6. Conclusie
6.2 Beperkingen en vervolgonderzoek
Dit onderzoek is uitgevoerd in de Nederlandse woningcorporatiesector. Hierdoor is de externe validiteit laag. De resultaten kunnen niet gegeneraliseerd worden naar andere sectoren, vanwege verschillende Governancecodes per sector. Daarnaast kunnen resultaten tevens niet gegeneraliseerd worden naar andere landen, omdat veelal de institutionele omgeving sterk afwijkt. De externe validiteit is daarnaast laag, omdat er sprake is van vier case organisaties. In hoeverre deze vier cases iets zegt over de populatie6 valt te betwijfelen. Gezien de beperking in tijd ten aanzien van het uitvoeren van dit onderzoek (half jaar), zijn
vier case organisaties adequaat in aantallen. De resultaten van dit onderzoek dienen daarbij met zorgvuldigheid geïnterpreteerd te worden.
Constructvaliditeit is lager uitgevallen, dan aanvankelijk werd gedacht. Respondenten gaven aan dat onafhankelijkheid, kennis, kunde en expertise adequaat gemeten waren. Dynamiek, gedrag en processen kende daarentegen een aantal missende indicatoren. Veelal blijkt de ervaring van de onderzoeker in deze sector als een tekortkoming te gelden. In de eerste plaats valt te stellen in hoeverre dit te meten is door middel van interviews of documenten. Vooral de ‘softe’ praktijken en skills waren daarbij niet of nauwelijks te meten, door de gekozen opzet van dit onderzoek. Open discussies en het vertrouwen in elkaar, binnen de RvC, werden daarbij veelal als vanzelfsprekend beschouwd. De gekozen methode tot het meten van deze aspecten lijkt veelal invalide te zijn toegepast. Daarnaast is er een beperking, omdat onderliggende indicatoren en waarden als gelijkwaardig worden beschouwd, in de opbouw van het concept professionaliteit van de RvC. Vervolgonderzoek zou omtrent dit aspect een andere methoden kunnen gebruiken. Observeren lijkt daarbij de meest geschikte methode.
Vervolgonderzoek kan op meerdere vlakken plaatsvinden. Allereerst kan er methodologische verbetering plaatsvinden ten aanzien van het operationaliseren van het concept professionaliteit van de RvC. De ‘softe’ praktijken dienen daarbij adequaat meegenomen te worden. De gekozen methodiek om dit te meten kan veelal liggen bij observaties binnen de RvC. Daarnaast kunnen transcripten van RvC vergaderingen tevens een indicatie geven. Ten tweede, vervolgonderzoek kan ingaan op eventuele andere invloeden ten aanzien van het waarborgen van professionaliteit van de RvC. De rol van wet- en regelgeving (Governancecodes) kan daarbij overwogen worden en gekeken worden wat de effecten daarvan zijn op de professionaliteit van de RvC. Vanaf 1 juli 2015 is de nieuwe Governancecode woningcorporaties geïmplementeerd. Vervolgonderzoek kan ingaan op de rol van deze nieuwe Governancecode in het bewerkstelligen van professionaliteit in de RvC. Ten derde, vervolgonderzoek kan ingaan op de versterkte rol van risicomanagement binnen woningcorporaties. De vraag die hierbij gesteld kan worden is in hoeverre risicomanagement binnen woningcorporaties zorgt voor het beheersbaar zijn van de organisatie.
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Bijlage 1 Interne- en externe governance