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Knowledge Management in Public-Private Partnerships

Knowledge as a competitive advantage

Student: Jesse Bolscher

Student identification: 10271236

University: University of Amsterdam

Faculty: Graduate School of Social Sciences

Program: Political Science: Public Policy and Governance

Elective: Managing public and private organizations: what’s the difference? Mentor: Dr. Anne-Marie Reynaers

Second reader: Dr. Imrat Verhoeven

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Table of Contents

Acknowledgements ... 5 List of abbreviations ... 6 Executive summery ... 7 Chapter 1: Introduction ... 9

1.1 Introduction & problem ... 9

1.2 Goal ... 10

1.3 Relevance ... 11

1.4 Outline... 12

Chapter 2: Theoretical framework... 14

2.1 Introduction ... 14

2.2 Theoretical origins ... 14

2.2.1 The doctrines and principles ... 14

2.2.3 NPM in the Netherlands ... 15

2.3 Public-private partnerships ... 16

2.3.1 DBFM(O) ... 17

2.3.2 Problems of the DBFM(O)-project ... 18

2.3.3 Knowledge related problems of the DBFM(O) ... 20

2.4 Knowledge management ... 21 2.4.1 Theoretical origins ... 21 2.4.2 Explicit knowledge ... 22 2.4.3 Implicit knowledge ... 23 2.4.4 Relational knowledge... 24 2.5 Conclusion ... 25

Chapter 3: Methodological framework ... 28

3.1 Introduction ... 28

3.2 Variables & indicators ... 29

3.2.1 Explicit KM... 29 3.2.2 Implicit KM ... 30 3.2.3 Relational KM ... 30 3.3 Case study ... 31 3.3.1 Case selection ... 31 3.3.2 DBFM(O) ... 32 3.3.3 Rijksvastgoedbedrijf ... 33 3.3.4 Rijkswaterstaat... 34

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3.4 Data collection ... 35

3.4.2 Semi-structured interviews ... 35

3.4.3 Respondents ... 36

3.5 Method of analysis ... 37

3.6 Implications of the methodology ... 37

3.6.1 Reliability ... 38 3.6.2 Validity ... 39 3.7 Conclusion ... 39 Chapter 4: Results ... 41 4.1 Introduction ... 41 4.2 Explicit knowledge ... 41 4.2.1 Documentation system ... 41 4.2.2 Evaluation system ... 43

4.2.3 Internal information exchange ... 45

4.3 Implicit knowledge ... 46

4.3.1 Diversity project team ... 46

4.3.2 Experience project team ... 48

4.3.3 Internal experience exchange ... 48

4.4 Relational knowledge ... 50

4.4.1 Stakeholder management ... 50

4.4.2 Third-party involvement ... 51

4.4.3 External information exchange ... 53

4.4.4 External experience exchange ... 54

4.5 Conclusion ... 55

Chapter 5: Conclusion ... 57

5.1 Introduction ... 57

5.2 Answer to the research question ... 57

5.2 Discussion ... 58

5.3 Recommendations for future research ... 60

Chapter 6: Sources ... 62

Appendix 1: Interview protocol ... 67

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Acknowledgements

This master’s thesis is the result of months of research into Knowledge Management by the Dutch government in Public-Private Partnerships. More than five months ago, I enrolled in the elective ‘managing public and private organizations: what’s the difference?’ without a clue where to write about. The ideas I had back then about the subject stand in sharp contrast with the ideas I have right now. Thereby, I had neither experience with the writing of such an extensive thesis nor with the methods to collect my own primary data. Luckily there is nothing that cannot be learned within a short amount of time.

And I have learned a lot. The writing of this thesis has not only increased my empirical knowledge enormously, it was also an eye-opener for my future plans and career. I have learned about the public administration and management paradigms, I have analyzed the differences between public and private organizations and I have recognized the importance of knowledge management for the public sector. I have not only learned a lot, I have also started to enjoy conducting empirical research. For those reasons I decided to extent my scientific career a little more by applying for another master’s program in Public Administration and Organizational Sciences.

All of this has not been possible if I had to do it on my own and therefore I would like to express my gratitude to the persons who helped me the last couple of months. Firstly, I would like to thank my mentor Anne-Marie Reynaers for her knowledge and her critiques. Without her structured teaching methods and numerous feedback opportunities I would not have written these acknowledgements so relaxed a week before the final deadline. Her expertise about my subject helped me define my specific goal and brought me into contact with my first respondents. Secondly, I would like to thank all ten respondents without whom it would not have been possible to write this thesis. They all deserve to be mentioned separately but due to their promised anonymity I will thank them personally. Thirdly, I would like to thank Kees van der Zee and Thom Gall for their efforts during the writing of this thesis, without their remarks this thesis would have been full of contradictions, strange sentences and misspellings. Lastly, I would like to thank Imrat Verhoeven who’s selfless efforts as a second reader I admire. I hope he will not only perceive correcting this thesis as additional work, but that he shares my interest in Public-Private Partnerships and that he will enjoy reading this thesis.

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List of abbreviations

AM Asset Management

CCM Constant Comparison Method

DBFM Design Built Finance and Maintenance

DBFMO Design Built Finance Maintenance and Operate IPM Integral Project Management

ISO International Organization for Standardization

KM Knowledge Management

NPM New Public Management

PFI Private finance Initiative PPC Public Private Comparator PPP Public-Private Partnerships

PPS Publiek Private Samenwerking, Public-Private Partnership

PWC PricewaterhouseCoopers

RVB Rijksvastgoedbedrijf, Central Government Real Estate Agency

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Executive summery

This thesis investigates the Knowledge Management (KM) strategies of the Dutch government within Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs). PPPs are collaborations between the public and the private sector designed to create value that otherwise would not have been created. The specific focus is with the Design, Built, Finance, Maintenance, and Operate (DBFMO) variant that the entire lifecycle of a real-estate or infrastructure project tenders to one consortium. Because future costs and risks are uncertain, and because there is only one consortium involved, the literature identifies several problems for PPPs. There are problems with contractual incompleteness, high costs, a lack of accountability and a lack of capacity.

The common denominator of those problems is that they all have knowledge related components and solutions in it. Therefore this thesis proposes KM of the public sector as a solution for these problems. To analyze KM the theoretical framework builds towards a KM framework. The literature identifies three different types of KM. Explicit KM is concerned with a documentation system, an evaluation system, and the internal exchange of information. Implicit KM analyzes the experience of a project team, the background of a project team and the internal exchange of expertise. Relational KM investigates the stakeholder management strategies, the third-parties involved and the external information and experience exchange.

To measure the indicators a case study is conducted. The focus is with two projects, one from each governmental agency that is concerned with the execution of PPPs. The first project is the redevelopment of the Closure Dike and the second project is the redevelopment of the Knoopbarracks. Within both projects semi-structured interviews are conducted that are analyzed using the Constant Comparison Method (CCM).

