Master Thesis:
Security of Humanitarian Workers and
Private Security Providers (PSPs)
Supervisor:
Prof. Dr. Joost Herman
Lucia Blanco 1943391
Rijksuniversiteit Groningen
Groningen, 30 Nov 2010
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Master Thesis:
Security of Humanitarian Workers and
Private Security Providers (PSPs)
Prof. Dr. Joost Herman
Lucia Blanco 1943391
Rijksuniversiteit Groningen
2010
2 Table of content List of Acronyms 1. Introduction 1.1. Context 1.2. Research Question 1.3. Objectives 1.4. Methodology 1.5. Purpose 1.6. Paper Structure
2. The Security of Humanitarians
2.1. Changes in the Humanitarian Context: impact on security 2.2. Term definitions
2.3. Reasons and reports of security 2.4. The impact from inside
3. Private Security Providers (PSPs) and Security Management in Humanitarian Organizations
3.1. The Role of PSPs in the Humanitarian Space
3.2. Security management in Humanitarian Organizations 3.3. About Security and Management
3.4. Remote Management
4. The concerns raised by PSPs
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4.1.1. From public service to a market of security 4.1.2. Humanitarian Principles and PSPs
4.1.3. Legality, liability and accountability
4.2. Current Regulations
5. Conclusion
4 Acronyms
ACF Action Against Hunger (Action Contre la Faim)
ALNAP Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action
ANSO The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office CIC Centre on International Cooperation DRC Democratic Republic of Congo
ECHO European Commission of Humanitarian Aid & Civil Protection GDP Gross Domestic Product
HNP Humanitarian Practice Network HPG Humanitarian Policy Group
HPCR Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research of Harvard University INGO International Non- Governmental Organization
ICRC Committee of the Red Cross IASC Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICVA International Council of Voluntary Agencies IHL International Humanitarian Law
ISECT Integrated Security Clearance & Tracking LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MSF Doctors without Borders (Medecins Sans Frontieres) NGO Non- Governmental Organization
OCHA Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs ODI Overseas Development Institute
PSP Private Security Provider
UN United Nations
UNDSS UN department of Safety and Security
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
5 1. Introduction:
Security of Humanitarian Workers and Private Security Providers (PSPs)
1.1. Context
In June 2004 five workers from Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) were killed during an incident in Kabul, Afghanistan. 17 aid workers from Action Against Hunger (ACF) were shot to death in August, 2006 in Sri Lanka during an intense period of fighting between Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the government’s armed forces of that country. 34 UN personnel were assassinated during 2008 as a result of ‘malicious acts’. These and dozens of more tragedies have been reported with more frequency during the last two decades. Humanitarian personnel have increasingly become the target of attacks, kidnaps, ambushes and violence in the field, thus limiting their capacity to access and reach those who are most needed. The places where humanitarian actions are carried out are insecure environments.
It is during the 1990s that security has started to impact more negatively in the humanitarian missions. The experiences and perceptions of security incidents in the field have led to important changes. There has been an important evolution in the management of security within humanitarian organizations. Some new security practices have arisen and have been implemented recently. The outsourcing of security services is one of those practices and Private Security Providers (PSPs) have been attending to this growing market.
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these private companies. In situations when IHL is applied there still remains a grey area on who is accountable for those crimes: the contractor or the perpetrator. This normally remains only as an issue of reputation and bad marketing image for the companies rather than actual legal responsibility for their actions. The crimes have remained, most of the times, unpunished. As a result, from the more publicized incidents PSPs have been branded as mercenaries and have incited the discussion over their regulation.
The present research is a result of the concern as a humanitarian worker of the security practices that might be counterproductive to both, the effective delivery of aid and for the security of the aid organizations’ human assets. The reason why this has become an issue is mainly the confrontation of the humanitarian ideologies and the new practices given the increasing complexity of the emergencies. More specifically, the concern is on those deterrence practices that involve the use of force and the outsourcing of these services. This dilemma is linked in its entirety to the core principles of humanitarianism: humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence. The definition of the humanitarian principles rises under the light of the work of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)1 that represents a guiding actor in the humanitarian
sector. Thus, the purpose of humanitarianism is to alleviate human suffering by delivering aid to those vulnerable and affected groups disregarding religion, race, gender, age or any other discriminative condition. Any humanitarian action is not to take part in any conflict or situation taking place in the affected area and therefore, will act independently for its own mandate to achieve its humanitarian objectives.
