The role of the Benelux cooperation in European integration

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The role of the Benelux cooperation

in European integration

From an inspiring testing ground

to a tool for executing integration?

MA Thesis in European Studies

Graduate School for Humanities

Universiteit van Amsterdam

Author: R.J.H. Flipse

Student number: 10340335

Main supervisor: Dr. R.J. de Bruin

Second supervisor: Dr. S. Rajagopalan

December 2017

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Introduction

Belgium, The Netherlands and Luxembourg have a long history of cooperation. During the early 20th_{century several attempts were made to bring these countries closer together,}

which at first resulted in an economic union between Belgium and Luxembourg. During World War II the three countries agreed to start cooperating with each other more closely by a customs agreement. After the war this cooperation continued and expanded as the Benelux, and developed over the following decade into a real community. In 1958 the Benelux Treaty was signed. This created the Benelux Economic Union, and a leap forward was made in economic integration. Since the Benelux was ahead of other methods of integration it was seen as a pioneer. During this decade, and with great support for the aims of integration, the European project also began. The 1957 Treaty of Rome created the European Economic Community, and the idea of working towards an integrated union of European countries was also envisaged. The pioneering Benelux Treaty could be seen as a testing ground for European integration as well as a source of inspiration for it.

However, although the economic integration of the Benelux continued over the following decades, along with the development of Benelux institutions, there was no high level of political integration. The Benelux remained an inter-governmental union that focused on connecting the economies of the Benelux countries. The European project, however, continued with the establishment of the common market, the European Union and the monetary union. Because of this deep economic integration at the European level, much of the function of the Benelux seemed to be replaced by it. As its formerly pioneering and inspiring role was called into question, a debate emerged centred on the relevance of the Benelux. In 2008 a new Benelux Treaty was signed, in which its competences were expanded to areas such as sustainability and legal affairs.1_{As this would take the Benelux cooperation}

project beyond any solely economic union, the name was changed to the Benelux Union. Nevertheless this change did not result in an end to the debate, as the relevance of the Benelux remained an unresolved issue. A motion was even presented to abolish the Benelux Union. Although this did not result in any real abolition, it serves to symbolize how the Benelux struggles with its role and how its relevance is being questioned.

1_{Benelux, ‘Nieuw Benelux-Verdrag’}_{http://www.benelux.int/nl/benelux-unie/nieuw-benelux-verdrag}_{, accessed}

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From this debate on the relevance of the Benelux Union, it would be interesting to discover whether the role has indeed changed over the years. Originally the Benelux was seen as a way of inspiring European integration through pioneering and by being ahead of the European project in integration. However, currently many of the Benelux policies, for

instance those on economic topics, seem to be based on, or heavily influenced by, European policy. This could therefore indicate that the Benelux now has a role in actually executing European integration rather than inspiring it.

In this study the role of the Benelux will be further examined by looking at it both historically and through the present perspective. To do so historical and contemporary documents will be used to analyse its functioning and to gain insight into the interaction between both the Benelux and the European projects during the past and the present. When these roles become evident a comparison will be made in order to see whether a change in functioning has occurred and how this can be explained. The insights that follow from this can be useful for several reasons. First, a valuable contribution to the debate on the relevance of the Benelux will have been made. To this day little research has been done on the Benelux within such a timeframe, and the research that does exist focuses more on its history, or examines specific contemporary issues. Therefore the multidisciplinary approach of this thesis that connects political theory, history and policy analysis could shed new light on the Benelux cooperation and give greater insight into its role in its interaction with the EU. Furthermore, this thesis could help in the debate on the future of both the Benelux and the EU. As the EU engages in an ongoing discussion on the future of the European Union, the Benelux becomes more topical. A Europe integrating at different speeds, or a Europe of regions, means that the Benelux, as an integrated bloc, could attract more interest. This study on the role and functioning of the Benelux could help us gain greater understanding of how the Benelux currently acts and how it ended up with such a role. Furthermore, it can also help us to gain insights into what can be expected from the relationship between the Benelux and the EU, and to discover whether more ambitious goals can be justified. The thesis is structured as follows. First, a theoretical framework for the research will be given. For this the Benelux will be explored as an example of sub-regional cooperation. This phenomenon will be examined by looking at the various methods of such cooperation and the functions that it can have. This can help to understand the meaning of the Benelux role

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and why it is important for its relevance. Next, the debate on the Benelux will be further explored to show more of the research and the scientific basis that the thesis is built on. Together this forms a good framework for the central part of the study.

In the second chapter the historical Benelux will be examined by considering its major historical cruxes. For this, World War II will be taken as a starting point. Thereafter the development of the Benelux will be explored until the establishment of the Benelux Economic Union in the early 1960s. During this period the role of the Benelux will be

examined by focusing on the 1944 customs agreement and the 1955 Benelux memorandum, two major pioneering, and inspiring, events. These have been also been referred to by the economist Max Weisglas. Third, the Schengen Agreement, a significant event during the 1980s, often mentioned by the Benelux itself, will also be examined. These three points will create a good overview of the functioning of the Benelux and will give an insight into its historical role, thus providing the first part of the comparison.

The third chapter will focus on the contemporary Benelux after the new Benelux Treaty entered into force in 2012. This Treaty brought a new structure to the Benelux with annual plans and reports. By analysing these documents over recent years the Benelux strategies will become visible, thus leading to insight into its contemporary role. When this role has become clear a comparison can be made with its historical role from the previous chapter. This will then lead to the conclusion that the mixed Benelux may have lost its dominant pioneering role, but still has potential, especially when this loss of role becomes fully accepted.

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1. Theoretical framework

In order to explore the role of the Benelux in its interaction with European integration and to discover whether this role has changed, it is necessary to build a research framework. This will not only provide a good starting point, but also an overview of research so far

undertaken in this area. A good approach for this is to start with a broad focus on what the Benelux is: a form of regional cooperation in Europe. By exploring examples of sub-regional cooperation and their functioning in general, some idea of the value of such cooperation can be gained. The model can then be applied to the Benelux in order to see how it works within this wider context. The contemporary debate on the relevance of the Benelux, which will be discussed later, suggests that either its original purpose or meaning is no longer fully sufficient, or that its function could and perhaps should now change. This brings us to the final part of the theoretical framework and provides the starting-point for the main research of the study.

