Policies for return migration in Germany : a clash of declared development aid goals and national interests?

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Graduate School of Social Sciences

MSc Thesis in Political Science, International Relations

Policies for return migration in Germany

A clash of declared development aid goals and

national interests?

Miriam Schröer – 11265531 Supervisor: dr. Sijeong Lim Second reader: dr. Franca van Hooren

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Abstract

This master thesis deals with the potential of return migration as a channel of brain gain for emigration countries in the Global South. It first provides an overview over literature on the phenomenon of brain drain and presents possible channels through which international migration can benefit the development of sending countries. Recent research has led to a reassessment of the effects of migration on development, opening the possibility of “brain gain”. Consent exists on the prospects related to return migration. Despite its potential, this channel remains understudied in the existing literature. Whereas current scholars focus predominantly on action that can be taken by the home countries of emigrants to provide incentives to potential returnees, the role receiving countries can play is neglected.

This study explores return migration policies of the migrant receiving country Germany with regard to their contribution to the prospect of brain gain. It does so by applying Jean-Pierre Cassarino’s notion of the returnee’s preparedness to German return migration policies. The theoretical framework is based on the central role that resource mobilisation and the duration of stay play in order for the migration experience to be conductive to brain gain upon return. Hence, it will be qualitatively analysed to what extend the policies contribute to these variables.

The purpose of this study is to show to what extend German return migration policies contribute to the prospect of brain gain. This will be done by analysing German return migration policy documents and web contents that are publicly available with regard to their contribution to the returnee’s preparedness. The result of the analysis shows that German return migration policies do not substantially contribute to the returnee’s preparedness and therewith undermine the development potential inherent in the channel of return migration. In the course of this analysis, incoherencies between declared development aid goals and return migration policies in Germany become visible, which reflects that national materialistic interests take precedence over declared development aid goals.

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1. Introduction

The emigration from developing countries to developed countries has been studied broadly, both determinants and consequences have been subject of research. One focus of scholars in this field has been on the effects of emigration on the formation of human capital in the sending countries. A popular theory dealing with this subject is the brain drain theory. In short, it states that the emigration of the highly skilled from developing to developed countries would reduce the ability of the home country to build up human capital (Dulam and Franses 2015: 2339). However, human capital accumulation is crucial for growth in poor countries (Hussain 2015: 310). Thus, the settling of a considerable proportion of emigrants in rich countries acts as a detriment to human capital accumulation in developing countries. For the sending countries, it is hard to provide incentives to the emigrants to return. (ibid) Therefore, the phenomenon captured by the term brain drain is one of the biggest concerns developing countries have about migration, and it has been amplified by the rapid increase in skilled emigration in recent years.

Initially, the academic discussion focussed on the negative effects the emigration of a share of the educated population would have on the home country of the emigrants. More recently, however, possible positive effects the migration of the highly skilled can have on the sending countries have been explored as well, an approach captured in the brain gain theory. One channel through which brain gain can operate is for example an increased incentive to invest in education, stimulated by prospective migration opportunities. Higher education investment increases human capital in the sending country, as not all people who consider the option to migrate will eventually do so. Finally, higher human capital will increase welfare and boost development. Another way how brain gain can operate is through remittances the emigrants send back home to their families. (Gibson and McKenzie 2011: 18)

One channel and its potential effect has been emphasised in the literature dealing with brain gain: return migration. Mayr and Peri claim that, combined with the incentive channel, the return migration channel has the potential to reverse the brain

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6 drain into significant brain gain for the sending country (Mayr and Peri 2008: 1). The existing literature on brain drain, as well as, even though only since more recently, on brain gain, is very large. Thanks to more and better data, recent studies can rely on larger samples and more detailed information than preceding studies, which led to a renewed interest in the theories of brain drain as well as brain gain and in testing the hypotheses they formulate. (Dulam and Franses 2015: 2340)

In this thesis, I am tying in with this renewed interest. I am motivated by the great development potential of return migration, as pointed out in the literature. The return migration of highly educated workers is a central and overlooked mechanism of brain gain from international mobility. It is especially noteworthy as it constitutes not only a marginal phenomenon, since one fourth of all migrants return, and even more in the case of the highly educated. (Mayr and Peri 2008: 2)

Return migration is a relatively understudied subject in the literature on brain gain. Especially understudied is the role of migrant receiving countries’ policies. Besides the migrant her- or himself and the home country of the migrant, the migrant receiving country might be a third crucial actor in this process. The receiving country as unit of study is furthermore interesting when taking into account the fact that the receiving country can commonly be expected to be able to resort to bigger resources to provide impactful policies, as compared to the poorer sending countries. Local attempts in the sending countries to influence the trend of brain drain can be expected not to be sufficient to make a difference, as external incentives for local educated people to emigrate are likely to remain high, which motivates my focus on receiving countries. In that sense, receiving countries can be considered as valuable part of the international migration regime driving the trend of brain drain and potentially brain gain.

Germany, as a particularly migrant attracting country, is an interesting case to observe as a receiving country involved in the process of brain drain and potentially brain gain. I am expecting that Germany, as country that takes a leading role in development aid engagement, facilitates return migration in order to support development in poor countries. In this thesis, I am thus exploring how German return migration policies

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7 utilize the potential of the brain gain channel of return migration. Since skill-oriented incentive structures in host countries are mentioned among the reasons why emigration from developing countries has become increasingly threatening for the latter, I will also include information about incentives given to the highly skilled to stay in Germany. Thereby, I aim at putting return migration policies into a wider perspective. A complete picture shall be painted, as even if return may be supported through policies, incentives provided to stay may eventually substantially influence the decision to return. In that way, the inclusion of selective migration incentives in the analysis and the final conclusion serves the interest of relativizing the findings related to return migration.

The outline of my thesis is as follows. In the following literature review, I will present the current state of knowledge regarding brain drain, brain gain and the channel of return migration. After that, I am going to introduce the theoretical framework which borrows from Jean-Pierre Cassarino’s notion of the returnee’s preparedness. Cassarino claims that the potential of return migration to support development upon return is conditional. The factors on which the prospect of brain gain through return migration depends will be explained and operationalized. In part four, I will point out my methodological proceeding, which includes a justification of the case selection Germany. Then, I will present my empirical analysis and its results. Finally, I will draw conclusions from the findings and thereby answer the research question whether and how German migration policies contribute to the prospect of brain gain, before pointing out policy implications and suggesting objects of study for future research.

