Leiden University
Bachelor: Internationale Betrekkingen en Organisaties
From Victors to Victims:
The Narrative of Chinese Leaders regarding the Century of Humiliation
Bachelor project 10: The history we live in First reader: Dr. C. Vergerio
Second reader: Dr. F. de Zwart Student: Mark Schutjens Student number: s1740040 Date: 18-06-2018
2 Table of Contents
Introduction………p.3 Literature Review……….………..p.4 Conceptual Framework………..p.6 Research design and methodology………... .p.8 Case selection…...p.9 Limitations……….p.10 Chapter 1: Mao Zedong……….p.11 1.1. Historical context………...p.11 1.2. Mao’s narrative regarding the century of humiliation..….…...p.11 Chapter 2: Deng Xiaoping………...p.14 2.1. Historical context………..….………...p.14 2.2. Deng’s narrative regarding the century of humiliation.………p.15 Chapter 3: Xi Jinping…..………...p.17 3.1. Historical context………..……….p.18 3.2. Xi’s narrative regarding the century of humiliation…...p.18 Conclusion….………..…p.21 Bibliography...p.24 Appendix A………..p.27 Appendix B………...p.31 Appendix C………..p.34 Appendix D………..p.38
3 Introduction
Throughout history, state leaders have used historical narratives as a means to shape the collective memory of their state’s population. Since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Chinese leaders have also been known for using historical narratives in shaping a Chinese collective memory. One of the most commonly used Chinese narratives is referred to in both media and academia as the “victim narrative”. The “victim narrative” refers to the period of 1839 to 1949, also known as “the century of humiliation” (Kaufman, 2011, p1). According to China’s political elite, this period is about the foreign aggression against the Chinese people. Surrounding the debate on the “victim narrative”, roughly two camps can be identified, namely the camp that sees this narrative as a rather new phenomenon that came about in the 1990s (Gries, 2004, p4), and the camp that sees this narrative as a continuous and static story as told by Chinese leaders ever since the century of humiliation itself (Scott, 2008, p.xi).
The research question this paper addresses is: To what extend can variation be identified in the form and context of the narrative regarding “the century of humiliation" as used by different Chinese leaders to shape a national collective memory”?
The goal of this paper is to establish whether or not a variation in the form and context of the narrative in collective memory shaping can be identified. This provides clarity about the continuous and static (no real changes) or discontinuous and dynamic (important changes) nature of the narrative(s). First, there will be assessed what the leader specific narrative regarding the century of humiliation entails, and second, to establish why this narrative is used in the shaping of a collective memory, as to assess if there is a variation in the form and context. This research will use the “victim narrative” as the starting point of investigation. Through this analysis it can be established if the “victim narrative” is an accurate depiction of the narrative as used by these Chinese leaders.
The significance of this paper is first and foremost to give an insight into the debate surrounding the “victim narrative”, and if a variation in the form of the narrative can be identified, as to establish the continuity or discontinuity of this narrative. Second, historical narratives predicated by political leaders, are often used to shape the collective memory of a nation. It is of importance to understand in what context Chinese leaders have used this narrative, as the purpose of using this narrative could change over time, and with that the form of the narrative (White, 1984, p.19). Based upon the form of the narrative and the context in
4 which it is used to shape a collective memory, it will be assessed whether or not the “victim narrative” can be labeled as a continuous and static story, or if variations can refute this perspective. Moreover, it will be assessed whether or not the term “victim narrative” is an accurate depiction of the discourse itself.
The outline of this paper is as follows. In the first section, a broad overview of the existing literature surrounding the narrative will be presented, before continuing with the conceptual framework. The concepts of historical narratives and collective memory shaping will be elaborated, and the methods of analysis that can be employed to extract narratives from texts. Second, the research design and methodology section will treat the methods of analysis and the criteria that are used, the case selection, and limitations of this research. The core of this paper is divided in three separate chapters. In each chapter a different leader will be discussed based upon the analysis of their works. In the last section, the findings of this research and its contributions will be presented. This paper concludes by stating that the label “victim narrative” is not the correct narrative to attribute to ‘all Chinese leaders’ assessed in this research. Even so, variations in the form and the context of the discourse can be observed, that confirms that the narrative of the Chinese leaders varies significantly, whilst they all refer to the century of humiliation.
Literature Review
This section aims to provide a description of the debate on the “victim narrative”. Both sides of the debate will be explained. One side who sees it as a rather new phenomenon and second, those who see it as a continuous story that has been around since the century of humiliation itself. According to the literature, the century of humiliation refers to the period from 1839 to 1949, the First Opium war up to the establishment of the PRC. In China, the “victim narrative” became the story as told by China’s elite (Kaufman, 2010, p.2). The “victim narrative” is centered on a Chinese collective memory of Western and Japanese aggression towards China during this period that according to China’s elite has prevented it from development. The core elements of the century of humiliation that are emphasized are that of unequal treaties, extraterritorial rights, and outright annexation of Chinese territories that essentially made China the “sick man of East Asia” (Scott, 2008, p.249; Chong, 2014, p.943). The First and Second Sino-Japanese wars, fought between 1894-1895 and 1937-1945, have framed how China acts towards Japan. This stems from the painful reminder of Japanese
5 expansionism and annexation of former Chinese Territories like Taiwan. This reminder is still present in contemporary Chinese memory (Gries, 2008, pp.46-47). As Wang (2013) puts it: “Chinese remember this period as a time when China was attacked, bullied, and torn asunder by imperialists” (p.20).
The “victim narrative” is a general account as told by Chinese leaders, that appeals to the collective memory of China’s population. As scholars like Volkan and Wang argue, the “victim narrative” is a means of selecting what the Chinese should remember, and what they should forget regarding the century of humiliation, in order to shape the collective identity of the nation (Wang, 2014, p.24). Callahan notes that this memory of victimization is predicated by Chinese leaders to construct a collective memory that places China as an exceptional nation, by emphasizing that China is the only nation that was able to go from a great power status, to be “the sick man of East Asia”, and back to great power status again (Callahan, 2004, p.206).
According to Gries, Mao’s “victors narrative” of overcoming the imperialistic Western and Japanese aggression against all odds via political unity, was replaced by the “victim narrative” during the 1990s (Gries, 2004, p.48). This “victors narrative”, according to Gries, is displayed by referring to acts of heroism, patriotism and overcoming against all odds, the foreign aggressors through unity and victory (Gries, 2008, p.70). Scott agrees with Gries that the narrative centers Japan as the aggressor in a wider context than only the Sino-Japanese Wars. However, Scott disagrees that this narrative is a new phenomenon. According to him this narrative was already established during the century of humiliation (Scott, 2008, p.xi). Vogel agrees with Scott and continues by stating that this narrative was important for gathering public support, and therefore no Chinese leader has ever dared to criticize the narrative (Vogel, 2011, p.477). There is general consensus that since the 1990s, the “victim narrative” can be traced back to Chinese history books, educational programs and official statements from Chinese officials (Gries, 2004, p.48). As Scott argued, this narrative was not just an artificial creation by the state, but the fact that it existed made it possible to be used and become further embedded in the collective memory of China (Scott, 2008, p.295). However, as shown above, there is a lack of consensus on the usage of the “victim narrative” prior to the 1990s.
