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Investigation of the lesser-known case of Beppe Grillo:

A critical discourse analysis on how the populist star mediatized Italian politics.

Lucrezia Bonarota S-3411117

Rijksuniversiteit Groningen

Thesis BA Media Studies Supervisor: ​Rieke Böhling Second reader: ​ Elisabetta Costa LJX999B10 12/06/2020

Wordcount:12.300

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Declaration of Sole Authorship

I, Lucrezia Bonarota, declare that this thesis and its content are my own and are the result of my own original research unless otherwise stated. The thesis “Investigation of the lesser-known case of Beppe Grillo: A critical discourse analysis on how the populist star mediatized Italian politics”

has not been submitted nor accepted anywhere else for the award of any other degree or diploma.

Lucrezia Bonarota, 12/06/2020

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Abstract

In the growing digital age, many populist leaders have become more notable to the public sphere

for their remarkable media presence and usage. The media has, indeed, created situations in

which populist rhetorical and communicative strategies can flourish largely. ​ This thesis aims to

investigate the obscure case of the populist Beppe Grillo and his role in the mediatization of

Italian politics. This dissertation primarily draws upon Frank Esser’s (2014) fourth dimension of

mediatized politics, which discusses mediatization of politics as the expressed preference of

political actors to adapt to the thinking and behaviour of media. In this regard, I will explore the

concept of (digital) media logic as “the engine of mediatization” of politics. Additionally, the

concept of mediatized politics will be discussed in relation to democracies and the institutional

transformation they are facing. It will be argued that the adaptation to the logic of the media has

critical implications on democracies, which results in being the nexus for the section

Mediatization and (political) Populism.

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Table of Content

Abstract ………...3

Introduction………..5

Executive Summary………...7

Theoretical Framework………9

Mediatization of Politics………..………9

Mediatization and New (Social) Media……….12

Mediatization and Democracy………...14

Mediatization and (political) Populism………...18

Methodological Framework…...………23

Critical Discourse Analysis………...24

Critical Discourse Analysis in action………...25

Results & Analysis……… 26

Linguistic Dimension……….... 26

Ideological Dimension……….. 29

Discussion & Critique ………...37

Limitations ………37

Discussion……….….38

Conclusion……….40

Reference List…..………..42

Appendix A………....48

Appendix B.………...100

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Introduction

“[T]he moment a people allows itself to be represented, it is no longer free: it no longer exists.

The day you elect representatives is the day you lose your freedom” (Social Contract, III, 15);

this is what Rousseau (1762) stated when asserting that the true nature of democracy is incompatible with existing representative institutions. The disappointment of representative democracy is still today something shared by many. Our contemporary democracies are not fixed arrangements. At the most democratic side, there are systems in which the ​volonté générale approximately manage to dominate; at the other, there are representative systems only accessible to few. In the midst of this, new political actors expressing strong discontent towards existing establishments emerged. Among these, populist figures are the most notable due to their distinct political communication. In the growing digital age, many populist leaders have become more evident to the public sphere for their remarkable media presence and usage (Nadler, 2019; 6).

The media has, indeed, created situations in which populist rhetorical and communicative strategies can flourish largely (Mazzoleni, 2014; Nadler, 2019). In Italy, the political communication realm is still extensively centralized on television broadcasting regarding the formation of political opinions and the transmission of knowledge. Between (the years of) 2005 and 2013 nonetheless, the country experienced a shift in processes of political communication, now ​thoroughly ​about connectivity and interactivity between digital media users. ​The engine of this was Giuseppe Grillo who managed to exploit digital media logic for the transmission of his populist discourse. To comprehend how exactly the media played into this, a brief outlook of Grillo’s persona will be illustrated below.

Giuseppe Piero Grillo pursued the career of comedian by performing in cabaret rooms as

a stand-up performer since the early ages of his life. In a very short time, his skills as an

entertainer started to pay off to the point that he featured in a number of very successful

programmes broadcasted by RAI (Italy’s public television network). Over the years, his

performances began to take on an increasingly satirical connotation. His biting satire, combined

with anti status-quo views, led to the creation of serious frictions with RAI that eventually

caused him to be ousted from any kind of entertaining programmes broadcast by the public

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network. Consequently, Grillo developed a great resentment towards the establishment and all the public network channels working for it. The satirical monologues, targeting especially politicians inactivity to act in the interests of the country and all public media that flanked the establishment, continued despite the “censorship” from RAI. The “censorship” he dealt with was considered by Grillo as a pure demonstration and clear example of the power exercised by the political establishment over the citizens. The institutional system was composed of politicians closely related to prominent entrepreneurial figures, among which a lobbying mechanism of favoritism existed. Therefore, Grillo was accusing the political establishment ​of working for its own interests and criticising the partiality of the laws that governed political institutions in favor of the parties in charge.

In 2005, Grillo met Gianroberto Casaleggio, who, as Grillo stated “explained webcasting

to me, direct democracy, chatterbots, wiki, downshifting, usability, objects of digital interaction, social networks, Reed’s law, intranets, and copyleft” (Grillo in Casaleggio, 2004; Preface).

Casaleggio held strong views on the potential that the Internet brought with its development; a ​nd became a great influence for Grillo’s understanding of the web and its affordances, to the point that he developed Grillo’s personal blog. This was a turning point for Grillo, as Casaleggio was now offering him a way to redeem himself against the political establishment that initially defamed him. Casaleggio was offering him a new way to reach the mass audience: the Internet.

The Internet through its technological means was considered by both as a revolutionary tool that

would erase all forms of mediation (i.e. traditional media) and bring about a new era for

democratic politics, exclusively carried out on the Net. This relates to the idea of

institutionalizing a direct democracy - an ideology strongly considered by Grillo and Casaleggio

throughout their careers as activists. The present thesis aims to examine how Beppe Grillo

performed mediatization of Italian politics by catering his populist views through the

Beppegrillo.it, and its technological affordances. Therefore, the following research question aims

to answer ​how the populist star Grillo, through his personal blog, mediatized Italian politics​.

