THE INDONESIAN PROBLEM:
FACTS ANDFACTORS
WHA T HAPPEN EO SINCE THE END OF THE PACIFIC WAR
THIRO PRINTING
Netherlands Indies Government Information Service
Bata via September· 1947
THE INDONESIAN PROBtEM: '
F ACTS- AND FACTORS
WHAT HAPPENED SINCE THE END OF THE PACIFIC WAR
THIRD PRINTING
Net her I a n d sin die s G 0 ver n men tIn
f
0 r mat ion Ser v i ce Batavia - September 1947-'
AU docurnents reproduced or quoted herein are in the possession of the Netherlands-Indies Govemment.
INTRODUCTION
E vents in lndonesia have) especially during the last lew months) been very much in the public eye; not in the least owing to ,the recent discussions in the Security Council.
The increased interest) gratilying in itself) has stimulated discussion of the problems exi.sting in this corner of the world) and also a demand for facts and the wi.sh to understand the motivating factors behind these events. Thi.s publica,tion aims at meeting this demand.
Experjence teaches that
itis exerpdingly hard to grasp cor- rectly the situation in a foreign cO'lfntry without instructive , illustrations. For th at reason a pictorial summary has been
added.
Batavia) September 15th) 1947
A political unity llIhicfl rests on this foundation moves far towards a realization of the purpose for which the United Nations are fighting, as it has been embodied, for instanee, in the Attantic Charter, and with which we could instantly agree, because it contains our own con- ception of freedom and justice for which we have sacrific- ed blood and possessions in the course of our history.
I visualize, without anticipating the recommendations of the tuture conference, that they will be directed to-
wards a commonwealth in which the Netherlands, Indo- nesia, Surinam and Curaçao wil! participate, with com- plete self-reliance and freedom of conduct for each part regarding its internal affairs, but with tlle readiness to render mutual assistance.
ft is my opinion that such a combination 'Of indepen- 'dence and collaboration can give the Kingdom and its
parts the strength to carry fully their responsibility, both internally and externally. This would leave no room for discrimination according to race or nationality; only the ability of the indivudual citizens and the 'needs of the various groups of the population will determine the policy of the government.
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(Text of H ,M. Queen Wilhelmina's radio adress of December 6th, 1942, ou(]inlng ,plans IQr the creation of a Commonwealth of the Netherlands, Indonesia, Surlnam and Curacao)
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INDEX
Page Introduction .' ... ... :... 5
Map of the Archipelago 8
CHAPTER I
General Delineation of the Republic Indonesia ... 9 CHAPTER II
Netherlands Policy ... .. ... ... ... ... . .... ... 13 CHAPTER III
Talks with the Republic up to the Signing of Linggadjati 21 The Agreement of Linggadjati (Translation) .. ... ... ... 33 CHAPTERIV
The Republic in Practice ... , .... ... '" .... 35 CHAPTER V
The Period after March 25, 1947 ...
ï ... ... ...47
I.
CHAPTER VI
"Cease Hostilities" ... ... ,... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. .. ... 57 CHAPTER VII
Photographs ... '. ... ... ... 63
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CHAPTER I .
GENERAL DELINEATION OF THE
,
\REPUBLIC INDONESIA
F
T
he question whether the revolution in . Indonesia should be seen principally ,as a ]apanese machination, or whether there was something much more profound and consequently much more real at the back of it, was often discussed, especially during the initia! post-war developments.The answer to this question cannot be conclusive. It is indisputable, however, that this problem is not so!ved by simply qualifying the revolution as "made in Japan".
Pre-war nationalisin
Long before the war an unmistakab!y genuine nationalist movement existed in these islands which it was impossible to deny. It was only Jack of able leaders and of astrong organisation, which prevented it from becoming an essential factor in the internal affairs of Indo)1esia. There were still too many different parties with different aims and views. However, it was clear to everyone that some day or other this move- ment would play its part in the rising tide of Asiatic nationalism. Then war came and Japan started to promote things for its own purpose.
Incidentally it may be said that every true nationalist movement in pre-war days was recognised as such and we1comed by the Government provided legal means were used for the realisation of the nati- onalist ideals. The Government indeed sought for the co-operation of the nationa- list leaders. Only when they illegally tried to obtain their e'nds, measures were taken.
Tke Government's ultimate aim however being the preparation of the Indies for self- government and independence, it was glad to accept suggestions and it gave the Indo- nesians every chance to show their abi- lities. Long before the ]apanese invasion quite a few held high offices.
The available tendencies towards nati- onalism and independence we re exploited e1everly and thoroughly, by the japs it might be asserted, who distorted them to fit in with their plans, at first to provide a slavish puppet in the hands of ]apanese demagogy and towards the end of the war to frustrate and thwart the Allies as much as possible. The retarded Allied occupation of Indonesia surely opened up an unforseen opportunity for the japs to perfect their machinations; that a future return to these isIands wat at the back of their minds is equally sure.
Nationalism in java and Sumatra (the area where the japanese military machine remained jntact '\lntil after MacArthur's entry into Tokyo and where nationalist movements always had been strongest) still ,shows traces of this japanese inheritance,
it being, practically everywhere, unabIe to free itself from this parasitic growth. The ]apanese system of administration, cha- 10
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racterized by ruthlessness, corruption and, in some respects, in efficiency, was adopted.
japanese militarism, developed by Nippon to an astonishing degree, even when compared with Nazi Europe, was largely maintained. Youth, worked up to a pitch of the highest excitement by Sukarno and their former japanese masters, could go on living in this atmosphere without anybody trying io change their outlook. Propaganda against the enemy (Britain and the U.S.) continued now under the guise of propa- ganda against "Netherlands imperialism".
So it may surely be said that the revolution, as it has manifested itself thus far:, bears the imprint of japanese mis- government. And this explains why the present Republican government has not been able to build up anything reliable.
Efforts were made to imitate a given mo- del, but not grasping the bearing of a good many things, and neither realizing the limita,tions nor the consequences of possibilities that suddenly cropped up, mostly the bad sides 'of the model we re imitated; the good sides of the model, if at all present, were not developeQ, either through lack of ability or unwillingness to do so.
