Dit onderzoek kent, als ieder ander onderzoek, sterke en zwakke punten. Als sterk punt kan worden genoemd dat de resultaten vrij robuust zijn. Deze zijn consistent onder het gebruik van verschillende leesbaarheidsformules. Een zwak punt van het onderzoek heeft betrekking op het gebruik van leesbaarheidsformules. Een aantal zaken worden niet ondervangen door deze formules. Zo worden het niveau van abstractie, samenhang, wijze van presentatie, verwarrende interpunctie en woordfrequentie niet meegenomen in het bepalen van de leesbaarheid. Ook elementen die betrekking hebben op de grafische presentatie worden via deze weg niet gemeten. Hierbij valt te denken aan lange paragrafen, volle pagina’s tekst, kleuren en afbeeldingen (Courtis, 1995). Met betrekking tot de variabelen kan als zwak punt worden genoemd dat bij de eigenschappen van de auditcommissie niet is gekeken naar de financiële achtergrond van de directors. Daarnaast liggen er mogelijkheden om ook voor de eigenschappen van de board gebruik te maken van een samengestelde variabele in plaats van het meten van de afzonderlijke effecten van de eigenschappen. Tot slot is er in het onderzoek alleen gekeken naar grote beursgenoteerde ondernemingen uit de FTSE 100. Toekomstig onderzoek zou kunnen uitwijzen of resultaten van een zelfde strekking gevonden kunnen worden bij een ander type ondernemingen.
36
6. CONCLUSIE
Risicoverslaggeving krijgt voor het maatschappelijk verkeer een steeds grotere betekenis. In toenemende mate wordt er waarde gehecht aan kwalitatieve risicoverslaggeving, welke leesbaar en begrijpelijk is voor de gebruiker. Dit onderzoek onderzocht de invloed van corporate governance eigenschappen op de leesbaarheid van risicoverslaggeving van beursgenoteerde ondernemingen in het Verenigd Koninkrijk. Hierbij werd binnen het sociaalpsychologisch paradigma impressiemanagement gekeken naar verscheidene eigenschappen van de board en de effectiviteit van de auditcommissie en hun invloed op de leesbaarheid van risicoverslaggeving. De analyse in dit onderzoek laat zien dat risicoverslaggeving moeilijk tot zeer moeilijk leesbaar is voor de gebruiker. Een positief significante relatie werd gevonden voor de grootte van de board, het aantal bijeenkomsten van de board, en de aanwezigheid van CEO dualiteit op de leesbaarheid van risicoverslaggeving. Daarnaast bestaat er een negatief verband tussen het percentage onafhankelijke directors en de leesbaarheid van risicoverslaggeving. Geconcludeerd kan worden dat de aanwezigheid van voldoende onafhankelijk toezicht op het management geen directe verbetering oplevert in de leesbaarheid van de risicoverslaggeving. De resultaten suggereren dat het benutten van de kennis en ervaring van de directors, eigenschappen voortkomend uit de ‘resource provision role’ van de board, een positief effect heeft op de leesbaarheid van risicoverslaggeving.
37
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41
8. BIJLAGEN
Bijlage 1:
Lijst met ondernemingen
ARM Holdings Kazakhmys
Aggreko Kingfisher
Amec Marks & Spencer Group
Anglo American Meggitt
Antofagasta Melrose Industries
Associated British Foods Morrison (Wm) Supermarkets
AstraZeneca National Grid
BAE Systems Next
BG Group Pearson
BHP Billiton Petrofac
BP Randgold Resources
BT Group Reckitt Benckiser Group
Babcock International Group Reed Elsevier
British American Tobacco Rexam
British Sky Broadcasting Group Rio Tinto
Bunzl Rolls-Royce Holdings
Burberry Group SABMiller
