refuting the myth: Dutchbat III and its pre-deployment training

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Refuting the Myth:

Dutchbat III and its Pre-Deployment Training

© WFA/Hennie Keeris. Bosnia 1995

Lara Alias

Amsterdam, November 2015

Thesis Military History

Supervisor and First Reader: Artemy Kalinovsky

Second Reader: Herman Amersfoort

University of Amsterdam

Graduate School of Humanities

M.A. Program Military History

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Acknowledgements

‘Peace, we have learned, can never be taken for granted. Sometimes it is

all too fragile. And once it is disrupted, restoring it may come at a great cost.’

- Minister of Foreign Affairs Bert Koenders on the 20th_{commemoration of the fall of Srebrenica} First and foremost, I would like to thank the brave men and women of Dutchbat III who tried to defend the enclave with everything in their power. Moreover, I would like to pay the deepest respect to all who have lost their lives in the safe area of Srebrenica as a result of the horrific Bosnian War, and of course the terrible genocidal endeavor which led to the death of approximately 7000 Bosniak males and the expulsion of thousands more. We can only hope that this atrocity will never be forgotten.

This thesis could have never been completed without help from my

beautiful mother, my boyfriend and friends, and the colleagues from my internship at the department Cultural-Historical Background and Information, at 1CMI Command of the Royal Netherlands Army. Thanks for telling me all your stories, helping me and letting me feel part of the gang.

A special thanks goes out to my thesis supervisor Artemy Kalinovsky who had the hard task of guiding me and reading all my work. In addition, I would like to thank my second reader, Herman Amersfoort.

Last but not least, I need to mention Karel Berkhoff, who was my thesis supervisor when I wrote my thesis for the Masters Holocaust and Genocide Studies. Thanks for not giving up on me, letting me find my way, pushing me when needed and kicking my behind along the way.

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Introduction

On the 11th of July 1995 Bosnian Serb forces under the command of General Ratko Mladić captured the enclave of Srebrenica. At the time the enclave, or ‘safe area’, was under the protection of Dutch UN peacekeepers. As the enclave fell, thousands of local inhabitants, mostly of Bosniak descent, sought refuge on the Dutch compound in Potočari.1_{Although the Dutch tried to form a cordon between the refugees and the}

advancing Serb forces, they were unable to adequately intervene. The negotiated ‘evacuation’ between Dutch commander Thom Karremans and Mladić led to the expulsion of 23,000 Bosnian Muslim women and children, and even a genocide on approximately 7000 Bosniak males.2_{To this day the Bosnian genocide is the worst}

mass murder seen in Europe since the Second World War.

The events of July 1995 remain controversial for several reasons. First of all, there are questions on whether the international community could have done more to prevent the disastrous fall of the enclave. Secondly, to this day some wonder if the Dutch peacekeepers should have fought off the advancing Serbian forces, thus ward off the large-scale ethnic cleansing campaign. Lastly, and more importantly, to this day there is confusion on whether or not Dutch ‘blue helmets’ helped ‘evacuate’ and separated Bosniak males and females, therefore making them complicit in the Bosnian genocide.3

After the fall of the enclave lots of false information on the events in

Srebrenica kept circulating. For example, the theory that the safe area fell as a result of a plot involving senior UN personnel, the French government and the Serbian government.4_{Moreover, the fall of Srebrenica had a profound effect on Dutch society.}

For years the public tried to make sense of what happened, and why, but more importantly, what role or responsibility the Dutch soldiers and politicians had in this event. In the aftermath of Srebrenica Dutch soldiers were accused of cowardice and of all that was bad in the world. Furthermore, they were seen as one of the most

important reason for the fact that the Serbs easily overran the area and committed large-scale mass murder. The following years after the fall of the enclave journalists

1 J. W. Honig and N. Both, Srebrenica. Record of a War Crime (New York 1996) 24, 26. 2 J. W. Honig and N. Both, Srebrenica, XIX.

3 Ibidem, XVII. 4 Ibidem, XIX.

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reported about everything the Dutchbats soldiers had done wrong, including alleged collaboration, fornication, poor morale, right-wing extremist behavior, rape, and children having fed esbit fuel cubes.5_{Soon Dutchbat personnel were seen as}

criminals, weaklings and incompetent soldiers. Moreover, questions were raised on their performance in Bosnia and if they were adequately trained to participate in a peacekeeping mission. Therefore this thesis will try to find out twenty years after the fact, whether or not Dutchbat’s pre-deployment training was truly as amateuristic as portrayed in the Dutch media.

Today, more than two decades after the enclave fell, Srebrenica remains a black page in the international community and in Dutch military history. The year 2015 marked the 20th_{anniversary of the fall of Srebrenica and the Bosnian Genocide.}

Unfortunately, the ethnic hostilities in the region remain and while the trials of Karadžić and Mladić are expected to come to a verdict in 2015, the events of 1995 are still an open wound. The reason why Dutchbat had to be deployed to the region in the 1990s can not be referred to without placing it in the context of the Cold War, and in particular the rise of nationalism in Yugoslavia.

Propaganda and myth making before the 1990s

The disintegration of the Social Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s caught policy makers off guard for several reasons. In 1989 Europe celebrated the fall of Communism as the beginning of a new era, and according to Mikhail Gorbachev, people from East and West could now look forward to building ‘the common

European home’.6_{In a period where politicians were distracted by the threat and}

violence in the Middle East, and in particular in the Gulf War, conflict between the Croatian police and Serb rebels in Knin, which led to the first exchange of fire between the belligerent parties, went unnoticed by the international community.7

While the collapse of Yugoslavia was seen as sudden, certain preceding events, dating back decades before the disintegration, had a severe influence as the situation on the Balkans unfolded in the 1990s. To understand how and why the situation deteriorated so severely that the UN had to establish a UN peacekeeping mission in the former

5 H. Praamsma, J. Peekel and T. Boumans, Herinneringen aan Srebrenica. 171 Soldatengesprekken (Amsterdam 2005) 7.

6 M. Glenny, The Balkans. Nationalism, War and the Great Powers 1804-1999 (New York 2000) 634.

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Yugoslavia in the 1990s, one must take a closer look at the establishment of the country and the role of nationalism.

After the Second World War a socialist, communist republic was established in the region. The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was modeled on the Soviet Union. In Yugoslavia Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia were part of the federation with Kosovo and Vojvodina as autonomous provinces. ‘On the surface, Yugoslavia was a thriving region after 1945, with good economic growth and firm political direction from Tito. In reality, the tensions that were exacerbated during World War Two still existed, but circumstances forced them underground.’8_{This meant that while on the outside Yugoslavia tried to keep up}

appearances, turmoil was already brewing after its establishment in the 1940s. Tito’s regime was characterized by oppression of regional nationalism. However, after his death in 1980, as the Yugoslav economy worsened, nationalism flared up.9

From the 1980s onwards, the Serbian politician Slobodan Milošević emerged as one of the most prominent politicians and crucial for the Yugoslav Wars. From the 1980s Milošević portrayed himself as Tito’s worthy successor, the last defender of communism and the leader of Serbian nationalism. Similar to the other nationalist politicians in the region, such as Tudjman in Croatia and Alja Izetbegović from Bosnia, Milošević even more than his fellow politicians, used nationalist propaganda in order to legitimize territorial gain. Important for Milošević’s propaganda was the publication of a paper from the Serbian Academy of Sciences in 1986.10

The document, also known as the SANU Memorandum, accused Tito of prejudice towards Serbians, stemming from the fact that his parents originated from Croatia and Slovenia. Furthermore, the writers of the memorandum saw the 1974 constitution as very anti-Serb and a manifestation of the decade long subordinate position of Serbs in the Yugoslav federation.11_{Also, Yugoslavia was seen as a society that lagged behind}

modern civilization. ‘In Yugoslavia the fundamental civil rights of individuals can still be violated with impunity; elections of officials are a farce; the judiciary depends on the executive branch; freedom of speech, freedom of organization, and public assembly are restricted by bureaucratic arbitrariness and legal prescriptions which

8 A. Finlan, The Collapse of Yugoslavia 1991-1999 (Oxford 2004) 15. 9 A. Finlan, The Collapse of Yugoslavia, ibidem.

10 Ibidem.

11 Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, Memorandum 1986 (Belgrade 1986).

http://www.trepca.net/english/2006/serbian_memorandum_1986/serbia_memorandum_1986. html [18-05-2015].