The Benelux as sub-regional cooperation

In contrast to the little research that has been done on the Benelux itself, a range of literature can be found on general sub-regional cooperation in Europe. Neighbouring countries working together is quite a common phenomenon within the EU. According to political scientist Martin Dangerfield, sub-regional cooperation, which is defined as a process of economic and political interaction among a group of neighbouring states, is initiated because of advantages that result from working together. For instance, sub-regional

cooperation can stimulate economic development, but can also enhance security or border management. From the various examples of cooperation four categories can be

distinguished: pioneer, substitute, complement/pre-accession instrument and involuntary

alternative/substitute. Pioneer means a group of countries that are gaining ground on a

larger regional cooperation project and can influence the integration of the latter.

Substitute, the second category, means that for various reasons cooperation is created as an

alternative to other integration projects. The third is complement/pre-accession instrument, in which sub-regional cooperation is founded in order to work together towards the

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alternative/substitute means a group that has been brought together because the relevant

countries are unable, albeit temporarily, to join the larger integration project.2

When these categories described by Dangerfield are applied to the Benelux, it becomes clear that it is part of the pioneer group. As we have seen, this group is characterized by a higher level of integration than larger projects and tends to influence the latter. When looking at the early Benelux it can indeed be seen that it achieved deeper economic integration than the European Community in the 1950s and 1960s, while it was also considered a testing ground. Thus it was intended to inspire European integration. The position of the Benelux in the pioneer group therefore becomes clear not only from its age, but also from its

relationship with the wider European project.

When neighbouring countries engage in sub-regional cooperation, various rationales can be considered, mainly those that seem quite obvious. As neighbours, the countries may share a geographical region, culture and history. It would therefore be logical and easy to become partners economically and politically. However, according to economist András Inotai, these incentives do not always result in cooperation or support. In his research he claims that a common geographical region does not necessarily make countries natural economic partners.3_{There are several examples in the world in which neighbouring countries do not}

focus on each other for trade. There are also neighbouring countries that have not

cooperated but that have only recently decided to commence cooperation. For Inotai this shows that geographical proximity does not automatically result in a natural partnership. Furthermore, Inotai agrees that a shared history can support cooperation, but at the same time it may also hamper the process. Such a shared element can make it easier to cooperate, but there may be instead a history of suffering and conflict. In case of the latter it can hinder cooperation instead of stimulating it. Nevertheless, such complex circumstances of history and culture can still result in countries working together. Inotai gives the Benelux as an example. Although it can fairly be claimed that the Benelux has similarities in history and culture, Inotai emphasizes the differences in religion and language. He calls it a “difficult

2_{M. Dangerfield, ‘The Viségrad Group in the Expanded European Union: From Preaccession to Postaccession}

Cooperation’, East European Politics & Societies, no. 3 (2008), pp. 632-634.

3_{A. Inotai, ‘Correlations between European Integration and Sub-Regional Cooperation: Theoretical Background,}

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heritage”. If the shared history and culture aspect were a major influence, then this could make cooperation complex. Nevertheless there has been Benelux cooperation for a long time.4_{This is one of the examples that brings Inotai to his first conclusion on sub-regional}

cooperation: the true rationale of strengthening and enhancing cooperation can often be found in common economic and political priorities. When neighbouring countries share such priorities for dealing with global or regional challenges, it is likely that they will cooperate in order to achieve better results in this. If the opposite situation occurs, in which countries develop different political strategies, then it can take a long time for cooperation to get started and to succeed, even when those countries have many other things in common.5

The common political and economic priorities can also be found in the rationale of the Benelux countries to engage in sub-regional cooperation, as shown by Inotai. He states that openness and strong economic development were the main factors that stimulated these countries to integrate, long before the European Community was created.6_{The creation of}

several international bodies after World War II stimulated the Benelux to work even closer together by taking a common position in such international organisations. This can even be seen today in the joint memoranda on various international topics that, for instance, are sent to conferences.7_{Together, this shows how common interests from similar political and}

economic strategies brought the countries together to cooperate. The Benelux compared to the Visegrad Group

In order to gain greater insight into sub-regional cooperation in Europe, it can be useful to look at other forms of such cooperation. An interesting one in this regard is the Visegrad Group. As Dangerfield shows, this cooperation initiative between Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia came into existence in the 1990s. The Visegrad Group was created in order to work together to join the European project. Following the fall of communism these countries wished for rapprochement with the European Community, and later the European Union. By cooperation and a synchronisation of politics it became easier to work towards better relationships, and towards membership of the EU and NATO. To do this the countries

Experience and Policy Impacts’, Russian & East European Finance and Trade, no. 6 (1998), pp. 18-19.

5_{Ibidem, pp. 19-20.} 6_{Ibidem, pp. 20-21.} 7_{Ibidem, p. 26.}

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followed a path that was the opposite of the pioneering Benelux: they focused on economic, political and security integration within European structures. Until these countries became members of the EU in 2004, the Visegrad Group worked closely together to reach these goals. After the accession the Visegrad Group shifted its focus more towards the Central European region itself. As the goals of NATO and the EU were achieved, the countries have since been trying to stimulate intra-Visegrad cooperation.8

When considering the Visegrad Group and comparing it with the Benelux several differences can be seen. A major difference is found in the institutional structures. Although both the Benelux and Visegrad are examples of intergovernmental sub-regional cooperation in Europe, the Benelux is the only one that has fully institutionalized its cooperation. The Visegrad Group does not have any genuine institutions or institutional framework; the cooperation is solely based on intergovernmental meetings with a rotating presidency. According to Inotai this can be explained by, on the one hand, the fear of creating a

framework that would resemble the former communist structure, while on the other hand institutionalisation could delay integration into Western Europe.9_{Therefore the functioning}

methods of the Visegrad Group and the Benelux are entirely different.

In addition, another difference can be found when both groups are placed in the categories proposed by Dangerfield. As previously mentioned, the Benelux belongs to the pioneer category. The Visegrad Group easily slots into the category of complement/pre-accession

instrument, as its main goal was to prepare the members of the group for EU membership.

However, when examining the goal to stimulate intra-Visegrad cooperation, which had a larger focus after the EU accession goals were achieved, that particular category no longer seems fully adequate. Nevertheless, the other categories can be excluded because their characteristics are not consistent with those of the Visegrad Group. Hence, as outlined by Dangerfield, the Visegrad Group can indeed be placed in the complement/pre-accession

8_{M. Dangerfield, ‘The Contribution of the Visegrad Group to the European Union’s ‘Eastern’ Policy: Rhetoric or}

Reality?’, Europe-Asia Studies, no. 10 (2009), pp. 1737-1738.