·Of course, all this was accentuated be- cause the revolution had to face the task to take over the government of a vast area and lacked officials, sufficiently capable to carry through their jobs. A riot of amateurism started. It was upheld and varnished over for reasons of prestige, understandable, but nevertheless wrong.
The factual appearance of the apparatus was of greater importance than the responsibility actually incumbent on it.
The majority of republicans abruptly promoted into leading functions being amateurs, deriving their authority from armed power, though intellectually but Httle superior to the masses suddenly placed under their care, it was a case of
"much wealth makes wit waver". The pos- sibilities for corruption were legion and were eagerly entered into. Co-operation between the various public services was little th,ought ot so that the administration. was soon muddled up, causing still greater misgove'rnment. Society finding itself. with- out a government in charge, disorganized rapidly, the scum saw their chance clear, murdered and looted, attracting followers and increased in power by camouflaging their crimes under the banner of patriotism.
Thus aRepublic came into being, based on perverted nationalism which could only keep going by talking itself and others into believing that ~verything was running splendidly af ter all. Actually things we re in a pretty bad shape and the country was sliding further and further down towards a precipice.
Youth out of control and brought ,to excesses; artificially cultivated feelings of hatred; the example of a corrupt, unbusin.ess- like inelficient government; the revolutlOn- ary spirit interpreted as a permit to every form of licentiousness; all these things worked together to bring to the forefront the destructive and disorganizing forces alive in all reyolutions, the constructive elements seldom getting a chance to come to the front. This is all the more tragic since
the possibilities for a different development were actually present.
ment was pleasant and not too hard a game.
The worst outcome of this new tendency was that a great number of officials dating from earlier periods were removed. The govemment apparatus lost a good deal of
An enthusiastic start
In. the beginning, one may say, practi- cally no politically conscious Indonesian could back out of the current of nationalism as it was taking shape. The Netherlands Indies Government faced a serried complex of people c1early not willing to accept Netherlands authority and who acted ac- cordingly. The politically Iittle conscious or unconscious masses that only want autho- rity to allow them to live peacefully, may be left out of account here, be- cause in the political organisation they cannot form a decisive factor. The demands of reality were, in most case!) unconsciously, put aside and people held themselves at the service of the Republic. The road chosen by the republicans and their leaders, was fairly weil beaten at first and th us easy to follow. All parts of the existing government machinery had first of all to be definitely taken over before they could be gathered into one central authority.
Matters were taken in hand with unmista- kable success and with great enthusiasm.
Moreover continuity played an important part in the beginning. The greater number of Government servants and departmental chiefs stuck to their post. Thus the Republic of Indonesia actually took on the appearance of a state, not yet fuUy built up, it is true, but c1early on the way towards a well- organized fin al structure.
ExternaUy 100 percent independence was generally upheld as an indisputable de- mand. InternaUy there was: hopeful and enthusiastic activity to "maké something of it", to create a state capable of beating the Netherlands set-up previous to 1942 by functioning properly.
Clt,aracteristic changes
In the course of the foUowing few months a few highly characteristic changes became noticeable. Enthusiasm was not yet decreas-
ing but the fa ct of being their own master and the initial successes bred an unripe atmosphere of contentment and certaif.lty, with all the consequences thereof. The unexpected initial success·es led the repu- blicans to believe that playing at' govern.-
its backbone th at way. .
The obligations attached to authority were not c1early realized. Little impression was created by the great nu mb er of failures.
especially upon those who had not to bear the consequences. Constructive work con- tinued, but requirements were formulated differently. The revolutionary idea became more and more an official institution. This was dragging the Troyan horse within the walls. It may be said that within the first six months of its existence the development of the Republic Indonesia towards areliabIe political unit came to a standstill. Since th en the disintegrating elements have played an ever increasing part.
DisintegraUng elements taking the upper-hand EspeciaUy during the second half of 1946 the disintegrating element grew and usurped the leading. part, al~hou.gh, .exter-
nally, it looked as lf consohdahon m. the Republic was making headway, especlaUy in Java.
Disintegration, however, had implanted . its germs in vital spots. Sympt01!ls of paralysis became apparent. Restorahon uf law and order, extension of the republican services, improvement in the activity of political organs, slowed up and gradually came to a standstill. While in the begin-
ning the construction of alocal government apparatus and the organization of cen~ral ministries had been worked at enthuslas- ticaUy, the pace gradually slaekened.
Disappointing set-backs and the lack of successful re su lts were endured. lnward and outward the republicans struck a pose of preparedness and infallibility.
Actually this meant treason to the State.
the abandoning of what should have been insisted.on and normally would have been asked for 'as the regular requirements for a weU organized and efficient system of government. Nor coul.d thi~ be d?ne witho~t supporting or creatmg lmposslble. condI- tions for large strata of the populahon and causing serious discontent. This discontent -not at first noUceable-took root and flourished, though it was checked in the beginning, as far as the be~ter educated republicans were concerned, elther by fear of the arowth of a Netherlands stronghold or by fe ar of Ahe republican authorities.
Many loyal to. their coun~rts cause retired and abstained from all achvlty; others stuclc to the republic, eve·n though they were con- vineed th at things were going the wrong way.
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Manifestation of discontent
The extern al manifestation of this dis- content was a gradually increasing desire for contact with Netherlanders, especially with those, who in the frame of the Nether- lands Indies Government or elsewhere had previously worked with the Netherlanders.
Naturally th is group consisted mainly of people who had experienced difficultie's during the republican period. It should be taken into consideration that anybody showing feelings of sympathy for the Dutch during that period exposed himself to all kinds of danger. No matter how apparent the failure of the Republic in respect of the requirements of reality, th ere were but few among the republican leaders who dared to acknowledge this. The masses in the Sundanese interior and in Madura neces- sarily lacked good leaders to the detriment of all parties concerned.
This discontent further created opportu- nities for purely destructive activities pf
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republican Indon~sians, who, in their own opinion, had not been allotted a sufficiently important post in the republican organisat- ion. It was especially this group of discon- tented republican Indonesians who were eager to use for their own ends the inefficiencies so richly offered by the Republic, lack of proper organisation and government care.
