Hegemony and the EEAS: Who Dominates EU External Action?

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M

ASTER

T

HESIS

Hegemony and the EEAS: Who Dominates

EU External Action?

Author:

Lena MATTMÜLLER

Supervisor:

Dr. Carlos REIJNEN

A thesis submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master in European Studies

in the

Graduate School of Humanities

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Declaration of Authorship

I, Lena MATTMÜLLER, declare that this thesis titled, “Hegemony and the EEAS: Who

Dominates EU External Action?” and the work presented in it are my own. I confirm that:

• This work was done wholly or mainly while in candidature for a research de-gree at this University.

• Where any part of this thesis has previously been submitted for a degree or any other qualification at this University or any other institution, this has been clearly stated.

• Where I have consulted the published work of others, this is always clearly attributed.

• Where I have quoted from the work of others, the source is always given. With the exception of such quotations, this thesis is entirely my own work.

• I have acknowledged all main sources of help.

• Where the thesis is based on work done by myself jointly with others, I have made clear exactly what was done by others and what I have contributed my-self.

Signed: Date:

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List of Abbreviations

CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy EEAS European External Action Service EU European Union

EUDEL European Union DELegation HoD Head of Delegation

HR/VP High Representative of the European Union and Vice President of the Commission IO International Organization

IR International Relations TEU Treaty on European Union

TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union UN United Nations

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Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Introducing the Thesis

After the vote for Brexit, Google searches for "What is the EU?" briefly spiked in Britain [Selyukh, 2017]. This question, as uninformed as it made Britons look, is one that is indeed very hard to answer. After more than 60 years of debate, there is still no single answer satisfactory to everyone. Since the EU is not clearly a state but still possesses many of its characteristics and duties, defining its organs and institutions is an endeavor of similar difficulty as that of defining the EU’s structures. The EEAS, the most recent of such bodies, is no exception. It is often called the foreign ministry of the EU but in reality, the EEAS is an organization that is very hard to define in existing terms. Article 27(3) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) provides for the setting up of a service to support the High Representative in exercising her tasks in the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and implementing these policies. It furthermore provides that the service shall be composed of Council Secretariat staff, Commission officials, as well as national diplomats on a rotating basis. However, the EEAS is not recognized as an official institution. This raises many questions, and especially questions of identity. What is the EEAS in organizational terms, and more, what is the EEAS in terms of its internal identity? With differing sources of staff and further resources, can it develop an intra-organizational culture of its own? And how do the different institutional cultures that are thrown into the EEAS impact its work?

These questions, so asked, are not as naive as they may seem at first sight. In fact, they are questions frequently asked by scholars of the EEAS. This has to do with sev-eral factors. First of all, the EEAS is fairly young, and so scholars of all disciplines have not yet managed to come to any established, and perhaps competing, theories that would classify the EEAS. Secondly, the nature of the EEAS itself is the source of theoretical ambiguity. An initial comparison made on the institutional side was that to national foreign ministries. For example, an international law standpoint shows that in that regard, the EU delegations fall short of offering the same kind of protec-tion and services as naprotec-tional ones, due to their official status not being that of a na-tion’s embassy or consulate [Bosilca, 2014]; [Wessel and van Vooren, 2013]; [Wouters and Duquet, 2015]. Another factor is the make-up of the EEAS in terms of staff, fi-nancing, and expertise. The EEAS is institutionally situated in-between the Member States, the Commission, and the Council, as provided for in article 27(3) TEU, but not clearly attached to one over the other. This has led Batora to his conceptualiza-tion of the EEAS as an interstitial organizaconceptualiza-tion, which means it is an organizaconceptualiza-tion drawing on different resources of a legal nature, for legitimation, and organizational models [Batora, 2013]. As has been shown by many scholars, the classification of the EEAS as an institution in EU terminology is furthermore not correct, seen as it does not possess institutional features, but is a more autonomous service to the High

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2 Chapter 1. Introduction Representative [van Vooren, 2011]. All in all, it is characterized by a strongly hybrid nature [Onestini, 2015]. Questions that have been posed following this are focused on the organizational culture of the EEAS, between the staff from Member States, the Commission, and Council. Due to the hybrid nature there have been turf wars over competences between these groups, and there is a lack of a common esprit de corps uniting the officials from different groups [Onestini, 2015]. Spence even iden-tified six different epistemic communities within the EEAS [Spence, 2015b]. What is more, the delegations between themselves seem to differ a great deal in how they are run, as evidenced by the analyses of the transitions from Commission delegations to EU delegations in Washington [Maurer, 2015], New York [Laatikainen, 2015], Vi-enna [Lundin, 2015] and Geneva [Spence, 2015b]. These have yielded a particular emphasis on the fact that the head of delegation seems to have a lot of influence over the general development of a delegation. Differences also exist between multilateral and bilateral delegations. Juncos and Pomorska argue that there has been a devel-opment towards an institutional identity, or esprit de corps, within the EEAS [Juncos and Pomorska, 2015], but only from the bottom-up, without top-down institution-alization. Other authors argue that the institutional identification still plays a big role in influencing the esprit de corps and how routines are developed [Lequesne, 2015]; [Henökl, 2015]. Unity and solidarity within the service thus seem vital for its smooth functioning.

As the considerations above already show, there are two dimensions to the question of how the EEAS acts in foreign policy. One side is regarding material aspects, such as formal procedures, and related to questions of organizational setup and resources that are used in the policy making process. The other aspect is related to questions of identity. ’Who’ therefore pertains to the identification of officials, whether they see themselves as, for example, different epistemic communities or whether an esprit de corps is there EEAS- or delegation-wide.

Looking at the formal side of competences, the EU is clearly subsidiary to the Member States. Over time, some exclusive foreign policy competences have been granted to the EU in parallel to exisiting internal competences. This is now found in article 3(2) TFEU. In practice, there are three exceptions, namely the Open Skies case, where the EU was competent exclusively, but gave back powers to Member States [Cremona, 2014], mixity, which means that Member States and EU enter an agreement, which is based on a shared competence, next to each other [Schütze, 2010], and in the third place vertical mixity, which means that a shared competence is exercised by the EU externally, and by the Member States internally [Weiler, 1999]. However, the EEAS goes beyond mere treaty making, in that it represents the EU diplomatically next to Member States. De Baere and Wessel sketch an outline of how the EEAS is involved as regards the distribution of competences [Baere and Wessel, 2015].

When regarding the foundational period of the EEAS, the Council gave the High Representative guidelines in setting up the EEAS [Erkelens and Blockmans, 2012]. On the other hand, Commission interests were prevalent in staffing decisions [ Gän-zle et al., 2013]; [Murdoch and Trondal, 2015].

Before getting into the analyses and discussions, a few clarifications are in order to frame the research in this thesis.