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group, but with some differences to the regular groups of sub-regional cooperation that also occupy that category.10

It would be easy to say that these differences in character indicate a different rationale for the Benelux and the Visegrad Group engaging in cooperation. While the Benelux began focusing on economic topics, the Visegrad Group aimed at moving towards Western Europe. Yet when Inotai’s conclusion is applied, in which similarities in political and economic

priorities are the main reason to cooperate, this can be seen in both groups. The Benelux had both the economic similarities and the wish to work together for gaining economic advantages from integration, while all the Visegrad countries wanted to shed the old Soviet influences and turn their focus towards Western Europe.11_{This shows that although the}

Visegrad and Benelux groups can be placed in different categories of sub-regional

cooperation, and seem to differ in their reasons for such cooperation, they are driven by the political will of a joint course of direction.

A similarity between the two can be found in their interaction with the EU. Like the Benelux, the Visegrad Group also had a debate on its relevance. When its original goal, becoming a NATO and EU member, was close to achievement, the question arose of the continuing function of the Visegrad Group. As Dangerfield shows, the real discussion began in 2002, when the accession negotiations were completed. Internal tensions between the Visegrad countries were visible, which made it questionable whether a new form of cooperation would be found. Nevertheless in 2004 a new document on cooperation was presented. The Visegrad Group would henceforward focus on the Central European Region. This meant a strengthening of intra-Visegrad cooperation and a focus on the neighbouring countries to the East within the European Neighbourhood Policy.12

This shift in the aims of the Visegrad Group shows how both its role and cooperation methods changed. Here another similarity with the Benelux can be seen. Both were

influenced by the EU, which would eventually ask for a change in their roles and functioning. In the Visegrad Group the influence can be seen in the EU accession. Although this was a

10_{M. Dangerfield, ‘The Viségrad Group in the Expanded European Union: From Preaccession to Postaccession}

Cooperation’, East European Politics & Societies, no. 3 (2008), pp. 634-635.

11_{Ibidem, p. 638.}

12_{M. Dangerfield, ‘The Contribution of the Visegrad Group to the European Union’s ‘Eastern’ Policy: Rhetoric or}

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goal in itself, the accession made Visegrad cooperation in this form rather unnecessary. Therefore, thanks to European integration, its role was completely changed. The Benelux focused initially on economic integration and acted quite successfully in this, as will be shown in the next chapter. However, as Inotai shows, the Benelux Economic Union as a separate entity soon lost its central relevance because the European Economic Union more or less replaced it.13_{Hence, the Benelux also had a debate on its relevance and its}

functioning, which brings us to the topic of role changes.

The debate on relevance, which both groups experienced, and is still going on for the Benelux, can be brought back to the categories of sub-regional cooperation. These

categories not only distinguish the various forms, but also give some meaning to cooperation by showing its role or rationale. One could say that as soon as any developments cause the cooperating entity to begin losing its purpose within its group, a relevance debate can be initiated. For the Visegrad Group this would be the moment of accession to NATO and the EU, while for the Benelux it is the moment when it can no longer fulfil its pioneering role. To find meaning once more the ambitions or the sub-regional cooperation method could be changed. For the Benelux and Visegrad the interesting difference is that in the case of the latter the debate and the decision on a new cooperation method took place briefly, and with clarity, before the EU accession occurred. This is in contrast to the Benelux, which had a long ongoing debate on its relevance before expanding its competences by the new Benelux Treaty of 2008. Since the old treaty was about to expire, the reason for this decision seemed more for securing continuing cooperation rather than resulting from the debate on its changed role and relevance.

The differences in debate and in changes can of course be explained by the fact that the Visegrad goal of accession is more concrete than the Benelux ambition to inspire and to be a pioneer. It may therefore be easier to have a debate over new cooperation methods. As far as the Benelux is concerned the debate did not end by creating a new treaty and expanding the Benelux competences beyond an economic union. As will soon be outlined, a few years after the new Benelux Treaty was signed there was even a study made on the relevance of the Benelux. When it is considered that the potential new functioning was inadequate, this

13_{A. Inotai, ‘Correlations between European Integration and Sub-Regional Cooperation: Theoretical}

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makes it even more interesting to examine the role of the Benelux and to examine to what extent it has changed over time.

The debate on the Benelux and its relevance

Before this role can be adequately explored, however, a closer examination of the Benelux debate is required. Since this thesis focuses on contemporary role changes, the most suitable approach would be to consider a contributing study that was made after the new Benelux Treaty was presented. In 2012 the IOB, a Dutch inspection group of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, published the previously mentioned study on the Benelux in order to

evaluate Benelux cooperation from a Dutch perspective. In the final report on the history of the Benelux, the new Benelux Treaty and contemporary challenges are discussed. However, since the study is focused more on evaluating the current Benelux Union, the Benelux history is only briefly referred to in order to introduce the Benelux and to place cooperation in the relevant context by showing its historical path. The report illustrates how cooperation began after World War II and how this led to the Benelux Treaty. The beginnings of

European integration and relations with the Benelux are shown, as well as the special status that the Benelux had achieved in the Treaty of Rome. An interesting detail is how the IOB report places emphasis on the advantages of this status as far as integration of the Benelux is concerned. This status not only guarantees the functioning of the Benelux independently of the European project, but also gives the Benelux the opportunity to integrate more fully and more speedily than the wider European Community.14

Furthermore, the IOB report explores how the new Benelux Treaty in 2008 came into existence and gives an explanation of this new treaty. As the report was made from a Dutch perspective, it shows how the Dutch discussion of the treaty took place. In 2007, one year before it was signed, an advisory council presented a recommendation for the treaty negotiations. As with the Dutch government, this recommendation was positive concerning cooperation and stated that it should be continued. However, several criticisms were also presented which should be taken into account. On the one hand, the original goals of economic integration were either achieved or replaced by European integration. On the other hand, the Benelux had in the last years unofficially expanded its policy areas to, for

14_{IOB Evaluatie, Relaties, resultaten en rendement – Evaluatie van de Benelux Unie-samenwerking vanuit}

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instance, transport and legal affairs. This resulted in a level of cooperation that was not clear, and gave rise to the question of to what extent the Benelux was still relevant.

