The Principles of the European Union’s External Action 08

(1)

[First Page Header]

The Principles of the European

Union’s External Action

The Influence of Energy Security on International

Socialisation of Azerbaijan and Ukraine

Master thesis for the master International Relations and International Organisation Name: Jola Huijberts (s1695789)

Address: Heerenweg 44, 1768 BD Barsingerhorn Telephone number: 06 12 46 50 55

(2)

DECLARATION BY CANDIDATE

I hereby declare that this thesis, “The Principles of the European Union’s

External Action; the Influence of Energy Security on International

Socialisation of Azerbaijan and Ukraine”, is my own work and my own effort

and that it has not been accepted anywhere else for the award of any other

degree or diploma. Where sources of information have been used, they have

been acknowledged.

Name: Jola Huijberts

Signature

Date: 25 January 2015

(3)

List of Abbreviations

AA Association Agreements

AMIP Azərbaycan Milli İstiqlal Partiyası, National Independence Party of Azerbaijan

AP Action Plan

BTE Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipeline

CEEC Central and Eastern European Countries CIS Commonwealth of Independent States

CoE Council of Europe

DCFTA Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement EaP Eastern Partnership

EC European Commission

ENP European Neighbourhood Policy

ENPI European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument

EP European Parliament

EU European Union

EUROMED Euro-Mediterranean Partnership GDP Gross Domestic Product

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NGO Non-governmental Organisation

ODIHR Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights OSCE Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe PCA Partnership and Cooperation Agreement

TACIS Technical Assistance the Commonwealth of Independent States TEU Treaty of the European Union

UK United Kingdom

US United States of America WTO World Trade Organisation

(6)

List of Illustrations

Tables

Table 1:

EU import of oil over the last twenty years….………..36

Table 2:

Level of Democracy in Azerbaijan over the last ten years according to Freedom House…………..38

Table 3:

Level of Democracy in Ukraine over the last ten years according to Freedom House…………...56

Figures

Figure 1:

(7)

Introduction

Over the last 60 years, the European Union1_{(EU) and its member states established a framework}

of norms and values that form the foundation of the EU’s organisation and actions. Article 2 of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) states that “The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.”2_{These list of values form important internal}

guidelines, as well as for the external action of the EU. Article 21 (1) TEU shows that “The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world […]”.3_{This is applicable for both political external action as well as the EU’s external}

commercial policy. However, this could lead to an interesting paradox between economic interests and political interests. For example, on the global energy market, most of the European member states are dependent on importing energy resources from Russia and the Middle East. This makes it difficult for member states to adhere to these principles. To secure its energy supplies, European countries have to do business with authoritarian regimes that do not always respect these European values. Due to the dependency, the options to exert pressure on these regimes to change their policies and practice are rather limited.

1_{In this research, the term European Union is used to refer to the current organisation, as well as its}

predecessors.

2_{European Union, “Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the}

Functioning of the European Union”, Official Journal of the European Union C83, 30 March 2010, available on http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/ALL/?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:TOC.

3_{European Union, “Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the}

(8)

EU’s eastern neighbourhood

One of the instruments the EU developed to influence on policies and practices of non-EU countries in Europe is the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). 4_{Around 2009, the EU}

started a multilateral program within the ENP by dividing it in three regions: the Eastern Partnership (EaP)5_{, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EUROMED)}6_{, and the Black Sea}

Synergy7_{. The main goal of the ENP is to create a ‘ring of friends’ around the EU that share the}

same norms and values and to improve the economic development in neighbouring countries. In other words, the EU aims to Europeanise its neighbourhood. Furthermore, the EU aims to increase the level of prosperity, stability and security of the countries involved as well. By enhancing the relationship with the countries in its backyard, the EU tries to decrease the estrangement between itself and the neighbouring states. To achieve these goals, the EU has conducted bilateral agreements with the countries involved, on how to improve values such as human rights, democracy and rule of law. Moreover, economic cooperation and development should be seen as a vital part of the improvement of the political situation. To limit the scope of this thesis, it will focus only on the relationship between the EU and Eastern Partnership countries, and more in particular with Ukraine and Azerbaijan.

Energy and the Eastern Partnership

Prioritizing both a political and an economic relation with EaP-countries could lead to the above named paradox. The main problem in this situation is the difficulty to use economic means to europeanise the government’s behaviour and policies. This thesis will especially focus on the paradox of importing energy from, or transporting through, countries that are involved in the EaP and the attempts of the EU to improve the European norms in the same countries. What makes this interesting is the dependency of the EU towards EaP countries when it comes to energy security. On the one hand, European countries need the supplies from the east to safeguard their economic development, prosperity and living conditions. On the other hand, the

4_{Countries that are part of the ENP are Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel,}

Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine.

5_{The Eastern Partnership countries are: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine} 6_{EUROMED countries are: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Syria and}

Tunisia.

7_{Participants of the Black Sea Synergy are: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Republic of}

(9)

EU wishes to spread European norms and values in these countries as well. However, since the energy exports are of high importance for the stability of the regimes in EaP countries, purchasing oil and gas, and thus supporting the regimes, goes against EU objectives of promoting democratic development.

Innovation and developments on the energy market could lead to better opportunities for the EU in the future. In the last decade the sources of supply of energy on the global market has diversified. One of the causes of an increased variety of supplying countries on the world energy market is the recent shale gas revolution in the United States (US). The increase of shale gas exploitation in the US is not only beneficial for the gas price on the domestic market, but it has an influence on the European energy market. Because of the low gas prices in the US, many large industrial companies decided to start using (shale) gas instead of coal as energy source for their production. The price of coal dropped substantially, which led to an increase of demand in Europe. Because of the lower coal prices, European energy companies started using more coal instead of gas for their energy plants.8_{Eventually leading to a decrease of the European demand}

of gas from outside the EU. Another important new source is renewable energy, which has already changed the demand of Germany extensively.9_{These developments could be an indicator}

of future opportunities for the EU as a normative power in EaP countries when it is less dependent on them for its energy security.