Although there is disagreement on the timeline of the “victim narrative”, the most prominent scholars in this field of study tend to describe this narrative from the same basic
6 principles as described in the first paragraph (Chong, 2014, p.943). However, the literature on the variation of this narrative is limited. This stems from the fact that only minimal discourse analysis has been conducted on the texts of Chinese leaders. Therefore, the “victim narrative” is mostly used by scholars as a general idea. Gries did make use of a discourse analysis on a variety of scriptures, like poems and writing of Chinese scholars to review how this narrative has been used in practice. However, minimal literature is available on how different Chinese leaders have used the narrative, and if a change in the form of the narrative can be identified (Gries, 2008). Because of this, no definitive statements can be made on the continuity or discontinuity and static or dynamic nature of the narrative. As Chong puts it, relying on a static and continuous view on the narrative, makes the study of it problematic, as deviation from the narrative is necessary, because the political elite must change the narrative to fit the context of the period it is used in to effectively create a collective memory (Chong, 2014, p.950).
Conceptual framework
For this research a specific narrative as told by Chinese leader is examined. In this section first there will be explained why the historical accuracy of a narrative in collective memory shaping is unimportant to understand how and why a narrative is used, because the goal of historical narratives is to produce meaning. Therefore a historical account differs significantly from a historical narrative. Second, there will be argued that a proper tool for examining a specific narrative, is via a predicate analysis. Combined with an analysis of the general underlying pattern and the context in which the narrative is used, the specific narrative as used by the particular Chinese leader can be constructed.
Hayden White, a prominent scholar on narratives states that the narrative level of a historical account differs significantly from the chronological level that gives an account of the events existing within time. A narrative on the other hand, is always presented in retrospect, and forms a continuity by linking the beginning of a period to the end of a period. Therefore, according to him, the historical (accurate) account differs from the narrative level of a historical account as the person telling the story alters the meaning of the narrative (White, 1984, pp.28-29). White taught us that “we require a history that will educate us to discontinuity more than ever before; for discontinuity, disruption and chaos is our lot (Genzlinger, 2018). Moreover, scholars like Stone and Sparrowe argue that a historical narrative is descriptive rather than analytical. It gives an account of the past that is interpreted
7 by the person telling the story. This provides a narrative its intelligibility (Stone, 1979, p.1; Sparrowe, 2005, p.425). Some scholars argue that historical narratives are only useful when it can be judged on its “truth value”. This means giving an accurate account of the past that fits the historical facts. However by reviewing narratives based upon its “truth value”, it undermines the fact that an account of a historical event, is subject to differences based upon the person telling the story (White, 1984, p.18). Therefore White taught us that historical facts are verifiable, whilst stories are not, as stories are produced by the person telling it (Genzlinger, 2018).
By exploring a historical narrative in a descriptive manner, it is about reporting the form of the narrative as used by the person, and not rejecting it for its historical inaccuracy (Polkinghorne, 1988, pp.161-162). Therefore a historical narrative is about the “production of meaning”. A narrative can be subject to change, as a change in the form of the narrative, might not explicitly change the information about the referent, but it would certainly change the meaning produced by it (White, 1984, p.19). For example, when two Chinese leaders predicate a narrative regarding the century of humiliation, they can both refer to the same event(s). However, by changing the form of the narrative from a form of victimization to a of form of victory, although the referent stays the same, the meaning produced by the narrative changes significantly, as it changes from China as a victim at the hands of Japan, to China as a victor against Japanese aggression.
National collective memory (onwards referred to as “collective memory”) can be described as the way in which the public mind is merged through writings on history, other images and stories (Wang, 2014, p.28). The goal of history is to make a historically accurate account of the past. Collective memory on the other hand, is a means to establish a collective recollection of the past, which is influenced by the narrator’s perceptions and the historical context in which the narrative has been used (Wertsch, 2008, p.120). As Halbwachs (1980) argues, how could history ever be a memory, since there is a break in continuity between the society that reads the history and the history itself (p.79). Moreover, leaders use historical narratives to shape a collective memory with the purpose of realizing political goals. Collective memory is used to bind a group of people (Wang, 2014, p.20). In the case of historical narratives referring to painful events, the historical “truth value” is of lesser importance than the purpose of the narrative itself, which is to achieve certain political goals by shaping a collective memory (Wang, 2014, p.38).
In order to examine a historical narrative, a discourse analysis can provide the methodology to do so. More specific, a predicate analysis can be used to identify the
8 production of meaning and variation in the narrative. A predicate analysis is useful to study the language in texts. By examining the nouns, (ad)verbs, and adjectives that are attached to a proper noun, predictions can be made on how the narrative is constructed, what its features are, and to what ends it is being used (Milliken, 1999, pp.231-232). Studying the structure of a predicate, and labeling them as positive or negative attributes and actions, provides the ability to establish a general narrative (Polkinghorne, 1988, pp.87-88). Historical narratives that construct an “enemy” for the person or group to which it is addressed, can be assessed by studying both the “specific narrative” and the “schematic narrative template”. A specific narrative refers to narratives generated through a specific historical event or events. Schematic narrative templates, according to Wertsch, are a necessary tool for studying collective memory shaping through historical narratives, as it provides us with general underlying patterns that are not visible when only looking at specific narratives (Wertsch, 2008, pp.122-123). Moreover, when examining historical narratives in relation to collective memory, state leaders, especially in autocratic regimes, are the single most important entities, as state leaders have put the most effort in mass-collective memory shaping, throughout history (Wertsch, 2008, p.124; Reilly, 2011, p.466).
Research design and methodology
This paper provides an analysis of the works of Chinese leaders to establish whether or not a variation in the form of the narrative regarding the century of humiliation can be observed. Therefore, it is not about the historical (in) accuracy of the narrative (White, 1984, p.18). The analysis will consist of a predicate analysis, following the guidelines of Milliken and Polkinghorne. This encompasses the study of writings and speeches of Chinese leaders in which they refer to the century of humiliation. The nouns, (ad)verbs, and adjectives that are used, will be defined as to establish how they relate to the proper noun. In this research the proper nouns that will be observed are Japan, China, and to a lesser extend the West, as to construct the form of the narrative (Milliken, 1999; Polkinghorne, 1988). In Appendices A, B, and C the results of the predicate analysis have been processed, and summarized in Appendix D. The writings that are selected, are those writings where there is a direct reference to an event(s) regarding the century of humiliation. The relevant nouns, (ad)verbs, and adjectives are structured in tables, and specified as being a negative or positive attribute or action to the relevant proper noun. Moreover, by counting how many times a certain word is used, the
9 importance of the word in relation to the predicate can be established. This provides the tool to establish the form of the narrative of each Chinese leader.