Together with a decline of public support for the Benelux and the political tensions between the Benelux countries, its cooperation could simply be terminated following the expiry date of the original treaty. The Dutch government argued that a new treaty was needed to solve these problems, which should cover the various areas of cooperation and set main priorities for easing the functioning of the Benelux.15

In the new Benelux Treaty it can indeed be seen to show a widening of the cooperation areas rather than focusing on the Benelux Economic Union. The Treaty had a framework setting. This may sound contradictory, as the new treaty was supposed to provide a better structure to the functioning of the Benelux. A framework setting could still allow the Benelux to have a vague and unclear function. Yet this setting was seen as flexible in allowing the Benelux to achieve greater integration with more ease. In addition, the new treaty introduced a minimum number of obligatory meetings and created annual strategies to ensure its adequate functioning. Although the Treaty entered into force in 2012, after some delay had prevented its entry in 2010, several elements had been set at an earlier date. It can be seen that annual plans based on the main priorities, and the regular meetings had been already introduced shortly after the treaty was signed.16_{This may indicate the}

enthusiasm and support within the Benelux for the outcomes of the new treaty.

When looking, on the one hand, at the criticisms made before the negotiations on the new Benelux Treaty started, and while considering, on the other hand, how this treaty was received, it seems that the problems that emerged from the debate had been solved. However, it is still arguable whether the functioning of the Benelux has indeed been improved. The main uncertainty in the IOB report is whether or not this has worked out satisfactorily since the new Benelux Treaty was presented, and what the advantages of Benelux cooperation are. One of the unanswered questions is, indeed, whether the Benelux inspires European integration at the forefront of the integration process. Unlike this thesis,

Nederlands perspectief, Den Haag: Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 2012, pp. 37-40.

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the report does not compare contemporary Benelux to the historical one of the 1950s and 1960s, but rather focuses on how it is currently performing.17

According to the IOB the new treaty has created new structures to enhance the functioning of the Benelux. It can be seen that ambitions such as presenting the annual plans and having regular meetings do indeed take place. However, this has not yet brought about any

significant results, which may indicate an ongoing lack of political commitment.

Furthermore, the structure of setting priorities and of flexibility towards potential new areas of cooperation is still rather vague. Therefore this new treaty seems simply to have put this broad and highly flexible functioning, that has emerged over the years, into a framework rather than genuinely enhancing the cooperation process.18

As far as inspiring integration is concerned, the IOB concludes that there are no recent examples of policies in which the Benelux has been a testing ground for European integration. Nevertheless, inspiring integration is considered in broader terms than this. Since the Benelux countries are working more closely together than other EU Member States, they can certainly inspire others in doing the same. In some policy areas, such as transport, the Benelux projects were later joined by neighbouring countries such as France and Germany. This can also be seen as a way to inspire integration. Furthermore, the

Benelux countries often work together to implement EU legislation. While one could say that this is precisely an example of executing integration instead of inspiring it, the results gained from joint implementation can also help in stimulating European countries to engage in closer cooperation.19

Notwithstanding the criticism of the results of the new Benelux Treaty, the IOB seems to be positive concerning the Benelux Union, which they see as complementary to the EU and an actor in the system of multi-level governance.20_{Yet the IOB report was used by the Dutch}

MPs Harry van Bommel and Arnold Merkies of the Socialist Party to present the motion on abolishing the Benelux Union. According to them, the report showed how the Benelux had become unnecessary, something which the new Benelux Treaty had not been able to solve.

Nederlands perspectief, Den Haag: Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 2012, p. 14.

18_{Ibidem, pp. 75-76.} 19_{Ibidem, pp. 150-151.} 20_{Ibidem, p. 16.}

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When institutions lose their relevance, they should be abolished, including the Benelux.21

Some of the authors and researchers who worked on the IOB report responded to the motion by stating that it was not their intention to call for an abolishment of the Benelux Union. The report was critical, but wanted to offer recommendations for improving cooperation.22

Although the motion to abolish the Benelux was not adopted and the Benelux Union

continued, it shows how its relevance can still be questioned and how rigorously the debate proceeds. This may indicate that the previously mentioned pioneering category is no longer suitable. A changing role in the process of European integration, in which interaction

between the EU and the Benelux has changed over time, could explain why a new strategy and meaning was requested. The new Benelux Treaty, to the extent it had the intention to solve this question, was inadequate for finalising the debate. This could mean that its pioneering role of inspiring European integration is currently lacking, and may possibly have been transformed into a role of actually executing integration. Nevertheless, the IOB report shows that the initial Benelux function of inspiring integration can still be met, albeit in a different, less direct way. On the other hand, Inotai states that the Benelux might have lost its classical pioneering role of being at the forefront of the European project, but admits nonetheless that it is difficult to provide a comprehensive answer to this hypothesis.23

Hence, together with the IOB statement, the role of the Benelux remains vague and unclear. In order to provide deeper insight, more research into comparisons of the historical role with the contemporary is required. This will be taken up in the next chapter.

21_{Overheid.nl, ‘Kamerstuk 33414 nr. 11: Motie van de leden Van Bommel en Merkies over het opheffen van de}

Benelux Unie’, https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-33414-11.html, accessed April 23, 2017.

22_{J. Rood, ‘Wie de schoen past…!’, Internationale Spectator, no. 6 (2013), p. 50.}

B. Limonard & J. Stöger ‘De Benelux Unie naar waarde schatten’, Internationale Spectator, no. 6 (2013), p. 57.

23_{A. Inotai, ‘Correlations between European Integration and Sub-Regional Cooperation: Theoretical}

Background, Experience and Policy Impacts’, Russian & East European Finance and Trade, no. 6 (1998), pp. 81-82.

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2. The historical Benelux

Before the main research on the changing role in the contemporary Benelux can begin, a view at the historical Benelux is required. This second chapter will further outline the historical aspects of Benelux cooperation and analyse its interacting role in the European project. To do this the first decades of the functioning of the Benelux will be examined, focusing on three major events. Economist Max Weisglas clearly stated that the special role of the Benelux was most visible in the customs agreement of 1944 and its common

memorandum in 1955.24_{These will be the first two events to focus on. Furthermore, the}

1958 Benelux Treaty and how this worked out in practice alongside the developing European Economic Community will be explored. The third and final major event is the 1985 Schengen Agreement. This is not mentioned by Weisglas, but is perceived by the Benelux itself as another main example of how the Benelux Union can function as a testing ground, hence inspiring European integration. Together these three events will help to create a clear view of the Benelux as a pioneer.

