FACULTEIT DER MAATSCHAPPIJ- EN
GEDRAGSWETENSCHAPPEN
Afdeling P
oliticologieUNIVERSITEIT VAN AMSTERDAM
Asylum policy in the
Dutch political arena
The stakeholder dynamics behind restrictionist and
expansionist outcomes
Gita Maas, 10003424
31/01/2014
2 Table of Contents
Introduction ……….. 3
Chapter 1. Theoretical Framework ……….. 5
Methodology, Research Design & Data Collection ……….. 9
Chapter 2. Actor’s preferences on 2 asylum dossiers ……….. 11
Chapter 3. Policy outcomes on 2 asylum dossiers ……….. 17
Chapter 4. Actor’s channels of influence ……….. 20
Conclusion ………. 26
Bibliography ……….. 28
Annex 1: Content Analysis ... 32
Annex 2: Interviews ………. 37
Transcript Interview F. de Vries (Vluchtelingenwerk) ……… 37
3 Introduction
In the last years the political debate about the current state of the asylum policies in Europe and the solidarity between member states has drawn growing attention in the media. All this coverage made me curious and I started to wonder why there exist such differences between the member states in opening up to these refugees. How was it possible that in a democratic institution like the EU the leaders could sit back and watch, and situations like the one on Lampedusa could occur.
Although I discovered the existence of the Common European Asylum System, that sets some minimum standards for the treatment and response to asylum-seekers, I noticed that on asylum policy a lot was still decided semi-autonomously on the national level. Following, I decided to take a closer look at one case, my own country of the Netherlands.
In short, this thesis will research the current direction the asylum policy is taking and will try to reflect on three different types of actors and how they try to influence the policy’s outcomes to their interests. The central objects of analysis will be: 1) the current governing coalition of VVD and PvdA (government) 2) the political parties of SP and PVV (opposition) and 3) Vluchtelingenwerk Nederland (NGO).
To narrow down the problem to a researchable size only 2 seemingly important asy-lum themes will be discussed:
asylum procedure (refugee detention, no cure no fee, children in jail, Kinderpardon) return of asylum seekers (‘buitenschuldprocedure’, penalization illegality).
The social relevance of this thesis lies in the transparency it can offer to citizens about the policy process, specifically on the stage of formulation, on asylum issues. It can also show if the possibility in claims-making is equally divided or at least divided in a fair way, which means there is more public discussion on one side or government dominance on the other side.
Scientifically, this thesis is relevant, because it could fill a gap of knowledge that ex-ists in the theories that will be used, because almost all the existing studies focus on the cases of the United Kingdom or the United States. Therefore this thesis can lead to conclusions in different circumstances and strengthen or weaken the leading theories with more empirical evidence. Moreover, it offers the chance to combine the already existing theoretical divides of expansionist/restrictionist and insider/outsider into an integrated approach.
4 The goal of the thesis is to answer the following research question:
To what extent do NGO’s, political parties in the opposition and the current government con-tribute to the formulation of asylum policy? A case study of the Netherlands and 2 asylum
themes.
The following sub-questions will help with answering the research question:
1. What are the preferences of the three different types of actors on theme 1: the asylum procedure and on theme 2: the return of asylum-seekers?
2. What have been the final decisions of the government in the stage of policy formula-tion on these two themes?
3. Along which lines do the three actors exercise their influence on the asylum policy?
The thesis consists of the theoretical framework. Following, the sub-questions will be in-dividually answered by use of a political claims analysis and preference attainment. Sub-question 3 will focus more on explaining the lobbying part. The conclusion answers the re-search question. Finally, the discussion will offer a critical reflection on the results and some suggestions for future research.
5 § 1 Theoretical Framework
The main theories this thesis uses to explain the political arena origin in theories about immi-gration policy. These theories will hereby be tested on the subject of asylum policy. Through-out the body of literature there are authors who put their emphasis on different intervening variables to explain the policy’s direction, from Joppke (1998) on activist courts, to Ellermann (2006) on bureaucrats, or Matthews & Brown (2012) on the shaping of the agenda by media campaigns.
Freeman (1995) was one of the first to write about the fact that there exist a lot of fac-tors that contribute to the fact that in liberal democracies the immigration policy is more liber-al than the logic of the informed voter or public opinion would dictate. One of them is the scarcity of official information that is available, another are the boundaries, in this case the criticism of racism, of legitimate discussion about the topic (Freeman, 1995: 883-884). This leads to his first conclusion, namely that the public opinion is a log monster on this issue and that it’s not easily mobilized.
Secondly, he goes on to argue that political parties agree to not drag immigration is-sues onto the political agenda, and that therefore they don’t really take strong stances (man, 1995: 884). However, with the governments not having made any commitments Free-man argues that it’s the organized public, what he understands by this will follow, that domi-nates the politics (Freeman, 1995: 885). He illustrates this with the following argument:
“The direction of policy is mostly a function of which fragments of the public have the incen-tives and resources to organize around immigration issues. As it turns out, those who benefit from immigration in direct and concrete ways are better placed to organize than are those who bear immigration's costs.” (Freeman, 1995: 885)
Finally, Freeman finishes his argument with another line of reasoning, called ‘client politics’, where the groups that profit from the concentrated benefits from expansive immigration get close work relations with the state officials that make the policy. This link is made possible, because of the fact that officials are so-called vote-maximizers and simply listen to the better organized, according to Freeman (1995: 885-886). In short, this is his argument for the expan-sionary bias.
However, to test this theory on the current asylum policy formulation in the Nether-lands we should be aware that the main groups in the organized public in his article are the employers of labor-intensive industries and the families of migrants (Freeman, 1995: 885).
6 The type of migrant flows and beneficiaries in the receiving countries have changed, and so have the boundaries of legitimate discussion. Last but not least, Freeman admits that over time and with economic reasons he calls the ‘good times/bad times’ dynamic it is possible that immigration issues will be more contested and that there’s a change towards interest groups politics (Freeman, 1995: 886).
Statham & Geddes (2006) formulated in my opinion the most clear critic on Free-man’s expansionary policy bias and their conclusion is quite different. The following sentenc-es sum up the role they give to the government:
“On the contrary, the government dominates claims-making acts, significantly shaping the context in which other actors must position themselves, by setting an agenda that is highly restrictionist. Rather than promoting client politics, the government appears as an active ‘en-trepreneur’ dominating and influencing the political environment.” (Statham & Geddes,
2006: 254)
The set of results that supports this theory shows that 60% of claims-making over immigra-tion in the researched period was the share of the British state. British civil society only had a share of 25% but with an expansionist position of +0,67 (idem, 2006: 253). However it weren’t the groups as predicted by Freeman (1995) that had the most positive preferences, but the specific pro-migrant groups and the general human rights groups (Statham & Geddes, 2006: 256).