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make it possible to persecute opinions which differ from the official line.’12_According

to the document social inequality was solely aimed at the Serbian nation.

The writers of the document accused Yugoslavia of not granting Serbia the right to its own state, the right to use the Serbian language and script, and the refusal to set up political and cultural organizations to advance Serbian heritage. Furthermore, the alleged persecution, expulsion and genocide of Serbs in Kosovo was used as an example to show that the Serbs were an unprotected minority. 13_{This, in combination}

with poor economic progress, made them victims of a policy aimed at the destabilization Serbia.

Furthermore, the Memorandum used historical events to explain Serbian suffering and victimhood as a linear phenomenon. The battle of Kosovo Polje in the Middle Ages in combination with several liberation wars, including the First Serbian Uprising in 1804 and the uprising in 1941; forced assimilation in Croatia and the ‘physical, political and cultural genocide of the Serbian population in Kosovo and Metjohija’; were used as examples of centuries long Serb suffering.

The Đorđe Martinović case from 1985 was used to demonstrate that this suffering was ongoing in the twentieth century. In May 1985, a 56 year-old Serb famer named Đorđe Martinović was rushed to the hospital with injuries caused by the forceful insertion of a beer bottle in his anus. 14_{Martinović accused two Albanian masked men}

of his rape and this case became a symbol of the attack on Serbian manhood and the overall subordinate position of Serbs in Yugoslavia. Moreover the case was a symbol of Serbian victimhood. With these examples the drafters of the memorandum tried to mobilize Serbs in order to preserve the Serbian nation and culture.

Serbian nationalist propaganda was aimed at the creation of a Greater Serbia.15

Therefore Serbian nationalism was based on historic myths and legends, in which Kosovo ‘held a symbolic and cultural significance of mythical proportions’.16_During

a demonstration in Kosovo, on 24 April 1987, Milošević only strengthened Serbian nationalism when he spoke to the protestors, while the police was attacking them, and

12 Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, Memorandum 1986. 13 Ibidem.

14 C. Morus, ‘The SANU Memorandum: Intellectual Authority and the Constitution of and Exclusive Serbian People’, in: Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies 4 (2007) no. 2, 142-165, 155-156.

15 A. Finlan, The Collapse of Yugoslavia, 15. 16 Ibidem.

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he claimed that Kosovo would remain Serbian.17_{Another instrumental event for}

Milošević was the anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo Polje. At the battle in 1389 Serbs were defeated by the Ottomans and later, especially in the 1980s, the battle became a symbol for the preservation of Christianity in Europe against the invading tide of Islam.18

Milošević was aided by the Orthodox Church, who fully supported his propaganda and strengthened it by claiming that Albanian Nazi’s engaged in the extermination of Serbs in Kosovo and compared the plight of the Serbs with the story of Cain and Abel.19_{Furthermore, the extensive use of media, printed and broadcasted,}

was instrumental for Milošević’s manipulation of history and circulation of

nationalistic ideology. By rewriting history and the lack of nuance, on a daily basis Serbs were influenced by the demonization of other ethnic groups, including Bosniaks. Often Bosniaks, or Bosnians of Muslim decent, were referred to as those belonging to the Mujahedeen, Jihadi fighters and Muslim fundamentalists.20

Moreover, Serbian media outlets saw parallels between Bosnian Muslims in the 1980s and the Ottoman occupation, fearing for forced conversions to Islam, and even

terrorism.21

This image of the ordinary Bosniak as Muslim terrorists was also based on the image of the Bosniak politician Alija Izetbegović. His controversial book The Islamic

Declaration was instrumental for the portrayal of Bosniaks by Serbs. In the book,

published in 1970, Izetbegović sought a way for Muslims to recover from both the sterility into which he felt Islamic education had fallen and the stagnation that he saw throughout the Islamic world.22_{Unfortunately, Serbs perceived the book, a document}

of its time aimed at reconciling the Islam and the modern world, as a call for the introduction of fundamentalist Sharia law in Bosnia-Herzegovina.23_{The portrayal of}

17 M. Oproiu, ‘Slobodan Milosevic and the Violent Transformation’, in: Eurolimes 11 (2011) 142-157, 147.

18 A. Finlan, The Collapse of Yugoslavia, 15-16.

19 J. Sémelin, Purify and Destroy. The Political Uses of Massacre and Genocide (New York 2007) 85-86.

20 R. de la Brosse, Political Propaganda and the Plan to Create ‘A State For All Serbs’: Consequences

of using media for ultra-nationalist ends (2003) 63.

http://www.stadensomoffrades.se/de_la_brosse_political_propaganda_pt3.pdf [15-05-2015].

21 R. de la Brosse, Political Propaganda, ibidem.

22 G. Stokes, ‘Independence and the Fate of Minorities 1991-92’, in: C. Ingrao and T. A. Emmert, ed., Confronting the Yugoslav Controversies. A Scholar’s Initiative (Washington 2007) 83-112, 87. 23 G. Stokes, Independence and the Fate of Minorities 1991-92, 88.

‘Obituary: Alija Izetbegovic’, BBC News, 19 October 2003.

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Bosnian Muslims as internal enemies and threats for Serbian existence would prove to be a powerful image and reason to exterminate Bosniaks.

The Yugoslav Wars

‘Propaganda was an essential part of his strategy, drawing upon Serbian history and the battle of Kosovo Polje to promote his cause. By the end of the 1980s, Milosevic had managed to annul Kosovo's autonomous status and forcibly suppress Kosovo Albanian protests against his actions. In Vojvodina - the autonomous region to the north of Serbia - the Serb strong man had already ensured that his own people were already firmly in control of the region. Milosevic's actions in both Kosovo and Vojvodina caused immense concern amongst the other republics of the Yugoslav federation, most notably Croatia and Slovenia.’24

By the end of the Cold War, some Yugoslav republics, such as Slovenia and Croatia, looked at the European Community (EC) as a means to provide long-term economic stability.25_{However, since this was seen as difficult to combine with their status}

within the Yugoslav Federation, Milošević strongly opposed this proposal and

repeatedly tried to manipulate the League of Communists. As a result, the delegates of Croatia and Slovenia walked out of the critical meeting of Yugoslav Communists in January 1990 and promised to hold multi-party elections as soon as possible.26_While

Ante Marković, the 31st_{and last Prime Minister of the Socialist Federal Republic of}

Yugoslavia, tried to solve the economic and political problems the federation faced, on 25 June 1991 Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence.27_{With that the}

Yugoslav federation would be no more. The war between the Yugoslav army (JNA) and Slovenia can be seen as the beginning of chaos, violence and bloodshed known as the Yugoslav Wars. The Brioni Agreement, signed on 7 July 1991, ended the fighting in Slovenia, but the violence in Croatia only increased. Early 1992 the war would spread to Bosnia. Initially the violence in the former Yugoslavia went unnoticed by the international community. However, by January 1992 the United Nations had set up the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), a peacekeeping force, in

24 A. Finlan, The Collapse of Yugoslavia, 16. 25 Ibidem.

26 Ibidem. 27 Ibidem, 17.

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Croatia create conditions for peace and security in order a peace agreement to be effective. As the situation in Bosnia deteriorated, UNPROFOR’s mandate was enlarged to compass Bosnia as well.