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Executive summary

The focus of this thesis is to discuss that mediatization of politics is about political actors becoming able to adapt their behaviour to media imperatives that is, fitting the media's needs in regards to performances targeted for the public. In addition, processes of mediatization of politics involve the specific communication outlook of the political actor involved and the content of his/her political discourse (Campus, 2010). To exemplify, this thesis takes Beppe Grillo and his digital discourse as the case study. Grillo’s communication outlook and discourse delineates him as a populist figure (Barisione in ​Mazzoleni, Barnhurst, Ikeda, Maia., & Wessler, 2016; 643) ​, which has been empirically discovered by looking at Grillo’s linguistic techniques employed when digitally addressing his audience. This has societal relevance due to the critical implications populism, through mediatization of politics, has on a democracy. In fact, populist movements and their leaders make great use of means of communication of both the mass and social kinds (Mazzoleni in ​Esser, 2014; 42-54) ​in order to successfully transmit populist ideologies of people-centrism and anti-elitism.

Hence, this thesis argues that mediatization concretely affects the way of doing politics (Schulz in ​Esser, 2014; 57-68​) and presents challenges for established democracy. A potential challenge for liberal democracies is the erosion of these into direct democracy, where governing is allegedly more effective and the process of political decision-making increasingly participatory (Esser, 2014; 226). This further connects to the case study as Grillo’s mediatization of politics intended to re-moralize the Italian political system by institutionalizing a direct-democracy. As it will be analytically discovered, the concept of direct-democracy comes from ideologies of cyber-utopianism and web-centrism that Grillo grasped by Gianroberto Casaleggio, his web-strategist.

The present thesis broadly owns societal relevance due to the increasing presence and

importance of media in all spheres of social and political life. Specifically, researching

mediatization of politics, provides insights on how political communication is changing in terms

of what kind of needs media affordances serve on the social and political level. The contribution

of my thesis in researching political actors that recognize the power of media logic and

consequently adapt to it for processes of political communication, adds up to what Michael

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Meyen, Markus Thieroff and Steffi Strenger (2014) have researched. They have analyzed mass media logic as a driving force for social changes and concluded that political actors “believe in first-order effects and, therefore, adapt their individual strategies as well as the resources of organizations and the programs of the political system to the mass media logic” (282). They argue that the first-order of mass media effects is about the influence of mass media on knowledge, attitudes, feelings or behavior; thus, political actors believing in such first-order effects and their potential tend to change their strategies according to media logic. Accordingly, this thesis has produced further insights to Meyen, Thieroff and Stranger’s research by discussing the concept of media logic in relation to the Internet in which Grillo developed his personal blog and engaged in mediatization of politics. Moreover, the present thesis contributes to what Nino Landerer (2013) has conducted in his study. He investigated how some political actors are more likely to apply mediatized and audience-oriented activities in processes of political communication. This was pursued by defining mediatization of politics as “the predominance of audience oriented market logic in political actors’ behavior in day-to-day decision-making processes” (Landerer, 2013; 240). Which raised the question on popullist challenges that liberal democracies might encounter. In fact, if populists and their mesmerizing discourses are catered by media logic affordances (for instance of connectivity and interactive) this might lead to a replacement of liberal democracy with a populist-based government. This relates to the present thesis as Grillo’s exploitation of media logic, combined with populist behavior and discourse, also raised questions on the possible threats democracy might be confronted with.

To supply answers to the research question, I will first provide theoretical debates around

notions of mediatization of politics and its relation with digital media, democracy and populism,

to lay out ideologies that have guided the formulation of the research question. The methodology

section describes and justifies the sample created in order to support the final statement, which

will be analyzed through the lenses of a critical discourse analysis. Later, the analysis of the

results will be presented. At the end of the paper, I will discuss the limitations on the method of

critical discourse analysis followed by a reflection upon the results obtained.

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Theoretical Framework

The formulation of the research question is based upon a variety of different concepts and existing theoretical research. The following theoretical framework provides relevant contextualization and terminology needed to evaluate and discuss the research question in a coherent manner. It is structured in four distinctive, but highly interrelated sections. In fact, the concepts and theories I draw upon include first and foremost Frank Esser’s (2014) formulation of mediatization of politics, with particular attention to the fourth dimension proposed in the model.

Based on Esser’s fourth dimension , the thesis will discuss processes of mediatization of politics

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that can be observed when political actors adapt to the thinking and behaviour of media. In this regard, I will explore the concept of (digital) media logic as “the engine of mediatization” of politics (Mazzoleni, 2008; Schrott, 2009 in Esser, 2014, 16). Additionally, the concept of mediatized politics will be discussed in relation to democracies and the institutional transformation they are facing. It will be argued that the adaptation to the logic of the media has critical implications on democracies, which results in being the nexus for the section Mediatization and (political) Populism . The aforementioned theories are framed to provide

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theoretical grounds on which the present BA thesis is based upon.

Mediatization of Politics

In order to discuss the concept of the mediatization of politics, it is necessary to first explore and define what mediatization refers to. During the 1990s and early 2000s, various academic approaches emerged that sought to explain the interrelations present between media transformation and the transformation of societies. This eventually led to the formulation of the concept of mediatization in the late 2000s, in which two separated traditions originated: the institutionalist and the social-constructivist tradition. For the former, media, characterized by their own set of rules, are perceived as independent social institutions. Here, mediatization refers to “the adaptation of different social fields or systems (for example, politics or religion) to

1Esser’s fourth dimension refers to “the extent to which political institutions, organizations and actors are guided by media logic or political logic. This dimension deals with the very essence of the mediatization of politics, that is, the ripple effects of media in political processes and on political actors and institutions.” (​Esser, 2014​; 6).

2 View page 18 (in this thesis) for detailed description about ​Mediatization and (political) Populism​.

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institutionalized rules” (Couldry and Hepp, 2013; 196). Such institutionalized rules are described as “media logic”, which will be later discussed. As for the social-constructivist tradition, the process of mediatization has to do with capturing “both how the communicative construction of reality is manifested [...] and how, in turn, specific features of certain media have a contextualized ‘consequences’ for the overall process” in which reality is constructed through communication (Couldry and Hepp, 2013; 196). It can be reckoned that mediatization refers to changes in practices, cultures and institutions in media-saturated societies. Therefore, mediatization is about social changes processes in which media have acquired an influential position and are deeply integrated into different spheres of society (Strömbäck, 2008).