They understate the different gap that they found by ‘opportunities’ reasoning and claiming that the organized public stays relatively weak, while not seeing enough incentives to mobilize on behalf of migrants in this restrictionist-set arena (Statham & Geddes, 2006: 257). The thesis will test their conclusion against the one predicted by Freeman (1995; 2006) for the Netherlands and will make use of the two definitions of expansionist and restrictionist as put forward by Statham & Geddes for a content analysis:
‘restrictionist’: “A claim was ‘restrictionist’ (-1), when, if realised, the claim would reduce, restrict or go against the rights and interests of the constituency of migrants (aliens, immigrants, asylum-seekers, refugees). (Statham & Geddes, 2006: 252)
‘expansionist’: “Conversely, it was expansionist (+1), when, if realised, the claim would increase or go in favour of the constituency of migrants.” (Statham & Geddes, 2006: 252)
7
Theory: channels of influence
Finally, this thesis describes theories that analyze the channels of influence that actors use on asylum politics. Grant (1978) considered insider groups as groups that have a legitimate status by the government and are regularly involved in the consultation process (Grant in Maloney et al., 1994: 18). Maloney et al. (1994) aimed to reconsider Grant’s insider/outsider model, arguing that the classification is based on a false account of the policy process and the state’s role, that being one of a central all-commanding actor who decides who gets access and who doesn’t (Maloney et al, 1994: 23).
In their view, the idea of insider groups is that they operate in a fragmented bureaucra-cy representing clientelistic interests. The bureaucrabureaucra-cy often pursues these groups for consul-tation, while it is a functional necessity for policy makers (Maloney et al, 1994: 19, 23).
However, what is more interesting is that through the whole article we see the authors getting closer to another classification than the insider/outsider model. The authors focused on a ‘quality of access’ perspective (Maloney et al, 1994: 26). They make a distinction between access as the thing that only leads to consultation, and privileged access leading to negotiation and bargaining (Maloney et al, 1994: 25).
The strategy chosen by a group may improve their chance for granted legitimacy by the government, but sometimes it’s not enough and the resources are more decisive than the acceptable norms of behavior that groups adhere to (Maloney et al, 1994: 28-29). Further-more, the outcomes that Maloney et al. come up with is that considering interest group strate-gies, the distinction of 1) insider strategy, 2) outsider strategy and 3) tresholder strategy is still useful. However, concerning status there’s a degree of acceptance, which they explain as:
“Insider status ranges from regularized participation on a wide variety of issues cognoate [sic] to a policy area (i.e. core) to participation in particular areas (i.e. specialist) to participation that has the insider form but little, if any, influence (i.e. peripheral).” (Maloney et al, 1994: 30).
Influence can differ for both groups depending on the question if the proposals they lobby on are close to their areas of expertise (Maloney et al, 1994: 31), and even more important the amount of expertise competition between groups. Concerning the outsider status they see two options, one being by ideology or the nature of the group’s goals and the second being by choice (Maloney et al, 1994: 32, 35). Finally, Maloney et al. argue that interest groups are not free in choosing an insider or outsider strategy, but that they need to have ‘appropriate’ goals,
8 that fit with the ‘bargainable incrementalism’ that they call the process of policy change (Maloney et al, 1994: 34, 36-37). To sum up, Maloney et al. see three important factors for becoming an insider group: resources, strategy and goals.
Research choices
One reason for writing this thesis on the Dutch case is that the main cases in the literature (Great-Britain and the United States) are known for their one-party government, and the Netherlands is quite the exception to that rule. Secondly, the country has a famous ‘polder-model’ and consensus culture and of course different groups that organize around refugees. The choice of Rutte II as the to be analyzed government leaves us directly with a time-frame, namely late 2012 and 2013, the years of appointment of this coalition. The thesis will be lim-ited to the stage of policy formulation.
This thesis justifies researching the two opposition parties SP1 and PVV’s2 interests for several reasons. First, the current government doesn’t possess a majority in the First Chamber, therefore it will be troublesome to pass laws without cooperating with some other political groups3. Following, the choice to research SP and PVV is justified by the often made categorizing of these parties on the ideological left-right spectrum, while the SP is often posi-tioned on the left from the PvdA and PVV on the extreme-right, next to the VVD.
The choice for Vluchtelingenwerk Nederland is a logical one, with organizations like EMN (2012:21-22) describing it as one of the main, or even the biggest beneficiary party when it comes to the organization of the asylum policy. Vluchtelingenwerk is researched here as a refugee-specific interest group.
Finally, the choice to focus on return policy is the heavy-handedness of this topic and the fact that it often concerns individual cases, which makes it a perfect topic to test state ca-pacity, since there’s probably a lot of contestation involved. The reasons behind the focus on the asylum procedure is that there have been a lot of policy changes on the issue in the past, which could infer that there’s a lot of lobbying taking place.
1 The Socialistische Partij was founded in 1972. From Maoism to Socialism, and the tomato as a symbol of pro-test against underperforming governments, it’s really an opposition party on the far left. It currently has 15 seats in parliament, its vision’s core: solidarity, equality, human dignity. (SP.nl)
2 The Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV) was registered in 2006. It currently also has 15 seats in parliament, it’s not possible to become a member of this party. The main image: populist, contra-Islam, and contra-‘left’, and anti-elite. Despite it being an extreme-right group, it also knows leftish arguments. (Parlement.com)
9
Methodology: Claims-making and preference attainment
To be able to make a statement concerning the three actors that aim to restrict or expanse the asylum policy and to measure in how far their views are integrated in the decisions I will use the method of ‘preference attainment’, as described by Dür (2008). The most central point of this method, when speaking about political processes, is “that the distance between an out-come and the ideal point of an actor reflects the influence of this actor’ (Dür, 2008: 55). The biggest drawbacks for my thesis following from this method will probably be the risk of black-boxing the process/the channel through which influence is exercised, and the control for alternative factors (Dür, 2008: 57-58).
