A Meta‐Analysis on the
Impact of Role Effects in
Economic Negotiation
Outcomes
Lulu Wang （10605444）
University of Amsterdam Faculty of Economics and Business Master thesis MSc Business Studies Specialization: Marketing Academic year: 2013‐2014 Supervisor: dr. Alfred Zerres Amsterdam, September 2014
Abstract
This meta-analysis investigates role effects in economic negotiation outcomes. As suggested by the rational of negotiation strategy preference and the regulatory-fit theory, a vigilant strategy and a prevention focus are more congruent with the buyer role as compared to the seller role, supposing that buyers are tend to achieve better economic outcomes than sellers. However, the main effect is predicted to be moderated by task-based, person-based, and situation-based influences. By including 97 effect sizes, the current meta-analysis uses a multilevel modeling approach to examine all hypotheses. As predicted, the main effect was confirmed. Nonetheless, moderator analyses revealed that role effects were attenuated when the negotiation task had an integrative potential, when negotiators had some previous negotiation experiences, and when face-to-face was applied as the communication channel. However, the findings also reflected that the role effects were strengthened when buyers negotiated on behalf of others (but not on behalf of themselves). Both theoretical and practical implications, limitations of the current study, and directions for future research are discussed as well.
Table of contents
1. Introduction ... 1 2. Theoretical framework ... 3 3. Method ... 13 4. Results ... 18 5. Discussion ... 21 6. References ... 28 Table ... 36 Appendix ... 391 | Introduction
1. Introduction
A negotiation normally occurs because different parties represent various interests and thus they need to negotiate about the distribution of precious resources, resulting in diverse economic outcomes among parties. In a classic two-party business-related negotiation, two roles that negotiate the purchase/sale of a good or service are a buyer and a seller. These two roles consistently affect negotiators’ motivational states and then their negotiation strategies, which make their resulting behaviors differ from each other (e.g., Neale & Bazerman, 1992). As a consequence, role-relevant information is strongly related to negotiation outcomes.
Role effects are among the most complex and enduring issues in negotiation research, drawing mixed conclusions concerning the success of buyers and sellers in negotiations. Many researchers of negotiation have concluded that buyers achieve more profits than sellers in terms of economic outcomes in negotiations (e.g., Huber & Neale, 1986; Moore, 2004; Srivastava, 2001; Schei et al., 2006). In 1987, Neale and his colleagues first researched this topic, revealing that when role-relevant information (i.e., being a buyer or a seller) was present, buyers achieved greater mean value than sellers, independent of the framing of task characteristics. After that, a lot of studies confirmed this result even though some applied different study designs. On the other hand, some studies suggest that role-relevant information has no discernable effect on the economic outcomes of negotiations (Brooks & Schweitzer, 2011; Huber & Neale, 1987). In addition, a few studies even reveal that sellers gain more profits, especially when negotiators are under unequal power positions (Tripp & Sondak, 1992) or when they use Instant Messaging as communication tool (Loewenstein et al., 2005). Of concern is that conclusions regarding role effects in negotiations are not consistent and thus a synthesized research tool is strongly needed to summarize and compare results from empirical literatures.
The main objective of this research is to provide a comprehensive overview on role effects in economic outcomes based on existing empirical studies. In the following, a meta-analysis will be presented in great detail to analyze all available studies to measure the impact of one variable—in this case, role effects—on another variable—in this case, economic negotiation outcomes. Using this technique, whether six moderating factors (i.e., integrative potential, extra incentives, negotiation experience, impending deadline, face-to-face communication,
negotiation representatives) might limit or increase the impact of role effects on negotiation outcomes will also be explored.
The article proceeds as follows. In Part 2, the phenomenon of role effects is explored in detail, providing insight into the relationship between the two roles (i.e., the buyer and seller) and the economic outcomes. In addition, five moderators is presented to estimate their impact of role effects on negotiation outcomes. The next part describes how the analysis conducted. Stating from describing literature research methods, this part continues to explain the inclusion criteria of available studies and then the coding procedure of moderators. Moreover, this part presents the estimates of effect sizes and the models that would be used to evaluate the mean effect size which intends to assess the impact of role effects on economic outcome. In Part 4, findings are reported to document the impact of role effects in negotiation. Finally, in Part 5, the author explores the implication of this analysis, offering both theoretical and practical perspectives. In addition, the suggestions to future researches are discussed as well.
3 | Theoretical framework
2. Theoretical framework
Role Effects and Economic Negotiation Outcomes
A negotiation can normally be regarded as a process by which parties with initial divergent interests can resolve their differences via communication to reach agreements on the distribution of scarce resources (e.g., Pruitt, 1998). Parties take part in a negotiation can be two or more, for example, a negotiation contains employees, employers, and labor union is a third-party negotiation. Besides negotiation parties, negotiations can also be grouped basing on various negotiation topics. Some general topics can be labor-, employment-, politics-, and business-related tasks. In the current study, only two-party business-related negotiations are considered as research literatures.
The consequences of a negotiation can be measured as two types outcomes, one is economic measures and the other is social-psychological measures (Thompson, 1990). While economic measures focus on the gains that negotiated, social-psychological measures include negotiators’ perceptions and behavioral intentions toward other parties, for instance, their willingness to interact with opponents in the future (Thompson, 1990). In the current study, only the economic outcome is researched as the dependent variable. The social-psychological outcome is out of consideration.
In two-party negotiations, resources, of course, are not always distributed equitably between negotiators. Indeed, empirical research results present a mixed picture of role effects in negotiation outcomes by suggesting that either buyers or sellers can achieve higher economic outcomes; however, theoretical perspectives propose that buyers are more effective in gaining access to resources than sellers and thus achieving more profits.