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2. Literature review

In the following, I will present the literature relevant to this thesis. It can be separated into two main strains: Literature about the brain drain on the one hand and literature regarding return migration on the other. I will start by presenting the phenomenon of brain drain and mechanisms through which it affects development in the Global South. After that, I will present return migration as a potential way of making temporary migration a valuable tool that can serve the goal of advancing development. Finally, I will point out my contribution to the existing literature. Based on the finding that while the literature on the effect of brain drain is inconclusive, there is a broad consensus that the return migration of skilled workers is valuable and beneficial for developing countries, I will argue that among many factors, the policies of developed, receiving countries are important to make sure developing, sending countries benefit from the return migration.

2.1 Brain drain

2.1.1 Definition of terms

The term brain drain is popularly used and describes the migration of scientists, academics, doctors, engineers and others with university training from one country to another. When discussing the brain drain from the underdeveloped countries to the advanced countries, however, it makes sense to apply a broader definition and include students who have left their developing home country for the purpose of studying in an advanced country and who have eventually stayed in the latter. (Adams 1968: 233) Far more efforts to define the concept of brain drain have been made. Out of this big pool of definitions, I want to mention one more because it addresses the role of the receiving countries. It is a UNESCO report from 1968 saying: “[…] the ‘brain drain’ could be defined as an abnormal form of scientific exchange between countries, characterized by a one-way migratory flow in favour of the most highly developed countries. The root cause of this process lies in the fact that countries at different stages of scientific and technological development have correspondingly different scientific and technical manpower requirements. Its more immediate cause is the

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9 receiving countries’ wish to acquire productive intellectual capital as quickly and as cheaply as possible. This leads them to encourage selective immigration in various ways (immigration policy, recruiting of foreign specialists, advertising, etc.).” (UNESCO 1968: 45)

In this UNESCO report, it is stated that the brain drain was in favour of rich receiving countries and thereby suggests that it was unfavourable for the sending countries. This claim is based on the finding that the emigration of the highly skilled from developing to developed countries would reduce the ability of the home country to build up human capital (Dulam and Franses 2015: 2339). Because human capital accumulation constitutes one of the “leading engines of growth in capital scarce countries” (Hussain 2015: 310), the poor sending countries would substantially suffer under the drain.

Thus, the definition stresses the demand of intellectual capital of developed countries as a cause of brain drain. This demand is reflected in selective migration policies of developed countries such as Germany. But what about return migration policies? Return migration policies in favour of return of the skilled have the potential to be an additional factor at play in this mechanism. I observe that the factor has been neglected and assume that in theory, it might relativize the idea of the UNESCO that the migration of the highly skilled would be exclusively “in favour of the most highly developed countries”. If there are policies efficiently promoting return migration in a way that allows for brain gain in the home countries, then the migration of the skilled might as well be in favour of less developed countries. Selective migration policies of wealthy countries, then, could no longer be accused as causing the negative consequences of brain drain. On the opposite, such skilled migrant attracting policies might even benefit the positive effect return migration can have.

2.1.2 Brain drain vs. brain gain

Whereas early scholars dealing with brain drain had predominantly negative forecasts for its effects on sending countries, more recent theoretical and empirical literature on migration of skilled labour forces from less developed countries has revaluated the

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10 possibility that international labour mobility may benefit human capital in the sending countries in the long run. Three channels have been emphasized: incentives, remittances and returns. Through these channels, the mobility of the highly skilled could turn out to be a chance for the developing wold.

Regarding the incentive channel, the theoretical literature has noticed that the mere access to international labour markets may induce people in poorer countries to pursue higher education. To be more precise, the fact that returns to human capital are higher abroad than domestic returns is the particular trigger in this process. This finding has been presented by Elmenstein and Stark (1998), who was followed by Beine, Docquier and Rapoport (2001), Stark (2003), Schiff (2005) and Beine, Docquier and Rapoport (2006). The incentive mechanism is effective only due to the uncertainty of migration. That means that even if many people want to migrate and therefore invest into education (and relatively more than if they did not intend to migrate in the first place), a share of this group will not migrate eventually, due to immigration laws and procedures, as well as unforeseeable events that made them change their minds. So in short, the incentive channel in combination with the eventual uncertainty of migration might result in greater acquisition of education by people who end up staying in the country. Whether this mechanism is only a theoretical curiosum or has empirical relevance has been tested by Beine, Docquier and Rapoport (2006) using the database assembled by Docquier and Marfouk (2006). While there seems to be some evidence of the incentive effect at work, the combined net effect of brain drain and brain gain seems positive only in countries with low emigration rates. Also, the analysis of remittances in relation to emigration of highly skilled workers is not very large and does not reach strong conclusions. (Mayr and Pei 2008:4-5)

2.2 Return migration

Return Migration from an international migration theory perspective

Return migration has been the object of international migration theorists, who developed assumptions about why migrants decide to return. The neoclassical approach to return migration sees failure as the reason for return, in a sense that

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11 migrants did not successfully maximise their expected earnings. In contrast to that, the New Economics of Labour Migration view (NELM) argues that return migration is the logical outcome of a calculated strategy, which was created at the migrant’s household level. Oded Stark argues the NELM approach “shifts the focus of migration theory from individual independence … to mutual interdependence” (Stark 1991: 26), i.e. at the level of the family or the household. Furthermore, there is a structural approach to return migration arguing that more than being only a personal issue, return is above all a social and contextual one, affected by both situational and structural factors. Adding also from insights of network theory, Cassarino combines these approaches. (Cassarino 2015: 255-257) My thesis builds mostly on structural and network theory, as I am exploring the influence of institutional conditions on return migration, but neglect the individual component of motivation stressed in the neoclassical return migration theory.

Effects of return migration on development

Approaches to return migration have been revisited after international organisations have paid increased attention to the link between international migration and the economic development in migrants’ origin countries (Cassarino 2004: 253). Studies to date range from econometric analysis of labour force samples to detailed interview-based research. The effect returnees have on their home country can be split in three categories: Influencing political development, influencing economic development and influencing entrepreneurship. Yet, these are only broad categories for the sake of structure. In reality, all of these influences of returnees have effects on all categories in its consequences.