To circumvent this, preferences are equated with political claims of the actors, conceptualized as follows:
“It consists of intentional and public acts which articulate political demands, decisions, im-plementations, calls to action, proposals, criticisms, or physical attacks, which, actually or potentially, affect the interests or integrity of the claimants and/or other collective actors in the policy field.” (Statham & Geddes, 2006: 252)
The most important advantage of using political claims is explained by Koopmans and Statham, who argue that claims are inherently connected to actual, strategic public action, of which they name two examples: protest mobilization and political decision making (Koopmans and Statham, 1999: 216). Also, with these claims actors try to improve their chances of deliberation, by opening up policy decisions (Statham & Geddes, 2006: 252). In short, a method that suits the inside/outside lobbying theory that we’re using, as well as the ‘gap’ thesis theories.
Finally, this claims-making will be mixed with the information from an in-depth inter-view, that sheds more light on the process of influence or ‘how’ question.
Research design
Concerning the first and second sub-question I’d like to test the two theories of Freeman (1995) and Statham & Geddes (2006) on the outcomes in this case. The expectations and hy-potheses are as follows:
Hypothesis 1: Government policy will have an expansionist focus as a consequence of the domination in politics of the better organized clients that directly benefit from immigration.
10 Expectation: The hypothesis will be refuted, because of new contexts and facts. Freeman’s theory was based on old pressure groups that dominated politics. Secondly, the arrival of ex-treme-right movements has broadened the discussion on immigration, giving the people who bear immigration’s costs more voice. Finally, the expectation is that political parties take a stronger stance on asylum than they used to when they start to govern.
Hypothesis 2: Government dominates claims-making and promotes a restrictionist political agenda, the organized public doesn’t see many opportunities.
Expectation: Hypothesis will be partly refuted, the expectation is that the government does block some discussions off, but the chances of independent NGO’s not having any strong role anymore is also not realistic. This is also an argument, because this theory has been tested on the USA and Great-Britain, whereas the Netherlands is famous for consensus and coalition governments.
Hypothesis 3: The possibility of consultation, bargaining or negotiation in the policy process is determined by an interest groups resources, goals and strategies.
Expectation: This hypothesis will probably be approved.
Data collection
The claims-making guided the stage of data gathering of documents: I decided that motions of political parties in the Second Chamber would be a very important source to look at the pref-erences political parties have, plus they constitute a clear public act and often some way of criticism, call to action by the ruling coalition or a political demand/proposal.
Next to a content analysis, the data that will be analyzed come from a semi-structured interview with Vluchtelingenwerk and a written response by the SP to the interview guide.
11 § 2 What are the preferences of the three different types of actors on theme 1: the asy-lum procedure and on theme 2: the return of asyasy-lum-seekers?
The analytical framework of this thesis involves two categories when it comes to the descrip-tion of claims: expansionist or restricdescrip-tionist. However that does not automatically mean that we can form a clear image of all the actors and if they’re exclusively restrictionist or either expansionist. The three actors different preferences will now be discussed per issue, under the two dossiers. Most of the arguments are shortly categorized and can be found in Annex 1.
2.1. Asylum procedure
First, we’ll start with the main theme of asylum procedure. However, since this is very broad the focus will stay on recurring issues that are central in discussions in the political arena, of whom detention (at the border), and judicial help for refugees have gained importance after the Dolmatov affair in 2012. The other two issues that concern vulnerable groups, in this case children seeking refuge, are characterized by sustained debate in the political arena and have led to several claims by the different actors, regarding this issue.
Detention at the border
First, we’ll consider the arguments of Vluchtelingenwerk on this issue. Their main preference is for the coalition to stop using detention at the border and to remove the ‘Gesloten Verleng-de Asielprocedure’ from the asylum chapter. Secondly, they Verleng-desire that only the 1F criterion will be found reasonable in the future4. This piece of policy holds that refugees that come in through Schiphol airport have to await the decision of IND for a permit in detention, instead of in an open asylum center. The arguments in the research on the GVA from UNHCR and Vluchtelingenwerk (2013b) can be summed up as follows:
The contrast with people that look for asylum and arrive here over land, they get to go through their procedure in an open center where they can move freely. This is also seen as unfair by asylum seekers at Schiphol themselves (2013b: 2).
As written in the Vreemdelingencirculaire (this is not a law that has passed through the Sec-ond Chamber) the GVA needs to move forward quickly (basically, six weeks is the limit). In reality people are kept in a cell for a long time, since this is no obligation by law. This is only
4 1F (a) criterium UN Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees: ‘hij een misdrijf tegen de vrede, een oorlogsmisdrijf of een misdrijf tegen de menselijkheid heeft begaan, zoals omschreven in de interna-tionale overeenkomsten welke zijn opgesteld om bepalingen met betrekking tot deze misdrijven in het leven te roepen.’ The clauses of the Convention do not apply to this group.
12 one of the judicial faults they see (2013b: 5). The other ones are that international regulations prescribe that there needs to be an individual decision before choosing this means and the knowledge that alternatives are not possible. Vluchtelingenwerk sees detention as the standard procedure in the Netherlands (2013b: 9).
Moreover, there’s a third humanitarian reason. This group of people asks for protec-tion and detenprotec-tion isn’t even an obligaprotec-tion according to article 5 from the UN Convenprotec-tion. Adding to that, from the personal stories Vluchtelingenwerk adds the asylum seekers get de-pressed and hurt in this procedure (2013b:17).
For one thing, the SP voted in favor of a motion put forward by Voortman from GroenLinks (nr. 1687) on the abolishment of detention at the border, which said that there isn’t supposed to be an arrival by air/land distinction, that there are alternatives and that 31.650 people supported a petition for this cause. The PVV didn’t vote in favor. Also, the SP considers detention as an ultimum remedium (TK, 2013b: 4). She also pushed for a more hu-mane detention regime, from the preference that alternatives would be cheaper and would lead to less psychical damage and a higher return as well (website SP/Justitie, 2013). What could we say about these results? Concluding on this issue, I would say there seems to be a certain resemblance or parallel between the preferences of Vluchtelingenwerk and SP on this issue. Referring to the interview with de Vries from Vluchtelingenwerk where she claimed the following: “ Nou we weten gewoon van bepaalde partijen waar ze belang aan hechten. […]
Alles met illegaal en de rafelranden van het beleid is SP, detentie.” (Interview de Vries, 2014:
15) this result doesn’t seem so surprising.