The results showed that implicit and relational knowledge are managed properly and therefore the problems of accountability and capacity are solved. Explicit knowledge is not managed properly and therefore the problems of contractual incompleteness and high costs still exist within PPPs of the Dutch government. It appeared that although the importance of documentation and evaluation was acknowledged, a system to translate the lessons learned to changes in future projects was missing.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Introduction & problem

This thesis is concerned with the knowledge management (KM) strategies of the public sector in Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs). Both concepts of KM and PPPs are based on the principles of New Public Management (NPM). NPM is the overarching label for a series of public sector reforms. Proponents of NPM are determined to transform the traditional public administration into an entrepreneurial government (Osborne, 1993: 351).

PPPs are used to realize this transformation into an entrepreneurial government, and are therefore a practical example of NPM. PPPs are a collaboration between the public and private sector, they aim to gain advantage by creating value that would not have been created without such a collaboration (Weihe, 2008: 153). A PPP is a broad concept that has many definitions. This thesis focuses on a specific type of PPP: the Design, Build, Maintenance, Finance and, optionally, Operate (DBFM(O)) variant. A DBFM(O) is an integral contract form that covers the tender for the entire lifecycle of a project. From the creation of the design (D) to the operational (O) aspects of the project, everything is executed by the same consortium (Straub, Prins & Hansen, 2012: 49). An example of a DBFM(O) project is the redevelopment of the Knoopkazerne, or Knoopbarracks. The contract in this case is rewarded by the government to the consortium ‘R Creators’. R Creators is a collaboration between the architects who created the design, engineering agency Strukton who covers the construction, maintenance and finance aspect of the construction and Facilicom who will provide the operational aspects, the associated services as the catering and cleaning for the next twenty years (Website Rijksvastgoedbedrijf, 2016e).

The government chooses for DBFM(O)s because this type of collaboration between the public and private sector creates a better product for a better price and with shared risks (website Rijksoverheid, 2016). However, recent research of the Dutch Court of Auditors came to an opposite conclusion. It revealed that the government does not measure the performance of the private party correctly and that contractual fine-mechanisms are not applied consequently (Algemene Rekenkamer, 2013: 12). In addition the literature showed that the lack of success of DBFM(O)s is caused by the government who has downsized its public management capacity and is unable to be accountable towards its citizens (Domberger & Jensen, 1997: 76; Van Slyke & Hammonds, 2003: 147).

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As a solution for those problems the Court of Auditors urged the government to invest in contract-management, evaluations, documentation and information (Algemene Rekenkamer, 2013: 18-19). This implies that they claim that a knowledge deficit can be solved by applying KM strategies. KM is the use of practices and techniques by organizations for identifying and spreading knowledge with the goal to leverage, reuse and transfer knowledge across the organization (Jain & Jeppesen, 2013: 348).

The literature also identifies KM solutions for the problems the government faces within DBFM(O)s. Firstly, contractual incompleteness is solved by increasing the knowledge about future costs and risks (Van Slyke, 2003: 296). Secondly, accountability is increased by improving knowledge about the performances and the service delivery of the private party (Domberger & Jensen, 1997: 68). Thirdly, costs are reduced by increasing knowledge about how contracts have to be written and how performances need to be monitored (Van Slyke, 2003: 296). Fourthly, the problem of capacity becomes less urgent when the government increases the knowledge within its public management (Van Slyke & Hammonds, 2003: 147). To investigate whether both the literature and the Court of Auditors are right, and to analyze if there really is a knowledge deficit that can be solved by KM, this thesis investigates the KM strategies applied by the Dutch government. The goal is to answer the following research question:

 How and to what extent is knowledge management cultivated by the Dutch government within the Public-Private Partnerships?

1.2 Goal

The goal of this thesis is twofold. Firstly, the goal is to develop a comprehensive KM framework that is able to measure the KM strategies of the Dutch government. In developing a KM framework it is important to review the literature about NPM. NPM is the overarching concept where PPPs and KM are derived from. Therefore it is important to know what NPM is, who its main scholars are and how it is cultivated in the Netherlands. Also, it is important to review the literature about PPPs and specifically about DBFM(O)s. By doing so the challenges and problems the government faces within DBFM(O)s are clarified.

When these challenges and problems have been made clear, it is possible to develop a KM model. Because the literature does distinguish different forms of KM and no research

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has been done to all of them together, this thesis aims to integrate the different forms of KM into one comprehensive KM model which will be used to measure how and to what extent KM is cultivated by the government within DBFM(O) projects.

The second goal of this thesis is to find out, using the KM model, how KM is cultivated. Therefore semi-structured interviews with key-figures within DBFM(O) projects are conducted to analyze which KM strategies are used in practice. I focus on two main agencies of the Dutch government: Rijkswaterstaat (RWS) and the Rijksvastgoedbedrijf (RVB). The KM model is used to structure the interviews. The results and theory combined provide the tools to reflect on the literature and answer the research question.

1.3 Relevance

This thesis is empirically relevant because firstly, the literature is divided about if and how PPPs realize a competitive advantage for the government. By analyzing KM, I show what the government does to create that competitive advantage (Riege & Lindsay, 2006: 25). Secondly, KM is becoming increasingly important but scholars still find it difficult to investigate. Knowledge resides in people’s heads, which makes it for organizations hard to monetize and therefore makes it difficult to analyze KM (De Groot, 2003: 95). The KM model this thesis develops will make it possible for others to investigate KM. Thirdly, research that has been done about KM mostly focused on the private sector. Investigating KM within the public sector reveals what differences exist between both sectors and how they can learn from each other (Rasmussen & Nielsen, 2011: 479). Fourthly, research that has been done only focused on one of the aspects of KM. This thesis aims to develop a comprehensive model that includes all relevant aspects of KM and therefore adds a new model to the scientific field.

This thesis is societally relevant because firstly, organizations face continuous pressure to innovate and maximize productivity in a globalizing world where information and communication technologies become more important (Rasmussen & Nielsen, 2011: 480). This is why successful organizations need to recognize the importance of a learning process next to other operations (Hall, 1991: 135). A KM model gives them the tools to implement that learning process. Secondly, although science sees knowledge as an important asset for a successful PPP, the government still does not refer to it when discussing its asset management strategy. For example, when the City of Amsterdam uses

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the term asset management, they refer to the maintenance and management of the objects in public space, not to the maintenance and management of knowledge about the public space (Rekenkamer Amsterdam, 2015: 20). Research on KM can function as an eye opener for the government to transform the science of KM into a practical policy strategy. Thirdly, the DBFM(O) becomes an increasingly important contract form for the government (Website Rijksoverheid, 2016). Research into KM can give the government the tools to retain and exchange their knowledge and increase the competitive advantage the government claims that the DBFM(O) creates.

1.4 Outline

This thesis investigates how and to what extent knowledge management is cultivated within Public-Private Partnerships. The next chapter consists of the theoretical framework. Firstly, it discusses the principles and doctrines of NPM because both KM and PPPs are concepts that emerged within the main ideas of NPM. Secondly, NPM in the Netherlands is discussed to give a better understanding of when and in what context the Dutch government choses to initiate PPPs. Thirdly, the different types of PPPs are presented and it is argued why the focus of this thesis is with the DBFM(O) variant. The problems the literature identifies regarding PPPs will be discussed as well. Lastly, the theoretical framework presents KM in general and a KM model as a possible solution for the problems PPPs face.