Theory

The Europeanisation of the Eastern Partnership countries is one of the ways in which the EU can practice its normative power.10_{To do so, the EU uses the same mechanism for ‘neighbourhood}

Europeanisation’ as it did during the ‘accession Europeanisation’ of the Central and Eastern

8_{Guy Chazan and Gerrit Wiesmann, “The Last Hurrah Power in Europe for Coal,” Financial Times}

(London Edition), 3 February 2013, accessed on 18 June 2013 http://academic.lexisnexis.eu/??lni=57NF-2V11-JBFS-D3WW&csi=293847&oc=00240&perma=true.

9_{“Energiemix: Erneuerbare sind Deutschlands wichtigste Stromquelle”, Der Spiegel Online, accessed on}

14 October 2014, http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/soziales/oekostrom-erneuerbare-sind-wichtigste-stromquelle-vor-braunkohle-a-994816.html.

10_{This definition of normative power is developed by Ian Manners and gives a general view on this form}

(10)

European Countries (CEEC’S) that became members in 2004, 2007 and 2013. This conditionality-based mechanism implies that when countries adapt their policies and behaviour to the European standard, they are rewarded. If this is not the case they will be punished, or wont get the reward. By doing so, the EU tries to change what is ‘normal’ in the partnership countries.11

To analyse this form of actively influencing norms in other countries, this focuses on the process behind the adoption of new norms and the change of behaviour when countries become a member (or partner) of an international organisation, namely International Socialisation. More particular, the rationalist perspective of strategic calculation in international socialisation of Frank Schimmelfennig will be used. Schimmelfennig developed this approach to rationally explain the transformation of the CEEC’s that became a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in the 1990s and the EU in 2004 and 2007. This approach focuses mainly on the rational action behind adaption, depending on the interplay between the rewards from the side of the EU and the costs for the regimes of target countries. Therefore, to influence reform, the EU conditionally rewards good behaviour and policy change and it punishes countries by publishing malpractices and lack of progress, or so-called ‘naming and shaming’.12

Because the EU uses similar mechanisms to enforce socialisation within the EaP-countries as it did during the accession process of the CEEC’s, the same approach will be worked with in this research. The energy trade relationship between the EU and EaP countries Azerbaijan and Ukraine is introduced as another factor that could influence the rational decisions of both the EU and the target countries. This will lead to a better understanding of the broader dynamics of the Eastern Partnership and the socialisation process.

Methodology

In this thesis a lot of recent developments will be discussed. The developments on the world energy market are constantly changing. For the literature review this thesis is depending recent academic literature and papers published by research institutes and think tanks. Also, to get a better understanding of the current dynamics of the Eastern Partnership, the energy trade policy

11_{Ian Manners, “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?,” JCMS: Journal of Common}

Market Studies 40, no. 2 (June 2002): 239.

12 _{Hiski Haukkala, “The European Union as a Regional Normative Hegemon: The Case of European}

(11)

and the European influence in Ukraine and Azerbaijan, EU publications, such as the Association Agreements (AA) and monitoring reports are used. For the measure of possible change in the level of normative power of the EU, both EU data as well as independent data sources will be used. By using a combination of academic resources and information for the institutions and actors involved, this thesis will provide an analysis of the interaction between the EaP and the EU’s energy security challenges.

Chapter outline

This research will particularly focus on the normative power of the EU in the two EaP-countries Azerbaijan and Ukraine. Both these are energy trading partners of the EU member states responsible for reasonable amount of gas and oil export and transport to EU member states. When looking at EU relations with eastern neighbours, Russia plays an important role as well. Especially when dealing with countries such as Ukraine and Azerbaijan, which are considered the ‘near abroad’13_{from a Russian perspective. A good example of this Russian urge for influence}

in these countries is the Eurasian Union, a Russian led trade union. Although the role of Russia cannot be ignored, the in depth analysis of the Russian influence on the EU’s relationship with Azerbaijan and Ukraine will not fall in the scope of this research. To summarize, the main question of this research is: To what extent does the European energy security influence the European Union’s normative power towards Eastern Partnership countries Azerbaijan and Ukraine?

To answer this question, this thesis will examine whether the energy dependency position of the EU will play a role in the lack of substantial reform in EaP countries. The two case studies on Ukraine and Azerbaijan will provide a more in depth analysis of the dynamics of the EU’s wish Europeanise its neighbourhood and the energy trade relationship. Firstly, chapter one explains Schimmelfennig’s theory of strategic calculation in international socialisation and how this can be used to explain the developments in the Eastern Partnership. The internal and external factors that determine the success of failure of socialisation will be elaborated on. This chapter gives an insight in to what extent the European Union can influence the norms and values of the EaP countries. In the second part, the case studies on Azerbaijan and Ukraine are

13_{The Russian political rhetoric distinguishes two types of foreign countries. Countries that were part of}

(12)

presented. In the light of the approach of Schimmelfennig, the developments around Europeanisation of these two countries will be analysed. Furthermore, the role of the energy trade relations and the import dependency position of EU member states are combined with Schimmelfennig’s approach.

Relevance

(13)

Chapter 1 Theorising the Eastern Partnership incentives: International

Socialisation and Strategic Calculation

1.1 Introduction

The end of the Cold War changed the geopolitical situation in Europe tremendously; new countries emerged and old ideological borders dissolved. With the ‘victory’ of the western world, the end of history was proclaimed.14_{Liberal democracy was seen as the new standard and it was}

the aim of the (Western) European institutions to help the Central and Eastern European Countries to reach these new norms of governance. All CEEC’s became members of the Council of Europe (CoE) —a forum that primarily deals with human rights and related subjects— and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Most of the CEEC’s would later join the EU, the political and economic community. For other countries a different framework for cooperation was created, namely the European Neighbourhood Policy, which became the Eastern Partnership (EaP) for Eastern European countries in 2008.