Then, what has the PVV to say about detention at the border? The PVV has a more general opinion on the detention of refugees and asylum-seekers, that is more related to the imprisonment of illegal refugees and the figures of the amount of asylum-seekers that get sent back. A citation of an argument brought forward by Fritsma (PVV) in a general meeting of the House of Representatives will give an idea of why they think refugee detention is so nec-essary:
“Éen van de redenen waarom het een slechte zaak is dat vreemdelingenbewaring wordt
be-perkt, is het simpele feit dat vreemdelingenbewaring nodig is om gedwongen vertrek mogelijk te maken. Voor mensen die het te technisch vinden komt het erop neer dat illegalen die wor-den uitgezet niet de benen kunnen nemen voor hun uitzetting.” (TK, 2013b: 36)
The PVV also adds that reducing detention would lead to more illegal refugees on the streets, meaning more problems for society, and that more illegal people would leave for the
Nether-13 lands, because the chances of detention in comparison with other countries is very small (TK,
2013b: 5).
Buitenschuldbeleid5
First, considering the groups that can make use of ‘buitenschuld’ Vluchtelingenwerk is not of the opinion that we should include more groups, it should only count for those people that really cannot go back, and not for those who don’t want to or don’t dare to (Vluchtelingen-werk, 2013a: 4). From this point of view Vluchtelingenwerk sees no need for more expan-sionist policy proposals. Secondly, Vluchtelingenwerk agrees that it would be preferable if a refugee would be no longer obliged to literally prove that he/she has contacted it’s country’s embassy, but to make a strong argument for the fulfillment of these steps.
Finally, Vluchtelingenwerk propagates there to be a time span of 1 year, then if there’s still no reaction to the refugee’s attempts the government can no longer hold him/her account-able and should provide the person with a permit (2013a: 5). These and other arguments (see Annex 1) are explained as expansionist in that Vluchtelingenwerk tries to make it easier for the refugees to successfully meet this criteria, thereby improving their rights.
The SP/Gesthuizen has put forward a motion in 2013 (nr. 1737) asking for the same 1 year limit. The view is certainly expansionist from the current case decision-making of the IND where every employee is asked to standardly and directly refuse requests for a ‘buitenschuld’ permit if there’s no known reaction yet (Vluchtelingenwerk, 2013a: 5).
The SP upholds this new rule from the viewpoint that otherwise there will be cases where people try to get a permit for 8 years and there’s no legal base to end it (TK, 2013b: 31). As such, an interesting fact is that the SP uses the words ‘gebed zonder einde’ in this con-text, describing the asylum policy with these words in a restrictive manner, while the PVV on the penalization of illegal immigrants, uses the same words, but then to describe the policy as way too expansionist, by providing these rejected people with general pardons all the time. Finally, the SP adds in her program that people who can’t leave the Netherlands although they try to, should not be left on the streets and should get a temporary permit, that could be pro-longed to a permanent one (SP, 2012: 14)
The PVV doesn’t directly put claims forward in the political arena about the buitenschuld policy, but looking at their proposals and motions we could state the following:
5 The Vreemdelingenwet (Vw 2000) states that when receiving a decision to return (article 61/62) refugees need to leave on their own instigation within 28 days. However, sometimes a refugee wants to go back voluntarily but simply can’t, because they don’t get provided with new travel documents etc. For these people there’s the possi-bility of a ‘buitenschuld’ permit. (see Vluchtelingenwerk, 2013: 3)
14 the PVV finds that first, refugees who haven’t cooperated in preparing their return earlier, should never be able to switch to a permanent permit made possible by new ‘pardon’ agree-ments (motion nr. 1617), this will lead to an acceptable atmosphere of rewarding those that sabotage the rules. What was found on the PVV is that they prefer that the buitenschuld policy will not be widened to new groups, just as Vluchtelingenwerk, but also that the so-called facts surrounding the debate around the Vluchtkerk have been false, the people there cán go back (TK, 2013b: 6).
2.2. Return of refugees
Penalization of illegal stay/immigrants6
The main arguments from Vluchtelingenwerk on this issue can be found in a letter they wrote with other NGO’s addressed to the PvdA. They write that it’s a direct attack on human rights of this vulnerable group of refugees and asylum-seekers and that it will be much harder to get in contact with bureaus providing help. In my opinion what they are referring to here is medi-cal care. More importantly, and more in contrast with the views of the other actors (PVV), they claim that it won’t improve the return figures and that it will lead to a less safe public order than a safer one (Vluchtelingenwerk et al., 2012b).
The SP’s preferences are first, that local governments have the right to provide shelter in case of emergency and the State will take care of the financial means (SP, 2012: 14) They want to get rid of the penalization of illegal immigrants, one because their interest says that the right to medical care and education will probably suffer from it (TK, 2013c: 6) Overall, their main interest is in humane shelter, which according to SP works better for return as well, they claimed this in a motion in 2012 already (nr. 93).
Even considering the action groups and public attention around it the PVV doesn’t change its preference, it considers mayors ‘lobbying’ for shelter and permits not in the interest of a strict return policy, and aims that the refugees will be put in detention and expelled (Fritsma, 2013). Also, it encourages the coalition to start with an active ‘hunt’ on illegal im-migrants, especially because of the low figures (TK, 2013a: 36). Other claims from the PVV on this issue can be found in 1) a motion on financially cutting local governments that provide
6 In the Netherlands you receive the status of illegal immigrant when: you didn’t leave the country within 28 days after you were asked to by the IND. You can be fined or taking into custody if you are the owner of an ‘ongewenstverklaring’ or inreisverbod.
15 shelter (nr. 1642) and 2) a motion calling the Second Chamber to refuse the motion Terphuis7 (nr. 1662).
For the other issues: judicial assistance, children in detention and the ‘pardon’ the claims of the actors can be found in Annex 1. It suffices to say that Vluchtelingenwerk is wor-ried about cuts in the fees of lawyers, making assistance less easier to reach. The PVV is gen-erally of the opinion that this assistance leads to the repetition of procedures and the “asylum industry”, while there often is clarity after the first rejection already, plus this is being paid by tax money. The SP had the following to say, back in February 2013:
“Het zijn asociale bezuinigingen op de vreemdelingenadvocaten. Deze beroepsgroep moet
altijd binnen zeer korte tijd onder grote druk heel belangrijk werk leveren, dat van levensbe-lang voor mensen kan zijn. Als een asieladvocaat zijn werk niet goed doet, dan kan dit ge-vaarlijk zijn voor degene die op zijn deskundig advies en zijn begeleiding vertrouwt.” (TK,
2013d: 8)
Finally, Annex 1 contains a short overview of the original preferences of both coali-tion partners around the 2012 eleccoali-tions, before they had to make political deals and exchanges on these asylum issues. Chapter 3 will provide more information on how these have changed with new policy decisions.