The war in Bosnia and the fall of Srebrenica

With the enlargement of UNPROFOR’s mandate, the violent situation in Bosnia had to be contained, which made the UN an important player in the region. While all warring parties, including the Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks, committed war crimes, such as ethnic cleansing, looting, and the widespread rape and other forms of sexual violence of captured victims, one can conclude that the Bosnian Serbs were the biggest perpetrators of these offenses.28_{Militias such as Arkan’s Tigers or the White}

Eagles were key implementers of ethnic cleansing and responsible for the worst large-scale killings and atrocities in order to gain control over the area.29_Notorious

concentration camps, such as Omarska, were set up in order to detain and in some cases even exterminate Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats in most appalling conditions.30

In April 1993 the town of Srebrenica was declared a safe area. As a result Dutch peacekeepers, also known as Dutchbat, were given the difficult task to protect it, offer humanitarian aid to improve the living conditions of the inhabitants of the enclave and offer support to the UNHCR and other NGO’s.31_{The enclave of}

Srebrenica consisted of an area approximately 12 by 14 kilometer and a border of 50 kilometers around.32_{Around the enclave Dutchbat III Commander Karremans had the}

command over twelve observation posts. On paper Dutchbat III, which was given the responsibility over the safe area from January 1995 onwards, consisted of 780 men. However, during the fall of Srebrenica only 400 men were actually in the enclave and approximately half of them were trained to perform specific infantry tasks.33

In the early hours of 6 July 1995 several detonations from heavy artillery near the Dutch compound in Potočari startled not only the inhabitants of the enclave, but also the Dutch Peacekeeping force who were attacked directly.34_{Several days later, on}

the 11th_{of July, the enclave of Srebrenica fell. Approximately ten thousand Bosniaks}

28 Ibidem, 39.

29 N. Cigar, Genocide in Bosnia. The Policy of Ethnic Cleansing (Austin 1995) 54. 30 A. Finlan, The Collapse of Yugoslavia, 39.

31 T. Karremans, Srebrenica. Who Cares? (Nieuwegein 1998) 28. 32 T. Karremans, Srebrenica, 31.

33 Ibidem.

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sought refuge on and around the Dutch compound while this was surrounded by Bosnian Serb forces.35_{That night, and the following night, Karremans tried to}

negotiate free passage for the inhabitants. The awkward encounter between Karremans and General Mladić would remain infamous for the words uttered by Karremans ‘don’t shoot the piano player’. With this he wanted in to indicate that he was simply an insignificant pawn in the conflict.36_{However, his performance in the}

encounters made him seem weak and inadequate for the job. This performance became an example of the way Dutchbat would be perceived in the aftermath of Srebrenica.

A part of the Muslim inhabitants, and a majority of the Muslim fighters tried to break trough Bosnian Serb lines to get to Central Bosnia.37_{Unfortunately, many}

were gunned down by machine gun fire and the murdered as a result of alleged use of non-lethal chemical weapons.38_{Muslim men of fighting age who remained in}

Srebrenica, or on the compound, were separated from the women and children, deported by the Bosnian Serbs and killed. Despite Mladić’s reassurance that the refugees would not be harmed.39_{Women and children were taken by bus out of}

Srebrenica towards Bosniak territory.40_{The killing of approximately 7000 Bosniak}

men would be largest genocide in Europe after the Second World War. Dutchbat’s downfall

Immediately after the fall of the enclave the international community had lots of praise for Dutchbat and how they handled the difficult situation in Srebrenica without heavy weaponry or close air support. However, on 13 July 1995 French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hervé de Charette, concluded that Dutchbat was complicit in the Bosnian genocide.41_{Moreover, as more information about the genocide became}

known, the Dutch and international media grew increasingly critical of the work of

35 C. Klep and R. van Gils, Van Korea tot Kabul. De Nederlandse militaire deelname aan

vredesoperaties sinds 1945 (Den Haag 2005), 316-317.

36 ‘Srebrenica blijft Karremans achtervolgen’, Nu.nl, 28 July 2015.

http://www.nu.nl/dvn/4039571/srebrenica-blijft-karremans-achtervolgen.html [15-05-2015]. 37 C. Klep and R. van Gils, Van Korea tot Kabul. 317.

38 A. Finlan, The Collapse of Yugoslavia, 54. 39 C. Klep and R. van Gils, Van Korea tot Kabul, 317 40 A. Finlan, The Collapse of Yugoslavia, 55.

41 ‘Van Mierlo eist opheldering over kritiek Franse collega op Dutchbat’, De Volkskrant, 14 juli 1995.

http://www.volkskrant.nl/dossier-archief/van-mierlo-eist-opheldering-over-kritiek-franse-collega-op-dutchbat~a393748/ [13-03-2015].

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Dutchbat. Besides the unfortunate statements made by Karremans and his feeble position in his conversations with Mladić, it seems that the final nail in Dutchbat’s coffin would be Dutchbat’s celebratory departure. On 22 July Dutchbat celebrated their ‘liberation’. In front of television camera’s they drank with proud politicians, generals and the Dutch Crown Prince Willem-Alexander, while they danced the polonaise.42_{‘Public opinion, led by journalists, was relentless in its decision: the}

Dutch peacekeepers were complicit in the greatest mass murder in Europe since World War II.’43

Testimonies by Dutchbat soldiers themselves only strengthened the idea that Dutchbat participated in the UNPROFOR mission whilst unprepared. According to Sergeant Timmermans:

‘Late November 1994 it was reported that they needed me. I had no longer counted on it and was in the middle of a divorce proceeding. Actually in such a situation you should not be deployed. I did not receive an education, it was report for duty, get acquainted, enjoy a few days off and get on the road.’44

The lack of training also seemed to be corroborated by the testimonies of Corporal Doze and Soldier Meuken:

‘Because I signed up late for Luchtmobiel there was no time for a thorough education. I’ve had a few quick courses to be a medic, there was no time to join the exersices.’45

‘I had been trained as a four-ton truck driver. I went to Zagreb to drive convoys to Split, but when I got there I was not expected it at all. In my plane were all these medics who were en route to Srebrenica. They sent me with them to the enclave. I was there without any preparation. To my surprise, I was expected there and assigned to the medical warehouse.’46

42 H. Praamsma, J. Peekel and T. Boumans, Herinneringen aan Srebrenica, 7. 43 Ibidem.

44 Ibidem, 55. 45 Ibidem, 206 46 Ibidem, 334.

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In the decades after the fall of the enclave on 11 July 1995, the event has not only damaged the reputation of the UN and had cast doubt on peacekeeping missions in general. It also had profound consequences on Dutch society. Dutch participation in UNPROFOR was seen as a disgrace, a black page in Dutch military history and even led to the Srebrenica-crisis in the Dutch Cabinet. The crisis led to the

resignation of Minister-President Kok and his Cabinet in 2002. With that the Cabinet accepted its political responsibility for the outcome of the NIOD report and the fact that the Dutch military had failed to protect the inhabitants and prevent the large-scale massacre. Moreover, the event of that fateful day in July led to extensive research by the UN itself; the van Kamenade research, published in 1998; and the extensive report by the Dutch War Institute (NIOD), followed by a political inquiry led by Bert Bakker. Despite al these reports, combined with decade long negative news coverage, the question remains whether Dutchbat III’s training was indeed as inadequate as portrayed in the Dutch media.

