Kimberlynn Nina Chaves
01/07/2018
Master Thesis Public Administration: International and
European Governance
The Relativity of
the Freedom of
Movement Within
the European Union
A Q-Methodological research to understand the public opinion of the French.1
To my Father,
I am forever grateful for your unconditional support. You have raised me with values of respect,
openness, and toleration of differences in this world. I live by the wisdom you so often repeat:
‘The freedom of one is limited to where the freedom of others begin’ (Orlando Guerra Chaves, almost every day of my life).
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INDEX
Chapter 1: Introduction ... 4
Chapter 2: Theoretical Foundation ... 7
I. The French Attitude ... 7
Mercantilism, the French Way ... 7
Brief History: Popular French Support for Europe ... 9
National Identity ... 12
II. One Strong European Union ... 14
European Integration ... 14
Schengen: The Freedom of Movement ... 17
Transposition of Directive 2004/38/EC ... 19
III. The 21st Century, Decades of Crisis ... 20
Crisis and Politicization ... 20
Right-wing Populism: Front National ... 22
Terrorised France ... 23
EU Refugee / Migration Crisis ... 25
Macron, EU’s Best Student ... 27
IV. Concluding Remarks ... 28
Chapter 3: Methodology and Operationalisation ... 30
I. Q: a Five-Step Methodology ... 30
What is a Concourse? ... 32
How to develop the Q-Sample / Q-Set? ... 33
Who to select for the P-set? ... 36
How to proceed to Q-Sorting? ... 39
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II. Concluding Remarks ... 44
Chapter 4: Analysis of the Results ... 45
I. 4-Factors large Analysis ... 45
Factor 1: The Safety & Security Discourse ... 46
Factor 2: The Anti-Capitalist Discourse ... 48
Factor 3: The French Nationality Discourse ... 51
Factor 4: The Patriot’s Discourse ... 54
II. Concluding Remarks ... 56
Chapter 5: Discussion of the Findings ... 58
I. Expectations concerning The French Attitude ... 58
II. Expectations on the ideal of One Strong Europe ... 60
III. Expectations derived from the Consequences of the 21st Century’s Crisis ... 63
Chapter 6: Conclusion ... 67
Acknowledgements ... 69
References ... 70
Appendix ... 78
Map of the Schengen Area ... 78
Q-set statements in French and English ... 79
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Chapter 1: Introduction
It was a week after the Paris terrorist attacks on the 17th of November in 2015 that I decided to go to Bordeaux and visit my family. When arriving at the French airport, the change in attitude, and the ‘State of Emergency’ the country’s stance was undeniably clear. Normally, the Schengen agreement provides all citizens of the Schengen area with Freedom of Movement, therefore passport control is not needed to cross the Schengen borders. This time, arriving at the airport, Border Patrol was awaiting us. Officers asked for our passports, checked our identity, and wanted to know the reason of our stay. Simultaneously, Patrol-men with dogs were profiling people on their ethnic background, and checking these persons more thoroughly. Then, the following situation unfolded in front of us all. A man of about 70 years old, in traditional Moroccan djellaba, awaiting passport control, was picked out of the cue. Minutes later, Border-Patrol opened his suitcase and started to unpack and check his personal belongings. Nobody seemed surprised or had a problem with the deliberate selection and checking of this specific individual. The action was supposedly justified by the fact that Islamic extremists had just orchestrated the most lethal attack in Paris since the post-war era. These terrorists had travelled very easily from Belgium to France, thus crossing the Schengen border without effective border-control. In theory, had there been heavier border control between Belgium and France, as there was at the airport after the attacks, the attacks may have been prevented (Bigo, et al., 2015). The situation seemed justified on the one hand, on the other; this old man was gravely humiliated in front of many people and assumed a potential threat to French society because of his clothing, and thus his cultural background. He was not treated respectfully and his privacy was invaded in name of safety and security. Surprisingly enough, even though the old man’s rights to privacy and culture were violated or disrespected, even the man himself valued ‘ensuring the security’ above his own rights and did not object the investigation.
A week later, when returning to the Netherlands through the Airport of Bordeaux, a bomb alert was issued just after I passed customs. All flights were ‘momentarily’ cancelled; tourists and people within the airport, who were in a state of panic, were asked to ‘stay calm’. Standard procedures during a ‘State of Emergency’ had been triggered by a suspect car. When law enforcement arrived, the car was preventively neutralised and 1.5 hours later daily airport business resumed. In the end,
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the car was wrongly parked on a rental car emplacement and therefore presumed as a suspicious vehicle and a potential threat to security (Sud Ouest, 2015; Maugue, 2015).
I share these personal anecdotes to illustrate the state of France in the direct aftermath of its most lethal terrorist attack since the post-war era. I wanted to show first-handed how the attacks have affected the Freedom of Movement toward France.
The right to Freedom of Movement within Europe emerged from the initiative of the Schengen agreements 1985-1990. In order to explain how the Freedom of Movement was established, it is vital to trace back to the creation of the historic Maastricht treaty. With the establishment of the Maastricht treaty in 1992, one single European Union body was developed on the basis of three pillars. The initial pillar; the ‘European Communities’, is known as the oldest of pillars, and thereby the most active entity of the European Union. It was created in 1957, along with the treaty of Rome, and was previously known as the European Economic Community (EEC). The second pillar is that of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. This pillar is concerned with the Foreign and Security policies, and builds upon the informal cooperation of member-states on their common foreign policy. The third pillar is widely known to be responsible for Cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs. This pillar was the most innovative part of the Maastricht treaty. It consists of coordinating Police units, Customs, Immigration services, and Justice Ministries of each EU Member-State. It is the Schengen agreements that enhanced the idea of coordinating border policies. This resulted in the Freedom of Movement of peoples, goods and services in the Schengen area of the European Union (EU Today, 2018).
As I started off with the limitations of that Freedom of Movement in the aftermath of the Paris terrorist attacks, I can’t help but wonder what the French actually think about the Freedom of movement. Moreover, if they have hostile feelings/attitudes towards this Freedom, is there a causal relation linked to the terrorist attacks? Or, is it the migration crisis that causes this attitude? This research aims to understand why people have certain perspectives and how these perspectives have been shaped. How can we interpret the meaning behind people’s words, and adjust our policies accordingly in order to meet the needs of the people? As I will be focussing on the case of France the following questions will be leading the research:
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Reflecting on the French citizens, what discourse(s) can be identified concerning The Freedom of Movement within the European Union; to what extent are these discourses related to the issues of extremist-Islamic terrorism and the growing migration-flux; and are there any important gaps or differences identified within the opinion of the French population?