The welding fogether of a real opposition -no matter in what form-proved ex- tremely difficult. Threafs and fear played a large part, as much as political inex- perience and lack of prospect of new possibilities. •
The outward appearance of all th is was, as a matte\- of course, draped with curfains of varying degrees of fransparency. The recent Nefherlands poli ce action has produced a great deal of revelatory material, but nevertheless it is as yet impossible to overlook the whole field. We may ' find occasion in the continuation of this paper to complete the above general delineation.
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CHAPTER 11
NETHERLANDS POLICY
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etherlands policy has aimed right through at giving constructive elements and groups such SUpport as would enable them to defeat the destructive elements. Not until that point was reache'd could java and Sumatra be made into a state. This policy, offering the most reasonabie chances of success and best calculated to serve the cflmmon good, had, however, to be abandoned, but not until after every imaginable effort had been made. However, constructive tendencies weakened and finally disappeared altogether.Many of those who at the start thought constructively and who regretfully saw the true nationalist ideal trodden upon by their own people, were nevertheless dragged along in the fareway of the destructive elements.
We wil! endeavour now to outline how Netherlands policy manifested itself in regard of what happened in this country. In this outline we shall also touch upon the areas outside ja a and Sumatra which also were exposed to japanese influences and japan- ese propaganda methods, but whiç!1 managed to shake them off. In honesty it must be granted th at circumstances fav,oured this development (a few areas were actually reconquered by the Allies and the number of inhabitants is smaller). A discussion of these points is, however, outside the scope of this putline.
Pre-war progressive poliey
It is necessary to go back to conditions previous to the japanese invasion, which wil!
iIlustrate that the idea to do away with
"colonial relations" is no innovation but originate'd during a period long before the second worId war.
We will not · go into this. It may, ho wever, be underlined th at as early as 1922 the word "colonies" was deleted from the Netherlands constitution while thenceforward, actually from the commencement of the twentieth century the Netherlands Govern- ment actively carried through such changes as might provide more room for the Indo- nesian element in the government of their own country. The institution of the People's Council (in which the Jndonesian element held a majority) is one example, another is the institution in 1940 of a mixed commis- sion for studying polit1cal reforms which conclucted its proceedings by presenting an exi'ensive report, known as the Visman- report. It is a pity that war intervened, for had not that been the case the Government would undoubtedly have proceede'd to carry through further radical political changes.
Measures during the war for carrying tOut tbis policy
When during the second world war huma- nhy started once again to reflect on themes Iike democracy and human dignity and these 14
old familiar ideas got a new lease of life, exactly because 0f the struggle for life and death against the powers that trampled down democracy and human dignity, the Nether- lands wholehearte'dly came into line.
As a matter of course, these principles were brought to bear by the Netherlands more especially on the relationship between herself and her overseas territorie's. The Roy'al address of December 6, 1942 left no doubt about the Netherlands' ultimate aims.
In London as weil as in Brisbane the Netherlands Government of that day con- sidered its future policy and the manner of carrying through the proposed reforms.
H. M. the Queen personally summoned her people over the BBC, fm pressing upon them to study these problems so as to be ready for discussion immediately up on liberation.
'Also Dr. van Mook, Minister for Overseas Territories in those days delivered his ,con- tribution towards the c1arification of ·the same problems in half a dozen radio speeches.
Progressive eVQlution frustrated by post-war happenil}gs
However, events took a different turn. The Indonesian people (and among them more especially the intelligentsia) th at were found
in '1942, were different from the people
that in result of an unequal struggle, forcibly had to be left to the japanese. Something has already been said about the influences which tainted the revolution from the very start. To this might be added th at the excesses of tue population under the revo- lutionary Government, expressing itself in cruelty, murder, looting and arson, created a chaos, in which law and order could only oe resfored with the greatest difficulty.
Should the republic have succeeded in canalizing this chaos into something carrying the germs of law and order, the present farms of conflict might perhaps have been pre- vented. Wh at matters now is that the Netherlands Government was faced af ter the capitulation by a people that had passed through a kind of crisis, still in the aftermath thereof and unwilling to accept Netherlands authority.
This mental revolution (coupled with lack of material and personnel) re'ndered the Netherlands plans for' reform useless at one stroke, because infeasible.
This was totally unexpected and the pro- blem as it presented itself could not be coped with out of hand.
The British Interregnum
A dominating part was played by the following set, of circumstances. The struggle with japan was ended and the war was to be Iiquidated. 'The Netherlands had contri- buted their share in the struggle but there were as yet no troops available to take an activ·e part in the task ef Iiquidation. So the Allied Supreme Command had allotted to Great Britain the task of officially effectuating
the surrender of the japanese in the Nether- lands Indies, disarm the japanese forces, release prisoners of war and internees and establish a provisional military administration.
Of course the Sovereignty of Netherlands Government in Indonesia was never quest- ion ed. On the' contrary it was completely acknowledged by the British and United States Governments. The above circumstan- ces, ihowever, prevented prompt manifest- ation. The Netherlands Indies Government could proceed to Batavia but actual authority was exe'rcised by the British Commander in Chief for java and Sumatra, General Chris- tison.
His instructions of course were exclusively military. He. did not wish to take si de with either the Netherlanders or the Indonesians and did not give purport to the formally recognized sovereignty of the Netherlands In dies Government. It may be true th at initially the revolution also had anti-Allied tendencies (Japanese propaganda, beside Sukarno. had ruIYbed it into the people that the U.S. should be "ironed out" and the British ibe la'boured with a crowbar), but actually the revolution very soon proved it- self clearly anti-DutClh, as the Nether- landers were seen in the first instance as representatives of wh at was feared as
"colonial" authority. General Christison con- sidered thè matter as an internal question between the Netherlands Indies Government and the Indonesian people. It was known to General Christison and his Government that the Netherlands were planning to carry through certain political reforms in these territories, but method and circumstances lay beyond his competency.
This neutral attitude, however, caused the formally acknowledged sovereignty of the Netherlands Indies Government to remain an empty sound at least for the time beïng.
The Indonesians interpreted this position as a sort of acknowledgement on the side of the British. This enabled them to get over the first difficult days of their movement and to consolidate, cleverlyexploiting the British attitude in their propaganda and thus deriving the greate'st authority among their own ;people from this attitude.