Nowadays, there is no part of our society unaffected by media and as the evolution

towards mediatized society has been reaching all social areas, it is now “impossible to imagine

individuals and social groups existing outside the dense web of media influence” (Mazzoleni in

Strömbäck and Esser 2009). In fact, media can be found everywhere, all-embracing (Lundby,

2009; 2) and all areas of public interest - such as politics - can be subjected to mediatization

processes. In regards to this, Frank Esser’s (2014) seminal work on mediatization is going to be

exceptionally considered to situate the theoretical focus, as his contribution is the most widely

accepted in political communication studies. In ​Mediatization of Politics: Understanding the

Transformation of Western Democracies (Esser, 2014), the scholar describes mediatization of

politics as a process of four highly interrelated dimensions. The first dimension refers to the

degree to which the media are seen as the most relevant source of information in regards to

political and societal matters. The second dimension refers to the degree to which “the media

have become independent from other political and social institutions” (Esser, 2014; 6). Whereas,

the third dimension points out to what degree media and media coverage of politics is driven by

media or political logic. Ultimately, the fourth dimension deals with situations in which political

organizations, as well as actors, are driven by media or political logic. It refers to the influence

that media logic exercises on political institutions and agents. These four dimensions present

distinct characteristics that classify them separately, but at the same time need to be understood

as strongly interrelated. In fact, the process of the mediatization of politics is not static and

linear, but is a complex and multimedia mechanism (Esser, 2014; 6). In this model of

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mediatization, strong emphasis is put on the importance of media and political logic. Media and political logic are referred to as two different systems that act upon each other's goals, needs and interests. Therefore, each of these systems owns a “logic of appropriateness” (March and Olsen, 2004). The logic of appropriateness is a way to interpret human action and it entails specific rules factually followed, as they are seen as “natural, rightful, expected and legitimate” (March and Olsen, 2004; 3). In this sense, within specific systems (be the media and political sphere in the present case) certain types of behaviour and action are expected to be performed by agents part of those systems. As for political logic, what is considered a center-point is that politics ultimately deals with processes of decision-making as well as with the employmentation of such decisions (policies). In this context, it is relevant to emphasize that political logic varies across countries with different institutional frameworks. This introduces the notion that mediatization is a consistent “matter of degree, and that the degree of mediatization can vary across time as well as countries and processes and institutions within countries” (Esser, 2014; 16). Therefore, mediatization is never fully achieved, but, rather occurs differently according to the institutional conditions proper of the countries chosen for the discussion.

The concept of media logic can be generally identified “as a kind of meta-communication device” (Altheide, 2016; 1) as it refers to the rules or codes for defining, selecting, presenting and recognizing information. Media logic is ​primarily characterized by professional, commercial and technological production rules. In this regard, communication science researchers have noted a major change in political communication that involves “the emergence, adaptation, and innovation of communication formats associated with more entertainment-oriented content”

(Altheide 2016; 2). In fact, media logic and its dimensions are considered essential criteria for political actors and agencies; that in the modern age, tend to take into great account if they aim to receive support from the public opinion. With respect to the thesis, the concept of media logic thus offers a great lense to analyze the mediatization of politics within the Italian context.

By applying it to social media platforms, it will demonstrate how Grillo through his personal

blog, seen at the time as a new revolutionary platform of communication that grew in importance

through the rising of the Internet and its affordances, conducted mediatized politics.

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Mediatization and New (social) Media Platforms

The quick rise of the Internet and its web affordances has generated a “networked culture where information and communication got increasingly defined” ( ​Van Dijck and Poell, 2013; ​5). In this new technological realm, social media platforms emerge as all the internet-based applications constructed on the basis of the Web, and that consent “the creation and exchange of user-generated content” (Kaplan, 2011 in Van ​Dijck and Poell, 2013; ​5). In an increasingly digitized and networked world, media is influential in people’s daily life on many levels. In fact, media can be seen as empowering tools that allow users to engage in discussions with others;

but, at the same time, [digital media] can have critical implications for the formation of a public sphere.

Like mass media, digital media come into play with their own set of institutionalized rules. The elements that describe the character of social media logic are programmability, popularity, datafication, interactivity and particular forms of connectivity ( ​Van Dijck and Poell, 2013 ​). These elements have relevant implications in various social and political contexts due to their significance in transforming people’s ways of living. In fact, due to the spread of the Internet and ICTs (‘Internet communication technologies’), digital media are strictly linked to processes of mediatization in terms of their capacity to reshape the traditional role of social and political communications. The strong influence of the media logic applied to the theory of mediatization “draws attention to the actual modalities by which a certain social domain becomes mediatized” ( ​Thimm, Anastasiadis, & Einspänner-Pflock, 2018; 4​). Which implies, in the political context, great interdependence between political logic and social media logic. In reality, political institutions tend to adapt and use social media strategies of communication in order to achieve their needs.

A growing number of studies on political and campaign communication have shown this

interrelation between mass media and political actors. For instance, a study made by E. D’Heer,

reported ​in ​Media Logic Revisited ​(​Thimm, Anastasiadis, & Einspänner-Pflock, ​2018; 173-194)

on politicians’ usage of social media from a media logic perspective, clearly supports what has

been said so far about the interrelationship between political and social media logic. By using

qualitative interviews and reading of politicians’ online behaviour on Twitter and Facebook, 19

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politicians running for the 2014 federal election in Belgium were analyzed. The results of the study showed that politicians “predominantly tailor to the logic of mass media and the intersections of mass and social media logic” (D’Heer in ​Thimm, Anastasiadis, &

Einspänner-Pflock, 2018; ​188). Consequently, it can be observed that politicians tend to ​adapt to the work of the media and their institutionalized codes of behaviour, perceived as essential criteria to promote particular kinds of representations. As Schrott (2009) argued, processes of mediatization of politics have led to a “gradual displacement of political logic through media logic’’(44), and, therefore, media logic is often perceived as “the engine of mediatization” of politics (Mazzoleni, 2008; Schrott, 2009 in Esser, 2014, 16). In this conceptualization of mediatized politics, one precondition that needs to be emphasized is the presence of media as the most important source of information at the disposal of the public. In fact, the media by covering such a role have increasingly become independent from any other existing institutions. This results in media coverage of political matters increasingly driven by media logic and less by political logic. Consequently, political institutions and actors are progressively adapting to media logics, which ends in “increasing the relevance of media considerations in political processes and political institutions” (Esser, 2014; 23). Thus, it can be suggested that the more political processes are determined and shaped by media logics, the more politics itself becomes mediatized.