The third chapter discusses the methodological framework. Firstly, the variables and indicators used to measure how KM is cultivated in the public sector are introduced. Here the KM model is presented. Secondly, the method of qualitative research and in particular the case study is discussed. It is argued why the choice for a case study is made, how the cases were selected, and on the details of the cases is elaborated. Thirdly the sampling methods used to select the respondents are presented and the arguments behind the choice for semi-structured interviews to gather the data are discussed. Fourthly, the method of analysis is introduced. Lastly, the implications of the choices that are made for the reliability and validity of this research are presented.

The fourth chapter presents the results. This chapter is structured around the proposed KM model. Subsequently explicit, implicit and relational KM with its indicators are discussed.

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The conclusion combines the data with the theory by answering the following research question: How and to what extent is knowledge management cultivated by the Dutch government within the Public-Private Partnerships? This thesis ends with a reflection about the research methods and with recommendations for future research.

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Chapter 2: Theoretical framework

2.1 Introduction

This chapter introduces the relevant theories, concepts and ideas for this research. The goal is to work towards a KM model for the government in PPPs. Firstly, both concepts are derived from NPM and therefore the theoretical foundations of NPM are discussed. Secondly, a literature review about PPPs in general and the DBFM(O)-variant in particular is introduced. The goal of the literature review is to identify the problems PPPs face. Thirdly, KM is presented as a solution for the problems of PPPs. Lastly, the problems of PPPs and the solutions of KM are combined in table 2.1. The purpose of this table is to give a directory for the government on which KM solutions are able to solve the PPP’s problems.

2.2 Theoretical origins

NPM forms the theoretical foundations on which the concepts of PPPs and KM are based. NPM is more of a group of ideas, rather than an actual theory and as a consequence the literature does not distinguish strict propositions or indicators for NPM (Osborne, 1993: 352). NPM is the overarching label for a series of public sector reforms. Its main goals are the maximization of productivity and the allocation of efficiencies that are hampered by bureaucratic procedures (Kaboolian, 1998: 189-190).

Proponents of NPM are determined to transform the traditional public administration into an entrepreneurial government (Osborne, 1993: 351). To make this transformation NPM is based on two theoretical thoughts. The first thought is the theory of institutional economics that introduces a set of administrative reforms based on the ideas of transparency, incentive structure, contestability and consumers choice. The second thought is the theory of managerialism that proposes that managers need to be portable, conscious about the importance of technical expertise and need to have discretionary power (Hood, 1991: 6).

2.2.1 The doctrines and principles

Because the concept of NPM might still seem to be an empty shell, Hood (1991) and Osborne (1993) introduced a couple doctrines and principles which the literature agrees upon. Because of that consensus these doctrines and principles are enhanced in this thesis as well.

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Hood (1991) conceptualizes NPM by analyzing seven doctrinal components (Hood, 1991: 4). The first doctrine states that management should be hands-on, managers should be able to apply active and visible discretionary control. The second doctrinal component of NPM proposes that performance should have explicit standards and measures to improve the accountability of managers. The third component says that the government needs to emphasize output control more than input control. The fourth doctrine wants the government to shift to the disaggregation of units in the public sector. Services need to be separated and become manageable to gain efficiency advantages, for example by the use of contracts and franchise agreements. The fifth doctrinal component dictates a shift to greater competition in the public sector by public tendering procedures. The sixth doctrine states that the government needs to use private sector tools that have proven to be successful. The last doctrine emphasizes the importance of greater discipline and parsimony in the use of resources (Ibid.: 4-5).

Osborne (1993) identified ten principles of which most organizations should have at least six in common. The first principle states that the government needs to be catalytic, it needs to steer rather than row and let others implement the policies they decide upon. The second principle is that the government needs to be competitive, it needs to inject competition into service delivery and thereby increase productivity (Osborne, 1993: 352). The third principle proposes that the government should be mission driven, it should not focus on rules and budgets but on its goals and mission. The fourth principle is that the government needs to be result-oriented, managers should be held accountable by their outputs (Ibid.: 353). The fifth principle is that the government needs to be customer-driven, it needs to be responsive to the needs of the customer because every citizen is unique (Ibid.: 354). The sixth is the principle of an enterprising government, the government should pay more attention to earning instead of spending (Ibid.: 355). In addition to those six principles, there are four more that cannot be found in every organization. These four state that the government needs to be decentralized, community owned, anticipatory and market driven (Ibid.:356).

2.2.3 NPM in the Netherlands

NPM emerged in the Netherlands after it became clear that the welfare state was under pressure. The oil crises of 1973 and the subsequent stagnation of the economy made four

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problems visible. Firstly, the internal structure of the public administration became too complex. Secondly, laws, plans and projects where vaguely formulated and therefore their execution became problematic. Thirdly, the goals and targets from policies were not met. Fourthly, the costs increased rapidly because more citizens made use of social services of the welfare state (Bovens, ‘T Hart & Van Twist, 2007: 44-45).

For those reasons the role of the traditional bureaucracy was revised after the NPM-tradition. The government started to work with targets and let others execute their policies, this happened for example in the Dutch housing sector, which became the responsibility of municipalities and corporations. The government also started to reform financially. Budget cuts were implemented to reduce deficits and governmental companies were privatized. The service delivery was adjusted to the contemporary requirements of a diverse society, therefore certain tasks were decentralized to municipalities (Ibid.: 45-46). The government did not provide a safety net anymore, it provided a kick-start for citizens to get back on the labor market as soon as possible (Ibid.: 49).

2.3 Public-private partnerships

Against the background of the developments of NPM, PPPs were introduced. PPPs are a collaboration between the public and the private sector with the goal to gain advantage by creating value that would not have been created without such a collaboration (Weihe, 2008: 153). The literature distinguishes five different types of PPPs. The first type considers them as an institutional cooperation for joint production and risk sharing. The second type is concerned with long-term infrastructure contracts with specific output specifications. This type is also known as a Private Finance Initiative (PFI). The third type considers PPPs to be public policy networks that are characterized by loose stakeholder relationships. The fourth type defines PPPs as a form of civil society and community development in which the symbolism of the partnership is used for cultural change. The fifth type sees PPPs as a method for urban renewal and downtown economic development (Hodge & Greve: 547).

This thesis analyzes the second type of PPPs. This type is derived from the Anglo-Saxon tradition of PFI. PFIs are long term contracts that give the complete responsibility of the construction, financing, building and maintenance of an object, often a road or building, to the private sector. While the assets remain in possession of the public sector, the private

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sector is assigned to take care of all the aspects of its life-cycle (Hall, De la Motte & Davies, 2003: 6).

