Rhetorical Action in Croatia’s accession to the European Union

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Rhetorical Action in Croatia’s accession

to the European Union

Testing the relevance a decade later

By: Pieter Tichelaar s1778854 Spaanse Aakstraat 55 9741CV, Groningen The Netherlands Tel: (+31)610403886 Supervisor:

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DECLARATION BY CANDIDATE

I hereby declare that this thesis, “Rhetorical Action in Croatia’s Accession to the European Union: testing the relevance a decade later“, is my own work and my own effort and that it has not been accepted anywhere else for the award of any other degree or diploma. Where sources of information have been used, they have been acknowledged.

Name: Pieter Tichelaar

Signature

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Chapter 1 - Introduction

In 2003, Frank Schimmelfennig wrote his seminal work The EU, NATO and the integration of Europe: Rules and rhetoric (Schimmelfennig, 2003). Throughout this book he took the reader on a journey through various theoretical avenues with the aim of understanding the expansion of the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) with ten Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs), which finalized during the first years of the new millennium. On this journey, he proceeded from rational institutionalism through sociological institutionalism, and eventually found his way to rhetorical action as the way to understand the eastern enlargement of the two international communities (Schimmelfennig, 2003). Rhetoric action is defined as the strategic use of rule-based arguments (Schimmelfennig, 2001; 2003:193), where the user aims to utilize community rules (read: rules, norms, culture) for self-serving purposes.

Since the publication in 2003, however, the world has continued, and the institutions have developed. The suggestion has been made that rhetorical action may no longer be applicable in the modern day as a result of rhetorical action being invalid, having had a one-time utility, or no longer functioning now that it is a known phenomenon (Saatçioglu, 2012; Bürgin, 2009).

In order to ascertain the validity of such claims, and more generally to investigate the contemporary applicability of rhetorical action as a concept, this thesis will take up the task of theory testing rhetorical action.

Fortunately, a very recent expansion of the EU permits the study of a contemporary eastern enlargement, albeit of considerably smaller scale and impact than that of 2004. The accession of Croatia to the EU in 2013 provides an excellent opportunity for studying the relevance of rhetorical action a decade after its original application.

Research question

Therefore, utilizing Croatia’s accession process and result as a case study for the investigation into rhetorical action’s contemporary relevance, the operational research question for this thesis will be as follows:

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5 To aid in providing an answer to this broad core question, several sub-questions with accompanying steps must be posed and undertaken.

Sub-questions and chapter division

Primarily, an investigation and analysis of the intricacies of rhetorical action is required. To this end, the first sub-question will be as follows:

Which are the intricacies of rhetorical action?

The first chapter after this introduction will take up the task of answering this question, and through answering it allows for greater understanding of rhetorical action at a theoretical level as well as providing the groundwork for empirical analysis through which the core research question may be answered.

Secondly, it is imperative that the ‘how’s’ and the ‘why’s’ of the case study are justified and elaborated upon. Therefore, the second sub-question will be as follows:

How can rhetorical action be tested in the case study?

In order to answer this sub-question, the third chapter of this thesis will deal with the methodological questions. Primarily, it will justify whether a case study is appropriate and whether a single or a multiple case study is appropriate. Furthermore, it will indicate how the case study might give empirical evidence in support of or against the contemporary utility of rhetorical action.

Following the elaboration upon the methodological issues, the case of Croatia’s accession to the EU is laid bare. Such a case is of such vast proportions that a narrowing down of the instances for detailed study is not only desirable, but required. As such, the third sub-question is formulated as follows:

Which occurrences surrounding Croatia’s accession to the EU allow for rhetorical action?

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Chapter 2 – Theoretical considerations of rhetorical action

The purpose of this chapter is to delve into the intricacies of rhetorical action. As such, the first sub-question, namely ‘which are the intricacies of rhetorical action?’ will be answered. This chapter will start by outlining the origin and primary points of rhetorical action as used in this thesis. Subsequently, a brief review is held.

Origins of rhetorical action

Rhetorical action as understood in this thesis was introduced by Frank Schimmelfennig in his 2003 work The EU, NATO, and the Integration of Europe (Schimmelfennig, 2003), with some earlier and less elaborate works done on it before (Schimmelfennig, 2001). In this book, Schimmelfennig aimed to explain the eastern enlargements of the EU and NATO involving the ten Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) that were in the process of joining around the time of writing. He initially employed rationalist institutionalism and sociological institutionalism for their explanatory capacity and through them aimed to understand the outcome and process of the eastern enlargement. He then found these two lacking in explanatory power and introduced rhetorical action. First, a concise explanation of rationalist institutionalism and sociological institutionalism is in order to explain how rhetorical action was reached as a solution.

Rational institutionalism

Schimmelfennig started his theoretical approach with rational institutionalism. This is an approach to understanding the functioning of institutions through the lens of utility maximization. It holds the assumptions that the actors are, as one might guess from the name, rational actors that are the ultimate source of social patterns, meaning that the individual is central. Furthermore, in International Relations (IR) rationalism the state is regarded as a central, egoistic (self-serving) actor operating in a context of anarchy, forced as such to emphasize the distribution of power and wealth. Important to note is a deviation from Realist thought in IR, as while the assumptions are similar, rationalist institutionalism admits that social norms and rules can form constraints upon the actor in a context of institutions, a premise not permitted in classic Realist thought.

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8 the EU to occur as few gains were had by the EU member states compared to the already existing association agreements. Furthermore, countries geographically located further away from the CEECs certainly had little incentive to allow them access, whereas declining access was considerably more logical, as this would deny the prospective members certain advantages such as co-decision making and access to club goods (such as funding from the common agricultural policy). In contrast, allowing access would grant the prospective members these advantages and therefore reduce existing members’ degree of influence and access to club goods. Nonetheless, the CEECs were accepted. Therefore, Schimmelfennig then turned to sociological institutionalism to explain this outcome.

Sociological institutionalism

Sociological institutionalism differs greatly from the rational perspective. Rather than a world constituted by rational self-serving actors, sociological institutionalism sees a world where ideas are the most fundamental cause of social phenomena. Actors’ interests are only for a small part shaped by material conditions, as human action and interaction also shape the world, and as such actors’ interests. Ideas, preferences, interests, all such concepts are created in an intersubjective manner, and as such interests are not the starting point of an analysis, as in rationalist thought, but rather follow from interactions between actors; they are socially constructed.