In a two-party business negotiation, two roles that played in it are the buyer and the seller. From a social perspective, these two roles are part of the business environment and thus naturally separate negotiators into two diverse categories (Taylor, 1981), which in turn could be interpreted as scripts (Abelson, 1976) or schemas (Taylor & Crocker, 1980) for negotiators to understand the categorization process (Taylor, 1979). Additionally, negotiators use the categorization process to group their cognitive, emotional, and behavioral patterns (Harre, 1980). From a functional perspective, the grouped patterns allow negotiators the opportunity
to use their social characteristics of a particular role to moderate, influence, or determine their negotiation behavior (James, 1985).
When only the economic outcomes is centered as negotiation consequence, issues bargained between two parties are always related to price, or at least, monetary centered. Consequently, during a negotiation process, the buyer is trading money for the receipt of the good or service, and the seller is trading the good or service for the receipt of money. Previous research demonstrates that the buyer considers the money to be paid as a loss, while the seller views the money to be received as a gain (Carmon & Ariely, 2000; Monga & Zhu, 2005; Neale et al., 1987; Thaler, 1980). Therefore, buyers and sellers frame the negotiation differently. Buyers frame the negotiation as a loss or nonloss process while sellers frame the negotiation as a gain or nongain process (Monga & Zhu, 2005; Neale et al., 1987; Schei et al., 2006). In this case, buyers are inclined to minimize their monetary losses in terms of paying as little as possible to reach a deal while sellers are tend to maximize their monetary gains in terms of receiving as much as possible.
It is obvious that buyers and sellers have different goals (i.e., minimize losses vs. maximize gains) in negotiations. In order to contemplate the negotiation to reach their separate goals, negotiators need the support of helpful strategies. Indeed, they have two choices: one is vigilant strategy and the other is eager strategy. A vigilant strategy ensures the absence of negative outcomes in terms of minimizing losses, while an eager strategy secures the presence of positive outcomes in terms of maximizing gains (Higgins, 2000). As a consequence, buyers’ goal of loss-minimization is supported by a vigilant strategy and sellers’ gain-maximizing strategy is supported by an eager strategy. By using a vigilant strategy, buyers are much more cautious to initiate information exchange or persuasion attempts. They are more tend to behave passively to wait for sellers to come up with acceptable offers (Cai et al., 2000; Schel et al., 2006). In addition, buyers usually focus more on their own preferences and refuse to make concessions. By contrast, sellers are actively to proceed the negotiation by exchanging information and persuading buyers (Neale et al., 1987; Ritov, 1996; Schei et al., 2006). Therefore, buyers tend to pursue security in a negotiation, while sellers are much more risk seeking since they are more eager to reach an agreement. The more risk seeking the negotiator,
5 | Theoretical framework
the higher the premium he/she is willing to exchange for a negotiated settlement (e.g., Neale et al., 1987). If this is the case, it is much more difficult for sellers to have any monetary gain than buyers to have any monetary loss. In other words, buyers’ desire of against overspending is stronger than sellers’ desire of achieving compensation, which in turn means that buyers may gain more profits.
After discussing the rationale of role effects from the strategic preference perspective, the present study continues the research from another aspect: the regulatory fit theory. There are two separate and independent self-regulatory orientations, prevention and promotion (Higgins, 1997; Higgins et al., 2001). Prevention individuals value safety, the fulfillment of responsibility, and security needs, and thus strategically concern losses/nonlosses. On the contrary, promotion individuals emphasize hopes, accomplishments, and advancement needs, and therefore strategically concern gains/nongains (Appelt et al., 2009). Regulatory fit occurs when one negotiator’s goal pursuit (i.e., negotiation strategy) sustains his/her orientation to the goal, for instance, the prevention buyer or the promotion seller. A prevention focus and a vigilant strategy are both sensitive to losses/nonlosses, especially the difference between “0” and “-1” (maintenance). A promotion focus and an eager strategy are both sensitive to gains/nongains, especially the difference between “0” and “+1” (attainment) (Brodscholl et al., 2007). Therefore, someone who is prevention-focused generally prefers a vigilant strategy, and someone who is promotion-focused generally prefers an eager strategy (Cesario et al., 2004; Crowe & Higgins, 1997; Higgins, 2000). To conclude, a prevention focus and the buyer role share the same preference for a vigilant (loss-minimization) strategy, and a promotion focus and the seller role share the same preference for an eager (gain-maximization) strategy. As a consequence, prevention individuals fit the role of buyers, whereas promotion individuals fit the role of sellers (Appelt et al., 2009). When a negotiation conducted between a prevention buyer and a promotion sellers, both parties feel “right” about their responses in terms of decreasing buyers’ losses or increasing sellers’ gains. This feeling of rightness only intensifies the magnitude of the response instead of altering the response valence itself. For instance, regulatory fit will increase the positivity of the response when the response is positive. As discussed above, buyers’ desire to prohibit losses is stronger than sellers’ desire to achieve gains,
similarly, when regulatory fit occurs, the intensification of the magnitude of buyers’ monetary losses is supposed to be much more intensified than the magnitude of sellers’ monetary gains. In this research, previous studies analyzed are all naturally, positively framed. With a prevention focus, buyers prefer a vigilant strategy in order to achieve their goal of minimizing losses; however, with a promotion focus, sellers prefer an eager strategy in order to achieve their goal of maximizing gains. The above descriptions clearly illustrate ultimate differences between buyers and sellers: 1, buyers are inclined to minimize their monetary losses while sellers are tend to maximize their monetary gains; 2, buyers’ desire of against overspending is stronger than sellers’ desire of achieving compensation; 3, the intensification of the magnitude of buyers’ monetary losses is supposed to be much more intensified than the magnitude of sellers’ monetary gains.
Hypothesis 1: Buyers are supposed to achieve better economic negotiation outcomes than sellers.