2.3.1 DBFM(O)

In the Netherlands the PFI is known as the Design, Build, Finance, Maintain, and, optionally, Operate (DBFM(O)) variant (Ibid.: 7). The DBFM(O) is an integral contract form that covers the public tender of the entire life cycle of a product, from the design to the operational aspects of the building, for instance the associated services. Because it covers the entire life-cycle the government signs contracts with a private consortium for a period of multiple years (Straub, Prins & Hansen, 2012: 49). The main advantage of the DBFM(O) variant is the integration of all aspects of the lifecycle of a building or road in one contract, therefore cost advantages emerge. The purpose of the contract is to create an incentive structure for the private party. To make sure that the private party does what was promised, the government only has to pay when the promised services are delivered in time (Algemene Rekenkamer, 2013: 4-5).

It is debated whether the DBFM(O)-variant is an example of NPM or of privatization. Scholars state that the concept of PPPs and, particularly, DBFM(O)s was only introduced as a substitute for the concept of privatization when that term became politically controversial. The term was used to sound less aggressive than privatization, but DBFM(O)s were still based on contractual relationships and therefore not partnerships (Hall, De la Motte & Davies, 2013: 2). This is in line with other scholars who emphasize the contractual aspect above the partnership aspect. In their words DBFM(O)s are cooperative institutional arrangements or government-business arrangement for the planning and delivery of public services and infrastructures (Broadbent & Laghlin, 2003: 332; Lonsdale, 2007: 311).

Another group of scholars emphasizes the partnership and NPM components of the DBFM(O). The DBFM(O)-variant aims to combine the strong points of the public and private sectors and thereby form the main alternative for privatization (Hodge & Greve, 2007: 545). They aim to gain advantage by creating value that would not have been created without a collaboration (Weihe, 2008: 153). A DBFM(O) lets governments gain efficiencies and qualities that they would not have had by their own production. Simultaneously, it lets the private sector earn a profit because the government pays more than their production costs (Brown, Potoski and Van Slyke, 2010: 41). In addition, the fourth and the fifth doctrine of

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Hood (1991: 4) are in line with the characteristics of NPM. They say that the government disaggregates public services by contractual agreements and that the government needs to create greater competition by public tendering procedures. A DBFM(O) is also used by the government to steer and let others execute their policies and to become more result-oriented by focusing on output-control, so a DBFM(O) is also in line with the first and the fourth principle of NPM of Osborne (1993: 352-353).

2.3.2 Problems of the DBFM(O)-project

The government faces problems and challenges during and after the tender of a DBFM(O)-project. This part subsequently discusses the problem of contractual incompleteness, costs, accountability and capacity. The goal is to find a common denominator of those problems that can be used to provide a solution.

2.3.2.1 Contractual incompleteness

DBFM(O)s are concerned with the tender of complex products (e.g. roads and buildings). Complex products lead to value uncertainties for the private sector because it is hard to measure the value of products, materials and risks beforehand. The public sector also faces cost uncertainties because it is unknown what the exact production costs will be (Brown, Potoski & Van Slyke, 2010: 43). These uncertainties urge both parties to define their rights and obligations for future circumstances in a contract. Because it is impossible to specify all future scenarios in advance all contracts are in a way incomplete (Ibid.: 43-44; Hodge & Greve, 2007: 546). Another effect of risk reduction is that contracts become too detailed. Complete contracts may reduce risks, but to write down every scenario hinders innovation and makes it harder to adapt to unforeseen events (Brown, Potoski & Van Slyke, 2007: 608).

Contractual incompleteness also creates collective action problems. DBFM(O)s that are concerned with complex products and services have a higher chance of market failure. This is because the private partner is the only viable supplier left after the contract is signed. It is therefore harder to exit the contract and gain information about the quality and costs of the products. It also leaves the private partner relatively unconstrained by market mechanisms (Brown, Potoski & Van Slyke, 2010: 42). Those factors are incentives for both partners to exploit the contractual ambiguities, which leads to collective action problems.

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2.3.2.2 Costs

The writing of contracts and the monitoring of private parties is costly. Not only the administrative elements of contracts, e.g. the writing, evaluation and negotiation process, but also the contractual incompleteness create high costs. This is because it is impossible to write a contract that foresees all unexpected problems and events (Domberger & Jensen, 1997: 70). Contractual ambiguities create additional costs because they create problems that are costly to solve (Ibid.: 71-72). Those future costs can be decreased by a sufficient public management capacity. The government needs personnel with experience in contract-management, policy expertise, and negotiation, bargaining and mediation skills (Van Slyke, 2003: 296).

Even when there are few costly unforeseen events, it is still expensive for the public sector to monitor whether or not the private partner delivered the promised services, since the performance measurements and evaluation tools need to be developed. This requires the public management capacity to remain high, which will incur costs (Van Slyke, 2003: 297).

2.3.2.3 Accountability

In a DBFM(O)-project it is difficult for the public sector to remain accountable for the services that are delivered by the private party. The distance between the government and the project increases the government’s dependency on the private party for quality and information of the project. It cannot provide its citizens directly with information anymore, and it is harder for citizens to exercise direct influence on the public services (Domberger & Jensen, 1997: 68).

This accountability problem can be reduced or solved by the implementation of a sufficient monitoring system, performance standards and documentation systems. By giving citizens the opportunity to redress if they have complaints, and by creating mechanisms to measure performances, the government is still able to control the private partner (Domberger & Jensen, 1997: 76). This is costly and requires a sufficient public management capacity which the government does not always have (Van Slyke, 2003: 297).

2.3.2.4 Capacity

The DBFM(O) requires other public management capacity than the traditional tender. Personnel need to have contracting and policy expertise to develop contracts and define its

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goals, measures and outcomes. However, because the government transferred many tasks to the private party they were able to downsize their public management capacity. As a consequence they do not always have the right personnel anymore. In this regard the switch towards DBFM(O)s caused a phenomenon called the hollow state (Van Slyke & Hammonds, 2003: 147). The government needs personnel that has oversight and audit capabilities, but also personnel that has communication and political skills to manage the partnerships in a complex political environment (Van Slyke, 2003: 296-297; Van Slyke & Hammonds, 2003: 147).

2.3.3 Knowledge related problems of the DBFM(O)

The common denominator of the aforementioned four problems is that they have a knowledge related cause. The problem of contractual incompleteness is caused by a lack of knowledge about future risks and costs (Brown, Potoski & Van Slyke, 2010: 43). The problem of costs is caused by expensive knowledge-retaining measurements and evaluations (Domberger & Jensen, 1997: 70). The problem of accountability is caused by a government which is unable to control the private party (Ibid.: 76). The problem of capacity is caused by the lack of relevant knowledge of government employees (Van Slyke & Hammonds, 2003: 147).

All problems having a knowledge related cause implies that KM is an important tool for the government to manage a DBFM(O) project. This is underlined by Campagnac (2011: 211) who emphasizes that KM is critical to manage and improve DBFM(O)-projects. Within a DBFM(O) project the government is more a regulator and monitor than a service provider, which changes the design of the knowledge needed by the govenrment. Also the long-term aspects of a DBFM(O) contract require other types of knowledge and therefore KM. The complex and constantly adjusting environment needs evaluations and the sharing of knowledge (Ibid.:212).