This research is structured around six main chapters. The first chapter will introduce the research topic. The second will provide the theoretical foundations needed to understand and interpret the expected French discourses on the Freedom of Movement within the EU. The third chapter lays down the Q-Methodology employed for this research. As Q-methodology is often disputed by established scholars, it will be interesting to see how the method fits the main purpose of this research: understanding why people think what they think. Moreover, the fourth chapter will describe the application of the Q-Method on France as a case and will assiduously demonstrate the different identified discourses. The fifth chapter will mirror the identified discourses to the expectations of the theoretical foundations, and will reflect on the extent in which the expectations match the actual discourses. Lastly, chapter six will conclude and summarise the research.
Using this Q-Methodological method within the research on the French public-opinion will, first inform you on the established knowledge and dynamics of French politics, and second, identify the discourse(s) on the topic by the respondent of the research. The findings will advance current-knowledge about the dynamics of French discourses on the specific topic of the Freedom of Movement, thence giving respondents the opportunity to express their opinion. European policy-makers are given the instrument, and hence the opportunity, to adjust policies to the wishes of the people.
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Chapter 2: Theoretical Foundation
I will be researching the opinion of the people of France, and why they think what they think. Therefore, a theoretical background will be needed to help guide those who are unfamiliar with the ‘French logic’. The essentials will be addressed in three interconnected parts.
To begin, I will address where the ‘typical’ French attitude originates from. To understand the French public opinion, an awareness of the concepts that influence their choices, actions and statements is much needed.
Second, I will engage further with the ideals of a strong European Union. ‘What is important?’, ‘how did the Schengen agreement come along?’, and ‘how was Schengen agreement accepted/received in France?’
Lastly, I will focus on the 21st century and more specifically the decade we now live in. The crises
the EU has faced, and is still facing today, the rise of populism, and Europe’s greatest chance to restore French public faith in the EU: Mr. Macron.
I. The French attitude
Mercantilism, the French way
As Kindleberger stated: ‘French attitude towards free trade since the nineteenth century is a typical blend of nationalism and protectionism, and stands in contrast to the British attitude’ (Kindleberger, 1951). The notion of the ‘us against them’ perspective, which seemingly does not make sense on economic grounds, is used to silence those who lose from the protective attitude. Yet, as France has a relatively small sized economy, compared to other world-powers nowadays, for what reason does it uphold this strong nationalistic façade on trade policy? Patrick Messerlin, professor of economics at Sciences Po Paris, explains that the answer is to be found in the domestic arena. Here it is important to explain the process of protectionism. Protectionism favours domestic producers (at the cost of other domestic firms), and hence the domestic prices of import-competing sectors increases. This allows the favoured domestic producers to survive at the expense of
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importing industries of the country. It can thus be assumed that the ‘us against them’ attitude is more a ‘some of us against the rest of us’ game. When the government puts every effort into balancing the domestic interests, it needs to be accounted for and be perceived as a strong power. The 20th century French government-system is not that strong, mercantilism, following Kindleberger’s definition of mixing protectionism and nationalism, was ergo the logic answer. It was reintroduced in the 1920’s when France experienced becoming a ‘diminished giant’. Ever since, France only embarked upon discriminatory trade agreements, allowing a maximum of political rents for the country’s rulers, and at the lowest costs (Messerlin, 1996).
As the French were amongst the founders of the world liberal trade regime in the nineteenth century, the end of the twentieth century was of sharp contrast and many French economists even believed protection had become the best solution. Consequently, the old hostility against free trade was held intact. Messerlin’s article concludes that public opinion is crucial when defining the trading regime of a country. When wanting free trade, the public opinion needs to accept the concept. In this regard, it is not surprising that the French opposed free trade, as economic issues were only vaguely explained and translated through buzzwords and matters of credibility or confidence. No concrete economic arguments were given, which logically results in hostility by the people towards free trade. In trade, the matters of politics have the decisive power against economics (Messerlin, 1996). Harry Johnson expressed this well in the following statement: ‘One of the main themes that international economics has to teach about international relations is that most of the beliefs that motivate national policies are irrational, most of the alleged facts are not facts, and most of the alleged lessons of experience are the result of ignorance or falsification of the actual facts of experience’ (Johnson, 1977).
Messerlin believed that French attitude and trade policy, dominated by mercantilism in the 20th
century, should and could become more open to multilateral trade agreements and have a more positive position towards the rest of the world. He stressed the need for improvement within the inefficient and fragmented French bureaucracy and improvement of the debate on trade issues. As the European Union has reached a certain level of integration among EU member states, members have a ‘duty of interference’ now. This would translate for the French as providing a means to improve the French debate on trade issues (Messerlin, 1996).
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The Freedom of Movement also entails the free movement of goods and means. This translates in trade regimes as ‘free trade’. Taking into account the power of the public opinion toward the definition of the trade regime of the country, it is expected that the French will have a more negative, hostile attitude towards free trade within the European Union. This is thereby expected to translate into an extremely nationalistic discourse. Nonetheless, there is still some hope for a more positive attitude as the beginning of the 21st century is characterised by the hopes of Messerlin; a more open French attitude towards multilateral agreements and an increased positivity towards the world outside of France. This would accordingly be expressed through a more liberal and pro-European discourse.
At the end of the 20th century, the French joined The World Trade Organization (WTO), created after the Marrakesh agreement in 1994. It is aimed at multilateral trading and is widely known for being non-discriminatory, open, transparent and fair. France supports the WTO multilateral system and actively participates in disputes of settlement processes and the surveillance of protectionist practices (favouring the second part of my expectation). Nonetheless, France still aims to protect businesses from unfair practices to maintain conditions of fair competition within international trade and strengthen the multilateral trade system (France Diplomatie, 2018).