To join the EU, countries need to fulfil the membership criteria (the Copenhagen criteria) in political, economic, and judicial areas. For the countries that became a member in 2004, 2007 and 2013 severe political and economic changes were needed to comply with the norms of the EU. However, they reached the goal of membership eventually and ‘returned’ to Europe. By only accepting new members under the above-mentioned criteria, the EU influences the norms and values in candidate countries without the use of real force. ENP-countries agreed to adopt similar changes in the same areas as the candidate countries; however, they have to do this

14_{Francis Fukuyama saw the end of the Cold War as the end of and evolutionary process of state}

(14)

without the golden carrot of membership.15_{This could mean that for successful international}

socialisation other measures are needed.

This chapter will give the theoretical background of the analysis made in this thesis and an insight in the socialisation process as part of the Eastern Partnership. This chapter focuses on how the approach of Frank Schimmelfennig on strategic calculation in international socialisation can explain the power of the EU to change norms and values in the EaP-countries Ukraine and Azerbaijan. In order to answer this question, first, the process behind the changing of norms and values in countries outside the EU will be elaborated. Therefore, the work of Schimmelfennig on international socialisation theory and especially strategic calculation will be explained. After dealing with the principles of international socialisation, a comparison between the transformation of the CEEC’s and the EaP countries will be given, followed by an analysis on the past and current developments around the Eastern Partnership in general will be given. Furthermore, an update of Schimmelfennig’s analysis on the role of international socialisation in the Eastern Partnership will be made in this chapter as well.

1.2 The theory of International Socialisation

Schimmelfennig defines ‘international socialisation’ as: “The process that is directed toward a state’s internalization of the constitutive beliefs and practices institutionalized in its international environment”.16_{In other words, international socialisation is a process through which countries}

adapt to an international organisation’s norms and values because countries want to be a part of that organisation. To better understand the meaning of Schimmelfennig’s definition, he elaborates on four concepts. First, he stresses that socialisation is a process, not a result. The result of successful socialisation is always internalisation of the beliefs and practices of an international organisation. In the European context this is also known as Europeanisation.17

Secondly, the word internalisation is used to describe the inclusion of these beliefs and practices into one’s own behaviour and reasoning. Internalisation is already taking place when a country

15 _{Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler, The European Union as a Global Actor (Oxon: Routhledge,}

2006), 158.

16 _{Frank Schimmelfennig, “International Socialization in the New Europe: Rational Action in an}

Institutional Environment,” European Journal of International Relations 6, no. 1 (2000): 111.

17_{See for example: Andrea Gawrich, Inna Melnykovska, and Rainer Schweickert, “Neighbourhood}

Europeanization through ENP: The Case of Ukraine,” JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 48, no. 5 (November 06, 2010): 1209–35. or Tanja A Börzel, The Transformative Power of Europe Reloaded

(15)

develops an effective internal system to control possible norm violating behaviour, yet this is not the desired end result. Thirdly, Schimmelfennig’s level of analysis is that of states. Socialisation theory finds its origin in sociology and focuses mainly on the internalisation of norms in individual behaviour. International socialisation does not deal with individuals, or with the individuals that are part of a government or state. This means that the actual socialisation is not targeting individuals, such as policy makers, but the decision making process and the control system to prevent norm violation. Finally, the terms ‘beliefs and practices’ that are used in Schimmelfennig’s definition are broad concepts. The author refers to these terms as being constitutive for the social order of the international organisation (in this case the EU) that is interacting with the target country (the EaP-countries).18

1.2.1 Rational Action in a Institutionalised Environment

To understand the approach of international socialisation as Schimmelfennig uses it, it is important to mention his assumption that “[…] state governments are rational actors operating in a normatively institutionalized international and domestic environment”.19_{This is an}

interesting statement in which a constructivist theory of sociological institutionalism is mixed with a more positivist theory of rational action. Social institutionalism sees the international system as an institutional environment. Especially when looking at the regional developments in and around the European Union, the environment in which states interact with each other is highly institutionalised. A good example is the enlargement process and all the agreements, official institutions and meetings around it. Although the theory of social institutionalism is sufficient in explaining the environment in which the states in Europe behave, it fails to explain the behaviour motives like egoism and instrumentalism. Social institutionalism prefers explains states’ actions on the basis of the logic of appropriateness – this means that a state acts in a certain manner, because it considers it appropriate in a certain situation or environment.20_This

is not something that is the case before the internalisation of norms, according to

18 _{Schimmelfennig, “International Socialization in the New Europe: Rational Action in an Institutional}

Environment,” 111.

20_{James G. March and Johan P. Olson, Rediscovering Institutions, the Organizational Basis of Politics}

(16)

Schimmelfennig. The basis of a state’s behaviour will change during the socialisation process from the logic of consequences as basis of behaviour to the logic of appropriateness.21

Behaviour based on the logic of consequences is closely linked to Schimmelfennig’s statement that governments act rationally. This means that they will weigh the costs and benefits of socialisation and act in their best interest. In other words, they will base their behaviour on a rational choice. This includes all actors involved in the socialisation process, both the socialising agency and the external states that are being socialised. The fact that both parties act according to the same logic does not mean that their relationship is of equal nature. On the contrary, their relationship is highly asymmetrical. Asymmetry in the context of international socialisation means that the socialising agency is in control of resources (both material and immaterial) that the external states would like to or needs to have. Successful socialisation needs a power asymmetry between the socialising and target actor to make conditionality work.22_{For the}

socialisation process, the dependency between the two actors will stimulate a learning process of the external state(s).23_{What makes this interaction between the EU and Eastern neighbours even}

more interesting is that the EU is claiming the monopoly on what it considered ‘European’. The immaterial side of Europeanisation or socialisation by the EU is the European identity of which a country can be part.24

1.2.2 Types of Socialisation

Jeffrey Checkel, the editor of an edition of International Organization on international socialisation gives in his introductory article an overview of the three different types of international socialization processes that can take place. Two of them, role-playing and

normative suasion, are based on accepting new norms as a new identity and acting accordingly,

the other type follows a rational learning process, namely strategic calculation.25_{The first two}

21 _{Jeffrey T. Checkel, “International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and}

Framework,” International Organization 59, no. 04 (October 18, 2005): 804.