The analysis of mediatization of politics in such terms is essential for the present research

as it explores how political institutions incorporate social media logic. In relation to the case

study, Grillo as a political actor exploited the logic of internet-based applications in order to

transmit his political and social views to the public. He blogged about issues on freedom of

information, citizens activism and political corruption. These controversial topics brought the

blog to a remarkable level of readership and discussions among its users. In fact, it was ranked

by the Guardian among the top ten influential and most visited blogs in the world (Aldred, Behr,

Pickard, Wignall, Hind, Cochrane & Potter; 2008). This unprecedented popularity of the blog

embodied the great power of the Internet and internet-based applications as sources that grant for

freedom of information and discussions. In fact, the network logic of the Internet allows people

to act outside the domains of traditional media boundaries by offering “self-observation

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possibility” to make them “aware of their role in communication processes” (Rossi, Boccia Artieri; 344). In relation to the case study, it can be argued that Grillo conducted a “social media politics” (Froio, McDonnell, Littler & Bartlett, 2013; 13). Political actors performing social media politics share in common the idea of a “direct, free and easy involvement; regular updates and information; and active participation from members” (Froio, McDonnell, Littler & Bartlett, 2013; 13). The power of the Internet to act as a means of mobilization has been documented by many. Rheingold (2002) and Shirky (2008) have looked at the Internet and at the role covered by communication and information technologies in sparking collective action from the citizens.

Others have instead studied how the Internet has been used by political actors for their campaigns ( ​Johnson and Kaye, 1998; Best and Krueger, 2005).

To conclude, political actors increasingly recognize the potential of digital media logic and adapt to it. This makes it relatively easy to reclute numbers of individuals and can create political changes difficult to ignore. ​This sets the basis for understanding the institutional transformation that contemporary democracies are facing - due to the rise and expansion of mediated communication. In fact, mediatization has been used by many scholars ( ​Esser, 2014;

Esser and Matthes ​in Kriesi, 2013) ​as a starting point for the discussion on modern political communication processes and consequently on liberal democracies.

Mediatization and Democracy

As emphasized earlier, the concept of mediatization is a key factor in shaping political communication and, in turn, it is necessary to address its consequences on contemporary democracies. In order to pursue such a discussion, the fourth dimension formulated by Esser (2014), which refers to the extent to which political institutions and actors are driven by media logic or political logic, will be used due to its political essence. Before proceeding with the implications that mediatization has on democracy, it is relevant to define the concept of democracy first.

The concept of democracy is a highly debated concept in the field of social sciences and

today the use of the term democracy tends to refer more to the notion of “liberal democracy”. In

relation to this, Robert Dahl’s work will be used in order to settle such a notion. Dahl’s approach

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to the concept of democracy is also the most widely accepted due to its appropriateness for empirical analysis. Dahl’s definition of democracy starts with the idea that “all members are to be considered as politically equal” (Dahl, 2015; 37) and proceeds by listing a series of criteria that governments should meet in order to have all members equally entitled to participate in politics and political decisions. These criteria are (a) Effective participation, (b) Voting equality, (c) Enlightened understanding, (d) Control of the agenda and (e) Inclusion of adults (Dahl, 2015). Nevertheless, the concept of democracy developed through these requirements results in an idealistic political system. This idealistic system should be fully committed to making social living standards achievable to all its citizens; but, that, in reality, does not exist. This is the reason why the term democracy is most of the time referenced as “liberal democracy”, which, in turn, denotes political systems that are part of the existing world.

Moving to the implications that mediatization has on democracy, what is of great relevance is the “irresistible” power of mass media, that pushes political agencies and actors towards processes of mediatization. In the academic community ​(B​ühlmann & Kriesi in Kriesi, 2013; 44-68 and Esser in Kriesi, 2013; 155-176), negative consequences of this on democratic processes have been often shared and discussed. These concerns come from cases such as Silvio Berlusconi (a media entrepreneur) and his successful political performance that started in the 1994 Italian election and lasted for about twenty years. In the past decades, critics’ concerns blamed the power of the media in many different ways. They accused media conglomerates to have distorted political processes by turning them into a “marketlike game that humiliates citizens’ dignity and rights and ridicules political leaders’ words and deeds” ( ​Mazzoleni &

Schulz, 1999 ​; 248). Or went on arguing that the media's representation of politics acquired a

“show-biz” character, based on “battle of images, conflicts between characters, polls and marketing, all typical frenzies of journalism that are increasingly commercial in its outlook”

( ​Mazzoleni & Schulz, 1999​; 248). Today, critics’ concerns are extended to the newest (digital) media that created the possibility of downgrading traditional democratic institutions in favour of what is commonly referred as “direct democracy”.

The notion of direct democracy is essential to the present thesis as its institutionalization,

through the usage of Internet affordances, has been at the core of Grillo’s political ideologies. As

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it will be noted in the Methodological Framework, for Grillo the Web represents the perfect tool for the involvement of the citizenry into politics, and the consequential deterioration of the political system ruling Italy at the time. Implied in all this is the idea that networks and interactive technologies allow for direct interaction with governmental bodies about social and political matters. The discussion around the notion of e-democracy is not just a product of the importance that the Internet has acquired in past years. It is part of a long-debated argument on the course and development of communication technologies generally. In fact, as ICTs have developed so they have been considered in discussions about politics and democracy. This is because the technological and political sphere should not be considered as separate entities but rather as extensions of each other (Street, 1997; 30). Which aligns with what mediatization stands for. We live our lives through technologies and our values both change and are changed by them. Supporters (such as Grillo and Casaleggio) of the benefits of technology in people’s lives, consider modern communication technologies as means to broadly educate and inform the public, to engage and foster discussions and ​as means to empower citizens in the political realm.