Concerning the political development, there is evidence showing that education in foreign, especially Western universities, has made returnees promote ideas of modernity with regard to political regimes and economic systems in their country of origin (Kapur and McHale 2012: 11). For example, Chinese emigrants who studied in US universities have played an important role in China after having returned to China (Ye 2001). Also, Indian people educated in England laid the foundations of a liberal

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12 democratic polity (Kapur 2010). In general, foreign-educated individuals promote democracy in their home countries, if the foreign education is acquired in democratic countries (Spilimbergo 2009). To give further supportive evidence, returning elites have played an important role on a broad scale in Jamaica, with a diaspora about as large as the island’s population. There has been a recent upturn in return migration, driven by an improvement in the country’s fortunes and a perception that returning exiles can assume higher levels of responsibility at home, and at a much younger age, than they could in Britain or America. This is not only in business but also in politics, where political parties are giving returnees prominent positions because weary voters see this group as an improvement in the political arena (Kapur and McHale 2005: 173-174).

Concerning the economic development, the literature shows that returning Indian elites that had graduated at US universities pushed the Indian policies more towards the market (Kapur 2010). Moreover, in a work on the entrepreneurial behaviour of returnees to Egypt, McCormick and Wahba (2003) conclude that migration to higher wage economies enables future new entrepreneurs to accumulate both useful skills and financial capital on a scale not otherwise possible. The economic contribution of return migrants in this sample supports the view that overseas work experience in a high wage country can play a useful role in the development process (McCormick and Wahba 2003: 526). This view is supported by a study by Dustmann and Kirschkamp (2002) who found, using data about Turkish returnees from Germany, that a majority are economically active and most engaged in entrepreneurship. Moreover, McCormick and Wahba (2003) compared non-farm small enterprises owned by returnees to those owned by non-migrants. The data suggests that return migration has a favourable impact on the quality of jobs provided by the enterprise.

Concerning the third category, several recent case studies emphasise how returnees have been important sources of entrepreneurship and start-ups in high tech (IT) sectors in countries such as India (Commander et al. 2004) and in the Hsinchu Science Park in Taipei (Luo and Wang 2002). McCormick and Wahba’s sample showed a higher rate of entrepreneurship after international migration. In an econometric model of

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13 entrepreneurial activity, they found evidence supporting the hypotheses that overseas savings on the one hand and the duration of the stay overseas on the other hand have positive effects on becoming an entrepreneur. Zucker and Darby (2007) confirm this tendency: they found that in the period of 1981-2004, there was a strong tendency for ”star scientists” in several science and technology fields in the US to return for at least some period to their country of origin in order to promote the start-up of high tech firms, especially to China, Taiwan and Brazil.

This empirical evidence confirms the assumptions of scholars about the theoretical potential of the return channel I referred to in paragraph 2.1.2. They illustrate how return migration can lead to brain gain for the developing world. Key evidence for the more general potential of return migration has been presented in the central study “Return Migration as a Channel of Brain Gain” by Karin Mayr and Giovanni Peri. Resorting to parameters from the literature and data (on the wage differentials, education returns and migration and return flows) from Eastern and Western Europe, Mayr and Peri analyse the impact of international mobility on the average human capital (and wages) in the emigration countries. (Mayr and Peri 2008: 2)

In this study, Mayr and Peri show that 25% to 50% of the human capital and wage gains from freer migration accrue to the Eastern European countries through the return channel, which is in addition to the pure incentive channel studied by the literature so far. For a reasonable share of return migrants (20 to 30% of those who emigrated), the model reveals that their role can be critical in evaluating the benefits of labour mobility to the sending country (ibid: 3-4). In short, Mayr et al. find that in the long run, it is plausible to expect a positive effect on the average human capital of Eastern European countries under looser migration polices. Based on these findings, they come to the conclusion that combined with the incentive channel, the return channel has the potential to reverse the brain drain into significant brain gain for the sending country.

The literature is inconclusive on the question which groups of emigrants are more likely to return. Whereas Mayr and Peri have found that the more skilled decide to

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14 return more often, Kapur and McHale. (2005) state that returnees are negatively selected, meaning that the least successful migrants will re-immigrate. This has been shown in studies conducted in the study field of assimilation in Denmark, Norway and Sweden. The least successful (measured by earnings and labour market attachment) are thus the least assimilated. However, they add to this finding that even though few among the highly skilled return, those who do are likely to have a utility function that places greater weight on the public good rather than private returns. They argue that if only the latter mattered to returnees, there would be little reason to return. So, even though there exists disagreement on whether the highly skilled are more or less likely to return, there exists consent on the fact that returnees are likely to benefit their home countries. Kapur and McHale stress that returnees are likely to have a greater commitment to institution building, which is a non-tradable public good with returns that cannot be appropriated privately. The benefits for the country of origin then may be quite substantial. (Kapur and McHale 2005:172)

Especially this last fact put forward by Kapur and McHale stresses that the inconclusiveness on the question who are more likely to return does not undermine my research, which builds on a broad consensus over the transformational potential of returnees.

2.3 Research gap and research question

Based on the finding that while the literature on the effect of brain drain is inconclusive, there is a broad consensus that the return migration of skilled workers is valuable and beneficial for developing countries, I argue that among many factors, the policies of developed, receiving countries are important to make sure developing, sending countries benefit from the return migration. My contribution to the existing literature consists in exploring how policies specific to the receiving country Germany might influence return migration, and in turn, shape the trend of brain drain.

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15 1) Do the GIZ1_{and the BAMF}2_{have specific policies with regard to return}

migration?

If so,

2) do and how do these policies contribute to the prospect of brain gain?