22_{Gwendolyn Sasse, “The European Neighbourhood Policy: Conditionality Revisited for the EU’s Eastern}

Neighbours,” Europe-Asia Studies 60, no. 2 (March 2008): 303.

23_{Schimmelfennig, “International Socialization in the New Europe: Rational Action in an Institutional}

24_{Haukkala, “The European Union as a Regional Normative Hegemon: The Case of European}

Neighbourhood Policy,” 1606.

25 _{Checkel, “International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework,” 808–}

(17)

types are more sociological based, which means that the external state accepts beliefs and practices as part of its own, because can identify itself more and more with the community and other community members will be seen as role models.26_{There are two ways in which}

socialisation takes place: either by learning how to act appropriate, or by accepting the new norms as a part of your identity In case of role-playing, state behaviour is not rationally analysed, but changes almost automatically due to the organisational environment and group processes. Normative suasion is taking place when a state actively and intentionally starts to internalise new norms of appropriate behaviour.27_{In contrast, the third type – strategic calculation – is based on}

economic learning is and primarily driven by reinforcement. This means that the external state learns to act in a certain way by which it avoids sanctions and tries to acquire rewards. Thus, by using sticks and carrots, the socialising agency can influence the behaviour of the external state, which will change its behaviour by acting according to community norms, because it is beneficial.28_{Regarding the process by which the western European organisations had planned to}

socialise the potential EU members, they chose for the process of strategic calculation, using rewards and punishments to stimulate the learning process. This is also the chosen method for the reform of the Eastern Partnership countries.

1.2.3 Factors in successful socialisation

Besides this more fundamental description of strategic calculation as presented above, Schimmelfennig also explains important factors that play a role in the success of socialisation. He distinguishes four factors that influence the outcome of the socialisation process by reinforcement and strategic calculation. Firstly, the relationship between the EU and the target countries needs to be asymmetrical. This means that the socialising actor has (im)material resources that the target country would like to have. This will improve the learning process and the more a state depends on cooperation with the EU, the more valuable the rewards will be.29

The second factor is the adaption costs and is based on the cost-benefit analysis that countries

27 _{Checkel, “International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework,” 810–}

12.

29_{Anja Franke et al., “The European Union’s Relations with Ukraine and Azerbaijan,” Post-Soviet Affairs}

(18)

make and base their behaviour on. The accession of the CEEC's has shown that, even though the EU used different strategies for reinforcement, only high political and material rewards have lead to sustainable changes. This means that only membership of the EU was a high enough reward to legitimise the radical transformation that countries had to make.30_{If membership is not}

available, the power of the EU to change norms in other countries in Europe is proven to be rather limited.31_{However, this does not mean that change is not taking place at all. Despite high}

costs and limited economic resources available for change in target countries the rhetorical commitment sometimes does lead to adaption of behaviour. This happens, for example, when powerful domestic actors make a different cost-benefit analysis or when policy-specific conditionality is applied.32

Thirdly, the level on which socialisation is taking place is important. According to Schimmelfennig socialisation could take place on a transnational level towards civil society or on am intergovernmental level, targeting governments. However, with regard to the EaP countries transnational socialisation is barely taking place, because the civil societies are not strong enough or even oppressed by their governments. Consequently, Europeanisation can only take place if a government is willing to cooperate.33_{Intergovernmental socialisation is as such highly depended}

on the political cost-benefit analysis made by governments. Despite this limitation, there are often only small budgets available to put policy changes into practice.34_{Moreover, the regulatory} power of the regimes is rather small when compared to for example the eleven Central and Eastern European countries that joined the EU recently.35

The fourth and last factor that Schimmelfennig presents is the constellation of political parties. He distinguishes three different possibilities: liberal, anti-liberal, and a mixed party

31_{Bretherton and Vogler, The European Union as a Global Actor, 137.}

32_{Julia Langbein and Tanja A. Börzel, “Introduction: Explaining Policy Change in the European Union’s}

Eastern Neighbourhood,” Europe-Asia Studies 65, no. 4 (June 2013), 572–73.

33_{Franke, Gawrich, Melnykovska, and Schweickert, “The European Union’s Relations with Ukraine and}

Azerbaijan,” 155.

34_{Börzel, “The Transformative Power of Europe Reloaded”, 9.}

35 _{Langbein and Börzel, “Introduction: Explaining Policy Change in the European Union’s Eastern}

(19)

constellation.36_{Schimmelfennig states that the more liberal the constellation of the parties is, the}

more successful socialisation will be. Liberal parties are in his view more open to reform and have to some extent already internalised Western norms. For them, the costs of socialisation are low and adaption will happen more smoothly. However, in an anti-liberal set-up, in which more parties are more authoritarian, nationalist and populist oriented, the costs of becoming a member and adapting are higher than the benefits. Therefore, it is less likely that change will take place in an anti-liberal constellation. Lastly, in countries with a mixed system with both liberal and anti-liberal parties, the process of socialisation will be either successful or failing, depending on the character of the party that is in power. With regard to socialisation, the positive side of a mixed constellation is a lock-in effect that could take place. This means that when anti-liberals come into power, they cannot easily undo the changes that are set in motion by the more liberal parties. This eventually results in the transformation of the more anti-liberal parties towards Western standards as well. Because of this, socialisation by reinforcement and reward is in the end also successful in the countries with the two types of parties. The greatest results and progress are often booked in countries with the mixed constellation.37_{In the next chapter a more}

in depth analysis of the factors for successful transformation, including the developments of the party constellation will be given of Ukraine and Azerbaijan.

