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Master of Arts Thesis

Euroculture

University of Groningen

University of Uppsala

March 2011 – Final version

Convergent or Divergent?

Frames in the European Women’s Lobby’s

Discourse on European Commission Gender

Equality Policy

Submitted by: Ronja Dornberg s1943944 Düsseldorfer Str. 28 51063 Köln Germany +49-163-640 2800 Ronja@dornberg.com Supervised by:

Prof. Dr. Mineke Bosch Dr. Annika Berg

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Table of Contents

Preface ... 5

Introduction ... 6

1. Theoretical Premises... 10

1.1 Civil society – origins and definitions... 10

1.2 A gender critique of the concept of civil society... 13

1.3 Civil society in the European Union – definition and roles ... 16

1.3.1 The emergence of civil society discourse in the EU ... 16

1.3.2 Civil society discourse in the EU since 2001 ... 19

1.3.3 Civil society organisations at European level ... 20

2. Methodology: Frame Analysis ... 23

2.1 Definitions and origins of frames and the frame analysis approach... 23

2.2 Relevance of the frame analysis approach ... 25

2.3 Proceeding ... 26

3. Development of Gender Equality Policy of the European Union ... 28

3.1 Article 119 ... 28

3.2 European gender equality policy in the 1970s... 29

3.3 European gender equality policy in the 1980s and 1990s ... 30

3.4 European gender equality policy and restriction between 2000 and 2010 ... 33

4. The European Women’s Lobby... 35

4.1 Origin... 35

4.2 Structure and mission ... 36

4.3 EWL’s activities ... 38

5. The strategies of the EWL and the European Commission for Equality between women and men – 2006 until 2015 ... 40

5.1 EWL and the Roadmap for equality between women and men 2006-2010.... 41

5.1.1 Gender Equality – an end in itself? ... 41

5.1.2 Gender equality’s economic dimension ... 43

5.1.3 Gender equality: a human right ... 45

5.1.4 Diversity ... 46

5.1.5 Prognostic frames ... 46

5.2 The new Strategy for equality between women and men 2010-2015 ... 48

5.2.1 The role of men in gender equality... 48

5.2.2 Reoccurring economic frame ... 50

5.2.3 A stronger rights frame? ... 51

5.2.4 Violence against women – an economic issue? ... 53

5.2.5 More economic framing ... 55

5.2.6 Women – seen as a homogenous group?... 55

5.2.7 Women’s health – an issue of gender equality? ... 56

5.2.8 Gender equality and external trade policies ... 57

5.2.9 Prognostic frames ... 58

5.3 Changes in frames over time and their causes and consequences... 62

5.3.1 The changes itself ... 63

5.3.2 Representation and gender equality frames... 63

5.3.3 Professionalization and counterframing ... 65

5.3.4 The ‘Equality for all’ approach ... 66

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5.3.6 Dependent on funding?... 68

5.3.7 Renewed economic focus ... 68

5.3.8 Limited in competences... 69

5.3.9 Consequences for the EWL’s impact ... 71

Conclusion... 72

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Preface

In this thesis, I present the result of more than half a year of hard work and (intellectual) sweat. It would not have been possible without the help of a great many people, the most important of which I would like to thank individually:

- my colleagues at my internship for their understanding and support when I had to take some time off for thesis writing

- my fellow EuCus who “suffer(ed)” with me and presented some comic relief once in a while

- my supervisors Mineke Bosch and Annika Berg for their helpful comments and their patience

- my parents for making my participation in the Euroculture programme possible through their financial and moral support and for believing in me at all times - my mother in particular for her helpful comments and her encouragement and of

course for raising me in such a way that I am interested in gender equality issues and last, but most certainly not least

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Introduction

After more than 50 years of European integration, the European Union has reached a critical point concerning issues of legitimacy. Since the completion of the Single European Act and the Treaty of Maastricht of 1992, the then newly founded European Union (EU) has no longer exclusively followed an economic road but has also put its focus more on political integration.1 This way, its policies and activities seem to have a greater impact on and more visibility in the everyday life of the citizens of its Member States. Popular discontent with those policies led to questions about the Union’s democratic legitimacy.2 As the EU’s model of representative democracy is still flawed and dissimilar to the MS’ representative democracies, citizens felt that they had no power over decisions taken at the European level and they demanded legitimacy.3 More power was given to the European Parliament (EP) as a response, however, this was not the only way the EU and especially the European Commission tried to legitimize its existence. In the 1990s, the European Commission turned to so-called organized civil society for legitimation.4

This is why, since the 1990s, the EU has been offering more and more opportunities to organised civil society to participate in policy making.5 More and more public interest groups have established offices in Brussels and try to influence European policy making through consultations, conferences and other forms of institutionalized activism. At the same time, the EU’s competences in the social area have increased over the years. Even though this development has not been as strong as in other policy sectors, more social issues are decided on EU level and the European institutions have gained more power in initiating and formulating social policies.6 These two factors offer great opportunities for organized civil society to advance their positions at the European

1 David J. Bailey, “Misperceiving Matters: Elite Ideas and the Failure of the European Constitution,”

Comparative European Politics 6 (2008): 33; Carlo Ruzza, “Conclusion: linking governance and civil

society,” in Governance and civil society in the European Union Vol. 2, ed. Vincent Della Sala and Carlo Ruzza (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007), 146.

2 David Beetham and Christopher Lord, “Legitimizing the EU: Is there a ‘post-parliamentary Basis’ for

its Legitimation?” Journal of Common Market Studies 39 (2001): 444; Ruzza, “Conclusion,” 147.

3 Baley, “Misperceiving Matters,” 33.

4 Carlo Ruzza, “EU Public Politics and the Participation of Organized Civil Society” (Working Papers del

Dipartimento di studi sociali e politici, November 23, 2005), 2.

5 Rachel A. Cichowski, “’No discrimination whatsoever’ – women’s transnational activism and the

Evolution of EU Sex Equality Policy,” in Women’s Activism and Globalization – Linking local struggles

and transnational politics, ed. Nancy A. Naples and Manisha Desai (New York: Routledge, 2002), 221.

6 Carlo Ruzza, Europe and Civil Society – movement coalitions and European governance (Manchester:

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level to achieve changes in the Member States. This is valid for many different fields of interest, including gender equality.