Brief history: popular French support for Europe
Since the 70’s France was considered as one of the most pro-Europe countries. Especially by the end of the 80’s where this attitude rose to a peak of more than 70% of French saying Europe was a ‘good thing’. Growing out of the initial period of suspicion, the people of France experienced the modernization of French economy and linked this success to the membership of the EEC (European Economic Community) (Cameron, 1996). However, the French were unaware that this confidence would soon drastically drop. The 1990’s are dominated by the Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties. Both of these treaties were the next integral steps towards European integration and implied a set of serious consequences for member-states who signed them. While the benefits of the Single European Act within the EEC were simple to explain, the benefits of the Maastricht treaty were more complex and more importantly even debatable. The latter entailed; a remote leap into the dark with the Monetary Union, uncertainty about less control on national borders and fears towards giving up an extent of national sovereignty, which consequently led to scepticism in many people’s
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attitudes towards change. A new type of EU-scepticism evolved with the establishment of the treaty: Euro-scepticism (Miller, 2000, pp. 37-39). Doubts and fears rose regarding the new currency, and so did hostility toward European integration. In 1998, the majority of the French public held the opinion that the Euro would be synonym to problems and complications. However, when the decision was made to join the Euro-zone, a slight shift in opinion reported a more favourable position toward the new currency (Strauss-Kahn, 1999, p. 94). Economy and Finance minister, Dominique Strauss-Kahn (1998), identified the main factor behind this shift of opinion to be: the change of the government in June 1997. A new package of tax measures was introduced to reduce the public sector borrowing (Strauss-Kahn, 1999, pp. 96-97). Secondly, the fact that France’s economy was deemed in line with the convergence criteria fuelled French pride, which probably influenced the more positive attitude as well (Miller, 2000, p. 40). With the 1992 referendum on the Maastricht treaty, two main groups of opinions were identified. On the one hand, the ones who would benefit from the new economic EU policies and on the other hand those who wouldn’t. The latter were described as blue collar workers and unemployed, who voted ‘no’ in the Maastricht treaty referendum (Moss, 1998, p. 70). In a similar way, a two-part division was found regarding the opinion towards the European Monetary Union (EMU). Households with an income of above 15.000 francs favoured the EMU, and saw rising opportunities with the innovation, but those with an income below the 15.000 francs only saw the inequalities growing (Strauss-Kahn, 1999, p. 100). People were burdened with the lack of choice and did not identify with the given options. Therefore a ‘crisis of representation’ crystallized public support for referenda. As with the Maastricht treaty France gave parts of its sovereignty to the European Union, and as sovereignty depends to a large extent of the international status of a state, the new diminished independence of France reopened a classic debate on Gaullist ideas of ‘grandeur’ and independence. Since the French revolution, France and its people need to feel independent and uphold its national motto: Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité (Miller, 2000, p. 40). Additionally, by the end of the 1990’s the concept of a democratic deficit caused a considerable amount of discontent. The French named it ‘inverted federalism’, as decisions that would influence the everyday life of French citizens were taken at such high levels that the ‘normal’ people could not control for them (Bouvet, 1998). Accordingly, the overall unease of the French population by the end of the 90s created a solid ground for Euroscepticism to flourish (Miller, 2000, p. 52).
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The results of the Maastricht treaty referendum concluded with a ‘petit oui’ (little yes). In fact only 51% were in favour of the treaty, which led to a clear distinction/division between the French citizens and political elite. Not surprisingly, but still a shock to the French sitting government, the 2005 referendum on a European constitution rejected the concept with 54.7% of the French public voting ‘no’. Interestingly, the Dutch public rejected the adoption of a European constitution at an even greater percentage of 61.6%. This provoked a shockwave through the EU institutions, as France and the Netherlands were amongst the founding fathers of the EU, considered top-students of the class, and always met the European credentials (Startin & Krouwel, 2013, p. 65). President Jacques Chirac, informed the people of France on the decision of holding a referendum during the annual Bastille-day speech in 2004, leaving one year for the media and the public to debate the issue. One of the motivations behind the referendum was Chirac’s idea that it would divide the Socialist Party. He did not expect the large rise of ‘no’ campaigners as polls initially predicted a victory for the ‘yes’ (Startin & Krouwel, 2013, p. 69). As part of campaign tactics, although not quite mentioned in the new constitution, the Bolkenstein Directive, permitting the free movement of services within the EU, was highly politicized (Cautres, 2005, p. 33). This provoked fear amongst the people who began to draw upon scenarios of unemployment, reform of the 35-hour workweek, the risk of the influx of foreigners ‘stealing’ French jobs (‘Polish plumbers’) and many other similar concerns. Furthermore, the question of EU enlargement was highly debated. As the French were not consulted on the decision of the EU enlargement in 2004, and according to the Eurobarometer (2003) actually 59% of the French opposed this enlargement, the issue remained a very sensitive one gaining lots of ‘no’ voters within the campaign. Together with the anti-Chirac factor and the big win within the 2002 election by extreme Right-wing politician: Jean-Marie Le Pen, the hostility toward the EU constitution was quasi evident and Chirac could have seen it coming (Startin N. , 2008).
Post-EU constitution referendum, research was done amongst the people to understand why the ‘no’ vote won. The Eurobarometer showed an overwhelming concern about the negative effects it would have had on the employment situation in France, which was considered weak. The draft was considered too liberal, economically speaking, and not addressing the social issues enough. Further on, 18 % of respondents within the Eurobarometer stated to oppose the French president, national government, or certain political parties (Startin & Krouwel, 2013, p. 72). As in France 78% of manual workers (blue-collar) voted ‘no’, which is 23% more than the average 55% rejecting the
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treaty, the socio-economic divide in ‘deux Frances sociologiques’ was very present (Duhamel & Grunberg, 2008, p. 79) The socio-economic status as evidently influencing the positive or hostile position towards EU enlargement became even clearer when votes of the unemployed were analysed. 79% of ‘chomeurs’(unemployed) voted ‘no’, while in more affluent, often urban areas, people prominently opted for the ‘yes’ vote according to the IPSOS and SOFRES polls (Startin & Krouwel, 2013, pp. 76-77).
Drawing on the information above, one would expect a two-sided discussion resulting in two discourses. One would think, in the basis of this brief history, that the opinion on the EU is basically positive or hostile. The socio-economic divide in two-sided France should then on the one side result in a Eurosceptic discourse, debating the democratic deficit of the EU and strongly encouraging referenda. On the other side, based on the theory presented, I would expect a more liberal pro-Europe discourse that would less support the idea of referenda as it diminishes the power of the EU institution. The question which then arises: is (are) there no in-between(s)?
National Identity
When researching the opinion of the public towards the Freedom of Movement within the EU there needs to be adequate focus on the broader picture at hand. As this Freedom is resulting from one of the pillars on which the EU stands, it is important to understand how people feel towards the entire concept of the European Union. Consequently, I will be much more likely to understand the stance of the French towards the Freedom of Movement. A study by Sean Carey, Oxford University, elaborated on the idea that national identity is one of the most valuable measurements for EU integration support. He developed a model of support suggesting that the public’s perception of national identity defines their individual choice of supporting EU integration. In this way, when feeling increased national identity, the people will feel less open to EU integration and vice-versa (Carey S. , 2002, p. 388). The creation of a European identity would bring lots of benefits and could lead to increased public support for EU integration (Leonnard, 1998).The future of EU integration dynamics is actually prospected to lay within the ability of the EU to create this European identity (Laffan, 1996). Little consensus exists amongst scholars on the idea of which
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concept exposes the national identity the most. Therefore Carey elaborated on three alternative conceptualisations of national identity.
First, the relationship toward the nation-state is explored (Blank, Schmidt, & Westle, 2001) . The national identity relates to one’s intensity of positive attachment to the nation state. The stronger this feeling towards the nation, the more people will oppose the idea of a United Europe (Carey S. , 2002, p. 391).
Secondly, Carey looks at the level of attachment to the national government vis-à-vis other geographic entities (Carey & Lebo, 2001). He defines the concept of terminal community, which is the highest political community towards which individuals feel allegiance to (Peter & Hunold, 1999). People sharing the idea of European identity would argue the EU to be their terminal community, and therefore accept the EU authority. Contrastingly, people who feel their terminal community on a lower level, national or even local, tend to reject the EU. They have a more hostile position regarding the EU taking power and sovereignty away from the national institutions (Carey S. , 2002, p. 392).