In this perspective, institutions are not utilized strategically by self-serving actors, but they shape actors and become a part of the actors’ identities and interests. They aid in defining what material aspects of reality are of relevance and, through their part of actors’ identity, influence actors’ strategies and goals. The actors are assumed to internalize the rules, broadly defined to include norms and ideas in addition to official rules, and to manifest rule-following behavior. In this manner, the logic for individual action does not follow from strategic considerations on the individual’s part, but rather from considerations regarding what is appropriate under institutional rules, a logic commonly referred to as the ‘logic of appropriateness.’

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9 importance, was adequately explained by rational institutionalism, with sociological institutionalism falling short (Schimmelfennig, 2003). This created a clear puzzle; if rational institutionalist premises hold for the process of the eastern enlargement, why do they not account for the result? By contrast, if sociological institutionalist premises account for the result of the enlargement, why do they not for the process?

The answer Schimmelfennig brought forward to solve this puzzle was rhetorical action.

Rhetorical action

Rhetoric action is defined as the strategic use of rule-based arguments (Schimmelfennig, 2001; 2003:193). Essentially, it presupposes self-serving strategic actors operating under a context of a rule-based institution where the preferences of individuals are in accordance with rationalist assumptions of egoism and materialism, but where the collective decision making process takes place after a series of interactions that follow social rules and as such the outcomes are, at least in part, rule-based. Thus, rhetoric action is a cross-over between rationalist and sociological thought and explains the puzzle of how self-serving members moved to rule-conforming behavior.

Schimmelfennig’s rhetoric action poses that strategic actors use rule-based arguments to sway opposition. This technique goes a long way in explaining the enlargement decisions by NATO and the EU. Essentially, there were, as is wont in the international sphere, both opposition and proponents to the eastern enlargement in both institutions. As such, it would have been unlikely for the enlargement to take place, as enlargement decisions usually require unanimity among member states, and no single member state in either institution (note that the terms ‘institution’ and ‘community’ are used interchangeably in this thesis), save perhaps the USA in NATO, had the bargaining power to convince (or threaten) opposition into compliance (and the USA did not have enough stake in the issue).

However, because the EU and NATO have long employed community rhetoric in engaging the CEECs, this provided proponents with arguments based on the communities’ previous statements to sway opposition into compliance. As such, Schimmelfennig explains how strategically acting self-interested member states end up performing rule-based outcomes.

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10 encounters. However, he also makes two assumptions which, while certainly necessary for his analysis, do not necessarily hold true in reality. The first is his treatment of the EU and NATO as similar enough to analyze together. While he does treat them separately at times, he applies rhetorical action uniformly to these two institutions and as such treats their extent of socialization as the same. Secondly, and more importantly, is his treatment of the CEECs as a homogeneous group of states. While this once again is logical considering his goal of generalizability, it is nonetheless a questionable decision.

In spite of these criticisms, the notion of rhetorical action functioned exceedingly well in explaining the process and outcome of the eastern enlargements. Therefore, the aim of this thesis is to discover whether or not the mechanism of rhetorical action is also sufficiently capable of explaining the expansion round ending a decade later; that of Croatia.

Before this can occur, however, an explanation of how rhetorical action was reached as a conclusion and a concise explanation of what it is does not suffice. As such, the following section will elaborate upon more precise aspects of rhetorical action with the purpose of providing clear points, in absence of which one cannot adequately speak of rhetorical action. First, assumptions of rhetorical action will be elaborated upon, without which the concept is not applicable. Subsequently, mechanisms of rhetorical action will be formulated which can serve to indicate the presence and relevance of rhetorical action.

Core facets of rhetorical action

Rhetorical action – prerequisites

Rhetorical action as applied by Schimmelfennig entails a number of assumptions, even prerequisites without which one cannot start to apply its logic. Notable is that in absence of these prerequisites, rhetorical action cannot be utilized. However, in presence of these prerequisites, rhetorical action may well still be irrelevant for a number of reasons, outlined below.

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11 proverbially ‘fits the bill’ regarding this assumption, as it has both a history of socialization and a strong rhetoric of rules and norms, and yet consists of semi-sovereign nation-states with their respective interests and internal socialization mechanisms. An important point that Schimmelfennig seemingly ignored is that participation in the institution is far from the only activity of an institution’s members, and as such the pure internalization of interests from the institution would seem unlikely in any event.

Thus, under the assumption of a weakly socialized institution, actors take institutional rules into consideration, but nonetheless base decisions on egoistic, likely material objectives.

Crucial to understand is that within the context of such a weakly socialized institution, actors are also assumed to value their own legitimacy as perceived by other members of the institution. Thus, the legitimacy becomes an egoistic interest to the community members. The collective identity, political values, and norms of the institution are a basis for such legitimacy; objectives and interests that are aligned with collective identity, values, and norms are deemed legitimate, while those that oppose are deemed illegitimate. As such, actors are constrained by the legitimacy issues, but can also find support for their policies through it.

Furthermore, as a result of the issue of legitimacy within the institution, members are forced to argue (Schimmelfennig, 2001). They are required to justify their choice of policy and their formulation of interests through community values and norms. Thus, members whose objectives are aligned with institutional norms will be able to promote their purpose through the use of community rhetoric, and will be able to silence opposition whose interests are misaligned with community identity, values and norms. This is the essence of rhetorical action.

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12 in time” (Schimmelfennig, 2001). This support need not be heartfelt; it merely needs to be a declaration to which other parties can link the initial actor’s legitimacy.

Furthermore, a final prerequisite for the occurrence of rhetorical action is a misalignment between the community rules and the individual actor’s interests. In absence of this misalignment the actor would simply comply with community rules and no form of rhetorical action would be required on any part. Moreover, once this misalignment occurs the actor will face dual pressure both to conform to community rules and to follow its own primary interests. The resultant choice will be influenced by the actor’s expectations regarding the extent to which it can legitimize its deviation from community rules. As such, rhetorical action is at the decision’s core not only in terms of utility but also as an important aspect of the decision making process preceding the manifestation of its interests.

At this point, it is possible to ascertain whether or not a particular instance or prolonged case contains the possibility of rhetorical action being utilized. Therefore, the following section will indicate the mechanism or techniques through which actors can employ rhetorical action to attain their goals.