1_,2 _{Both the GIZ and the BAMF as relevant actors in German return migration policies will be introduced}

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3. Theoretical framework: Cassarino’s notion of preparedness

So far, based on existing literature, I have shown that return migration can play a key role in advancing development in the Global South. The purpose of my empirical research is to find out how the receiving country Germany becomes involved in the process of return migration. Are there specific policies in Germany regarding return migration? But more than that, I want to find out if Germany contributes to return migration in a way that promotes brain gain. To be able to do that, I borrow a theoretical framework by Jean Pierre Cassarino. With the help of Cassarino’s model, I can determine when return migration is likely to be a “success story”, when the return of migrants is likely to result in advancing development through the positive impact of the returnees as explained in 2.2 (impact through entrepreneurship, political office, economic boost).

This chapter is organized as follows. I am first going to introduce the key components in Cassarino’s model which are intangible resource mobilisation, tangible resource mobilisation and the duration of stay. All of these components contribute to the returnees “preparedness”, which stands central in Cassarino’s approach. The higher the level of preparedness, he claims, the more likely will the returnee become an actor of development and change in his home country. When introducing the components, I will also discuss their relevance and support their crucial role by presenting other scholars that have stressed the same components. A table will visualize the model and allows me to visually reflect the relationship of the single components and how different levels of the respective components lead to different levels of preparedness. After that, I will give two reasons why using this model is conductive to my research purpose. Finally, I will mention limitations I face by resorting Cassarino’s model.

3.1 Key components and their contribution to the returnee’s preparedness

Cassarino presents two main variables determining whether a returning migrant will become an actor of development and therewith represents a potential of reversing the initial brain drain into a brain gain situation for the sending country. The first variable is the migrant’s willingness or motivation to return, the second is the degree

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17 of resource mobilisation, or also referred to as readiness. Resource mobilisation is separated in two different kinds of resources. First, tangible resources are addressed, capturing for example financial capital. The second category of resources are intangible resources. This category includes for example contacts, relationships and acquaintances, as well as skills. So the readiness of the returnee is determines by the accumulation of tangible and intangible resources during the migration experience abroad. Another variable is the duration of the stay abroad.

Let me discuss these components. Why is tangible resource mobilisation, so e.g. the accumulation of financial capital, crucial in order for returnees to become actors of change? Mc Cormick and Wahba (2003) present a mechanism which they have derived from an econometric model. They found evidence supporting the hypotheses that overseas savings have a positive effect on investing in a project or an enterprise back home. The findings suggest how overseas migration facilitates the accumulation of financial capital on a scale not otherwise possible. So this shows how financial capital accumulation is conductive to economic development.

When discussing the second component, intangible resource mobilisation, I also want to refer to the study of Mc Cormick and Wahba (2003). Besides facilitating the accumulation of financial capital, Mc Cormick and Wahba find how overseas migration also facilitated the accumulation of new useful skills. Such skills, in turn, they found, increased the investment of returnees in enterprises back home, whether these are their own or existing enterprises.

Let us turn to the third component, which is the duration of stay. How and why is that important? Again, Mc Cormick and Wahbas study (2003) also refers to this component. The found evidence supports the hypotheses that besides overseas savings, the duration of stay had a positive separate effect on investing in a project or in an enterprise upon return. Moreover, the duration of the migration experience is considered a relevant aspect following King (1986), who argued a duration of stay abroad of less than a year or two is too short to allow migrants to gain experience that could be of any use in promoting modernisation back home. At the same time, the period of absence can also be too long, leading to an alienation of the returnees from their origin society. Also, they might be too old to exert much influence. An optimum

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18 length of absence is sufficiently long to influence the migrant and sufficiently short so that the migrant still has time and energy upon return to utilise his newly acquired skills and attitudes. (King 1986: 19). In Cassarino’s model, a high level of preparedness of labour migrants, refugees, highly skilled migrants, students and asylum seekers is given if the stay lasted between 4 to 15 years, which reflects King’s views.

Mc Cormick and Wahba confirm the relevance of Cassarino’s component of tangible and intangible resources as well as the duration of stay by showing with their study how these components led to increased investments in projects and enterprises in their home land. So domestic private investment in companies is a way how development in sending countries can be pushed forward. This has also been observed by the OECD (2006). In the DAC reference document titled “Promoting Private Investment for Development. The Role of ODA”, they state that sustained economic growth must be fuelled by investment and entrepreneurship so that the private sector can create more jobs and increase incomes. Higher incomes will generate higher revenues which governments can use in order to expand access to health, education and infrastructure services, which are crucial factors to increase productivity. The documents says that it is among other factors due to too low investment rates that productivity gains remain insufficient. Investment rates are low because returns from investment are too hard to predict and thus often too risky. (OECD 2006) From that follows that if tangible and intangible resource mobilisation as well as a sufficient duration of stay promote investment of returnees in their home country, then it can be summed up that these components increase the likelihood of brain gain induced by returnees. The relevance of the duration of stay in the host country has also been discussed beyond the study of Mc Cormick and Wahba. I have shown that the right duration of stay, in the study of Mc Cormick and Wahba, influences the likelihood of private investment upon return. However, more than that, the duration of stay must allow the migrant to make the experiences that are of use back home, including e.g. skill acquisition and the establishment of a network. Beyond resources, also age and alienation are factors to consider, as they can lead to a situation in which a returnee may be equipped with both financial resources and a sufficient set of skills and contacts, but still does not become an actor that will promote brain gain.

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19 Kapur and McHale (2005) represent one more scholar that identifies the same components as crucial. In their paper “Give Us Your Best and Brightest: The Global Hunt for Talent and Its Impact on the Developing World”, they claim that that in order to turn the time abroad into an advantage of the home country, one has to look at the extent to which the time spent abroad has allowed the migrant to accumulate human, entrepreneurial, financial and social capital. Then, one has to compare these gains to what they would have gained if they had never left. (Kapur and McHale 2005: 163) This mirrors the components of tangible and intangible resource mobilisation employed by Cassarino.

So now that the components have been introduced and discussed, let me present the model of preparedness Cassarino established. The preparedness of a returnee depends on two factors, the willingness to return and the readiness to return. The willingness to return describes the migrants motivation and therewith is an internal and subjective factor. It can influence the efforts the migrant makes to mobilise resources. The readiness however is determined by the returnees equipment with tangible and intangible resources as well as by the duration of stay. Circumstances in host and home countries can influence the returnees’ preparedness, so both the returnee’s motivation, so his willingness, and also his readiness. Home and host countries can contribute to the returnees’ readiness by contributing to high levels of resources and by promoting a duration of stay that is conductive to the returnees’ active engagement in transformational activities (entrepreneurship, political offices, private investment). In my thesis, I focus exclusively on how circumstances in the host country Germany effect the returnees’ readiness to return. Figure 1 below depicts these relationships.