Capita Sage Group
Centrica Sainsbury (J)
Compass Group Serco Group
Croda International Severn Trent
Diageo Smith & Nephew
Eurasian Natural Resources Corporation Smiths Group
Evraz TUI Travel
Experian Tate & Lyle
Fresnillo Tesco
G4S Tullow Oil
GKN Unilever
GlaxoSmithKline United Utilities Group
IMI Vedanta Resources
ITV Vodafone Group
Imperial Tobacco Group Weir Group
InterContinental Hotels Group Whitbread
Intertek Group Wood Group (John)
42 Bijlage 2:
Resultaten Regressie Fog Index
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
B Sig B Sig B Sig B Sig
Constante 9,500 ,000 ** 9,656 ,000 ** 8,612 ,000 ** 9,333 ,000 ** Totale Activa LN ,443 ,000 ** ,395 ,000 ** ,560 ,000 ** ,461 ,000 ** ROA 3,158 ,019 * 2,810 ,040 * 3,096 ,020 * 2,887 ,029 * 2008 ,262 ,307 ,268 ,296 ,285 ,261 ,295 ,241 2009 ,435 ,090 ,423 ,099 ,418 ,099 ,465 ,065 2010 ,160 ,529 ,145 ,568 ,149 ,553 ,159 ,524 Industrietype 1 -,353 ,162 -,378 ,134 -,349 ,161 -,436 ,079 Industrietype 2 -,060 ,813 -,015 ,955 -,045 ,859 -,201 ,427 Industrietype 3 -,417 ,155 -,439 ,134 -,372 ,199 -,542 ,062 Industrietype 4 ,118 ,810 -,051 ,919 ,188 ,698 -,008 ,987 Board onafhankelijkheid (H1) 1,347 ,156 Board grootte (H2) -,117 ,005 ** Dualiteit (H3) -2,143 ,001 ** Board bijeenkomsten (H4) ACE (H5) R-Square Change ,174 ** ,006 ,025 ** ,036 ** F-Change 6,210 ** 2,021 8,108 ** 12,149 ** F-value 6,210 ** 5,813 ** 6,550 ** 7,039 **
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
B Sig B Sig B Sig
Constante 9,686 ,000 ** 8,940 ,000 ** 8,127 ,000 ** Totale Activa LN ,479 ,000 ** ,481 ,000 ** ,630 ,000 ** ROA 2,863 ,032 * 3,226 ,017 * 2,262 ,081 2008 ,281 ,268 ,262 ,306 ,353 ,146 2009 ,470 ,064 ,450 ,078 ,484 ,046 * 2010 ,169 ,500 ,170 ,502 ,148 ,536 Industrietype 1 -,272 ,278 -,356 ,155 -,401 ,096 Industrietype 2 ,064 ,803 -,111 ,663 -,103 ,681 Industrietype 3 -,353 ,224 -,466 ,112 -,509 ,072 Industrietype 4 ,070 ,885 ,238 ,628 -,045 ,925 Board onafhankelijkheid (H1) 1,011 ,293 Board grootte (H2) -,145 ,001 ** Dualiteit (H3) 2,668 ,000 ** Board bijeenkomsten (H4) -,105 ,006 ** -,094 ,011 * ACE (H5) -,408 ,051 -,257 ,240 R-Square Change ,024 ** ,012 ,109 ** F-Change 7,804 ** 3,838 7,907 ** F-value 6,513 ** 6,033 ** 7,337 **
*. Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). **. Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
43 Bijlage 3:
Resultaten Regressie Flesch Reading Ease
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
B Sig B Sig B Sig B Sig
Constante 62,303 ,000 ** 61,996 ,000 ** 64,320 ,000 ** 63,049 ,000 ** Totale Activa LN -2,082 ,000 ** -1,988 ,000 ** -2,348 ,000 -2,162 ,000 ** ROA -6,202 ,220 -5,520 ,283 -6,061 ,229 -4,993 ,310 2008 ,465 ,629 ,454 ,638 ,413 ,667 ,318 ,734 2009 -1,234 ,199 -1,210 ,208 -1,196 ,212 -1,368 ,143 2010 -,324 ,734 -,295 ,758 -,299 ,753 -,319 ,730 Industrietype 1 1,560 ,100 1,610 ,090 1,551 ,100 1,934 ,037 * Industrietype 2 ,908 ,342 ,819 ,396 ,873 ,360 1,535 ,103 Industrietype 3 -,653 ,553 -,608 ,581 -,754 ,492 -,093 ,931 Industrietype 4 -,954 ,604 -,624 ,742 -1,114 ,544 -,396 ,825 Board onafhankelijkheid (H1) -2,638 ,460 Board grootte (H2) ,267 ,089 Dualiteit (H3) 9,560 ,000 ** Board bijeenkomsten (H4) ACE (H5) R-Square Change ,224 ** ,002 ,008 ,048 ** F-Change 8,518 ** ,547 2,912 17,487 ** F-value 8,518 ** 7,708 ** 8,013 ** 9,892 **
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
B Sig B Sig B Sig