Concluding remarks
Looking back on the arguments from the three different actors we can conclude the following: the PVV mainly uses restrictionist arguments. This is also based on their repeatedly out-spoken assumption that for most refugees it is clear that they don’t deserve protection, but the current policy on issues, like judicial assistance, Kinderpardon, detention, prevents them from being expulsed, and makes sure that tax money is being paid in the meantime. An argument that is often heard (Annex 1) is that the government is ‘rewarding’ irresponsible behavior by refugees. However, the PVV does respect ‘real’ refugees, one observation might be that they just don’t want them to have rights that Dutch people don’t even get, for example not having to listen to judges.
Secondly, Vluchtelingenwerk and SP seem to share more expansionist arguments: from asking to ban a policy proposal as a whole (children in jail), to reducing negative effects (having to wait long on a buitenschuld decision) or to thinking about alternative solutions. Whereas the arguments from Vluchtelingenwerk are directed towards coming up with
7
Motion Terphuis holds 8 concrete steps that the PvdA members put forward in approving aspects of their own coalition agreement: quitting the illegal quota, shorter detention periods, no penalization of illegality etc.
16 cal improvements in the Asylum chain, the ideology is more recognizable in SP’s arguments, as in their call to let municipalities organize solutions for themselves. They both, however, seem to share a ‘humane view’.
Keep in mind that this means they have these categorized preferences in relation to the
current policy plans. Also interesting is the importance of the different documents analyzed,
for example the PVV doesn’t say anything about the issue of detention in their party program, just like the VVD. These parties are however quite restrictive on this issue, but they don’t directly communicate this to their voters then through this channel. Vluchtelingenwerk goes into detail about its preferences in researches, which come across as having more political weight than their letters.
17 § 3 What have been the final decisions of the government in the stage of policy formula-tion on these two themes?
The use of the word final in the question implies that the stakeholder dynamics and outcomes will be analyzed in a time-frame. The original decisions of the government Rutte-Asscher on asylum were laid down in the ruling agreement, this document will be used as the basis to reflect on policy changes from thereafter, within the two asylum dossiers. The coalition de-scribes its asylum chapter in two main, important words: restrictive and righteous . (Kabinet Rutte, 2012: 29-30). A real turning point for the asylum policy occurred around 17 and 18 April 2013, when the Russian dissident Dolmatov committed suicide while he, this was proved later on, was being kept in detention without proper grounds. The whole debate the opposition and coalition partners spoke out their opinions; from the failing culture of the re-strictedness; from Teeven talking about an ‘incident’; and statements of the type ‘we need to make a move from figures to real people’. In the end, it was the PvdA and some other parties that didn’t go along with a motion of no confidence, but only because Teeven had promised to make the policy more humane and to set-up some proposals on that path. What follows de-scribes this development.
3.1. Asylum procedure
Wortelingswet. What made it through the decision-making and trading-out between the parties
is that children who resided in the country 5 years before they turn 18 are eligible for a permit. However, stricter rules are also enforced later on: cooperation with authorities on their return, proving their identity and requesting before 19 (Kabinet Rutte, 2012).
About the definite policy decisions of the Kinderpardon there’s not much left to say, only that it looked like oversight from the State would be a very important criteria to evaluate if you would be considered as welcome (TK, 2013a: 26). However, Dennis (8) has now been granted a permit, although he didn’t meet this criteria.
Detention at the border. The pilots for alternatives for detention will also be opened
up to detention at the border, but only if it doesn’t negatively affect the perspective of return (Teeven, 2013:18). Families with children can be put in detention for the maximum period of 2 weeks (the regular procedure), if the GVA is necessary it will be decided on, but with a stay in an open asylum center (idem, 2013: 25). This of course relates to the other issue of ‘no children in a cell’. Concluding, Teeven promised policy changes on these matters, but two things stayed the same: the policy will not be adjusted to just fit refugees with the suspicion of crimes into the GVA. Also humanitarian protection and border security can go together
ac-18 cording to Teeven, therefore asylum-seekers are still lawfully denied access to the Nether-lands. Only Dublin claimants8 can get an individual evaluation in the future if GVA is neces-sary (Teeven, 2013: 26).
Following, the issue of buitenschuldbeleid. Teeven promises to implement the follow-ing advices from the ACVZ research and that from Vluchtelfollow-ingenwerk: 1) an improvement of provided information: a list of the types of documents that meet identification criteria per country 2) the refugee no longer has to call on IOM and 3) reducing the criterion of providing evidence of dedicated effort in returning (idem, 2013:39-40). What didn’t change, and stays restrictive, is the following: 1) testing on an ‘open norm of facts’ 2) holding a buitenschuld permit doesn’t mean you can’t be asked to return it under different circumstances (2013:47) and 3) the time for decision-making won’t be allowed to go from 6 to 12 months if it’s not the refugees fault that there hasn’t followed a reaction (idem, 2013:42-43).
Thirdly, asylum-seeking children in jail. Teeven proposes a policy change that chil-dren will not be put in detention in all cases, except if they consciously haven’t accepted sur-veillance before. He aims to restrict this to a time as short as possible, the maximum allowed time now is 2 weeks before a return. Teeven wants to find other detention options than judi-cial youth institutions within this policy regime (Teeven, 2013: 16).
One of the other much-debated issues within this coalition is the issue of No cure, no
fee. It started as a plan under former Minister Leers, the final decision-making under Teeven
has become more restrictionist, leading to the protest we saw from Vluchtelingenwerk for one. The decision made by Teeven on the 18th December 2013 has taken effect from the first of January 2014 and means that the financial compensations for a second request for asylum have been lowered; for winning the case the reward will be 5 points, for losing it will only be 2 points. The justification of this change is as follows, basically to reduce the amount of sec-ond procedures:
“bij tweede of volgende aanvragen, waarbij geen nieuwe feiten en omstandigheden worden
aangevoerd en die niet tot inwilliging leiden, een substantieel lagere of geen vergoeding voor verleende rechtsbijstand zal worden toegekend […]” (Decision 18 December 2013)
8 Related to Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national.
19
3.2. Return policy
Penalization illegality. There will be sentences for illegality, employers that hire illegal
asy-lum-seekers or landlords that want to make money from them and provide them with shelter will be dealt with. Individual help will not be punished. (Kabinet Rutte, 2012: 29-30)
In January 2013 Teeven came with his proposal to penalize illegality (33512), the first time people can get fined, if refugees get caught twice or more than twice they get an ‘inreis-verbod’ and violation of this will be punishable with 6 months of jail. Teeven stated that he has to find a solution to the protest within the PvdA to this proposal (TK, 2013c: 54).