1.3 The European Neighbourhood Policy

Along with the enlargement of the EU a ‘new’ neighbourhood emerged. These countries came geographically closer to the EU borders, but the differences in governance and economic development were still high. The EU considered it necessary to improve the stability in the neighbouring countries to secure the stability on the continent. The United Kingdom (UK), who was very active in the field of EU foreign policy at the end of the 1990’s, came up with the first initiative in 2002, which included on Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus and Russia. However, when the European Commission published its view on the new relationship with EU-neighbours, the Southern Mediterranean countries and the three republics in the Southern Caucasus were

36_{Frank Schimmelfennig, “Strategic Calculation and International Socialization: Membership Incentives,}

Party Constellations, and Sustained Compliance in Central and Eastern Europe,” International

Organization 59, no. 04 (October 18, 2005): 835.

37_{Schimmelfennig, “Strategic Calculation and International Socialization: Membership Incentives, Party}

(20)

included as well. Only Russia, Belarus, Libya and Syria were not part of the ENP. With Russia another form of partnership has been developed, the others remain mainly outside the structures of the EaP or ENP. Belarus is only part of the multilateral programs of the EaP.38_{The ENP was}

built on already existing Free Trade Agreements with the Mediterranean countries and Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA’s) with neighbours in the East of Europe. These PCA’s were primarily focussing on the harmonisation of the legal norms in neighbouring countries with the European acquis and the establishment of a free trade area.39_{With the start of}

the ENP, the security component was added and the main goal became the creation of a stable and secure neighbourhood. This is established through enhancing the cooperation between the EU and the countries along its border. This should lead to more effective solutions for trans border problems, such as terrorism and environmental threats.40_{More cooperation with}

neighbours was also mentioned in the 2003 European Security Strategy that was published by the European Council. The Council considered it as an important task of the EU to create a ring of well-governed and stable states, also known as the ‘ring of friends’, to increase its security.41

Creating a secure and stable neighbourhood became a distinct part of the EU’s foreign policy and was seen as vital for the security on the continent as a whole. 42

1.3.1 Prevention of new division lines

Besides the security incentive of the ENP, the policy also aims to bridge the prosperity gap between the EU and its neighbours and to promote shared values. Regarding the prosperity gap, the Commission wants to prevent a new division line in Europe, which splits the continent by the level of prosperity instead of the ideology divide during the Cold War. The Commission sees more economic cooperation as the key to increase economic growth in ENP-countries. The

38_{Karen E Smith, “The Outsiders  : The European Neighbourhood Policy,” International Affairs 81, no. 4}

(2005): 759.

40_{Commission of the European Communities, Wider Europe - Neighbourhood: A New Framework for}

Relations with Our Eastern and Sourthern Neighbours (Brussels, 2003), 3, accessed on 25 April 2014,

http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/pdf/com03_104_en.pdf.

41_{European Council, A Secure Europe in a Better World (Brussels, 2003), 8, accessed on 27 April 2014,}

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf.

(21)

funds that are part of the ENP are only available to support economic and policy reform.43_Both

the EU and the neighbouring countries have to work on the further accomplishment of trade flows and international investments. 44_{For the EU this means that it will gradually open its}

market for the neighbours when they make the right policy reforms. These reforms will make the countries more European in the sense that they will adopt European values. In its ENP strategy paper the Commission calls these values ‘shared values’, such as protection of human rights, democracy, the rule of law, and commitment to a market economy.45_{Although the text in the} strategy paper suggests that these values are shared, it is clear that they are all western values.46

Most of these values still have to be adopted by the neighbouring countries to receive the benefits from the partnership. Most scholars that focus on the ENP agree on the point that the reforms that the ENP-countries have to make, will cost more than the benefits of market access and European funds.47_{The fact that ENP countries will not be rewarded with membership is found in}

the statements that the ENP is only meant for those countries that currently have no membership perspective48_{and that EU could only offer “[…] a stake in the EU’s internal market}

and further integration and liberalisation to promote free movement of persons, goods, services

43_{Smith, “The Outsiders  : The European Neighbourhood Policy,” 767.}

Relations with Our Eastern and Sourthern Neighbours, 3–6.

Relations with Our Eastern and Sourthern Neighbours, 4.

46_{Elena Korosteleva, “Change or Continuity: Is the Eastern Partnership an Adequate Tool for the}

European Neighbourhood?,” International Relations 25, no. 2 (June 22, 2011): 246.

47_{See for example: Thomas Risse and Tanja A. Börzel, One Size Fits All! EU Policies for the Promotion of}

Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law, vol. 49, Workshop on Democracy Promotion, 2004, 26;

Sandra Lavenex, “A Governance Perspective on the European Neighbourhood Policy: Integration beyond Conditionality?,” Journal of European Public Policy 15, no. 6 (September 2008): 938–55; Judith Kelley, “New Wine in Old Wineskins: Promoting Political Reforms through the New European Neighbourhood Policy,” JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 44, no. 1 (March 2006): 29–55; Smith, “The Outsiders  : The European Neighbourhood Policy”; Stefan Gänzle, “EU Governance and the European Neighbourhood Policy: A Framework for Analysis,” Europe-Asia Studies 61, no. 10 (December 2009): 1715–34; Kristi Raik, Between Conditionality and Engagement: Revisiting the EU’s

Democratcy Promotion in the Eastern Neighbourhood, FIIA Briefing Paper, 2011, www.fiia.fi/assets/publications/bp80.pdf%E2%80%8E.

48_{Commission, Wider Europe: p. 4 and p. 10. This information was already communicated in 2002 when}

the former head of the Commission Prodi spoke at the ECSA World Conference. See Romano Prodi, A

Wider Europe – a Proximity Policy as the Key to Stability, Speech delivered at the 6th ECSA–World

(22)

and capital.”49_{This was followed by another statement that the EU tends to work towards a} similar close relationship as it has with the members of the European Economic Area (EEA).50

Thus, the ultimate boundaries of the integration are clear from the start of the Neighbourhood Policy in 2004; countries that are seen as neighbours are never to become actual members of the Union.