First of all, for any kind of analysis it has to be kept in mind that the EEAS knows many parts which have to be distinguished from each other. First of all, there is the EEAS as a whole versus just the delegations. Next, each delegation is situated in a

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distinct context, and has different staff, which makes each delegation different from the other. One aspect of this is also the distinction between multilateral and bilateral delegations. The focus in this thesis will be on delegations, both multilateral and bilateral.

Secondly, the question that is central to the research regards identity of the EEAS, and more precisely of the delegation staff. This is based on certain material condi-tions, and has an organizational component and one of more individual identifica-tion. It is important to answer these questions in order to unveil the implications that these identities may have for the work of the EEAS.

In order to analyze these, a theoretical framework based on Gramsci is used. It combines material aspects with those of identification and placing the individual within a bigger framework of identities. Since the EEAS is placed at the material interstice of different resources, and internally fragmented when it comes to iden-tities, the Gramscian approach is well fit to analyze power relations and especially differentiate stages of development. Two notions are central to this analysis, namely those of hegemony-maintenance and hegemony-creation. The former is a conserva-tive attempt of the hegemonic class, that is dominant in a consensual way, to retain their power. This can be seen in the turf wars and in struggles over tasks in represen-tation. In that stage, classes are already developed. Hegemony-creation on the other hand means the development of a new class which rises to a hegemonic status. This is related especially to identity building. The main point of analysis in this thesis is therefore to find out whether there has been a shift from the hegemony-maintenance of the early period towards hegemony-creation, whereby the EEAS delegations or distinct groups therein form a class and become hegemonic in foreign policy mak-ing.

1.2 Introducing the Topic, or: What Is the Aim of This

The-sis?

There are three main aims to this thesis, concerned with the theory, methodology, and the outcome of the research as such. The first aim of this thesis is to add to the growing body of literature on the EEAS and filling a gap in literature by adding a Gramscian approach. This approach of combining material issues and identity questions has not been used yet (to the author’s best knowledge) to analyze EEAS delegations in EU policy making. Furthermore, it aims to add empirical data to a field of research that knows many unexplored questions. More precisely, this field is one of empirical research on EEAS delegations and how material resources and iden-tity questions are influencing the delegations’ work. A third aim is to work towards an answer to the broad question of who is dominant in EU foreign policy making by using the notion of hegemony as a starting point for the analysis of material and identity relations. The material conditions are somewhat static, since the EEAS has not been changed drastically in formal terms. Therefore, the main focus will lay on the development of identities. By distinguishing hegemony-maintenance from hegemony-creation, the central point of analysis will be whether such a shift has taken place, and whether the identities have evolved to creating a new hegemony, away from the more static conditions as enshrined in the organizational setup that assumes hegemony-maintenace. A literary as well as an empirical analysis will be used to address the question whether this shift has taken place, or is taking place, and shall thereby contribute to the broad consideration of who is the hegemonic actor in European foreign policy.

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4 Chapter 1. Introduction So, to answer the question of why studying the development of a class, or an esprit de corps, is of importance, this is found in the fact that disunity has had nega-tive impacts on the early work of the EEAS. It is furthermore found in the logic of the Gramscian framework itself, which is based on the assumption that only social groups can become hegemonic, and as such they need to be united.

1.3 Theory, Methodology, and Limits

This section will motivate why the Gramscian theory as well as the methodology were chosen, and show some of the limitations that the theoretical and methodolog-ical approaches entail.

1.3.1 The Theory: How and Why?

The use of a Gramscian approach has briefly been motivated above. The subject of research gives the main incentive to use a Gramscian framework. Since the EEAS is situated at an interstitial plane of different sources of institutional cultures, ma-terial resources, and ideas about EU integration, Gramsci seems very appropriate. Material and cultural conditions play a major role in the development of a class con-sciousness and situating oneself in that wider framework. This thesis also wants to situate the EEAS in its wider framework, and address questions of the identity and belonging within the EEAS and the EU delegations. The Gramscian approach is very suitable, since it combines material considerations with those of individual and group identities.

A second motive for using this theoretical framework is a more practical one. As Adler-Nissen [Adler-Nissen, 2015] has identified, Gramscian approaches to the EEAS have rarely been made so far. There is a general lack of Marxist approaches to the EEAS. International relations theories, which are, for an important part, also informed by Gramscian notions, have also been fairly absent from the literature on the EEAS. This is striking, since Gramscian theory combines questions of material resources with those of identity and enables reveal power relations. Therefore, a gap exists in EEAS research that this thesis would like to start filling.

However, this theoretical perspective also entails limitations. Gramsci focused on the Italy of the early 20th century. Not everything he theorized can be applied easily, or at all, to the EU of today. Furthermore, a Gramscian approach must be adapted to the international, which is not unproblematic either. Furthermore, as any theory, a Gramscian perspective views the issue from a specific standpoint, and therefore asks specific questions, and can only provide answers in line thereof.

1.3.2 The Empirical Analysis: How and Why?

The methodology is twofold. First, existing literature will be reviewed in light of the theoretical framework. Second, own interviews will be conducted to build on those data.

The literary analysis is done in order to situate this research within a broader frame-work. Furthermore, it provides interpreted data of interviews in different delega-tions and with other EEAS officials, work which could not singlehandedly be done

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within the confines of this thesis. Since the existing works are not taking a Grams-cian perspective but provide very diverse theoretical approaches, other perspectives are not forgotten in the focus on the Gramscian framework.

However beneficial, this will also put the shortcomings of the theoretical per-spective in sight. Since the data have not been interpreted in light of a Gramscian approach, they will have to be adapted to the purpose of this thesis. Another point to carefully consider is that the empirical data found in the literature have already been interpreted and employed for the use of a specific research aim. The exact meaning of statements or output might thus be diverting from their original intention. The second part of the methodology entails conducting own interviews. This is done in order to add to the empirical data on the EEAS and to provide an insight of developments. Furthermore, the theoretical framework is concerned with con-sciousness and self-identification, and therefore warrants the direct input from the people concerned.

Again, this comes not without limitations. As stated before, the Gramscian frame-work comes with specific terminology and quite leading concepts. It is a difficult endeavor, and a task for consideration when drafting questions, to avoid being too leading while still gaining data that are useful in application of the framework. Sec-ondly, while the individual input is certainly vital for this thesis, it cannot be forgot-ten that it is still one thing: individual. The same holds true for the interpretation of these talks.

Some very practical limitations are barriers of language, as well as the impos-sibility of conducting all interviews face-to-face due to budgetary issues. That will limit the experience of non-verbal communication and certainly provide more inse-curities in interpreting what was said.

Another point to be noted is also that this thesis is limited to interviews within two delegations, which will be sufficient in the confines at hand, but not necessarily apt for abstracting these conclusions to all delegations.

1.4 Roadmap of the Thesis

This thesis will progress in a fairly straightforward manner as concerns the outline. After having introduced the basic problem of the EEAS, as well as the more specific one of policy making, in the introduction, the analysis and arguments will be built up from here on.