20 § 4. Along which lines do the three actors exercise their influence on the asylum policy? This chapter will first, analyze the strategies and capacity of Vluchtelingenwerk as an NGO, according to the article from Maloney et al. that they wrote about the insider/outsider model. This account will be based on the interview with F. de Vries and also by some general obser-vations of how their resources are being used in the political arena. After that, a comparison with the SP and PVV will be made, but acknowledging that although their actions may over-lap and the opposition may organize in a same sort of manner, these political parties are often viewed as vote-maximizing, while from Vluchtelingenwerk we mainly expect them to influ-ence the policy process. The analysis has to be different, while the actors pursue different goals.
4.1. NGO: Vluchtelingenwerk (See Annex 2)
What exactly is the political strategy of Vluchtelingenwerk? The first result from the inter-view with Femke de Vries, is that she answered the question if she considered Vluchtel-ingenwerk to be influential by claiming that it is the only organization that the political parties take seriously and whose arguments are seen as trustworthy and well-considered. She ex-plained this was partly so, because of the role that Vluchtelingenwerk plays in the asylum procedure, by providing information to refugees, which means they themselves experience the problems in the field.
This role is also subsidized by the government, which on the one side you could claim that this means they are in a sort of network of cooperation with the government on this side, but more importantly it gives them a valuable resource, namely decent technical information, which was the thing that de Vries also hinted towards (Interview de Vries, 2014: 1)
The other role of Vluchtelingenwerk is that of its political lobby, where they use the channel of sending letters to the Second Chamber before a political debate. De Vries states that the parties on the left almost seem to wait for their arguments and that these are almost always recognizable in the speeches of MP’s afterwards, this leaves us to conclude that up to this point Vluchtelingenwerk’s influence is restricted to consultation and access. De Vries found that this doesn’t imply influence on policy changes (Interview de Vries, 2014: 1-2).
Use of the political field/environment and interest group partners
In the case of the Kinderpardon, a successful lobby, the influence was realized by using a domino effect instead of a well-defined strategy. When further prompted de Vries added that
21 they nevertheless did take some active steps; which included asking questions at the Court that could lead to a positive verdict and talking to other clubs involved with children rights, like Defence for Children (Interview F. de Vries: 2-3). Thus, where Maloney et al. (1994) observe expertise competition, F. de Vries claims the opposite is true: a core insider group and a specialist insider group (Defence For Children) can use their names and resources together, instead of competing with each other.
One of the domino factors, that the political science literature rates as very important, especially for liberal democracies, but Freeman (1995) described as ‘a log monster’, is that there had to be some sort of stirring (talk/concern) within civil society, or the public opinion. Therefore, when Freeman stated that public opinion lacks official information on immigration to mobilize around, he may have forgotten what this case shows as signals: public opinion reacting to the implementation (information from their environment), information from NGO’s, and the use of social media nowadays to further NGO’s policy goals. This strategy enables an NGO to state: not only we see that this problem is there, but also 100,000 people who signed a petition/support our actions etc. Therefore, one channel of influence for NGO’s is definitely the use of public support. The coalition ‘Geen kind in de cel’ even uses the sto-ries from asylum children affected by the policy to heighten the pressure on politicians (Volkskrant, 2014: 10).
Insider strategy/outsider strategy and behavioral norms
F. de Vries stated that one of the reasons Vluchtelingenwerk as an NGO was also influential had to do with their style and nuance in their arguments. In the emotional debate around asy-lum issues she argues that in the choice of cooperation partners the factor ‘how they com-municate’ is really important. Therefore, the partners of Vluchtelingenwerk she summed up (Amnesty International, Defence for Children and UNHCR) have a nearly similar campaign strategy to their own. It seems that the position/status of Vluchtelingenwerk indeed directs them in choosing a certain behavior or got them close to the government in the first place (pp. 29), something that shows in the following citation:
“Je hebt te maken met het feit dat je ook in de keten zit op het gebied van voorlichting over de asielprocedure. Dus dat heeft toch een, je moet dan toch ook soms voorzichtiger zijn in hoe je dingen brengt, juist ook omdat je wilt effect hebben en als je je te hard uitspreekt kan dat ook tegen je werken.” (Interview F. de Vries, 2014: 7)
22 Vluchtelingenwerk doesn’t find demonstrating with political parties an attractive strategy, refusing an offer by Rood, the youth department of SP. The reason for this is political neutral-ity (Interview F. de Vries, 2014: 15/16), as de Vries explains Vluchtelingenwerk lobbies on different parties according to their ideology and specific knowledge and they prefer to do this in a personal way.
Finally, from the two roles this NGO has connected to the government, in their inde-pendent political lobby de Vries claims that their political lobby is made more effective by knowing in what political context the minister has to decide and where possible room for ne-gotiation lies. Since the Dolmatov affair, humanity seems to be a new theme and window of opportunity, especially within the PvdA (Interview F. de Vries, 2014: 14).
One of the other important claims from Maloney et al. is that interest groups don’t really have a choice on what strategy they can follow: inside or outside. For a large part it depends on the NGO’s goals: are they pragmatic, then they’re suitable to negotiate over in detail with policy makers, do NGO’s want radical change then public protest fits better. An example of this is, when De Vries describes that their reaction to the illegal refugees in Am-sterdam was as follows, where they don’t ask for a radical policy change in one day:
“van ja weet je, of je het nou eens bent met het beleid of niet, of die mensen nou terecht of niet terecht een vergunning of niet hebben gekregen, wat er voorop staat is dat het voor mensen werkt of niet, dus we hebben toen in een slogan constant gezegd ‘werken aan terugkeer doe je niet vanaf de straat’” (Interview F. de Vries, 2014: 4).
Getting back to the first role we spoke about from Vluchtelingenwerk, the fact that F. de Vries states that Vluchtelingenwerk gets to sit in a seminar group to talk about the improvement of the asylum procedure, gives the impression that this is more similar to a decision-making power than a door-opening power. She may be talking about bargaining and negotiation in this case.