Methodology

After the Bosnian Serbs overran the enclave of Srebrenica, Dutchbat III’s performance became scrutinized. This thesis tried to demystify the idea that Dutchbat III’s pre-deployment training was as bad as portrayed in the Dutch public.

In order to find out more about Dutchbat’s training, a closer look was taken at the character of peacekeeping operations, Dutch policy in regards to deployment and the training itself. The data used in this work is predominantly based on secondary literature, since so much qualitative research has been done on the subject. The most important work for this research is the extensive NIOD report. Regardless of large amount of written work on which this research is based, combined with survivor testimonies conducted by Hendrina Praamsma, Toni Boumans and Jet Peekel in Herinneringen aan Srebrenica, there remains the possibility that the existing data around the Srebrenica-affair is limited. Srebrenica occurred twenty years ago and more and more classified documents will be made public in the future. That includes documents about decision-making processes on the highest political level. For example the uncovered documents in which France, the United Kingdom and the United States decided on stopping air strikes without

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warning the Dutch authorities.47_{Moreover, in September 2015 it became public}

that former Prime Minister Wim Kok, and most probably other politicians, had no idea that the opinion on the executability of the mission in the safe area of

Srebrenica was not based on interaction with Dutchbat’s predecessors nor reconnaissance in the area.48

The debate after the Srebrenica event was mostly focused on trying to understand what had happened and who was responsible. It seems that almost everyone, except the Serbs or Serbian sympathizers, firstly blamed senior Serbian politicians, officers, and (military) personnel who authorized and organized the systemic ethnic cleansing of Bosniaks.49_{Throughout the aftermath of Srebrenica}

there has been, and to this day there remains, a large amount of criticism directed towards the role of the UN and the feasibility of UNPROFOR. Despite this, the debate on whether or not the Dutch military and government were in a way responsible for the fall of Srebrenica continued long after the fact. As a result of ongoing debate on Dutch responsibility, the Dutch government decided to issue a research by the NIOD, then called RIOD (Rijksinstituut voor

Oorlogsdocumentatie) in 1996.50_{In 1998 the UN issued a self-critical report in}

which it clearly stated that the Dutch peacekeepers were not responsible for the fall of the enclave and the subsequent genocide.51_{In the same document the UN}

reflected on the pitfalls of the character of second-generation peacekeeping. That same year the Dutch Defenses were under scrutiny for accusations that it tried to cover-up certain events during and after the Bosnia mission. As a result research was done under the direction of van Kamenade to establish whether the Dutch military deliberately tried to conceal certain events. Van Kamenade concluded in his research that the Dutch Defenses not deliberately obstructed disclosure of

47 ‘New Documents Shed Light on Srebrenica Failings 20 Years on’, France 24, 13 July 2015. http://www.france24.com/en/20150709-srebrenica-bosnia-muslims-dutch-UN-intelligence-france-clinton [29-07-2015].

48 http://www.npogeschiedenis.nl/andere-tijden/afleveringen/2015-2016/De-strijd-van-Kok-deel-1.html [07-09-2015].

49 J. W. Honig and N. Both, Srebrenica, XX

50 NIOD, ‘Srebrenica: een ‘veilig’ gebied. Reconstructie, achtergrond, gevolgen en analyses van de val van een safe area (Amsterdam 2002) 9.

http://publications.niod.knaw.nl/publications/srebrenicarapportniod_nl.pdf [03-03-2015]. 51 United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35, The Fall of Srebrenica, 15 November 1999, (A/54/549). http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/54/549 [09-09-2015].

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information regarding Srebrenica.52_{This, however, was disputed by the extensive}

NIOD report, which was published in 2002.53_{As a result of the NIOD report, the}

Dutch Cabinet handed in its resignation. The Cabinet concluded that it, and the international community, failed to adequately protect the inhabitants of the enclave of Srebrenica.54_{Nevertheless, despite its resignation, the Dutch government did not}

expressed responsibility for the mass murders in Bosnia. The NIOD report was highly critical of the UN and the Serbs, but also expressed that the Dutch

government displayed ‘moral politics’ in which human rights and humanitarian aid was decisive for the decision-making process concerning Bosnia.55_{After the report}

a parliamentary inquiry, led by Bert Bakker, had to determine once and for all if the Dutch government and military made crucial mistakes concerning Srebrenica or were responsible for the outcome of the event. After thorough hearings the commission concluded that humanitarian considerations were predominant in the decision-making process.56

This thesis argues that the Dutch government was not guided by moral reasoning, but mostly by the wish to play an important role in the international community. While the NIOD report does refer to this element, it places a greater importance on the moral aspect.57_{Even though most politicians used humanitarian}

arguments for intervention, it seems more obvious that Dutch politicians were motivated by the end of the Cold War and the wish for the Netherlands to

reposition itself in this changing environment. Unfortunately, the end of the Cold War also resulted in severe budget cuts for the Dutch military. Therefore the organization gasped anything and everything to maintain significant for the Netherlands and its foreign affairs. These two manifestations eventually led to the deployment of Dutchbat. With disastrous consequences.

While the UN is divided on the question whether the events in Bosnia should be seen as a genocidal event, in this research there is no doubt that the massacre on men of Bosniak descent should be seen as genocide.58_{Especially when regarding}

52 De Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Parlementaire enquête Srebrenica. Missie zonder vrede (The Hague 2002) 352.

http://www.parlement.com/9291000/d/tk28506_3.pdf [18-06-2015] 53 Parlementaire enquête Srebrenica, 357.

54 Ibidem, 403.

55 Srebrenica: een ‘veilig’ gebied, 3133. 56 Parlementaire enquête Srebrenica, 416. 57 NIOD, Srebrenica: een ‘veilig’ gebied, 3133.

58 ‘Srebrenica: Russia vetoes UN resolution to recognize massacre as genocide’, Euronews, 8 July 2015.

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Milošević’s propaganda and mythmaking campaign started in the 1980s. Moreover, it intensified after the collapse of the former Yugoslavia and made Bosniak inhabitants internal enemies. Additionally, the deliberate separation of males and females only strengthens the notion that in Bosnia a genocidal event occurred. Therefore, the event can be characterized by the following definition coined by myself, namely: ‘genocide is a sustained purposeful action to collectively destroy a national, ethnic, racial, gendered, political or religious group, directly or indirectly, through interdiction of the biological and social reproduction of group members, by means of killing, violence and coercion against individuals whom the perpetrators regard as members of the groups.’59_{The fact remains that Dutchbat soldiers were unable to prevent the genocide}

on Bosniak males. However, this helplessness mostly stems from the toxic

culmination of Dutch political eagerness to play an important role in the international community and the strong desire of the Dutch military to prove its worth, not so much Dutchbat’s pre-deployment training.

http://www.euronews.com/2015/07/08/srebrenica-russia-vetoes-un-resolution-to-recognise-massacre-as-genocide/ [09-07-2015].