Moderators of Role Effects in Economic Outcomes
In addition to the assumed general role effects in terms of economic outcomes, six moderators are also investigated to examine their influences on role effects in economic outcomes. In the following, task-based (i.e., integrative potential, extra incentives), person-based (i.e., negotiation experience), and situation-person-based (i.e., impending deadline, face-to-face communication, negotiation representatives) moderators of role effects in economic negotiation outcomes are investigated. The rational of each moderator is provided in the following as well.
Integrative potential
In negotiation research, two types of negotiation tasks are generally distinguished: distributive and integrative. A distributive negotiation normally contains only one issue, and therefore, an increase of one party’s economic outcomes corresponds to an equivalent decrease of the counterpart’s profits. In short, buyers’ and sellers’ negotiation outcomes are negatively related. However, in an integrative negotiation, two or more issues need to be negotiated. Thus, there is an opportunity for the discovery and creation of joint gains (Bazerman & Neale, 1983; Neale & Bazerman, 1991) since not all issues are valued the same to the two parties. For
7 | Theoretical framework
example, one issue which is considered as the most important one by the buyer can be ignored by the seller. To conclude, an integrative negotiation can be viewed as the process of two parties’ identifying common interests and making trade-offs on differentially valued issues (Bazerman & Neale, 1983).
The discovery and creation of joint gains require information exchanges like asking questions about the counterpart’s interests or preferences (De Dreu et al., 2006; Thompson, 1991), which can be interpreted as seeking cooperation and concerning for the other party. In order to achieve joint gains, concession making occurs on some less significant issues, which might appear to be more congruent with the role of seller. Buyers, on the contrary, originally resist to behave actively or make any concession, are more likely to be affected by the integrative characteristic of the negotiation task. As a consequence, buyers are more likely to start compromising on some less valued issues when integrative potential exists. The advantage of buyers’ negotiation outcomes compared to sellers’ is supposed to weaken.
Hypothesis 2: When there exists any integrative potential in the negotiation, the relationship between role effects and economic outcomes are attenuated such that buyers’ advantage in gaining more profits is reduced.
Extra incentives
Another task-based moderator is the extra incentive that negotiators have in the negotiation. In many laboratory studies, participants are informed that good performance is rewarded. The incentives normally taking a variety of forms such as money (e.g., Conlon et al., 1994), increased course credit/experimental credit (e.g., Esser, 1989), or school supplies (e.g., Komorita et al.). It is noteworthy that extra incentives are different from participation bases. When negotiators receive participation base, the received compensations are just for their participation in the negotiation, independent of their negotiation performance and resulting outcomes. However, extra incentive is quite another thing. Negotiators can only receive stakes when they reach an agreement.
Incentives are commonly used to encourage participants to take their roles seriously via generating some personal commitment to the task (Stuhlmacher et al., 1998). Another stimulation derived from extra incentives is the endeavor to complete as much agreements as
possible. Druckman (1994) suggests that one negotiator’s motivation and related outcome may be influenced by the presence of extra incentives, especially when they receive monetary rewards. Therefore, it is reasonable to suppose that negotiators attempt to reach more agreements in order to gain higher premium. However, the desire to reach more agreements inspires negotiators to behave actively in a negotiation and even generates more concessions to the counterpart, which is in conflict with the role of buyer. Subjects who negotiated as buyers are supposed to compromise more regularly when their good performance is compensated.
Hypothesis 3: When extra incentives to good performance present, the relationship between role effects and economic outcomes are attenuated such that buyers’ superiority in economic outcomes is weakened.
Negotiation experience (person-based characteristic)
The only person-based moderator in the current study is negotiators’ prior negotiation experiences. In negotiations, novices are likely to be uncertain about how to behave appropriately and effectively for the sake of higher profits. However, there is evidence that a single previous negotiation experience is sufficient to improve negotiation performance (Thompson, 1990). Obtained negotiation experience should be helpful to understand negotiation task, reduce improper behaviors in negotiations, and increase the possibility to maximize negotiation outcomes. Thus, it seems likely that negotiation experience weakens the influence of role effects on economic outcomes. When negotiators are experienced in the negotiation field, their dependencies on negotiation roles are reduced, and thus buyers’ profits are predicted to decrease.
Hypothesis 4: When negotiators have previous negotiation experience, the relationship between role effects and economic outcomes are attenuated such that buyers’ superiority in economic outcomes is weakened.
Impending deadline
Time pressure has been central variable in negotiation research for a long time (De Dreu, 2003). Impeding deadline, which is one manipulation of time pressure (De Dreu, 2003), can be varied by giving participants a plenty versus limited amount of time (e.g., Carnevale & Lawler, 1986), or by allowing them many versus few rounds to negotiate (e.g., Kelley et al., 1976).
9 | Theoretical framework
Early evidence clearly indicates that when time pressure presents, concession-making is normally considered as showing weakness to the opponent, and accordingly promotes a strong negotiation position (of the counterpart) in return (Stevens, 1963). Furthermore, when deadline is impending, time pressure may become more motivating (Stuhlmacher et al., 1998). Accordingly, more concession behaviors are inspired.
Although previous studies suggest that when negotiators face different time pressures, the resulting agreement tends to favor the party under less pressure (Carnevale et al., 1993; Komorita & Barnes, 1969; Rapoport et al., 1990; Stuhlmacher et al., 1998), in buyer-seller negotiations, two parties negotiate under the same time period and similarly, it is not obvious which party negotiates under less pressure and later on gains more profits. However, since concession-making matches the role of seller better than buyer, when deadline comes closer, it is reasonable to suppose that the influence of impending deadline on buyers is much stronger than on sellers. Consequently, role effects in negotiation is diminished and buyers are assumed to gain less profits.
One important thing is that negotiations always have deadlines. The difference between deadlines in different negotiations is that some negotiations emphasize deadlines in forms like “subjects were allowed 15 minutes to negotiate” or “subjects negotiated up to 6 rounds”, while other negotiations do not emphasize deadlines. However, de-emphasis of deadlines does not mean deadlines do not exist since negotiations are always limited in some time periods. As a consequence, the current study will apply the existence of deadlines, or in other words, the emphasis of deadlines, as one situation-based moderator.