Although KM is critical to manage and improve DBFM(O)-projects, KM has not been studied much. In particular about KM in the public sector there are only a few authors who are specialized in the subject. This is because KM is a relatively young academic field (Massaro, Dumay, Garlatti, 2015: 542). Also, there is a high concentration of publications about a limited amount of topics and cases (Ibid.: 543-544). A gap cleary exists within the

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literature and therefore the next paragraphs will work towards a KM model for assessing DBFM(O)s.

2.4 Knowledge management

KM is the use of practices and techniques by organizations for identifying and spreading knowledge with the goal to leverage, reuse and transfer knowledge across the organization (Jain & Jeppesen, 2013: 348). When knowledge is not managed properly valuable information and experience will be wasted (Smith, 2001: 311). KM is the process for acquiring, storing, diffusing and implementing knowledge inside or outside an organization’s boundaries with the purpose of achieving its goals (Magnier-Watanabe & Senoo, 2010: 216). Knowledge can be seen as a strategic asset that can turn the relatively uncompetitive public sector into an innovative organization when managed properly (Riege & Lindsay, 2006: 25). Because knowledge is conceived as an asset, this paragraph starts to discuss the theoretical origins of asset management before introducing the three types of KM.

2.4.1 Theoretical origins

The origins of KM lay in the strategy of Asset Management (AM). Asset management monetizes the features and outputs of an organization with the goal of creating competitive advantage (Greco, Cricelli & Grimaldi, 2013: 55). AM is a useful strategy for the government because it creates sustainable competitive advantage. Assets are value drivers, they are determinants of competitiveness that the government could profit from by managing them correctly (Porter, 1985: 1).

There are both tangible and intangible assets that both create a competitive advantage. Tangible assets are an organization's physical (e.g. the benefits of the location of the organization) and technological (e.g. the benefits of the equipment of the organization) features (Greco, Cricelli & Grimaldi, 2013: 57). Intangible assets are harder to define. Some scholars refer to them as all the other assets that are not tangible (Ibid.) Hall (1992: 135) for example mentiones that ‘’intangible resources range from the intellectual property rights … through contracts … to subjective resources of know-how, networks [and] an organizational culture’’. Others refer to them as relational or knowledge assets (Rasmussen & Nielsen, 2011: 481). Because the problems of the DBFM(O) are knowledge related, and KM is critical to improve and manage those projects, the focus of this thesis will be on knowledge assets.

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Originally KM was only concerned with explicit and factual knowledge, Hall (1992, 136) for example claimed that explicit knowledge consists of intellectual property rights, contracts and networks. Know-how and cultures were not examples of knowledge assets but of the skills an employee has (Ibid.: 139). Those skills were later referred to as a different type of KM, namely implicit knowledge and experience. Some actually claim implicit KM is the only form of KM and that explicit knowledge is a part of information management (Wiig, 2002: 225). The division between explicit and implicit knowledge is referred to as first generation KM that focuses on codification and documentation, and second generation KM that focuses on the processing of perspectives and experiences (Ferguson, Burford & Kennedy, 2013: 172). Nowadays it seems there is a third generation of KM, this generation in particular pays attention to social activity and networks (Ibid.). This third type is referred to as relational knowledge. This is a hybrid form that is concerned with the external exchange of information and experience, but also with the contacts one has with external actors or stakeholders (Rasmussen & Nielsen, 2007: 480).

This thesis embraces a broad definition of KM. Explicit, implicit and relational KM will all be analyzed for three reasons. Firstly, because all types of KM are an important asset for the government for reaching competitive advantage (Greco, Cricelli & Grimaldi, 2013: 57). Secondly, because all types of KM are intertwined. KM aims to transform implicit knowledge into explicit knowledge, but also to exchange knowledge externally (Rasmussen & Nielsen, 2007: 480). Thirdly, because all types of KM increase the responsiveness of the government to the public (Riege & Lindsay, 2006: 26). By increasing its responsiveness, the government is better able to deal with the problems the DBFM(O)-projects face.

Because prior research only focused on one or two types of KM, no comprehensive KM model has been made. Therefore, this last part of the theoretical framework will assess the literature and work towards a framework that determines what KM strategies deal with the problems of DBFM(O) projects

2.4.2 Explicit knowledge

The first category of KM consist of the management of explicit knowledge. The KM of explicit knowledge is important because the search for data and documents can be time consuming, labor intensive and costly (Jain & Jeppesen, 2013: 348). Rasmussen & Nielsen (2007: 481) argue that this category is concerned with formalized and systemic knowledge,

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for example facts rules and science. This is in line with Smith (2001: 314) who states that it is knowledge is formalized in print or in electronic media and therefore stays within the company when the employees leave.

That explicit knowledge has to be formalized is debated by others. Sanchez (2001: 79) referred to explicit knowledge as structural capital that stays within the organization when the employees are gone. It consists of an organization’s cultures, databases, routines and procedures. Most scholars, however, do not take cultures and routines into account. They state that there are barriers to managing explicit knowledge effectively since it requires data and documents to be stored in knowledge bases (Jain & Jeppesen, 2013: 348). Cultures and routines cannot be stored in databases so will not be taken into account when explicit KM is assessed.

Explicit knowledge is managed by implementing documentation and evaluation systems wherein data can easily be gathered, updated and used. It is important for an organization to have factual knowledge to control the services employees provide and implement performance measurement models (Younes & Knight, 2014: 134).

2.4.3 Implicit knowledge

The category of implicit knowledge is concerned with informal, practical and experience-based knowledge. This type of knowledge is partly tacit and resides in the actions of people (Rasmussen & Nielsen, 2007: 481). Others refer to implicit knowledge as human capital because it resides in people's heads and consists of the experience, abilities, knowledge and skills of an organization's employees (Sánchez, 2001: 79; De Groot, 2003: 95). This implies that implicit knowledge not only refers to experience, but also to the ability to use that experience in practice. This is underlined by Van Winkel and McDermott (2011, 558) who emphasize that implicit knowledge not only involves having specialized knowledge, but also having the skills to use that knowledge for problem solving. They combine the ability to act with the ability to know. Implicit knowledge not only functions as an asset for organizations, but also for its employees. It is a source of power for employees because it increases their personal value relative to others, which counteracts the sharing of expertise (Jain & Jeppesen, 2013: 348).

Implicit KM is possible by maintaining a diverse range of expertise within the organization. An organization does not only need accountants, bureaucrats and juridical

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advisors, but also people with for example case specific experience or contract managers (Arnaboldi & Lapsley, 2010: 406). Those different forms of expertise can be managed properly by enhancing a systemic approach to problem solving. By using a systemic approach experience can be gathered and lessons can be learned from other teams or cases. In this way a systemic approach can transform implicit knowledge into explicit knowledge (Lotti-Olivia, 2014: 1056).

Another way of managing implicit knowledge is to stimulate a cognition process to prosper innovation and thereby improve an organization's knowledgebase (Kululanga & McCaffer, 2001: 347). This depends on the organization's culture because a culture can bind the employees together to create a climate of high standards and innovation. In this case, employees need to have a shared destiny and shared values (Hall, 1992: 135-139; Kinder, 2012: 408).