Of course there were clashes between the British forces and the Republic. This, how- ever, emanated dhiefly from tbe task circum- scribed by the Allied Supreme Commando Principally when British troops were hjnder- ed in their task of disarming and removing japanese forces or when protecting the Jives of ex P.O.W.'s and ex-internees. The Nether- lands and Indonesia may feel grateful to Great Britain for the work done in th is field and for the sacrifices made, even a long time after the war was finished. Many British soldiers are buried in these territories, killed at a timè, wh en everybody expected to be able to live in peace at last.
The British retreated to a few enclaves;
Batavia, Bandung, Samarang and Surabaya,
whence efforts were made to keep in contact with the remainder of java, which, though not officially, had fallen into the hands of tfhe Republic. T'he situation in Sumatra was
similar. There the enclaves were: Medan, Palembang and Padang. In the remainder of the Archipelago the situation was different.
Allied Military administration was there too, but without the revolutionary republican movemènt causing much tr'ouble.
It might be objected that Netherlands Civil authority, wherever possible, was fairly soon re-established. Civil authority, however, could assert itself only in those places where it was under protection of military authörity, viz. the British High Commando So civil authority, too, was limited to the above- mentione'd areas and enclaves.
Transfer of authority in Borneo and the Great East.
This was the situation when the British in july ,1946 transferredl authority in Borneo and the Great East to the N.E.1. government.
It was soon demonstrated that no time had been wasted, awaiting this moment. That very mon~h a conference was held at Malino with delegates from Borneo and Celebes to discuss politicai reform's. There for the first time the N.E.1. government officially con- tacted thè people of Indonesia and the first thing to be discussed was reform in the political field.
A few days later:
Fitst conference about political reforms- Malino
Of course this conference did not drop out of the ski es. It was c10sely connected with the developments in java and Sumatra. The N.E.I. government had accepted the conse- quences emanating from her conviction that there was no denying a genuine background to the striving for freedom in Java and Sumatra.
The initial restnunt had disappeared.
Sjahrir had become Prime-Minister on con- dition' 11hat Ihis cabinet slhould be consti- tutional. His hands were unstained and no blame of collaboration blurred his name.
Besides the Rêpublic had consolidated so effectively that it would have been imprac- tical to ignore her.
Moreovèr having attuned itself before and during fhe war to the idea of political reform, the road of negotiation. was chosen.
Sukarno, in the eyes of many, was and remained a collaborator and a war criminal, but the Netherlands government refrained from a factual judgment, leaving it to the Indonesian people to judge. The right of self- determination had long since been acknow- ledged and though it would have been more
·elegant if this could have bèen realised with- out a revolution (after all, wh at did the Indonesians know of the Netherlands plans), this rea-lization had to be translated into 15
practice. Why not try this out in a straight talk wii'h a dJelegation of ~is movement, now that Sjahrir had takelll over and his policy was known even though the movement itself rnigbrt be considered iIlegal. So by negotiation it was tried to come to an un~
derstanding with fhe Repulblic albout ft
realization of their self-determination Which eventuaJ.ly led to t91e signing of the Linggadjati-agreement on. March 2'5, 1947, éJ'bout whiah more is to follow furliber on. At the same time, opening discuss.ions with the Republic abollt self-determination and its realization implied that similar dis- cussions would have to take place with the r;emainder of Indonesia, and this as soon as opportunlty offered.
This being a moral principle, interpreted by the Netherlands in an idealistic spirit, tbere was no reason whatever to give the Republic preference. That is why, even before the transfer in Juli 1946 end·eavours were made in the outer territories to constitute a body able to formulate the will of the people. The first contact between the govern- ment and the people would be informative In character 80 as to get to knowand appre- ciate each other's point of view. So ;t was tried fo convene without delay a meeting, approaching a parJiament in its constitution.
The Federative ldea
Direct elections were impossible, the po- pulation lacking both in Iiteracy and organis- ation. A method was looked for which would nevertheless enable the people to express their desire.s in their various shades. Nether- lands and Indonesian civil servants travelled upcountry and conv·ened meetings in cam- pongs and villages explaining to the people what the Government had in mind, leaving it to the population to elect their confidants.
So by way of graduated elections a body of representatives was constituted. Wherever political parties existed, especially in the coastal regions, their organisation was made, use of. The minwities and some social care- gories were represented by the Government nominating a few individuals. However, more than 75% of the' representaiives were elected by tbe people themselves.
MALINO
Thus oonstituted tb.e oonference met at Ma1ino, Where for tlhe first time the idea was broached to transform the Netherlands Indies into a federation, Borneo, East-Indonesia and the Republie being the constituents. The meeting unanimously ap- proved ,the proposal, because under this aystem the varying tempers of the different groups of the population would teil to full
·advantage, wnile maintaining the Unity of Indonesia.
The old Nethe'rlands-lndies were a geogra- phical concept, a geographic Unity, welded together by what sometimes was ca lied tlle J6
"Pax Neerlandica". The archipelago oonsists of numbers of different peoples. each wiih it5 own customs, habits and religious opinions.
The Netherlands civil administration has always watched that one group or one people should not prevail over the other, but tltis has not everywhere take'n away the latent fear for sueh domination. Outside Java, for instanee, there is a decided fear for a so-callè'd Javanocracy. The Malay element has settled in the course of time along the coasts of Borneo and also in Celebes and has partly pushed back into the interior file original inhabitants. It was rightly feared that a withdrawal of Netherlands authority would eaU to tlhe fore domination in oppressin form.
SeJf-determination is supposed to benefit all and does not mean th at certain groups are brought into a dominating posit- ion. The excesses this may lead to and the dan gers implied therein are demonstrafed for
• instanee just now in the conflict between Hindoos and Mohammedans in India.
So a federation was preferred. The three proposed participating states, each within rts own, now more circumscribed territory, would, it was supposed, form a sound orga- nisation. By welding fhe 3 participants to- gether in a federative organisation, if was
!ltoped to establish a strong government, which, joined with the Netherlands and the rest of the overseas territories into one Union, would constitute astrong structure, offering good prospeets for the future.
