National direction

When Netherlands troops take part in (international) military operations, the CHOD will be represented. Depending on the size of the Netherlands contribution, this will be done by either a contingent commander or an SNR. Unlike the contingent commander, the SNR will not always have his own staff.

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The mission, the participating units and local conditions will determine the composition and the rank level of the functions within the contingent command. For his national role, the contingent commander or SNR will be governed directly by the CHOD²⁷.

The powers of the contingent commander/SNR differ from those of the operational commanders. The contingent commander/SNR has no authority over the operational units other than that of ‘red card holder’. To prevent ‘dual management’, it is vital that the Netherlands operational commander(s) and the contingent commander/SNR coordinate their tasks and powers in a process known as mutual adjustment. In accordance with the basic principles of military operations, operational units must be under a single command.

If the situation is unclear, the CHOD, or the Director of Operations on his behalf, may exact the necessary clarity.

2.8 Mission command

The Netherlands bases its style of command on four guiding principles. First of all, there must be a clear understanding through the entire chain of command of the higher commander’s intent (what he wants to achieve, why and, in broad terms, how). Secondly, the subordinates are obliged to actively pursue that intent. The third principle is the importance of good and timely decisions, and the last is the commander’s determination to bring the plan to a successful conclusion. This approach requires a style of command which encourages decentralisation and which allows freedom of action at lower levels, thus enabling speed of action and initiative. At the same time, this style must remain open to direction from higher levels, particularly where the deployment of scarce assets and capabilities is concerned. In the Netherlands armed forces²⁸, mission command (opdracht-gerichte commandovoering, Auftragstaktik) is the preferred method of implementing these four principles.

Successful mission command is based on a number of conditions:

› the commander must ensure that subordinate commanders actually understand not only his intent, but also the orders they have received and the context in which they have to operate;

27 For a detailed description of the Netherlands approach in respect of the SNR/NCC, see CHOD Directives A-300 and 320.

28 And also in NATO (AJP-01, 2007).

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› it must be made clear to subordinate commanders what effects they have to achieve and where they are needed, and there must be sufficient assets available to carry out the assignment;

› commanders exercise a minimum of control over their subordinate commanders, in accordance with their experience and capabilities, although the commander does remain responsible for the actions of his subordinates;

› subordinate commanders make their own decisions regarding the best way to perform their task.

Within the concept of mission command, the balance between decentralisation and centralisation merits particular attention. A commander may decide on a low level of decentralisation and retain a high level of control himself, or he may be forced to do so by, for instance, the short supply of certain assets or capabilities. By doing so, he will reduce his own level of uncertainty (in any event, it will allow him to respond to that uncertainty by deploying reserves and issuing orders). He could also decide to delegate responsibility and authority for decision making to his subordinate commanders. While that will reduce his own ability to influence events directly, it will also reduce uncertainty at lower levels and boost the ability of his subordinates to anticipate and react to direct opportunities themselves.

The extent to which and the manner in which a commander can apply mission command depends on several factors which affect freedom of action and the degree of decentralisation.

› The authority vested in the commander. If the allocated freedom of action is limited, this will also work through to lower levels.

› The quantity and number of assets available. A short supply of assets will usually lead to greater centralisation. This applies particularly in the case of air power.

› The nature and (political) sensitivity of the activities to be conducted in the campaign.

› Task maturity of the commander and subordinates. There will be more delegation and freedom in the case of experienced (subordinate) commanders who have worked with each other frequently and have a good understanding of each other’s capabilities and

limitations than there will be in the case of less experienced commanders.

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› The nature of the physical operational environment. A relatively surveyable environment will usually offer greater scope for centralised control.

› Commander’s personal style.

› The extent of multinationality and collaboration with non-military actors.

› The prevailing culture in individual services and within countries. Variations in the style of command between the services are usually the result of assets, history, doctrine and the prevailing physical environment. Those differences also exist between nations.

Operations are often chaotic and the outcome is usually unpredictable. While technology can be useful if it enables the commander and his troops to react swiftly, much will still depend on the judgement of those who are removed just far enough from the chaos to see things clearly. Military activities, particularly the manoeuvrist approach²⁹, require freedom of action so that commanders have the authority to actually act in accordance with the higher commander’s intent as soon as an unforeseen situation arises.

Generally speaking, control measures should restrict the freedom of action as little as possible. A lack of certainty or clarity at any given time during the operation could prompt the commander to opt for more rather than less control. It may also be necessary for the higher commander to intervene in order to exploit opportunities or reduce risks that have not been identified by subordinate commanders. The commander must, however, remain aware at all times that unnecessary intervention could lead to a culture of dependence and risk-avoidance on the part of subordinate commanders.

29 The manoeuvrist approach is the main method used in the conduct of operations by NATO and the Netherlands. “The Manoeuvrist Approach

focuses on shattering the adversary’s overall cohesion and will to fight, rather than his materiel. It is an indirect approach, which emphasizes targeting the enemy’s moral component of fighting power rather than the physical. The approach involves a combination of lethal and non-lethal means to achieve effects which shape an adversary’s understanding, undermine his will and shatter his cohesion. It aims to apply strength against identified vulnerabilities. Significant features are momentum, tempo and agility, which in combination lead to shock and surprise. It calls for an attitude of mind in which doing the unexpected, using initiative and seeking originality is combined with a relentless determination to succeed. It is applicable to all types of military activities across the spectrum of conflict” (AJP-01(c), 2007).

2.9 Leadership

2.9.1 General

In general terms, leadership refers to those activities designed to influence the behaviour of others to perform the mission properly. Leadership is the projection of the personality and character of an individual, usually the commander, to motivate troops to do what is expected of them. The possession of leadership skills is one of the prime qualities a commander needs to exercise his command; it is an extremely important precondition for achieving a unit’s success at all levels of operation. There is no formula for leadership. It is not only the commander who leads; other officials involved in the command also provide leadership to personnel and (parts of ) the command process. This applies in particular to key officials such as the deputy commander, the chief of staff, deputy or assistant chiefs and section heads.

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