Armed-protected humanitarian INGOs or NGOs entail for some academics a contradiction to their principles. If they are neutral and impartial and their objective is to alleviate human suffering, they should not need to outsource security. Some humanitarians, like the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), state that hiring PSPs is incoherent with the whole humanitarian philosophy. They believe it is a threat to
1 ICRC was created in 1863 as the result of the ideology of Henry Dunant, which basically focused
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the intrinsic principles of the humanitarian action. Outsource security might jeopardize the safety of the organization, specifically due to the loss of neutrality and impartiality that such a relationship implies.
Other humanitarians see the relationship between security forces and aid organizations as the ‘new humanitarianism’ that responds to global changes. For them such security practices are not a contradiction to humanitarianism, but an evolution required to adapt to the new contexts. This perspective is linked to military and political aims. There are evident justifications for hiring private security that go along with the fundamental purpose of humanitarian assistance, e.g. the access to the victims and survivors impartially in order to alleviate human suffering. Hiring PSPs is seen lately as something necessary and useful.
8 1.2. Research Question
Given those services that the security providers are fulfilling in the humanitarian field, are their activities improving humanitarianism or jeopardizing the human, neutral, impartial and independent position of humanitarians in the field? To what extent does the incursion of PSPs in the humanitarian space affect humanitarianism and its core principles?
1.3. Objectives
General Objective
This review seeks to address to what extent does the incursion of PSPs in the humanitarian space affect humanitarianism and its principles. Based on a qualitative comparison of benefits and perils gathered from the international discussion on PSPs; the identification of how their link affects humanitarian organizations will determine to what extent hiring PSPs can potentially threat the humanitarian space and what regulations should be taken. This research will be focused on the current security situation for humanitarian workers in the field and what tools have been developed to cope with it.
Specific Objectives
Given the contexts where aid workers operate:
What is the security situation of aid workers in the present and what influences that?
• To determine what is the level of insecurity that humanitarian workers faced in the field given the contexts where they operate.
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• To describe the role of PSPs in this given scenario
How has the operational security management responded to this situation to cope with the actual risks for humanitarians?
• To review what has been done in the security management field to respond to the risks
• To compare the contextual situation with the operational practices of security to identify field of improvements or good practices
What are the different positions regarding the contracting of PSPs?
• To discuss the issues of PSPs from three different angles: practical-based, principled-based and legal-based approaches
How is this dealt with within the security management? Is there a point of agreement that could be taken?
• To recognize the potential risks that humanitarian organizations have while hiring PSPs, regarding these three approaches
1.4. Methodology
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and other relevant literature and articles with both, reasons for the use of security and the negative implications of it.
Both of the debates have valid arguments for whatever the position they are taking. However, the mix of them together leaves gaps. Some of the disadvantages of PSPs do not necessarily apply for humanitarian organizations. The same happens with the advantages. Therefore, security needs a grass root level to be able to determine the real benefits and perils of PSPs in a humanitarian context. Thus, this is an empirical study, seeking for those matching points between the existing framework and the complex context where it is taking place.
1.5. Purpose
The purpose of this research is to present potential improvements on security practices for a sensible regulation in contracting PSPs by humanitarian organizations. This could serve as reference for those in charge of elaborating security controls and regulations for humanitarian organizations.
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purpose is to identify the real perils and advantages that humanitarian organizations have while hiring private security.
1.6. Paper Structure
The first part of this paper will be focused on the current security situation of humanitarian staff. What are the facts and what are the perceptions regarding the security of humanitarian workers in the field. This part will also make reference to those internal and external aspects of the organization that influence security. For instance, external geopolitical transformations have been significant to the new conditions. Thus, it is important to consider the recent background regarding important political changes to better understand the general international context in which humanitarian organizations operate at the moment. At an internal level there is a review of specific characteristics of individual humanitarian organizations that affect their security policies. These views focus on the different types of humanitarian organizations and workers, and how their principles and work methodology affect the overall security.
The second part will deal with the technical aspects and the theory behind security management. This will be based on the review of some of the most recent documents on security good practices. The comparison of the development of security management with the global context, in which they operate, presented in the first part, could help to the identification of possible differences. Such a comparison will also allow identifying the possibilities for the standardization of security management for humanitarian organizations.
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current concerns will be presented here: a-) practical-based discussion, b-) principled-base approach and c-) legal-principled-based approach to the use of PSPs.
The final part will be dedicated to summarize conclusions and elaborate on recommendations for the effective and efficient management of security of humanitarian organizations. Moreover, seek alternatives to avoid myths related to the use of PSPs to adopt better practices on security management. This is an attempt to adapt to the new humanitarian contexts without jeopardizing the effectiveness of the missions and humanitarianism itself.