Moreover, following the reasoning of Wertsch, the specific narrative and the schematic narrative template will be reviewed by examining the context in which the narrative is used to provide insights on the general underlying pattern of the narrative in shaping a national collective memory (Wertsch, 2008). The combination of a predicate analysis and a context analysis is suitable to define the form of the narrative, and why this specific narrative is used for collective memory shaping. For the particular narrative in this research, the analysis will focus on the references of Chinese leaders towards Japan and China, and to a lesser extend the West, in the context of the century of humiliation. The context is reviewed through a qualitative analysis of the writings and by placing them in the context of the time. This research will only focus on the use of the narrative regarding the century of humiliation by state leaders, as state leaders have been the most effective in shaping the collective of a nation (Wertsch, 2008, p.124; Reilly, 2011, p.466; Olick, Vinitzky-Seroussi & Levy, 2011, p.11).
Case selection
For this research Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping and Xi Jinping have been selected because they have contributed significantly to China’s socio-political, ideological and economic development. The research will be divided into three chapters. Each chapter will first give a brief historical background of the Chinese leader, before continuing the examination of the narrative in collective memory shaping. Mao Zedong’s narrative regarding the century of humiliation will be examined in chapter I. He is selected for obvious reasons, including; he was a leading figure in the Second Sino-Japanese war, the founding father of the PRC, and he reformed China into a centralized Communist state (Cheek, 2010, p.3). Deng Xiaoping’s narrative will be assessed in chapter II. He was the successor of Mao, and is well known for transforming China through his reforming and opening policy, which put China on the path of economic development (Kuhn, 2011, p.104; Vogel, 2011, p.9). In the third chapter Xi Jinping’s narrative will be examined. Xi’s recent consolidation of power, by abolishing presidential terms, and his long term plans of transforming China into a moderately well of society and a world leader, make him an interesting leader to study (Kuhn, 2013; Economy, 2018, pp.60-62).
10 Limitations
Due to the limited time frame of this research, this paper will primarily focus on the form of the narrative as used by different Chinese leaders, and not on the historical accuracy of the narrative. Moreover, a limited number of Chinese leaders will be reviewed as to narrow down the scope of research. These leaders have been selected because their leadership is characterized by major changes in China’s socio-political, ideological and economic landscape (Kuhn, 2011, p.104). However, it should be mentioned that the contribution of Chinese leaders in shaping China is an ongoing debate and opinions on this matter differ greatly. Therefore, in future research other Chinese leaders could be included as well.
11 Chapter 1 – Mao Zedong
In this chapter first some brief background information on Mao will be presented. Second, based upon the results of the predicate and context analysis, Mao´s narrative in collective memory shaping will be presented. The writings that have been examined are those writings in which Mao refers to the century of humiliation, and are bundled in the “Selected Works of Mao Tsetung” Volume IV and V (Zedong, 1956; Zedong, 1977). In short, Mao´s narrative can best be described as a “victors narrative” that he used to shape a culture of the masses and to gather public support for the resistance against Japan and the Kuomintang (KMT) in the Second Sino-Japanese War and the War of Liberation.
1.1. The historical context
During the period of 1940 to 1949, Mao was the leader of the self-established Red Army and from 1945 he became chairman of the Politburo of the Communist party. During the first period of the writings up till 1945, Mao was a key player in the War of Resistance against Japan. The Second Sino-Japanese War was the most destructive war in Asia in the 20th century (Wang, 2014, p.65). In alliance with the KMT, China was able to resist Japan, and with the end of World War II, Japan was on the losing side of the conflict. From 1945 to 1949 Mao fought the reactionary KMT, who was backed by the U.S. This led in 1949 to a decisive victory for Mao and the establishment of the PRC, only excluding some islands in the Asia-Pacific like Taiwan, Korea and Tibet (Scott, 2008, p.276). From 1949 to 1976 Mao was the unchallenged leader of the PRC (Cheek, 2010, p.134).
1.2. Mao’s narrative regarding the century of humiliation
In the period of 1940-1945, Mao primarily focused on what he calls the “resistance of the Japanese imperialists”. Looking at the historical background, this is no surprise, as the war against Japan was one of the bloodiest wars in East-Asia’s history (Kuhn 2011, p.55). The general pattern in his works, are essentially based upon the context of that time, which is the Second Sino-Japanese War. This makes it difficult to identify the narrative regarding the century of humiliation in a broader context.
12 Especially his writings on arts and literature reveal the emphasis that Mao puts on framing Japan as a fundamental evil that needs to be resisted. As he puts it,
“With regard to our enemies, i.e. the Japanese imperialists and all other enemies of the people, the task of revolutionary artists and writers is to expose their cruelty and chicanery, point out the tendency of their inevitable defeat and encourage the anti-Japanese army and people to fight them with one heart and one mind and overthrow them resolutely” (Zedong, 1942, p.64).
He continues by stating that those artists and writers who do not actively oppose Japan, must be combatted, and any form of pro-Japanese art resolutely rejected (Zedong, 1942, pp.65-69). The quote above, clearly shows how Mao in his early years was already promoting a “culture of the masses”. He was trying to shape the collective memory of the Chinese by influencing the perception of the masses against, what he calls, the “enemies of all people of China” (Zedong, 1942, p.71; Wang, 2014, p.28). He continues later on, by stating that the public needs a popularization of “culture, knowledge, arts and literature”, in order to shape one “mind and heart” (Zedong, 1942, p.78). As Wertsch argued, state leaders have been the most effective entities in mass-collective memory shaping, with the goal of realizing political objectives. Following this reasoning, one can extract from his writings in the period of 1941 to 1949 that his objective was to increase Communist influence in China. It was to establish a stronger position for after the end of the Second Sino-Japanese War. He did so by gathering public support through collective memory shaping to strengthen his political position (Wertsch, 2008, p.124).
Examining Mao’s narrativve during this period, the rhetoric he mostly used is that of “defeating the imperialists”, which he used interchangeably to denominate Japan and other “fascist” states like Italy and Germany. It is during this period that his writings are clearly influenced by the relationship with the Communist Soviet Union, about the destruction of Fascism worldwide (Zedong, 1945, pp.225-227). As Gries stated, Mao did not use the narrative regarding the century of humiliation in the form of “victimization”, but rather as a form to emphasize “victory”. His writings during the Second Sino-Japanese war can indeed be identified as a “victors narrative” (Gries, 2008, p.207). The attributes and actions in his writings, accentuate a narrative of victory through uniting the Chinese people in their collective struggle to overcome the Japanese imperialists. By enforcing a collective identity on China’s people, of the need for unity, he was trying to shape a collective memory in order
13 to mobilize the masses behind his cause. Moreover, by attributing negative adjectives (ad)verbs and nouns when referring to Japan like “fascists”, “invaders” , “imperialists” and “defeatists” he framed Japan as a fundamental evil that was trying to subjugate China (See Appendix A). This can be illustrated by the following statements: “We hate Japanese imperialism because the Japanese imperialists oppress us”. He continues: “We cannot love our enemies, we cannot love social evils, and our aim is to exterminate them (Zedong, 1942, p.87). On the other hand, the Chinese people he puts in an underdog position. Through a “heroic and courageous struggle unmatched in history” the “great” Chinese people will prevail in establishing peace and an independent China. After the Second Sino Japanese War his emphasis on the “heroism” of the Chinese collective front against Japanese imperialism is amplified even more, but the context also shifts to the War of Liberation (See Appendix A). In his writings from 1949 to 1957, references regarding the century of humiliation are still limited to the two wars mentioned above, although he sporadically mentions Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s overthrowing of the Qing dynasty in 1911, as one of the most “heroic acts” in recent Chinese history (Zedong, 1956, pp.308-309). In short his narrative about the century of humiliation can be identified as, the heroic struggle of the peoples to defeat the foreign imperialists (Zedong, 1956).