Concluding remarks
These results give more than enough evidence for the statement that Vluchtelingenwerk is an insider group, regularly involved and having access to policy makers: in an asylum procedure working group, in direct contact with all party factions etc. It’s difficult to conclude if the resources or strategy of Vluchtelingenwerk in the end provides more chances to effectively influence decision points, but the resource of technical information (from their role in the
pro-23 cedure) seems to be very important. Also, in Vluchtelingenwerk’s view to be influential as an NGO on the asylum field you need a certain nuance and activist groups don’t really achieve any concrete policy goals.
Although Vluchtelingenwerk adds that specialist insider groups, like Defence for Children, are also consulted, it seems like this NGO is one of the few core insiders and that the fact that they’re capable to put aside their principles sometimes and to lobby in an incre-mental manner on what is possible has provided them with a bargaining & negotiation posi-tion. In review of this, the results we’ve gotten from Vluchtelingenwerk don’t reject the ar-guments from Maloney’s theory. However some comments can be made, for example on the notion that there’s always a certain level of expertise competition, according to Maloney et al. My research paper suggest otherwise. The arena overall is small and mainly comprised of specialist party experts, pro-asylum groups and human rights groups, and government repre-sentatives.
4.2. Political parties: SP (See Annex 2) and PVV
The political parties mainly operate through a few different channels: the Second Chamber of parliament, through demonstrations and other campaigns, and the mobilization of public opin-ion, through media etc.
SP
Although the SP claims that concerning the issue of asylum they share the same opinions as the parties D66, GroenLinks, ChristenUnie and Partij voor de Dieren, they possess the most influence as a result of party size. However as an opposition party debating alternative plans is often difficult, because the majority has to be convinced (SP, 2014: 4). The thesis will first show the different general parliamentary strategies, before continuing with the SP’s tactics. Some MP’s regard that asking the State Secretary to explain or inform on asylum is-sues is not the instrument for change. The opposition can criticize the conduct of the coalition partners, saying that they don’t make the responsible person take account for his policy. This may not seem a really influential channel for changing the policy, but cán put the issue on the agenda or lead to continuing discussions on the topic.
From this first strategy in parliament, let’s look into a second one. Knowing that par-ties often use motions to change policy, the voting results are an indicator of success. On the 2nd of July 2013 only 1 of the 11 motions was supported by a majority from the different po-litical groups, as a consequence of the PvdA joining the opposition parties. On the 17th of Oc-tober we observe the same trend: again only 1 out of 11 motions is accepted, because of a vote
24 of the PvdA, the same results can be seen on 28 May, 23 April, 19 March, 5 March, all the way until 29 January 2013 (on Kinderpardon). Not one motion of the SP or PVV was accept-ed in 2013, concluding that it’s not a really effective channel of influence (anymore), support-ing the SP’s claim (Website Parlementaire Monitor).
A way out of this ineffective channel of influence, is according to the SP to heighten the pressure society can muster. The actors they consider important in influencing the policy formulation are the municipalities and organizations that work together with the refugees, although the SP argues that the government doesn’t respect the knowledge of procedural problems in these groups (SP, 2014:3).
However, before moving on to these public tactics, there’s one more strategy left: po-litical parties can write an amendment to a proposal for a law, for example on the penalization of illegality. However, should the Second Chamber vote in favor, the minister can always withdraw the law.
Concerning the parliamentary debates, the employee from the SP claimed their own research centers deliver extra material to confront the State Secretary Teeven with. An exam-ple is ‘Maak werk van menswaardige opvang’, which serves to back up the party’s incentive for change.
Getting back to the relation between society and political parties, it turns out that failed motions can resurface in the public arena. Political parties also employ domino effects. The SP’s motion on humane shelter was covered broadly in the news, according to the SP, after the government refused to carry it out, which led to more pressure and another reaction from an judicial institution, this time the Council of Europe that requested an immediate measure on access to shelter (also for the undocumented migrants). The SP by again request-ing a debate and thereby askrequest-ing for even more attention.
The SP claims that their lobbying activities for individual refugee cases have the most effect without notion in the press or in any debate. However, in October 2013 the SP did have a demonstration against the expulsion of Wime, outside tactics are still an arena for their ar-guments, and a way to get the attention of more voters inclined to agree on this subject.
Finally, whereas the SP might form a minority on asylum policy in the parliament, a very influential channel, according to their employee in charge of this policy, is to appeal to the local departments of the SP to not comply with national policy (and to in the future pro-vide shelter for illegal refugees). This will lead to a very hollow implementation of the policy.
25
PVV
Ideological proximity to the government is important for the SP, as well as for the PVV. Like M.A. Schain (2008) concludes, when it comes to centre-right governments, the extreme-right has developed agenda-setting influence that primarily has an influence on these centre-right parties (VVD), preventing them from developing more open policies on immigration (2008:469). The fact that these political parties share the same pool of voters indirectly means that Teeven will not ignore the PVV’s arguments and that the PVV has a reason to politicize this issue.
What can we say about this party’s strategies? Mostly, they use the same channels, but the difference is that in parliament the PVV doesn’t seem to have other parties to partner up with in votes for motions. The PVV has its own way of doing research on asylum and immi-gration, by asking their constituents to think about the best way to measure how much the mass immigration is costing the Netherlands, the party build a site for this purpose. The strat-egy of the PVV remains difficult to analyze, but they rely heavily on the media.
26 Conclusion
This thesis has analyzed the preferences of three actors, compared these to the final outcomes of the asylum policy, and concluded with a research on their methods of influence. The goal was to answer the following research question: To what extent do NGO’s, political parties in the opposition and the current government contribute to the formulation of asylum policy?
First, we found that on all the six issues that were analyzed Vluchtelingenwerk and SP shared critical, expansionist preferences. Especially the NGO had multiple humanitarian & judicial reasons for demanding improvements in the rights of refugees. The PVV showed an opposite view, with critical, restrictionist preferences, although not per se having a negative stance against ‘real’ refugees and offering asylum. Interpreting the debates and claims, the PVV seemed extra critical on the VVD’s original plans (illegality) and how they had weak-ened, because of the PvdA’s influence. The SP had more arguments on PvdA’s plans (Kinderpardon/children in jail) and their strict enforcement.
Concerning the outcomes, the coalition started with a strong agenda: restrictionist, righteous. Although the PvdA got the Kinderpardon and VVD its penalization of illegality, asylum wasn’t a big theme within the politics.