Even though a gender equality principle (at least in economic terms) has been included in the European Community treaties since its foundation in 1957, women still find themselves today in a disadvantaged position in the labour market and society in general in the EU.7 Higher risk of unemployment, insufficient child-care facilities, unequal representation in national and the European Parliament, persisting gender stereotypes and the danger of cancelling gender equality measures because of the economic crisis are only a few examples of how women are underprivileged in the EU and its members states and equality between women and men remains a right on paper.8 In addition, the EU and the European Commission use a specific discourse in order to promote gender equality policy, which might potentially miss the aim of the eradication of gender inequalities. This is why not only women’s movements but also organised civil society at the European level try to find an alternative discourse in order to effect changes and improve women’s role in society.

There are many different civil society organisations at the European level whose interest lies in the promotion of gender equality. Some have gender equality as one interest among others (for example the Social Platform) while others solely focus on women’s interests (for example WIDE and KARAT). Among the latter is the European Women’s Lobby (EWL). It was founded in 1990 with the help and funding of the European Commission and lobbies the European institutions for the advancement of women’s interests. Among the issues that the EWL takes up are women in decision-making, women’s social exclusion, immigrant women and others relevant issues.9 Its members are national women’s co-ordinations and European-wide and international organisations with a commitment to equality all over Europe.10 Judging from its rather long existence (20 years) and its large number of members (2000 direct members), the EWL seems to be a rather successful lobbying organisation.11 However, this is a very superficial statement. Many claim that the EWL’s discourse on gender equality is not so different from the overall goals and discourse of the European Commission and that it

7 Ingrid Biermann and Theresa Wobbe, Von Rom nach Amsterdam – Die Metamorphosen des Geschlechts

in der Europäischen Union (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2009), 11.

8 European Commission, Report on Equality between women and men 2010 (Luxembourg: Publications

Office of the European Union, 2010), 8f.

9 European Women’s Lobby, The Official Website, www.womenlobby.org (accessed June 1, 2010). 10 Ibid.

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has been around so long for these reasons alone.12 However, this has not yet been thoroughly investigated. In order to shed some light on this question, this thesis aims at exploring the question of possibly converging discourses of the EWL and the European Commission. The questions that are addressed are the following: Does the EWL really follow the same discourse as the European Commission? Does it propagate the same ideas and argumentation? Is there a development over time? What might be the reasons for possible convergent opinions or discrepancies? And, most importantly, does this convergence of discourse influence the impact the EWL has on gender equality policy-making? By answering these questions, not only the importance of discourse for the making of gender-equality policy is highlighted in this thesis but attention is also drawn to the discursive obstacles European civil society organisations such as the EWL might face. Due to space, time and resource limitations, this thesis focuses on the influence the European Commission’s discourse has on the EWL. The success of the EWL’s lobbying is only tentatively looked at with the European Commission’s influence being at the centre of the thesis.

To arrive at valid conclusions concerning the above mentioned questions, content analysis of policy documents is undertaken using frame analysis, which is explained more in depth in the second chapter. Consultation papers by the EWL and official documents and statements of the European Commission are looked at under the aspect of how gender equality, possible strategies and measures are discursively framed in those documents. The documents that are analysed deal with the Roadmap for equality between women and men 2006-2010 and the follow-up strategy for this roadmap. These strategies are analysed considering similarities, differences and development over time of the frames used by the EWL and the European Commission. The documents used for the frame analysis come from the official website of the EWL and the European Union. Other material is drawn from academic sources such as books and scientific journal articles. Internal documents of the EWL can unfortunately not be consulted as only EWL employees have access to these documents.

The thesis consists of five chapters. The first chapter deals with the concept of civil society. The origins of the concept in general and in the context of the EU are briefly given. The importance of gender as an analytical category within civil society is

12 Tetyana Pudrovska and Myra Marx Ferree, “Global Activism in ‘Virtual Space’: The European

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1.

Theoretical Premises

The concept of civil society is a contested concept.13 Its meaning has changed many times since its first use in Antiquity and still today, there is not one definition for it. In order to understand the significance of civil society and its meaning for the European Union it is important to briefly trace back its origins and different meanings over time. This includes its contestation by feminist scholars on grounds of exclusion and neglecting the gendered dimensions of civil society. Furthermore, the meaning and roles conferred to it by the EU are explained in order to be able to draw conclusions on its place in European gender equality policy discourse.

1.1 Civil society – origins and definitions

The concept of civil society was already discussed among Roman and Greek philosophers such as Cicero or Aristotle in Antiquity.14 According to Deirdre Curtin, Cicero’s idea of the

civitas (or ‘city-state’) as a societas (a kind of union or association of people) […] refers

to the condition of living in a civilized political community sufficiently advanced to include cities, having its own legal code and with undertones of civility, urbanity and ‘civic partnership’.15

The main idea taken from this was “that people living together form a political community with a common good”.16 If there was this “kind of political society”, civil society would automatically exist.17 This way, antique philosophers did not make a distinction between state and civil society but saw them as one.18 These antique concepts were taken up by political philosophers throughout the centuries. Philosophers such as John Locke or Immanuel Kant continued to consider civil society to be one with the political community.19

13 John A. Hall and Frank Trentmann, “Contests over Civil Society: Introductory Perspectives,” in Civil

Society – A Reader in History, Theory and Global Politics, ed. John A. Hall and Frank Trentmann

(Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 1.

14 Deirdre M. Curtin, “’Civil Society’ and the European Union: Opening Spaces for Deliberative

Democracy?” (Collected Courses of the Academy of European Law, Florence, 2006), 16.

15 Ibid. 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid.

18 Jan Aart Scholte, “Civil Society and Democracy in Global Governance” (CSGR Working Paper No.

65/01, 2001), 5.

19 John Locke, “The Second Treatise of Civil Government, and a Letter Concerning Toleration,” in Civil

Society – A Reader in History, Theory and Global Politics, ed. John A. Hall and Frank Trentmann

(Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 32; Kenneth A. Armstrong, “Rediscovering Civil Society: The European Union and the White Paper on Governance,” European Law Journal 8 (2002): 107; Stijn Smismans, “Civil Society and European governance: from concepts to research agenda,” in Stijn

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It was only after Enlightenment that a modern definition of civil society developed. At that time, society as a whole was seen as being divided into two distinct spheres: the public sphere (the state and anything political) and the private sphere (the family). With this post-Enlightenment vision in mind, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, in the 19th century, introduced the notion of civil society not being contained in either of the two spheres but being differentiated from the public as well as the private sphere.20 In other words, in contrast to the antique understanding of civil society, to Hegel, civil society was “a differentiation of society in which civil society is defined as more or less formalised institutions which form an autonomous social sphere that is distinct from the state.”21 Hegel contrasted civil society to political society and saw it as

a part of society (in opposition to the state) […] representing that complex network of non-political relationships whose importance and inner logic are regarded as being the result of the development and internal differentiation typical of modern societies.22

It was a social as well as an economic order,23 including corporations and economic interests.