To conclude this chapter, in identifying Mao’s narrative regarding the century of humiliation, Gries’s definition of Mao’s “victors narrative” is established here as well (Gries, 2004, p.70). Although there is a change in the general pattern of his writings, which is mainly because of the changing historical context, his narrative is certainly one that emphasizes victory and heroism through unity, in which the fundamental evil Japan has to be and later on, has been defeated. As Kaufman puts it, China’s propaganda is and was very effective in glorifying their victories, not only over Japan, but also in the Korea conflict and the civil war against the KMT (Kaufman, 2011, p.3). Moreover, Wang stated that in collective memory shaping, the Chinese leaders choose what the Chinese people should remember and what should be forgotten (Wang, 2014, p.24). However, he uses it to confirm the “victim narrative”. By assessing Mao’s writings from 1941 to 1957 in which he refers to the century of humiliation, (See Appendix A) it can be established that Mao most definitely, in his rhetoric, was trying to shape the collective mind by mobilizing mass support through emphasizing victories and downplaying losses, as to establish a “victors narrative” (Wang, 2014, p.38). Even so, mentioning the century of humiliation in a broader context, from a “victimized” point of view is only used by Mao on rare occasions (Zedong, 1949, p.17). As he
14 mentions at the establishment of the PRC, “Ours will no longer be a nation subject to insult and humiliation”. However, the core of this speech was used to predicate a “victors narrative” (Zedong, 1949, pp.15-17). Moreover, in referring to Japan, and to a much lesser extend the West, Mao mostly used the noun “imperialists”. This could be seen as a ways of referring to the century of humiliation in a broader context of imperialism trying to take down China. However, in general the references are based upon the victories of the Second Sino-Japanese War and the War of Liberation (See Appendix D). By carefully reviewing his writings over a time-span of 17 years, it can be concluded that his “victors narrative” as a specific narrative, is continuous and static.
Chapter 2 – Deng Xiaoping
This chapter first covers the historical background of Deng Xiaoping, before continuing to define Deng’s narrative about the century of humiliation, and how he used this as a means of collective memory shaping. In short, a clear distinction can be made between Deng’s narrative before and after 1984. During his first period Deng’s narrative is closely related to Mao’s “victors narrative”. However, from 1984 onwards he shifts from a narrative that emphasizes China’s victories towards a narrative that emphasizes China as the ultimate victim. The results of the predicate and context analysis have been derived from “The Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping 1975-1982 and “Den Xiaoping – Speeches and Writings 1956-1985” (Xiaoping, 1984; Xiaoping, 1987). The writings that have been used are only those in which he refers to the century of humiliation (See Appendix B).
2.2. The historical context
In contrast to Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping was a man who did not tolerate a “cult of personality” (glorification of his person). Despite this, from 1874 onwards he was able to become the most powerful man in China, by acquiring the position of vice chairman of the party, vice premier, and chairman of the Central Military Commission (Vogel, 2011, p.377). Deng is first and foremost known for initiating the reforming and opening of China. This led the country onto the path of fast economic growth. Deng was more pragmatic in his policies than his predecessor, who was mainly ideologically driven. He defended his policies by stating that the truth about the effects of a policy can only be measured via results and not
15 based upon an ideological framework (Kuhn, 2011, p.103). Furthermore, Deng introduced what is called the “One Country, Two Systems” policy. He granted considerable autonomy to Hong Kong and Taiwan, in order for them to return to the Motherland. This policy would eventually in 1997 lead to Hong Kong’s return to the PRC as a special administrative body (Vogel, 2011, pp.478-479).
2.2. Deng Xiaoping’s narrative regarding the century of humiliation
Whereas references regarding the century of humiliation in Mao’s works can frequently be observed, in the works of Deng, these references can only sporadically be observed. However, this does not mean that Deng’s narrative regarding the century of humiliation cannot be identified. In Mao’s works a continuous general pattern can be established, whilst in Deng’s narrative, a critical shift is clearly visible. This will be further specified in this chapter.
Whereas Mao generally refers to the century of humiliation in the context of the Second Sino-Japanese wars, Deng refers to the century of humiliation in the wider context of 100 years of “oppression”. As he stated, “For more than a century since the Opium War, the Chinese people were looked down upon and insulted by foreigners” (Xiaoping, 1984, p.93). It is only from the mid-1980s that references in the wider context of the century of humiliation, can be observed. Gries in his book “China’s New Nationalism” states that the “victim narrative” came about in the 1990s. However, Deng already used the narrative as described by Gries in the 1980s (Gries, 2004, p.4).
During the 1970s and early 1980s Deng sporadically mentions the War of Resistance against Japan” and the War of Liberation, all from the point of view of “comrade Mao’s successes” (Xiaoping, 1984). Throughout this period Deng uses a narrative that is closely related to Mao’s “victors narrative”. In his references, Japan is also put forward as China’s biggest enemy. The nouns and (ad)verbs he uses in referring to Japan are “aggressors” and “occupiers”. Deng clearly toned down the rhetoric in referring to Japan, in comparison to Mao’s rhetoric. Moreover, he continuously refers to Mao’s achievements in the War of Resistance against Japan and the War of Liberation, by using adjectives like “heroic” and “patriotic” (See Appendix B). This can be illustrated by the following statement he made during the conference on science in 1978: "Comrade Mao Zedong won the war of resistance against Japan and defeated Japanese Imperialism” (Xiaoping, 1978, p.111). Although there
16 are major similarities between Mao’s and Deng’s “victors narrative”, some variations can be observed. Although his predecessor continuously refers to Japan, and in a somewhat wider context the West, as “imperialists”, Deng only uses this attribute 4 times in his writings from 1970 to 1980 (see Appendix B). As mentioned, his tone towards the “enemy” is moderate in comparison to Mao, as Mao refers to Japan as the fundamental “evil”. Whereas Deng, only mentions Japan as “aggressors” and “occupiers”. This can be explained by the context of the time because during the 1970s, Deng was trying to improve Sino-Japanese relations by expanding Sino-Japanese cooperation (Vogel, 2013, p.294).
When it comes to using the narrative in collective memory shaping, Deng follows the line of his predecessor up to the mid-1980s. During his speech at the National Conference on Education he stated: “We should foster revolutionary ideals and communist morality in young people from childhood” (Xiaoping, 1978, p.121). He continues by glorifying the Youth League for their performances on “stirring the deeds of heroism” of the Chinese people during the war against Japan and the War of Liberation (Xiaoping, 1978, p.123). It is at this background that Deng emphasizes the importance of a collective memory that should be shaped from childhood, which tells about the historical “successes” and “prestige” of the Red army and the “victories” over the “aggressors” (Xiaoping, 1978, pp.137-138). From 1984 onwards, the Youth League establishes a prominent place in producing a collective memory, driven by the “victim narrative” (Scott, 2008, p.xi).