Thirdly, attention is given to the perceived cultural threat EU integration may poses towards national culture (McLaren, 2002). Antipathy towards cultures not being the national one should be measured and included in the study of public-support towards EU integration. When exploring this concept, McLaren asserted that people may be more concerned with the undervaluing of the nation, rather than the costs/benefits to their own day-to-day lives. As national culture is threatened by European integration, individuals supporting their nation-state oppose the idea of EU integration. Their fear may be expressed in the idea of the national language being used less or even lost, or the national identity and culture being less distinct, therefore explaining their hostile position toward EU integration (Carey S. , 2002, p. 393).
The French, stereotypically, are seen as these rude and arrogant people who do not speak to you unless your sentence begins with ‘Bonjour’ (Henley, 2011). They are prominently seen as having a strong national identity, but also to have great disagreement with their government as strikes happen on a daily basis. France being a considerably large country, people may refer more easily to the local governments rather than national or even higher. The EU is too far out of their reach; therefore identifying themselves with local entities is much easier.
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It is expected that the terminal community for the French lies within their national-government, which may be already quite distant for a variety of village people. The antipathy towards other cultures is expected to be high, as the French are a very proud people. The idea is that the rest of the world should learn French and you should adapt to French way of living whenever visiting the country. Considering these assumptions, the national identity of France is expected to be very strong and consequently according to Carey’s theory, the hostile position towards European Integration as well. Accordingly this would then translate in a nationalistic discourse favouring France above anything foreign. The idea of a European Identity or the identification with any European common feeling is furthermore not expected to show in any discourse when strictly following the theory. Nonetheless, I am inclined to suspect some moderate ideas about convergences between our European cultures to show in at least one discourse. Expressing my personal experience, in the era of Erasmus scholarships, and the ‘Nomad generation’, the younger respondents in this research are expected to have less of a strong National Identity towards France, therefore being more open minded towards other cultures not even limited to the EU. I expect to see this translate into a discourse that is more nationalistic, and a second discourse that has a more positive stance towards any foreign (non-French) culture.
II. One strong European Union
European Integration
The public’s attitude is significant in the shaping of the integration process within the European Union. The most obvious expressions of public opinion through referenda, lobbying, elections and public protest (well known by the French public), are often discussed by scholars in this field of study. Since the referendum on a European constitution resulted in a hostile no in France and the Netherlands, EU law struggles with enforcement means. It is therefore dependent on national governments together with public opinion compliance to be implemented (Caldeira & Gibson, 1995). It is needed to understand ‘how to positively influence’ the public opinion of each EU member state, in order to ensure compliance and warm feelings toward European integration.
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Mathew Gabel (1998), professor of political science at Washington University, provides five theoretical explanations to predict compliance with integration.
First, cognitive mobilization is argued to be characterizing the compliance level. The argument explains that when information on European integration is understood and increased in affluence, citizens get familiar with the concept and feel less threatened by it (Inglehart, Rabier, & Reif, 1991, p. 147).
Second, it is political values, shaped by socioeconomic conditions that define the public’s political attitude. When value priorities are concerned with economic and physical security they are labelled as materialist values. When people are more concerned with self-actualization and intellectual fulfilment, we speak of materialist values. Inglehart et al. (1991) argue that people with post-materialist values are most likely to support European integration as the EU stands for this societal, political and economic hub towards a most egalitarian society (Inglehart, Rabier, & Reif, 1991, p. 152).
The third theory concerns a utilitarian model of public support for European integration developed by Gabel and Palmer (1995). They argue that socioeconomic background influences public stance on the issue of EU integration. As, for example, the liberalization of capital markets benefits mostly people with higher incomes, since they are presented with greater investment opportunities, those individuals are most likely to embrace the concept of EU integration. In contrast, the people with lower incomes are less sensitive to this liberalization because of their dependence on labour wages defining respective welfare. These people are most hurt by the capital liberalization as it enables the wealthy to move their capital abroad instead of investing it within national labour demands (Frieden, 1991, p. 434).
Fourth, partisanship is identified to weight on people’s position towards EU integration. Right-wing party supporters are seen as more supportive of the integration, consequently Left party supporters are identified with a more hostile position (Inglehart, Rabier, & Reif, 1991). Left parties often link EU integration to supporting capitalism which contradicts their political norms (Wessels, 1995).
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Lastly, support for Government is stressed to define support for integration. Applying this to the case of France, the more the people trust the president to represent French interests vis-à-vis the EU, the greater the French will support EU integration (Franklin, Eijk, & Marsh, 1995).
Drawing upon these five theoretical explanations I proceed by applying them in the case of France. Regarding cognitive mobilization, evidence of the public debating European integration should be found in order to support the claim that was made above. As I will be conducting interviews with respondents it will naturally become clear rather whether they are familiar or not with the topic, and consequently support or have a more hostile position towards EU integration. As the interviews hopefully will result in identifying certain discourses amongst my respondents, different political values will rise within respective various discourses. I expect to label these discourses as material or post-material and conclude accordingly whether this confirms or disconfirms public support for integration. As utilitarian appraisals of integrative policy is based on socioeconomic background and, as explained later in this research, includes blue collar (lower income) and white collar (higher income) workers, I expect to see a difference between both groups and according form two different discourses. Elaboration on this follows within the research methodology. Ingelhart et al.’s theory on the influence of partisanship will be difficult to distinguish as respondents are not selected on this criterion specifically. It may be interesting to reflect on possible colours of the different discourses. While the respondents are not asked about their political party preference, the resulting discourses could still identify a certain political lenience. In this way the acceptance of EU integration could still be measured by partisanship. Lastly, when investigating survey scores from the Kantar Sofres Barometer OnePoint on public support for Emmanuel Macron May 2018, 41% of respondents said they trust in the President to resolve current public issues. 56% confirm they do not trust him, leaving 5% without stating an opinion (Meeus, 2018; AFP Liberation, 2018). In this respect, support for government is not very strong in France. I expect the respondents to express discontent with the current president of France, and therefore provide the discourses with hostile positions toward EU integration.