Karl Marx also saw civil society as a social and economic order. However, to Marx, civil society was dominated by economic interests and “reduced to reproducing the functional demands of both the economic and political systems.”24 In his definition, civil society was defined by what it was not: the state. This way civil society was distinguished from the state but not from the market and included all social relationships other than the state.25

This definition of civil society was used for a long time until the 1980s as the concept had been neglected in political and social science. In the 1990s, the concept became more popular again as it was used to explain the role society had played in the fall of the Soviet Union.26 Political and social scientists challenged the concept as

20 Armstrong, “Rediscovering Civil Society,” 107; Robert Fine, “Civil Society Theory, Enlightenment

and critique,” Democratization 4 (1997): 21; John Keane, Civil Society – Old Images, New Visions, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 6.

21 Smismans, “Civil Society,” 3.

22 Deirdre M. Curtin, “Private Interest Representation or Civil Society Deliberation? A Contemporary

Dilemma for European Union Governance,” Social and Legal Studies 12 (2003): 57 (emphasis in original).

23 Curtin, “Civil Society,” 17; Armstrong, “Rediscovering Civil Society,” 107f; Fine, “Civil Society

Theory,” 18/21.

24 Armstrong, “Rediscovering Civil Society,” 108.

25 Emanuela Lombardo, “The Participation of Civil Society in the Debate on the Future of Europe:

Rhetorical or Action Frames in the Discourse of the Convention?”, University of Zaragoza, 2003, 2.

26 Chris Rumford, “European Civil Society or Transnational Social Space? Conceptions of Society in

Discourses of EU Citizenship, Governance and the Democratic Deficit: an Emerging Agenda,” European

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understood by Marx and found new definitions. However, still today, the concept of civil society is ambiguous and there does not exist one clear definition.

It is now mostly seen as the “public interactions of citizens, non-state institutions, and autonomous collectivities.”27 According to Curtin, civil society is “a sphere of social interaction between the economy and the state, composed above all of the intimate sphere (especially the family), the sphere of associations (especially voluntary associations), social movements and forms of public communication.”28 By most, it is seen as distinct from state as well as market.29 It is considered to consist of a large variety of state and governmental actors, such as networks, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), academic institutions, social movements, unions, religious institutions and more.30 Important features of civil society are its associational character and its voluntariness. In Scholte’s view, civil society is a “political space where voluntary associations explicitly seek to shape the rules […] that govern one or the other aspect of social life.”31 Civil society also shares values of participation and deliberation and according to Armstrong and Habermas, communication is its “distinctive rationality”.32

Another way to describe civil society is as a ‘third sector’.33 This refers to the belief that civil society is autonomous both from state and market. It is seen as the intermediate between the two other sectors. Again, this concept of civil society evolves around voluntary associations and includes the idea that the public interest or common good is pursued.34

The idea of civil society being separated from the state as well as from the market shows a fundamental difference to the concepts of Marx and Hegel. In contrast to their view that civil society also included corporations (Hegel) or reproduced the

27 Rumford, “European Civil Society,” 27. 28 Curtin, “Civil Society,” 19.

29 Armstrong, “Rediscovering Civil Society,” 107; Curtin, “Civil Society,” 20; Scholte, “Civil Society,”

6; Imogen Sudbery, “Bridging the Legitimacy Gap in the EU: Can Civil Society help bring the Union closer to its Citizens?” Collegium 26 (2003): 84; Smismans, “Civil Society,” 3.

30 Scholte, “Civil Society,” 6; Armstrong, “Rediscovering Civil Society,” 107; Bob Edwards and Michael

W. Foley, “The Paradox of Civil Society,” Journal of Democracy 7 (1996): 38.

31 Scholte, “Civil Society,” 6.

32 Armstrong, “Rediscovering Civil Society,” 109; Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms:

Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, transl. William Rehg (Cambridge, MA:

MIT Press, 1996), 359; Curtin, “Civil Society,” 19.

33 Helmut K. Anheiner, “The Third Sector in Europe: Five Theses” (Civil Society Working Paper,

February 2002), 1; Lombardo, “Participation of Civil Society,” 2; Henning Banthien, Michael Jaspers and Andreas Renner, Governance of the European Research Area: The Role of Civil Society (Final Report for the European Commission DG Research, October 2003), 7.

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economic system (Marx), most of the contemporary concepts no longer see civil society as including “the economy as constituted by private law and steered through markets.”35 Another aspect that plays into this is the fact that civil society is considered to promote the public interest or common good.36 This distinguishes it further from the market as the market is regarded as pursuing private and self-interest.37

However, there is no agreement on this aspect of civil society. Some include the market and its actors in civil society’s institutions and see it as a “combination of economic and social relations.”38 According to Emanuela Lombardo and Jan Aart Scholte, lines between civil society and market practices tend to blur and there is a mix of aims and interests, public as well as private that are advocated by civil society.39

To summarize the different concepts that exist, Lombardo used the following definition:

A general definition of civil society may depict it as the site of economic, social, ideological, and religious struggles, whose subjects are groups, movements, associations, organisations which defend interests, rights, and ideals, and can have private and/or public aims.40

This general and inclusive definition makes very clear that the concept of civil society has undergone many changes. It is used variedly and it is contested, including by feminist scholars on grounds of exclusion and neglect of its gendered dimension.

1.2 A gender critique of the concept of civil society

The concept of civil society is not only contested when it comes to its definition but also by feminist scholars. Even though not many feminist scholars have dealt with or mentioned the concept, those who do are very critical of the absence of gender. The most important criticism feminists bring up is the resting of the concept of civil society on the division between private and public sphere.41 The division of society in private and public sphere dates back to the 18th century but can still be felt in contemporary society. Already in the 18th century, it greatly influenced the relationship between men and woman as the public sphere was considered to be a “political, public, sphere populated by male citizens” and the private sphere was a “non-political, private, sphere

35 Curtin, “Civil Society,” 20.

36 Curtin, “Civil Society,”, 20; Curtin, “Private Interest Representation,” 59; Anheiner, “Third Sector,” 3. 37 Curtin, “Civil Society,” 20.

38 Lombardo, “Participation of Civil Society,” 3.

39 Scholte, “Civil Society,” 6; Lombardo, “Participation of Civil Society,” 2. 40 Lombardo, “Participation of Civil Society,” 3.