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1. The Character of UN Peacekeeping

To understand the changing world at the end of the Cold War and the great difficulties Dutchbat faced as part of UNPROFOR, a closer look at the character of peacekeeping is necessary, and in particular at the evolution of second-generation peacekeeping. Right before the Cold War came to an end, peacekeeping operations were viewed as a positive phenomenon and were seen as the answer for the future to ensure global peace. Remarkably, just a few years later, in the mid-1990’s, the faith put in

peacekeeping operations quickly diminished as a result of the disastrous outcome of the Yugoslav Wars and the 1994 genocide in Rwanda.

The need to establish international co-operation, create intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations, and maintain world peace, was not

something that was confined to the twentieth century. It had its roots in the nineteenth century and the ‘balance of power’ that occurred after the Vienna Congress of 1814-1815. While the creation of what we nowadays consider peacekeeping operations was created after the establishment of the UN in 1945, the development of joint military operations stemmed from the ‘balance of power’ period. Cooperative intervention in 1897 by the Great Powers, namely Russia, Great-Britain, France, Germany and Austria Hungary, to aid in the ongoing conflict between Christians and the Ottoman rules in Crete from 1866 onwards can be seen as the first ‘real’ peacekeeping

operation in the modern idiom. Despite the fact that the Great Powers were unable to end the status quo.60

The disintegration of the balance of power became clearly evident with the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo on 28 June 1914. After the First World War several members of the international community tried to ensure and maintain world peace, but failed. However, the atrocities of the Second World War established the United Nations with its utopian ideology of global peace. An important element of the aim to implement and restore international peace and security has been the faith the UN has put in the practice of peacekeeping operations.

60 R. Holland, ‘Nationalism, Ethnicity and the Concert of Europe: The Case of High

Commissionership of Prince George of Greece in Crete 1898-1906’, in: Journal of Modern Greek

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Nevertheless, since the mid-1990s criticism of the efficiency of UN operations has grown stronger. Particularly, since the fall of the enclave of Srebrenica in 1995, peacekeeping operations under the UN banner have been criticized and scrutinized. Often they are seen as unable to efficiently intervene when needed. But how exactly did peacekeeping operations evolve from traditional peacekeeping to the complex second-generation peacekeeping? In addition, what problems did the UN face at the end of the Cold War when the future of peacekeeping operations was at a crossroad? In order to understand the optimism of the 1980s and the early 1990s, a closer look at the evolution of peacekeeping will provide some answers. It seems that the eagerly optimistic worldview of the UN led to the establishment of second-generation. Something that was intended to make the world a better and safer place, but paradoxically led to complex missions for peacekeepers from the 1990s onwards. The establishment of peacekeeping operations

The failure to prevent the outbreak of the First World War led to a development of the idea to approach international relations as a science or academic discipline, which had to provide a better base of preventing future wars and sustainable peace. This stood in comparison to the then leading ideas on pacifism, which was seen by some as a sentimental and simplistic moral response to warfare.61_{The creation of International}

Relations as a science led to the development of theories on state sovereignty, self-determination, diplomatic relations, international security, and of course intervention. Despite this development, and the establishment of the League of Nations in January 1920, which had to put these ideas on international affairs in practice, again the world was unable to prevent the outbreak of a major international conflict from the 1930s onwards. After the Second World War the world was left in ruins and there was a common goal to strive for peace and increase international cooperation. As a result the UN was established on 24 October 1945 as an intergovernmental organization with the goal to prevent major armed conflict similar to the Second World War. This time the international community was determined to succeed.

Immediately after the establishment of the UN the organization was confronted with tension in several parts of the world and the threat of nuclear

weapons, which could undermine its ambitious goal towards global peace. The United

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Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) was established by the Security Council, on 29 May 1948, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.62_{The UNTSO}

mission is seen as the first UN peacekeeping operation. The mission consisted of ‘unarmed military observers who were sent to Palestine in June 1948 to supervise a truce negotiated by Count Bernadotte in the first war between Israel and its Arab neighbors.’63_{These unarmed military observers were generally officers who}

monitored the implementation of a ceasefire or peace agreement from fixed

observation posts or patrols in the region, whilst cooperating with local actors.64_These

observers had to report their findings as soon as possible. ‘The sooner the observers report incidents of violations, the greater the chance that escalation could be nipped in the bud.’65

The first armed UN military mission was established as a response to the Suez Crisis in 1956. After the invasion of Egypt in 1956 by Israel, the Security Council was unable to pass resolutions in order to stop the conflict. This had everything to do with the mechanism of the Security Council and the conflict of interest of some permanent members, including France and Great Britain. Efforts by Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld (1965-1961) and Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs Lester B. Pearson led to the creation of the concept of peacekeeping operations under the authority of the UN. In his second and final report ‘On the plan for an emergency international United Nations Force’ Hammarskjöld called for an emergency force developed on the basis of three different concepts, namely with a chief responsible officers fully independent of the policies of any one nation; charging a country, or a group of countries, with the responsibility to provide independently for an

international force; and lastly, setting up this force in agreement among a group of

62 Chapter VII: action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression.

Article 39: ‘The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.’

https://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml [02-03-2015].

63 M. Goulding, ‘ The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping’, in: International Affairs 69 (1993) no. 3, 451-464, 452.

64 C. Klep and R. van Gils, Van Korea tot Kabul, 18. 65 Ibidem.

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nations.66_{In his report Hammarskjöld suggested the idea that such force could operate}

with consent of the Security Council under Chapter VII.67_Moreover:

‘The Force obviously should have no rights other than those necessary for the execution of its functions, in co-operation with local authorities. It would be more than an observers’ corps, but in no way a military force temporarily controlling the territory in which it is stationed; nor, moreover, should the Force have military functions exceeding those necessary to secure peaceful conditions of the assumption that the parties to the conflict take all necessary steps for compliance with the

recommendations of the General Assembly.’68

Eventually, the adoption of Resolution 1001 on 7 November 1956 led to the creation of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I).69_{UNEF I was set up as the first}

military force under the authority of the Secretary-General, acting with consent of the Security Council.

‘A 6,000 strong United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF (I)) was assembled and rapidly deployed to enable the intervention forces to withdraw, and then patrol the armistice line between Egypt and Israel. The establishment of his force was facilitated by the experience gained in the observer missions. The soldiers wore their national uniforms, but with blue headgear (blue-painted helmet liners, later also blue berets and field caps) and UN badges as distinctive insignia – which in turn gave way to the familiar term ‘ blue helmets’ or (‘blue berets’).’70

Immediately after its creation, the UN and its utopian ideology of global peace were challenged by international tension in the Middle East, the mechanisms of the

66 D. Hammarskjöld, Second and final report of the Secretary-General on the plan for an

emergency international United Nations force requested in the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 4 November 1956 (A/3276), A/3302, 6 November 1956, para. 4.

http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ls/Urquhart_A-3302_e.pdf [02-03-2015]. 67 D. Hammarskjöld, Second and final report of the Secretary-General, para. 9. 68 Ibidem, para. 12.

69 United Nations General Assembly, A/RES/1001, 7 November 1956.

http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/14BCD994EE8F6558852560DF0067939D [02-03-2015]. 70 E. Schmidl, ‘The Evolution of Peace Operations from the Nineteenth Century’, in: Small Wars &

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Security Council and national interests of its permanent members. To ensure military intervention if and when international security was threatened, Hammarskjöld created the concept of UN peacekeeping missions. This meant that the most influential intergovernmental organization now had a military force at its disposal in order to assure the preservation of peace agreements.