Rhetorical action – mechanism

The primary mechanism through which rhetorical action operates is social influence (Schimmelfennig, 2003: 217). This may seem reasonably ‘weak’, especially when confronted with egoistic interests. However, under the conditions outlined above where the actors operating in a weakly socialized institution value their legitimacy, and where future interaction is a near certainty, it becomes a powerful mechanism. The actors seek approval and respect from other community members, and have a need to be seen as ‘good’ community members, especially as this influences their future capacity to argue and defend their positions and interests.

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13 against community rules for egoistic reasons is less likely to change behavior as a result of a private meeting than of a public debate.

From these conditions follows the primary technique used in rhetorical action: shaming. Shaming entails the exposure of goals and/or interests that are illegitimate according to community culture or institutionalized rules. Naturally, this technique would not be effective when the target has not publicly declared adherence to the community’s standard of legitimacy, nor if the issue at hand is irrelevant to, or not covered by community rules. Moreover, it is possible for the target of shaming to engage in rhetorical action, either through arguing that its goals and/or interests are in fact legitimate and the accuser is mistaken, or by drawing attention to accuser’s own illegitimate acts or interests. Such defensive techniques are referred to as strategic manipulation (Schimmelfennig, 2003: 220). These techniques are limited however, e.g. because community rules may be reasonably unambiguous, and it is important for actors not to lose their credibility in the community, as this may severely damage their ability to engage in rhetorical action, or even any form of interaction within the community, in the future.

Credibility in argumentation stems from the dual criteria of impartiality and consistency. Impartiality refers to the actor seeming to not aim purely for egoistic goals but rather seeming (sincerely or otherwise) to promote the community rules. This is a relatively simple matter of formulating arguments in a manner that’s hard to criticize on ‘concealed purpose’. The second criterion, consistency, is of greater complexity. It entails being consistent in three manners; between rhetoric and action; between rhetoric employed at different times; and internally to the arguments. As such, it is quite possible to opportunistically employ community rhetoric once to attain an egoistic goal, but in the future the opportunistic actor faces a dilemma: either adhering to previously made statements regarding community rhetoric, or being inconsistent and thus losing credibility and legitimacy.

The abovementioned effect is referred to as rhetorical entrapment (Schimmelfennig 2003: 222). When an actor becomes rhetorically entrapped, she may be forced into compliance with arguments that contravene its egoistic interests and thus ends up acting in a manner inconsistent with rational institutionalist premises, in spite of these premises holding true in terms of interest formation.

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14 individual interests, allow for rhetorical action to take place. This rhetorical action operates through the mechanism of social influence, which manifests itself primarily through shaming, which in turn is exemplified through the use of arguments about another actor behaving against community rules and/or being inconsistent in their adherence to these rules.

With these core facets of rhetorical action being explained, a final note is required on measures that can be taken against future rhetorical action employed by another actor.

Measures against rhetorical action

Having elaborated upon the prerequisites for, mechanism of, and technique of rhetorical action, a final note needs to be made about measures that can be taken against future rhetorical entrapment. Since Schimmelfennig brought rhetorical action into the light, it stands to reason that some actors would wish to protect their (future) strategic interests from entrapment by opposition, and therefore take measures to prevent being entrapped. One very specific instance of this has occurred. As pointed out by Saatçioglu (2012) and Bürgin (2009), EU member-states opposed to Turkish accession to the EU found themselves entrapped in 2005 to permit accession talks being opened. However, they then provided what Bürgin dubbed an ‘escape strategy’ (Bürgin, 2009). Opponents to Turkish accession did not utilize community rhetoric to argue against Turkish accession, as this had already been shown not to function, but rather offered alternatives to full membership for potential results of the accession negotiations. In this manner, an attempt was made to prevent being entrapped, and thus preserve the ability to protect strategic interests in the future (Saatçioglu, 2012).

Whether or not such an escape strategy is fully functional has not been shown by history thus far, as Turkish accession negotiations have been complicated by internal political disagreements. The argument may well be made, however, that such internal disagreement was strengthened by what was perceived as the EU’s unwillingness to allow Turkey access in spite of previous engagements (Bürgin, 2009).

Conclusion

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Chapter 3 - Methodology

The purpose of this chapter is to elaborate upon and justify the choices made for the analysis in this thesis. The first section of this chapter will explain how the choice of a single case study with the purpose of theory testing was reached. Furthermore, the source material to be used in the analysis will be indicated and briefly elaborated upon.

Finally, building upon the considerations as outlined in the theoretical chapter, this chapter will aim to answer the second sub-question, ‘how can rhetorical action be tested in the case study?’ By utilizing the core attributes isolated in the previous chapter, certain requirements for rhetorical action in addition to core aspects of its mechanism permit the formulation of questions that allow empirical analysis of the case in the subsequent analytic chapters.

Choosing the case study

A case study, as defined by Yin (1994), is “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.” The use of rhetorical action in enlargement of the EU certainly fits the requirements of being a ‘contemporary phenomenon in its real-life context’. Furthermore, the context and, as is often the case in IR studies, the phenomenon certainly do not have clear-cut boundaries.

A case study can be exploratory, explanatory or descriptive in nature (Yin, 1994). Furthermore, it has a wide variety of applications, including the creation of theory (Eisenhardt, 1989) and the testing of theory (Hak and Dul, 2009). This paper being of a theory-testing nature, it is imperative to ascertain the suitability of the case for theory testing. To this end, a checklist of Benbasat et al. (1987; in Iacono et al., 2010) will be utilized. This checklist asks four questions, the answers to which serve to indicate whether or not an alternative method would be more appropriate.

The checklist comprises the following questions, with their respective answers posed underneath:

- Can the phenomenon of interest be studied outside its natural setting?

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17 because of its underhand nature. EU enlargement is a unique occurrence which requires entire states in its participation, and is therefore also impossible to reproduce.

- Must the study focus on contemporary events?

Yes, it must. The whole purpose of this thesis is to ascertain the relevance of rhetorical action contemporarily.

- Is control or manipulation of subjects or events necessary? (Or possible…?)

Control and/or manipulation of subjects and events is entirely impossible and entirely undesirable, because the occurrence is in the past and, as noted under the first question, not reproducible under laboratory circumstances.

- Does the phenomenon of interest enjoy an established theoretical base?

This question is hard to answer as the phenomenon of interest is a theory itself, and as such this question will be disregarded.

The answers above show that alternative research methodologies, such as laboratory research (questions 1 & 3), (socio-) historical analyses (question 2), and theory building methods (question 4), are less appropriate for this thesis than the case study method, because the case study method allows for in depth analysis of a non-reproducible occurrence without the possibility of manipulation of subjects or events.