41 Birgit Sauer, “’Bringing the State Back in’ Civil Society, Women’s Movements and the State,” in Civil

Society and Gender Justice – Historical and Comparative Perspectives, ed. Karen Hagemann, Sonya

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populated by their non-citizens wives.” 42 This meant that women were confined to their homes and expected to take care of the children and cater to the needs of their husbands. Male citizens were seen to be the head of the household with ultimate power over everyone who was part of this household.43 Inclusion of women and their influence in the public sphere was not wished for, thus women were denied full citizenship and political participation. This subordination of women was presented as natural and beneficial to society and the state.44 This historical division also showed itself in civil society itself, which was originally conceived of by men for men. It had been intended as a possibility for adult citizens to engage in political activities outside the state, in which adult citizens only included educated white Christian men who owned property.45 Therefore, the first problem when it comes to civil society is its exclusiveness.46 Birgit Sauer states: “[T]he modern state is thus grounded in a gender compromise in civil society that separated the family from other social institutions, organized the hierarchical sexual division of labor, and normalized and naturalized these social divisions through binary gender roles.”47

Even though the concept of civil society has been broadened since and women now have the right to politically participate in contemporary society, civil society is still linked to male-dominated democracies and patriarchal welfare states.48 In addition, this division of social spheres continues to influence the relations between men and women within civil society.49 Civil society is located between the private and the public sphere

42 Barbara Arneil, “Women as wives, servants and slaves: Rethinking the Public/Private divide,”

Canadian Journal of Political Science 34 (2001): 29. However, one should keep in mind that “male

citizens“ in this case does not mean all men: citizenship at the time was determined by the fact of owning property. The exclusion of certain groups of the public sphere in society was therefore not solely based on gender. Jane Rendall, “Recovering Lost Political Cultures: British Feminisms, 1860-1900,” in Women’s

Emancipation Movements in the Nineteenth Century, ed. Sylvia Paletschek and Bianka Pietrow-Ennker

(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), 37f.

43 Karen Offen, “Challenging Male Hegemony: Feminist Criticism and the Context for Women’s

Movements in the Age of European Revolutions and Counterrevolutions, 1789-1860,” in Women’s

Emancipation Movements in the Nineteenth Century, ed. Sylvia Paletschek and Bianka Pietrow-Ennker

(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), 15.

44 Offen, “Challenging Male Hegemony,” 18f.

45 Karin Hagemann, “Civil Society Gendered. Rethinking Theories and Practices,” in Civil Society and

Gender Justice – Historical and Comparative Perspectives, ed. Karen Hagemann, Sonya Michel and

Gunilla Budde (New York: Berghahn Books, 2008), 19.

46 This exclusion did not only concern women but also white men, men without property and/or

non-Christian men. Hagemann, “Civil Society Gendered,” 24.

47 Birgit Sauer, “Conflict, Compromise and Hegemony: Civil Society, Women’s Movements and State

Feminism” (paper presented at the Conference Civil Society and Gender Justice: Historical and

Comparative Perspectives, Berlin, Germany, 9-11 July 2004).

48 Ibid.

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but cannot be considered politically or gender neutral.50 As women are largely still seen as confined to the private sphere, civil society remains the place “where women are not”.51

Gender is here understood as “relative and contextual ‘knowledge’ about ‘sexual’ differences produced by culture and society”.52 It is a “knowledge that is neither absolute nor true, but always relative and manufactured in complex discursive situations.”53 Along with other categories of difference, gender defines images and ideas of civil society that are construed in discourse. It has influence on who can participate, what action can be carried out and the possibilities for access to civil society and its resources and institutions. Gender also causes hierarchical structures to form within civil society and has a large impact on the identity of individuals within civil society but also of civil society in general.54 This becomes obvious in the fact that, apart from the structural inequalities due to the persistence of the public/private divide, civil society is also practically dominated by men. Civil society has historically been little regulated; therefore discrimination has always been more common place than in state institutions, leading to the exclusion of women.55

Another critical point concerning civil society is the place of family in the concept. Family is an important element of civil society as it not only forms civil society actors and but leaving it out can also lead to the exclusion of women, based on the public/private divide. Including the family in the concept of civil society is also necessary, considering the division of labour within the family.56 Karen Hagemann states: “The gender-hierarchical division of labour in family and society upon which the project and concept of civil society are implicitly based is yet another structural difference between men and women.”57 As women are still today considered to be responsible for most of the household tasks and the caring for children or other family members, they have considerably less time and energy to engage in civil society

50 Barbara Einhorn and Charlotte Sever, “Gender and Civil Society in Central and Eastern Europe,”

International Feminist Journal of Politics 5 (2001): 167.

51 Anne Phillips, “Does Feminism Need a Conception of Civil Society?” in Alternative Conceptions of

Civil Society, ed. Simone Chambers and Will Kymlicka (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 72.

52 Hagemann, “Civil Society Gendered,” 24.

53 Karin Hagemann, Sonya Michel and Gunilla Budde, “Introduction. Gendering Civil Society,” in Civil

Society and Gender Justice – Historical and Comparative Perspectives, ed. Karen Hagemann, Sonya

Michel and Gunilla Budde (New York: Berghahn Books, 2008), 3.

54 Hagemann, “Civil Society Gendered,” 24f. 55 Ibid., 30.

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activities than men. This is aggravated by the political demand for the delegation of responsibility to civil society. The praise of civil society by politicians often leads to a change in political orientation, in which the state gives more responsibility to civil society, such as caretaking. Most of the time, however, this falls back on women who are expected to take over the state’s tasks, leading to unequal opportunities and even more gender inequality within the family and society.58

All these factors mentioned above show that the concept of civil society is not gender neutral but deeply influenced by it, even though the dominant discourse on civil society suggests otherwise. This has consequences for women’s participation in civil society and their possibilities to frame discourse within and on civil society. It puts women in a disadvantaged position concerning participation and influence in civil society. The following section shows that this is also the case in European civil society, as the European Union also considers civil society to be gender-neutral.

1.3 Civil society in the European Union – definition and roles

1.3.1 The emergence of civil society discourse in the EU

The concept of civil society had been included in the framework of the European Communities from the very beginning in 1957. However, until the 1990s, civil society as understood by the European institutions only included economic interest groups.59 At the beginning of the 1990s, the situation changed. The fall of the Soviet Union had largely been influenced by so-called civil society groups and more attention was paid to their democratic potential.60 Furthermore, the Treaty of Maastricht was signed in 1992 in order to include political integration into the European integration project.61 Due to the ratification process of the treaty and several referenda in different Member States, European integration became more visible in the media and it seemed to affect citizens’ everyday lives more directly. The EU’s seeming inability to deal with problems stemming from globalisation and Member States’ use of it as a scapegoat for their own problems led to mounting Euroscepticism and opposition to integration among the

58 Ibid., 36.

59 Carlo Ruzza, “Conclusion,” 147

60 Howell, “Gender and Civil Society,” 415.

61 European Union, Treaty of Maastricht on European Union, The European Union,

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European publics.62 One of the consequences of this opposition was the growing concern with the Union’s lack of democratic features.