Therefore, electronic democracy seems to offer solutions for the failures of representative democracy and the consequential alienation of citizens from political life. In fact, in a networked world communication and participation become instantaneous and direct as citizens “can participate at the push of a button” (Street, 1997; 31). The notion of e-democracy fits with Grillo’s project of remoralization of Italian politics. In Grillo’s view, the implementation of a direct democracy that would include ​the citizenry in political participation processes would replace the corrupt political system ruling Italy at the time . The great value that Grillo and

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Casaleggio have attributed to the Web throughout their political activism, comes from notions of cyber-utopianism and web-centrism that have determined their beliefs since the early 2000s.

Specifically, these forms of digital utopianism have guided the political message of Grillo that points towards the direction of the Web as a revolutionary tool for political and social change (Natale & Ballatore, 2014; 105-121).

3 For more information on this view repertoire “The Revolution is Digital” page 35.

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Cyber-utopianism and web-centrism are the foundations of the Californian Ideology .

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The concept of “cyber-utopianism” emerged as an argumentation that proved that the Internet could boost democratic participation, trigger a renaissance of communities and strengthen associational life (Morozov, 2012; Introduction). Cyber-utopianism can be seen as a

“non-hierarchical network of free information flows” in which the Internet offers “a perfect

‘marketplace of ideas’, a space for private information exchange and individual decision-making free of bureaucracy, administrative power, and other restrictions (bodily, geographical, cultural) found online” (Hayden & El-Ojeili, 2009; 178). Moreover, this term suggests the belief that advances in science and technology could lead to a utopia. Therefore, technologies are seen as the means for the achievement of (idealistically) “perfect” social living standards. In such utopian societies, social and political institutions will solely operate for the benefit of the citizen

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. In this sense, the concept of technological utopianism is often related to discussions in which technologies are seen as agents of social and cultural change (“technological determinism”).

“Internet-centrism” is referred to as a “philosophy of action that informs how decisions, including those that deal with democracy promotion, are made and how long-term strategies are crafted” (Morozov, 2012; Introduction). Supporters of this argue that the Internet is both the starting point and the main agent that can transform the surrounding society. It considers the logic of the internet as a revolutionary force that can reshape society for the better. These notions will be of assistance to understand Grillo’s claim of using the Internet as an element of potential transformation of the Italian political system. In Grillo’s political messages, the digital revolution was the speculum of the political shift he was trying to foster ( ​Natale & Ballatore, 2014 ​; 106). The Web represented the ideal tool for the creation of a direct democracy, which had at its ​foundation a transparent political system that allows for direct consultation and participation .

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4“The Californian Ideology” was first formulated by R. Barbrook and A. Cameron (1995). They defined it as a critique of dotcom neoliberalism in the US. The Californian Ideology holds the argument that information technologies empower individuals, improve personal freedom and radically weaken the power of nations.

5 For more information on this view repertoire “The Revolution is Digital” page 35.

6 For more information on this view repertoire “The Revolution is Digital” page 35.

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To summarize, mediatization and the practice of adapting to the logic of new digital media allow for critical changes in representative democracies. In relation to the case study, this occurs in favour of a new model of democracy: direct/e-democracy.

Mediatization and (political) Populism

The following paragraph focuses on the political dimension of mediatization and its connections with populism in the contemporary political realm. As already mentioned, mediatization of politics is broadly about the importance of the power exercised by the media on political agencies and the relationships involved. In fact, the media have gained a central position in political routines, government communication with citizens and image building (Mazzoleni, 2008 in Esser, 2014; 43). This relates to media logic considered as a way for politics to approach the citizenry. To explore the linkage between media (logic) and populist phenomena, I will first define the concept of populism and then examine populist outlooks behavior. Thus, a discussion on populism is essential due to its contribution to outline Grillo as a populist actor, in addition to being an actor performing mediatized politics.

The first attempt aimed at providing a cohesive definition for the term “populism”

occurred in 1967 at the London School of Economics, where a number of political theorists gathered together for the first-ever academic conference on populism (Baker, 2019).

Nevertheless, at the time no coherent definition was formulated, but, over half a century later significant progress has been made. Populist theorists now agree on the idea of conceptualizing populism as an ideological way to examine politics. The most relevant contribution on this was made by Cas Mudde in his ​Populist Zeitgeist (2014). Mudde defines populism as “an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups,

“the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite”, and which argues that politics should be an

expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people” (Mudde, 2014: 543). This

formulation of populism brings with it a moral connotation that interprets it as part of a “cosmic

struggle between good and evil” (De la Torre, 2000 in Hawkins, 2009). Therefore, populism is

discussed as a Manichean discourse (Hawkins, 2009) that recognizes the “good” with the unified

will of the people and the “evil” with a corrupted elite. In such dualistic vision the people, as

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well as the elite, hold particular identities. The people are identified as the mass of individual citizens that, guided by their collective interests, demand a government constructed to embody people’s needs; whereas, the elite is identified as a conspiring entity that has overthrown the will of the citizens. Furthermore, Mudde argues that populism should not be defined as demagogy or opportunism, but neither as a fully formed political ideology that owns a level of intellectual refinements such as socialism or liberalism. Populism is a “thin” ideology that can be found everywhere along the left-right political spectrum and that exhibits “a restricted core attached to a narrower range of political concepts” (Mudde, 2014; 544). Populism is not constrained to just far-right ideologies, as when populism claims to represent the “government of the people” (main feature proper of such ideology) it can be observed far and wide on the political spectrum. In fact, when such a claim is “accompanied by anti-elitist slogans and dissatisfaction with mainstream politics”, populism can also “display clear liberal left-wing features, especially if they recoil from nationalist, anti-immigration platforms” (Esser, 2014; 45).

In relation to this, a clear example can be noted in Beppe Grillo and the 5 Stars Movement (‘5SM’) . This is because Grillo has always portrayed himself as leftist fighting for global justice

7

issues, environmental issues and participative issues as a reaction against the nature of traditional parties ​(Fe, 2013).

Almost every populist movement is initiated and performed by charismatic figures that are often “media-savvy and exhibit remarkable public rhetoric skills” (Esser, 2014; 45). These figures in their political performances usually implement emotional, passionate and opinionated language styles, all traits that guarantee a wide media recognition and visibility. Populist personalities tend to appeal and attract the attention of the media with a variety of linguistic practices aimed at “bullying” and downgrading the mainstream political elite in charge.