Single case study

Using case studies to test theory is, at its bare essence, entirely simple. Hak and Dul (2009) explain it concisely as “ascertaining whether the empirical evidence in a case or in a sample of cases either supports or does not support the theory.” The next issue, therefore, is whether or not to use a single case study or multiple case studies.

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18 important, the question is that of a sufficient condition, and as such a single case study is appropriate.

A brief explanation of the difference between necessary condition and sufficient condition questions is required.

Necessary and sufficient conditions

Necessary condition and sufficient condition questions are similar, yet have a notable difference. While both questions regard the presence of a factor, in this thesis rhetorical action, the necessary condition logic is not appropriate in this case. Necessary condition logic is used when something cannot exist without the necessary condition. This is not relevant in this thesis as rhetorical action may be very important, but is most certainly not a prerequisite per se. Therefore, a necessary condition methodology would be inappropriate.

Sufficient condition logic suits this thesis well, however. With this logic, the phenomenon of interest is not necessarily present, nor can any factor be expected to guarantee its presence. However, its presence can be ascertained to a certain extent, and as such the argument can be made that, given certain circumstances, the condition is sufficiently present. This paper will follow this logic, and will develop testable benchmarks from the theoretical considerations, which will permit the establishment of both the presence of rhetorical action, and its relevance.

Material used

Concerning the materials, both primary and secondary, used to perform the analysis, the EU is reasonably forthcoming. The website of the European Stability Initiative (ESI) provides an overview of over 90 documents related to Croatia’s accession to the EU, ranging from interim progress reports by the Commission, to negotiation chapters, to conflict resolution papers, to UN reports.

Moreover, these publications include academic reviews of the Bay of Piran conflict from varying perspectives. Additionally, documents by both the Croatian and Slovenian government, general as well as directed at each other, are available and will be utilized.

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Testable benchmarks

Having elaborated upon the importance of the concept of sufficient condition, it is imperative to also indicate what would provide indication for claiming that a sufficient condition has been met. To this end, the key notions brought forth in the theoretical chapter will be utilized.

The key notions may be separated into two categories; the prerequisites, without which rhetorical action cannot begin to be analyzed; and the mechanism, through which rhetorical action functions. Important to note at this point is that a final distinction will be required between the presence of the mechanism and the utility of the mechanism; i.e. the mechanism being employed by actors would indicate the presence of rhetorical action, yet not necessarily its usefulness to that particular actor.

Prerequisites

The two prerequisites for rhetorical action to occur that were inferred from Schimmelfennig’s work in the theoretical chapter were that of (1) weakly socialized actors, and (2) misalignment between community rules and individual interests.

The first, the weakly socialized actors, entail the situation of actors being a part of the international institution and as such sharing its rules, yet not having internalized these rules to the point where they constitute the actor’s interests directly and completely. As such, while community rules are important to the actor and certainly form a part of the actor’s considerations, different situations may manifest differing degrees of deviation from community rules.

In order to ascertain whether or not an institution has weakly socialized actors, previous works on this institution may be used. In the case of the EU, previous work by Schimmelfennig may serve to justify that this is appropriate.

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20 The following chapter will delve into a time-line of occurrences surrounding the accession of Croatia and, through the use of the two prerequisites indicated above, aim to isolate occurrences potentially important for the analysis of rhetorical action.

Mechanism

Once the prerequisites have been met and therefore the situations to be analyzed have been isolated, the analysis may proceed to search for the mechanism of social influence. Recalling that social influence entails the interlinked strategies of shaming, where an actor indicts another actor of deviating from community norms; strategic manipulation, where an actor defends her position against shaming; and rhetorical entrapment, which describes the situation where an actor is forced to change her behavior in a manner inconsistent with her primary interests as a result of another actor’s usage of rhetorical action mechanisms.

In order to ascertain the presence and relevance of rhetorical action in any situation, the following questions need to be answered on a case-by-case basis:

- Are there actor(s) attempting to shame an opposing actor into compliance with its own interests?

This question serves to discover whether or not the mechanism of shaming occurred, so as to find an indication of rhetorical action’s relevance.

- If so, are the target actors engaging in strategic manipulation to avoid changing behavior?

This second question serves to isolate instances where opposing actors engaged in strategic manipulation, for the dual purpose of further identifying the relevance of rhetorical action and to lay the groundwork for understanding its effectiveness.

- Are other actors engaging in shaming and/or strategic manipulation to alter the course of events?

This third question serves to investigate whether any third parties joined in employing rhetorical action after the conflict had started. The purpose of this investigation is to further ascertain the relevance of rhetorical action and to isolate the purposes of different actors to allow for the analysis of effectiveness.

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21 This final question addresses the issue of effectiveness. Therefore, the first three questions serve to discover the presence of rhetorical action and its usage. On the other hand, the final question addresses the success of actors in using rhetorical action. Naturally, the words ‘effective’ and ‘success’ are methodological nightmares. They will be defined on a case-by-case basis, where perceived goals of actors will be indicated and the extent to which these goals were achieved will be discussed as an indication of ‘success.’

Conclusion

This chapter started by justifying the selection of the single case study for the investigation of rhetorical action in Croatia’s accession to the EU. Moreover, after indicating where the used materials originate, this chapter built upon the considerations of the theoretical chapter to create testable questions through which the analysis can take place.

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Chapter 4- Time-line

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a contextual overview regarding Croatia’s accession. Primarily, the relevant actors and their degree of relevance will be outlined. Furthermore, a time-line depicting the most crucial occurrences around the accession negotiations will be provided and used as a functional reference point for future analysis.

Primary actors

In accordance with the Treaty on European Union, henceforth referred to as the Maastricht Treaty, accession to the EU can only occur through unanimous ratification by all member-states, as well as the European Parliament (Treaty on European Union, 1992). In other words, all 27 member-states were relevant actors to the accession negotiations. The Parliament does not have other official roles beside ratification, and does not participate in the accession negotiations. While the Parliament has influence over the contents of the negotiation chapters and aids in setting the agenda, its lack of involvement in the actual negotiations leads to it having little relevance to this thesis.

Naturally, however, there were some more some less involved actors amongst the abovementioned. Furthermore, another core actor was the European Commission, as it sets out the necessary standards (based on the Copenhagen criteria) to be followed. These standards are described as follows:

Membership requires that candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. Membership presupposes the candidate's ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union (Copenhagen European Council, 1993).