2.4.4 Relational knowledge

The category of relational knowledge consists of the external exchange of implicit and explicit knowledge and is concerned with the networks of an individual or organization. This type of knowledge is needed when implicit and explicit knowledge are not available or sufficient within the organization (Rasmussen & Nielsen, 2007: 481). Other scholars refer to this type of KM as relational capital, as the implicit and explicit knowledge that is derived from the external relationships of an employee or organization. Not only the relations with stakeholders are important, also the perceptions that stakeholders have of the organization (Sánchez, 2001: 79). Some state that relational knowledge can refer to the networks inside (the vertical and horizontal relations and interactions) and outside (the relations with customers, suppliers, institutions, etcetera) an organization (Greco, Cricelli & Grimaldi, 2013: 57). However this thesis covers the networks inside an organization by assessing the other two types of KM, therefore relational knowledge is only concerned with the networks outside an organization.

Relational knowledge can be managed by acquiring knowledge from other departments. The performance of different departments should be measured and compared by implementing benchmark tests (Kululanga & McCaffer, 2001: 348). Silos of information need to be connected to create efficiencies, this can be done by stimulating employees to regularly update their databases (Riege & Lindsay, 2008: 25).

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Another method of managing an organization’s external relations is by entering into partnerships with knowledge-related institutions (Rasmussen & Nielsen, 2007: 489). Successful public policy emerges when the government constantly tests its options through knowledge transfer in partnerships (Riege & Lindsay, 2008: 25). The same result can be achieved by hiring external expertise or staff for tasks that you do not have the knowledge for (Kululanga, McCaffer, 2001: 348). External expertise can both have a technical or managerial character. KM in this case should focus on the sustainability of the relations with external expertise. It should invest time to create a shared interpretive framework which will make the work and knowledge exchange more efficient (Werr, Blomberg & Löwstedt, 2009: 455).

2.5 Conclusion

This chapter introduced the relevant concepts and ideas of the research question: How and to what extent is knowledge management cultivated by the Dutch government within the Public-Private Partnerships? It appeared that PPPs, or in this case the DBFM(O) faces KM problems. The government struggles with contractual incompleteness, costs, accountability and capacity. Because the problems are caused by a lack of knowledge, this thesis imposes KM as a solution for those problems. Table 2.1 shows a model that connects the KM strategies the government should implement with the problems they are supposed to solve. Because the literature is clear on the lack of knowledge of the government within PPPs it is expected that all four problems are existing within the Dutch public sector. The purpose of the KM framework presented in the next chapter is to analyze if the literature is right or needs to be revised.

The problem of contractual incompleteness is caused by the lack of knowledge about future risks and costs (Brown, Potoski & Van Slyke, 2010: 43). To solve this problem a combination of explicit and relational KM is imposed. To reduce the future risks and costs it is important to learn from prior projects by implementing documentation and evaluation systems to share information internally (Younes & Knight, 2014: 134). It is also important to learn from other departments by connecting and exchanging their silos of information (Riege & Lindsay, 2008: 25).

The problem of costs is caused by expensive knowledge-retaining measurements and evaluations (domberger & Jensen, 1997: 70). For these problems the same combination of

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explicit and relational knowledge is imposed. By learning from prior projects, costly changes can be reduced and by adopting its documentation and evaluation measurements the costs remain low.

The problem of accountability is caused by the government which is unable to monitor the private party and is therefore unable to redress the complaints of its citizens (domberger & Jensen, 1997: 76). For solving this problem, a combination of explicit and relational KM is imposed. Performance measurement models or evaluations enable the government to prove that the private party does what is stated in the contract (Younes & Knight, 2014: 134). Stakeholder management and external information exchange can also be applied to control and answer to the stakeholders (Werr, Blomberg & Löwstedt, 2009: 455).

Problems of PPPs KM strategies

Contractual incompleteness Explicit KM

- Documentation system - Evaluation system

- Internal information exchange Relational KM

- External information exchange

Costs Explicit KM

- Documentation system - Evaluation system

- Internal information exchange Relational KM

- External information exchange

Accountability Explicit KM

- Evaluation system Relational KM

- Stakeholder management - External information exchange

Capacity Implicit KM

- Diversity project team - Background project team - Internal experience exchange Relational KM

- Third-party involvement - External experience exchange

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The problem of capacity is caused by the lack of relevant knowledge of the government its employees (Van Slyke & Hammonds, 2003: 147). To solve this problem a combination of implicit and relational KM is imposed. Implicit KM makes sure that an organization has a diverse range of expertise (Arnaboldi & Lapsley, 2010: 406). When the government lacks the expertise, it needs to be obtained externally (Rasmussen & Nielsen, 2007: 489).

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Chapter 3: Methodological framework

3.1 Introduction

The goal of this chapter is to introduce the cases and respondents, and to provide a clear and transparent insight in the methodological choices that are made and why they are made. This chapter presents the methodological framework that is used for answering the research question: How and to what extent is knowledge management cultivated by the Dutch government within the Public-Private Partnerships?

This question needs two answers. Firstly, to investigate ‘how’ KM is cultivated instead of ‘if’ KM is cultivated, qualitative research is conducted. A qualitative research analyzes data in a nonmathematical manner and therefore it is an ideal method to apply when all the categories of KM are not clear before. Although the KM framework is made based on the literature, the qualitative research method will make it possible to adjust the framework and extent it with issues the literature did not mention. Therefore the Constant Comparison Method (CCM) of analysis is ideal (Boeije, 2002: 392,393).

Secondly, to investigate the ‘extent’ of how KM is cultivated the method of qualitative research is helpful as well. Qualitative data can consist of observations and interviews, but one can also use documents and other media (Strauss, & Corbin, 1990: 11). This thesis conducted semi-structured interviews for data-gathering. During these interviews it was possible to focus on particular topics and ask very specific as well as very broad questions, therefore it was possible to ask for the complete ‘extent’ of how KM is cultivated in the Netherlands.

This chapter starts with the introduction of the main variable of this research question: KM. KM is operationalized by dividing the concept in three types of KM. For each type indicators are presented to make it measurable. The cases from the research question are PPPs or, in particular, DBFM(O)s. After the operationalization of the indicators, the cases are introduced. Thereafter the data collection and selection are discussed. Eventually the methods of analysis and the implications of the choices I made for the validity and reliability are introduced.

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3.2 Variables & indicators

For conducting this research KM is divided into three different types. Explicit KM is concerned with formalized and systematic knowledge (Rasmussen & Nielsen, 2007: 481). Implicit KM analyzes the informal and practical knowledge that is experience based and therefore resides in people's heads (Ibid). Relational KM investigates the external implicit and explicit knowledge and one’s network (Ibid.). Figure 3.1 presents the KM framework that is derived from the literature and used to structure the interviews and the analysis with. The framework consist of the three variables with their indicators.

3.2.1 Explicit KM

Figure 3.1 shows that explicit KM is measured by three indicators. Firstly explicit KM can be measured by assessing if there is a documentation system in its most general form (Younes & Knight, 2014: 134). The only precondition is that it gathers and updates data, therefore it can refer to anything from a bulletin board to a national knowledge center. To assess to what extent a documentation system exists, it is important to know when and how this system is used and if there is a protocol.