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Schengen: the Freedom of Movement
The free movement of persons is an old European dream and was written as economic goal in 1957 within the treaty of Rome (Barbier, 1997). Less than a year later, the countries of the Benelux (Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxemburg) joined together to sign a treaty for the economic union of the Benelux to start in 1960. The first article of the treaty stated: ‘economic union including the free movement of persons, merchandise, capital and services’ (Louette, 1998, p. 3). The intentions were purely economic and border control was to be shifted to the outer borders of the Benelux (Golenvaux, 1994). At the European level we were not yet ready to take this step; the free movement of persons was not yet aimed at. With the rise of international crime in the 1970s, member states of the EU realised they would need to instate cooperation beyond border control such as regarding custom services, policing and jurisdictions. Truck drivers, exasperated by red tape while passing EU borders, united in 1984 for a massive strike. It is only then, due to the annoyance the strike brought, that EU member states began to consider lighter border control (Sénat, 1992, p. 1)
The 14th of June 1985, in the small city of Luxemburg, the countries of France, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxemburg signed an accord aiming at: ‘the free trespassing of external borders by all people from EU member states and the free movement of merchandise and services’. Hence, the Schengen accord was the first step for the ‘European Union without internal borders’ (Louette, 1998, p. 5). There were two parts in the initial accord:
1. Measures that could be implemented on short term notice such as lightning border-control and restricting it to visual control without needing to stop vehicles.
2. Long term measures that needed more negotiation. These long term measures were aimed at suppression of any border control within the Schengen area and transferring those to the common Schengen border. This would implicate fighting against international crime and work against illegal immigration (Louette, 1998, p. 5).
After five years of negotiations, the application of the initial accord was presented in June 1990. The Schengen agreement is based on the essential principle of free trespassing of internal borders, and compensatory measures of policing and internal security. The Freedom of Movement was made concrete by ‘erasing’ the internal borders, and is supposed to benefit EU nationals, but also
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frequent visitors of the Schengen area. Compensatory measures were grouped in three sub-principles:
1. Controlling for immigration: a common convention was made fixing principles and responsibilities to the state in which the immigrant is asking for asylum. To fight clandestine immigration the convention developed harmonised conditions for entry of the Schengen area, and a common policy on delivering visas.
2. Fighting international crime: the EU aimed for harmonisation of legislation and a strong cooperation of competent services to prevent the import of drugs in the Schengen area. 3. Schengen Information System (SIS): this instrument, a database, is intended to help signal
illegal individuals or objects. Consultation of this database was also meant for controlling purposes when delivering a visa or residence permit (Louette, 1998, pp. 6-7).
Only when all the jurisdictional, technical and political conditions are put in place by all member-states, then the executive commission in charge of implementation of the convention would decide on the ‘coming into force’ of the Schengen agreement. Four years later, the 22nd of December 1994
the commission decided upon the ‘irreversible’ application of the Schengen agreement between nation states that fulfilled all the jurisdictional and technical preconditions prior to the 26th of March 1995. At the latter date, the treaty went into force for the following EU members: Belgium, The Netherlands, Luxemburg, France, Germany, Spain and Portugal (Louette, 1998, p. 7).
Naturally, the implementation of the Schengen agreement encountered difficulties. They translate into the complexity of certain measures, the technical level of certain subjects, and the limitations to intergovernmental cooperation when restrictions regarding national laws are encountered (Louette, 1998, p. 51).
Concentrating on France, the government chose the tactic of isolation politics, as they focused on security measures of the Schengen agreement in detriment of the principle of open borders. It is on the matters of limited immigration that France encountered the least of problems. This is considered paradoxical with the past of the European Union, as Europe has always been a ‘land of open doors’ for all foreigners. In France, many anti-federalists are found to contradict the idea of European integration. Many debates held by the ‘pro-French’ and ‘anti-Maastrichtians’, and the operated isolation politics towards Schengen, demonstrated the French hostility to submit to a supranational entity (Louette, 1998, p. 52). To cite Jean-Sébastien Louette, researcher for CRISP (centre of
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research and information on socio-politics):‘The political culture of France, attached to a tradition, which is very attached to its roots, to its territorial and national integrity. The borders and the preservation of them form a more symbolical element rather than physical. They form, to the eyes of the opponents of opening of the borders, efficient and psychological barriers, showing that the usual national prerogatives still and will always belong to the Nation, and this regardless of what federalists say.’ (Louette, 1998, p. 52).
Bearing in mind the very nationalistic French position towards the supranational organisation, that is the European Union, and the difficulties of letting go to some extent of sovereign powers, is expected to translate in at least one discourse on the Freedom of Movement within the EU. I predict that this French pride will translate through public opinion, or at least in some of the respondents in this research, in a more anti-federalist discourse on the EU.
Transposition of Directive 2004/38/EC
The European Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, justice and Home Affairs commissioned a study to analyse the current status of transposition of Directive 2004/38/EC, concerning the free movement for EU citizens (Leigh, Chateau, Morel, & Buschel, 2016). The 2008/2009 European Commission’s report stated that France had not respected the deadline for transposition of the Directive 2004/38/EC. Most of the directive had actually been implemented into French law but some issues still needed to be addressed (definition of partnership, delays in registration with authorities and proportioned sanctions, access to permanent residence etc.). When considering the conditions of ‘sufficient resources’ for people that want to immigrate to France, the French legislation refers to the fixed amount if minimum income for people with low income (French RSA). Within the French law the approach to the directive is much more restrictive than its initial intention by the EU. The French demand proof of the amount of resources and rather there is continuity in time. Other persisting barriers by legislation in France are restriction in equal treatment for social benefits and registration for healthcare for EU citizens. Furthermore, with regards to access to employment (there is discrimination going on and EU citizens are excluded from some of the public jobs), recognition of professional qualifications, and taxes are respective obstacles for EU citizens as well. Hence, the administrative burdens and excessive bureaucracy led
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to unreasonable delays. The French in general are very keen on upholding their Civil Code to high standards. Marriages of convenience are strictly forbidden and the law imposes criminal penalties on the offence of marriage to obtain a residence permit/French nationality. There exists a criterion in which an EU citizen’s family can be ordered to leave the French territory. This can be applied when the family members do not fulfil the conditions for residence rights, or his/her conduct poses a real treat to French society. An order to leave France can even be issued on the basis of the assumption that the family member may benefit from social security one day, thereby France contravenes the wording of Directive 2004/38/EC (Leigh, Chateau, Morel, & Buschel, 2016, pp. 7-8). It can be argued that a power-struggle is going on here. The French make the EU legislation even stricter domestically, or overdo it and then contradict the EU Directive.
III. The 21st century, decades of crisis
Crisis and politicization
As commonly known, the EU has experienced three major crises during the last decade. These are namely; the economic crisis, the refugee/migration crisis and the 2016 ‘Brexit’ decision by the UK referendum. These crises have brought along the increasing politicization of European issues and consequently voter pessimism empowering the perfect context for Euroscepticism (Ivaldi, 2018). For all the Populist Radical Right (PRR) parties in Europe, the French Front National (FN) is considered as prototype for PRR parties in Western Europe (Mudde, 2007, p. 41). France has endured the crisis in various degrees but, nonetheless, the FN has gained many votes and power since the beginning of the economic crisis in 2008 (Ivaldi, 2018). It has been acknowledged that since the mid 1990’s, the FN has taken the leading role of spreading Euroscepticism across France. Since then, the party has been pressuring the French government to take their sovereignty back from Europe. The party is of the opinion that a ‘loose coalition’ of states within Europe is sufficient cooperation (Hainsworth, O'Brien, & Mitchell, 2004, p. 47). Ivaldi argues further that the FN has adjusted its position within EU issues to exploit the opportunities produced by the crises.