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Figure 1: Return Preparation (Source: Cassarino 2000: 270)

Table 2 below (see p.21) shows how Cassarino organises the presented components along three levels of preparedness. In accordance to the mechanisms at work behind the components, Cassarino allocates different levels of resource mobilisation (which comprises both tangible and intangible resources) as well as different durations of stay to different levels of preparedness. The column on the right shows: The higher the level of preparedness, the more likely it is for the returnee to become an actor of change. The lower the level of preparedness, the more likely it is that he will be dependent on support rather than giving support. When lacking preparedness completely, the returnee may even consider re-emigration, which can be translated with no brain gain at all, a failure of return migration as opportunity for development. Let me briefly elaborate on each level of preparedness. Cassarino differentiates three levels of preparedness, a high level of preparedness, a low level of preparedness, and no preparedness at all. According to Cassarino’s assumption, different levels of preparedness would lead to different post-return conditions, which again mirror the degree to which returnees act as influencing power in their home country in a way that supports development.

According to this classification, a high level of preparedness can lead to the returnee’s rediscovery of the real characteristics of the origin country, his adaptation and negotiation facing these characteristics as well as to the returnee’s distinctiveness in

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21 the home environment. The returnees’ high level of preparedness allows them to organise their own return autonomously while mobilising the resources needed to secure their return. This category pertains to migrants who feel they have gathered enough tangible and intangible resources to carry out their projects in their home countries. They have also developed valuable contacts and acquired skills and knowledge that can constitute a significant adjunct to their initiatives. They have had time to evaluate the costs and benefits of return, while considering the changes that have occurred in their countries of origin, at institutional, economic and political levels. Some of them may maintain their residential status in their former places of settlement with a view to securing their cross-border mobility. Their high level of preparedness influences their participation in cross-border social and economic networks; these convey informational and financial resources that can foster resource mobilisation not only before return but also afterwards.

A low level of preparedness, however, would lead to a return situation in which households and relatives have to provide both moral and financial support, so that only limited resources can be invested in the home country. This category pertains to migrants whose length of stay abroad was too short to allow tangible and intangible resources to be mobilised, owing to major events which abruptly interrupted their migration experiences, e.g. unexpected family events, ostracism, no real opportunities for social and professional advancement in host countries. These migrants consider that the costs of remaining are higher than those of returning home, even if few resources were mobilised before their return. Hence, resource mobilisation in receiving countries remains extremely limited and the returnee will tend to rely on resources available at home in order to reintegrate.

A situation in which no preparedness is given at all will result in post-return situation characterized by difficult conditions, so that re-emigration may be envisaged by the returnee. These returnees neither contemplated return nor did they provide for the preparation of return. Circumstances in host countries prompted them to leave, for example as a result of a rejected application for asylum or following forced repatriation. (Cassarino 2000)

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Table 2: Returnees’ Level of Preparedness (Source: Cassarino 2000: 273)

Types of returnee

(a) Pre-return conditions

R e tu rn mi gr ati o n (b) Post-return conditions Status Motivation _Resource

mobilisation Length of stay Reintegration process High level of preparedness Labour migrants, refugees, highly skilled migrants, students, asylum seekers May obtain residence status in host country. May own property in host country. Migration objectives are reached. Perceived positive changes in government at home. Perceived political and/or economic improvements at home generate new opportunities. Strong incentives in origin country induce return. Savings, acquaintances (address book), contacts, knowledge, skills, expertise, higher education On average, from 4 to 15 years Rediscovery of real characteristics of origin country. Adaptation and negotiation. Distinctiveness. Low level of preparedness Labour migrants, short-term refugees, highly skilled migrants, students none Migration objectives could not be reached as planned: disappointment. Unexpected family events in home country interrupted stay abroad Few savings On average, from 6 months to 3 years Household and relatives provide moral and financial support, limited resources can be invested as a result of migration experience. No preparedness Rejected asylum seekers, irregular migrants None Deportation, expulsion. Rejected visa extension Non-existent On average, less than 6 months Difficult conditions at home. Re-emigration may be envisaged.

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23 3.2 Advantages of Cassarino’s model

I now want to give three reasons why Casserino’s model is suitable for my research purpose. The first characteristic of Cassarino’s model that makes it a good tool for me is depicted in Figure 1. He includes the variable “circumstances in home and host countries” in the model and thereby suggests that the receiving country has the power to interfere in the mechanism of successful return migration. I am investigating return migration policies of Germany, which is a receiving country of a large number of migrants, with regard to their contribution to successful return migration and thus the potential of brain gain. Relying on Cassarino’s framework allows me to make this connection between the receiving country Germany and the factors that enable returnees to have a transformative role upon return. What Cassarino labels “Circumstances in host countries” is compatible with my object of research, namely German return migration policies. Furthermore, also selective migration law can be captured by the factor “circumstances in host countries”. Migration law that provides selective incentives to stay can be considered to affect especially the migrants motivation, thus the willingness. Even though I do not include the individual motivations of the returnee in my analysis, I want to include this factor in my final assessment. In this way, the model allows me to include the accusation that selective migration policies of the developed world are a cause of brain drain on the one hand, but also the potential of return migration and the role that host countries play in this process on the other hand. At the same time, the model shows that next to “circumstances in host countries”, also “circumstances in home countries” influence the mechanism, which I will refer back to at the end of this thesis.

A second reason why I rely on Cassarino’s model is that it allows me to categorize my findings along the levels of preparedness he defined in the model. This differentiation makes it possible to compare different policies with regard to their contribution to the returnees’ preparedness in a clearly organised fashion.

The last aspect I want to mention is the fact that in the majority of the literature, the consent goes towards the claim that the prospect of brain gain through return migration is a possibility that can only be realized by highly skilled returnees. Now, Cassarino’s model differs from this view. Instead of differentiating between e.g.