Even though the Treaty of Maastricht expanded the European Parliament’s powers, citizens felt that the EU was an elite project and that their own interests were not represented enough at the European level.63 One of the solutions to this ‘democratic deficit’ was a turn by European institutions to civil society. In the mid-1980s, the European Commission had already established the so-called ‘social dialogue’ between economic partners such as employers, trade unions and management associations for consultations on social policy.64 As more and more social policy was being decided upon at the European level due to increased competences of the European institutions in the Treaty of Maastricht,65 it became clear that different partners in the social field such as cooperatives, mutual societies and associations other than the social partners needed to be included.66

At the same time, demands for more citizen participation and transparency in the EU’s policy-making process grew louder. This led the Directorate-General V to create an equivalent to the ‘social dialogue’ in the mid-1990s: the ‘civil dialogue’.67 The intention of this ‘civil dialogue’ was to increase the inclusion of public interest groups into policy-making.68 Contrary to the ‘social dialogue’ which had been institutionalised with the Treaty of Maastricht, the ‘civil dialogue’ was missing a legal basis in the policy-making process of the EU. There was hardly any mentioning of civil society of any kind in official documents in the 1990s and the ‘civil dialogue’ focused only on non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in the social sector.69 It was limited to exchange between these organisations and a few Directorate Generals (DGs) of the European Commission.70

62 Ruzza, “EU Public Policies,” 4.

63 Sabine Saurugger, “The social construction of the participatory turn. The European Union and

‘organized civil society’,” in The Transformation of EU policies. Governance at work, ed. Renaud Dehousse and Laurie Boussaguet (CONNEX Report Series No. 8, June 2008), 154.

64 European Union, Glossary: Social Dialogue, The European Union,

http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/social_dialogue_en.htm (accessed 7 September 2010).

65 Anheiner, “Third Sector,” 4.

66 Stijn Smismans, “European Civil Society: Shaped by Discourses and Institutional Interests,” European

Law Journal 9 (2003): 475.

67 Directorates-General or DGs are the departments of the European Commission. DG V has been

renamed Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities. European Commission, Departments (Directorates-General) and services, http://ec.europa.eu/about/ds_en.htm (accessed 4 February 2011).

68 Smismans, “Shaped by Discourses,” 475. 69 Smismans, “Civil society,” 4.

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Funding of social NGOs by the European Commission, however, existed and was extensively used by the Commission to achieve social projects it did not have the legal competence to carry out. When Member States noticed and put a halt to the funding through the European Court of Justice (ECJ), many NGOs were faced with no money to continue their projects.71 Due to this crisis, the social NGOs decided to work together and to include NGOs from the development and human rights sector and created the Social Platform. Even though funding was later granted again, the Social Platform demanded legal recognition of civil society at European level in order to prevent crises like this from happening again.72

At the same time, several manifestations by NGOs took place all over the world at World Trade Organisation summits and at European summits, mostly directed against globalisation and its negative effects. Member states and European institutions had now the choice to include organised NGOs and their activities into the policy-making process and give them a voice, or risk violent manifestations and social protest.73 From this moment on, the ‘civil dialogue’ became more structured, included more DGs and NGOs from other sectors than the social sector.

In 1999, the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) drew up an opinion on “The role and contribution of civil society organisations in the building of Europe”.74 Had the EESC been rather marginalised since its creation in 1957, it now tried to re-establish itself as the connecting link between civil society in Europe and the European institutions. Following the EESC, the Commission published a discussion paper on “The Commission and non-governmental organisations: building a stronger partnership” in 2000, to define its relationship with NGOs more clearly.75 For the first time, the importance of civil society in European governance was formulated in official documents drawn up by European institutions.

71 Giampiero Aldaheff and Simon Wilson, “European Civil Society Coming of Age,” Social Platform,

(2002): 7.

72 Stijn Smismans, “Civil society in European institutional discourses,” Cahiers européens de Sciences Po

4 (2002): 8.

73 Smismans, “Shaped by Discourses,” 478.

74 European Economic and Social Committee, Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on ‘The

role and contribution of civil society organisations in the building of Europe’, (Brussels: European

Communities, 1999).

75 European Commission, The Commision and non-governmental organisations: building a stronger

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1.3.2 Civil society discourse in the EU since 2001

With the new millennium, criticism about the European Union’s complexity and way of governing did not cease. The ‘democratic deficit’ had turned into a major legitimacy crisis for the EU. In order to counter opposition and to initiate reform, the Commission published a White Paper on European governance in 2001.76 In this White Paper, the Commission introduces the “idea of civil society participation as a way to improve both the efficiency and legitimacy of European governance”.77

Drawing from the definition of the EESC’s Opinion of 1999, civil society is here defined as something that includes “all types of social action, by individuals or groups, that do not emanate from the state and are not run by it.”78 Religious groups as well as trade unions and employers’ organisations are contained in the Commission’s description of civil society. It shows that, for the European Commission, civil society does not exclude economic actors but can be any organisation or association that is not run by the state.79 However, even though the definition of civil society is broad, the Commission prefers to deal with confederations or associations established at the European level in Brussels to facilitate direct interaction.80

Despite this restriction to the European arena, the Commission sees civil society organisations as “mediators that will help resolve [the Commission’s] structural remoteness from European citizens, and therefore as key agents in its legitimacy.”81 In the Commission’s view, this mediating role includes several functions civil society needs to perform. According to Beate Kohler-Koch, these functions can be divided into two areas: Civil society organisations at EU level have a performative function and a representative function.82 Within the performative function fall the gathering of information and the inclusion of local knowledge into the policy-making process. This also includes consultation with European institutions, provision of expertise and the

76 European Commission, European Governance: A White Paper, (COM (2001) 428 European

Communities, July 2001).

77 Smismans, “Civil Society,” 5.

78 European Economic and Social Committee, Opinion, 32.

79 European Commission, European Governance, 14; Smismans, “Shaped by Discourses,” 481; Beate

Kohler-Koch, “Civil society and EU democracy: ‘astroturf’ representation?” Journal of European Public

Policy 17 (2010): 107.

80 Smismans, “Shaped by Discourses,” 489.

81 Justin Greenwood, “Governance and organised civil society at the European Union level: the search for

‘input legitimacy’ through elite groups,” in Governance and civil society in the European Union Vol. 2, ed. Vincent Della Sala and Carlo Ruzza (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007), 33.