During the financial crisis, the Euro-crisis, the FN advocated that France should urgently leave the EU translating it into ‘Frexit’. They even compared the EU to the ‘Trojan horse of globalization’
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and as an urgent threat to the domestic French welfare state (Ivaldi, 2018). France endured the terrorist attacks of Charlie Hebdo, the Bataclan, the Nice attacks and many more, all of them connected to Extremist Islamic terrorism. Moreover, as the country was ‘flooded’ by immigrants living together in the ‘jungle of Callais’, the 2017 presidential campaign agenda was easily set for the FN. Party leader Marine le Pen accused migrants of being a criminal threat and a burden for the French social system. Linking the migration and terrorist crises, she stressed the immediate closure of the French border (Ivaldi, 2018, pp. 8-9).
In Le Pen’s Presidential manifesto she stated she would lead France to leave the Schengen agreement and reinstate the national border. She pledged to repatriate all illegal immigrants and to even put a stop on legal immigration. Furthermore, she opposed family reunion rights to migrants and promised to close all ‘extremist’ mosques and strip jihadists from their French nationality after deporting them (FN, 2017). This harsh stance may be effective on a short-term notice during crisis, but is not very credible for a long term governmental profile attracting the moderated and majority of all voters (Ivaldi, 2018).
Concluding Ivaldi argues that ‘populism provides for the critique of Europe as elite-driven project going against the will of the people’ (Ivaldi, 2018, p. 14). This is in line with the anti-system idea, but works against the ability of gaining governmental credibility. As the FN aims to enter a government coalition, it should tone down its position on Europe as the prevailing attitude in France is still pro-Europe (Ivaldi, 2018).
As described by Ivaldi, the moderated voters/citizens constitute the majority of French population. Nonetheless, I do not doubt that the Extreme Right-wing political ideology will be identified in at least one discourse. This does not mean I expect the PRR values to dominate the different discourses identified. Relying on Ivaldi’s reasoning, as currently Europe, and more specifically France, is not in the heat of an imminent crisis, the majority of identified discourses are expected to be moderate and more pro-Europe rather than Eurosceptic.
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Right-Wing Populism: Front National
The core clientele of Extreme Right-wing parties are suggested to be the working class, mostly blue collar citizens of the country. The French Extreme Right-wing party is called the French National Front (FN) ( (Mayer N. , 2002). With this in mind, what are the incentives of workers to vote for the FN? A significant article produced by Daniel Oesch, professor at the University of Lausanne, advances three prominent explanations: the economic conflict, the cultural conflict and the concept of alienation. Extreme Right-wing parties are dependent on the support of those who have more to lose rather than to win. The article draws upon the example of opening the borders of the EU. While the latter brought mostly positive socio-economic change, the FN underlined the idea of invasion by non-French workers who would ‘steal’ French jobs. Voting FN is described by the party as voting to protect French-jobs and wage competition within this new labour-migration and international trade society (Oesch, 2008). The cultural conflict is fuelled by expressing the unease with multiculturalism and expressing the unfairness of equal rights for foreigners that ‘do not work as hard as the French do’. There is the challenge of immigration and accepting differences of culture which requires a kind and open mind. Oesch argues that (blue-collar) workers may be ill-equipped to deal with this challenge. Thirdly, there is a link with the concept of alienation. As citizens increasingly feel dissatisfied with their governments and political systems, they will vote for the steadiest anti-system and alternative for strong western-European politics, mainly Extreme Right-wing parties (FN for France in this case). Oesch also argues that the alienation is amplified as trade unions are not taken seriously anymore (Oesch, 2008). The unions may shout very loudly, but does the government really listen? A significant example is that of ‘la CGT’ in France, where in most cases when there are demands of change and large protests news headlines scream: ‘The government doesn’t want to listen’ (Le Figaro, 2018). Consequently, the working-class institutions get weakened, as even with great manifestations they are not empowered to make a change. With the unfolding of such events, people have thereby started to lose faith in the democracy of the state of France. The main conclusion of the article by Oesch is that economic parameters play a smaller role than is often assumed for the rise of Right-wing populism. There is more fear of the ‘negative influence’ from immigrants on the country’s culture than on its economy (Oesch, 2008).
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Consequently, this increasingly pessimistic view is expected to be identified within a discourse on the freedom of movement within the EU. I expect to find expressions of discontent towards migrants, the ‘stealing’ of jobs and expressions that are on the verge of racist, discriminatory political views.
Terrorised France
As the Oxford dictionary is one of world’s most trusted dictionaries, I looked up the definition of terrorism. The definition is exhibited as follows: Terrorism: The unlawful use of violence and intimidation, especially against civilians, in the pursuit of political aims. (Oxford dictionnary, 2018). As it is very difficult to define the term, and while this definition brings some clarity to the idea of terrorism, I deem it not yet specific enough for the case of France. Therefore, I looked deeper into the subject and found, though resembling the largely scholarly accepted definition, a slightly more specific definition of terrorism that better explains the events in France: ‘a systematic campaign of discriminate violence against public civilian targets to influence a wider audience’ (Fortuna, 2015, p. 522). It is the influence of terrorist actions on the public opinion that is of interest in this particular research.
First let us take a step back and reflect upon the violent terrorist attacks that have occurred in France in the past couple of years. Almost instantly, the issues of terrorism and security became France’s main priority, and deemed the ‘most important problem’ by public opinion (Mayer, Michelat, Vitale, & Tiberj, 2016). Starting off the year of 2015, 17 people lost their lives as the headquarters of satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo and a Jewish Hyper Casher supermarket were attacked in Paris between the 7th and 9th of January. This was the first wave of fear induced on the French people. Not even a year later, in November 2015, the deadliest terrorist attack since WWII occurred in Paris again. 130 people lost their lives and many more were injured during the attacks in the football stadium in Saint-Denis, a crowded street with restaurants, and the concert venue ‘Le Bataclan’. It was a second unanticipated blow for the French that truly shook the French population and affected the rest of Europe as well as the western world. The next summer in June 2016, a married couple, both police officers, were brutally murdered in their own home in the name of Islamic-state. Their children were left terrorised but physically unharmed. As of July 2016, a so called ‘lone wolf’ terrorist drove into large crowds celebrating Bastille-day in Nice. 86 people died that night and
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over 400 were left injured (Mayer & Tiberj, 2016) Just over a week later, a Church was hijacked in Normandy and two terrorists coldly beheaded the priest and held hostage five other parishioners (Mayer & Tiberj, 2016). Recently terrorism stroke again in March 2018, a man stole a car killing its passenger and injuring its owner in the process. He then drove to a local supermarket and took hostages inside with him. His main goal was to demand the liberation of Salah Abdeslam, the only terrorist that survived the November 2015 Paris attacks. Consequently, 4 people were killed and 15 left injured. While Daesh’s caliphate and de facto capitals in Syria and Iraq have supposedly imploded (Arab news, 2017), the Islamic State still echoes their extremist school of thought through the internet and more specifically social media. The threat is still very imminent which logically should translate through public opinion and the expression of fear (Deugis & Pelletier, 2018).