From the mid-1980s onwards, Deng’s narrative regarding the century of humiliation makes a 180 degree turn. It is the “victim narrative” that becomes prevalent. His “victim narrative” is most frequently used for educating the youth on China’s sufferings during the century of humiliation, as a means to shape the collective memory of the nation. Moreover, from the 1990s this process became increasingly systematized and institutionalized. Whereas in the 1970s Deng mentioned that it is the teachers that cultivate the success of our revolutionary successes, this shifted towards, teachings from a perspective of “victimization” (Scott, 2008, pp.294-295). As Schell and Delury argue, Deng made this shift first because of the declining legitimacy of his power, and second, to get the next generation of “subordinate students” in line. He does so by emphasizing the atrocities that not only Japan, but also the West committed towards China (Schell & Delury, 2013, p.409). Therefore Scott also argued that it was used as a tool to further entrench the century of humiliation in the collective mind of the people of China. The “victim narrative” was therefore used to strengthen the future of
17 the Party, which most prominently was implemented in the educational system (Scott, 2008, p.295).
To conclude this chapter, Deng’s “victors narrative” seems to be strongly influenced by Mao’s “victors narrative”. Although a moderate version of Mao’s narrative, it is also mainly used in the context of the Second Sino-Japanese war and the War of Liberation, and celebrates the “successes” and “victories” of the Chinese people and the Communist Party (Xiaoping, 1978). However, in the mid-1980s, due to the changing context, Deng makes a 180 degree turn in his references regarding the century of humiliation. It is here, that we can define the “victim narrative” as described by most scholars (See Appendix D). This entails referring to the century of humiliation in the wider context “100 years of Chinese suffering under foreign oppression” (Chong, 2014, p.943). Therefore, there is a break in the continuity of Deng’s narrative regarding the century of humiliation. This shift could be explained by his pragmatic approach to policy, as he used this change in narrative to strengthen his own position (Kuhn, 2011, p.103).
Chapter 3 – Xi Jinping
This chapter will first give a brief summary on the background of Xi Jinping’s China.
Furthermore, the results of the predicate and context analysis will be discussed in this chapter. The writings and speeches that have been examined are about his broader policy plans
regarding the Chinese Dream of the Great Rejuvenation. These are bundled in “Xi Jinping – The Governance of China” (Jinping, 2014). Second, his speeches on the commemoration of the war against Japan and his speech given during the 19th People’s Party Congress will be reviewed (Jinping, 2015;2017). His works have been examined over the period from 2012 to 2017. Xi’s narrative regarding the century of humiliation has three distinct features. This is placing China both as victim and victor, and Japan as the evil imperialists (See Appendix C). All three features will be discussed in turn.
18 3.1. The historical context
China under Xi Jinping differs greatly from China under the reign of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. This is first and foremost because of the great power status that China has obtained since the 21st century. Due to the relative decline of U.S. hegemony in economic and political terms, China’s growth contributed to an increase of China’s power in the international system. Since Xi Jinping came to power in November 2012, China’s assertiveness in international affairs has grown significantly, and in doing so, China seems to be on the road to becoming a peer-competitor to the U.S. (Shor, 2012, p.157; Cabestan, 2010, p.1). Although China’s status has changed significantly, some old conflicts that were already present during Mao’s reign, like the conflict with Taiwan, are still present. Regarding Sino-Japanese relations, China and Japan still have territorial disputes concerning the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in the East China sea (Drifte, 2010, p.140). The literature on China’s century of humiliation narrative shows consensus on the increasing usage of the narrative by Chinese leaders since the 1990s (Gries, 2004, p.48; Callahan, 2010, pp.41-43). By reviewing speeches and writings of the current Chinese president, Xi Jinping’s century of humiliation narrative will be put under scrutiny.
3.2. Xi Jinping’s narrative regarding the century of humiliation
Since Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, writings and speeches in which he refers to the century of humiliation, resurge regularly. Even so, the general underlying pattern that can be observed is that he refers to the century of humiliation in the broad context of 100 years of humiliation, where China suffered at the hands of the “imperialists” (Jinping, 2014). Xi’s usage of the narrative regarding the century of humiliation can be put at the background of his future plans for China. The century of humiliation narrative is primarily used to strengthen his policy plans of China’s “peaceful” development through mutual cooperation and openness. As he states: “China needs peace as much as human beings need air and plants need sunshine” (Jinping, 2014, p.294). Moreover, the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese nation entails the long term plan he has for China. This encompasses the material goal of China’s modernization program towards a “moderately well-off society” by 2020, and a “fully-developed nation” by 2049. In short it is about a “strong, civilized, harmonious and beautiful China” (Kuhn, 2013).
19 Within his writings on the Chinese dream, references regarding the century of humiliation are used to establish a narrative that describes why China will rise peacefully. This can be exemplified by the following statement: “With the agonizing sufferings inflicted by war etched in our memory, we Chinese cherish peace and stability” (Jinping, 2013, p.273). This quote shows Xi’s first feature, which is about putting China in the position of the ultimate victim, and therefore China is inherently peaceful. Throughout the writings nouns, adjectives, (ad)verbs, when referring to China from 1839 to 1949, are that of “suffering”, “sacrifice”, “trauma”, “ravaged by war”, and “humiliation” (See Appendix C). It is through these attributes and actions, that Xi places China as the ultimate victim in modern history. The victimization of China can best be illustrated by the following statement in his article “Achieving Rejuvenation Is the Dream of the Chinese People”, published in March of 2012: “Its sufferings and sacrifices in modern times were rarely seen in the history of the world” (Jinping, 2012, p.56). These attributes and actions also situates China as an “exceptional nation” (Callahan, 2004, p.206).
Xi’s second feature is that of framing an enemy. He puts Japan in the position of the enemy, by attributing certain nouns, adjectives, and (ad)verbs to Japan, and in a wider context, the West. He mostly uses “aggression”, “aggressor”, “militarism”, “evil and darkness”, and “fascists”, to describe Japan (See Appendix C). As he stated during his speech at the 19th People’s Party Congress, “China was plunged into the darkness of domestic turmoil and foreign aggression”(Jinping, 2017, p.11). Combining both China as the “victim” and Japan as the “enemy” can best be exemplified by his quote during the commemoration speech of the victory on the war against Japan: “The Chinese People's War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War were a decisive battle between justice and evil, between light and darkness, and between progress and reaction” (Jinping, 2015). The quotation above clearly positions China as the ‘ultimate victim’ and Japan as the ‘fundamental evil’.