Furthermore, the Commission also monitors Croatia’s compliance and progress in conforming to the acquis of the EU (Commission, 2004). As such, the list of relevant actors to Croatia’s accession essentially entails the entirety of the EU member states, their setting within the European Council and the Council of the EU, and the Commission in an advisory and informing role.

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23 points in time. Furthermore, by pinpointing the crucial points in time, the more involved actors may also be identified.

Time-line

This section serves to provide a time-line of events that were important to Croatia’s accession to the EU. Primarily, a general time-line is provided that indicates many relevant dates and issues. Subsequently, an overview is provided of the most important occurrences where rhetorical action’s prerequisites are met. Those events will then be put forward for analysis in later chapters.

While the argument can certainly be made that Croatia’s accession started with the 1999 creation of the Stabilization and Association Process (Kaminski & de la Rocha, 2003), this time-line will start in 2003, the moment where Croatia officially applied for EU membership (Commission, 2015). At this point in time, it becomes accurate to speak of Croatia’s accession into the EU, and numerous issues arise.

Following Croatia’s application, the Commission provided a questionnaire to be filled in. Subsequently, upon receipt of the questionnaire answers the Commission provided a positive opinion regarding Croatia’s accession bid (Commission, 2004), and the Council confirmed Croatia as a candidate country.

At the end of 2004 the Council set March 2005 as the starting date for negotiations, conditional upon full cooperation with the Tribunal (Commission, 2015). This followed from perceived lack of cooperation with the Tribunal which had previously led Britain and the Netherlands to delay progress towards association (Cutler, 2013). The lack of cooperation was perceived as such because Croatia had been less than forthcoming regarding the surrender of certain war criminals that were internally perceived as heroes. A prominent example of this is Ante Gotovina, who evaded capture for several years following the Tribunal’s summon (ICTY, 2008; 2012).

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24 Following the official opening of negotiations, ‘screening’ took place in 2005/6 (Populari, 2012). ‘Screening’ entails the analytic examination of the acquis as preparation for the negotiations. The Commission and the candidate country together analyze the inconsistencies between national laws and the community acquis, thus allowing the candidate country to familiarize with the acquis, and to create clarity regarding the matters where progress is needed (Commission, 2012).

Subsequently, the first negotiation chapter was opened in June 2006 (Commission, 2015). A grand total of 35 chapters of negotiation were opened and closed in the period from 2006 to 2011, when the 35th chapter was finally closed and negotiations ended. An extensive overview of all chapters will not be discussed here, as a result of both practical considerations and issues of relevance. While the 35 chapters are certainly core to Croatia’s accession, they do not constitute sources of rhetorical action. Rather, they are a part of the basic conditionality of EU accession. By its very nature, conditionality is a coercive mechanism following from the interests of the Union (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004). Rhetorical action, on the other hand, requires a misalignment of interests and community rules. As such, conditionality cannot fall under the heading of rhetorical action, and the mechanism of rhetorical action cannot be at play when conditionality is.

Notable is that the acquis (on which the 35 chapters of negotiation are based) can certainly be a source for arguments through which to rhetorically entrap an opponent. However, this can only follow the acceptance and internalization (sincere or otherwise) of the acquis. Therefore, the implementation of the acquis and the negotiations between the Commission and Croatia regarding how to implement it fall outside of the scope of rhetorical action.

During the many years of negotiations, a maritime border conflict between Croatia and Slovenia caused Slovenia a halt in the progress of negotiations in 2008, to be resumed a year later (Cutler, 2013). Here, Slovenia perceived an attempt by Croatia to take advantage of their accession into the EU to gain the upper hand in negotiations surrounding a conflict in the Bay of Piran. Croatia, on the other hand, claimed that Slovenia was attempting to abuse their position as EU member state to gain concessions in the same conflict (Alic, 2007; Avbelj & Cernic, 2007).

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25 this issue (perceived to be) solved, EU accession became a more sincere possibility and talks both inside and outside of Croatia gained optimism.

In 2011, the 35th chapter was closed (Commission, 2015), and shortly after the Commission issued a favorable opinion regarding Croatia’s accession (Commission, 2015 (Fact Sheet)). Subsequently, the accession treaty was signed, after which a referendum was held in Croatia in 2012 where over 60% of votes were in favor of EU accession. Ultimately, accession was finalized July 1st 2013.

Relevance

Following this brief overview of chronological occurrences around Croatia’s accession, it is important to return to the research question. To what extent was rhetorical action relevant throughout all this? In order to be able to answer this question, it is crucial to understand when rhetorical action could even take place. The theoretical chapter outlined several crucial prerequisites without which rhetorical action cannot take place. Therefore, looking at the time-line with these prerequisites in mind will allow for finding instances where rhetorical action may have been relevant.

The first prerequisite was that of weakly socialized actors. The theoretical chapter ascertained that the member-states of the EU fit this description. The question then arises; do Croatia and the EU fit it?

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26 The final prerequisite was a misalignment between community interests and national interests. Continuing from the assumption that adopting the acquis was not a conflict of interest, as this would not lend itself to rhetorical action and therefore cannot become a part of the analysis, two specific instances remain where this assumption is, or at the very least may have been, met. The first instance is found when the negotiations were postponed in 2005 as a result of non-compliance with cooperation requirements surrounding the Tribunal. The second instance is the maritime border conflict with Slovenia. Therefore, the analysis in the following chapter shall focus on these two issues in determining whether or not rhetorical action was relevant to the outcome of Croatia’s road to accession.

At this point it is important to note that the accession of Croatia did not have the same degree of opposition as observed by Schimmelfennig (2003) in the big round of eastern enlargement of the EU and NATO at the time. This is of course naught but natural as the enlargement was not quite as widely commented on in national media throughout the Union, and the enlargement round was simply far less significant in terms of size and impact. As such, the argument can certainly be made that rhetorical action is considerably less relevant in this expansion round than when Schimmelfennig initially used it for its explanatory capacity, simply because there was considerably less opposition. However, this in no way means that it was irrelevant.

Conclusion

This chapter set out to identify the crucial actors involved with Croatia’s accession to the EU. Initially, documentation regarding accession procedures was studied and found that on the EU side of the process, the European Council; the Council of Ministers; the European Commission; the European Parliament; and the individual member states all had roles to play, which sometimes also overlapped.