Hypothesis 5: When deadline is emphasized in a negotiation, the relationship between role effects and economic outcomes are attenuated such that buyers’ superiority in economic outcomes is weakened.
Face-to-face communication
The communication channel people used to negotiate is one of the situation-based moderators. Negotiation studies often vary from communication channels that negotiators applied, for instance, face-to-face, video conference, notes exchanging, and electronic communication via computer (e.g., e-mail; Instant Messaging). By utilizing various
communication channels, many elements are differed among negotiations, such as the degree of information interchanged, the manner of offers exchanged, the possibility of cooperation accomplished. Compared to other channel, face-to-face is widely applied in many studies. Most electronic communication channels are text-based and thus lack communication cues such as the ability to see and hear others (Swaab et al., 2009). The same happens to note exchanging. Other communication channels, like video or audio conference, although they enable negotiators to see and/or hear, there exist some geographical distances between two parties. Such distances create barriers that weaken other communication cues like emotion expression. All in all, face-to-face channel is the one that releases more communication cues when compared to other communication channels.
When two parties meet at the table, it normally turns out that negotiators represent different interests do not acquaint with each other. Previous research suggests that under such circumstance, the lack of communication cues would further decrease feelings of social presence and consequently diminish cooperation (Swaab & Galinsky, 2007). From this perspective, cooperation is more likely to happen in face-to-face channel compared to other channels. Actually, previous meta-analysis also support this idea (Baltes et al., 2002; Swaab et al., 2006). Cooperation, when it happens in a negotiation, very probably generates concessions to the counterpart. As a consequence, buyers are more likely to concede when they communicate through face-to-face channel and thus their corresponding economic outcomes are expected to decrease.
Hypothesis 6: When negotiators apply face-to-face as communication channel, the relationship between role effects and economic outcomes are attenuated such that buyers’ superiority in economic outcomes is reduced.
Negotiation representatives
Negotiation representatives is the last situation-based moderator. When concerned with negotiation representatives, three situations can be distinguished as follow: first, one negotiates for him/herself; second, one negotiates in the function as employee of a company; third, one negotiates as representative for a constituency. It is clear that, under the first condition, the negotiator serves his/her own interests, while under the third condition, the negotiator serves
11 | Theoretical framework
others’ interests (i.e., the interests are entirely owned by the constituency). The second condition is somehow ambiguous because the negotiator mainly serves the company’s interests, meanwhile, he/she also serves his/her own interests because the negotiated profits at the company level influence the negotiator’s own interests in some way. For example, if a salesman at a motor sales company performs outstandingly in a negotiation (e.g., sells more cars than expected), he/she is very possible to get promotion or receive higher bonuses.
In terms of interesting servicing, the above three situations can be further divided into two types: one is individual negotiations (i.e., negotiators are self-representative and serve their own interests), and the other is representative negotiation (i.e., negotiators are other-representative and serve just/mainly others’ interests; e.g., Druckman, 1994). In other-representative negotiations, a negotiator’s company or constituency can have a significant impact on his or her bargaining motivation and behavior. Negotiators who negotiate on behalf of others normally have a desire to impress their bosses/constituents positively (Adelberg &Batson, 1978; Gruder & Rosen, 1971; Wall, 1975, 1991), therefore, they typically tend to behave less cooperatively and make fewer concessions than self-represented negotiators do (Benton & Druckman, 1974; Druckman et al., 1972; Van Kleef et al., 2007). Furthermore, some other studies suggest that other-represented negotiators are more concerned with the profits of their group rather than those of their opponent (Reinders Folmer et al., 2012). With the addition of this concern, when negotiators represent others, their possibility to make any concession is largely decreased.
Synthesize what has been discussed above, the behavior of making as less concessions as possible is more congruent with the buyer role, and thus when buyers represent others, they are even more cautious to make any concession. As a consequence, buyers should prevail even more in terms of economic outcomes. When it comes to sellers, they are basically very eager to reach agreements, and also consider concession making as a regular applied effective method to reach their goals of maximizing outcomes. Under an other-representative situation, sellers’ strong desire to secure and maximize the profits of their company/consistency decrease the possibility of concession making to some extent. Therefore, buyers’ superiority in economic outcomes is weakened.
Hypothesis 7a: When buyers represent others instead of themselves, the relationship between role effects and economic outcomes are reinforced such that buyers should gain even more profits in terms of economic outcomes.
Hypothesis 7b: When sellers represent others instead of themselves, the relationship between role effects and economic outcomes are attenuated such that buyers’ superiority in economic outcomes is weakened.
13 | Method
3. Method
Location of sample studies
Studies potentially related to implicit role effects on economic outcomes (individual gain) published until April, 2014 were searched to locate samples. Several combinations of terms related to negotiation (negotiation, bargaining, conflict, mediation, arbitration) and terms potentially related to role effects (e.g., role effects, buyer-seller, business, buy, sell, economic outcomes, individual profits) were used as keywords in order to find a pool of potential studies. The search strategy was manifold: First, computer databases (e.g., Academic Search Premier, Business Source Premier, PsycLit, PsycInfo, and Educational Resources Information Center) were searched by using the above-mentioned keywords. Second, articles from 16 mainstream business journals (e.g., Journal of Management) and applied psychology journals (e.g., Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes) were searched manually if either the words “negotiation”, “bargaining” were in the title, abstract, or keywords. Third, the reference lists of all studies retrieved were searched for relevant research.