The third feature of the narrative regarding the century of humiliation can be summarized as the “heroic struggle” of the Chinese people against foreign aggression (Jinping, 2015). This resurfaces recurrently in his writings through statements like, “We never yielded” (Jinping, 2014, p.56), the “Chinese people fought gallantly and finally won total victory against the Japanese militarist aggressors” (Jinping, 2015) and the “Dauntless and tenacious struggle for national independence” (Jinping, 2017). There is consensus within the debate on the narrative regarding the century of humiliation as being a “victim narrative”
20 (Gries, 2004, p.48). However, in defining Xi’s narrative, placing the Chinese people as both victims, and heroes/victors is clearly visible. Therefore coining the narrative as “victim narrative” seems to downplay the feature of heroism in his narrative.
Xi uses this narrative to shape a Chinese collective memory. The titles of his works already show how he frames his policy plans in the context of collective memory. Titles like, “Achieving Rejuvenation Is the Dream of the Chinese People”, “The Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation Is a Dream Shared by All Chinese” and “Together Fulfill the Chinese Dream of National Rejuvenation” (Jinping, 2014). As already mentioned, Xi mainly uses the narrative as a means to legitimize his policy plans of National Rejuvenation (Schell & Delury, 2013, p.502). By placing the Chinese people both as victims and victors, who overcame the evil and darkness of Japanese aggression, he shapes a collective memory for support of his political objectives. These political objectives seemingly are used not only to convince the Chinese people, but also the international society. The latter is certainly because of China’s growing influence in the international system. Even so, Xi is increasingly active in the international system, and with the establishment of the Chinese led Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank and the One Belt One Road Initiative, het wants to give potential partners reassurances (Jinping, 2014, pp.338-339). He does so by repeatedly mentioning that China will always rise peacefully, as it has endured sufferings during the century of humiliation that should never be inflicted to any other state (Jinping, 2014). He also put this forward in his commemoration speech on the war against Japan, where he stated: “It will never inflict its past sufferings on any other nation” (Jinping, 2015). Moreover, the rhetoric he uses when referring to this peaceful rise is put in a context where both the rise of China and peaceful development are fundamentally inseparable.
Xi’s collective memory shaping does not only apply for the people living in China, but also in Taiwan and Hong Kong. Using the narrative to address the Taiwanese people as being part of a shared historical “trauma” at the hands of Japanese aggression, he states that the Chinese people on the mainland and in Taiwan are part of “one Chinese nation” (Jinping, 2014, p.265). The narrative as used by Xi is one of gathering collective support for achieving his political objectives through the Great Rejuvenation, but also as a defense for the “One Country, Two Systems” solution, that he defends during the anniversary speech of Hong Kong’s return to the motherland (Jinping, 2017; Connor, 2017).
21 Where Mao’s narrative and Deng’s narrative (prior to 1984) regarding the century of humiliation is primarily focused on the Second Sino-Japanese war and the War of Liberation, Xi consequently refers to the century of humiliation in a broader context, ranging from the start of the First Opium War (1839) to the victory in the Chinese Civil War (1949). In defense of his Chinese dream he stated that: “In the 100 years from the Opium War in 1840 to the founding of the PRC in 1949, China was ravaged by wars, turmoil and foreign aggression” (Jinping, 2014, p.194). Moreover, he mentions recurrently different historical events that took place during this period like the May 4th movement of 1919, the war against fascism, and the colonization of Chinese territories like Taiwan, Hong Kong and Korea (Jinping, 2014). As scholars like Scott and Gries argued, it is at the background of China’s 100 years of humiliation which, at least in the eyes of China has led it to unquestionable sufferings through wars, annexations, expansionist attitude of foreigners etc. (Scott, 2008, p.27; Gries, 2008, p.19). Xi’s narrative also shows the broad mentioning of the century of humiliation. As shown above, Xi’s century of humiliation narrative is threefold. One in which he places China as the ultimate victim, second, the creation of a common enemy, and third, the heroic struggle of the Chinese people (See Appendix D).
Conclusions and reflections
This research has shown that in referring to the century of humiliation, Mao makes use of a “victors narrative” by referring to acts of heroism. It is about celebrating the victories of China, and downplaying its losses. Moreover, he frames the Chinese people as “courageous heroes and victors”, whilst placing Japan, and to a lesser extent the West, as the “ultimate enemy and evil”. As for Deng’s narrative, it can be observed that there are two distinct narratives that follow each other consecutively. From the 1970s to the mid-1980s, Deng follows the “victors narrative”, as also predicated by Mao. However, the context of the time in which Deng sought rapprochement with Japan, his rhetoric towards the country was less aggressive. Since the mid-1980s, his narrative shifts from a “victors narrative” to a “victim narrative”. Xi’s narrative has three distinct features. The third feature of heroism, also takes a prominent place, besides the “victim narrative” in which he places China as the “ultimate victim” and Japan as the “fundamental evil”. Therefore, Xi’s narrative combines both a “victims” and a “victors narrative. Where Xi and Deng from 1984 onwards, refer to the broad context of 100 years of suffering at the hand of foreign oppressors, Mao, and Deng prior to
22 1984, primarily refer to the Second Sino-Japanese War and the War of Liberation (See Appendix D).
The narratives regarding the century of humiliation show that there is significant variation in the form of the narrative as used by different Chinese leaders. The variation in the form of the narrative is primarily divided on the line of victor versus victim. Moreover, where Xi and Deng (1984 onwards) refer to the century of humiliation in the context of 100 years of suffering, Mao and Deng (before 1984) used it primarily in the context of the Second-Sino Japanese War and the War of Liberation.
When it comes to collective memory shaping by using the narrative regarding the century of humiliation, variation is also visible. Where Mao primarily used it to mobilize the masses against the “foreign aggressors”, in the context of the Second Sino-Japanese War and the War of Liberation, Deng used it as a means to defend his political position and to subjugate the Chinese youth. Although Deng mentions the century of humiliation far less than Mao and Xi did, his shift from a “victors narrative” to a “victims narrative” is especially interesting. Certainly because it seems that from 1984 onwards the “victim narrative” becomes the primary form of the narrative as used by Chinese leaders. However, there should be mentioned here that Xi’s narrative is threefold, and that one of the features definitely emphasizes victory. For Xi, collective memory shaping can be put against the background of the Great Rejuvenation and the “One Country, Two Systems” policy. He does so by connecting the narrative with the peaceful rise of China, as to make the two “fundamentally inseparable.
In reviewing Mao’s narrative over time, it primarily follows the same underlying pattern, which is based upon the context in which he uses it. Essentially it comes down to the central role of the Second Sino-Japanese war and the War of Liberation. For Deng, there is a critical shift because of the two narratives that were observed. His “victors narrative” follows the same underlying pattern, whilst it must be mentioned that his tone is moderate in comparison to Mao. His “victim narrative” on the other hand, follows the broad context of the century of humiliation. This underlying pattern is also observed in Xi’s narrative. In conclusion the general underlying pattern can be divided into two distinct patterns, one in which the Second Sino-Japanese War and the War of Liberation are centered, and one in which the 100 years of suffering and oppression plays the central role.