This pioneering and inspiring role of the Benelux will be examined by exploring and analysing several documents from this period. The contemporary Benelux has a tightly structured functioning in presenting its strategy plans and annual reports. During the historical period examined in this chapter, these were absent, yet many reports and notes from meetings, negotiations and agreements that brought the Benelux countries together and formed its policy can nevertheless be found. From these documents a good overview of the intentions behind this sub-regional cooperation, and how it interacted with the developing European project, can still be formed. As this will provide insight into the historical role of the Benelux and its functioning during its first decades, it will give us a good starting point from which to progress to the contemporary situation.

The start of cooperation

The beginning of the Benelux, for this thesis and also for the first major event, was in 1944 with the customs agreement. Before this agreement there were some other initiatives to bring these countries into working partnerships. Belgium and Luxembourg formed the

24_{J. Busschaert & Th. Grosbois, ‘Gesprek met Prof. Dr. M. Weisglas’, in: A. Postma & J. Busschaert (eds.),}

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Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union (BLEU) in the early 1920s, which created economic cooperation. Another example is the Oslo States and the Ouchy agreement in the 1930s. During the economic depression Belgium, The Netherlands and Luxembourg, as well as the Scandinavian countries signed a trade agreement to stimulate their economies, and also to act as ‘guide countries’ in cooperation. The Oslo States were also formed by an agreement; however, this was not ultimately successful.25_{Disagreements amongst other countries led to}

Belgium, The Netherlands and Luxembourg signing the Ouchy agreement, which expanded the original trade agreement.26_{Yet political developments in the 1930s caused instability}

and such cooperation as there was did not result in success.27_{Therefore, although earlier}

attempts were made, the 1944 customs agreement can be seen as the one genuine and successful beginning of economic cooperation in the Benelux.

Officially, this agreement is a bilateral one, as it was made between two entities: The

Netherlands and the BLEU. First outlined during the war, the agreement clearly showed that it wanted to facilitate the reconstruction of Belgium, The Netherlands, Luxemburg and their economies. The liberation was under way in the south of Belgium and there was the strong prospect that the whole of the Benelux area would soon regain its sovereignty. Cooperation by a Benelux customs union could stimulate the reconstruction of the countries.28_{In the}

agreement no other rationale is mentioned, nor any prospects for further cooperation. In addition, the idea of taking the agreement to a European level, or of expanding the customs union, was not foreseen either. Since the agreement itself is rather short, with a detailed description of goods, one could say that only such a short outline of the customs union rationale was needed, making it an unsuitable document for presenting European ambitions. Nevertheless, the idea of a Benelux customs union was created with a focus on realism, genuinely working on reconstructing and revitalising the Benelux economies.29_{From the}

negotiations it also becomes clear that the agreement would not be a step to European

25_{G. van Roon, ‘Great Britain and the Oslo States’, Journal of Contemporary History, no. 4 (1989), pp. 657-658.} 26_{G. van Roon, Kleine landen in crisistijd – Van Oslostaten tot Benelux, 1930-1940, Amsterdam: Elsevier 1985,}

p. 100.

27_{Ibidem, pp. 372-373.}

28_{Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, Staatsblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden – 1944 E. 77, Londen: 9}

September 1944.

29_{M. Conway, ‘Legacies of Exile: The Exile Governments in London during the Second World War and the}

Politics of Post-war Europe’, in: M. Conway and J. Gotovitch (eds.), Europe in Exile, New York: Berghahn Books 2001, p. 267.

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cooperation. Notwithstanding the few supporters of a European federation, most politicians just focused on the Benelux cooperation.30

Any genuine sign of interaction with the potential European integration project could not be expected, as that project had not yet begun. Nevertheless, the idea of European countries working together had been existing for long and all three Benelux countries would

eventually be among the initiators of the first genuine move into European cooperation. In the same years as the agreement was made European countries were working together with the United States to create a new monetary system, eventually resulting in the Bretton Woods Agreement.31_{Although the Benelux countries were also part of these negotiations,}

this method of economic cooperation was neither inspired nor stimulated from the customs agreement.

This shows that it was not all a matter of differences in time, but that the early Benelux was simply not yet seen as a testing ground in this matter. In another way, however, it could be perceived as such. By agreeing on the customs union, the Benelux was the first in Europe to create such a form of sub-regional cooperation. Therefore the documents could be called revolutionary.32_{The Benelux was a pioneer, and as such it set an example for future forms of}

sub-regional cooperation. Hence, although at the moment of signing it was not anticipated, we can be fully justified in claiming that this agreement was among the three major events for inspiring European cooperation.

Working towards the customs union

The customs union agreement entered into force in January 1948. However, in the years leading up to this several Benelux conferences were held to discuss cooperation. Here, not only intra-Benelux issues on the functioning of the customs union were arranged, but explanations on cooperation were also given to other European countries, which shows just how the Benelux inspired other countries. France had been interested in a customs union

30_{Th. Grosbois, ‘De onderhandelingen van Londen voor een Benelux Douane-unie (1941-1944)’, in: A. Postma}

& J. Busschaert (eds.), Benelux in de kijker, Tielt: Lannoo 1994, p. 64.

31_{W.H. Weenink, Bankier van de wereld, Bouwer van Europa – Johan Willem Beyen 1987-1976, Amsterdam:}

Prometheus 2005, pp. 242-246.

32_{A.E. Kersten, ‘Politieke aspecten van de Benelux-samenwerking: wisselwerking tussen interne opbouw en}

internationale machtsvorming 1944-1958’, in: A. Postma & J. Busschaert (eds.), Benelux in de kijker, Tielt: Lannoo 1994, p. 79.