In a first step, the theoretical framework for analysis will be developed, based on the reasons given above. As mentioned, neo-Gramscian approaches will be pitted against "the original" in order to derive a framework applicable to the EEAS. To that end, literature by Cox will be used, in which he sets out his framework of inter-national relations theory, the use of hegemony in IR, as well as the role of interna-tional organizations in this framework [Cox, 1981]; [Cox, 1996]. These texts were chosen because Cox has been called the "grandfather of neo-Gramscian IR" [Saurin, 2008, 35]. Moolakkattu [Moolakkattu, 2009] has been used as additional informa-tion on the framework developed by Cox. Based on the concepinforma-tions of Cox, two other works were chosen that apply neo-Gramscian IR theory to international or-ganizations. The first is an article by Ünay which analyses the world bank as to its hegemonic status [Unay, 2010], whereas the second is a Master’s thesis on Security Council reform from a neo-Gramscian standpoint [Yilmaz, 2007]. Regarding their

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6 Chapter 1. Introduction content and outcomes these articles are not further incorporated into considerations of this thesis, but their approach is exemplary of neo-Gramscian IR theory in the sense of Cox and will as such be used.

This approach is then taken under critical consideration by invoking critical ar-ticles from an edited book, namely by Saurin [Saurin, 2008] and Lacher [Lacher, 2008], who both list criticisms of Cox’ approach in particular. The focus of the book, however, lies less on IR theory than on international political economy. Nev-ertheless, they provide insights into how Cox deters from Gramsci in his original meaning, and add meaningful criticism to his approach. Furthermore, articles by Worth [Worth, 2011] and Robinson [Robinson, 2005] provide additional criticism on Cox’ state-centric approach to hegemony in the international arena.

Taking this criticism to heart, Gramsci’s conception of important notions such as hegemony is reviewed. This is done at the hand of Adamson’s comprehensive book which recreates the systematic of Gramsci’s thinking [Adamson, 1980]. Articles from the International Gramsci Journal, such as by Vacca [Vacca, 2016], Frosini [Frosini, 2016] or Cospito [Cospito, 2016] as well as additional ones, such as by Hawley [ Haw-ley, 1980], offer more detailed insights in order to fully explain the notions surround-ing hegemony.

After having established the theoretical framework, there follows a discussion of the relevant literature on the EEAS and its delegations, with an eye to assess it in light of the theory. To that end, the literature is critically reviewed.

The chapter will follow a four-fold division. First comes the introduction that will provide a closer overview over the chapter and what it seeks to achieve.

Secondly, the material conditions of the EEAS are set. This means discussing the formal and other resources and the establishment of the EEAS based on them. More precisely, that section reviews how the EEAS came to be an interstitial organization as Batora qualified it [Batora, 2013]. For this, the article by Onestini [Onestini, 2015] as well as information from the EEAS website are central. They lay out how the pro-cess of setting up the EEAS has worked, and what it currently looks like. The chapter then discusses how the EUDELs were transformed and what organizational ambi-guities existed in that process. Austermann [Austermann, 2014], Onestini [Onestini, 2015], Spence [Spence, 2015a], and others offer valuable insights into the material conditions of the delegations. Two central problems are the turf wars and the lack of an esprit de corps.

Thirdly, the problems arising from these material conditions will be laid out and analyzed as problems that are closely connected to identity. The basis for that further analysis are mainly four articles by Spence [Spence, 2015b], Henökl [Henökl, 2015], Juncos and Pomorska [Juncos and Pomorska, 2015], and Lequesne [Lequesne, 2015] that offer insights into the identification of officials, based on empirical studies.

In the last part, there will be a qualification of the acquired insights in terms of hegemony-maintenance and hegemony-creation, before a preliminary conclusion will be drawn with regard to the question whether a shift has taken place or been ini-tiated. The finding that a shift has occured but that the extent of hegemony-creation is unclear will then lead to further empirical research as presented in Chapter four. Chapter four is the central chapter to the research in this thesis. It is the chapter that will present new empirical data, and at the same time the chapter that will con-clude the analysis and lead to an answer of the research question.

In Chapter four, two case studies are presented. One is of the EUDEL Geneva, the EU delegation to the United Nations in Geneva, and the other is a study of the

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bilateral delegation of the EU to Ankara. These very different delegations will first be introduced and then contrasted, in order to picture the respective arenas.

The chapter itself will follow a similar approach as the analysis of the existing academic literature. First, the material conditions of both delegations will be set by providing an overview over their setup and tasks based on their respective online presentation.

After that, the identity criteria will be taken into account. This takes the shape of an analysis of the interviews. To that end, the interviewees and the settings will briefly be described. This will be done anonymously but by providing the necessary amount of context to be able to draw conclusions. The eight interviewees cover dif-ferent sections of both delegations, difdif-ferent ranks, and also difdif-ferent backgrounds, comprising experience in naional diplomacy, the Council Secretariat, the Commis-sion, as local staff, and even an outside perspective. Finally, an analysis is done for both delegations separately before the findings will be contrasted. The analysis will take place in light of the overall theoretical framework and on the basis of the findings of Chapter 3, in order to answer the research question.

This will show that there is indeed a close link between the work done by the del-egation and the identification and that, despite the hegemony-maintenance found for material criteria, the identity conditions are less static.

Finally, Chapter five, the Conclusion, will recap all that has been said, present an overview of the argument, discuss the outcomes of the research and formulate a response to the question whether the EU delegations can be best described by the notion of hegemony-maintenance of existing powers or as hegemony-creation of a new social group. This conclusion will especially provide insights regarding the ex-tent of change away from pure hegemony-maintenance and trace the evidence of hegemony-creation and relate these outcomes back to the theoretical framework in a critical manner.

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Chapter 2

Drafting the Theoretical

Framework with Gramsci

2.1 Introduction

This chapter will lay the groundwork for the thesis, namely its theoretical frame-work. First, it briefly needs to be reiterated what approach was chosen and the motivation behind that choice needs to be made clear.

As mentioned above, this thesis aims to contribute to the sparse, yet growing body of literature on the European External Action Service. Two related elements have therein led to the choice of a Gramscian approach.

The first element is an existing gap in literature on the EEAS, as has been identi-fied by Adler-Nissen [Adler-Nissen, 2015]. As she notes, both international relations theories and Marxist approaches are largely absent from the analyses of the EEAS.