23 The results of this research have shown that there is significant variation in the form of the narratives as used by different Chinese leaders. There is a clear distinction between the “victors narrative” and the “victims narrative”. Following Gries his reasoning, this research follows to an extend the same results, which is that there is a break in the continuity of the narrative. This paper shows that this break in continuity started in the mid-1980s, whilst Gries stated it started in the 1990s (Gries, 2008). Therefore, this paper rejects to an extent the arguments made by scholars like Scott and Vogel, that this narrative is a continuous and static story as told by different Chinese leaders (Scott, 2004; Vogel, 2011). As this paper has shown from the mid-1980s there was a shift in the narrative regarding the century of humiliation. Moreover, following Chong’s reasoning, it should be mentioned that the context did have a significant effect on the usage and the form of the narrative in collective memory shaping, as the underlying objective for using the narrative differs significantly amongst the Chinese leaders (Chong, 2014, p.950). To further understand the development of the narrative regarding the century of humiliation, future research could be done on more Chinese leaders, as to establish a chronological time line on the variation of the form of the narrative.
24 Bibliography
Callahan, W. (2004). National Insecurities: Humiliation, Salvation, and Chinese Nationalism. Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, 29(2), 199-218.
Callahan, W. (2010). China : The pessoptimist nation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cabestan, J.P. (2010). China’s new diplomacy: old wine in a new bottle? In Breslin, S.,
Handbook of China's international relations (pp.1-11). London: Routledge.
Cheek, T. (2010). A critical introduction to Mao. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chong, J. (2014). Popular narratives versus Chinese history: Implications for understanding
an emergent China. European Journal of International Relations, 20(4), 939-964. Connor, N. (2017, June 01). China’s Xi Jinping recalls national 'humiliation' to Britain as he
seeks to stir patriotism in Hong Kong. The Telegraph. Retrieved from: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/07/01/chinas-xi-jinping-recalls-national-humiliation-britain-seeks/
Drifte, R. (2010). China and Japan. Between Co-operation and Competition. In Breslin, S., Handbook of China's international relations (pp.138-146). London: Routledge.
Economy, E.C. (2018). China’s New Revolution: The Reign of Xi Jinping. Foreign Affairs, 3(97), 60-74.
Genzlinger. (2018, March 9). Hayden White, Who Explored How History Is Made, Dies at 89. The New York Times. Retrieved from:
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/09/obituaries/hayden-white-who-explored-how-history-is-made-dies-at-89.html
Gries, P. (2004). China's New Nationalism : Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Halbwachs, M. (1980). The collective memory. New York: Harper & Row Colophon Books. Jinping, X. (2014). The Goverance of China. Beijing: Foreign Languages Pres Co. Ltd. Jinping, X. (2015, October 03). Full text of Chinese president's speech at commemoration of
70th anniversary of war victory. Xinhua. Retrieved from:
25 Jinping, X. (2017, July 01). Full text of President Xi Jinping’s speech on ‘one country, two
systems’ and how China rules Hong Kong. South China Morning Post. Retrieved from: http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/2100856/full-text-president-xi-jinpings-speech-one-country-two
Jinping, X. (2017, October 18). Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately
Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era. Speech at the 19th People’s Party Congress. Xinhua. Retrieved from:
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/download/Xi_Jinping's_report_at_19th_CPC_Nati onal_Congress.pdf
Kaufman, A. (2010). The “Century of Humiliation,” Then and Now: Chinese Perceptions of the International Order. Pacific Focus, 25(1), 1-33.
Kaufman, A. (2011). The “Century of Humiliation” and China’s National Narratives. Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. Retrieved from: https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/3.10.11Kaufman.pdf
Kuhn, R.L. (2011). How China’s Leaders Think., New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons. Kuhn, R.L. (2013, June 04). Xi Jinping's Chinese Dream. The New York Times. Retrieved
from: https://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/05/opinion/global/xi-jinpings-chinese-dream.html
Milliken, J. (1999). The Study of Discourse in International Relations. European Journal of International Relations, 5(2), 225-254.
Olick, Vinitzky-Seroussi, Levy, Olick, Jeffrey K., Vinitzky-Seroussi, Vered, & Levy, Daniel. (2011). The collective memory reader. New York: Oxford University Press
Polkinghorne, D. (1988). Narrative knowing and the human sciences (SUNY series in the philosophy of the social science 095080201). Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press.
Reilly, J. (2011). Remember History, Not Hatred: Collective Remembrance of China's War of Resistance to Japan . Modern Asian Studies, 45(2), 463-490.
26 Schell, O., & Delury, J. (2013). Wealth and power: China's long march to the twenty-first
century (1e ed.). New York: Random House.
Scott, D. (2008). China and the international system, 1840-1949 power, presence, and perceptions in a century of humiliation. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press
Shor, F. (2012). Declining US Hegemony and Rising Chinese Power: A Formula for Conflict? Perspectives on Global Development and Technology, 11(1), 157-167. Sparrowe, R. (2005). Authentic leadership and the narrative self. The Leadership Quarterly,
16(3), 419-439.
Stone, L. (1979). The Revival of Narrative: Reflections on a New Old History, Past and Present. Oxford University Press, 1(85), 3-24.
Vogel, E. (2011). Deng Xiaoping and the transformation of China. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Wang, Z. (2014). Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations. New York: Columbia University Press.
Wertsch, J. (2008). The Narrative Organization of Collective Memory. Ethos, 36(1), 120-135. White, H. (1984). The Question of Narrative in Contemporary Historical Theory. History and
Theory, 23(1), 1-33.
Xiaoping, D. (1984). Selected works of Deng Xiaoping, (1975-1982). Translated by: Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. Bureau for the Compilation Translation of Works of Marx, Engels, Lenin Stalin. (1st ed.). Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. Xiaoping, D. (1987). Speeches and writings. Oxford: Pergamon.
Zedong, M. (1956). Selected works of Mao Tse-Tung. Vol. 4. London: Lawrence & Wishart. Zedong, M. (1977). Selected works of Mao Tse-Tung. Vol. 5. London: Lawrence & Wishart.
27 Appendix A
Predicate analysis of the narrative regarding the century of humiliation The writings listed below are examined from:
*Zedong, M. (1956). Selected works of Mao Tse-Tung. Vol. 4. London: Lawrence & Wishart. **Zedong, M. (1977). Selected works of Mao Tse-Tung. Vol. 5. London: Lawrence &
Wishart.