Criteria for inclusion in the meta-analysis
Empirical studies included in the meta-analysis met the following criteria: (a) investigated in two-party negotiations (i.e., without the participation of any third party), (b) two parties of the negotiation had a potential buyer-seller relationship, (c) focused on behavioral negotiation experiments (i.e., not measurements that asked negotiators to indicate outcomes or to self-report questionnaires), (d) self-reported relevant moderator information as well as either parties’ economic outcomes that can be used to calculate effect sizes.
The current meta-analysis was interested in studies of dyadic negotiations and thus did not include studies with three or more bargaining parties (e.g., Bazerman et al., 1992). In order to research implicit role effects in dyadic negotiations, a buyer-seller relationship must exist in focal studies. Studies that clearly assigned participants either to play the role of buyer or seller were definitely included, such as negotiations on the purchase of a car (e.g., Giacomantonio et al., 2010). Other negotiations that had implicit role assignment based on situation or task descriptions, like company A hire company B to complete a task (e.g., Moran & Ritov, 2007), were considered as well. However, negotiations related to political conflicts, labor discussions
or employment bargaining were excluded since no buyer-seller relationship existed in those studies.
Only behavioral negotiation experiments were focused in this meta-analysis. A number of self-report or perceptual measures were excluded because self-reported or perceptual behaviors have not always been found to be consistent with objective indices of the same behaviors (Neu & Graham, 1994; Watson, 1994). As a consequence, the meta-analysis did not consider studies that only employed measures that asked participants to indicate, for example, how satisfied they felt they were during negotiations (e.g., Oza et al., 2010). Similarly, studies that measured buyers’ or sellers’ economic outcomes by self-report questionnaires were also excluded (e.g., Keysar et al., 1995). In addition, studies that did not reflect any communication in any way between two parties during the administration of the experiment were excluded as well.
Finally, a large amount of studies were excluded because they did not report the appropriate quantitative data to enable the calculation of effect sizes (e.g., Bazerman et al., 1985). In this study, individual gains of buyers or sellers were required for further calculation. Besides, studies must provide information related to (a) the integrative potential of the negotiated task, (b) extra incentives to negotiation performance, (c) negotiators’ previous negotiation experiences, (d) the existence of deadline, (e) the communication channel applied, and (f) the representative of negotiators, which later on will be analyzed as moderators.
At first, the search resulted in over 400 potential articles, however, the majority of the potential studies located did not fit the criteria. After a careful review by the author, the search finally yield 23 studies that met the criteria for inclusion in the meta-analysis.
Coding of variables
The following characteristics were coded for every effect size:
Whether there existed any integrative potential in the negotiation (0 = no integrative potential existed, k = 62, n = 2341; 1 = some integrative potentials existed, k = 35, n = 1361)
Extra incentives for good performance (0 = negotiators’ were not provided with extra incentives for their good performances, k = 52, n = 2055; 1= negotiators were provided with extra incentives for their good performances, k = 45, n = 1647)
15 | Method The existence of negotiators’ previous negotiation experience (0 = no, k = 45, n = 1435;
1 = yes, k = 52, n = 2267)
The emphasizing of the deadline to the negotiation (0 = no, k = 24, n = 662; 1 = yes, k = 73, n = 3040)
The application of face-to-face as the communication channel (0 = no, k = 37, n = 1519; 1 = yes, k = 60, n = 2183)
Buyers were represented by other people rather than themselves (0 = no, k = 41, n = 1838; 1 = yes, k = 56, n = 1864)
Sellers were represented by other people rather than themselves (0 = no, k = 63, n = 2004; 1 = yes, k = 34, n = 1698)
All studies were coded by the author for three rounds to reduce discrepancies. Multilevel modeling for meta-analysis
Meta-analysis is used to compute an overall effect size which integrates the results of manifold primary studies on one specific topic (e.g., Stuhlmacher et al., 1998; Van Den Noortgate & Onghena, 2003). The main advantages of conducting a meta-analysis are a decrease of ambiguity in the estimates of interest and the possibility to systematically investigate the relationships between moderators and the effect sizes. In the current study, some effect sizes are derived from one same study, and therefore their experimental settings can be similar or even the same, potentially yielding dependencies among effect sizes from a single study. Under this circumstance, a mixed-effects multilevel model is required to conduct the meta-analysis. In the following, the employed meta-analytic technique will be presented.
At Level 1, the individual effect sizes (m=1, …, M in study s = 1, …, S) are the sum of their respective true effect sizes and sampling errors , leading to the following measurement model:
. (1)
the sampling error is assumed to be normally distributed ( ~ N (0, )). Its variance, which varies across the observed measurements, is given by primary studies.
Because in the current meta-analysis, 97 effect sizes are nested within 23 studies, both the level at the individual effect size and the level at the individual study should be covered. At
Level 2, where the level of the individual effect size is considered, moderators are illustrated, especially about how they regress the true effect sizes:
∑ , , (2)
here, the is the studies’ intercept, , is the effect size characteristic, or moderator variable, k = 1, …, K , and depicts the respective coefficient. The random error, represented by , is supposed to be normally distributed as ~ N (0, ). reflects the variability in the true effect sizes.
Finally, at Level 3, the study-specific intercept is decomposed into moderators at the study level and the random error :
∑ , (3)
Where is the Level 3 intercept, represents the moderator variable 1, …, L, and is the corresponding coefficient. The error term is assumed to be normally distributed as ~ N (0, ). is the variance of the true effect sizes between studies.
Combining the models at Level 1, Level 2 and Level 3 yields the general hierarchical model for the current meta-analysis:
∑ , ∑ . (4)
It follows that an effect size can be modeled as a linear function of an overall effect size and a set of moderator variables (Van Den Noortgate & Onghena, 2003). When no moderators are included in the model, the model is an unconditional model (random-effect model); while when several moderators are included in the model, it is termed a conditional model (mixed-effect model) (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). In the following, the difference in deviances will be used to examine the relative fitness of the nested structure of the unconditional model (without any moderators) and the conditional model (including moderators).