The second element in choosing a Gramscian approach is based on the advan-tages that it offers in analyzing the EEAS. This derives from its ambiguous nature in institutional terms. The EEAS is not easily definable in terms of already existing organizations. Therefore, its set-up and internal dynamics are a novel phenomenon. A prevalent topic in research on the EEAS have been the turf wars between the iden-tities of the different composites of the EEAS, namely the Member State diplomats, as well as officials with a background in the Commission or the Council [Onestini, 2015]. Notions such as hegemony, class, and class consciousness can help shed light on the underlying power relations within the EEAS and its delegations. Central to the Gramscian idea of society is the individual. By identifying with other in-dividuals, class consciousness can develop that situates the individual in a greater framework in society [Adamson, 1980, 133-134, 152-153]. Likewise, there are differ-ent groupings within the EEAS that the individual officials can iddiffer-entify with. There are different stages in this identification process with a class, which will be laid out in more detail below. Furthermore, the class itself can unify on the economic, po-litical, intellectual, and moral level, in order to create a hegemony [Adamson, 1980, 160-161]. In this, two stages can be distinguished, namely hegemony-maintenance, which aims at preserving an exisiting hegemony, and hegemony-creation, which is the process of creating a new class identification [Adamson, 1980, 171, 174]. Further-more, a Gramscian framework allows for the incorporation of a broader context and broader relations, focusing on the kind of work and diplomatic relationships, and how these influence the class identification.

To that end, these and related notions need to be defined. Looking superficially at the EU, it can in the first instance be defined as an international organization. As such, relations between Member States are at stake. These are most directly found

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10 Chapter 2. Drafting the Theoretical Framework with Gramsci in the relations between Member States as well as within the Council. Therefore, it seems relevant to consider Gramscian theories of international relations. This will be done by looking at the writings of relevant scholars of Gramscian descent in interna-tional relations, most prominently Robert Cox [Cox, 1981]; [Cox, 1996]. Furthermore, Gramscian analyses of other international organizations, such as the United Nations Security Council [Yilmaz, 2007] and the World Bank [Unay, 2010] will be reviewed. This will provide some relevant notions in taking a Gramscian approach to interna-tional organizations. However, due to the peculiarities of the EU as an internainterna-tional organization, these notions will not immediately be fit for an analysis of the EEAS. In order to achieve the analytical clarity needed, criticism of these approaches will be addressed [Lacher, 2008]; [Saurin, 2008]. Most notably, the direct relationship with Gramsci and also Marx seems to have deteriorated. In order to address this, the Gramscian approach to the notions surrounding hegemony, as well as their in-terconnectedness, will be brought back to mind [Adamson, 1980]. Finally, in light of the discussion of these notions, they will be defined for the purpose of this thesis, meaning that the relevant notions shall be adapted to the situation of the EEAS.

2.2 Gramsci Between the International and the National

In this section, Gramsci as used in IR theories is reviewed, before critical mentions to that will be applied, and then the notions as identified by scholars concerned with Gramsci on a national level will be reviewed in order to come to a framework that can be used for analyzing the EEAS.

2.2.1 Gramsci in IR

This part focuses on the use of a Gramscian approach in international relations. On the one hand, this contains the neo-Gramscian approach to international relations by Cox and other scholars, and on the other hand, specific instances of the use of these approaches in analyses of international organizations are reviewed. This will help drawing parallels and make distinctions with the EEAS and will therefore help adapt the framework to the analysis of the EEAS.

There are many different strands in IR theory. One of them, and the one the focus will predominantly lie on here, is that of critical IR theory. According to Moolakkattu, this strand is based on Gramsci and Horkheimer and represented prominently by Cox. A second strand, that focuses more on communicative issues and identity, is represented by Habermas [Moolakkattu, 2009, 440]. All of these strands are de-rived from theories and theorists originally focused on national states and having been taken to the international plane in order to explain processes there that resem-ble those intra-national ones. Within Cox’ conception, there is also a separation of problem-solving and critical theories [Moolakkattu, 2009, 443]. Critical theory is the focus of further analysis here. Cox has tried to move away from the traditional, state-centered mode of IR theory which sees foreign policy as a mere extension of na-tional interests. These do not account for different forms of state that derive from the interaction between the state and civil society internally. He furthermore criticizes that these theoretical approaches seem to account for the maintenance rather than change of a given order [Cox, 1981, 127]. They fall under the ahistorical problem-solving theories that are seeing social relations as fixed and try to make existing forces work smoothly. Critical theories, on the other hand, look at a given order

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from the outside, and try to historically analyze its birth and transformations [Cox, 1981, 128-129]. Critical theories are guided towards transformative action and can contain problem-solving theories as ideologies with misguided consequences [Cox, 1981, 130]. Critical theories stem from historical materialism, a dialectical Marxist strand focused on change in social relations and advanced by Gramsci and Hobs-bawm. These are focused on social relations in a vertical sense, as expressed in the relationship between state and civil society, and they concentrate on transformations of these [Cox, 1981, 133-134]. Furthermore, historical materialism analyzes how the power relations of the levels of production, the state, and in international relations are connected [Cox, 1981, 135]. On each level, material capabilities, ideas, and insti-tutions interact to configurate the social forces in the production process, the form of a state, and the world order respectively. Material capabilities are resources of differ-ent kinds, ideas can be either held by society as a whole, as intersubjective meanings, or by specific groups, forming collective images that may be in competition within a society. Institutions reflect existing power relations and prevalent ideas and aim to stabilize and preserve the existing order [Cox, 1981, 136-138].

Such as the above notions are derived from a Gramscian influence, so is another central notion, namely that of hegemony. Certain configurations of material capabil-ities, ideas, and institutions can lead to a hegemonic order. This entails that consent prevails over coercion in the exercise of power [Cox, 1996, 127]. If not, there exists a non-hegemonic order, in which diverging views are assimilated into the dominant one, which Gramsci called trasformismo [Cox, 1996, 130]. The emergence of a strong order out of the dialectic forces internally is what is called an historic bloc [Cox, 1996, 131]. In IR, hegemony is the extension to the international of an internal hege-mony, whereby these configurations are transported outwards. According to Cox, one state founds and sustains a hegemony, whereby other states find their inter-ests represented as well. Hegemony can in that way be a euphemism for impe-rialism but does not mean domination. Cox’ view of hegemony encompasses an economic, political, and social structure in the world order, and especially the world economy [Cox, 1996, 135-137]. When it comes to international organization and the institutionalization thereof, the existing order is reflected. Cox identifies five criteria that IOs possess. First of all, they aid in the dissemination of the dominant forces, while taking into account countering ones. Secondly, they are therefore at least in line with the state who initiated the hegemony. Thirdly, they legitimate the exist-ing order, also towards the national level. They furthermore employ trasformismo to co-opt both peripheral ideas and talent by incorporating them into the hegemonic structure [Cox, 1996, 138-139].

Ünay applies these five criteria to the World Bank in order to see whether it is a hegemonic institution in the sense of Cox [Unay, 2010]. He finds that the criteria are met and that therefore the World Bank is a hegemonic institution. Yet, when it had to be reformed in order to respond to the demands of civil society, these reforms were not done with a critical approach in mind but with the aim of solving problems based on an order which was static. In that sense, Ünay notes that over shorter terms, orders can indeed seem static and therefore warrant a temporary problem-solving approach [Unay, 2010, 51].