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24 “highly skilled” and “barely skilled” migrants, he focusses on the preparedness. However, acquired skills are a part of the preparedness. Also, financial capital often results from being highly skilled. In that way, Cassarino offers a more differentiated approach, which is a strength towards other approaches in my eyes. Also refugees can reach a high level of preparedness, if they gained some skills during their stay in the host country, and if they were given the opportunity to accumulate financial and social capital. Then, they could become actors of change and development upon return, even if they are not highly skilled. So in the end, even though this aspect stresses a discrepancy that seems to emerge from a lack of overlap between literature and theoretical framework, eventually this aspect can be considered a strength of Cassarino’s model as well, as it observes in more detail which factors of the highly skilled are making them more likely to transform their home country (e.g., financial resources, a social network, and not their status of being highly skilled per se).

3.3 Limitations of Cassarino’s model

Despite these advantages, relying on Cassarino’s model also comes with limitations. There are two major constrains I am facing.

First, analysing only a part of the factor “circumstances in home countries”, namely return migration policies and immigration law, is not exhaustive. Return migration policies and immigration law are not all circumstances in the host country Germany that influence the mechanism of return migration. That is why, one could argue, it may be overhasty to still use table 2 when drawing conclusions. Because parallelly, other circumstances in Germany might change the picture. In the same way, the fact that I focus exclusively on host countries’ circumstances, but neglect home countries’ circumstances leads to the limited possibility of reaching conclusions about the final level of preparedness of the returnee. Mayr and Peri for example stress the role of wage premia, which is a “circumstance in the home country”. However, the focus of this thesis lies on the contribution of the host countries’ policies and the model allows me to apply this focus. Still, it must be mentioned that in order to reach a complete evaluation of the returnees’ preparedness, more factors have to be taken into account. So by using this model, I cannot reach final conclusions. Whether Germanys policies are the cause of a returnee’s shift of level of preparedness, for example,

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25 depends on more factors than on the analysed policies. To make a perfectly complete analysis, one would need to take into consideration any other possible circumstance in Germany influencing the migrant’s level of preparedness, as well as the sum of circumstances in the home country, which would need to be determined beforehand. Also, the returnee’s motivation might be motivated from reasons that are beyond both circumstances in receiving countries and circumstances in home countries. The second problematic that emerges from resorting to Cassarino’s model is rooted in the heuristics of the model. For example, it does not provide information about the level of preparedness of the returnee if she or he has a high level of preparedness according to one component, e.g. duration of stay, but a low level of preparedness according to another component, e.g. intangible resource mobilisation. That shows that it works with clear-cut conditions, which must be assumed often to be far from realistic conditions. Despite this idealized scheme Cassarino employs, the model still offers orientation. One might just draw conclusions based on the average levels of preparedness that result from the respective levels of components. Therewith, it is not a very grave shortcoming but a minor issue that, on top of that, is a common characteristic of theoretical models.

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4. Methodology

The following paragraph includes a justification for the case selection Germany and lays out how I chose the institutions whose policies I will analyse by explaining my selection criteria. After that, I will discuss my method of qualitative content analysis. Finally, I will present the analysis scheme I will apply in the empirical part, which I derived directly from the theoretical framework.

4.1 Case Selection Germany

“The German government is actively engaged, in close cooperation with the international community, in combating poverty, securing food, establishing peace, freedom, democracy and human rights, shaping globalisation in a socially equitable manner, and preserving the environment and natural resources.” (Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development 2010-2017)

To add to this quote, the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development further admits responsibility to help the weak. It lists justice and solidarity as its fundamental values. Moreover, it refers to the German constitution which says that property entails obligations, in a way that its use shall serve the public good. This public good, in a globalised world, would not end at national borders but must include people living abroad. As the majority of the global population lives in developing countries, the German government thus acknowledges that its privileged position of wealth implies responsibility to eliminate poverty.

This quote and the additions convey a clear message: they declare goals of the German government, one of them being the goal of influencing the ways in which globalisation plays out for developing countries in a way that is fair (“socially equitable”). Moreover, the goal (even phrased as a sort of moral obligation) of combating poverty appears. In fact, later on, the Ministry states the German government regards such declared behaviour “an imperative of humanity and of reason”. (Ibid)

If these intentions are honest, the German government would need to offer a coherent framework that renders reaching these goals possible. As pointed out in my literature review, brain drain risks exacerbating the development in the poorer countries substantively whereas return migration bears high development potentials.

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27 Following this reasoning, I expect the German government, in order to realize its declared goals, to promote return migration in its migration policies.

Germany as a case of receiving country can be considered a most likely case to have policies that help return migrants to contribute to brain gain. What leads me to this assumption? It is a relevant case as it is an immigrant attracting country and major development aid donor. However, so are all Western European countries, the US as well as Oceania. Yet, there are four reasons why Germany is different to the other aid donors. First, Germany was itself once a recipient of international aid programmes. The country was devastated during the Second World War and subsequently received billions of dollars in support from the United States under the Marshall Plan. It taught the German population how important and successful aid can be. The prosperity and values that are characteristic of today's Germany are also a consequence of this forward-looking post-war policy. Secondly, and induced by this experience, the German government was the first country in Europe to establish a development ministry in 1961. That leads to the assumption that Germany has a pioneering task in the field of development aid. In this sense, more than providing mere charitably designed development aid primarily in the form of funds, they would be the most likely to provide a more integral approach by taking migration policies into consideration. A third reason that makes Germany a most likely case can be derived from a statement the BMZ makes on its website: “[…] modern German development cooperation is more than just charitable aid for the poor. It helps people to help themselves and plays a part in enabling people to get out of poverty by their own efforts.” (ibid)

This statement explicitly stresses the acknowledgement of the important role natives play in shaping the future of their home country. The empowerment of the native population to shape the way out of poverty is mentioned as an explicit goal, which is more than being a development aid donor. The realization of such intentions evidently must be based on scientific knowledge. As I have shown, temporary migration and the subsequent return, motivated by willingness and supported by resource mobilisation can satisfy precisely the here described motive of enabling the native population to positively influence the development of their home country.