Therefore, it is accurate to conclude that populists and their discourse tend to situate themselves always in opposition to something (political opponents). As Panizza (2005) suggests populism can be understood as “an anti-status quo discourse that simplifies the political space by symbolically dividing society between ‘the people’ and it’s other’” (3). Thus, the populist

7 ​In 2013 the party participated for the first time in the national election and obtained remarkable results for the first chamber (Chambers of Deputies). During their electoral campaign, the movement expressed “an anti-establishment sentiment and the final success was strongly boosted by Grillo’s personal image and communication abilities (Diamanti and Natale, 2013 in Musella & Vercesi, 2019; 235).

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dualistic vision can be noted in the discourse carried out by populist actors as an effort to identify their enemies. This is a relevant factor as it precisely represents the mechanism that allows populists to embody the people they claim to speak for. Therefore, it is of utmost importance to examine the populist rhetoric in order to understand how populist fabricate their identity by criticising their opponents. The way in which populist construct their identities occurs through inflammatory language aimed at disrupting the civility of relationships between citizens and political actors. ​Populism is “inherently about ​attributing blame to others while absolving the people of responsibility” (Bos et al., 2016; 2) and it typically emerges as a result of the perceived unresponsiveness of the political establishment towards the citizens’ demands. In this conceptualization, anger plays a crucial role as it is concerned “not only with responsibility for a negative event, but also with its legitimacy, meaning that causal attribution is accompanied by a normative judgment” (Rico, Guinjoan & Anduiza, 2017; 448). A crucial condition for anger is the perception that an event is illegitimate which thus implies the confidence about whom is to be held responsible (Rico, Guinjoan & Anduiza, 2017; 446). What adds up to this is populism's inclination to see society as consisting of two antagonist groups; this provides the ideal environment where tendency of anger manifests itself.

Populist figures often employ strategies of irony and reliance on personification in order to depict political opponents as untrustworthy. They use inflammatory rhetoric with regular use of comical but offensive epithets aimed at ridiculing the (political) opponents. The term

“epithet” refers to a “descriptive phrase or appellation used to characterize someone” (Wales, 2001; 132). In the populist realm, epithets are better understood as “nicknames”, given on the basis of physical and mental characteristics of a person, that undermine the integrity and the political capacities. The implementation and strong usage of epithets can be noted in the case study of this research. In fact, in his personal blog (Beppegrillo.it), Grillo often refers to his political opponents through offensive epithets . This way of acting is aimed at undermining

8

“other political leaders and their parties in order to maximize support and votes” (Bortoluzzi &

Semino, 2016; 6). Grillo attacks his political opponents by highlighting both their age (often

8 For more information on this view repertoire “Sarcasm” page 27.

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advanced) as well as their physical and psychological traits to portray them as something

“antique” that needs to be overcome .

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These strategies translate in modes of impolite behaviour performed by Grillo as well as by populist leaders generally. Culpeper (2011) in this regard proposes three different functions of impoliteness: affective impoliteness, coercive impoliteness and entertaining impoliteness. For the sole purpose of this BA thesis “coercive” and “entertaining” impoliteness will be discussed in relation to populist behaviours as they apply specifically to the case study. Coercive impoliteness is defined as impoliteness that “seeks a realignment of values between the producer and the target such that the producer benefits or has their current benefits reinforced or protected” (225).

Therefore, it can be noted that coercive impoliteness relates to the concept of gaining power;

and, as Beebe (1995) argues, the use of impoliteness to gain power has different purposes. And one of these is to appear superior to someone else by using insults and putdowns. As for

“entertaining impoliteness”, it involves “exploitative entertainment” and, therefore, it is described as “entertainment at the expenses of the target of the impoliteness” (232). In relation to the case study “entertaining impoliteness” exercised by Grillo closely relates to his reputation as a showman, “who knows how to stir up a crowd through a skillful use of provocative language and exasperated body language” (D’Arma, 2015; 109). Grillo has always been famous for his biting political satire, which additionally ousted him from RAI’s broadcasting programmes. He transformed political satire into political communication causing blurred boundaries between the two in order to reinforce his aggressive anti-establishment message (D’Arma, 2015; 109). In performing political satire the implementation of foul language is functional to the strategy of reducing politicians to their human traits. By entertaining his audience in such manner, as stressed by Bortoluzzi and Semino (2016), Grillo aims at strengthening his own relationship with his supporters ​ ​as well as the internal cohesion of the 5SM.

Coercive and entertaining impoliteness show strategies implemented in order to attract media attention. From a media perspective modes of behavior perceived as controversial “make the headlines” (Esser, 2014; 48). It is well known that news media conceive newsworthy whatever breaks the routine. Thus, covering sensationalist events in order to “satisfy the public

9 For more information on this view repertoire “Sarcasm” page 27.

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appetite for catchy stories” (Esser, 2014; 51) is at the center of media content production. This relates to the notion of “infotainment” which refers to entertainment that uses politics, daily lives matters and so on, in a way that brings entertainment and enjoyment to the audience.

Nevertheless, infotainment is often negatively connoted as it can be employed to “draw depoliticized society’s attention to politics, social problems and reality” (Eşitti & Işık, 2004;

259). In this regard, “media populism” (Esser, 2014) comes into the picture when discussing the relationship between mediatization, media logic and populism. Media populism brings along a key-idea related to the inner essence of contemporary mass communication and their shift towards a “market orientation and a more audience-focused culture” (Esser, 2014; 47). This has further implications on populist figures that, to persuade and attract public attention, adapt to the media logics - driven by ways of making news more enjoyable and acceptable to the audience members. Thus, mass media in producing content that extensively takes into consideration the audience’s tastes supports the idea that media can cater, intentionally or unintentionally, valuable visibility to populist figures and their political ideologies. In Italy, the exceptional electoral success of Grillo and the 5 Stars Movement owed much to the coverage performed by mainstream media between 2012 and 2013. In fact, their controversial and sensationalist modes of behavior caused quite a stir and were very often at the center of media attention. As Grillo always identified political themes that tapped into the concerns of the Italian public opinion and made them mainstream.