Another paper which applies Cox’ criteria to an IO is the analysis of the United Nations Security Council done by Yilmaz [Yilmaz, 2007], who asks why the Secu-rity Council has not yet adapted to a change in hegemony [Yilmaz, 2007, 9]. He takes a framework derived from Cox for his explanatory part in assessing the Secu-rity Council power relations [Yilmaz, 2007, 22]. Specifically, historical materialism is used within the specific historical structure [Yilmaz, 2007, 25]. The analysis then

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12 Chapter 2. Drafting the Theoretical Framework with Gramsci yields a perception of the Member States that indeed, the existing structure does not fit the changed power relations and should be reformed [Yilmaz, 2007, 61]. Yilmaz qualifies the current world order as still hegemonic, but with counter-hegemonic forces on the rise, although they are not strong enough to lead to institutional change in the Security Council [Yilmaz, 2007, 78-79].

The above section has laid out the critical theory of Cox as it is used in IR research. Two instances of analyses of international organizations have been presented, show-ing how Cox can be applied. Relevant notions that have been identified are those of hegemony, counter-hegemony, trasformismo in a non-hegemonic order, and historic bloc. Of foundational value are social relations, which are constituted on the levels of production, the state, and internationally, according to the specific configurations of material capabilities, ideas, and institutions.

2.2.2 Criticism of IR theory

Above, critical theory in Cox’ conception has been presented. However, no theory is without criticism, so before applying Cox to the EEAS, his approach should be scrutinized and criticism being taken into account. Therefore, this section will be a critical approach to critical theory.

Since Cox claimed that theory is always for a purpose [Cox, 1981, 128], Saurin some-what provokingly asked who and some-what neo-Gramscian theory is for [Saurin, 2008, 28]. Specifically, Saurin addresses the issues in the extension of Gramsci to the inter-national level as done by Cox, and questions how Cox’ notion of hegemony is spe-cial [Saurin, 2008, 30]. One issue of the extension to the international is that Marx’ and Gramsci’s focus on using practice as a starting point for theoretical explanations was largely left behind in that neo-Gramscian theory is founded on already exist-ing theories rather than taken from observation of practice [Saurin, 2008, 30-31, 36]. Furthermore, Saurin criticizes that theories in the Gramscian tradition do no longer account for changes in social relations, but have rather become conservative in that they account for the fact that the current world order is not changing but repro-ducing itself [Saurin, 2008, 32]; [Worth, 2011, 376]. Lacher calls Cox "elite-centrist" and finds him to categorize change not as a class struggle, but as induced by the elite [Lacher, 2008, 77, 79].

Another point of criticism is the selectiveness with which concepts are taken from the national level and extended to the international [Saurin, 2008, 33]. On top of that, Saurin criticized that Cox merely derives concepts, rather than truly abstract-ing from Gramsci in a dialectic way [Saurin, 2008, 40]. Saurin further observes that hegemony seems to be a nationally based phenomenon which is then aggregated on the international level, without there being a corresponding international phe-nomenon [Saurin, 2008, 41, 44]. In the same line of criticism, Moolakkattu notes that the domestic blocs are emphasized and seen as mere national adjustment to capital-ism on the international level by Cox [Moolakkattu, 2009, 453]. The way that Cox describes the internationalization of the state it is merely seen in terms of the feed-back that the international level produces and the way that this affects the national scale. Furthermore, this internationalization is seen in terms of internationalization of production. What is somewhat noteworthy in this respect is the absence of any mention of the EU as international level [Cox, 1981, 146]. As Robinson notes, there is still a stark focus on the nation-state, and the state is still at the center of hegemony, despite all the awareness for transnational forces [Robinson, 2005, 561-562]; [Worth,

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2011, 381]. What he argues, then, is that classes are social forces that have to be redefined in light of globalization. In the same line of argumentation, we need to remember that "we cannot speak of the hegemony of a state. Hegemony is exercised by social groups[...]" [Robinson, 2005, 564]. Likewise,

hegemonic outcomes are not defined solely by specific super-structures, but by the larger relationship between the dominant and subordinate classes, which in turn is shaped by production [Worth, 2011, 383].

What can be noted in general is an overall difficulty in abstracting Gramscian con-cepts to the international. Although Cox tries to get away from the strictures of the state, he seems to see the international level as a mere aggregate of nation-state social relations. This is also reflected in his approach to analyzing international organizations, namely as a reflection of power relations between states. Social struc-tures do not seem to be built outside of national states. This does not fare well as a conceptual approach in applying to EU structures, since the latter are neither to be explained by the simplistic aggregation of national hegemonies of Cox’ international level, nor is it to be treated as the equivalent of a nation state. In order to address these questions of correct abstraction and the original purpose of a Gramscian ap-proach, key notions found above shall be laid out in light of Gramsci’s writings and by Gramscian scholars. This will aid in abstracting to the level of the EEAS.

2.2.3 Back to Gramsci on the National Level

This part addresses some of the criticism noted above by returning to Gramsci and his definitions of some of the notions used by Cox. This is meant to lay the ground-work for the abstraction of several of these notions to the EEAS.

As Adamson lays out, the notions that Gramsci used often came in pairs. They were either opposing or complementary, but always part of a system. This system, which has largely been developed by Gramsci in the Prison Notebooks, but never finished as a coherent whole, will be laid out below.

Gramsci takes an historical approach, and his philosophy is derived from the practical experiences of (political) life in Italy at the time [Adamson, 1980, 35, 105]. According to Gramsci, philosophy and the practice of politics are interacting in a dialectic way. He tried to rediscover Marxism to get away from the "vulgarized" form, and he did so by turning towards Hegelian Marxism [Adamson, 1980, 120, 122]; [Cospito, 2016, 86]. From history, one can extract laws of tendency, which are to be used in the political struggle of a class [Adamson, 1980, 35], but these are neither deterministic nor do they entail causality [Adamson, 1980, 35, 105]. The present history is made up of history, politics, and philosophy interacting [Adamson, 1980, 128]. Especially in his use of philosophy of praxis, Gramsci is a Marxist. What philosophy of praxis does is to make political subjects of people [Vacca, 2016, 376].

At the basis of Gramsci’s theories stands the individual. According to Gram-sci, identity is dialectically constructed by the relationship between individuality and collectivity. Therefore, humans can shape their social world, and can like-wise be shaped by it [Adamson, 1980, 133-134]. Humans thus define themselves in opposition to an other, in an interplay between the explicit consciousness derived from the past and the consciousness that is implicit in actions. This enables them to posit themselves in the greater framework of a class, which is their class con-sciousness [Adamson, 1980, 152-153]. Furthermore, they can place themselves in the bigger framework of society as a whole, as determined by all relations. This class

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14 Chapter 2. Drafting the Theoretical Framework with Gramsci setting develops through the spreading of ideas throughout civil society by organic intellectuals, who dialectically interact with workers, in order to unite to form an intellectual or moral bloc [Adamson, 1980, 143-146]. Organic intellectuals represent the essence of a certain class and are tasked with developing the consensus for a hegemony [Cospito, 2016, 74, 76]; [Frosini, 2016, 134]; [Gramsci, 1975, 42]; [ Haw-ley, 1980, 588]; [Vacca, 2016, 365]. Language helps to transmit these ideas and de-velop a new common sense which can challenge the established one of the ruling class [Adamson, 1980, 150-151]. These interactions can lead to the development of a hegemony in several steps. The concept of hegemony is of central importance in Gramsci, as well as in this thesis. Broadly speaking, it is what determines the re-lationship between civil and political society within a state [Cospito, 2016, 68]. As Gramsci writes [Gramsci, 1975, 1518]:

Si possono, per ora, fissare due grandi "piani" superstrutturali, quello che si può chiamare della "società civile", cioè del insieme di organismi volgarmente detti "privati" e quello della "società politica o Stato" e che corrispondono alla funzione di "egemonia" che il gruppo dominante es-ercita in tutta la società e a quello di "dominio diretto" o di comando che si esprime nello Stato e nel governo "giuridico".