Dr. van Mook later on formulated this as follows: "Anybody looking about and know- ing conditions in th is country and its po- pulation, and estimating these at their proper value, must come to the conclusion th at tlle unity of Indbnesia and its domestic harmony, wiJl be developed most efficiently in a fede- rative system, which, while joining the forces that will decide the position of the federation in the wortd, will give free play to the forces each in its own manner" (De'n Passar:
December l8th 1946).
Conference of minorities at Pangkal Pinang These di~cussions only touched the fringes of the problem. In the federative system the Indonesian people would handle the right of. seJf-determination, which implied that various other groups, occupying prominent positions in Indonesia so far, Netherlanders, Chinese and Arabs would be brought info the position of minority groups in the new organisation. _ These extremely important groups, it is obvious, could not simply be left out when constructing a new body politie; it was necessary that they should be consulted and given fhe opportunity to exptess their desires. This consultation took place in October 1946 in fhe" isle of Banka and is known as the Pangkal Pinang con-
ference. ,
Pangkal Pinang profited by the Malino conference held 3 months previously. A con-
siderable part of the Indonesian people had declared itself in favour of the idea of a federative organisation and practically with- out much discussion the minorities too accepted th is idea. There was some criticism of the policy pursued so far though the broad outlines were supported.
There was, however, one condition resoun- ding in all the discussions, viz. th at the rights of the minorities should be emphatically guaranteed. This condition was expressed in vatious detailed motions and resolutions and in the constitunon for East-Indonesia, as weil as in the Linggadjati agr\!ement a number of clauses are found guarante'eing these righ tso The right of self-determination was almost unanimously recognized, the latter giving the government encouragement to continue along the same lines.
DEN PASSAR CONFERENCE.
Foundation cf the State East·lndonesia Following the !ine runriing from Malino via Pangkal Pinang we are automatically landed in Den Passar. We will revert to the consul-
tations with the Republic, which ran parallel with the others, later on.
After Malino the reorganisation of the so- called Outer Territories could be taken in hanel energetically. A Oeneral Oovernment Commissariat for Borneo and the Oreat East took matters in hand, the method of repres- entation was, if possible, still better organi- zed and efforts were made to constitute at the Den Passar Conference the'
two
partici-pating states of the Federation: Borneo and The Oreat East.
This did not altogether succeed. As far as East Indonesia was concemed everythîng went according to plan. In Borneo difficulties arose so that eventually, the Den Pass ar Conference had to be reserved for the Con- stitution of the State East-lndonesia alone.
With tlle' Republic meanwhile agreement had been reached about the draft agreement of Linggadjati and debates in the Netherlands Second Chamber on this draft had started, The Den Passar conferenceexperienced a reaction, pecause through the debates on the draft agreement the Netherlands people, for the first time, could express the'mselves offi- cially about the pros. and cons. of tbe fede- rative idea. In case the Netherlands Second Chamber rejected this idea the Den Passar Conference would be useless, because it had been convened to constitute a participating state to the Federation.
So the decision of the Second Chamber was crucial; the draft was accepted with a fairly large majority and so the day for Den Pass ar was gained. The Netherlands, toa, had accepted thè Federative idea and East Indonesia could be founded in the proposed constitution.
A large measure of autonomy was granted
to East '/ndonesia, the new state immediately transferring to the Netherlands Indies Oovern-
I
ment the powers, which it would, later on, transfe'r to the Federal Oovernment (defence, foreign affairs etc.). '
Borrreo
As related previously, the initial plan had been to constitute the State Borneo in Den Passar as weil, but th is plan had to be aban- don ed. Republican propaganda namely had been remarkably active in, different parts of Borneo from the very beginning, using me- thods that were far from fair.
An attitude of extreme non-operation- was the result making the elections, without which a parliament for Borneo could not be constituted, impossible. Nothing could be done before the peop/e of Borneo had managed to free themselves of the influence of this intimidating propaganda. Looked at objectively there is no objection whatever to a republican party taking part in the dele- gation of Borneo and getting j11embers in parliament (the republican Tachudin Noor was nearly elected preside'nt for East-Indo- nesia) . But intimidation, abuse of the lack of experience and lack of Iiteracy of the population rendered it impossible-even if elections could have been held- to get a fair average 'representation of the' will of the people, In all probabjlity exclusively javanese or at least republicans would have been elected under the influence of fear, while actually the population would much rat her have delegated their own people that have different convictions. This is especially the case for the Dayak group that has always considered the Malay element as intruders and tyrants and for whom, anyway beforè the war, it was the district officer of the Netherlands administration whom they COD-
sidered the symbol of "Kemerdekaan"
(liberty) .
West· Borneo
Fortunately it was not long before part of the population of, Borneo realizing its OW"
interest freed itself of these con- ditions. This was the case in West-Borneo wh ere the republican element was least in- fluential and where the population had been rea<ly for some time to take part in establish- ing the State Borneo, though it had to wait until South and East Borneo would drop their non-co-operating attitude. Waiting was too protracted and at last West Borneo through its representative body, the West Borneo Council, made representations to the Netherlands Indies Oovernment to be granted apolitical constitution of its own.
This was granted and all the more readily because West Borneo intimated that they wanted to participate in the proposed fede- ration. On May 11 the "Daerah listimewa"
(special autonomous territory) was est- ablished, The fact that West Borneo is ready to co-operate proves this to be no schism.
17
East Borneo and the territory of Great- Dayak
Sin ce th en the sober minded 'in other parts of Borneo too have woken up, The Territory of Great Oayak and East Borneo looked for and found theÏr own forms of government.
$0 it looks as if, be it with some delay, a second participating state in the federation wil! also come into being.
Republican criticism of the constitution of East Indonesia and West Borneo
These are the broad outlines of what hap- pened in Indonesia outside of Java and Sumatra. The Republic has never been wiJIing to recognize these, occurrences and i.a. accuse'd the N.E.l. government of breach of the Linggadjati-agreement. Clauses 3 and 4, however, demonstrate clearly that there is no question of such a breach.