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ensuring of compliance and implementation.83 In the end, all this is meant to lead to improved policies.

On the other hand, civil society is also expected to represent European citizens and their interests. It is supposed to facilitate communication with the public and thus create “a European public space of discourse and communication” in which European citizens can express their ideas and grievances concerning European integration.84 Here, the mediating role of civil society between society and transnational governance is meant to increase the sense of identification of citizens with the EU.85 This ties in with the aim of the European institutions to use civil society as a guarantor of democratic legitimacy. As this European public space is still very limited, civil society is seen as the main way that citizens can engage with and participate in the European Union, making it an “outlet of participatory democracy”.86

1.3.3 Civil society organisations at European level

Since the Commission has a strong interest in civil society for reasons mentioned above, it is very involved in its support and advancement. It often stands behind the creation of civil society organisations and contributes largely to their funding.87 According to some authors, these funds are not given unconditionally as the Commission tries to influence policy content and very often, the independence of Commission-funded groups is called into question.88

This is not the only criticism concerning civil society at European level. As the civil society organisations’ main function is supposed to be ‘democratic representativeness’, one would expect close contact between the organisations and citizens in the respective Member States. However, the opposite seems to be true. Many of the people working for European civil society organisations are professionals with

83 Carlo Ruzza, “European institutions and the policy discourse of organised civil society,” in Civil

Society and Legitimate European Governance, ed. Stijn Smismans (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2006),

183; Smismans, “Shaped by Discourses,” 486.

84 Ibid., 474.

85 Sudbery, “The Legitimacy Gap,” 87.

86 Justin Greenwood, “Organized Civil Society and Input Legitimacy in the EU,” in Democratic

Dilemmas of Multilevel Governance: Legitimacy, Representation and Accountability in the European Union, ed. Joan DeBardeleben and Achim Hurrelmann (Hamsphire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 178.

87 Greenwood, “Organized Civil Society,” 180; Ruzza, “Conclusion,” 50; Justin Greenwood, “Review

Article: Organized Civil Society and Democratic Legitimacy in the European Union,” British Journal of

Political Science 37 (2007): 343.

88 Greenwood, “Review Article,” 343; Hans-Jörg Trenz, “A transnational space of contention? Patterns of

Europeanisation of civil society in Germany,” in Governance and civil society in the European Union:

Normative Perspectives Vol. 1, ed. Vincent Della Sala and Carlo Ruzza (Manchester: Manchester

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the necessary skills to be able to lobby the European Commission. The groups are very elitist and ordinary citizens are neither present nor consulted.89 As the Commission prefers to deal with organisations at the European level instead of national organisations, most civil society groups are umbrella organisations speaking for national umbrella organisations.90 This creates a distance to citizens in the Member States and leads to the fact that ordinary citizens still do not have the possibility to participate in European policy-making.91

Another point that might limit the success of civil society in participating in policy-making and thus its democratic impact is the complexity of the policy-making process itself. Civil society mostly lobbies the European Commission as it is most open to and has the most opportunities for input. However, this means that civil society’s influence ends when policy proposals are handed over to the European Parliament and Council. As the Commission only has power in the policy-shaping process but not in the decision-making process, direct impact of civil society’s input often gets lost in the policy-making process.92 This restriction seems to be intended by the Commission which focuses on the consultative, pre-decision stage for participation of civil society in its White Paper on Governance of 2001 but does not make concrete proposals for its inclusion in the decision-making stage.93

Furthermore, the Commission is very selective as to which civil society groups it chooses to consult. This does not only mean that groups have to adapt to the Commission’s criteria in order to be asked for an opinion but also that funding is given to civil society organisations of the Commission’s choice.94 According to Carlo Ruzza, the neo-liberal ethos of the EU slows down “allocation of resources and space to public pressure groups” and favours business groups as they tend to have more resources available on their own.95

89 Paul Magnette, “Democracy in the European Union: why and how to combine representation and

participation?” in Civil Society and Legitimate European Governance, ed. Stijn Smismans (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2006), 32.

90 Ruzza, “European institutions,” 172.

91 Greenwood, “Review article,” 348; Sudbery, “the Legitimacy Gap,” 94; Smismans, “Shaped by

Disocurses,” 493.

92 Paul Magnette, “European Governance and Civic Participation: Beyond Elitist Citizenship?” Political

Studies 51 (2003): 150.

93 European Commission, European Governance: A White Paper; Magnette, “European Governance,”

150.

94 Trenz, “Transnational Space,” 97.

95 Carlo Ruzza, “Advocacy coalitions and the participation of organised civil society in the European

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2.

Methodology: Frame Analysis

The intention behind writing this thesis is to critically analyze policy and position papers, official statements and documents from EWL and the EU in order to draw conclusions on the question if the EWL follows the same discourse as the European Commission and if it propagates the same ideas and argumentation. The thesis is also intended to give insights into changes of discourse over time and their reasons and effect on discourse and activities of the EWL. In order to be able to do so, documents are analysed using frame analysis. The frame analysis approach is chosen because it gives a good insight into the motivation of actors and in how they choose to present this motivation in their policy documents. This way, the interaction between the EWL and the European Commission can be analysed clearly.

2.1 Definitions and origins of frames and the frame analysis approach

The concepts of frame and frame analysis were originally elaborated by Erving Goffman in 1974. In his book Frame Analysis - An Essay on the Organization of Experience, Goffman states that frames give meaning to events that would otherwise be void of meaning.96 According to him, frames are “principles of organization which govern events – at least social ones – and our subjective involvement in them.”97 These frames make the understanding of events in society possible and form a major part of the culture of a society.98 In other words: frames are “mental constructs that organize perception and interpretation.”99 The construction of such frames and their analysis is called frame analysis.

Goffman’s concepts of frames and frame analysis were picked up by many authors in the social movement research field and were adapted to their purposes. Hank Johnston, a social movements researcher for example especially stresses the aspect of behaviour when he says that frames are “mental templates of appropriate behaviour for common situations, acquired through socialization and experience and fine-tuned by the individual on the basis of what worked in the past and/or what others report as

96 Erving Goffman, Frame Analysis – An Essay on the Organization of Experience (New York: Harper &

Row Publishers, 1974), 21.

97 Ibid., 1. 98 Ibid., 27.

99 Hank Johnston, “Comparative frame analysis,” in Frames of Protest – Social Movements and the

Framing Perspective, ed. Hank Johnston and John A. Noakes (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield

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useful.”100 He thus extends the definition by saying that frames do not only influence our perception but also our behaviour.