For now, we can fix two big superstructural levels. One can be called "civil society" which is the whole of organisms that are commonly called "private" and then there is that of the "political society or the State". These are corresponding to the function of "hegemony" that the domi-nant group exercises throughout the entire society and to that of "direct domination" or command that is expressed in the State and in the "legal" government. (Translation by author.)

Hegemony is a process developed from below [Smith, 2010, 39-40]. On the first stage, the catharsis, or economic-corporative, a perception of oneself within the class structure is developed, and a vague solidarity with other people, but not yet the class as such, manifests itself [Adamson, 1980, 153]. Concretely, this means that a merchant will be solidary with another merchant, and a factory worker with his peers, but the merchants and factory workers will not yet identify with each other as being part of a common social group [Cospito, 2016, 66]. On the second stage, self-autonomy and a historical consciousness are developed, and the class interest in eco-nomic terms is realized by the individual [Adamson, 1980, 153]; [Cospito, 2016, 66]. These stages are still involving the common sense, and structures are not challenged yet. Furthermore, they are still purely economic [Cospito, 2016, 66]. On the third level, there is another catharsis, but one involving the class as a whole gaining con-sciousness, in a move from the structure to the superstructure [Adamson, 1980, 153, 160]. This third level is a hegemony, on which the class unites on the economic, polit-ical, intellectual, and moral level and thereby passes from the civil society to political society [Adamson, 1980, 161]; [Cospito, 2016, 66]. Next to the hegemonic class are subaltern classes that may offer a future alternative for a hegemony [Smith, 2010, 45]. Adamson identifies two differing, yet related, meanings of hegemony in Gramsci. In one meaning, as has been assessed above, hegemony means the overcoming of the economic-corporative, thus a stage in the development of a class consciousness [Adamson, 1980, 171], or hegemony-creation [Adamson, 1980, 174]. This may be as-similated with guerra di movimento, literally war of movement [Cospito, 2016, 71-72].

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The other meaning, which grew out of that one, is hegemony-maintenance [ Adam-son, 1980, 174], and pertains to the consent by civil society for the hegemonic class that is already in place and governing. This meaning of hegemony conveys the opposite of domination or coercion [Adamson, 1980, 170], and can be related to the notion of guerra d’assedio, meaning war of position in the sense that a fixed po-sition is defended [Cospito, 2016, 71]; [Hawley, 1980, 590]. According to Frosini, the first type can be called egemonia giacobina and pertains to the struggle of ascen-sion of a hegemonic class, going thorugh the process of becoming conscious of one’s (class)identity [Frosini, 2016, 126]. However, Gramsci traces an historical develop-ment that, with the stabilization of the state, leads to a more passive revolution and eventually the struggle for keeping or reproducing the existing hegemony [Frosini, 2016, 126, 131]; [Gramsci, 1975, 2287]; [Maltese, 2013, 183].

[...]la guerra di movimento diventa sempre più guerra di posizione e si può dire che uno Stato vince una guerra in quanto la prepara minuta-mente e tecnicaminuta-mente nel tempo di pace [Gramsci, 1975, 1566-1567]. [...]the war of movement becomes ever more a war of position and it can be said that a State wins a war insofar as it prepares in detail and technically in times of peace. (Translation by author.)

When a class is hegemonic, it is both leading and dominating [Hawley, 1980, 589]. Gramsci calls this direzione intelletuale e morale, which means leading in intellectual and moral terms, and dominio, respectively:

Il criterio storio-politico su cui bisogna fondare le proprie ricerche è questo: che una classe è dominante in due modi, è cioè "dirigente" e "dominante". È dirigente delle classi alleate, è dominante delle classi avversarie. Perciò una classe già prima di andare al potere può essere "dirigente" (e deve esserlo): quando è al potere diventa dominante ma continua ad essere anche "dirigente" [Gramsci, 1975, 41].

The historical-political criterion on which one has to base their own re-search is this: that a class is dominant in two ways, that is "leading" and "dominant". It is leading the allied classes and dominant towards oppos-ing classes. Therefore, a class can be (and must be) leadoppos-ing even before it comes to power: when it is in power, it becomes dominant but continues to be also "leading". (Translation by author.)

The way these are combined through the specific relationships between social groups or classes determines the hegemony [Vacca, 2016, 364]. Gramsci also observed, looking at the USSR, that the struggle for hegemony-maintenance is a very intense struggle with a very intervening government [Frosini, 2016, 142]; [Gramsci, 1975, 801-802]. For Gramsci, the modern state thus exists in a struggle of hegemony-maintenance, and hegemony-creation is an historical element, as well as a way for future change. To say it more poetically, in the words of Maltese [Maltese, 2013, 182]:

Infine, l’egemonia e, in Gramsci, il viatico per immaginare un progetto alternativo di societa non fondato su un trascendentale indipendente dal flusso della storicita, ma inscritto nellesistente.

In the end, hegemony in Gramsci is the viaticum for imagining an al-ternative project of society which is not based on a transcendental that is

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16 Chapter 2. Drafting the Theoretical Framework with Gramsci indipendent from the flux of history, but inscribed in the existing. (Trans-lation by author.)

In the modern state, a hegemony forms by creating a bloc of the subaltern classes. However, not all states have a hegemonic structure in the way that it is achieved by consensus. They can be dominated by a class, not morally but by coercion, be pseudohegemonic, by which is meant that the ruling elite claims to represent a class, which in reality it does not, or it can be governed by trasformismo, which means that political society dominates over civil society by co-opting talent from subaltern classes who might otherwise form a counter-movement [Adamson, 1980, 175]. For example, by integrating people into the state apparatus, through mechanisms like military service, they might be less likely to rebell against the state they are fighting for and which provides them with jobs.