1.3.2 The Eastern Partnership

In 2009 the EU decided to reform the ENP and divide it in two areas: the Eastern Partnership and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. This division was made to develop a more tailor-made approach for the different areas and to accelerate the reform process in the neighbouring countries by stimulating a joint ownership perspective.51_{This means that the target countries are}

not only carry out policy changes, but also are involved in the decision making process. The bilateral relationship remained in the form of Association Agreements (AA’s). However, the new division also gave the EU more opportunities to improve the multilateral aspects of the ENP, because the two different regions varied widely with specific regional problems.52_{Because this}

thesis focuses on the relationship between the EU and Ukraine and Azerbaijan in the framework of the EaP, only this part of the ENP will discussed further.

The partnership in the east entailed several new multilateral programs to improve the socialisation and Neighbourhood Europeanisation. These are for example: the deep and comprehensive free trade area (DCFTA) to increase prosperity and commitment to market economy, the Comprehensive Institution-Building program (CIB) to strengthen democracy and “Mobility and Security" pacts to improve border security. Furthermore, special attention is given to energy security and the European Energy Community. Next to the AA’s the country-specific targets for reform are summed up in a so-called Action Plan (AP), which is country-specific and

51_{Jackie Gower and Graham Timmins, “Introduction: The European Union, Russia and the Shared}

Neighbourhood,” Europe-Asia Studies 61, no. 10 (December 2009): 1686.

52_{Elena Korosteleva, “The Eastern Partnership Initiative: A New Opportunity for Neighbours?,” Journal}

(23)

generally based on the Copenhagen criteria meant for membership.53_{There are however no}

formal benchmarks for the ENP.54_{In the AP’s the EU and a neighbouring country summed up}

the different goals to be reached in order to get market access to receive EU financial support – in 2007 the name of these funds changed to European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI).55_{The Commission annually evaluates the Action Plans by publishing}

progress reports on the developments in each country.

1.3.3 Rhetorical Commitments

All the agreements between the EU and EaP countries, such as the Association Agreements and Action Plans are in principle rhetorical commitments to reform policies from the side of EaP countries and to reward this reform from the side of the EU.56_{These commitments are supposed}

to lead to an international socialisation process of the neighbourhood countries. The reforms can stay a formal adjustment, which means that only legal and administrative changes are made. However, to reach the desired level of socialisation, behavioural compliance is necessary as well. Some scholars are sceptical when it comes to rhetorical commitments of the partner countries.57

Not only because it is a costly process for the regimes in these countries, but also because the agreements are in reality of a more unilateral character.58_{This means that only the partner}

countries is asked to make costly offers and has little influence on the content of the agreements. Other reasons for limited development regarding the agreed goals are for example the large gap

53_{Sasse, “The European Neighbourhood Policy: Conditionality Revisited for the EU’s Eastern}

Neighbours,” 302.

54_{Franke et al., “The European Union’s Relations with Ukraine and Azerbaijan,” 151.}

55 _{ENPI replaced two separate funding programmes, namely the one for the Eastern Neighbourhood:}

“Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States” (TACIS) and the programme for the Mediterranean countries: Measures d’accompagnement (MEDA).

56_{Julia Langbein and Tanja A. Börzel, “Introduction: Explaining Policy Change in the European Union’s}

Eastern Neighbourhood,” 572.

57_{See for example: Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, “Governance by Conditionality: EU}

Rule Transfer to the Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe,” Journal of European Public

Policy 11, no. 4 (January 2004): 661–79; Paul Kubicek, “Problems of Post-Post-Communism: Ukraine

after the Orange Revolution,” Democratization 16, no. 2 (April 2009): 337; Iryna Solonenko, “Added Value? Eastern Partnership and EU-Ukraine Bilateral Relations,” IPG 3 (2011): 122; Katrin Böttger and Mariella Falkenhain, The EU’s Policy towards Azerbaijan: What Role for Civil Society, SPES Policy Paper (Berlin, 2011), 20, accessed on 23 April 2014, http://www.iep-berlin.de/fileadmin/website/09_Publikationen/SPES_Policy_Papers/SPES_Policy_Paper_2011__The__ EUs__policy__towards_Azerbaijan_BOETTGER_FALKENHAIN.pdf.

58_{Lavenex, “A Governance Perspective on the European Neighbourhood Policy: Integration beyond}

(24)

between the practice in neighbouring countries and the EU’s demands as stated in the Action Plans.59_{Besides the problems with the actual changes that have to be made, there are some} difficulties with the measuring of the progress as well. The Action Plans are often not clear on for instance who has to take action, how the EU will judge the progress or it lacks time planning. Furthermore, the principle of ‘more for more’ is difficult to work with, when progress is made in one sector and in another sector the situation is deteriorating. Moreover, when the EU is applying negative conditionality (‘less for less’) it risks discouraging the EaP countries and pushing them away. This will not help to improve the democratic development and integration.60

Another interesting remark that can be made about the Action Plans is that they are more in the interest of the EU than in that of the EaP countries.61_{Moreover, the EU has quite a}

dominant position towards EaP countries judging their behaviour, constraining their choices and pushing them to change. This does not necessarily mean that the EU is a bad institution; its intentions are good and adoption of norms is beneficial for neighbouring countries as well. Though, it can also be seen as a form of ‘soft imperialism’ in which normative power is applied through a hard power means in an asymmetrical relationship, lacking dialogue and engagement of the recipients.62_{According to Schimmelfennig, asymmetry is a positive factor on the}

socialisation process. Whether this asymmetrical character of the relationship between the EU and EaP countries Ukraine and Azerbaijan is helpful for the process of socialisation will be discussed in the next chapter.

1.4 Eastern Neighbourhood Europeanisation

As stated above, Schimmelfennig’s approach on socialisation and strategic calculation was developed to explain the Europeanisation of countries that became member of the EU. In this research, his approach will be used to review the developments of the process of transformation of Eastern Partnership countries, and more specifically Ukraine and Azerbaijan. Both countries

59 _{Risse and Börzel, One Size Fits All! EU Policies for the Promotion of Human Rights, Democracy and the}

Rule of Law, 49:16.: p. 16.