To conclude, this media management performed by political actors reveals how closely

intertwined politics has become with media and their ways of working. Without any doubts,

populist figures are of no exception; as they do not reject in any ways the engaging and

persuasive power of media strategies of communication, in order to usure media and public

attention to their political ideologies. Beppe Grillo has done this throughout his entire career as a

comedian-turned-politician. In fact, he has positioned himself consistently within processes of

mediatization and spectacularization of politics driven by the media logic of entertainment. He

addressed a very large and heterogeneous audience with messages that, in addition to being

increasingly reduced to contrasts between oppositional entities (such as “the people” vs “the

elite” - key feature of the populist discourse), are increasingly generic and vague. Along with

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being progressively reduced to slogans that are effortless to remember due to the usage of word puns, funny as well as offensive epithets, assonances and so on.

Methodological Framework

As part of the present thesis, the research question of how the populist star Grillo mediatized Italian politics will be methodologically discussed and further answered by carrying out a critical discourse analysis on the sample created. The sample is composed of 36 blog posts from Grillo’s personal blog (Beppegrillo.it) between 2005 and 2013, and two Youtube clips published by Gianroberto Casaleggio on the Youtube channel CasaleggioAssociati respectively in 2007 and 2008. These clips are Prometheus - The Revolution of Media and Gaia - The Future of Politics .

10

The blogs selected for the sample were discovered through the use of keywords such as “The Web” (“La Rete”), “Mass Communication” (“Mezzi di informazione/comunicazione”),

“Thieves” (“Ladri”), “Corruption” (“La Corruzione”), “The Revolution” (“La rivoluzione”),

“The Future” (“Il Futuro”) “Information/Counter-information”

(“Informazione/Controinformazione”), “Political System” (“Il Sistema politico”), “Talk shows”

(“Programmi Televisivi”) etc. These were typed on the search bar of the Beppegrillo.it, which allows users to search the archive containing every blog produced and published by Grillo. These keywords were chosen in order to examine how recurrent particular ideologies about corruption, freedom of information, the Web and traditional media are in Grillo’s discourse. This helped in identifying Grillo’s behavior and thinking in order to test the hypothesis of (being) a populist actor conducting mediatized politics. In addition, the criteria for selecting the elements part of the sample were based upon the ideologies that would have provided me with suitable insights for answering my research question. As for the videos, these were shown to be the most popular videos ranked on Youtube and published by Casaleggio. Since they reached the wider audience and can thus be said to have greatly impacted societies perception of given issues within Italy.

Additionally, both clips have uncovered beliefs that situate the Internet as the driving force for changes in social relationships. The choice of including Casaleggio’s clip in the sample relates to

10 For more information on these clips view Appendix B.

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the close interpersonal relationship Grillo and Casaleggio had since their first encounter in 2005, that increasingly grew into the development of the Beppegrillo.it and determined the political message of the populist actor.

The chosen time frame illustrates the evolution of Grillo starting from “simple” activism and political satire to the realization of a real political movement. In 2005 the Beppegrillo.it was launched (through the help and support of Casaleggio) and rapidly became a platform for the transmission of political ideologies and one of the top 10 influential and most popular blogs (Aldred, Behr, Pickard, Wignall, Hind, Cochrane & Potter; 2008). The time frame thus presents the evolution of virtual support into the creation of a legitimate political force, that in 2013 entered the Parliament for the first time ever. To conclude, the years between 2005 and 2013 represent the ideal time interval in which processes of mediatization of politics can be denoted.

Critical Discourse Analysis

To investigate the research question, critical discourse analysis (CDA) was applied. The aim of CDA is to explore “opaque as well as transparent structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and control as manifested in language” (Wodak, 1995; 204 in Verschueren et al.). In particular, CDA analyzes “real, and often extended, instances of social interaction which take (partially) linguistic form. The critical approach is distinctive in its view of (a) the relationship between language and society, and (b) the relationship between analysis and the practices analysed” (Wodak, 1997; 173 in Gunnarsson et al.). Furthermore, CDA is enriched by the engagement that it has with a range of different fields of research including political communication, media studies and political as well as social science (Sengul, 2019; 3).

The main focus of CDA lies on the way specific ideologies are used and “attitudes are produced, disseminated, inculcated and naturalized through discourse” (Rahimi & Unvar, 2013;

Abstract). Ideologies are constructed on the basis of different linguistic practices that are at the

disposal of the actor who wants to transmit his/her own beliefs and values. An example of these

linguistic techniques and applicable to the present thesis are people-centrism and anti-elitism

( ​Leeuwen, 2019; Chapter 12) ​- the foundations of populist discourse (​Rooduijn & Pauwels,

2011 ​; 1276). Additionally, the study of language either written or spoken can disclose how

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beliefs are constructed in specific contexts. Context is a significant term as it considers the setting in which the communication takes place and is shaped by actors. With its focus on ideologies and power relations, CDA represents the ideal tool to explore the communication processes of political actors in an assortment of contexts including social and digital media (Sengul, 2019; 7). Therefore, in relation to the case study and the digital context (Beppegrillo.it) in which the communication of the populist actor takes place, critical discourse analysis results to be the most fitted method to employ. Through the implementation of CDA that investigates the language used intentionally in order to reflect political views, I will carry out an in-depth analysis of coded language practices and ideological utterances on the selected sample. This will be done in order to describe and provide answers on the political communication process of the case study.

Critical Discourse Analysis in action

As anticipated earlier, I created a sample of 36 blog posts from Grillo’s personal blog and two Youtube clips produced and published by Casaleggio. The 36 blogs are all in Italian and the translations provided in “Results & Analysis” are exclusively mine. As far as regards the videos, these are in English, thus no translation was needed. After having collected the sample, the coding process followed. I identified word codes and recurring ideological themes and grouped them together in interpretative repertoires. The categories identified throughout the coding belong to two different but highly interrelated spheres - the linguistic dimension and the ideological dimension - that I have personally identified by means of this analysis. What these dimensions entail is specifically and thoroughly discussed in the section “Results & Analysis”.

As it will be possible to note in “Results & Analysis”, each dimension is introduced before the description of the repertoires that were grouped either in the linguistic dimension or in the ideological dimension.