This being rather vague, the chapter then continued to create an overview of the most important occurrences surrounding Croatia’s accession to allow for further identification of crucial moments and crucial actors. The cases of Croatia’s cooperation with the Tribunal and of the border conflict with Slovenia were selected for their potential usage of rhetorical action.

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Chapter 5 – Case analysis

This chapter serves to demonstrate the process of the case analysis. Continuing from the previous chapter’s findings regarding the instances where the prerequisites for rhetorical action being relevant were met, this chapter will delve into these instances. Specifically, these are the situation surrounding Croatia’s cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, and the issue surrounding the Bay of Piran conflict with Slovenia.

Building on the theoretical considerations, the methodological chapter introduced several questions through which the presence and relevance of rhetorical action may be ascertained. These questions, which will serve as the proverbial backbone of this chapter, are as follows:

- Are there actor(s) attempting to shame an opposing actor into compliance with its own interests?

- If so, are the target actors engaging in strategic manipulation to avoid changing behavior?

- Are other actors engaging in shaming and/or strategic manipulation to alter the course of events?

- Were any actors effectively rhetorically entrapped?

The two cases shall be dealt with separately. Each will have a small introduction as to the case’s relevant issues, after which each of the four questions will be considered.

Cooperation with the Tribunal

The first instance noted in the previous chapter is that of Croatia’s cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (the Tribunal).

The issue had its roots in an earlier history. During one of the many conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, this particular one dubbed the Croatian War of independence, many atrocities occurred, as often happens during war. One particular instance was ‘Operation Storm’, led by general Ante Gotovina (ICTY, 2008; 2012). This operation has been credited to have liberated over 18% of Croatian territory, and was the last major battle of the Croatian war of independence.

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28 considerably less attention than Gotovina himself, they shall not be emphasized further as such emphasis would add little to the analysis.

Having been the leading figure in this major military campaign, Gotovina is perceived by many as a Croatian hero. In contrast, he is seen by many Serbs as guilty of genocide. He was summoned to appear before the Tribunal on charges of:

• Persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds, deportation and inhumane acts (forcible transfer)

• Plunder of public or private property and wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity

• Murder • Inhumane acts

• Cruel treatment (ICTY, Case Information Sheet, 2012).

In 2004, after the positive opinion by the European Commission, the Council set March 17, 2005 as the starting date for negotiations (Council, 2005). However, this was set to be conditional upon full cooperation with the Tribunal. On March 16, 2005, it was judged that Croatia generally cooperated well, however the continued evasion of justice by Ante Gotovina was interpreted as lack of cooperation by many of the member states, with only Croatia’s neighbors, Austria, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia being in favor of opening accession negotiations at this time (IrishTimes, 2005). As such, the start of negotiations was postponed.

The negotiations were later started after Tribunal chief prosecutor Carla del Ponte proclaimed Croatia’s full cooperation with the Tribunal (Neuman-Stanivukovic, 2012). This declaration followed Croatia’s clear signs of cooperation through its approaching western intelligence agencies and asking for aid in finding Gotovina. A few months later, Gotovina was arrested in the Canary Islands and transferred to The Hague.

As such, the issue of perceived cooperation with the Tribunal and the subsequent postponing of accession negotiations and soon-to-follow reopening of these provide opportunity for rhetorical action. This case will be looked at through the four questions above in order to ascertain the presence and relevance of rhetorical action.

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29 In order to answer this question, the primary actors in this case must be identified. From the varying EU institutions relevant to this case, the Council is pivotal as the decision to postpone talks was made there, and per extension the member-states are highly relevant. Furthermore, Croatia itself is of course a core actor. Finally, the Tribunal is important as its judgment forms the basis of the argumentation, and the Tribunal’s negative review of Croatia’s cooperation was the trigger, perceived by some as the reason, for postponing the negotiations (Kledt, 2005).

Recalling that shaming is the ‘exposure of goals and/or interests that are illegitimate according to community culture or institutionalized rules’, the question is then reformulated into ‘are any actors attempting to expose goals and/or interests that are illegitimate according to community culture or institutionalized rules to shame an opposing actor into compliance with its own interests?’

The community rule relevant to this case is the core EU norm of adherence to international law, where the surrender of sought-after individuals to the Tribunal is the ‘correct’ course of action and deviation from this, as Croatia was perceived to do, would be illegitimate.

In the context of the ambiguous cooperation with Ante Gotovina’s arrest, hindsight permits the statement that shaming may not technically have occurred, because there was no possible change in behavior (i.e. Croatia may have been fully cooperating with the Tribunal already in March 2005; Gotovina was later found in the Canary Islands). However, this was not the perception of the opposing nations, primarily Britain and the Netherlands (Waterfield, 2005). Instead, the perception was that Croatia was hiding its war heroes, and as such refused to comply.

From this perspective, an attempt at shaming can certainly be said to have been made, as the target actor (i.e. Croatia) was forced into compliance with institutional norms. One note, however, is that it is hard to see any particular interest of any party, except on the part of the Tribunal, where the interest would of course be to fulfill the purpose of the organization, in addition to the desire to seem legitimate and effective, and perhaps the Netherlands as being the ‘host’ of the Tribunal.

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30 objective/interest on the part of the Tribunal towards Croatia as it indicates an objective towards the EU, namely solidifying its position in the accession process.

Thus, the answer to the first question is ambiguous, as the shaming does occur, albeit in a manner not typically observed as the shaming actor is not a single actor, but rather several member states. Furthermore, the non-cooperation indictment was made largely on speculation and circumstance (i.e. the treatment of Gotovina as a national hero), though this need not be an argument against shaming. Finally, it ought to be considered that the indictment does not appear to have been followed by any form of alternative requests or conditionality, therefore not showing any indication of ulterior motives. This argument is supported by the swift resolution in terms of cooperation with the Tribunal that followed months later.

In conclusion, shaming certainly did occur, but not in a context one would generally expect, as it appears to have been more of a follow-up upon the conditionality than an attempt at rhetorical entrapment. Before solidifying this conclusion, however, several further questions need to be considered.

If so, are the target actors engaging in strategic manipulation to avoid changing behavior?

Recalling from the theoretical chapter that strategic manipulation entails attempts to counter the shaming effort, it would in this case mean that Croatia, the target actor, ought to engage in an attempt to either argue that it is in fact acting legitimately and the accuser is mistaken, or point out the accuser’s own shortcomings (Schimmelfennig, 2001).

To a certain extent this did happen. Croatia’s prime minster at the time, Ivo Sanader, stated that they were in fact looking for Gotovina, but he was no longer present in Croatia’s borders and as such they could not comply with the demand of handing him over to the Tribunal.