Both hegemonic and non-hegemonic structures are situated in an historic bloc. This is the abstraction of an intellectual or moral bloc, and grows out of class al-liances. Structure and superstructure are interacting on the economic, cultural, and political levels [Adamson, 1980, 176-177]. Within a state, a class can develop into an historic bloc and become hegemonic throughout society [Adamson, 1980, 213]. In this, subaltern classes are integrated [Frosini, 2016, 137]. If the two definitions of hegemony are abstracted to the state level, they are two versions of state-society relations. In the creation phase, the political society is equated to the state and to be accessed by civil society in the step from purely economic identification to a hegemony. On the maintenance side, since a hegemony is in place, civil and po-litical society are already closely linked and constitute the state together [Adamson, 1980, 217], [Hawley, 1980, 590]. They are meant to be in an equilibrium with each other [Vacca, 2016, 366], which also entails that civil society is losing its autonomy vis-a-vis political society [Frosini, 2016, 143].

Taking the state to the international level, Frosini argues that this international position can condense the hegemony inside of the state and create a true unity be-tween governed and governing [Frosini, 2016, 161]. This is an interesting and impor-tant point, since it raises the question of influence by external factors on the unity within.

As has become evident, Gramsci incorporates cultural and intellectual notions, and focuses less on economic terms than Cox. However, he remains Marxist in that for him, production and identity are closely related [Hawley, 1980, 586]. Secondly, Gramsci’s conception of the development of a hegemony is dialectic in a Marxist sense, and derived from practice. He also abstracts his own concepts from the in-dividual to the societal level, which indicates a possibility for abstraction to yet an-other level. The state seems less of a fixed entity than a constituted one. Below, these insights will be worked into a theoretical framework for analyzing the EEAS. More specifically, the development of identities will be put central through the no-tions of class consciousness, and in their extension, the maintenance versus the new creation of the hegemony of such a class. Looking at the EEAS, there are already cer-tain classes present, and officials identifiy with these. The point of analysis will be whether the creation of the EEAS changes the composition and hegemonic statuses of these classes.

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2.3 Defining the Theoretical Framework

As Cox believes, theory always has a purpose and should be based on practice rather than theory [Cox, 1981, 128]. For this reason, the theoretical approaches as set out above need to be adapted to the specific practice of the EEAS. The notions mentioned can offer a starting point but need to be abstracted based on the EEAS practice. To that end, some peculiarities of the EEAS will be delineated, as opposed to either the IR approach or the national one of Gramsci. In a second steps, a list of notions taken from the approaches above will be identified and adapted to the analysis of the EEAS.

The EEAS is neither a nation-state, which is an easily acceptable fact, nor is it a classical international institution. The latter point must be laid out closer.

First of all, the EU is made up of states like an international organization, but has developed its own legal order. The EU itself has gained significant supranational powers and can take decisions that are binding on the Member States. However, this goes further than a constellation as the UN Security Council, because decisions are not taken merely by the Member States and determined on the basis of their repsective power relations, as intergovernmentalist theories would have. Rather, the institutions have developed their own powers, and there is a strongly democratic element that is lacking in other IOs.

As regards the EEAS, this is made up of officials from different backgrounds. As article 27(3) TEU provides, roughly a third of these come from the Member States’ diplomatic services. Another part is made up of former Commission officials, whereas a third has a background in the Council Secretariat. As Spence notes, they even come from different backgrounds within these groups, depending on whether they have experience with EU diplomacy or not [Spence, 2015b, 50]. When it comes to the delegations themselves, there is even a group of staff still employed by Com-mission services [EEAS, 2015]. Furthermore, not only is the EEAS itself not classi-cally to be understood as an IO, but it is also not easily theorized by IR internally. Since IOs are mostly seen as the institutionalization of state powers [Cox, 1996], there is little room for an analysis of the internal dynamics of the EEAS rather than the or-ganization as a mere filter for foreign policy output aggregated at some EU-internal level. This would mean that the EEAS is just reaching through the foreign policy stances that the internal hegemonic forces have determined. That would most likely mean how Member States decide, since foreign policy is mostly made in the Coun-cil. However, the EEAS has been found to be independent and representing EU positions, and not the mere aggregate of Member State positions [Spence, 2015b]. As has become evident, neo-Gramscian IR sees the international as an extension of national hegemony. Since the EEAS is not made up of purely national forces, this poses a problem for that kind of analysis.

The starting point of developing a theory for the EEAS shall here be a critical ap-proach.

There are two possible ways of conceptualizing the EEAS and its delegations through the notion of hegemony: on the one hand from a perspective that is derived from the IR approach developed by Cox, and on the other hand the more national focus of Gramsci. In concrete terms, this means seeing the EEAS either as an institu-tionalization of the existing power relations between the Member States, the Com-mission, and the Council, or, on the other hand, it means looking at the EEAS as a more confined entity, parallel to the nation-state analyzed by Gramsci. The former

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18 Chapter 2. Drafting the Theoretical Framework with Gramsci would imply seeing the three participating parties as classes and analyzing whether they act as such between all the delegations and the EEAS Brussels office, exerting hegemony within the EEAS as derived from the outside power relations between said parties. This pertains to what Adamson called hegemony-maintenance. As will be further discussed below, the early period of the EEAS has shown strong signs of hegemony-maintenance, specifically in the turf wars, which were struggles over re-taining competences. The second option would take the EEAS as a subaltern space with a new class in the making and see whether internally there exists a class con-sciousness which would make no difference between the diverse components of the staff, and look at the organization and whether there is an organic elite within. That approach relates to Adamson’s term of hegemony-creation. Possible signs of this are found in studies that suggest that there is a degree of identification with the EEAS and that an esprit de corps might develop [Spence, 2015b]; [Juncos and Pomorska, 2015]. As Gramsci said [Gramsci, 1975, 1602]:

A un certo punto della loro vita storica i gruppi sociali si staccano dai loro partiti tradizionali, cioè i partiti tradizionali in quella data forma organiz-zativa, con quei determinati uomini che li costituiscono, li rappresentano e li dirigono non sono più riconosciuti come loro espressione dalla loro classe o frazione di classe.

At a certain point in their historical life, social groups will separate them-selves from their traditional parties. That means that the traditional par-ties, in the given organizational form, with these certain men that make them up, that represent them and that lead them, are not recognized as expressing their [the social groups] class or fraction of a class anymore. (Translation by author.)

It is up to further research, which will be conducted below, to discern whether there is an actual shift from hegemony-maintenance towards hegemony-creation. Fur-thermore, the stage of identification with the class will need to be analyzed, and the composition of the class. As mentioned, a degree of identification with the EEAS is there, and the question at hand is whether there is also separate identification with individual EUDELs, and to what degree. In order to identify this, the degree of iden-tification with other officials will be reviewed. Of central importance is the group of officials that are used as a point of reference for this identification.