Note:
13 2. The Security of Humanitarians
2.1. Changes in the Humanitarian Context: impact on security
Increasingly or not, justified or mere casualties, humanitarians have been attacked. Besides the changing practices made to cope with these situations, security concerns have reduced the humanitarian space over the last two decades. This is better understood when analyzing all the other actors present in the ‘so called’ most insecure places. Simple numbers cannot explain nor can give solutions to the insecure environment. When talking about the last two decades as the reference point for the changing dynamics, it is difficult not to acknowledge the geopolitical impact on the global security situation of the end of the Cold War and the post 9/11 periods. The nature of conflicts changed. On an international relations level many different justifications converge, involving all political and economic reasons (Tunander, 1997: 17-41). Humanitarian interventions are then affected as the interests (political and economic) of the other actors (states, military, INGOs and NGOs) present in the field shift to the achievement of different objectives.
During the second half of the 20th century, geopolitics was ruled on an ideological
basis between two polarized sides (democracy vs. communism). Once communism was ‘defeated’, the raise of a critical approach started contending the institutional liberalism that prevailed (Dalby et. al., 2006). Nearly ten years after the fall of communism, the appearance of a new type of conflict, “the war on terror” challenged the international structural order in a great manner. International Humanitarian Law for instance still has no clear provisions as on how to deal with non-state actors or in many cases on concepts like “terror”. These remains a grey area since the lack of provisions raises questions such as; whose sovereignty is being violated? And; who is or not a combatant?
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Before the new war on terror, the inclusion of aid as an international policy instrument was already being implemented, being the current situation an evolution of it. This was articulated first as an organizational adaptation in contexts that ultimately transformed aid into another pillar of political purposes:
“The cross-border operations in Eritrea and Trigray are celebrated examples of this (Duffield and Prendergast, 1993). In these operations NGOs covertly provided a channel for donor funds into rebel areas. This set a pattern for a division of labor that has subsequently become formalized in sub-contracting relations between the UN, donor governments, and NGO’s” (Adams and Bradbury, 1995: 32).
Furthermore Adams and Bradbury explain how this formalization is translated into the practice. First example, the UN and government donors, i.e. the EU, strengthens its relief wing and creation of aid teams (e.g. ECHO). Second, the expansion of the peacekeeping operations by the UN with an increasing budget. The Agenda for Peace of 19922 represents clearly the call of the UN to the international community to commit in
the integration of actions to actually generate a positive peace3. Such integration was now
possible due to the end of the Cold War. That meant the fall of the main obstacle4 for the
achievement of the UN Charter main purpose: “To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace…” (UN Charter 1945, Art 1). Bearing in mind that aid is an important component for the relief of emergency damages, it is essential for this discussion to consider the consequences that the ‘new world order’ has on the
2 See http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html
3 Positive Peace is a concept articulated by Johan Galtung. It is widely use nowadays by Peace and
Conflict researchers. It refers to the absence of the indirect and passive causes of conflict.
Negative peace is then only the absence of violence, e.g. ceasefire, while the structural root causes of it remain the same. See Johan Galtung, Peace by peaceful means: peace and conflict,
development and civilization (SAGE, 1996).
4 The Agenda for Peace refers to the impossibility of action that the UN had during the Cold War
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humanitarian field. Moreover, the impact that it, in the end, has on the security for humanitarian personnel.
During the 90’s analysts began articulating the terms of the politization and militarization of aid. This makes reference to the new ‘modus operandi’ of relief interventions characterized by a mix of tasks carried out both by humanitarians and the other actors, i.e. military, peace operation forces, states. The increasing number of civil wars and the complexity of the conflicts impeded access to affected populations. Consequently the use of military forces to enter some dangerous areas to bring aid augmented. The working collaboration in the field and the repeated images of soldiers providing humanitarian assistance led to perception of one only actor in control. In such circumstances this actor may be viewed as the occupying force. Thus, the perception of neutrality and impartiality began to fade away in the provision of aid5, According to some
analyst these factors constituted a threat to the security of humanitarians. ‘One consequence is the increased targeting of aid workers by combatants’ (Adams and Bradbury, 1995: 34). Scenarios of these tragedies have been witnessed in Somalia, Serbia, Sudan, and Iraq, to mention some.