This is a rather gentle form of strategic manipulation, where an attempt is made to show that the indictment is inaccurate, without creating any form of hostility, as would be the case with the alternative method of strategic manipulation.

Are other actors engaging in shaming and/or strategic manipulation to alter the course of events?

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31 Tribunal, whose statement regarding Croatia’s cooperation determined whether or not negotiations started.

Therefore, the issue is primarily one between the Council, the Tribunal, and Croatia. The above question is then best reformulated into ‘were any other actors getting involved with the emerging issues surrounding the postponing of Croatia’s accession negotiation?’

The answer to this question is a qualified no. Primarily, no new major actors got involved, where ‘major’ means other than reporting agencies and other media endeavors. Furthermore, other major actors that were already involved did not assume any new roles. The Commission, with its major advisory and informatory role, did not change its role nor did it make any clear attempts to influence the occurrences; it merely reported what occurred and made (positive-oriented) projections regarding what could happen once this issue would be resolved (Commission, 2005).

Therefore, no important new actors appeared and no new actions were taken by old actors, meaning that no other actors engaged in strategic manipulation to alter the course of events.

Were any actors effectively rhetorically entrapped?

In order to answer this final question, clarification is required regarding what would be ‘effective’ rhetorical entrapment. Recalling from the theoretical chapter that being rhetorically entrapped would involve actors altering their behavior towards the following of the norm, effective rhetorical entrapment in this case would mean that the target actor, Croatia, would alter its behavior towards arresting and handing over Ante Gotovina as demanded by the Tribunal and the Council.

The question whether or not this truly occurred then becomes slightly complicated. As Gotovina was apprehended in the Canary Islands a few months after the shaming started, a plausible conclusion would be that Croatia had not changed its behavior towards following the norm, and therefore had not been rhetorically entrapped to do so.

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32 and eventually found his location in the Canary Islands through investigation of communications between Gotovina and his wife (Lamont, 2013).

While internal investigation eventually led to Gotovina’s location, it was the approach to other intelligence agencies and further attempts at international cooperation that led chief prosecutor Carla del Ponte to acknowledge Croatia’s efforts by declaring that full cooperation was provided (Fausto Pocar, Letter to UN Security Council, December 14 2005). Moreover, this declaration by del Ponte took place before Gotovina’s arrest, further indicating that the desired behavior had not been Gotovina’s arrest, but merely further (perhaps more obvious) efforts by the Croatian government.

Thus, the answer to whether or not Croatia was effectively rhetorically entrapped is also rather ambiguous. While on the one hand Croatia did not act outside of its own interests (i.e. it was not actively attempting to prevent Gotovina from being brought to The Hague), it certainly did change its behavior in a manner desired by the Tribunal. As such, the behavioral aspect to rhetorical entrapment was fulfilled. However, the misalignment of interests was not necessarily present as the arrest of Gotovina, while not desired by the Croatian public, was not strongly opposed; cooperation merely did not occur as strongly as desired by the Tribunal.

Conclusion

The postponing of accession negotiations with Croatia certainly showed signs of rhetorical action, as indicated in the previous chapter. Furthermore, attempts at shaming were made, predominantly by the Tribunal, as its statement that Croatia was not cooperating enough was akin to stating that Croatia was not adhering to international law.

Furthermore, Croatia both engaged in strategic manipulation through its denial of non-cooperation, and altered its behavior towards more obvious attempts to apprehend Gotovina, which eventually succeeded. As such, aspects of rhetorical action were certainly present.

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33 As such, the distinction between rhetorical action and conditionality becomes blurred; the motivating mechanism for Croatia’s behavior was the conditionality of accession, and while rhetorical action took place in this instance, a statement that it was pivotal, or even important, cannot be made.

The Bay of Piran issue

The second instance noted in the previous chapter is that of the Bay of Piran conflict.

The Bay of Piran conflict was one of many border conflicts between Croatia and Slovenia. Since their independence, the two countries have been disputing the exact borders on several occasions and locations. The Bay of Piran conflict is of particular interest, as it nearly led to Croatia being unable to enter the EU (Alic, 2007).

Important to note is that most information regarding the case, especially background information, was provided by either the Croatian or the Slovenian government (European Stability Initiative, accessed 2015). As such, a certain degree of caution regarding the factual accuracy is in order. However, considering the emphasis of this thesis is the rhetorical action (potentially) involved in the case, the factual accuracy of the argument is of lesser importance.

Some factual history is available, however, and is provided below for contextual understanding of the case.

Croatia and Slovenia were non-sovereign municipalities under the former Yugoslavia, where land borders between the two were clearly delineated (with the exception of a few hotspots currently still being debated (Avbelj & Cernic, 2007). Sea borders, however, were not delineated as the territory was simply Yugoslavian waters. As such, since their independence in June 1991, the sea borders have been disputed.

The Bay of Piran has been under Croatian rule, with no significant Slovenian attempts at ‘retaking it’. However, incidents have occurred such as Slovenian nationals being arrested by Croatian officials for refusal to show passports on the disputed border (BBC, 2004).

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34 accession procedure (Vucheva, 2008), effectively halting Croatia’s progress towards accession.

Consecutively, the conflict became central to Croatian-Slovenian relations and to the internal politics of both countries. On the Slovenian side, it was argued that the negotiation chapters being blocked were because they involved, directly or indirectly, statements regarding the Croatian borders. Therefore, Slovenia indicted Croatia of attempting to strengthen its position regarding the borders through its accession to the EU (Avbelj & Cernic, 2007).

Croatia, in contrast, declared that it was merely following as close as possible the instructions by the Commission, and indicted Slovenia of attempting to use its position as EU member state to blackmail Croatia into conceding part of its territory (Vucheva, 2008).

A variety of suggestions to solve the problems were proposed by both sides, with Slovenia showing preference to bilateral solutions, and Croatia indicating a preference for external arbitration. Moreover, the EU (under circulating presidency and therefore circulating the key nations involved) attempted to provide solutions, and external arbitration was proposed.

Eventually, in 2009 the Croatian president resigned and the new president came to an agreement with the Slovenian president, where it was decided that a UN arbitrator would be approached and both parties would respect the verdict. Slovenia quickly unblocked the negotiation chapters, and Croatia completed the chapters in 2011.

In order to ascertain the presence and relevance of rhetorical action throughout this conflict, the four questions will be posed and answered separately below.