Peacekeeping from the 1950s onwards

As the first UNEF mission was viewed a success, peacekeeping missions, from the late 1950s onwards, were seen as an alternative for the political straightjacket brought about by the Cold War.71_{However, these operations were only possible if neither}

East nor West felt threatened. ‘As sir Brian Urquhart (a close aid of Hammarskjöld and later Under Secretary-General for political affairs) stressed, the main aim of these endeavors (and the strong motivation of the UN staff involved) was to keep regions out of the Cold War which were not yet directly involved in the East-West

confrontation, in order to limit the risks of a new World War.’72_{This was the main}

goal and important factor for the UN missions of the 1950s and 1960s.

According to former Under Secretary-General Marrack Goulding the period between 1956 and 1974 can be seen as the golden age of UN peacekeeping.73_During

that period ten peacekeeping missions were established in Egypt, Lebanon, Congo, New Guinea, Yemen, Cyprus, the Dominican Republic, the Indian-Pakistani border and the Golan Heights. In total thirteen peacekeeping missions were established during the Cold War. These peacekeeping missions had the following characteristics: they were established by one of the legislative organs of the United Nations; they were under the command of the Secretary-General who had the authority given to him by the Security Council; the cost of the peacekeeping operation was collectively paid for by all member states of the UN; peacekeeping operations could only proceed with the consent of the contending parties in the conflicts, peacekeeping forces had to be an impartial actor; only national armies and police forces could be the only source of UN uniformed personnel in the conflict areas; and lastly, force could be only used to the minimum extent necessary, based primarily on the practice of self-defense.74

71 C. Klep and R. van Gils, Van Korea tot Kabul, 19. 72 E. Schmidl, The Evolution of Peace Operations, 10.

73 M. Goulding, The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping, 452. 74 Ibidem, 454-455.

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Despite it’s ideological aims, peacekeeping operations as created by Hammarskjöld were supposedly characterized by a high degree of impartiality and ‘attempted to avoid becoming involved in domestic affairs of the countries in which they were deployed, and scrupulously avoided expressing views on the superiority of any particular system of domestic governance’.75_{However, soon the UN and its}

peacekeeping operations were challenged by the question of impartiality and charges of neo-colonialism. Despite the elevation of self-determination into a fundamental right as stated in the UN charter, and the condemnation of colonialism in the ‘Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.’76

The United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) from 1960 – 1964 shows these fundamental flaws within peacekeeping operations.

Congo: the perfect example of flawed peacekeeping

On 30 June 1960 the Congo, a former Belgian colony, became independent. However, within a week of independence the country was in chaos.77_{Unrest and rebellion}

within the Congolese military led to the removal of all Belgian officers commanding the Force Republique, and widespread fear amongst thousands of Belgian civilians as stories of attacks on Europeans in Leopoldville and other major cities spread.78_{As a}

result of the unrest Belgian paratroopers were sent to the Congo to protect its civilians from massacres and to prevent the country from suicidal disorders.79_However,

Belgium’s actions went further than mere protection of its civilians. It can be seen as a violation of Congo’s sovereignty. Immediately the international community

condemned Belgium’s actions. With the country in disarray, the province of Katanga, with copper, gold and uranium resources, seceded from the country on July 11 1960 and formed a separate de facto state under the leadership of politician Moïse

Tshombe. Independence of the Katanga province was aided by Belgian paratroopers

75 R. Paris, Peacekeeping and the constraints of global culture, 449. 76 Ibidem, 445.

United Nations General Assembly, Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial

Countries and Peoples, 14 December 1960.

http://www.un.org/en/decolonization/declaration.shtml [28-08-2015].

77 L.S. Kaplan, ‘The United States, Belgium, and the Congo Crisis of 1960’, in: The Review of

Politics 29 (1967) no. 2, 239-256, 240.

78 L.S. Kaplan, The United States, Belgium, and the Congo Crisis of 1960, ibidem.

79 D. N. Gibbs, ‘The United Nations, international peacekeeping and the question of ‘impartiality’: revisiting the Congo operation of 1960’, in: Journal of Modern African Studies 38 (2000) no. 3, 359-382, 363.

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who not only supported Tshombe, but also helped with the transformation of the gendarmerie into a military force. 80_{The Congolese government, under the leadership}

of Prime Minister Patrice Lumbumba and Joseph Kasavubu as Head of State, brought the Congo Crisis to the attention of the UN on 12 July when the government

requested UN assistance.81_{As a result of its actions, Belgium found itself a pariah}

among nations, ‘with the Secretary-General of the United Nations himself leading a campaign to remove the “Belgian factor” from Africa, and threatening reprisals if warnings were not heeded.’82_{In July 1960 the United Nations Operation in the Congo}

or ONUC was established and soon approximately 20,000 troops from some thirty countries, including Ireland, Ethiopia, Guinea, Ghana, India, Tunisia, Sweden and Morocco, who would provide military assistance to the country.83_{‘In addition, the UN}

established a Civilian Operations programme, and several hundred UN specialists assisted the Congolese in such diverse sectors as transport, health, education, public works, finance, public administration, natural resources development and emergency food relief.’ Immediately the UN had to think about the question if it should deal with regional secessions and future of the Katanga province. Shortly, despite the aim of impartiality and to quickly resolve the crisis, national self-interest of various countries would influence the ONUC mission.

Belgium, which had large economic stakes in the Katanga province, was a large factor in sustaining the Tshombe government. The United States’ policy was aimed at restraining Soviet impulses to profit from Belgium’s difficulties in the Congo and to replace Belgian investments with their own.84_{Although the UN}

deployed a large number of blue helmets to the region, in late August 1960, Lumbumba requested and received military assistance from the Soviet Union to suppress the regional rebellions.85_{Even though Secretary-General Hammarskjöld had}

to maintain a certain degree of impartiality, he clearly overstepped his boundaries by indicating that he hoped to see Lumbumba replaced.86_{While UN efforts to remove}

Lumbumba failed, they supported Colonel Mombutu’s coup d’état on 14 September

80 D. N. Gibbs, The United Nations, international peacekeeping and the question of ‘impartiality’, 363.

81 Ibidem.

82 L.S. Kaplan, The United States, Belgium, and the Congo Crisis of 1960, 241.

84 L.S. Kaplan, The United States, Belgium, and the Congo Crisis of 1960, 248, 252.

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1960.87_{‘UN policy, by supporting Colonel Mobutu’s rise to power, closely paralleled}

policies that the US government was pursuing during the same period…the US connection to Mobutu would remain a feature of Congolese politics for many years afterwards.’88_{By trying to remove Lumbumba, the UN impeded on Congo’s}

sovereignty and acted with its own agenda.

The actions of the UN and other Western powers during the Congo Crisis of 1960 can be characterized as Western imperialism or even neo-colonialism.

Furthermore, the Congo Crisis and ONUC mission show one of the biggest flaws of peacekeeping, namely the influence of countries’ self-interest within a certain peacekeeping operation.