Especially David Snow and Robert Benford further developed and adapted Goffman’s concepts. Similar to Goffman, they consider frames to be an “interpretative schema that simplifies and condenses ‘the world out there’ by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of action”.101 According to Benford and Snow, frames “help to render events or occurrences meaningful and thereby function to organize experience and guide action.”102 They are socially and culturally constructed, as “meanings do not automatically attach themselves to the objects, events, or experiences we encounter but often arise, instead, through interactively based interpretive processes.”103 Benford and Snow refer to the construction of meaning as framing and see framing processes as a “central dynamic”104 in the study of social movements. Furthermore, to them, the act of framing is a discursive process on which frames are built.105 Frames are constructed with a particular intention in mind and are strategically used by social movement actors.106 They draw attention to important and relevant facts by analyzing what is going on and identifying who is responsible.107

According to Hank Johnston and John Noakes, two other scholars in the social movement research field, a frame “identifies a problem that is social or political in nature, the parties responsible for causing the problem, and a solution.”108 In other words, frames have several functions: they are diagnostic which means that they give a diagnosis of what the problem is and the reasons for the problem. They are also prognostic, thus presenting a solution to the diagnosed problem. Lastly, they are

100 Ibid., 239.

101 David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford, “Master Frames and Cycles of Protest,” in Frontiers in Social

Movement Theory, ed. Aldon D. Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller (New Haven: Yale University Press,

1992), 137.

102 Robert D. Benford. and David A. Snow, “Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview

and Assessment,” Annual Review of Sociology 26 (2000): 614.

103 David A. Snow, “Framing Processes, Ideology, and Discursive Fields,” in The Blackwell Companion

to Social Movements, ed. David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule and Hanspeter Kriesi (Malden: Blackwell

Publishing, 2004), 384.

104 Benford and Snow, “Framing Processes”, 612. 105 Ibid., 623.

106 Ibid., 624.

107 Hank Johnston and John A. Noakes, “Frames of Protest: a road map to a perspective,” in Frames of

Protest – Social Movements and the Framing Perspective, ed. Hank Johnston and John A. Noakes

(Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005), 2.

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motivational, meaning that they call for action in order to solve the problem that was suggested in the diagnosis.109

Frames are not static but subject to transformation. The act of framing is an ongoing process, thus frames evolve and change in discourse. As there can be competing frames in various arenas, these frames influence each other and are at the same time affected by the discursive context in which they are found.110

In social movement research, frame analysis is used to analyse above mentioned aspects of different frames and to see how frames are constructed and what effect they have on movements. In other words, “frame analysis is about how cognitive processing of events, objects, and situations gets done in order to arrive at an interpretation.”111 Thus, frame analysis is about finding the way meaning was constructed.112 Frames are analysed through the analysis of discourse. In order to study the different aspects of a frame and their effect, discursive processes within organisations, institutions and movements are examined. These discursive processes include documents, speeches, communications, policies and other speech or written acts produced by above mentioned actors.113 Analysis can be performed at different levels, such as at the level of individual actors but for this thesis, the level of organisations and institutions is more significant.

2.2 Relevance of the frame analysis approach

Frame analysis cannot only be used in social movement research to analyse social movement frames but it can also be used to look at policy frames. Policy frames are defined as “frames present in policy documents”114 and as “organizing principle that transforms fragmentary or incidental information into a structured and meaningful

109 Hank Johnston and Johan A. Noakes, “Frames of Protest,” 5f; Benford and Snow, “Framing

Processes,” 615ff.

110 Snow, “Ideology,” 402f; Johnston and Noakes, “Frames of Protest,” 16.

111 Hank Johnston, “A Methodology for Frame Analysis: from Discourse to Cognitive Schemata,” in

Social Movements and Culture, ed. Hank Johnston and Bert Klandermans (London: UCL Press, 1995),

218.

112 Petra Meier, “Critical Frame Analysis of EU Gender Equality Policies: New Perspectives on the

Substantive Representation of Women,” Representation 44 (2008): 157; Hank Johnston and Bert

Klandermans, “The Cultural Analysis of Social Movements,” in Social Movements and Culture, ed. Hank Johnston and Bert Klandermans (London: UCL Press, 1995), 8 ff.

113 Benford and Snow, “Framing Processes,” 623.

114 Tamás Dombos et al, “Critical Frame Analysis: A Comparative Methodology for the QUING Project”

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problem, in which a solution is implicitly or explicitly included.”115 Thus, the frames in policy documents contain diagnosis of and prognosis for a problem, similar to social movement frames. Sometimes, they will also contain a call for action, indicating actors who are to solve the diagnosed problem.116 However, they differ from social movement frames in the sense that they cannot always be traced back to a specific actor but can also originate in institutions.117

Frame analysis is a useful way to study policy documents as it allows analysing the key dimensions of the representation of a policy problem. In the case of this thesis, it concerns the policy problem of gender equality as understood by the EWL and the EU.118 Frame analysis can identify the different ways that gender equality and possible solutions to inequality are framed. As “[g]ender equality is a dynamic, contested concept that takes on different meanings in spatiotemporal contexts”119 it can be interpreted and contested in very different ways by various actors.120 Therefore, in this thesis I use frame analysis to carefully examine the “creative process of construction, analysing what gets constructed how and by whom.”121 By analysing frames, I look at how the ownership of the problem and the solution are framed and in which other policy dimensions they are located.122 This then allows us to see whether and how the EWL has influence on European policy making.

2.3 Proceeding

In the thesis, I proceed as follows. First of all, the choice of documents is important. The most important actors are identified and major changes and shifts are included.123 However, due to time and space limits and the topical limit of this thesis, the selection of documents is restricted to policy documents from the European Commission and the EWL on a certain issue within gender equality policy.

115 Mieke Verloo, “Mainstreaming Gender Equality in Europe. A Frame Analysis Approach” (paper

presented at the Conference of Europeanists, Chicago, USA, 11-13 March 2004), 4.

116 Ibid., 9. 117 Ibid., 10.

118 Emanuela Lombardo and Lise Rolandsen Agustín, “Framing intersectionality in the European Union

gender equality policies: what implications for the quality of policies?” (paper presented at the ECPR First European Conference on Politics and Gender, Belfast, Northern Ireland, 21-23 January 2009), 3; Meier, “Substantive Representation,” 157.

119 Dombos, “Critical Frame Analysis,” 4.

120 Emanuela Lombardo et al. quoted in Dombos, “Critical Frame Analysis,” 4. 121 Meier, “Substantive representation,” 157.

122 Emanuela Lombardo and Petra Meier, “Framing Gender Equality in the European Union Political

Discourse,” Social Politics 15 (2008): 105f.