Clause 3 so far has not been applicabIe, no territory.having declared not to be willing to belang to the federati<m. Remains but dause 4, paragraph 1, which is clear enough even without interpretation. In this first ' paragraph of clause 4 it is nowhere stated that the Republic should have been consulted first and if the Republic wishes to refer to clause 2, it ought to be stated, that such co- operation iowards the constitution of a United States of Indonesia, cannot take place until after the participating states have been constituted. It is the constitution of these participating states that has had the full attention of the N.E.l. government.
These strange opinions of the Republic resulted from the fact that although the Republic has signed the Linggadjati-agree- ,ment they have never started thinking
in a federal way. Their ideas are unitarian and they can only visualize an Indonesian unitarian state. ft is not' as if the Republic, East Indonesia: and Borneo were to co- operate on an equal footing in one federation, on the contrary, East lndonesia and Borneo are granted the privilege to jo in the repu- blican unitarian state. This idea is not ac- cepted by anyone ex cept the Republic, it being in conflict with the desires emphati- cally expressed in Malino and Oe'n Passar.
Since the Netherlands police action the Republic has shaken off all formality and has openly proclaimed the unitarian state.
This does not make a great deal of difference, republican propaganda never having promul- gated anything else. No matter how impor- tartt the position of the Republic in the future federation, it has been emphatically laid down that any superiority of the Republic is completely out of the question. We may revert to the Den Passar speech of Dr. van Mook wh ere he stated that though it may not be possible to realize absolute equality i nfo r m of all parties by wa ving a wand, the history of the different parts of Indonesia having been very different of late, it is nevertheless necessary that there should be 'equality in value.
18
Besides the above criticism the Republic passionately affirmed that East Indonesia and West Borneo were nothing but puppet states. They endeavoured to demonstrate to their own people that the' Netherlanders 'were onc1e more introducing their colonial tyranny through the back-door; th at independent statelets were created in name only, but that actually-with an eye to world opinion this was not done overtly-strings were being pulled just as hard as heretofore.
Nothing is farther from the truth. Some important posts, in East Indonesia as wel! as in West Borneo, -are filled by Netherlanders, but at the express request of the govern- ments themselves. The Netherlands have promised to East Indonesia and Borneo to give assistance, wherever help might be needed. The fulfilment of this promise is found in the presence of these Netherlands officials.' The officials however, are in na way respon~ible to the N.E.1. Government, being in the service of either East Indonesia or Borneo. Their function is advisory and 'the decision is entirely with the responsible minister whose oroers they have to take.
As soon as East Indonesia and West Borneo wiJl have sufficient trained official of their own these will replace tile Netherlanders.
Anybody returing in a few years time to Macasser, the capitalof East Indonesia or to Pontianak, the Seat of the West Borneo Council, wil! find fewer Netherlanders in government posts than th ere are to-day.
The budget may serve as an example of the reality of the independenee granted. On the establishme'nt of East Indonesia part of the N.E.I.-budget was, after consultation, completely. put at the disposal of the new state. What USe to make of those millions js their own busines. They owe responsi- bility to no one, ex cept as a government to its parliament. Should East Indonesia choose to expend these funds for completely useless purposes the N.E.I. could do nothing.
Finally it has often been observed by Republican sources that the East Indonesian parliament was not elected on a democratic basis, but arbitrarily nominate'd by the Netherlanders for their own transparent pur- poses. Quite recently, during the discussions in the Security Council of August 1947, this was again stated emphatically by the rep u- blican representative Sjahrir. In the preceding pages we have shown this to be a misrepre- sentation of facts. It may be jusrIy mainiain- ed that 1!he East Indonesia parlia'ment is.a 'true representation of the wil! of the ipeople.
ft would go beyond the scope of the present paper to describe t'he .parliamentary history of this young assem'bly, but sQme scrutiny wil! soon reveal that duriQg the recent ses- sioru inddents occurred and decisions were taken, w'hich, Iby their very nature and spirit, certainly could not have been inspired by Outch machinations.
The republican parliament on tl1e other hand is up to now quite arbitrarily constituted
by nomination. The population was never consulted.
Connectian between consultations with the Republic and the outside territories
Having drawn the line running via Malino and Pangkal Pinang to Den Passar, we may now study the line running to Linggadjati.
From the above it may be clear of what eminent importance th is agreement is for the development of the non-republican territories.
Moreover in the line to Linggadjati there is the junction of Pangkal Pinang, which goes to show that consultation with the Republic should never be seen apart from consultation with the other territories and vice versa.
To quote Dr. van Mook: "Endeavouring to join together what has become divided by facts and senbments, rendered it necessary at Malino to take into account Java and Sumatra, in the same way as at Linggadjati account was taken of the Great East and Borneo". There is a continuous interaction between both methods of consultation.
Meanwhile there is no denying that Java and Sumatra counting 60 million inhabitants besides their modern equipment, supplied by western capital and western enterprise, wil\
constitute the most important element in the future federation. And so it was the point to bring the Republic into line with the federative idea.
19
HUBERTUS fAN MOOK 20
,
CHAPTER 111
IT ALKS WITH THE REPUBLIC UP TO
THE SIGNING OF ~INGGADJATr'
P
racti~ally !mmedtiatel~ after the Japanesecapltula~lOn and wIthout, through lack Qof actual c0ntact with Java, being suffidently informed about the true inwardness of events that were comdng to pass there (news was scarce and confused, whiJe connections were 'highly insufficient), the Netherlands Government sta.rted to work out the plans drafted during the war. Some changes were made in connection with aHered' conditions, though vhe broad lines remained unchanged.
T,he purpor? was to set things moving at shorter notice t·han· had originally been antd- cipated.
First a commissiün was convened to stud'X fhe wis'hes of the Netherlands people as regards changes in the political organisation of the Kingdom (thus continuing the work al- readly done durin'g theperiod. 1940/19412 by flhe pr~viously mentioned Visman-commcrs.- sion).
ft was soon realized, ,however, th at elalborate commissional met'hods were unsuitable in times of ferment and conflict.
Soon after, the minister for Overseas Ter- ritories made a detailed statement in the SecondChamber of the States General setting out the political retor.ms tlhe Nether- lands Government proposed to carry througlh in consultation w,ith the oi'her Territories.