In regards to the critical discourse analysis carried out on the Youtube clips, it is

necessary to convey to the reader that the clips have disclosed repertoires associated solely with

the ideological dimension. As the analysis of linguistic practices on the clips revealed no more

than a simple narration of events. In fact, it can be noted that the narration is quite flat and it is

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functional for the sole purpose of describing events, issues and ideologies. Therefore, the linguistic dimension and its repertoires do not consider the contributions of the selected clips.

For more information on the coding scheme for both dimensions as well as the colour-coded material, view Appendix A & B. To conclude, in the next section I will provide a more detailed analysis of these repertoires and the dimensions they belong to, as well as examples to make them understandable.

Results & Analysis

Linguistic Dimension

The linguistic dimension aims at grouping together repertoires that illustrate linguistic practices in the descriptions of events, social and political issues as well as actors. The categories discovered in this dimension are “ ​Sarcasm” and “Anger​”, which were formulated inductively on the basis of my material. Nevertheless, these categories have rather shown theoretical concepts previously introduced in the Theoretical Framework of this thesis that discussed the linguistic practices carried out by populist actors. In fact, “Sarcasm” and “Anger” provide elements that broadly mirror linguistic strategies relevant for the analysis of populism practices performed by Grillo in his way of expressing himself.

In order to discuss the repertoires of the linguistic dimension, it is of great relevance to emphasize the definition of populism as a discourse ( ​Hawkins; 2009) which, in turn, urges us to

11

investigate the linguistic aspect of the phenomenon. Assuming that any political actor that takes part in the electoral system needs to find ways to differentiate him/herself from other political opponents, ​what are the main elements that characterise populist discourse? In the discourse analysis conducted for this thesis, the elements that characterised Grillo’s populist discourse were related to notions of sarcasm and anger. Sarcasm is often connected to strategies of reliance on personification aimed at downgrading political opponents. As for anger, populism often uses inflammatory language in order to create a reaction against the establishment in power

11​Populism as a discourse is defined by Hawkins (2009) as a Manichaean discourse that identifies the “good” with the unified will of the people and the “evil” with a conspiring elite. Analyzing populism as a discourse highlights a

“series of common, rough elements of linguistic form and content that distinguish populism from other political discourses” (1043).

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(Bos et al., 2016; 2). Therefore, the use of emotions in rhetorical discourse implies the implementation of the hyper-emotional language in order to ​trigger some kind of reaction in the eyes of the public. In relation to Grillo, he aimed to spark certain backlashes versus the establishment through the sarcastic and aggressive language he adopted in his blog posts.

(1) Sarcasm

In the repertoire “Sarcasm”, the use of strategies of irony and reliance on personification towards Grillo’s opponents were identified. As previously mentioned such strategies were implemented by the populist actor in order to demonize his opponents in the eyes of the public opinion. Grillo performs such strategies to portray social and political actors as untrustworthy and incapable of doing their job. This occurs on two different levels. The first level takes place more “indirectly”

in the sense that Grillo targets a specific group of individuals and ridicules it. In the blog posts this recurrently happens when Grillo refers to politicians, journalists or media conglomerates as a whole. For instance, ​Grillo refers to the politicians of the time as “politicians who are ‘worth little’, who have the po ​or ability” (“politicanti da strapazzo”, ​Item #34​) in performing their political function. Another example can be encountered in ​Item #26​, where Grillo refers to the group of politicians in power as “psycho dwarfs, ballerinas and pimps” (“psiconani, ballerine e papponi”). The second level is more “direct”, which sees Grillo impolitely addressing solely one person. This occurs, for instance, when Grillo portrays Silvio Berlusconi as a “dwarf bearer of interests” (“nano portatore di interesse”, Item #6 ​) or as an “asphalt head” (“Testa D'asfalto”

Item#28 ​). This impoliteness is not only performed towards politicians but also towards media actors. For instance in ​Item #4​, Grillo refers to Marco Tronchetti Provera, the chairman of Telecom Italia between 2001 and 2006, as the “stub of unhappiness” (“il tronchetto dell’infelicità”).

In this repertoire, strategies of ridiculing social and political opponents through the use of

epithets, based on physical and mental characteristics clearly translate in those modes of

impoliteness discussed by Culpeper (2011) and introduced previously in the Theoretical

Framework. Grillo implements coercive impoliteness by using insults aimed at presenting

himself as superior compared to his targets. In fact, by reducing social and political actors to

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their human traits, Grillo portrays them as something “antique” damaging the general well-being of the country. Here, the broader aspects of Grillo are envisioned: re-moralize Italy and, therefore, Italian politics by overthrowing the “old” (powerful establishment and traditional media in power) with something “new” (the Internet and digital activism). Furthermore, Grillo performs entertaining impoliteness as well. As Culpeper (2011) argued entertaining impoliteness is impoliteness at the expenses of the targets of the impoliteness (232). This idea is closely linked to Grillo’s reputation as a show-man that has always performed political satire. In fact, in performing political satire the usage of foul language and, thus, funny epithets is functional to the strategy of ridiculing social and political opponents and undermining their capacities.

(2) Anger

The repertoire “Anger” describes Grillo’s provocative and offensive language towards existing institutions and their actors. These insti ​tutions are the following: traditional media conglomerates, journalists, talk show presenters, politicians or members of the Parliament. It has to be noted that Grillo’s aggression towards such institutions and actors has the purpose of creating anger against the establishment ( ​Bos et al., 2016; 2)​. Examples of this will now be further provided.

In ​Item #34 ​Grillo while discussing talk shows (very popular format for the transmission of news in Italy), describes them as “unhygienic spaces where those who participate are homologated to the System waste” (“spazi poco igienici dove chi partecipa viene omologato alle scorie del Sistema”). This aggression is extended to talk show presenters. In fact, Grillo points out to Bruno Vespa (one of the most famous talk show presenters in Italy) as “a damage to the country, to ‘free information’ and to the economy” (“un danno per il Paese, per l'informazione libera e per l’economia”, ​Item #34 ). Describing talk shows as unhygienic spaces where solely

“trash” individuals take part in, and their presenters as “damages” for the country, doubtless has a powerful effect on the audience. Which is to downgrade the level of respect and trust that citizens always had towards traditional media and their agents. Here, it can be denoted the same set of ideologies supported by Grillo and previously introduced in the repertoire “Sarcasm”.

These “antique” organizations that are responsible for the flow of information in the country

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