After the 9/11, global security has become the top priority of a majority of international policy agendas. Securitization of aid, which means using aid as a condition to achieve peace, was added to the list of deep causes of the insecurity for humanitarians. A clear and recent example is seen in Afghanistan. ‘Having legitimized regime change intervention, they find themselves prevented from negotiating their space with any group not approved by the architects of the new political dispensation. As the country slips towards a serious humanitarian crisis, there may be no way back from their (NGOs working in Afghanistan) lost neutrality’ (Shannon, 2009: 1). This operational environment forces humanitarians either to play the political role the occupying force has
5 See Volberg, Thorsten, ‘The politicization of humanitarian aid and its effect on the principles of
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in its agenda or risk their lives while trying to provide the humanitarian assistance without any other political priorities, but with the human imperative as the first motive.
2.2. Term Definitions
This definition of concepts is made in order to focus specifically in the relationship between PSPs and humanitarian organizations that could potentially generate a negative impact. The services provided by these companies go beyond the provision of only armed security. Some organizations have hired PSPs for training, formation, transport and some logistics. It is seen mostly as cooperation and coordination in the field rather than a threat for the perception or the realization of humanitarian objectives.
• Security incidents: for the purposes of this research these incidents will comprehend only those that, not only represent a threat for the life of the humanitarian worker, but also that are commonly believed to be prevented with outsource security, i.e. delinquency, theft, kidnaps, murders, ambushes, targeted attacks, likewise. Other incidents such as car accidents or diseases are not to be considered as security incidents for these matters.
• Humanitarian workers: all the staff working for humanitarian organizations, expatriates and national staff, carrying out tasks directly linked to the humanitarian mission. Outsource staff hired for security tasks will not be considered humanitarian worker nor will be military carrying out humanitarian activities be included as part of the humanitarians group. INGO or NGO staff. • Humanitarian Organizations: national and international organizations with a
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• Private Security Provider (PSPs): those private security companies that offer private protection services and charge a certain amount of money (‘accordingly’) for it.
• Contracted security services: when referring to the hiring of PSPs services this means specifically services to protect and prevent security incidents.
In order to understand better the relationship between humanitarian organizations and PSPs it is necessary to have a view of the situations that originate this link, namely security.
2.3. Reasons and reports of security
Humanitarian aid is provided most, if not all of the times, in difficult places. Situations of conflict, man-made or natural disasters, social and/or political instability (to mention some) are always present in the contexts where humanitarian workers operate. The management of safety and security in such environments requires caution. Security plans cannot be adapted from other type of organizations or institutions due to the specific nature of the work. When talking about security for humanitarians it implicitly involves the principles and objectives of humanitarian action as an integral part of it. It is a common belief that the humanitarian principles provide the aid workers with protection in the field.
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will lead to the creation of a proper security strategy, which may not be a simple task. The causes of security incidents in the humanitarian arena are broad, diverse, constantly changing and not well identified by the different sectors that are involved or influence the aid provision.
During the last two decades targeted attacks to humanitarian personnel have been perpetrated with more intensity changing therefore security practices in the field. Chechnya, Iraq, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan are just some of the places where deliberated killings, terrorist attacks, kidnappings and ambushes have been made against humanitarian workers. There may be numerous reasons why these attacks occurred however it is necessary to ask whether the change in the humanitarian context previously mentioned has made them a preferred target of attacks. Such happenings are no less than the effect of a wider geopolitical context.
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The analysis of the security incidents made by both scholars and humanitarian workers may not be coherent between each other and therefore important differences exist to explain the causes of such violence. “For example, humanitarian practitioners lament the slippage of principles while international relations scholars tend to focus on terrorism and security” (Fast, 2010: 3). The latter opinion focuses on external factors, i.e. geopolitical changes, nature of conflicts, politics, etc. as the main causes of insecurity giving no place to other possible explanations. While doing so scholars are letting aside some internal factors, those over which humanitarian organizations have some control, i.e. security plans, personnel behavior, independence of actions, etc. The understanding of the security situations and the strategies taken are somehow biased instead of a complement to each other.
While reviewing how the level of security for humanitarians in the field is, there are differences between the academics’ and the humanitarians’ reports. Statistics of incidents are influenced by the variety of definitions that organizations have of security incidents and of humanitarian personnel as explained in the ECHO Security Review Report. In a wider scale, an increase in the reported security incidents (including these car accidents, corruption and illness for example) results in a higher number of security incidents reported. There is also the lack of understanding of those reporting incidents to differentiate between a humanitarian worker and other actors. As mentioned in ECHO’s report: ‘A recorded plane crash in Fizi, DRC on 18th September 1997 killed 22 people, of whom two worked for a humanitarian organization. Many of the other passengers were religious leaders attending a conference. In these circumstances the recording of the incident is correct, but not all the deaths could be strictly identified as humanitarian personnel’ (Barnett, 2004: 12-13). For these matters the report suggests to make reference to NGO’s worker/ staff instead of humanitarian worker.