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with the Benelux for a long time and tried to bring this to the discussion.33_{The Benelux could}

be combined with France and Italy, making a customs union called Fritalux, or Finebel.34_In

1947 European countries founded a European Customs Union Study Group. The Benelux delegation was invited in order to explain to this group how the Benelux customs union was founded in 1944 and how its functioning was arranged.35_{However, most of these aims were}

not successful in the end. Disagreements on excluding the post-war German economy led in the case of Fritalux/Finebel to a failure.36_{Nevertheless, this does show that in various ways}

countries were seeking for European cooperation. The Benelux countries were also helping and studying this matter, but on their own there was no real integration topic, as this was integral to working out the customs union. A possible explanation for this is that the countries did not have the same opinion of European integration, and differed in their enthusiasm for the matter. Therefore the negotiations were not held by a Benelux delegation, nor with common statements.37

As the Benelux customs union was developing, the countries realized that more integration was necessary to enhance cooperation. Several detailed agreements were successfully made on relevant issues for the customs union. However, the different Benelux economies would still hamper any smooth working union. Therefore, in June 1948, the countries agreed to create an economic union before 1950.38_{This was a very ambitious idea and criticism soon}

arose. In The Netherlands Dutch ministers discussed this ambition in a meeting. However, they did not criticize the Benelux cooperation itself. On the contrary, cooperation was seen as a good way to draw closer politically and economically. But since the Western European economies were still vulnerable, especially the Dutch when compared to the

Belgian-Luxembourg economy, it would remain questionable whether such a swift initiative with an

33_{Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Verslag vergadering}

Comité Exécutif, 04-08-1947’, http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/G00417.pdf, pp. 1-3.

34_{R. Griffiths and F. Lynch, ‘L’échec de la Petite Europe: les négociations Fritalux/Finebel, 1949-1950’, Revue}

Historique, no. 1 (1985), p. 160.

35_{Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Brief en nota studiegroep}

Europese Douane-Unie, 28-10-1947’, http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/S00733.pdf, pp. 1-5.

36_{E. Bloemen, ‘De economische integratie van West-Europa 1945-1957’, NEHA-Bulletin, no. 1 (1990), p. 13.} 37_{A.E. Kersten, ‘Politieke aspecten van de Benelux-samenwerking: wisselwerking tussen interne opbouw en}

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economic union could be successful. According to the criticising ministers, more time was needed to stabilize the economy and build such a union.39

Notwithstanding the criticism, steps were made to create a Benelux economic union.

However, as the economic situation did not improve very much, the fear of failure remained. This became visible in a Dutch minister’s document commenting on a customs union report of January 1949. Again, the use of an economic union in such a fragile economic situation was questioned, especially since sacrifices had to be made in working towards such a union.40_{Furthermore, a new reason for the high pressure was given: the purpose of the}

Benelux for the international community. According to the document the Benelux project was seen by the three countries as an economic project. However, the other Western European countries as well as the United States gave the project a political meaning. The developing Benelux was being closely followed in the context of an ambitious and more cooperating Europe. This step taken towards an economic union made the pressure of succeeding even higher. Because of this, the failure of such a union would mean very serious damage for the Benelux countries, both in European cooperation and in the international community.41

This statement on the international pressure is rather special, since it is the first in which the inspiring Benelux role is made explicit. Although in the minister’s document it is shown how the Benelux intentions were only economic, the minister realized how the rest of Europe had forced the Benelux into the more political role of a testing ground. Even though this was not an ambition of the cooperation initiative, the Benelux now had some responsibility to make the economic union successful.

The pre-union agreement as the next step

In order to enhance the preparation of the economic union it was decided to create a pre-union in July 1949, one year before the actual economic pre-union would enter into force. The rationale behind this was to make it easier to introduce the changes that would lead to

39_{Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Verslag vergadering Raad}

voor economische aangelegenheden, 25-08-1948’,

http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/D00084.pdf, p. 11.

40_{Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Opmerkingen rapport}

Voorzitters der Raden van de Belgisch-Nederlands-Luxemburgse Douane-overeenkomst, 28-01-1949’

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liberation.42_{Working towards this pre-union would indicate that good progress was being}

made. However, disagreements between Belgium and The Netherlands on the economic side-effects of the economic union caused some delay during the following months. The pre-union agreement was not reached in July, but was postponed for some a few months. It became clear that without solving the conflicts a pre-union could not be formed.43

Eventually the discussions were resolved and an agreement reached. The United States, which supported the reconstruction of European countries by the Marshall Plan, agreed to give extra financial support. This can be seen as an indication of the significance the Benelux had for the USA. As a testing ground it was vitally important that the economic union should succeed.44

Although Benelux cooperation was seen by others as an example for European cooperation, the Benelux countries themselves did not state it as such, nor did they connect the Benelux to the European project. This became clear from the statements of Belgian minister Van Zeeland, made during the negotiations that were expected to find a solution for the pre-union agreement. Van Zeeland stated that he was in favour of the Benelux on the one hand, but on the other supported the economic liberalisation at a European level. This statement was discussed at a Dutch minister’s meeting because there was some anxiety that Belgium would choose a European cooperation over the Benelux.45_{Such discussions not only show}

the difference in vision and opinion between the Benelux countries and others, but also that European cooperation was seen as distinct from Benelux cooperation.

In October 1949 the pre-union agreement was finally reached. In the agreement

preparations were outlined for working towards the Benelux economic union. The intention to start one year later, initially in July 1950, was stated in the agreement.46_{However, since}

the agreement did not enter into force until 1 January 1950 it is doubtful whether the

42_{Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, Tractatenblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden – Jaargang 1953 No. 55, Den}

Haag: Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 1953, p. 48.

44_{J.M.M.J. Clerx, ‘Beneluxsamenwerking in het slop’, Politieke Opstellen, no. 1 (1994), pp. 51-52.}

46_{Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, Tractatenblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden – Jaargang 1954 No. 18, Den}

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countries were fully convinced that the economic union would indeed be created on that date. It transpired that the late signing of the agreement did not really delay the creation of an economic union; instead even larger problems hampered a smooth transition process. It would eventually take more than eight years to arrive at the Benelux Treaty, which resulted in the founding of the Benelux Economic Union in 1960.

When looking at the events of the period following the signing of the pre-union agreement, a few issues can be noticed. First, those of connecting the Benelux markets continued for a long time. Disagreements between Belgium and The Netherlands, especially concerning agriculture, remained unsettled.47_{Some of the relevant politicians expressed opposing views}

to that of liberalising the integration of the Benelux, preferring a policy of protectionism, or were heavily influenced by the agricultural lobby, resulting in ongoing negotiations.48_The

integration process was thus delayed continuously.49_{Furthermore, the beginning of}

European cooperation caused the attention of the countries to shift to the European level. For a smooth distribution of American financial aid from the Marshall Plan, the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) was created, which was also seen by the USA as a way to stimulate European integration.50_{However, for cooperation between the Benelux}

countries this did not all work out beneficially. There were even signs that these countries worked against each other’s interests. Because of this The Netherlands claimed that the Benelux project could fail.51

The genuine start of interaction with the European project

In addition to these problematic negotiations other developments in European cooperation, such as the presentation of the Schuman Plan, also created distraction from the Benelux process. However, it was soon realised that the European project would also have

consequences for Benelux cooperation. These thoughts stimulated the Benelux countries to

47_{Th. Grosbois & J. Busschaert, ‘Gesprek met D. Spierenburg’, in: A. Postma & J. Busschaert (eds.), Benelux in}

de kijker, Tielt: Lannoo 1994, p. 95.