Secondly, explicit KM is analyzed by assessing if an evaluation system is in place. It is important to learn from each prior experience and control the services that are delivered, therefore evaluations need to be conducted (Younes & Knight, 2013: 348). For this indicator

Knowledge

Management

Explicit knowledge: - Documentation system - Evaluation system

- Internal knowlege exchange

Implicit knowledge: - Diversity project team - Background project team - Internal experience exchange

Relational knowledge: - Stakeholder management - Third-party involvement - External information exchange - External experience exchange

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it is not only important to know whether there is an evaluation system, but also how it is used.

The third indicator of explicit KM is the internal information exchange. This indicator measures with whom, when and how information is shared within the organization, and how the public sector makes sure the information is in the right hands.

3.2.2 Implicit KM

Implicit KM is analyzed using three indicators. Firstly the diversity of the project teams is assessed. Implicit knowledge can be managed by maintaining a diverse range of expertise (Arnaboldi & Lapsley, 2010: 406). Therefore the different disciplines involved in the project team and its capacity are important.

Secondly, the background of the project team is important, since implicit knowledge is also referred to as experience (Rasmussen & Nielsen, 2007: 481). Therefore the education and professional background of the project team is assessed. For this research it is important to know if there is prior experience with DBFM(O)s or constructors.

The third indicator measures how expertise is exchanged internally. It is important to assess whether there is an approach to gather experiences and learn from each other (Lotti-Olivia, 2014: 1056). Because education is also a method to increase one’s expertise, educational opportunities are also taken into account with the internal experience exchange.

3.2.3 Relational KM

Relational KM is measured by four indicators. Stakeholder management is important because stakeholders can provide implicit and explicit knowledge (Sánchez, 2001: 79). To measure this indicator, the formal an informal strategies and methods applied to manage the stakeholders are important.

The second indicator investigates which external actors are involved. Relational KM can be done by hiring or consulting external expertise (Kululanga & McCaffer, 2001: 348). To measure this indicator the partnerships and external stakeholders involved in the projects are important.

The third and fourth indicators are concerned with the external explicit and implicit knowledge exchange. This is important to measure, since good public policy emerges when the government constantly tests its options through knowledge transfer in partnerships

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(Reige & Lindsay, 2008: 25). To measure these indicators, the methods and practices the respondents use for exchanging the information and experience with actors who are not part of their own organization are assessed.

3.3 Case study

In order to answer the research question a multiple case-study is conducted. A case study analyses a phenomenon in its natural setting by employing multiple methods of data collection (Benbasat, Goldstein & Mead, 1987: 370). The phenomena, or cases, in this thesis are the DBFM(O) projects of the Dutch government. One of the goals of this thesis is to develop a model that is able to assess how KM is cultivated within PPPs in the Netherlands. Therefore a case study is useful because it lets one build iteratively towards a new theory or model (Eisenhardt, 1989: 532).

This research conducts a case study because this makes it possible to study the DBFM(O) projects in its natural setting. For this reason inside access in the project teams is obtained. With this access knowledge that is not documented and resides in people's heads becomes notable. Studying this in its natural setting gives an insight in how people exchange those types of knowledge.

Another reason to choose for a case study is that it allows the interviewer to ask ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions and thereby to learn more about the nature and complexity of the processes taking place (Ibid.). This provides understanding how knowledge is managed and why certain choices are made.

Lastly, a case study allows the researcher to investigate a phenomenon that has not been researched as much (Ibid.). The court of auditors in the Netherlands conducted a study that focused partly on KM (Algemene Rekenkamer, 2013: 12-13). Other research that has been done focused on how public values are cultivated or how management strategies are applied in DBFM(O)s (Edelbos & Teisman, 2005: 614; Reynaers & De Graaf, 2014: 120). Besides those studies almost no research has been conducted on KM within PPPs. A case study is therefore important to explore the field.

3.3.1 Case selection

For a multiple case study it is important to clarify the goal of the research, this goal can either be a literal or a theoretical replication. The goal of literal replication is to describe a phenomenon by choosing cases which are expected to have the same results. The goal of

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theoretical replication is to describe a theory by analyzing contrasting cases (Shakir, 2002: 193). The goal of this thesis is literal replication, since the goal is to describe one phenomenon, namely KM in DBFM(O) projects.

The case selection was done through theoretical sampling. This means that the case selection is done with the purpose of illuminating and extending the logic and relationships of the theoretical constructs (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007: 27). The constructs in this research are the three types of KM. To illuminate these three types of KM requires the types to be omnipresent in the selected cases. The management of explicit and implicit knowledge can be analyzed in every project. However, assessing the management of relational knowledge requires a project with many stakeholders and active stakeholder management. Therefore only cases which had a stakeholder manager in the project team and cases in which multiple actors were involved were selected. From the projects that matched the theoretical sampling criteria, convenience sampling was used to select the final two cases for the analysis. Convenience sampling refers to case selection which is based on the accessibility of the projects (Bryman, 2008: 183-184). Table 3.1 presents the main characteristics of the selected cases, paragraph 3.3.3 and 3.3.4 elaborate about those characteristics.

Agency Case Product Sector Consortium

RWS The Closure Dike DBFM Infrastructure TBA

RVB The Knoopbarracks DBFMO Real-estate R Creators

Table 3.1: Case characteristics 3.3.2 DBFM(O)

The type of PPP that is popular in the Netherlands is the DBFM(O)-project. This is either a governmental real estate (DBFMO) project or an infrastructure (DBFM) project. The difference between the two is the operational aspect that is concerned with the services that need to be delivered during the life cycle of a building (Straub, Prins & Hansen, 2012: 49). For a building lots of services (e.g. cleaning and catering) need to be delivered. Thus for the tender of real estate projects the operational aspects are included in the contract. For an infrastructure project no operational services need to be delivered, so an infrastructure project does not include the operational aspects in the contract.

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Since 1998 the Ministry of Finance promotes the application of the DBFM(O) variant, by now more than thirteen projects have started and twenty more are scheduled to be tendered very soon (Algemene Rekenkamer, 2013: 3). The Dutch government chooses for the DBFM(O) variant when the planned investment of a governmental real-estate project exceeds €25 million and the planned investment in a governmental infrastructure project exceeds €60 million. For such projects a Public Private Comparator (PPC) is employed which measures whether or not the DBFM(O) has added value above the traditional contract (website Rijksoverheid, 2016).

Two agencies in the Netherlands are responsible for the tender of DBFM(O)s. The

Rijksvastgoedbedrijf (RVB), or the Central Government Real Estate Agency, is responsible for

the DBFMOs. Rijkswaterstaat (RWS), the Dutch agency responsible for the construction, design, maintenance and management of the main waterways, roadways and water systems is responsible for the DBFMs (website Rijksvastgoedbedrijf, 2016a; website Rijkswaterstaat, 2016a). Both organizations were analyzed at the national level, as well as on the project level to give a comprehensive view of KM within PPPs. Focusing on the national level is useful to give a general and consistent view on how KM is cultivated within the two agencies. In this way the general KM strategies become clear. Focusing on the project level is important to analyze the specific KM strategies of the DBFM(O) projects and the differences between the projects.