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28 A fourth and last reason that makes Germany a most likely case is its current general leadership role in Europe. In their European Council on Foreign Relations policy brief “Leading from the Centre. Germany’s new role in Europe”, Josef Janning and Almut Möller point out how Germany, over the last decade, has taken on a natural leadership role, first in the EU’s economic and monetary affairs and more recently in foreign and security policy. President Gauck, Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier and Defence Minister Ursula von der Leyen had played a crucial role in pushing for a stronger Germany, moreover, Germany has played a pivotal role in responsing to the three major policy challenges of 2015, which are the Ukraine conflict, the euro crisis in Greece and most recently the refugee crisis. Furthermore, it has been Germany that has been arguing for the need of a joint European response. Here, it became clear how Germany takes agency. The results of the European Council on Foreign Relations’ annual Scorecard reflects this agency. The Scorecard ranks countries according to their influence on Europe’s foreign policy and placed Germany top in both 2015 and 2016. Even though action was not taken unilaterally, it is noticable that it was always Germany that took responsibility for the timing and the design of initiatives. Despite attempts of the US to push Germany to take on a hegemonic role in Europe, Berlin prefers to lead through the EU framework. Table 3 further confirms the finding that Germany has a leadership role within the EU.

Table 3: The top five preferred EU partners of the small, affluent member states (Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Austria), ranked according to the degree of like-mindedness, responsiveness, and how much of a priotity it is to contact them (Source: Janning and Möller 2016: 3)

To sum up, consciousness of the relevance of development aid as a result of the experience of Germany’s own neediness, the pioneer task resulting from Germany

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29 being the first country to establish a development ministry, thereby making development aid a state task, the emphasis put on enabling the native population to advance the development of their country as well as the leadership role Germany took on in the last decade in Europe make Germany a most likely case and therewith legitimizes my case selection. These four reasons make Germany, more than other aid donor countries, likely to pursue an individual, innovative and effective approach to development aid. If Germany, as a host of many “brains”, does not do anything to promote brain gain through return migration, then it is unlikely for any other migrant receiving wealthy country to do so, or that return migration will be promoted on an EU-level.

Legitimation of the choice of German institutions

There is a big number of German institutional actors involved in the issue of migration. The institutions I have selected have either a) formulated a goal that touches the issue of return migration, even if not explicitly, or b) are crucial actors in the provision of incentives for migrants to stay in Germany and therewith interfere in the potential process of return migration or c) provide policies promoting return migration. Moreover, I connect several a priori assumptions with the different institutions, that differ from one another. That is how I want to include different approaches in the selection and avoid bias towards a certain focus or interest.

Regarding selection criteria a), the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (in German, Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung, short BMZ) is central, as it already became clear in the quotes I mentioned in the preceding paragraph. I have the a priori assumption that the BMZ is, among the selected institutions, most concerened with international development cooperation. Since the BMZ is the main commissioning party of the GIZ, the GIZ reflects the goals of the BMZ, for example in their 2015 Integrated Company Report: “Above all though, we are working to tackle the root causes of migration and refugee movements in the home countries of migrants, with food security programmes, conflict and crisis prevention projects and economic development and employment programmes. We give people genuine prospects in their own countries

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30 so that they do not need to leave.” (GIZ 2015: 23) These statements lead me to the assumption that the GIZ might provide policies promoting return migration.

Regarding the selection criteria b), the Federal Ministry of the Interior is the central actor. The Federal Ministry of the Interior (in German, Bundesministerium des Innern, short BMI), within the Federal government of Germany, is responsible for the legislation determining residency rights, the Residence Act (in German: AufenthG). With this task, the role of the BMI is central in determining the German approach to migration. It is in the Residence Act that potentially selective migration law is manifested, which plays a crucial role in my empirical analysis. The inclusion of the BMI is thus essential. I have the a priori assumption that the BMI is promoting more national material interests and followingly might rather neglect return migratino of the skilled as a goal.

Regarding the selection criteria c), one actor stands out: The Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF). It is a German federal agency in the area of responsibility of the Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI). Its tasks cover the management of the asylum procedure, the promotion of integration, the research of migration, the covering of refugees and the furtherance of voluntary return. Especially the latter is of greates relevance for my purpose, as it is here where I can find concrete policies regarding return migration. It is the institution providing concrete policies, e.g. in the form of projects in cooperation with other organisations. Moreover, there is the limited liability corporation Deutsche Gesellschaft für internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ). It’s main commissioning party is the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, the BMZ. The BMZ represents the GIZ’s shareholder, the Federal Republic of Germany which is reflected in the fact that state secretary Friedrich Kitschelt is Chairman of the GIZ Supervisory Board. So the GIZ realizes projects on demand of the BMZ which is dedicated to the issue of development aid and development cooperation most. That makes it a promising object of research for my purpose. With the BMZ as main comissioning party, I have the same a priori assumption: I assume that the policies are driven by the goal of international development cooperation. With this assumption, I imply that I expect them to contribute to promising return migration by providing the needed policies.

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31 Another relevant actor are the Foreigners offices, in German “Ausländerbehörden”. They are crucial immigration offices and have the task to apply the Residence Act to the specific cases in each federal state. That includes visa issues, questions concerning the right of residence, work permits, and naturalization. (Stadt Freiburg 2017) In principle, they could also constitute an interesting actor to consider in my research. However, there is a Foreigner office in every city of Germany, so that would have led me either to an analysis that exceeds the scope of this thesis, if I had intended a full coverage, or I would have needed to make a selection. The feral representation of the foreigner offices is the BAMF, which I include.

In short, with the selection of the listed institutions I aim at including the most relevant actors of the German return migration regime.

4.2 Qualitative content analysis

The analysis of the documents will be conducted by applying the method of qualitative content analysis, which involves “a careful, detailed, systematic examination and interpretation of a particular body of material in an effort to identify patterns, themes, biases, and meanings” (Berg, 2007: 303-304). When analysing the content, I use an interpretative approach in order to answer the questions derived from theory. Policy documents and statements published on the official websites of the selected institutions will be organized in line with Cassarino’s model to point out analogies and therewith conclusions from the findings. The selected method is most suitable to answer the research question because the primary aim of the research is to find out whether and if yes, how German governmental institutions support return migration in a way that benefits sending countries and thereby opens the door to brain gain. To answer this question, the explorative character of document analysis is especially suitable because it allows me to uncover coherencies as well as incoherencies between my expectations derived from the legitimation of my case selection and my findings.