48_{Th. Grosbois, ‘Het Belgische besluitvormingsproces inzake Benelux (1945-1951)’, in: F. Boekema, H. van}

Houtum & K. Veraghtert (eds.), Benelux, Quo Vadis?, Groningen: Wolters-Noordhoff 1994, pp. 95-96.

50_{P. van der Eng, De Marshall-hulp – Een perspectief voor Nederland 1947-1953, Houten: De Haan/Unieboek bv}

1987, p. 20.

51_{Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Brief Stikker aan Drees,}

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continue the talks and to find agreement on a treaty to create the Benelux economic

union.52_{Hence it seems that even with these problems, the good will was sufficient to find a}

solution and quickly form an economic union. In a Dutch minister’s meeting of November 1950 the idea of founding a Benelux parliament had been proposed in order to stimulate cooperation. On the other hand, it was stated that this could not be expected to result in a treaty before the end of the year. Nevertheless, no long delay was mentioned and it still seemed as if the agreement on a treaty would soon be made. 53

When considering wider European developments in the light of the Benelux role, it once again becomes clear how the Benelux countries did not see a connection. European

cooperation events and initiatives were not linked to the Benelux project, nor discussed on possible interaction. The focus was thus placed firmly on the consequences of European events on Benelux cooperation, and even on contrasting national interests, which indeed showed a lack of cooperation. In the immediate post-war years the enforced responsibility of the Benelux to become a successful testing ground was evident, and was created by the perceptions of other countries. However, during this time this matter was not clear. A possible explanation for this could be that with clearer European developments the weight of responsibility was somehow eased. However, a more plausible reason would be that the perception itself was changed by a lack of progress. Since the Benelux countries increasingly failed to integrate and to form an economic union, the attention and the expectations of other countries deteriorated.54_{Together with the shift towards developments in European}

cooperation, international pressure to turn the Benelux into a form of successful sub-regional cooperation decreased. Nevertheless, it would be premature to claim that a strong change in role was already occurring. A more accurate description would be that the

inspiring role as testing ground was less evident during these years.

52_{Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Summary Verslag}

vergadering Raad voor economische aangelegenheden, 26-07-1950’,

http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/europeseintegratie/en/doc/D00117, accessed November 16, 2017. Ibidem, ‘Verslag vergadering Raad voor economische aangelegenheden, 26-07-1950’,

Ministerraad, 27-11-1950’, http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/S00116.pdf, pp. 13-14.

54_{Th. Grosbois & J. Busschaert, ‘Gesprek met D. Spierenburg’, in: A. Postma & J. Busschaert (eds.), Benelux in}

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Over the next few years a small shift in Benelux cooperation occurred. The Schuman Plan and efforts towards realising the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) stimulated the Benelux countries to engage in greater political cooperation by proposing to work on

common statements on the development of the European project.55_{This could also bring}

new inspiration as well as pressure to Benelux cooperation. To gain more power in the international community, successful cooperation and, eventually, formalising the Benelux economic union could be of great help. The Benelux integration could help European

integration, but European integration could also help the Benelux. Since the Benelux was still struggling to connect its markets and to deal with relevant economic problems, the risk of failure was still present.56

From this, two interesting things can be noticed. First, a connection between Benelux and European cooperation can be made. Instead of a completely separate entity, the European project was now also seen as a way to stimulate the process of Benelux integration. The two are not only connected in this matter, but taking Benelux cooperation to a European level is also proposed. This idea is not completely new, but in earlier scenarios it had been

presented more as cooperation on a specific topic rather than structural cooperation and integration. Furthermore, the pressure for being a successful Benelux returned. However, this was quite different from early Benelux cooperation in the 1940s when international pressure was applied to the Benelux to succeed. Now it seemed to be coming more from the consciences of the Benelux countries themselves. In explaining this pressure, broader effects were mentioned. The success of the Benelux project was seen as vital for its members’ power at the European level. This resembles the previous situation, with pressure for having powerful influence in the international community, albeit this time in a European context. However, since the Benelux participated in the European project, the question of having such a powerful role seemed of much more importance than it was in the previous situation. The internal economic consequences that would result from failure are shown by this. These consequences had already been noted a few times, but now a new light was shed on them.

55_{Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Memorandum}

samenwerking Benelux-landen buitenlandse politiek, 22-09-1951’,

Nederlands-Belgische samenwerking, 22-09-1951’,

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As economic integration is expected to result from European cooperation, it is seen as crucial and obvious that integrating the Benelux economically has a participating role in this. If the Benelux integration were to fail, the economic consequences could be even greater when adding to this the consequences from the European level. All this again shows that the Benelux and European projects were interacting, and outlining this process makes it clear how the sub-regional and European effects of success or failure were closely interwoven. The idea of the European project providing the Benelux with a reason to integrate is also clear from other documents. As the pre-union agreement had intended to create an economic union within one year, a special team was engaged to produce a draft for the Benelux Treaty. In a report by this group, it was stated that the lack of achievement is disappointing.57_{The founding of a Benelux economic union could go hand in hand perfectly}

with European integration.58_{The report presents an action plan for working towards the}

economic union and for finding a solution to the problems hampering the process. In

addition to the report, it can be seen that the various countries realised that more effort was required for success. It had even been stated, in a Dutch minister’s report, that a

supranational structure should be accepted. Although a purely intergovernmental

cooperation method would be preferred, supranational institutions might possibly create a breakthrough in the Benelux integration.59

When this idea was proposed to the Belgian and Luxembourg governments they initially gave a sceptical response. Nevertheless they agreed, and a political committee was founded to work on Benelux integration more intensively. A reference to European pressure on the Benelux was made by acknowledging that this pressure can be seen as a clear result of Benelux cooperation.60_{This new progress created fresh optimism in the Benelux countries,}

57_{Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Nota economische unie}

met België en Luxemburg, 27-12-1951’,

http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/S00441.pdf, p. 4.