Despite these fears of impartiality, accusations of neo-colonialism, and apparent flaws in the character of UN peacekeeping missions, in former Under Secretary-General Marrack Goulding’s opinion all operations of the 1950’s until the 1970s, including the Congo operation, were a success.89_{However there has been some}

criticism on this optimistic and positive view. According to International Relations scholar Adam Roberts: ‘there was no shortages of problems in the first 13 UN peacekeeping operations. The weakness of depending upon the consent of the host state was cruelly exposed by the expulsion of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) from Egypt in 1967.’90_{Furthermore, two of those peacekeeping operations}

UNFICYP (United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus) from 1964 and UNDOF (United Nations Disengagement Observer Force) in the Golan Heights from 1974 are still ongoing. These two missions, combined with the failure of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), showed that UN peacekeeping forces could not always prevent the breakdown of order, foreign invasions and seizures of territory.91

Moreover, after the ONUC mission’s departure fighting in Congo resumed. In the 1990s a new mission had to be established, namely the MONUSCO mission. In Angola the UN had to set up multiple missions under the heading UNAVEM. Today the situation in Angola remains tense.92_{After the establishment of UNIFIL it would}

take ten years before a new force was set up.

87 Ibidem, 374. 88 Ibidem, 374.

89 M. Goulding, The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping, 452.

90 A. Roberts, ‘The Crisis in UN Peacekeeping’, in: Survival 36 (1994) no. 3, 93-120, 95. 91 A. Roberts, The Crisis in UN Peacekeeping, 95.

92 http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unavem_p.htm [15-09-2015]. https://www.hrw.org/africa/angola [15-09-2015].

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Furthermore, during the years the UN and its peacekeeping missions have received more criticism besides accusations of neo-colonialism, its inability to prevent conflict or questions on its effectiveness. The lack of consensus in the Security Council often leads to no intervention, or too late, as seen today in Syria. This led to a severe humanitarian crisis not seen in Europe since the Second World War. Moreover, often reports emerge on the alleged sexual abuse by UN peacekeepers.93_{It is difficult}

to tackle these kinds of abuses when peacekeepers fall under the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations adopted in 1946.94_{Moreover, if they}

are found guilty they will be transferred to national authorities.95_{Although the UN}

vows to tackle and prevent these abuses, there is still a long way to go.

The end of the 1980s saw the establishment of five new peacekeeping

missions. A few reasons can be attributed to this expansion. The influence of glasnost and perestroika lessened the East-West rivalry in the UN Security Council, which also led to increased cooperation and a decline in the use of veto power.96_{‘A further}

reason for the expansion of peacekeeping has been a widespread mood of optimism that the UN can have a much more central role in international security and that peacekeeping can tackle a very wide range of urgent problems.’97_{Lastly, the end of}

the cold war increased the need for international intervention. In 1988 and 1989 five peacekeeping operations were set up in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP), Iran and Iraq (UNIIMOG), Angola (UNAVEM I), Namibia (UNTAG) and Nicaragua (ONUCA). This number only quintupled in the first five years of the 1990s. In 1988 the UN even received the Nobel Peace Prize for its efforts and contributions to global peace. However, after the end of the Cold War, as conflicts grew more complex,

93 https://www.hrw.org/middle-east/n-africa/syria [15-09-2015].

I. Traynor, ‘NATO force “feeds Kosovo sex trade”’, in: The Guardian, 7 May 2004. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/may/07/balkans [15-09-2015]. ‘Fears over Haiti child “Abuse”, in: BBC News, 30 November 2006.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6159923.stm [15-09-2015].

‘UN peacekeepers face new sex abuse claims in CAR’, in: Al Jazeera, 24 June 2015. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/06/peacekeepers-face-sex-abuse-claims-car-150624123505253.html [20-06-2015].

www.un.org/press/en/2006/sc8649.doc.htm [20-06-2015]. 94 http://www.un.org/en/ethics/pdf/convention.pdf [11-11-2015].

95 United Nations Secretariat, Secretary-General’s Bulletin. Special Measures for Protection from

Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse, (ST/SGB/2003/13), 9 October 2003.

http://www.refworld.org/docid/451bb6764.html [11-11-2015]

96 E. Osmançavuğlu, ‘Challenges to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in the Post-Cold War Era’, in: Perceptions. Journal of International Affairs 4 (1999/2000) no. 4,1-8, 1.

http://sam.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/EmelOsmanCavusoglu.pdf [23-04-2015]. 97 A. Roberts, The Crisis in UN Peacekeeping, 96.

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academics, politicians and UN personnel alike contemplated the future role of UN peacekeeping missions.

Second-Generation peacekeeping operations

In his Agenda for Peace, published in June 1992, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali outlined the way he felt the UN should respond to conflict in in the post-Cold War era. According to Boutros-Ghali the beginning of the 1990s marked a time of global transition in which sovereign and nationalistic rivalries challenged social peace.98

Furthermore, according to Boutros-Ghali, in a period where veto power has been used less and peacekeeping operations emerged as a central instrument for the prevention and resolutions of conflicts, additional tasks of peacekeeping operations had to aim at: seeking to identify at the earliest possible stage situations that could lead to conflict; engaging in peacemaking aimed at resolving issues that have led to conflict;

peacekeeping focused on preserving peace; assisting in peace building, by rebuilding institutions and infrastructures; and addressing causes of conflict, such as economic despair, social injustice and political oppression.99

Concretely, this meant that from 1988 onwards, peacekeeping operations had to engage in more activities, thus adopting a more multidimensional character. This included monitoring and running elections; protecting inhabitants in a specific region from the threat of force; protecting designated ‘safe areas’; ensuring the partial demilitarization of particular areas; guarding weapons surrendered by or taken from parties in the conflict; assuring the delivery of humanitarian relief supplies and the performance of a wide range of other humanitarian tasks during conflict; assisting in the reconstruction of governmental or police functions after conflict and reporting violations of the laws of armed conflict.100_{Operations that included peacemaking,}

peace building, peace-enforcement and humanitarian aid were seen as a departure from ‘traditional’ peacekeeping as implemented from the 1950s onwards. These multidimensional operations were referred to as second-generation operations.

Immediately there was criticism on these second-generation peacekeeping operations. While the first operations of the 1990s were regarded a success, such as

98 B. Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: Preventative Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping (1992) 2, para. 8.

http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/47/277 [22-03-2015].

99 B. Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, 4, para. 15. 100 A. Roberts, The Crisis in UN Peacekeeping, 97.

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the missions in Cambodia, Mozambique and Eritrea, the missions in Somalia, Western Sahara and Angola casted doubt on the capability of the UN and the

peacekeeping missions to adequately enforce peace. To this day it remains unclear as to why exactly certain mission succeed as others fail. Successful operations do have similar characteristics. Since a UN peacekeeping operation is only operational with the consent of warring parties, there is a need for cooperation between all parties. Furthermore, in the eyes of the warring parties the UN has to be credible and

legitimate. Also, the peacekeeping operation has to be supplied with enough soldiers, which was not the case during the UNPROFOR mission. Last but not least, there has to be the political will to end the conflict. Concretely, this means that there needs to be an absence of, or as little as possible, national self-interest of political

heavyweights such as the Russian Federation or the United States in the conflict. The reluctant attitude of US foreign policy during Bosnia has been partially attributed to the failure of the UNSOM II mission in Somalia in 1993.101_{Despite these difficulties}

in peacekeeping, such missions have been made more difficult by the expanded tasks of second-generation peacekeeping operations.