Computation of effect sizes
For each effect size, the standard mean difference - Cohen’s d - is first computed between the economic negotiation outcome of buyer and that of seller, which later on is converted into Hedges’g after correcting bias in the estimation of d in small samples. When
17 | Method
)) , where the df are the degrees of freedom used to estimate , which is the within-group standard deviation pooled across the within-groups. The variance of a single effect size is
1 , where and are the size of the two groups under
investigation and d is the estimate of Cohen’s d. For every effect size, was computed accordingly.
4. Results
Overall gender difference in economic outcomes
Buyers are expected to achieve higher economic outcomes when compared to sellers in negotiations (Hypothesis 1). The final dataset of economic outcomes concerning individual gains consisted of 97 effect sizes, among which 62 (63.92%) were positive and 35 (36.08%) were negative or equal to zero. These results indicate initial support for Hypothesis 1, which predicts that buyers achieve higher economic outcomes than sellers.
To test Hypothesis 1 precisely, the unconditional three-level model which does not contain any moderators was estimated. The dependent variable was the observed value of Hedges’g. A positive sign of g indicates a better performance of buyers. For all the following analysis, a full maximum likelihood estimator was used with robust standard errors. In the unconditional model, the intercept was estimated at Hedges’g = 0.107, with a standard error of 0.024 (p < 0.01) (cf. Table 1), which indicates higher economic outcomes for buyers as compared to sellers. The 95% confidence interval for this effect ranged from 0.061 to 0.154, according to Cohen (2013), this reflects a small effect size.
Assessments of heterogeneity of effect sizes
The variance component at the effect size level in the unconditional model was estimated at 0.013 and τ was estimated at 0.114, (73) = 603.118, p < 0.01 (cf. Table 1), while the variance component at the study level was estimated at 0.001, and δ was estimated at 0.031, (23) = 497.050, p < 0.01, which indicate certain variability of true effect sizes. The
I2 index, which reflects the magnitude of heterogeneity among studies, was also calculated in the current study. In the present meta-analysis, I2 was estimated at 91.297%, indicating a relatively large amount of heterogeneity (Huedo- Medina et al., 2006). Therefore, the variability among effect sizes was much larger than what has been expected from variances both within study and between studies (Lipsey & Wilson, 2000). These results suggest that adding moderators to the model should thus reduce heterogeneity among the effect sizes. Moderator analyses
Before analyzing the predicted moderator effects in the conditional model, potential multicollinearity among moderator variables were tested. A principal component analysis for
19 | Results
categorical variables was applied since all moderators were dichotomous (e.g., Bijmolt et al., 2005). As revealed by Table 2, none of the correlations exceeded ab absolute value of .5, which suggests that multicollinearity does not seem to represent a problem in the current meta-analysis.
To test the moderator effects outlined in Hypotheses 2 to 7, the full conditional three-level model with the hypothesized task-based (integrative potential and extra incentives), person-based (negotiation experience), and situation-person-based (impending deadline, face-to-face communication, and negotiation representatives) moderators specified at Level 2 was estimated. Table 3 depicts the results of the conditional model by reporting the parameter estimates, standard errors, the 95% confidence interval, t values, and p values.
Integrative potential
Consistent with Hypothesis 2, the results indicate a medium moderator effect of integrative potential on economic outcomes (coefficient = -0.307, p < 0.01). In negotiations where integrative potential exists, the advantage of buyers’ economic outcomes compared to sellers’ is even more pronounced than in negotiations without integrative potential (i.e., purely distributive negotiations).
Extra incentives
The current moderator analysis did not reveal a moderator effect of the extra incentives as the coefficient was estimated at 0.160, p < 0.01. When extra incentives presented in negotiation, buyers’ advantage in gaining more economic outcomes is not influenced.
Negotiation experience
In line with Hypothesis 4, the moderator analysis related to negotiation experience revealed a decrease of role effects in economic outcomes when negotiators had previous negotiation experience. As depicted in Table 3, the coefficient was estimated at -0.215, p < 0.01.
Impending deadline
The moderator analysis related to impending deadline did not reveal a moderator effect on the relationship between role effects and economic outcomes. As depicted in Table 3, the coefficient was estimated at 0.334, p < 0.01.
Consistent with Hypothesis 6, face-to-face communication channel moderated the overall role effects in economic outcomes. The role effects were slighted reduced when negotiators communicated via face-to-face channel (coefficient = -0.032, p = 0.224).
Negotiation representatives
When negotiators, either buyers or sellers, represented others, the economic negotiation outcomes were expected to change somehow. Consistent with Hypothesis 7a, when buyers represented others other than themselves, their relative economic outcomes increased even more largely (coefficient = 0.021, p = 0.482). However, the attenuate moderating influence on role effects in economic outcomes does not occur when sellers represent others, which rejects Hypothesis 7b (coefficient = 0.582, p < 0.01).
Overall conditional model
Last but not least, the comparison between the fit of the unconditional model (without any moderator) and the fit of the conditional model (including the moderators) was conducted by examining the difference in deviances of the two nested models. The difference is chi-square distributed with the difference in the number of estimated parameters as degrees of freedom. The findings suggest that the conditional model with moderators fits the data significantly better than the conditional model, (4) = 36.179, p < 0.01. In other words, with the help of moderators, the conditional model explained the data better than the unconditional mode. The including of moderators also helped to decrease the variance component , from 0.013 in the unconditional model to 0.009 in the conditional model. The value for I2 dropped from 91.297% to 80.942% as well.