Writings of Mao Zedong Period: 1941-1957 Article
number
Title Date pages
1 Preface and Postscript to “Rural Survey”* Mar. 17, 1941 7-11 2 Expose the Munich Plot in the Far East* May 25, 1941 21-22 3 On the Anti-Fascist International United
Front*
June 23, 1941 23-24 4 Speech Before the Assembly of the
Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region*
Nov. 21, 1941 24-28 5 Yenan Forum on Art and Literature* May 23, 1942 63-93 6 An Extremely Important Policy* Sept. 7, 1942 94-97 7 The Turning Point in World War II* Oct. 12, 1942 98-103 8 The United Front in Cultural Work* Jan. 10, 1945 225-227 9 On the Danger of the Hurley Policy* July 12, 1945 328-329 10 The Chinese People Have Stood up!** Sept. 21, 1949 15-18 11 Long Live the Great Unity of the Chinese
People!**
Sept. 30, 1949 19-21 12 Fight for a Fundamental Turn for the
Better in the Nation’s Financial and Economic Situation**
June 6, 1950 26-32
13 Don’t Hit Out in All Directions** June 6, 1950 33-36 14 Great Victories in Three Mass
Movements**
Oct. 23, 1951 59-63 15 Let Us Unite and Clearly Distinguish
Between Ourselves and the Enemy**
Aug. 4, 1952 78-81 16 U.S. Imperialism is a Paper Tiger** July 14, 1956 308-311 17 All Reactionaries are Paper Tigers** Nov. 18, 1957 517-518
28 Mao’s references to Japan regarding the century of humiliation
Nouns referring to proper noun: Japan
Negative /positive
Times used in writings Appears in the following articles listed above Imperialist(s) /
imperialism
Negative 10x 1,2,3,4,5,8,10,11,12,13,14, 15,16,17
Fascist(s) / fascism Negative 5x 3,4,7,8
Enemy Negative 5x 13,14,15,17
Anti- Negative 4x 6,7,9,16
Combat / combatting Positive 2x 3
Cruelty Negative 2x 5 Aggressor Negative 2x 5,14 Chicanery Negative 1x 5 Donkey Negative 1x 6 Monster Negative 1x 6 Hate Negative 1x 5
(Common) Foe Negative 1x 3
Militarist Negative 1x 16
Paper Tiger Negative 1x 16
Adjectives and (ad)verbs
that refer to proper noun: Japan
Negative
/ positive Times used in writings Appears in the following articles listed above (inevitable) defeat /
defeatist(s) Negative 24x 2,5,6,7,8,10,11,16
Fight / fighting against Positive 10x 2,3,4,5,6,9,16 Foreign oppressor /
Foreign oppression
Negative 6x 5,10,11
Aggression Negative 3x 6,14
Invader(s) Negative 2x 4,5
Subject / subjugate Negative 2x 4,10
Resist/ resisting Positive 2x 1
Enslave Negative 1x 3
Cunning schemes Negative 1x 2
Divide Negative 1x 2 Insult Negative 1x 10 Overthrow Negative 1x 11 Humiliation Negative 1x 10 Occupied Negative 1x 16 Oppose Negative 1x 16
29 Mao’s references to China regarding the century of humiliation
Nouns referring to proper noun: China
Negative/ positive
Times used in writings
Appears in the following articles listed above
Victory Positive 10x 10,11,13,14,16
(Culture of the) masses Positive 6x 5,8,11,12
(new) culture Positive 4x 5,8
Hero / heroes Positive 4x 11,14
(united) Front Positive 3x 3,8
Alliance Positive 2x 7
Pioneers Positive 2x 11
Adjectives and (ad)verbs
that refer to proper noun: China
Negative/
positive Times used in writings Appears in the following articles listed above
Struggle / struggling Positive 10x 4,10,11,12,15,16
Unite / uniting Positive 9x 1,3,6,8,12,15,16
Great Positive 5x 10,13,14
Liberate / liberated Positive 3x 8,10
Strength / strengthen Positive 3x 6,11,12
Collective Positive 2x 4,11
Persist Positive 1x 3
Reject Positive 1x 5
Courageous Positive 1x 10
Won Positive 1x 13
Mao’s references to third parties regarding the century of humiliation Nouns referring to third parties Refers to Negative/ positive Times used in writings Appears in the following articles listed above Backed (by U.S.) Kuomintang Negative 4x 9,10,11 Anti (fascist) Germany
and Italy
Negative 2x 3,6
Enemies Kuomintang Negative 2x 9,10
Alliance The West
Communist states
Positive 2x 7
Imperialist U.S. Negative 2x 10,11
Bandit Kuomintang Negative 2x 12
Overthrow Kuomintang Negative 2x 13
Enemy Italy and
Germany
Negative 2x 14,17
30
Adjectives and
(ad)verbs that refer to third parties Refers to Negative/ positive Times used in writings Appears in the following articles listed above
Liberate Taiwan and
Tibet Positive 2x 12,13 (Anglo-American) offensive Great Britain and the U.S. Positive 1x 7
Deceive Kuomintang Negative 1x 12
Undermine Kuomintang Negative 1x 12
Counter-revolutionary Kuomintang Negative 1x 12
31 Appendix B
The writings listed below are examined from:
*Xiaoping, D. (1984). Selected works of Deng Xiaoping, (1975-1982). Translated by: Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. Bureau for the Compilation Translation of Works of Marx, Engels, Lenin Stalin. (1st ed.). Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. **Xiaoping, D. (1987). Speeches and writings. Oxford: Pergamon.
Writings of Deng Xiaoping Period: 1975-1984 Article
number
Title Date pages
1 Report on the Revision of the Constitution of the Communist Party of China**
Sept. 16, 1956 1-39 2 The Army Needs to be Consolidated* Jan. 25, 1975 11-13 3 The Task of Consolidating the Army* July 14, 1975 27-38 4 The Army Should Attach Strategic
Importance to Education and Training*
Aug. 23, 1977 73-79 5 Speech at the National Conference on
Education*
Apr. 22, 1978 119-126 6 Speech at the All-Army Conference on
Political Work*
June 2, 1978 127-140 7 Speech at the Opening Ceremony of the
National Conference on Science** Mar. 18, 1987 40-53 8 Hold High the Banner of Mao Zedong
Thought and Adhere to the Principle of Seeking Truth from Facts*
Sept. 16, 1978 141-144
9 The United Front and the Tasks of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference in the New Period*
June 15, 1979 192-195
10 Speech Delivered at the National Day Ceremony**
Oct. 1, 1984 89-90
11 One Country, Two Systems** June 22-23,
1984
32 Deng’s references to Japan regarding the century of humiliation
Nouns referring to proper noun: Japan
Negative /positive
Times used in writings Appears in the following articles listed above Imperialist(s) /
imperialism
Negative 2x 1,7
Aggressor Negative 2x 1
Enemy Negative 1x 8
Adjectives and (ad)verbs
that refer to proper noun: Japan
Negative / positive
Times used in writings Appears in the following articles listed above
Aggression Negative 1x 10
(inevitable) defeat / defeatist(s)
Positive 1x 7
Insult Negative 1 11
Deng’s references to China regarding the century of humiliation Nouns referring to
proper noun: China Negative/ positive Times used in writings Appears in the following articles listed above
Victory Positive 3x 1,8
Occupation Negative 2x 1
Heroism Positive 1x 4
Adjectives and (ad)verbs
that refer to proper noun: China
Negative/
positive Times used in writings Appears in the following articles listed above
Oppose Positive 2x 8,10
Great / greatness Positive 2x 1,8
Overthrew Positive 1x 1
Defeated Positive 1x 7
Won Positive 1x 7
Generous Positive 1x 11
Deng’s references to third parties regarding the century of humiliation Nouns referring to third parties Refers to Negative/ positive Times used in writings Appears in the following articles listed above
Imperialism The West
and Japan
Negative 2x 8
Foreigners The West
33
Adjectives and
(ad)verbs that refer to third parties Refers to Negative/ positive Times used in writings Appears in the following articles listed above
Deceive Foreigners Negative 1x 8
Past Dark Period prior