The interpretive content analysis will be conducted according to the analytical structure provided by Berg (2009), starting with the collection of the data, which are the documents and the information provided on the websites, via the search on the

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32 official websites of the selected institutions. The content of the information given will be summarized in order to answer the first research question, whether the GIZ and the BAMF have specific policies with regard to return migration. In a next step, I will analyse the data, led by the second research questions. The analysis that allows me answering the second research question is structured by Cassarino’s categorical frames of different levels of preparedness. The analysis thus extracts empirical content to fill the abstract variable “circumstances in receiving countries” for the case of Germany.

Validity and reliability

The method of content analysis used in the analysis and the fact that I analyse the single case Germany have several implications in terms of both validity and reliability. Reliability of measurement techniques is reached if the measurement can be repeated and will lead to the same outcomes in quantitative approaches. In qualitative research, the reliability as quality criteria is considered to a limited extend. The renouncement of standardized measurement procedures is done on purpose in order to allow for more openness towards new discoveries as well as limitations of the theory. The link to the context of the research is accepted. Though, also the qualitative researcher depends on maintaining reliability in a sense of intersubjective confirmability and traceability. Reliability in qualitative research is very close to the criteria of objectivity then. The criteria of objectivity claims that good research is characterised by the possibility of verification. Different researchers should achieve the same results, given that all other conditions are equal, as using the same methods of analysis. Many qualitative studies describe and reconstruct in detail each step of interpretation. Therefore, in this work, special emphasis is put on giving reasons for interpretations. (Blatter, Janning & Wagemann 2007: 36)

The aim of the single case study is to generate an intensive examination of German policies in order to then draw conclusions on the likelihood that other countries might follow. Still, one should be cautious in generalising the findings from this research to other host countries, as national migration policies still vary substantially, even within the EU. However, as I have pointed out under 4.1, I have selected Germany as a most

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33 likely case, which allows me to draw conclusions on the likelihood of other countries to adopt certain migration policies. Yet, this shall be interpreted as an indication of a tendency, not a fact.

4.3 Variables for empirical analysis

Cassarino’s model serves as a tool to analyse German policies affecting return migration, with regard to my second research question “Do and how do German return migration policies contribute to the prospect of brain gain?”.

In part 3, I have explained the mechanism how Cassarino’s model can help me answering this question. In the following, I will operationalize the contents from Cassarino’s model. In my following empirical analysis, I will resort to Cassarino’s central variable of preparedness. The following question will guide my analytical work: To what extend does the policy contribute to the readiness of the migrant to return? Readiness and willingness increase the level of preparedness. As the readiness results from resource mobilisation, I will ask the more detailed questions:

a) Does the policy provide tangible resources (i.e. financial capital)?

b) Does the policy provide intangible resources (i.e. contacts, relationships, skills, acquaintances)?

Another variable I include is the duration of stay, operationalized in a question of analysis:

c) Does the policy encourage a duration of stay that is conductive to a migration experience that can benefit sending countries upon return?

In Cassarino’s model, a high level of preparedness of labour migrants, refugees, highly skilled migrants, students and asylum seekers is given if the stay lasted between 4 to 15 years. I will thus investigate in how far German migration policies encourage a stay of migrants of that length. If policies encourage a stay from 6 months to 3 years, migrants are likely to have only a low level of preparedness. If they return with this low level of preparedness, voluntarily or by force, this is likely to impede reintegration as well as the potential for the returnees to become actors of change and development.

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5. Residence Act as a legal basis

Before presenting my empirical analysis of German policies regarding return migration, I want to point out the legal foundations on which migration policies and therewith return policies are built upon. This shall serve as a background information in order to contextualize the following specific policies. Hence, it does not fall under return migration policies and therefore will not be analysed applying the scheme deducted from Cassarino’s model.

The Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI), as a part of the Federal government, is responsible for the legislation determining residency rights. The Residence Act is the crucial jurisdiction in this field. As a legislation document, this is a part of polity, not policy. As polity creates the rules and spaces within which policy can be formulated, I want to present these as a background information that I will refer to later on in the analyses.

The parts of the Residence act I want to stress are the parts that emphasize that opportunities to stay in Germany as a migrant are much more accessible as a highly qualified person. The first decisive part is Section 18b, headed “Permanent settlement permit for graduates of German universities” of the Residence Act:

“A foreigner who has successfully completed his or her studies at a state or state-recognised university or a comparable educational establishment in the federal territory shall be granted a permanent settlement permit, if

1. he or she has held a residence title pursuant to Sections 18, 18a, 19a or 21 for two years,

2. he or she has a job commensurate with his or her degree,

3. he or she has paid compulsory or voluntary contributions into the statutory pension scheme for at least 24 months or furnishes evidence of an entitlement to comparable benefits from an insurance or pension scheme or from an insurance company (…).” (Bundesministerium für Justiz und Verbraucherschutz 2007)

Further evidence for the residency advantages offered exclusively to the skilled migrants can be found in Section 18c headed “Temporary residence permit for qualified skilled workers seeking employment”.

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35 “A foreigner with a German or a foreign higher education qualification which is recognised or otherwise comparable to a German higher education qualification and whose subsistence is secure may be granted a temporary residence permit for the purpose of seeking a job commensurate with this qualification for a period of up to six months.(…).” (ibid)

Lastly, I want to quote Section 19: “Permanent settlement permit for highly qualified foreigners”

“(1) A highly qualified foreigner may be granted a permanent settlement permit in special cases (…)

(2) Highly qualified persons in accordance with subsection 1 are, in particular, 1. researchers with special technical knowledge or

2. teaching personnel in prominent positions or scientific personnel in prominent positions.” (ibid)

In these sections, one can observe that the circumstances in the host country are influenced by the polity in a way that give the highly qualified incentives to stay in Germany, e.g. a facilitated acquisition of a temporary or even permanent (cf. Section 19) residence permit. Based on that background, in the following section, I want to explore whether there are policies contributing to return migration in a way that benefits brain gain.

Policies for return migration in Germany : a clash of declared development aid goals and national interests?