It is argued that for the French ideological identity, meaning the left or right political stream, serves as the voter’s compass (Lewis-Beck, 1984, p. 446). The left-wing political stream is characterised by economic egalitarianism, accepting ethnic and social minorities, and protection of personal rights. The more right-wing political stream engages with free-market politics and respect for tradition (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003). An important aspect of expressing the support for the right wing ideology lies within psychological motives. Jost et al. explain that these motives might be concerned with: 1. the need to reduce uncertainty and; 2. having increased fears of death. These feelings may be temporary, and thus the shift of political priorities as well (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003). Terrorist attacks might be creating such momentary contexts.
Three claims proposed by Brouard et al. to understand public opinion after terrorist attacks are: the Reactive Liberals Hypothesis (RLH), the Terror Management Theory (TMT), and the Bayesian Updating Theory (BUT) (Brouard, Vasilopoulos, & Foucault, 2018).
RLH identifies the group of left-wing supporters shifting to right-wing values in the aftermath of a terrorist attack. It is argued that this occurs because the right-wing supports policies advocating social control. As the latter is wished for after a terrorist attack, left-wingers, due to the threat, will behave like right-wingers (Nail, McGrefor, Drinkwater, Steele, & Thompson, 2009).
TMT argued that one’s political beliefs, be it right-wing, or left-wing, are intensified when reminded of mortality and therefore infused with anxiety (Kosloff, Greenberg, & Solomon, 2010).
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While RLH argues one shifts of political view, TMT says a liberal will become more liberal and a socialist even more social.
BUT focuses on the idea that provision of quantitative or highly qualitative information regarding a focussing event (here the terrorist attack), will produce consensus among people regardless of their prior beliefs. The Bayesian model is inclined to converge the different opinions amongst the people. As terrorist attacks account for large amounts of information, this convergence should occur. Following terrorist attacks, BUT expects the convergence will lean towards the right-wing ideology in the specific field of security as the latter is central to the public’s concern and issued information (Boydstun, Hardy, & Walgrave, 2014; Bullok, 2009).
With regards to these claims, it will be interesting to find out what kind of discourses will result from the interviews and to assign one of the three claims to the discourses when possible. In the case that a discourse expresses the need for better protection from the government, and other discourses which claim that the Freedom of Movement policy is adequate but does not weigh up to ensuring security, I would link this to RLH. When I identify strong demands for more security but not at the expense of any sacrifices related to the Freedom of Movement or social policies, I would link the discourse to the BUT. Finally, when identifying very strong and extremist discourses I would be inclined to link this to the suggestions of TMT.
EU Refugee, Migration crisis
As we approach the summer of 2018, and we may not be at the highest point of an imminent EU crisis however, the European Union and international community are still in the process of resolving the EU migration crisis as well as the threat of transnational terrorism. Because crises were defined as factors that influence the public opinion I stress the need to provide accurate information. It is when people have a lack of information or exposure to certain proofs, that their minds may fill the blank spaces with imagination and fear. In the news, papers and national debates the word migrant is often amalgamated with refugees and displaced people. Therefore I will proceed by stating the accurate definitions according to Paolo Bargiacchi, Professor of international law at Kore University, Italy:
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Refugee(s): ‘all people fearing with reason to be persecuted on basis of race, religion, nationality, belonging to a certain social minority or because of their political opinions, finding themselves in ‘another country’ as of their personal nationality, and who cannot, because of this fear, ask protection in their own respective country. The ‘other country’, when it decides to welcome these persons on their own territory, are obliged to guarantee them their jurisdictional protection.’ (European Commission, 1951).
Displaced person(s): ‘third-country nationals, who had to leave their country or were evacuated from their originated region, to which return on a stable and secure long-term base is impossible because of the situation in that country, in particular, for war-zones or places where basic Human Rights were not assured (European Commission, 2001). The ‘other country’, when it decides to welcome these persons on their own territory, are obliged to guarantee them immediate or temporary protection, until the nation of origin is safe again and the third-country national benefited from temporary protection.’ (European Commission, 2001).
Migrant(s): ‘people that are not escaping some individual persecution or armed conflict, but are looking for better living conditions in another nation-state. The ‘other country’ is by no international means obliged to accept this person on their territory and may decide on his/her faith according to national law (Bargiacchi, 2012, pp. 361-362).
It is essential to provide the European citizens with accurate and simple information. In this way people may feel more included in the public debate. The media nowadays mostly reports on ‘sensational’ issues. Headings of newspapers scream: ‘1016 migrants evacuated from Paris’ (Le Figaro, 2018), ‘Why economic migrants are heroes’ (Le Monde, 2018), ‘the indifference vis-à-vis migrants takes me by the throat’ (La Tribune, 2018), and ‘Migrants, the tension between Humanity and Firmness’ (Les Echos, 2018). The latest headings incite sympathy towards migrating peoples. Most of them explain the difficulties these people encounter and how bad they are treated by the French government. The media paints a picture of this heartless government dominated by Right-wing parties. With the new law proposition on ‘Asylum and Migration’, Right-Right-wing parties expressed their fears on the draft not protecting the French against clandestine migration and on the contrary, encouraging economic-migrants to come to France (Le Figaro, 2018). Left-wing parties have a completely opposite stance and backed the law proposal, the French socialists claim: ‘We have helped, we help and we will help all migrating persons in need’ (Le Monde, 2018), no
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differentiation is made, only solidarity with migrants. Clear judgement is felt in every article, objectivity is hardly found.
I expect the lack of clear and objective information provision by the media and the government created some sphere of doubt within the public opinion. As the people lack substantial information, their opinion is not very clear cut. They may not be sure of their support or opposition towards the European Union or what their stance is on the whole migration crisis. I expect the media to be of great influence in steering the public view. As the articles in many newspapers tend to retrieve sympathy for migrating people, the discourses of the respondents in this research are expected to express more empathy towards the issue of migration as well. Should the media take another stance on the issue, and report more on how jobs must be shared with the new-comers in France, then the public opinion would be most hostile to the migrants.