3.3.3 Rijksvastgoedbedrijf

The Rijksvastgoedbedrijf (RVB) or Central Government Real Estate Agency, is responsible for

the property of the central government and tries to achieve its goals in cooperation with local parties (website Rijksvastgoedbedrijf, 2016a). The RVB is part of the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations and is the result of a merger in 2014 between the Defense Infrastructure Agency, the State Property and Development Agency, the Central Government Real Estate Directorate and the Government Building Agency. The aim of the merger was to create a single point of contact and combine the expertise and knowledge of the different organizations (website Rijksvastgoedbedrijf 2016c). The RVB uses DBFMO contracts to decrease its costs by integrating different phases of the project into one tender. Another reason for this choice is that it increases the sustainability and quality of the government’s real-estate (website Rijksvastgoedbedrijf, 2016d).

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Within the RVB the redevelopment of the Knoopkazerne, or Knoopbarracks is selected as the main case. Before, the building functioned as a barrack for the Ministry of Defense. Now it is being redeveloped into a modern office for a diverse set of governmental agencies. One of the reasons for its redevelopment was the renewal of the Utrecht city center and the Utrecht central station. As a part of the area around the central station it was decided that the Knoopbarracks would be redeveloped. The tender started in 2015. On the 2nd of June that year, the RVB selected the consortium R Creators for the construction. The construction is scheduled to start in 2016 and is planned to be completed in 2018 (website Rijksvastgoedbedrijf, 2016b).

The Knoopbarracks suits the two criteria for case-selection. Because its development is part of the redevelopment of the whole city center of Utrecht, many actors are involved. The Knoopbarracks was also one of the few projects of the RVB that had a stakeholder manager in its project team. Therefore the redevelopment of the Knoopbarracks is suitable to analyze all three types of KM.

3.3.4 Rijkswaterstaat

Rijkswaterstaat (RWS) is the Dutch agency responsible for the construction, design,

maintenance and management of the main waterways, roadways and water systems (website Rijkswaterstaat, 2016a). RWS applies DBFM contracts and in doing so keeps the operational aspects of the tender to itself. By doing this RWS transfers the risks of the project to the party that is best able to handle them (website Rijkswaterstaat, 2016c).

The focus is on one RWS project, namely the Afsluitdijk or Closure Dike. A project that is being developed primarily for safety reasons. To protect the Netherlands against the rising sea-level and future storms the dike has to be strengthened and the capacity to drain needs to be enlarged. This project is in the preparation phase. The tender will start in the second half of 2016, after which the construction will start in 2018 and the project will be completed in 2022. For this project RWS will cooperate with a side-project, namely De

Nieuwe Afsluitdijk, or the New Closure Dike. This is a collaboration between the province of Noord Holland and the province of Friesland and the municipalities of Sudwest Fryslân, Hollands Kroon and Harlingen. In addition to the goal to increase the safety, the New

Closure Dike develops projects to increase the sustainability, recreation, tourism and economy of the Closure Dike (website Rijkswaterstaat, 2016b).

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The project of the Closure Dike also met the two case-selection criteria. Because many actors are involved they appointed multiple stakeholder managers. Therefore the Closure Dike is a project that is also suitable for analyzing all three types of KM.

3.4 Data collection

In order to gather the data semi-structured interviews with key-figures within the cases were conducted. Respondents were selected by applying non-probability sampling. This is a sampling method that does not randomly select respondents and thereby increases the chance for some part of the population to be selected (Bryman, 2008: 168). Two specific types of non-probability sampling were applied: convenience and snowball sampling. This means that the sampling of respondents was based on the accessibility of the respondents and projects, and on the networks of the respondents (Ibid.: 183-184). For example, access to the first respondents was obtained by consulting my personal networks and thereafter access was given through the connections of the first respondents.

3.4.2 Semi-structured interviews

Most case-studies use data from interviews, archives, questionnaires and/or observations (Eisenhardt, 1989: 534). For this research interviews were conducted because there is limited documented data available on DBFM(O) in the Netherlands. Although the yearly progress reports are public, they do not go into detail for all projects. Specific information is not made public and therefore the data has to be obtained by interviews.

Specifically, this thesis conducted semi-structured interviews. These interviews use a topic list for the consistency among different interviews, but still have room to discuss certain topics more in-depth (Bryman, 2008: 438). This allows the interviewer to adjust the topics to the background of the interviewee. For example, to a stakeholder-manager more is asked about relational knowledge than to a contract manager. For conducting the interviews an interview protocol was used which contains the topics that are discussed and prevent the questions to become biased during the interviews (Benbasat, Goldstein & Mead: 1987: 377). The interview protocol starts with an introduction and general questions to comfort the respondent. The protocol continues with specific KM questions structured around the indicators. The interview protocol will be added in the appendix 1.

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3.4.3 Respondents

Respondent selection happened by applying two criteria: experience and diversity. The respondent selection was partly based on the same criteria as the case selection. This means that the respondent selection is done with the purpose of illuminating and extending the logic and relationships of the theoretical constructs (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007: 27). This means that respondents who were able to assess the three types of KM of the government within the DBFM(O) were selected. Therefore respondents had to have experience with DBFM(O)s and, more specifically with the two cases that were selected.

The second criteria is diversity. To obtain a comprehensive view about the KM strategies applied, interviews were conducted with a diverse range of respondents. A stakeholder manager knows more about relational knowledge than a contract manager, therefore interviews were conducted with respondents with different occupations and backgrounds.

Table 3.1 provides details and characteristics of the ten respondents that were interviewed. As a start, experts were interviewed to get a comprehensive view about KM and DBFM(O)s in the Netherlands. An expert of the Dutch Court of Auditors and a former-expert of the Dutch Council of Environment and Infrastructure, who is currently working for the Waddenfonds, or Waddenfund were interviewed. These experts elaborated about the challenges and problems of DBFM(O)s in the Netherlands. They also mentioned which people I had to interview next. Within RWS, the project manager, two stakeholder managers and the program manager of the Closure Dike were interviewed. For the RVB the chief

Respondent # Organization Project Job Date Time

1 Court of Auditors - Program manager 05-04-16 37:25

2 Waddenfonds - Vice-director 06-04-16 1:08:27

3 RWS Closure Dike Project manager 15-04-16 49:14

4 RWS Closure Dike Stakeholder manager 19-04-16 34:50

5 RVB - Director contract management 26-04-16 1:12:52

6 RVB - Chief purchasing officer 02-05-16 1:16:17

7 RWS Closure Dike Program manager 12-05-16 1:06:31

8 RVB Kromhoutbarracks Contract manager 20-05-16 1:21:17

9 RWS Closure Dike Stakeholder manager 03-06-16 59:43

10 RVB Knoopbarracks Project manager 07-06-16 1:11:12

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