The basic assumption when dealing with the EU and the EEAS specifically must radically depart from Gramsci and Cox. For the involvement of the high degree of institutionalization in the EU, as well as the European citizenship that every citi-zen possesses next to the national one, any consciousness and identification is de-veloping along an added dimension. Nowadays, nationality is the status quo. Like Gramsci’s Italy, there is a strong feeling of belonging to a certain region, in the broad-est sense comparable to the nationalism that connected Gramsci to Sardinia. With-out meaning to draw further unwarranted parallels between incomparable histori-cal contexts, the starting point is a basic sense of belonging to the regional (which means national) level instead of the united (EU) one. However, such a conscious-ness can arise through education, and lead to a sense of belonging to the EU. Just as the dialectic relationship between the individual and the collective helps posi-tion the individual in the framework of her class, so the individual can also posiposi-tion herself between her national and European identity. As Lequesne argues, identi-fication is also connected to rules and routines, and can therefore be attached to

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the professional affiliation [Lequesne, 2015]. This is in line with the link that Marx and Gramsci lay between class identification and the type of work one does. The function that officials have to fulfill are therefore assumed to be of influence when it comes to identification with other officials. This identification can know several stages, and finally lead to a hegemony in the sense of creation, in that a new class is formed. A point of consideration is whether this identification is led bottom-up, from the "civil society" of all officials, or whether it follows top-down institutional-ized patterns which could take the form of guidance as provided by an organic elite. Whichever institution one falls under, they have differing dynamics and different types of consciousness that shape the individual in a dialectic way, the same way this happens in national diplomatic services [Henökl, 2015]; [Spence, 2015b].

The question at hand is what happens when individuals are taken from these ex-isting classes, and are put into a new constellation, which is again pre-institutionalized. Officials from three different classes are put into the new constellation of the EEAS. From there, the two possible ways set out above open up. Either the officials posi-tion themselves anew, in an act of hegemony-creaposi-tion, by forming a new class - or new classes - in a new formation. Or, secondly, they are creating a hegemonic bloc based on outside power relations, in what amounts to hegemony-maintenance of one pre-existing class and subordination by the others.

The notion of class here is meant in a comparable, yet different, sense as in Gram-sci. What unites the classes is for a big part based on material resources, but is fur-thermore based on institutional culture and politics that foster identification. Rather than the unified stance being substantive, however, it is functional, in that the modes of policy making, of etiquette, as well as the way resources are used are ingrained in the individual’s consciousness as an official. However, the social context in which identities develop is also determined by external relations. Ives agrees with Laclau and Mouffe when they say that consciousness is largely materialistically determined. That means that "what one is one the economic level" determines identity [Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, 85]; [Ives, 2005, 459]. Instead of belonging to the worker’a class, it needs to be analyzed what social group EUDEL officials identify with. They will likely be solidary with colleagues that do similar work, or produce similar output. According to Ives, identity is not exclusively constructed on the economic terrein, but also that of culture and social life [Ives, 2005, 465]. When it comes to hegemony-maintencance in the EEAS, classes can be seen as already established, and identities with them. Every institutional background is assumed to come with a distinctive identity that is connected to the specific type of work, and that is accepted by all other groups as the hegmeonic leading principle for organizing a delegation. In hegemony-creation in the EEAS, the material conditions are largely given a priori through the setting up of the EEAS. This has still given rise to turf wars over mate-rial aspects like competences. More flexible, however, is identification of the officials with the service or delegations in a process of hegemony-creation. This works ex-clusively bottom-up, since no insitutional measures have been taken to ensure iden-tification, and has already seemed to start occurring [Juncos and Pomorska, 2015]. To recap, a theoretical framework for analyzing the identification in EEAS delega-tions has been set up, accounting for both Coxian and Gramscian input. Specifically, the question is whether a shift from the initial hegemony-maintenance that fostered turf wars for retaining competences and resources, paired with a lack of esprit de corps, has occurred towards hegemony-creation. The latter is connected both to ma-terial and identity issues. Mama-terially speaking, the setting up of the EEAS has pro-vided the EEAS with certain competences and resources. The identity, however, has

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20 Chapter 2. Drafting the Theoretical Framework with Gramsci to develop. For tracing this development, the notion of class consciousness is a good one, since it sees the individual in the framework of their class. This consciousness develops through stages and the aim is to see at what stage the developing con-sciousness of EEAS officials in delegations is and who is hegemonic in EU foreign policy. To answer the questions, two leading considerations will guide the analysis, namely how and with whom identification is formed.

2.4 Concluding the Theoretical Part

Above, the theoretical framework for the further approach to the thesis has been set out. The IR approach based on Gramsci has been laid out at the hand of its most in-fluential scholar, Robert Cox, and examples have shown how this has been applied. Some criticism was taken into account and the focus laid on Gramsci in order to address some of said criticism. Following that, the theoretical considerations have been abstracted in order to fit the situation of the EEAS. Both input from Cox and Gramsci has been used to explain the notions of hegemony, class, and class con-sciousness in light of the EEAS peculiarities. The central two notions for analysis are those of hegemony-maintenance and hegemony-creation, which incorporate all as-pects of material and identity resources in order to clarify what the EEAS is in terms of identity.

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Chapter 3

The State of the Art of EEAS

Literature

3.1 Introduction

In this chapter, the existing literature and academic discussion on the EEAS will be reviewed in so far as it is relevant for this thesis. The aim of this undertaking is to provide a bigger picture of the kind of research that has been done, but also to place the data and outcomes that have been gleaned through other studies in the framework of this thesis. This will also shed a light on the areas of study that can be distinguished when it comes to the EEAS and focus on the ones relevant here. In concrete terms, that means an interpretation and adaptation of other research to the theoretical framework used in this thesis.

To that end, the setup and history of the EEAS and the delegations will be briefly laid out in order to emphasize why the EEAS was founded and on what basis, as well as how the foundational period went. Initial theories as well as problems that were born out of this early period and struggles having their origin then will be discussed. The initial struggles between the Council Secretariat, the Commission, and the Member States that led to the organizational setup of the EEAS and its in-ternal division will be reviewed in order to explain problems like the turf wars over competences. In the next step, these central problems that have surfaced in the lit-erature will be discussed. These problems revolve around material ambiguities, as noted above. The EEAS will be taken here as an interstitial organization sitting in-between different fields of resources [Batora, 2013]. This mostly centers around the EEAS as an organization globally speaking. Issues that arose out of these material problems were those of identification, such as the turf wars or lack of an esprit de corps. In connection with administrative, institutional, financial, and staffing issues, as well as differing institutional cultures, there were pulls from all sides involved in an attempt to gain more power in the EEAS. This plays on all levels, both the central EEAS office as well as in the delegations. After having reviewed the literature on material conditions and identity of the EEAS, these will be placed in the framework of hegemony-maintenance and hegemony-creation.

The findings of this chapter, that there was a play of hegemony-maintenance in the early period of the EEAS, will act as a starting point from which the empirical re-search for this thesis will depart in finding out whether the hegemony-maintenance pulls have been weakened in favor of hegemony-creation within the EEAS and EU-DELs. Several distinctions will have to be kept in mind during the analysis. First of all, the EEAS is a big organization. When analyzing its setup, functioning, and questions of identity, a distinction needs to be made between the EEAS as a whole,