Macron, EU’s best student
By the spring of 2017, the EU was boarding a crucial moment concerning national elections. The Netherlands, Germany and France were on the verge of committing to populism when trusting the election polls. At that moment Presidential candidate Emmanuel Macron debated with foreign minister of Germany the future of Europe. Mr. Macron judged Europe to be at a death point, not proposing or taking any new actions. Furthermore, he proclaimed a lot of injustice is perceived, mostly regarding the Euro zone. The great risk, he stressed, is that the governments actually implementing reforms will get weakened because of the inequalities within Europe. As the inequalities persist, the reforms will not be fruitful which in their turn will be felt in the political and social arena (public opinion). E. Macron has a straightforward opinion, the French should take responsibility. In the last 15 years France lost faith in the other European countries and did not implement the reforms it engaged itself to. France needs now to restore its credibility regarding economic and budget affairs, and engage on this solidarity path with the other members of the European Union. It is not only solidarity on the economic part that is aimed for however. The path is also concerned with immigration, common security measures at the boarders and defence collaborations in the Middle-East and Africa (Habermans, Gabriel, & Macron, 2017).
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The question that rises now is: will Macron be this game changer for Europe and the euro area? As Macron himself stated, he wants to work very closely with Germany to enforce the strength of Europe. German economist Daniel Gros is of the opinion that the bargaining position between France-Germany is quite weak. As the French presidential position got some new air, Merkel is still the status quo for Germany, making not much of a change in her way of thinking or perceiving issues. The more important part to realize for Macron is that political and economic stability at home is the pre-condition for European issues to be successful. When achieving this stability at home, the alliance with Germany could bring actual progress and prosperity to the European Union (Gros, 2017).
As Emmanuel Macron was elected president in France, it seems that the majority of voting citizens in France endorse and support his opinion. Therefore his projects for Europe and the idea of taking responsibility and stepping up the French European game by collaborating very closely with Germany seemingly appears to be well-received by the majority. This is expected to translate in at least one discourse that would be pro-Europe and has a positive attitude towards the future.
IV. Concluding Remarks
In this chapter I laid out the theoretical foundations needed to understand the French positions towards the European Union and its Freedom of Movement. By doing so I have formulated 10 ideas for the discourses I expect to identify to live amongst French public opinion. These were extracted separately from each theoretical foundation, but may overlap in some way. I will proceed by giving an overview of the expectations and identify where they overlap.
The first section ‘Mercantilism, the French way’ allowed me expect older respondents in this research will voice a very nationalistic discourse and the younger respondents a more liberal pro-European discourse. In the second section ‘Brief history: popular French support for Europe’, I identified a socio-economic divide in France resulting in a quite similar expectation as the first one: a Eurosceptic and a pro-European discourse. Still, I question if the discourses are limited to this specific dichotomy, is (are) there no in-between(s)? The third section ‘National-Identity’ draws
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upon the same expectation of two opposing discourses. The distinguishing part of these similar expectations is that they are based on different reasoning but still result in almost identical expectations. In the section ‘European integration’ I explained how the attitude of the public is critical in shaping the integration process of the European Union. The different concepts identified within this section will allow for measuring the level of (dis)approval of EU integration. The section on the Schengen agreement drew upon the French being very patriotic, even nationalistic. Together with the sections on ‘Crisis and politicization’ and ‘Right-wing Populism: Front National’, I expect a somewhat ‘Extreme Right-wing political values’ expressing discourse to emerge. This adds a third dimension to the two-sided debate I expected from the beginning of the study. As terrorism is identified to very much influence public opinion, I decided to investigate how to measure and label this influence. I will do so with the three claims proposed by Brouard et al. to understand public opinion after terrorist attacks. These claims consist of: The Reactive Liberals Hypothesis (RLH), the Terror Management Theory (TMT), and the Bayesian Updating Theory (BUT) (Brouard, Vasilopoulos, & Foucault, 2018). The last two theoretical sections draw upon the idea that the media mostly influences public opinion by framing the news, and the concept that Macron’s positive stance towards the EU will translate in public opinion as well. This would then add a fourth dimension to the possible discourses to be identified as being a very much pro-European discourse.
This leaves me with the summing expectation that I will identify four discourses. The first discourse will be composed of an extremely pessimistic, nationalistic and Eurosceptic discourse which expresses PRR party values. Furthermore, the second discourse will be a somewhat Eurosceptic discourse that is favouring France over the EU, but still has a somewhat moderate attitude towards the EU. Thirdly, a discourse that is expressing support for the European Union and the Freedom of Movement that comes with it, but acknowledges that a lot needs to change so that the EU will function as it is supposed to. Lastly, I may identify a very positive discourse that is very much in favour of the EU and expresses that the EU is ‘a good thing’.
As I laid out the theoretical framework and academically backed concepts explaining why the French think what they think, I will now proceed to explaining the methodology of my on research. I will be using Q-methodology as mentioned previously in order to find the prevalent discourses concerning the Freedom of Movement within Europe amongst the respondents of this research.
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Chapter 3: Methodology and Operationalisation I. Q: a five-step methodology
In most researches we rely on Regular factor Analysis, ‘R-method’, to find correlations between variables across a sample of subjects. Within this research I aim to understand the French position within the discourse on the freedom of movement within Europe. Therefore a more adequate research method is needed with which I can identify the thoughts and discourses amongst the French.
Q-methodology does exactly this; it describes the different viewpoints/opinions that live amongst the people (Risdon, Eccleston, Crombez, & McCracken, 2003). The method aims to systematically study the subjectivity of people, their viewpoints, beliefs, opinions, attitudes etc. (Brown S. , A primer on Q methodology. Operant Subjectivity, 1993). Implicit, in Q methodology, is the idea that all individuals can develop a coherent viewpoint (Dryzek J. , Handle with Care: The Deadly Hermeneutics of Deliberative Instrumentation, 2005). We then focus on the range of viewpoints that are favoured and shared by specific groups of participants. Consequently, the method typically and very deliberately studies constructions and representations of a social kind (Moscovici, 1981).
Nonetheless being the study of subjectivity, Q allows for a ‘scientific’ approach. Numerous scientists have called it the ‘science of subjectivity’ or ‘the method for scientific study of human subjectivity (Previte, Pini, & Haslam-McKenzie, 2007). Nonetheless it is Stenner and Stainton Rogers who have given the research technique an actual label: ‘qualiquantological’, reflecting both features the methodology embodies (Previte, Pini, & Haslam-McKenzie, 2007). Furthermore, what makes the technique unique is the fact that it does not impose meaning to data, nor test its participants a priori. Opposing regular research techniques, it generates personal profiles and attributes meaning and significance to data a posteriori through interpretation (Brown S. R., 1980, p. 54).
In sum, to engage with Q methodology the first step is to identify the particular concourse under investigation. This refers to: ‘the flow of communicability surrounding any topic [in] the ordinary conversation, commentary, and discourse of every-day life’ (Brown S. , A primer on Q methodology. Operant Subjectivity, 1993). This concourse has direct influence and even dictates the research question of the study. As in quantitative research you are expected to develop
