University of Groningen
Corruption in Indonesia
Sondang Silitonga, Mala
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Publication date: 2018
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Sondang Silitonga, M. (2018). Corruption in Indonesia: The Impact of institutional change, norms, and networks. University of Groningen.
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STELLINGEN
Propositions to accompany the dissertation
CORRUPTION IN INDONESIA
The Impact of Institutional Change, Norms, and Networks by Mala Sondang Silitonga
1. Decentralization did not end corruption in Indonesia, but instead shifted it from central to local governments (Chapter 2).
2. Corrupt actors prefer to invest in social relations with resourceful exchange partners (Chapter 3).
3. Before deciding on the implementation of a specific anti-corruption strategy, governments should analyze the possible unintended consequences of the power structure change (Chapter 3).
4. Besides analyzing corruption networks at the dyad-level, role structure analysis adds to a deeper understanding of the network embeddedness of corruption (Chapter 4).
5. A three-actor corruption network does not necessarily contain an intermediary role (Chapter 4).
6. The perception of “everybody does it, why shouldn’t I?” shapes the individual decision whether or not to engage in corruption (Chapter 5). 7. Monitoring and sanctioning have a more positive effect in fighting
corruption if leaders in organizations act as a role model (Chapter 5). 8. Newspaper articles provide a fruitful data source for investigating social
networks and role structures of corruption (Chapter 2, 3, and 4). 9. Anti-corruption efforts may have a greater chance of success if formal
and informal institutions are aligned, complementing rather than competing with each other (Chapter 6).
10. Power attracts the corruptible. Suspect any who seek it (Frank Herbert, Chapterhouse: Dune).