21 | Discussion
5. Discussion
The current meta-analysis investigated role effects in economic negotiation outcomes. First of all, the results revealed that buyers achieved better economic outcomes in two-party negotiations than sellers. The overall role effect was estimated at Hedges’g = 0.107, indicating a small-sized effect according to the guidelines proposed by Cohen, 2013. In spite of this, the results still present a certain role effects in economic negotiation outcomes. Consistent with the rationale of how negotiators select their strategies basing on respective role-related information (Neale et al., 1987; Schel et al., 2006), the results confirm that vigilant-strategy-preferred buyers are less risk-seeking than eager-strategy-preferred sellers. In addition, the classical regulatory fit theory was also affirmed by analyzing the results. When regulatory fit happens to both roles, which is the regular situation, role effects are intensified in terms of buyers’ economic outcomes are in a much more advanced position compared to those of sellers’.
Importantly, ultimate evidence suggests that the overall findings is variable when the task negotiated (Bazerman & Neale, 1983; Neale & Bazerman 1991), the person involved (Thompson, 1990) or the situation depended on (Swaab et al., 2009; Balters et al., 2002) have any change. The current research investigated task-based, person-based, and situation-based moderators, providing meta-analytic evidence of moderation of role effects in economic outcomes.
The first task-based moderator examined was integrative potential — if the negotiated task has any integrative potential achieve any joint gain. The role effects in economic outcomes were significantly attenuated when there existed any integrative potential in negotiations. In negotiations, any integrative potential would stimulate cooperation for joint gains, which in turn, generates negotiators to make compromise to the opponents (De Dreu et al., 2006; Thompson, 1991). Theories related to negotiation strategy preference and regulatory role fit significantly reflect that sellers are more congruent with concession-making behavior, and thus the integrative potential of a negotiation has more stimulation on buyers in terms of generating them to compromise more to sellers as compared to when the negotiation is purely distributive. The only discussed person-based moderator in the current work was negotiators’ previous negotiation experiences. Consistent with predictions and previous research (Thompson, 1990),
the results of the conditional three-level model revealed that the role effects were significantly reduced when negotiators had even a single prior negotiation experience. To note, the current research only examined the moderation of the existence of previous negotiation experience, but not the level of gained experience. In other words, role effects in economic outcomes do not stain static, but diminish when negotiators just have a single previous negotiation experience. One explanation is that in the coding system, subjects’ experience level were coded basing on their social status — bachelor/master students, MBA students, specialists/managers, individuals with other social status. As discussed before in Part 3 Method, subjects with the status of bachelor/master students and other individuals were coded as novices without any business negotiation experience, while subjects with the status of MBA students and specialists/managers were coded as experienced negotiators. From the coding details, the level of negotiators’ previous experiences were not able to be obviously observed. Although it is reasonable to assert that specialists had more experience than novices, a more precise coding of novices (e.g., bachelor/master students) is to code them as negotiators without any experience. The reason is that experience levels of novices and specialists are two extremes. In short, the current work did not examine the influence of negotiation experience on role effects in economic outcomes when negotiators’ experiences increase or decrease.
Another proved moderator is the situation-based face-to-face communication channel. As predicted, the role effects in economic outcomes were reduced when negotiators applied face-to-face as their communication channel. However, the reduction was not very significant as the estimated coefficient (-0.032) revealed a small sized-effect. Compared to all the other communication channels, face-to-face is the one that provides most communication cues, which increase feelings of social presence and consequently cooperation (Swaab & Galinsky, 2007). However, communication cues are on the one hand, quite dummy and hard to measure whether they are more or less. On the other hand, the delivery of communication cues as signals, from the signaling theory (Connelly et al., 2011), is not the same thing as the receipt of such cues. The fact that face-to-face channel send out more communication cues than other communication channels does not equal to the consequence that negotiators do receive more information and implications from their opponents by applying face-to-face as their
23 | Discussion
communication channel. As a consequence, face-to-face channel plays as a reductive moderator to the relationship between role effects and economic outcomes, but the effect is small-sized.
A second situation-based moderator is the other representation of buyers. According to the results, when buyers represented others instead of themselves, role effects in economic outcomes were strengthened since buyers gained much more profits compared to sellers. This is in accordance with previous research which suggest that other-representative negotiators tend to behave less cooperatively, make fewer concessions and concern less about opponents (Benton & Druckman, 1974; Druckman et al., 1972; Van Kleef et al., 2007; Reinders Folmer et al., 2012). However, when sellers represented others instead of themselves, the relationship between role effects and economic outcomes was not weakened as predicted. On the contrary, the results suggest that role effects in economic outcomes were strengthened in the way that buyers achieved even more economic profits compared to sellers. No moderator effect of the other representation of sellers was found. One explanation is that the effect of sellers’ promotional role characteristic and eager strategy preference to promote more concession making behavior is much larger than the influence of sellers’ other-representative situation to irritate less concessions. In this case, it is reasonable that sellers were still oriented to make more agreements via conceding to the counterpart, resulting in a weak position in economic outcomes compared to buyers.
The second moderator that has not been proofed in the current work is one task-based moderator, named extra incentives. The data did not show that role effects are moderated by extra incentives. One possible explanation that can support the logic of the finding is the source of primary studies: all derived from laboratorial research. In the current meta-analysis, all primary research collected were laboratory studies, reflecting that all negotiations were simulated. Normally, negotiators had an opportunity to earn around $25 based on their decisions and the decisions of others in the simulated negotiation experiment, including a participation base around $8 (e.g., Brooks & Schweitzer, 2011; Srivastave, 2000). However, rewards for good performance in simulated negotiations are not the same thing compared to those in real negotiations, and thus may not have the expected influence which encourages
negotiators to behave seriously and reach as much agreements as possible. Unfortunately, there is no existing theory to support the above suspect, which may need the effort of future research. One last moderator that rejects the original hypothesis is impending deadline. The results suggested that there was no moderator effect of impending deadline on the relationship between role effects and economic outcomes. This finding is opposite to previous research which suggest that when deadline comes closer, more concession behaviors are inspired. No potential explanation has been found yet. The examination of this moderator still needs a further investigation.