‘It has become clear that the UN’s resourcefulness as a mediator has outstripped its capability as a military organizer and that a more effective military response is now required by the newly defined tasks of the second generation of UN activity. Peacekeeping cannot be adapted any further to perform these tasks. A more practical instrument is needed.’102

Furthermore, scholars Mackinlay and Chopra were not the only ones early 1990s to question the new wide range of responsibilities within so-called second-generation operations. International Relations Scholar Alan James claimed the following about the situation early 1990s: ‘Recently the peace-keeping pendulum has swung in a markedly internal direction…Could it therefore be that in going so briskly down the internal peace-keeping path, the UN is heading for - and perhaps reached – a

resounding dead end?’103_{According to John Ruggie, associated to Harvard as a}

101 L.S. Kaplan, The United States, Belgium, and the Congo Crisis of 1960, 248, 377.

102 J. Mackinlay and J. Chopra, ‘Second Generation Multinational Operations’, in: Washington

Quarterly 15 (1992) no. 3, 113-131, 113.

103 A. James, ‘Internal Peace-keeping: A Dead End for the UN?’, in: Security Dialogue 24 (1993) no. 4, 359-368, 359.

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professor in Human Rights and International Affairs, the UN entered a domain of military activity, for which it lacked any guiding operational concept.104_{Also, Ruggie}

stated that the gray area between peacekeeping and all-out-war-fighting, just like the doctrinal void between peacekeeping and enforcement got the UN itself into serious trouble.105_{By proposing credible military forces; a revision of the doctrines; as well as}

minimizing geographical, ideological or any other forms of bias from the military forces; and revising the domain in which UN needs to operate successfully, it was in Ruggies opinion that the international community could be able to effectively combat conflicts.106

To counter the gray area between peacekeeping and peace-enforcement, former Under Secretary-General Kofi Annan proposed closer cooperation with NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization).107_{The end of the cold war called for}

peacekeeping with teeth.

‘Today’s conflicts in Somalia and Bosnia have fundamentally redrawn the parameters. It is no longer enough to implement agreements or separate antagonists; the international community now wants the United Nations to demarcate boundaries, control and eliminate heavy weapons, quell

anarchy, and guarantee the delivery of humanitarian aid in war zones. These are clearly tasks that call for teeth and muscle…The teeth of peacekeeping are of necessity two-edged: they must have both mandate and means.’108

According to Annan, larger and more pro-active operations required more sophisticated command and control structures and equipment. With its existing military resources and political weight NATO could contribute to peacekeeping and increase peace-enforcement. However, even proposed cooperation with NATO could not eliminate criticism on second-generation peacekeeping missions. Andrew Roberts proposed more selectivity. In which types of situations is peacekeeping appropriate

104 J. G. Ruggie, ‘Wandering in the Void: Chartering the UN’s New Strategic Role,’ in: Foreign

Affairs 72 (1993) no. 5, 26-31, 26.

105 J. G. Ruggie, Wandering in the Void, 28, 29. 106 Ibidem, 30-31.

107 K. A. Annan, ‘UN Peacekeeping Operations and Cooperation with NATO’ in, NATO Review 47 (1993) no. 5, 3-7.

http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1993/9305-1.htm [23-05-2014]. 108 K. A. Annan, UN Peacekeeping Operations and Cooperation with NATO.

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and in which not?109_{By selectivity, peacekeeping missions could avoid internal}

conflicts, or civil wars, which are not dealt with in the UN Charter and costly,

unrewarding and difficult to resolve.110_{After the debacle of the Rwandan Genocide in}

the summer of 1994, when at least 500.000 Rwandans died in the span of

approximately 100 days, criticism of UN and its peacekeeping missions flared up. Charles Dobbie, drafter of the British Doctrine Wider Peacekeeping, argued that peacekeeping and peace-enforcement failed during the first years of the 1990s because they require radically different conceptual approaches.111_{According to}

Dobbie peacekeeping should address the perceptions and attitudes of the warring parties and the local population with impartiality and minimum force. Peace-enforcement on the other hand should be conducted in accordance with standard military principles predicated on the identification of an enemy. Dobbie also had criticism on the mandates from UN and their destabilizing influence. ‘The UN should never again betray the security or credibility of its peacekeepers by saddling them with mandates that are unmanageable or that demonstrate partiality.’112_{Lastly, Dobbie}

also called for a revision of the existing peacekeeping doctrine.113

However, despite the criticism on the character of second-generation

peacekeeping and UN peacekeeping in general, the UN was unable to truly reform the ambiguous character of peacekeeping and peace-enforcement. By the time the enclave in Bosnia fell, the words written by Ruggie two years earlier, became reality: ‘If the United Nations continues on its present course, its newly constructed house of cards will collapse and take traditional peacekeeping as well as humanitarian intervention down with it.’114

Conclusion

After the First and Second World War, the need for international cooperation to not repeat these disastrous events led to the establishment of the UN. Faced with political and social unrest, UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld created the revolutionary

109 A. Roberts, The Crisis in UN Peacekeeping, 105. 110 Ibidem, 106.

111 C. Dobbie, ‘A Concept for Post-Cold War Peacekeeping’, in: Survival 36 (1994) no. 3, 121-48, 121.

112 C. Dobbie, A Concept for Post-Cold War Peacekeeping, 145. 113 Ibidem.

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concept of UN peacekeeping. Peacekeeping missions that took place during the Cold War were mostly aimed at keeping regions out of the Eastern-Western influence sphere and limiting the risks of a new world war. Immediately after its creation UN peacekeeping operations were seen as the newest and best possibility to establish global peace. Despite this preconceived notion of the possibility to contain Cold War influence, in combination with the characteristics of peacekeeping, including

maintaining a high degree of impartiality, the UN could not escape the fact that it became the plaything of major political players, and in particular Security Council P5 members. Moreover, it had to operate within Cold War proxy wars. Nevertheless, in cases where amongst others cooperation between East-West was present, the UN was able to achieve success.

The end of the Cold War could have been the end of peacekeeping operations since the great divided between the Eastern and Western superpowers and the political and military tension disappeared. Nonetheless, the end of the Cold War did not mean a restoration of international peace. Even though the international community was extremely optimistic about the power of intervention in the form of peacekeeping operations. The post-Cold War world was characterized by ethnic, nationalistic, sectarian and civil conflicts. At the end of the 1980s the UN displayed an undue optimism in the strength of peacekeeping operations. The UN’s eager and optimistic ideology to ensure global peace, from the late 1980s onwards, was strengthened by the vanished East-West divide. In its quest to combat all threats towards international security, the UN transformed peacekeeping operations into unfeasible

multidimensional missions. In these operations UN peacekeepers were unable to efficiently operate and combat violence.

Unfortunately, while the UN drastically expanded the traditional tasks of peacekeeping operations, from the 1990s onwards, blue helmets were deployed to more internally complex situations whilst performing a more multidimensional role. This included observing and enforcing peace, ensuring demilitarization and

performing humanitarian relief. The lack of tension between the Eastern and Western superpowers gave the UN the notion that from that moment onwards every conflict, no matter how internally complex, was manageable. However, the character of second-generation peacekeeping made it for soldiers more difficult to properly preform their tasks, something that was noticeably after the UN was faced with great challenges during the missions in Somalia, the Western Sahara and Angola.

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While problems with the character of second-generation peacekeeping

operations were observed and commented on by a wide-range of scholars, the UN was deeply invested in a great deal of operations in different countries and thus incapable to reform on a short notice. Furthermore, despite criticism on the potential pitfalls of second-generation peacekeeping, the UN truly believed that such missions as engaged in from the late 1980s were the best way to achieve global peace. The extended tasks for blue helmets were therefore a logical outcome of the plan to strengthen the

missions. By the time UNPROFOR was in full progress, with an inadequate mandate, the disastrous outcome of the mission was unforeseen but also inevitable.

refuting the myth: Dutchbat III and its pre-deployment training