58_{Ibidem, p. 1.}

Permanente Politieke Contact Commissie, 14-01-1952’,

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resulting in the prospect of an imminent economic union.61_{There were still some minor}

problems and disagreements, but in general it was clear that all three countries were anticipating the next stage in Benelux integration.62

The Benelux solution to Europe in crisis

Because of such good prospects one would expect that this would have had positive effects on European integration also, in the idea of mutual stimulation. However, while the Benelux seemed to have found a solution to the integration problems, and was back on track,

European integration entered a crisis period. The Schuman Plan and the creation of the ECSC were expected to be followed by the European Defence Community (EDC) and the Political Community (EPC). This suggested that European integration should show swift progress. Yet disagreements in the European countries resulted in failure.63_{Negotiations between the}

countries proved difficult and were not undertaken with any real enthusiasm.64_{The eventual}

treaty on the EDC was not accepted, which blocked the idea of an EPC. Nevertheless, the Benelux countries now tried to form a common position in the negotiations. There were naturally some minor disagreements between the countries, but in general they proposed the same ideas for European cooperation. One of these ideas was to focus on economic integration, although the proposals had little success at first.65

While European integration was struggling, the endeavour towards the Benelux Economic Union was showing good progress; it was creating, among other things, a coordinated social and economic policy.66_{This can be seen from a shift in topics at the Benelux conferences.}

These had focused on disagreements between Belgium and The Netherlands, emphasising a lack of enthusiasm and a risk of failure of the Benelux project. Now, however, the

61_{Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Brief met conceptnota}

economische unie, 31-01-1952’, http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/S00440.pdf, p. 4.

62_{Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Ontwerpantwoord op}

Belgische en Luxemburgse nota’s economische unie, 08-05-1952’

internationale machtsvorming 1944-1958’, in: A. Postma & J. Busschaert (eds.), Benelux in de kijker, Tielt: Lannoo 1994, pp. 85-86.

Ministerraad, 02-01-1952’, http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/S00137.pdf, p. 5.

internationale machtsvorming 1944-1958’, in: A. Postma & J. Busschaert (eds.), Benelux in de kijker, Tielt: Lannoo 1994, pp. 86-87.

66_{A.J. Boekestijn, ‘Soevereiniteit en integratie: de Benelux 1945-1958’, in: A. Postma & J. Busschaert (eds.),}

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conferences were increasingly focused on the Benelux role at the European level. For instance, the discussion of European economic integration was proposed at the Benelux meetings.67_{This could indicate the good will of the Benelux to find a solution to the crisis,}

which can be seen as an attempt to get a more inspirational role in European integration. The cooperative role of the Benelux in Europe was again evident at a European conference discussing the European Political Community. The statements of the Benelux countries, in favour of economic integration, clashed with those of the other European countries

present.68_{The Dutch Beyen-Plan proposing more economic integration was also discussed.}

Some points were criticized by both Belgium and Luxembourg, while others were received more positively.69_{However, it is doubtful whether the inspiring of integration at this point}

was actually driven by the Benelux, as it seems that the Beyen-Plan was more or less developed by Beyen himself rather than arising from the Benelux meetings.70_{The result of}

the conference shows that even though the discussions were useful, political decisions were required in order to achieve a breakthrough with the integration problem.71

Decisive political steps to find a solution, however, were not taken on the European level, even though the external pressure became greater.72_{The Benelux countries then decided in}

a meeting that they should take the initiative in inviting the ministers of the six European countries to discuss the integration problem.73_{A further step can here be seen in the}

Benelux taking the lead in this integration phase. As attempts by the Benelux to save the EDC and EPC failed, the question arose of what should now be done. Soon the Belgian anxiety over France taking its own integration steps independently of the European project led to a

68_{Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Algemene beschouwing}

economische besprekingen Parijse studieconferentie E.P.G., 06-03-1954’,

http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/S00565.pdf, pp. 3-4.

69_{Ibidem, pp. 5-6.}

71_{Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Algemene beschouwing}

economische besprekingen Parijse studieconferentie E.P.G., 06-03-1954’,

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Benelux decision. As Belgium wanted to propose greater economic cooperation in Europe, then this idea should be turned into a Benelux proposal. Since all Benelux countries agreed on it, it was thought that this could be a good opportunity.74

By examining the following months, of early 1955, it can be seen how the Benelux discussed proposals to relaunch European integration, and how it tried to create enthusiasm in other countries, for instance Germany.75_{The Benelux countries worked on a memorandum for}

proposing greater economic integration, which they would present to the other European countries and discuss at a forthcoming ECSC meeting in Messina.76_{In this memorandum}

impressive proposals were made for working towards a common market with free movement and an integrated social policy.77_{When it was discussed at the European}

meeting, other countries responded positively and even France wanted to cooperate.78_From

this point the memorandum seemed to be successful. Of course, it could still remain a proposal that would not enable any real integration, or begin at a very slow rate. The Benelux itself had shown something similar in previous years. Nevertheless, during the period following the Messina conference the European countries began to work quickly on economic integration. The Benelux countries tried to remain at the forefront of the process and stimulated swift developments.79_{In the negotiations to work out the details of the}

European Economic Community (EEC), the experiences from the Benelux cooperation were used. Sometimes these were perceived differently by the Benelux countries. For instance, Belgium criticised the lack of a strong supranational institution for the Benelux. Such a power therefore should be created in the European cooperation. However, The Netherlands was not enthusiastic about such an issue.80_{It can thus be seen that although the Benelux}

74_{Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Memorandum bezoek}

Baron Snoy d’Oppuers, 20-11-1954’, http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/S00916.pdf, p. 1.

75_{Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Brief Adenauer aan Bech,}

15-04-1955’, http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/S01957.pdf, p. 1.

76_{Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Verslag bespreking Spaak}

en Beyen over eventueel Benelux-initiatief Europese economische integratie, 23-04-1955’,

77_{Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Memorandum des Pays}

Benelux aux six pays de la C.E.C.A., 18-05-1955’

Ministerraad, 06-06-1955’, http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/S00307.pdf, pp. 1-2.

79_{F.G. Moquette, Van Bep tot Beb, Leiden: Rijksuniversiteit Leiden 1993, p. 359.}

80_{S. Nasra & M. Segers, ‘Tussen argwaan en pragmatisme’, in: D. Hellema, R. Coolsaet & B. Stol (eds.),}

The role of the Benelux cooperation in European integration