The interesting thing is, in this study, most examinations of moderators were based on the degree of negotiators’ concession-making behaviors to their opponents, which would later on result in less economic gains to the concessive party.
Theoretical implications
The results of this study bring attention to the influence of role effects in economic negotiation outcomes. Although the moderating effect of the existence of negotiation experience was examined, whether the relationship between role effects and economic negotiation outcomes will be somehow altered when negotiators’ experiences increase or decrease has not been revealed. From a longitudinal perspective, it is meaningful and necessary to investigate the moderating effect of the degree of negotiation experience. In other words, whether role effects will change when negotiation experience increases or decreases should also be extended to confirm the moderating effect of negotiation experience. Similarly, the moderating effect of impending deadline was analyzed basing on the pressure derived from the presence of deadline, but not the pressure derived from the closeness of deadline. Thus the current findings call for the examination of moderators such as the closeness of deadline and the degree of negotiation experience.
Practical implications
The present meta-analysis has various practical implications. At first, buyers were found to achieve better economic outcomes as compared to sellers. Given the truth that sellers cannot avoid confronting buyers in negotiations, role effects can act as prompting for both
25 | Discussion
buyers and sellers: buyers should endeavor to maximize economic outcomes while sellers need to try their best to avoid any economic lose.
For sellers, several factors has been revealed to help reduce their disadvantages in economic gains. One best solution is to discover and create the possibility of gaining joint gains. As revealed by the results, achieving joint gains encourages more concession-making behaviors of buyers and thus helps to attenuate role effects. In addition, sellers’ disadvantages can be diminished by employing experienced negotiators to negotiate with opponents. The more experienced negotiators are, the better performances they may behave (Thomson, 1990). One effective method to increase negotiators’ experiences is to open negotiation training courses and programs for them, which teach trainees how to avoid behavioral biases and maximize negotiation outcomes of all negotiation situations (Lewicki, 1997). After training, negotiators should gain “the ability to apply a concept, schema or skill learned in one situation to a relevant but different problem” (Greene & Burleson, 2003, p.825). When this happens, negotiators’ acquire available skills and experiences, which help the improvement of negotiation performance. As a consequence, sellers should pay more attention to their experience gaining. Other than the above mentioned two settlements, one more solution that helps sellers to weaken their weakness in achieving economic profits is to apply face-to-face communication channel.
After discussing implications of three moderators that attenuate role effects in economic outcomes, the only approach that may help buyers to reinforce their advantages is to employ others represent buyers’ interests. Although role effects ensure better economic outcomes for buyers, when they are other-represented, their profits are further solidified.
Limitations and directions form future research
The current meta-analysis was limited in several ways. First, the dataset used in this study was derived only from 23 primary studies, which is fairly small compared to other meta-analyses. This limitation is mainly due to the restricted amount of relevant studies. In addition, no unpublished study was included in the current work, which further led to an incomprehensive meta-analysis. One valuable direction for future research is to include more studies, either published or unpublished, in order to generate a much more general result.
The second limitation is that just one coder coded all primary studies. In most meta-analyses, two or more coders coded the primary studies as a first round of coding, afterwards, the coding scheme was revised and all studies were coded a second time. After two rounds of coding, there might still exist some discrepancies, which later on resolved by discussions between the coders. By doing so, the ambiguity of the coding of all moderators was diminished to a great extent. However, just the author oneself coded all studies for the current meta-analysis because it should be a single work finished by one person. Fortunately, during the coding process, one supervisor, who is an expert in this field, helped to solve many discrepancies, which promoted a relative impartial coding consequence.
The above two limitations are about the involved primary studies and the coding scheme, in the following, several other restrictions will also be discussed. The current meta-analysis is limited in several other ways because the existing primary studies do not allow for the investigation of further theoretically relevant moderators. An example is power difference between two parties. Previous research revealed that power differences greatly affect negotiation outcomes (Koning et al., 2011). Suleiman demonstrated in 1996 that negotiators reach higher outcomes when their opponent had little control over their outcomes. Furthermore, other research on the relationship between power difference and economic negotiation outcomes has yield similar findings: negotiators in weak power positions tend to have lower aspirations, demand less, make more concessions, and consequently receive smaller outcomes than those with strong power positions (De Dreu, 1995; Giebels et al., 1998, 2000; Dwyer, 1984; Pinkley et al., 1994). As a consequence, when buyers are in strong power positions, their advantages in negotiation outcomes are expected to magnify; however, when sellers have relative strong power, their disadvantages in negotiation outcomes are supposed to diminish. However, in the 23 primary studies used for this meta-analysis, only 2 provided information that related power difference. Therefore, future research can investigate the power difference between buyers and sellers as a moderator on role effects in economic outcomes.
In addition, negotiators’ participation base might be another interesting moderator. In laboratory studies, negotiators were normally rewarded about $10 or course credits for their participations, regardless of their performance. The main purpose of those rewards is to
27 | Discussion
encourage negotiators to take the negotiation seriously and to make some contributions to it. As a consequence, the absence of participation base is supposed to affect the relationship between role effects and economic outcomes. However, no existing support has been found to provide an evidence for the very influence. Future studies are thus needed a comprehensively theoretical background to continue further research on the moderating effect of participation base.
Conclusion
To summarize, the results revealed that buyers achieved better economic outcomes as compared to sellers in two-party negotiations. However, the main effect was quite small and future research is needed to confirm and extend this conclusion. Moreover, the presence of integrative potential in negotiation tasks, the existence of negotiators’ previous negotiation experience and the application of face-to-face as communication channel were moderators which reduce buyers’ success in achieving more economic outcomes. The only moderator revealed in the current work that strengthen buyers’ advantages in gaining better economic outcomes was that buyers were on behalf of others.
As discussed above, some restrictions, for instance, limited amount of primary studies and irregular coding plan, exist in the current work, which require further study to reach a more perfectly understanding about role effects in negotiations.
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