This defined the Government's programme while putting into action the principles Jaict down in the Queen's speech of December
1942. , .
According to the Netherlands Gavern- ment . statement of policy of November 7 1945 the objective was:
"the most expeditious development of Indonesia i'nto a participant in a King- dom, thus constituted that the national self-respect or all partners is guaranteed.
So this and the centra I government in' this country wiJl have to be ·constitu- tionally reconstructed in such a manner so as to form
a
represen~ation of th~people on a democratic basis, constituted by a majority of Indonesians and a Council of Ministers subject to the Governor-General as representative of the Crown".
I A great number of further reforms were announced: no separation between Nether- lands and Indonesian administration, no distinct jurisdiction, recognition of both Indonesian and Dutch, as official languages
etc. .
As stated, the Government pr.ogramme requ.ired consultation with the parties in- volved. Tthe Netherlands certainly did not
intend to impose a "Diktat" on Indonesia. The difficulty, however. was ta get consultatio", with the other 'party going. Tension anct an atmospher.e of v,iolence reigned in all areas where the Allies had settled, rendering normal discussion impossible. 'Dhe rabble 22
had bro-ken loose, passions ihad been reJeas- ed and vioJence prevailed.
'Dhere were many who, from genuine patriotism and conscious idealism, were pre- pared to give their Jives for the freedom of Indonesia, never asking wh ether or no this was at all needrful. Larger, however, was the number of those, especially youths trained by tJhe Japanese in an atmosphere of bru- tality, faliling into dissipation which had no connection' whatever with nationalism.
I~ coolly calculated criminality the ]apan- ese, who had only capitulated formally, gave up their arms to the latter group .. It is a tragic phenomenon of th'e revolutIOn t'hat the first gl'OUp consisting of genuine
national~sts, Ihas Ibeen forcilbly dragged along by the second group and has never been alble to get free. The first group needed no revolution to get its ideals translated into rea'lity. The Net1herlanders were ready to meet them peacealbly .;n every way.
For one part their attitude rnust be ascrihed to ignorance of the Netherlands plans; furtJhermore loyalty to those whom t'hey regarded as fiheir cOJl1rades in battle, flhough they never atternpted to justify their methods; when finally the awakening came, it was too latei driveru into a corner they failed to escape from the grip of the destruc- tive gangs.
,so mortars, sten-guns and rifles spoke and there waS! no opportunity for discussion.
Cabinet formed by Sukamo
A cab in et had been formed by Sukarno, but recently found minutes of a Session of this calbinet go to prove that the destruction of the Allies was, in that time the first business of t,he Cabinet.
In one [Session of the c~binet the m1inister for communicatiolls is charged with tlhe making of preparations to faze Batavia-city to the grou·nd and in the next session, three days later, this hig1h official reports tihat all necessary preparations have Ibeen mad'e and that Batavia can be destroyect at any desired moment.
The landing of more and more allied troops and the consolidation of their positions brought about a greater measure of security and peace, and so opened up the possibility of the various parties meeting at a conference tabIe. No attempt had been made to drive out the repubJicarls, on the contrary, they were allowed to carry on their activities provided this was done in orderly fashion.
Violence had been reduced to bearable proportions.
Republican newspapers in Batavia
',Although the position of the R~ublJic stiJl
had to be regularized in every respect, the Kepublic was allowed! to operate varioul!
mmlstries and public services within the city. Repub!ican officials moved about freely at least five republican newsp'apers appeared
daily in' Batavia and could, if tlhey so wished, carry on an out-and-out anti~Netherlands
action, The printing paper for same of {'hese newspapers was even surpplied' by the Netherlanders; the Netherlands and repu- blican radio services operated in the same building etc, etc,
End'eavours were made to establish contact with leading repuJblicans wlho, could be supposoo to be trustworthy. At first na oontact was sought with the !President of the Repulblic, Sukarno, who was considered a collaborator, or a war criminal who had wrought more harm than good for his peo- ple. It was Sukarno who during the war had incited {'he ~ndonesian world against the Allies, especially against the United States, Great Britain and {lf course the Netherlands.
It was the who had champÎ'oned a union unto death with the Japanese people and wh.o had sacrificed hundreds of thousands of his countrymen to t'his ,policy by urging them strongly to join t,he Japanese, either in their army 1n Java and Sumatra, or in the labour- corps organizedJ under japanese pressure.
(But only a tew of these hundreds of thou- sands returned. The remainder perished in conditions of the greatest misery).
lMoreover, .sukarno mus,t also be held responsible for the large scale looting, murdering and burning during the early days of the revolution. It was ~e who in variOous speeches, just before the Japanese capitula- tion, stron'gly incited to these misdeeds,
Even to-day Indonesians are arrested who confess to the murd'er of a number of Ne'- therlanders as a result of the speeches made by Su'karno during ~hat period. For this and other reasans t'he Netherlanders were dis- inclined to enter into discussion with Su- Ikarno, though there was no disinclination to contact leading republicans, w'hose integrity there was no reason to doubt, beforehand.
Sjahrir nominated premier
The latter 'became all the more desirabIe and also Ipossible because some changes had taken place in the Republic clearly pointing to a new and better direction. Sjahrir had been. no.minated premier by Sukarno, which nommatlon had been accepted by Sjahrir, however on condition that his cabinet should not be presidential but responsible to a parliament. Sjahrir was known as the au thor
of ."Perdjoe~nS'an Kita" (Our Struggle) in
whlch he dehOitely settled accounts with the people who had collaborated with the japan- ese or who had profited by the presence of the ]apanese to realize their nationalist ideals.
It was known of him that in this respect he was "immaculate" and his definite choice of a parliamentary system of government, justified some confidence in attempt on the part of the republic to get away from the revolution by canalizing the revolutionary approach into democratic channels.
Charm of 100% Independenee
The Government programme (as proposed by t'he Netherlands Cabinet to the Second Chamlber and which migiht serve as a start- ing point for furthe'r discussions) could not find favour in republican' eyes. Sukarno m~de
short work Oof it a tew days later.
To ma'ny t:here was astrong charm in 1!he idea of coming to "100% Independence"
immediately after the Japanese capitulation.