Constante 61,534 ,000 ** 63,399 ,000 ** 65,944 ,000 ** Totale Activa LN -2,230 ,000 ** -2,155 ,000 ** -2,754 ,000 ** ROA -4,985 ,318 -6,335 ,210 -3,261 ,504 2008 ,388 ,682 ,467 ,628 ,130 ,887 2009 -1,382 ,145 -1,264 ,189 -1,464 ,108 2010 -,362 ,700 -,343 ,719 -,308 ,733 Industrietype 1 1,226 ,191 1,567 ,098 1,677 ,065 Industrietype 2 ,399 ,677 1,008 ,294 1,089 ,251 Industrietype 3 -,914 ,400 -,557 ,614 -,395 ,710 Industrietype 4 -,758 ,676 -1,190 ,521 -,345 ,848 Board onafhankelijkheid (H1) -,647 ,858 Board grootte (H2) ,450 ,006 ** Dualiteit (H3) 11,116 ,000 ** Board bijeenkomsten (H4) ,433 ,002 ** ,410 ,003 ** ACE (H5) ,799 ,311 ,126 ,878 R-Square Change ,027 ** ,003 ,097 ** F-Change 9,472 ** 1,032 7,400 ** F-value 8,858 ** 7,770 ** 8,780 **
*. Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). **. Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
44 Bijlage 4:
Regressieanalyse ACE (AC bijeenkomsten minimaal 4 i.p.v. 5)
Fog Flesch B Sig B Sig Constante 9,303 ,000 ** 62,189 ,000 ** Totale Activa LN ,460 ,000 ** -2,071 ,000 ** ROA 3,082 ,023 * -6,246 ,218 2008 ,269 ,294 ,469 ,627 2009 ,434 ,090 -1,235 ,200 2010 ,161 ,527 -,324 ,735 Industrietype 1 -,332 ,188 1,572 ,099 Industrietype 2 -,060 ,812 ,908 ,343 Industrietype 3 -,396 ,177 -,641 ,561 Industrietype 4 ,222 ,655 -,894 ,633 ACE -,225 ,236 -,130 ,855
*. Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). **. Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Bijlage 5:
Resultaten Regressie met individuele variabelen auditcommissie (Fog Index)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
B Sig B Sig B Sig B Sig
Constante 9,500 ,000 ** 9,273 ,000 ** 9,345 ,000 ** 9,106 ,000 ** Totale Activa LN ,443 ,000 ** ,443 ,000 ** ,422 ,000 ** ,483 ,000 ** ROA 3,158 ,019 * 3,137 ,021 * 3,057 ,024 * 3,178 ,019 * 2008 ,262 ,307 ,266 ,302 ,255 ,321 ,264 ,304 2009 ,435 ,090 ,441 ,086 ,422 ,099 ,436 ,089 2010 ,160 ,529 ,163 ,522 ,157 ,536 ,152 ,550 Industrietype 1 -,353 ,162 -,348 ,168 -,384 ,129 -,400 ,118 Industrietype 2 -,060 ,813 -,072 ,780 -,054 ,832 -,069 ,787 Industrietype 3 -,417 ,155 -,406 ,168 -,456 ,121 -,443 ,132 Industrietype 4 ,118 ,810 ,109 ,825 -,027 ,958 ,097 ,844 AC onafhankelijkheid ,237 ,596 AC grootte ,142 ,167 AC bijeenkomsten -,067 ,245 R-Square Change ,174 ** ,001 ,006 ,004 F-Change 6,210 ** ,282 1,923 1,355 F-value 6,210 ** 5,602 ** 5,801 ** 5,732 **
*. Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). **. Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
45 Bijlage 6:
Resultaten Regressie met individuele variabelen auditcommissie (Flesch Reading Ease)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
B Sig B Sig B Sig B Sig
Constante 62,303 ,000 ** 60,420 ,000 ** 63,400 ,000 ** 63,279 ,000 ** Totale Activa LN -2,082 ,000 ** -2,082 ,000 ** -1,934 ,000 ** -2,180 ,000 ** ROA -6,202 ,220 -6,379 ,207 -5,485 ,273 -6,251 ,217 2008 ,465 ,629 ,491 ,610 ,521 ,585 ,461 ,632 2009 -1,234 ,199 -1,180 ,220 -1,146 ,228 -1,237 ,198 2010 -,324 ,734 -,297 ,755 -,304 ,747 -,304 ,750 Industrietype 1 1,560 ,100 1,595 ,092 1,779 ,059 1,677 ,081 Industrietype 2 ,908 ,342 ,813 ,397 ,864 ,361 ,930 ,332 Industrietype 3 -,653 ,553 -,565 ,608 -,376 ,731 -,589 ,594 Industrietype 4 -,954 ,604 -1,029 ,576 ,064 ,973 -,902 ,624 AC onafhankelijkheid 1,974 ,239 AC grootte -1,002 ,009 ** AC bijeenkomsten ,167 ,444 R-Square Change ,224 ** ,004 ,020 ** ,020 F-Change 8,518 ** 1,392 6,935 ** ,589 F-value 8,518 ** 7,817 ** 8,531 ** 7,713 **
*. Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). **. Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).