• No results found

Socially smart software agents entice people to use higher-order theory of mind in the Mod game

N/A
N/A
Protected

Academic year: 2021

Share "Socially smart software agents entice people to use higher-order theory of mind in the Mod game"

Copied!
1
0
0

Bezig met laden.... (Bekijk nu de volledige tekst)

Hele tekst

(1)

Socially smart software agents entice people to use

higher-order theory of mind in the Mod game

Kim Veltman

1

, Harmen de Weerd

1,2

, Rineke Verbrugge

1

1

Institute of Articial Intelligence, University of Groningen

2

Research Group User Centered Design, Hanze University of Applied Sciences

Introduction

• Theory of mind [3] allows people to reason about unobservable mental content of others, such as their beliefs, desires, or intentions.

• People are capable of using theory of mind recursively, and use higher-order theory of mind to reason about the theory of mind abilities of others [5].

• In strategic settings, people typically rely on zero-order or rst-order theory of mind and are slow to engage in higher-order theory of mind [1].

• The best response to an opponent following kth-order theory of mind is to reason at (k + 1)st-order theory of mind [6].

Experiment

The Mod game [2] is an extension of rock-paper-scissors. In our experiment, two players each choose a number between 1 and 24.

Players score a point if they chose the number that is exactly one higher than the number cho-sen by their opponent. In addition, players that choose the number 1 score a point if their oppo-nent has chosen number 24.

Participants knowingly play Mod games against

a ToM1 agent, a ToM2 agent, a ToM3 agent,

and a randomizing agent that randomly switches between these three options every round.

• Blocks of 20 rounds per opponent

• Each opponent appeared in two blocks

Results and discussion

We used random-eects Bayesian model selection (RFX-BMS, [4]) to determine the level of theory of mind reasoning of the participants playing the Mod game. The following gures show the estimated strategies for the articial agents (left) and the participants (right).

0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 Other regarding Self regarding

ToM0 ToM1 ToM2 ToM3 ToM4 Win−Stay

Lose−Shift

Estimated strategies of ToM agent

Estimated propor tion of str ategy in population Actual strategy of ToM agent Random ToM1 ToM2 ToM3 0.0 0.1 0.2 Other regarding Self regarding Win−Stay Lose−Shift

ToM0 ToM1 ToM2 ToM3 ToM4

Estimated strategies of participants

Estimated propor tion of str ategy in population Strategy of ToM agent Random ToM1 ToM2 ToM3

• RFX-BMS accurately recovered the level of theory of mind reasoning of theory of mind agents (green, blue, and purple bars in left gure).

• RFX-BMS is unable to classify the randomizing agent (red bars in left gure).

• Participants adjust their level of theory of mind reasoning to their opponent:

 When playing against a ToM1 opponent, participants are best explained as using rst-order or second-order theory of mind (green bars, right gure).

 When playing against a ToM3 opponent, participants rely on third-order or fourth-order theory of mind (purple bars, right gure).

 Participants that play against the randomizing agent are better explained as using simple, behavior-based strategies (red bars, right gure).

• Surprisingly, participant behavior shows evidence of fourth-order theory of mind reasoning (purple bars, right gure). This is much higher than would

be expected based on the literature.

Random-effects Bayesian model selection

To classify participant behavior, we make use of random-eects Bayesian model selection [4]. In this analysis, we distinguish the following strategies to play the Mod game.

Behavior-based strategies

• The k-self-regarding strategy selects the

num-ber that is k higher than the numnum-ber chosen in the last round with some xed probability.

• The k-other-regarding strategy selects the

number that is k higher than the number the opponent chose in the last round with some xed probability.

• The win-stay lose-shift strategy selects the

same number as chosen in the last round if that number led to a victory, and otherwise randomly picks another number.

Theory of mind strategies [6]

• The zero-order theory of mind ToM0 strategy

predicts that if the opponent chooses number

n, it is likely that the opponent will play

num-ber n again in the future.

• The rst-order theory of mind ToM1 strategy

extends the ToM0 strategy with the

possibil-ity that the opponent follows a ToM0 strategy.

• The kth-order theory of mind ToMk strategy

attributes all lower order of theory of mind strategies to his opponent.

References

[1] Goodie, A.S., Doshi, P., and Young, D.L.: Levels of theory-of-mind reasoning in competitive games. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 25(1):95108 (2012). [2] Frey, S. and Goldstone, R.L.: Cyclic game dynamics driven by iterated reasoning. PloS ONE, 8(2):e56416 (2013).

[3] Premack, D. and Woodru, G.: Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1(4):515526 (1978).

[4] Stephan, K.E., Penny, W.D., Daunizeau, J., Moran, R.J., and Friston, K.J.: Bayesian model selection for group studies. Neuroimage, 46(4):10041017 (2009). [5] Verbrugge, R.: Logic and social cognition: The facts matter, and so do computational models. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 38:649680 (2009).

[6] de Weerd, H., Verbrugge, R., and Verheij, B.: How much does it help to know what she knows you know? An agent-based simulation study. Articial Intelligence, 199-200:67-92 (2013). This work was supported by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientic Research (NWO) Vici grant NWO 277-80-001, awarded to Rineke Verbrugge.

Referenties

GERELATEERDE DOCUMENTEN

In contrast, de  Villiers et al.’s (2014) preliminary results showed that 60% of five- to six-year-olds’ answers were based on the zero-order ToM strategy, and only around 20%

Figure 3.5 shows (a) proportion of correct answers to the second-order false belief questions at pre-test, post-test and follow-up sessions and (b) the difference in

It is as if one piece of the hierarchy is flattened, or skipped over in parsing.” (p. We may generalize children’s failures at first-order and second-order false belief

Chapter 5: The Role of Simple and Complex Working Memory Strategies in the Development of First-order False Belief Reasoning: A Computational Model of Transfer of Skills..

data were calculated based on the proportions under the assumption that there was no missing data. The number of repetitions of the DCCS and FB models at pre-test, training and

Based on our computational modeling approach that we presented in Chap- ter 2, we propose that even if children go through another conceptual change after they pass the

Het doel van deze modelleeraanpak was, naast het doen van exacte voorspellingen die empirisch getest kunnen worden, om een procedurele verklaring te geven voor

Five-year-olds’ systematic errors in second-order false belief tasks are due to first-order theory of mind strategy selection: A computational modeling study.. Frontiers