were fully transcribed. The data and the transcriptions were imported into the qualitative data analysis software Atlas.ti. This program was used to manage and order the data. Small fragments of the texts in the programs, and the
transcribed debates and interview were coded in a descriptive manner, wherein the basic theme or topic of that fragment of text is summarized (Bryman, 2016). In order to focus on the different migrant labels that politicians use, I created two different sets of codes: one for the basic codes, and a second one for the migrant labels. To develop a broader level of abstraction, second-cycle coding is adapted in the coding process (Saldaña, 2015). The set for the basic codes contained a total of sixty codes in the first cycle. In the second cycle, all the codes were critically analyzed again and reordered based on similarities; this reduced the final amount to thirty. For example, the coding label “migration brings social tensions”, and the coding label “the Netherlands is too full”, merged together in the label “migration causes social dissolution” in the second cycle. This coding technique enabled the concept of social dissolution to contain multiple aspects and enabled me to analyze the concept from multiple perspectives (Saldaña, 2015). The set with migrant labels contained nineteen different coding labels in the first cycle. This amount was reduced to ten in the second cycle. A similar process of analysis was used to organize the coding labels more efficiently. For example, the label “foreign talent”, and “knowledge migrant” submerged into one label.
During the coding process, I created memos on ideas about the analyses. Once the coding process was finalized, these memos formed the base and starting point for the analysis and the results section. The process of reading through the data and writing memos was repeated until no new information emerged. In this process, Atlas.ti helped to quickly detect from which party the text fragment stemmed from. I used qualitative thematic analysis to explore the data and the final coding labels; this technique emphasizes the interpreting of patterns (Braun & Clarke, 2006), which enabled me to see intersections between racism and neoliberalism.
I adopted a mostly deductive approach (Bryman, 2016) in the research process because the main aim was to fill in a gap in the literature; literature on migration in the Netherlands either focusses on racism or neoliberalism. In this process, neoliberalism was operationalized by the use of the concepts of autonomy, commodification, instrumentalization, and meritocracy, which were found in the literature. However, I chose not to prefabricate all labels to enable new information to emerge from the data more easily (Saldaña, 2015). In this way, an inductive approach was also used.
3.4 Trustworthiness
In order to assess the trustworthiness of this research, I adopted four main criteria for trustworthy qualitative research by Lincoln and Guba (1986): credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability. Because of the qualitative nature of this research, it is chosen to use alternative criteria instead of the criteria that are mainly used for quantitative research.
Credibility addresses the researcher’s representation of the described aspects of social reality, which determines its acceptability to others (Lincoln & Guba, 1986). A triangulation method has been used through the convergence of multiple data sources to ensure the credibility of this research (Bryman, 2016; Lincoln & Guba, 1986). The data consists of party programs, debates, and an