60_{Peter Munk Jensen, Getting on the Right Track  : The EU Eastern Partnership DIIS Policy Brief, DIIS}

Policy Brief, 2011, 2, accessed on 26 April 2014,

http://subweb.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/Policybriefs 2011/DIIS-Polict-Brief_EU-Eastern-Partnership_screen.pdf.

61 _{Smith, “The Outsiders  : The European Neighbourhood Policy,” 764–65.}

(25)

play a role in the energy security of the EU; Ukraine by being a transit country and Azerbaijan by having a respectable amount of oil and gas recourses. In this paragraph the four different factors that influence socialisation will be linked to the EaP. These factors were: the nature of the relationship (level of asymmetry), intergovernmental cooperation, party constellation and adaption costs. When looking at first factor in socialisation the relationship between the EU and EaP countries, it is of an asymmetrical character. The EU has material and immaterial resources that are of interest for the EaP countries; however, it is questionable whether all the regimes actually want these resources. Furthermore, when particularly looking at the energy trade relationship between the EU and some EaP countries, the relation between them could be more interdependent that in other areas. This makes the power more balanced than in that of the accession process.63

The second factor of that is important for socialisation in the Eastern Partnership countries is the level on which it takes place. The socialising agency can either chose for transnational socialisation or socialisation on an intergovernmental level – civil society is often too weak in EaP countries. This does not mean that civil society does not play a role at all. There are examples from previous socialisation processes that show that even in more authoritarian regimes the more pro-western society can push governments towards more reform. Two examples are Croatia under Tudjman and Slovakia under Meciar. When the EU was withholding rewards because of poor results in the progress reports, civil society actors could mobilise enough people and force the regime to change.64_{The regime in Ukraine is more willing to}

cooperate with the EU and more reluctant to become a member of the EU than Azerbaijan. Also, the power of the civil society in Ukraine is larger than in Azerbaijan, mostly because the Ukrainian regime is less dominant and fixed than the regime in Azerbaijan.

This difference in regime is directly linked to the third factor that Schimmelfennig distinguished as a factor for socialisation. The type of regime or party-constellation in a country is pivotal for the success of socialisation. In the 2005 article of Schimmelfennig on strategic calculation and international socialisation the different regime types are compared with Freedom

63_{Sasse, “The European Neighbourhood Policy: Conditionality Revisited for the EU’s Eastern}

Neighbours,” 303.

64_{Schimmelfennig, “International Socialization in the New Europe: Rational Action in an Institutional}

(26)

House data on the level democracy as an example of a European norm. The more liberal the CEEC’s and neighbours were, the faster the democratisation process would take place. In those days, Ukraine was categorised as a country with an anti-liberal party constellation.65_However,

much has changed since the end of the Kuchma-regime and the Orange revolution. The party constellation nowadays is more similar to the mixed party constellation, in which the orientation of the regime is ambivalent. This makes it more likely that Europeanisation can take place in Ukraine. For Azerbaijan not so much has changed since 2005; the country is still governed by the authoritarian Aliyev regime. Therefore it will be less likely that Europeanisation takes place in Azerbaijan.

The final factor and most important for strategic calculation is the cost-benefit analysis that the regimes of Ukraine and Azerbaijan make when considering reform that is requested by the EU. In the approach of Schimmelfennig, this analysis consists of the costs of policy change versus the benefits that are offered by the EU. To influence the cost-benefit analysis of the EaP countries, the EU offers financial assistance and governance support. With the condition that a country reforms its beliefs and practices, these rewards are meant to increase the learning of norms by the target countries.66_{Also, the naming and shaming that takes place with the}

publication of progress reports is considered to improve the learning process. Naming and shaming and the rewarding of good behaviour were very effective ways to improve socialisation and to share best practice between the CEEC’s.67_{The damage to a country’s reputation because}

of negative information in a progress report is considered to be costly for the regimes of target countries. This was the case during the accession process of the countries that recently became members.68

Besides the rhetorical action taken by the EU by publishing progress reports, the research in this thesis will also look at another factor that might influence the strategic calculations in

65_{Schimmelfennig, “Strategic Calculation and International Socialization: Membership Incentives, Party}

Constellations, and Sustained Compliance in Central and Eastern Europe,” 840.

66_{Julia Langbein and Kataryna Wolczuk, “Convergence without Membership? The Impact of the}

European Union in the Neighbourhood: Evidence from Ukraine,” Journal of European Public Policy 19, no. 6 (August 2012): 866.

67_{Risse and Börzel, One Size Fits All! EU Policies for the Promotion of Human Rights, Democracy and the}

Rule of Law, 49:12.

68 _{Kelley, “New Wine in Old Wineskins: Promoting Political Reforms through the New European}

(27)

international socialisation, namely the amount of energy that is imported from or transported through the two countries. In the case of Azerbaijan, the regime benefits highly from the oil and gas exports to Europe.69_{For Ukraine the dependency on Russian gas is not only influencing the}

relationship with Russia, but also the domestic political situation. The dependency position means that Russia and the Russian oligarchs can keep a stake in Ukrainian politics70_Moreover,

the EU is depending on good relations between Russia and Ukraine, because the energy security in most of the EU member states is subject to Russian gas supplies transported through Ukraine.71_{In the following chapters an analysis will be made about the influence of this}

interdependency position between the EU and gas supplying Azerbaijan and the fragile relationship between Ukraine and Russia. Both from the side of the EU and the side of the EaP countries, the costs and benefits of either pushing for reform or adopting new norms are assessed, since both parties are more or less dependent on each other. Whether the cost-benefit based conditionality is successful in the case of EaP countries Ukraine and Azerbaijan will be dealt with in the next chapter.