T'his they did not wish to ,depart trom; at least t'he more radical grooups in power were adamant. T<l the more soberminded, how- ever, it was quite c1ear at that time that
",100% freedom" was not really desirabie.
Indones.ia was not quite ready to hand'le the responsibiJ.ity attaching toO lIhis freedom and would' benefit greatly Iby Netherlands advice and assistance. T'his would open the possibiUty to use the right of self-determ,j- nat,ion mure effectively later on.
This attitude becaJ11e clearly apparent in the course of the discussions. But Sjahrir ooulod not always go in 1-he direction he wanted. (In this respect it may be significant that the seat of tlhe republican government in January 1946 was transferred from Batavia to Djocja). He !had to ta,ke int-o account the temper of the politically active sections
?f
',his 'people. In one manner 'ÜT orher 'he agam
and again had' to find a compr-omise between (his own r.irper convictions and the fanatica!
parHsans who had taken ovçr the running of the show.
Besides this ihe must try and' come to an understanding with the Nerherlanders.
It stands to reason that during that first ,period sentiment p'layed an important part and several times sentiment oprevailed over reason .. !t was nor so much the negotiators that were led by sentiment as the peoples on whose behalf they were acting.
lIhis could' not but influence the nego- tiat·ors.
Third party interested
iMeanwhile t'here was still' a third party highly interested in the conflict in these territories. That third party was Great Britain, whose troops constituted the prin- cipal.army of occupation. The British wanted
(0 see peace return to these territories in the interest of world peace as speedily as possible. IGreat Britain, by the mere fact of t'he 'ptesence of its troops in these territories, could not but fee I involved in the reigning conflict.
For this reason and others it was not surprising that Great Britain' c10scly followed the driscussions anti finally sent a special ambassado,r to try and Ibring 1-he !parties in vhe conflict togetlher.
ISir Archibald Clar;k 'Kerr (Lord Inver- chapel) arrived Ih,ere in thebeginndng of February J 946 to endeavour to bridge the
23
chasm that separated the parties and to find a solutiofL in concert wi~h /bath. It Gookect as if his mission was going to succeed. A common meeting ground was found as between Dr. van Mook and Sutan Sjahrir, wl1ioh brought parries fairly dosely. together.
A communique could soon be published announcing tlltat parties 'had come suffi- ciently closely together to make it desiraJble for Dr. van Mook and a few republicans to proceed to t1he Netherlands to get into direct contact with the Netherlands povernment. For the sake of oOO1!pI,eteness it shou'ld be related here tlhat t'his 'Oovernment ~ad introduced on FeJbruary IO~ deta~led and far-reaching proposals, folllowed Iby a detailed explanatory statement on February 25. These proposals definitely aimed at completei:ndependence for ITIldonesia, witlhin' the framewoI1k of the Kihgdom and wil'hin one generation (estimated' at 2ó years).
Complete agreement between Dr. van Mook and Slitan Sjahrir had not yet been reached but it was hopoo fhat tlhe remaining' dif- ficulties could so'Oo be solved in persona!
cO'nsultatiori wi~h ilhe Net1herla'llds Govern- ment.
Important Government proposals stated on Fel;lruary 10, 1946 were:
1) There shall be a Commonwealth of Indonesia, participant in the Ki1lgdom, composed of countr{es with a different '<legree of self-government.
2) Indonesian citizenship shall be institu- ted fór all those bom in !ndonesia.
3) The home affairs of the Common- wealth of Indonesia shall be managed independently. by the Commonwealth's own organisations; for the Common- wealth as an entity a democratically constftuted peoples' representation is thought of, that is to say with a sub- stantial Indonesian majority, a rninistry constituted in politica! harmO'lly with the peoples' representation and a representative of the Crown being the Head of the G.overnment.
4) The Netherlands Government will promote an expeditious admission of the Commonwealth of Indonesia as a member of U.N.O.
This 'hope, alas, was not to be flil- fj,lled. Ttle stllmbling stone for the dis- cussions in the NeMlerlands (Hoge Veluwe) provoo to be exacNy this independence
"within the framework of the Kingdom of the Net1l!erlands". Of course there were differ- ences on a numtJer of otlher paints, out these might have been cleared away, if only the Netherlands Government cOllild have droppe'(j' the idea pf a 'bond keeping Indonesia witllin the framework of the Kingdom even after the expiry of tlle 25 years" term. Tlle Nether-
24
laoos Govemmeri't" insisted on this point wnsiu'ering fue <proposed bond of vital in- terest for both parties.
Indonesia, in her positlon- of a young and inexperienced state, thus allied, would never stand alone amidst wor.Jd problems, 'whilst the Netherlands, even under the changed cond'itions, oould continue to gua~d !her numerous interests in Indonesia. Perhaps the Republic dio not want t'O adimit the' ad-..:ant- ages of thls arralll'gement so as to strengthen her position in further' negotiations. The reptiblican!1 simply w{}uldi not see that t1his bond with the Kingdom was to be based on V'oluntary agreement and co-operation. They would 'not realize that tthe proposed' bond was oot to be (aJIld cou-Ld not he eit'her) a matter of one-sided domJnance and, exploi- tation. The slogan "colon ia I demination"
develOtped, more es.pecially by japanese pro- paganda, into a bogey, 41ad so bitten itself into the repuoblican make-up, that they colild not be brought to open t'heir minds to t'he possibility that the Netherlands ,could accept-let alone welcome-Indonesia as a partner on a pêrfectly equal foo,ting. For completeness' sake a precis of the Nether- lands proposals in their final form as put before the republican delegations follows:
,
Governm,ent statement on May 2, 1946:
"Recognition of the Republic of Indonesia as a part of a federal commonwealth of Indonesia, which Commortwealth will. act as participant, bes,ides the Netherlands, Suriname' and Curaçao in the Kingdom of tbe Netherlands.
The Netherlands Government is prepared to recognise that the Republic of Indone- sia exercises de facto authority, in those parts of Java and Madura not belonging to the are as protected by Allied troops.
Regarding all outer territories, including Sumatra, tlle Netherlands Government takes the vie'w that they may decide freely about theÎr wis hes regarding their future status within Indonesia."