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The analysis will centre around two official strategies for equality between women and men issued by the European Commission: the Roadmap for equality between women and men 2006-2010 and the Strategy for equality between women and men 2010-2015. In addition, the report of a conference Gender Equality: a step ahead – A Roadmap for the future is looked at as well. All these documents can clearly show prominent and reoccurring frames on gender equality constructed by the European Commission. Documents of the European Commission are chosen as the Commission is, as the initiator of policies, the European institution that can first formulate policies on gender equality. For this reason, it is also the European institution towards which most lobbying efforts are directed.

From the EWL, two consultation papers concerning the two official strategies are analysed: the Gender Equality Road Map for the European Community 2006-2010 Presented by the European Women’s Lobby issued in 2005 and the European Women’s Lobby Response to the Consultation on the Roadmap for equality between women and men 2006-2010 and follow-up strategy of October 2009. Furthermore, the presentation Towards a new EU strategy for gender equality by the current director of the EWL, Myra Vassiliadou, is included in the analysis. These documents from the EWL are accessible via their website.

Borrowing from the frame analysis methodology of the MAGEEQ project, the following aspects are looked at while analysing above documents.124 Diagnosis, responsible actors, prognosis and call for action are the basic dimensions of study. In addition, the framing strategies of reframing and counterframing are looked at. Reframing refers to the fact of linking different frames, “whereby a (subordinated frame) is introduced into a (dominant) frame.”125 Counterframing can be described as constructing frames in order to possibly introduce new issues on the political agenda by challenging already existing frames.126 Naturally, place, time, actors, audience and main issues are evaluated as well.

124 MAGEEQ is a research project funded by the European Commission. It deals with policy frames and

implementation problems of gender mainstreaming in 6 different European Countries. The project was set up in 2003 and the researchers used the frame analysis approach to arrive at their conclusions. MAQEEQ,

Policy frames and implementation problems: The case of gender mainstreaming (MAGEEQ Research

Project), www.mageeq.net (accessed: 31 October 2010).

125 Lise Rolandsen Agustín, “Civil Society Participation in EU Gender Policy-Making: Framing

Strategies and Institutional Constraints”, Parliamentary Affairs 61 (2008): 509.

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3.

Development of Gender Equality Policy of the European Union

To understand the development of the European Women’s Lobby’s and the European Commission’s discourse on European Union gender equality policy, it is important to have insight into European gender equality policy in general. This chapter gives a brief overview on European Union gender equality policy and the major shifts from 1957 until today in order to show how the gender equality policy of the European Union evolved and how the ideas behind this policy have changed over the years.

3.1 Article 119

Article 119 in the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (1957) marks the beginning of European gender equality policy.127 Article 119 states the principle of equal pay for equal work with a strong focus on employment.128 The article introduces, for the first time in most of the original Member States, a regulation on the equal payment of women and men. On the surface, it shows a preoccupation with the fact that the work of men and women has to be valued equally, thus a beginning for gender equality policy. In reality, however, the article did not demonstrate so much feminist thought as the fear of competitive disadvantage by the French. As equal pay legislation was already in existence in France in 1957, French industries were afraid that the creation of an economic zone without tariffs would be very expensive for France. Their fear was of not being able to be competitive enough compared to companies in countries with cheaper labour. As the other founding states wanted to ensure lasting peace between France and Germany, they agreed very quickly to the proposal to include an article on equal pay in the Treaty of Rome.129

The focus of article 119 and all intentions behind it were strongly focused on economic issues and employment in particular. The fear of an imbalanced competition was the main reason for its inclusion in the treaty.130 According to Sara Clavero and Yvonne Galligan, it was “[m]odestly constructed to enable the harmonization of social

127 European Communities, The Treaty of Rome, 25 March 1957.

128 Chrystalla A. Ellina, Promoting Women’s Rights – The Politics of Gender in the European Union

(New York: Routledge, 2003), 21ff.; Sara Clavero and Yvonne Galligan, “Constituting and

Reconstituting the Gender Order in Europe,” Perspectives on European Politics and Society 10 (2009): 103; Biermann and Wobbe, Von Rom nach Amsterdam, 11.

129 Ellina, Promoting Women’s Rights, 24.

130 Ellina, Promoting Women’s Rights, 28; Jane Lewis, “Work/family reconciliation, equal opportunities

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costs in the interests of equalizing economic competitiveness.”131 It did not explicitly prohibit gender discrimination and its implementation in the six founding Member States did not take place until 20 years later.132

Furthermore, Article 119 was built on a particular understanding of gender equality. The authors of the Treaty of Rome understood gender equality “in terms of the same treatment of men and women in the workplace.”133 The idea behind this is to see men and women as the same and to guarantee them equal opportunities in the labour market. The downside of this approach to gender equality is that it does not take into consideration that men and women live in different circumstances and that women encounter different and more obstacles than men because of their gender.134 Article 119 was therefore aimed at taking away the overlaying symptoms but not the deep-rooted societal causes of gender inequality.

3.2 European gender equality policy in the 1970s

In addition, the implementation of Article 119 was very slow. It was only in the mid-1970s that action was undertaken to truly implement the provisions of Article 119. The Member States had proven to be reluctant to the change proposed in it and it took a change in government in several countries to spark a “strong commitment to a renewed social policy” at the European level.135

In addition to this, the feminist movement in all Member States grew and more pressure was executed on national governments to change the situation of women. The ideas and demands these women propagated challenged traditions and cultural attitudes and brought about a new focus on gender equality also at European level.136

Furthermore, groups of women in the Member States also began to use Article 119 in law claims in order to achieve their rights.137 This led to a strong involvement of the European Court of Justice in gender equality policy. The Court began to enforce gender equality in the Member States and even postulated the direct horizontal effect of

131 Clavero and Galligan, “Gender Order in Europe,” 103.

132 Johanna Kantola and Kevät Nousiainen, “Institutionalizing Intersectionality in Europe,” International

Feminist Journal of Politics 11 (2009): 464.

133 Lewis, “Work/family reconciliation,” 426.

134 Emanuela Lombardo, “EU Gender Policy: Trapped in the `Wollstonecraft Dilemma'?“ European

Journal of Women’s Studies 10 (2003), 161.

135 Catherine Hoskyns, Integrating Gender – Women, Law and Politics in the European Union (London:

Verso, 1996), 80.

136 Ellina, Promoting Women’s Rights, 38.

137 Rachel A. Cichowski, “’No discrimination whatsoever’ – women’s transnational activism and the

Evolution of EU Sex Equality Policy,” in Women’s Activism and Globalization – Linking local struggles

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