1.5 Conclusions

This chapter started with the normative power of the European Union in its EaP-countries and a way to analyse the process behind the power to change the norm. In the light of Frank Schimmelfennig approach of international socialisation and strategic calculation this process is analysed. This means that a country will make a rational choice to change its behavioural logic from consequence to appropriateness. Although Schimmelfennig’s approach was meant to explain the transformation of the CEEC’s, it can offer a framework for Neighbourhood Europeanisation as well. The EU used the same mechanism to promote transformation in its neighbourhood as it did for membership Europeanisation. The basis principle is to reward good behaviour with financial support and more cooperation. This is not only beneficial for the partner countries, but also for the EU itself. Although the willingness of the EU to improve its

69_{Jana Kobzova and Leila Alieva, The EU and Azerbaijan: Beyond Oil, European Council on Foreign}

Relations Policy Memo, 2012, 3, accessed on 16 April 2014,

http://ecfr.eu/content/entry/the_eu_and_azerbaijan_beyond_oil.

70_{Gwendolyn Sasse, “Linkages and the Promotion of Democracy: The EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood,”}

Democratization 20, no. 4 (June 2013): 561.

71_{Georgy Bovt, “Europe’s Eastern Partnership: Between Europe and Russia,” The World Today 65, no. 5}

(28)

(29)

Case Studies

Neighbourhood Europeanisation in Ukraine and Azerbaijan

The information presented in the first chapter of this thesis is not showed the possibilities of socialisation or Europeanisation in the neighbourhood of the European Union within the framework of the Eastern Partnership. Many of the authors have already recognised the mismatch between the demands and rewards of the EU. Also, the unified approach towards countries facing different challenges and circumstances could have a diminishing effect on the success of socialisation. The two following chapters deal with the international socialisation of Azerbaijan and Ukraine. Both countries are cooperating with the EU; however, the two countries vary greatly when it comes to progress and circumstances. When looking at the four factors divined by Schimmelfennig, the two countries are very different. These factors were: the nature of the relationship including the level of asymmetry and the level on which cooperation takes place; the willingness of a government to cooperate with the EU; the party constellation; and finally the costs and benefits of adaption.

(30)

countries is often the first priority in the Action Plans of the Partnership. None of the countries are entirely democratic, varying from ‘hybrid regimes’ like Georgia and Ukraine to ‘semi-consolidated authoritarian regimes’ in Azerbaijan and Armenia.72_{Although party constellation is}

an important factor in Schimmelfennig’s approach, it is questionable whether the parties in both Ukraine and Azerbaijan are comparable to parties in established democracies. However, non-democratic political ‘parties’ are a characteristic both mixed and antiliberal party-constellations. The political and economic relationship between the EU and Ukraine and Azerbaijan cannot be seen in a vacuum, without considering the influence of Russia in the eastern part of the European continent. Both Ukraine and Azerbaijan used to be part of the Soviet-Union and Russia considers the area of the former-Soviet-Union as its near abroad in which it has ‘special’ rights and influence.73_{A good example of the attempts of Russia to increase its influence in the}

region is the Moscow led Eurasian Economic Union (EEU).74_{The position of Moscow is further}

strengthened by the existing interdependency between mainly Ukraine and Russia and the EU and Russia as well.75_{For instance, the gas-pipeline infrastructure running from Russia trough}

Ukraine to the EU made Ukraine for a long time a vital transit country for Russian-EU gas trade. Also, the country itself is highly dependent on energy resources from Russia. This restricts the possibilities of European influence in Ukraine; too much involvement could upset Moscow and have negative effects. Russia is willing to use hard power to limit the soft power of the EU and other western organisations. A good example is the invasion of Georgia by Russian troops in 2008, after NATO promised future membership to Ukraine and Georgia.76_{This represents the}

unease of Russia with the engagement of western organisations in former Soviet countries.

72_{Freedom House, “Nations in Transit” accessed on 27 May 2014,}

http://freedomhouse.org/report-types/nations-transit#.U4SR1fLDXDG.

73_{Antoaneta Dimitrova and Rilka Dragneva, “Shaping Convergence with the EU in Foreign Policy and}

State Aid in Post-Orange Ukraine: Weak External Incentives, Powerful Veto Players,” Europe-Asia

Studies 65, no. 4 (June 2013): 668.

74_{In May 2014 the Eurasian Economic Trade Union was founded by Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan.}

Armenia joined in October 2014. Officially, the EEU is established to strengthen the economies of its member states by creating a regional trading bloc.

75_{Antoaneta Dimitrova and Rilka Dragneva, “Constraining External Governance: Interdependence with}

Russia and the CIS as Limits to the EU’s Rule Transfer in the Ukraine,” Journal of European Public

Policy 16, no. 6 (September 2009): 853–72.

76_{Neil MacFarlane and Anand Menon, “The EU and Ukraine,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 56,}

(31)

Although this is certainly an interesting side of the international relations in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus region, the role of Russia will not be analysed in depth in this research.

The Eastern Partnership was established in the aftermath of the Russian invasion in Georgia in 2008. This situation affected the content of the partnership agreements, focussing more on security and energy security with regard to Russia.77_{However, the Eastern Partnership}

is to no extent an anti-Russia initiative. Countries are not forced to choose between Russia and the EU. EaP countries are always working on finding a balance between the two power gravity centres in Europe.78_{This balance is currently seriously disturbed in Ukraine. Since the}

Euromaidan demonstrations in November 2013 —popular uprise after Ukraine did not sign the Association Agreement with the EU— the domestic situation has evolved in a still on-going violent crisis. Also in Azerbaijan the situation is instable, especially the conflict with Armenia in the region Nagorno-Karabakh is volatile. Because of the uncertainty about the outcome of these events, they will not be part of the analysis in this research.

77_{MacFarlane and Menon, “The EU and Ukraine,” 96.}

78_{Simion Costea, “EU-Ukraine Relations and the Eastern Partnership: Challenges, Progress and}

The Principles of the European Union’s External Action 08