Are there actor(s) attempting to shame an opposing actor into compliance with its own interests?

Before this question can be adequately answered, one crucial aspect must be stressed. For this analysis to work, a ‘starting’ actor ought to be selected who will be seen as the initial shaming actor. For this purpose, Croatia is picked. This choice does not in any way mean to imply that no shaming occurred from the Slovenian side, but rather is made because Croatia was the actor that initially indicted Slovenia of inconsistency with community norms, as will be indicated below.

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35 attempted to shame Slovenia into complying with its own interest of continuing accession negotiations on several occasions, the clearest of which being the following quotes by Prime Minister Sanader briefly after Slovenia’s blocking of accession negotiation:

"The blockade of 10 chapters, 8 for opening and 2 for closing, is a move without precedent in the history of the negotiations of European Union. If it doesn't rethink its stance and change its decision of the blockade of Croatian negotiations, the Slovenian government will show exclusiveness, which is in discrepancy with the basic principles of solidarity, community, supranationalism and good neighbor relations on which the EU and the whole Europe are based” (Nacional Weekly, 2008).

"Croatia isn't and won't be ready nor will it ever accept blackmail and exclusivism, which have no place in the EU... We won't buy our membership of the EU with territory. This is our firm position and our friends in Slovenia must know this” (Vucheva, 2008).

The above quotes are the pinnacle of a shaming attempt, with specific mention of the instance of action as well as the community principles being tarnished. Having established that shaming occurred and having picked Croatia as the starting actor, the answer to the initial question is completed. Many more instances of shaming occurred, but shall be dealt with instead in the following section on strategic manipulation as the arguments quickly erupted into a fray of shaming attempts better described as strategic manipulation in the sense that they respond to previous shaming attempts and do not constitute novel instances.

If so, are the target actors engaging in strategic manipulation to avoid changing behavior?

Recalling the two variants of strategic manipulation being the denial of allegations of inconsistency with community norms and as well as pointing out the other party’s shortcomings/inconsistencies, Slovenia can be observed to have engaged in both.

Primarily, Slovenia denied allegations of misalignment with community norms, emphasizing instead that it was “merely protecting its national interests” and “does not enjoy this position” (Seebiz.eu, 2008). Furthermore, Slovenia denied that it was blocking Croatia’s accession process:

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36 at a slow pace (with the EU) owing to the difficulties it has in meeting the requirements of the organisation it wants to join," the statement said (Balkan Insight, 2008).

Furthermore, in response to above Slovenian comments, Croatia proclaimed that: “Croatia has no intention whatsoever of bringing bilateral issues into the accession process and we expect nothing less from the relevant EU member states” (Balkan Insight, 2008). This statement, aside from being an obvious sneer towards Slovenia, also clearly indicates an attempt at separating the Bay of Piran issue from the accession negotiations, creating a new avenue of rhetorical action as the previous purpose was to shame Slovenia into dropping the matter, whereas here the purpose was to separate the two issues allowing for them to be dealt with separately (and therefore the accession to proceed unhindered).

Slovenia’s foreign ministry was quick to respond to the above with its statement that “no EU member state would allow an accession candidate to negotiate membership applying solutions that are harmful for current members” (Balkan Insight, 2008). This response again indicates a clear attempt to reframe the issue. Where Croatia attempted to frame the two issues as separate, Slovenia in turn aimed to show their relatedness.

The above clearly establishes the attempts at shaming and strategic manipulation by the two parties. Before the analysis of effectiveness can ensue, alternative relevant actors and their actions must be looked at.

Are other actors engaging in shaming and/or strategic manipulation to alter the course of events?

The ‘other actors’ involved with this case are the other member states of the EU. Specifically, France made an attempt at solving the issue, and, in a separate instance, the Commission attempted to aid in the issue’s resolution.

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37 Following the failure of the French suggestion, the Commission proposed “a three-member council of wise (people) that would mediate to help finally draw the border between Slovenia and Croatia” (EU Business, 2009). However, while this eventually occurred, nothing significant was achieved (Sancin, 2010), as the Commission merely mediated, and nothing binding emerged.

Croatian Prime Minister Sanader proclaimed his puzzlement by the proceedings: “I don't understand, why is Slovenia so afraid of International Law? That's the only enigma I can’t comprehend” (Sancin, 2010), clearly making another attempt at shaming through pointing out Slovenia’s non-conformance to the norm of following international law.

Finally, after the Croatian Prime Minister Ivo Sanader suddenly retired and Prime Minister Kosor came into office, agreement was reached. It was decided to leave the Bay of Piran issue to a binding arbitration tribunal.

Clearly, involvement from third parties was present, and again followed by rhetorical action from all parties. The presence of rhetorical action has been more than determined, and the following section will delve into its effectiveness.

Were any actors effectively rhetorically entrapped?

In order to answer this question, the word ‘effectiveness’ needs to be clarified. For Croatia, the purpose was to continue accession negotiations in order to become a full EU member state as soon as possible, without conceding on the Bay of Piran issue. For Slovenia, the purpose was either to gain headway in the Bay of Piran issue, or to alter the potential importance of Croatian documents in the accession negotiations so they would not influence future resolution of the Bay of Piran issue. ‘Effectiveness’, therefore, would be either actors succeeding in these goals.

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38 On the Slovenian side, partial success was also achieved as a part of the resolution to go to UN arbitration was that any documents involved with the EU accession would not presuppose any outcome regarding the two countries’ border dispute (EU Business, 2009).

Finally, it must be noted that the form of resolution closely resembles previous suggestions made by Croatia to form an arbitration tribunal with the EU. As such, the outcome hints at greater success/effectiveness on the part of Croatia with its successfully forcing Slovenia to take the way of International Law rather than bilateral solutions to the conflict.

Conclusion

The road to Croatia’s EU accession was certainly obstructed by Slovenia. Certain questions still remain regarding the ‘true’ interests at play, e.g. did Slovenia hope to blackmail Croatia into conceding the Bay of Piran? And did Croatia hope to utilize its EU accession documents to gain the upper hand in the border disputes with Slovenia?

In spite of these questions remaining, much has been observed in terms of rhetorical action between these two now member-states. Certainly, rhetorical action was present, and both sides managed to attain a certain degree of effective rhetorical entrapment upon the other party. This analysis would suggest that Croatia was more successful in doing so than Slovenia.

Rhetorical Action in Croatia’s accession to the European Union