However, we can conclude that after the beginning of 2013 this closed forum was opened, and political parties, after the Dolmatov affair, began to mobilize on the ‘failing cul-ture of restrictedness’. The thesis shows that although there were winners and losers in attain-ing their preferences, this mainly was a result of Teeven changattain-ing the regime, the actual rules stayed the same. On buitenschuld, the promises were not as high as Vluchtelingenwerk hoped for; on the GVA alternatives were promised, which was good news for the SP and Vluchtel-ingenwerk. Penalization of illegality remained outside discussion; just like no cure, no fee; both good deals for VVD and PVV’s preferences. The issues of Kinderpardon and children in detention might have reached their goals, but are still restrictive in the details.
The outcome of this thesis therefore does not stroke with Freeman (1995), although well-organized NGO’s did not achieve nothing. The outcomes do stroke more with Statham & Geddes’ theory (2006), also because the most-likely case of an influential NGO, Vluchtel-ingenwerk, has a role within the Asylum Chain and receives subsidy.
Finally, the chapter on channels of influence showed that cooperating with partners, support from the public and sending letters to the second chamber were most often used by Vluchtelingenwerk. However, the interpretation is that it attained a bargaining position, be-cause of its politically neutral and careful behaviour and its resources, proving Maloney et al.
27 (1994) right. However, Vluchtelingenwerk does remain critical and therefore does not fit Statham’s top-down formed NGO field. This leads to the conclusion that both theories are difficult to prove wrong/right in the Dutch case.
The strategies of the political parties were interpreted as having a lesser chance of in-fluence, but the PVV’s influence is hard to measure and possibly moves through media, whereas the SP does claim it has input in individual cases.
The main answer to the research question in this case is that it seems the coalition re-solves a lot among each other, but that it has given more room to expansionist groups. How-ever, this circle of influential actors looks like a small one, where the influence of NGO’s is perhaps even less connected to the type of government and more permanent than that of the researched political parties.
Discussion
A critical evaluation of this thesis begins with stating that the results are quite context-based and that they would only be decently comparable to other countries asylum arena if the same factors are present and the same type of actors. Secondly, it would’ve been interesting to in-clude the accounts of more actors per group, especially to check the stories with that of the government. Finally, it still proves hard to decently prove if actors possess access or real power. Recommendations for further research would be to research the formulation and im-plementation phase of asylum policy, giving welcome insights to if formulated policy is any guarantee. Researching the influence level of factors like European regulations and the media would also be a welcome study.
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32 Annex 1
Table 1: Preferences of Vluchtelingenwerk
Vluchtelingenwerk Expansionist Restrictionist
Document 1 (pp. 1-17)
Abolish GVA procedure Individual case evaluation;
look first at alternatives. Only rightful for persons
sus-pected of crimes. Document 2
(pp. 4-6)
More responsibility
government: individual plan of action refugee
1 year wait: permit from civil service
Evaluate only on plan of ac-tion, not open norms.
Document 3 Don’t pass the law that penal-izes no rightful stay.
Prevent negative consequenc-es: job exploitation etc. Law won’t help higher return. Document 4 Ban refugee detention
con-cerning children.
Cut out exceptionary circum-stances for detention amv’s. Alternative: individual project
guidance in normal centers. Document 5 Turn back cuts on lawyers’
fees.
Ensure professional
assis-tance: time and quality. Don’t block access to justice;
33 Document 6 Kinderpardon for all children
under criteria: not only with asylum history
No maximum age limit for re-questing pardon.
1F parents’ children also right to pardon
Surveillance too strict: blam-ing children for parents’ choices.
Document 1: GVA rapport (2013b)
Document 2: Buitenschuld rapport (2013a)
Document 3: Letter to PvdA about penalization illegality (2012b)
Document 4: Letter from coalition ‘Geen kind in de cel’ to Second Chamber (Coalitie, 2013) Document 5: Letter on judicial assistance to Second Chamber (2013c)
Document 6: Letter to Teeven on Kinderpardon (2012a)
Table 2: Preferences of PVV Partij voor de Vrijheid
(PVV)
Expansionist Restrictionist
Document 1 (pp. 37)
Remigration is good; expulse non-Dutch criminals immediate-ly; also it is work or leave
End accumulation of procedures; rejection means go
A ban on general pardons Illegal stay will be penalized No more than 1,000 asylum
seekers a year: total stop on peo-ple from Islam countries.
34 Document 2
(Website PVV)
Always help for real refugees. Shelter in own
region not pos-sible; prepared to provide ac-cess.
Criteria for admittance too sup-ple; success for refugees that lie and cheat authorities.
General pardons: no respect for rule of law; reward staying ille-gal
Don’t offer money, put illegal refugees in detention. Don’t limit detention.
Cancel Declaration on Refugees (1951); don’t treat all asylum re-quests.
Document 3 (Fritsma, 2013)
Pardons lead to longer stay; sab-otaged return; reward for staying illegal
‘Kinderpardon’ rewards irre-sponsible behaviour parents; get-ting children = means to exert pressure/blackmail.
Document 1: Party program (PVV, 2012)
Document 2: Begrotingsbehandeling Veiligheid en Justitie: asiel (PVV, 2013) Document 3: ‘Generaal pardon stelt vreemdelingen boven de wet’ (Fritsma, 2013)
Table 3: Preferences of SP
Socialistische Partij (SP) Expansionist Restrictionist Document 1 (pp. 14-15) As short as possible detention; justifiable if date of leave is known. As much as possible use of alternatives de-tention
Right to shelter when actively working on
35 return; right of
mu-nicipalities for emer-gency shelter with fi-nances State.
Abolish penalization of illegality
‘buitenschuld’: tem-porary permit/not left on the street; can be traded in for perma-nent.
Children may never be put in detention. Support for
Kinderpardon: 5 years.
Document 1: Party program (SP, 2012) Table 4: Coalition preferences
Actor Expansionist Restrictionist
VVD (pp. 52-53)
Penalize 1) illegality ánd 2) provid-ing the opportunities for illegality. Local government: stop shelter. Active search and expulsion regime,
the priority : criminal, illegal refu-gees.
The government is responsible for shelter until the moment of return. Prefer link between detention of
criminal refugees and expulsion: block chance of disappearing.
Send amv’s back; shelter in own re-gion when safe; prevent ‘worteling’.
36 PvdA
(pp. 34)
Refugees are not crimi-nals: search for alterna-tives detention
Children should never be put in a cell.
Cancel penalization of illegal refugees.
Don’t send children back after 5 years: grant Kinderpardon.
Organize shelter in hu-mane way; families with under-aged children & sick refugees shouldn’t end on the streets.