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correlation is not direct it could influence and affect the security of humanitarians. If geopolitical interests are to be mixed with those humanitarian purposes, the security of the organization could be threatened. This is for instance the case of the combination of mandates, besides the humanitarian one, within the objectives of a mission, e.g. peacekeeping operations. According to a study made by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) and Centre on International Cooperation (CIC) shows how the number of violent and targeted attacks against humanitarian personnel increases where there is the presence of a UN peacekeeping mission6, where humanitarian mandates are combined
with political and economic ones:
“The one slight exception seems to be the presence of UN peacekeeping missions or UN sanctioned peace support operations. Where this variable7 was present, we
saw a slight, but statistically significant, increase in the number of international staff victims. (Stoddard et al., 2006: 19)”.
Another important factor affecting the perceived rise of humanitarians’ insecurity is the increase in missions and number of humanitarians working in the field responding to the increase in crises and emergencies. Simple numbers do not represent levels of security per se. It is logical to say that the more aid workers there are and the more missions are set, the higher the probability of incidents to happen.
On a different report made by the European Commission of Humanitarian Aid & Civil Protection (ECHO) it is stated that: ‘[t]here is no hard evidence at this point to suggest that there has been a significant increase in the number of security incidents either in numbers of incidents or in numbers of people affected’ (Barnett, 2004: 22). This
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Although in this context the presence of a UN peacekeeping mission is seeing as an external variable, the concept of integrated mission is in its entirety an internal factor of the organization.
7 The variables to which this fragment refers to are: “intensity of the conflict based on the number
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affirmation is related to the ODI/CIC report where the collected statistics and conclusions show that the rise in number of violent incidents is proportional with the increment in number of aid workers (Stoddard et al., 2006: 2). A wide number of studies made not only by academics but also by humanitarians and other complementary literature8 are
summarized by Larissa Fast. With this comparison she concludes that: “The studies above [referring to the reports she analyzed] focus primarily on the epidemiological approach, including counts, rates, risk factors, and trends about who dies, where, and in what type of incident. Accurately assessing the intentionality of the act remains a vexing research problem” (Fast, 2010: 10). With this, she points out the unfeasibility of determining the root causes of any attack. Moreover, Fast highlights the contradictions in numbers and tendencies that these reports present to justify the attacks. Under these circumstances it is not possible to elaborate on a global tendency of insecurity.
Given such contradictions and differences in numbers and definitions, there is a lack of consensus among the different reports and research made, assuring that humanitarians’ face increasing insecurity. One overall conclusion is agreed upon and that is the change in the humanitarian context. Whether or not this situation has increased the number of incidents does not matter as much as how it can change humanitarian practices themselves.
2.4. The impact from inside
Humanitarian workers have experienced security incidents long before security became an issue and before it was introduce as a fundamental part of the mission management. Yet, as explained above, the international geopolitical changes have become more complex. The tendency of including humanitarian action in the international policy agendas is now more frequent. Some of the examples mentioned can demonstrate how
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this impacts the loss of humanitarian principles and security. This does not mean that neutrality and impartiality are the panacea to all security incidents. Relevant here is the principle of independence that ultimately plays an important role in safeguarding the rest of the principles. Once an organization starts being over-dependent and partial to an outside actor (i.e. donors) it compromises its neutral and impartial focus. Those NGOs or IGOs who agree on accepting, and operating under, the rules of big donors with political agendas may jeopardize and affect in general the whole humanitarian community, as for the beneficiaries there is no distinction of names or types of organizations. Outside the whole discussion that takes place about the role of humanitarian relief for international affairs, the humanitarian community should take a position as to what they actually are and what their main goal is.
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None of these positions or views has ever prevented or safeguarded humanitarians from falling victims to attacks. Nonetheless, the negative repercussions for having an everyday increasing number of NGOs, all with different positions and beliefs, are serious for the rest of the actors present in the field, including other humanitarians. Organizations do not work alone. An example of this is the situation in Colombia. During an interview with an Action Against Hunger (ACF) logistician, he referred to the new security strategies that the organization has to implement as a result of the new role of ICRC. The Red Cross has obtained a very important role in negotiations with the FARC insurgents and as a mediator with the government. This has had negative implications to the image of other organizations as they may be perceived as informants, enabling attacks9. This exemplifies how what one organization does, it affects the rest.
There are many security measures that the organizations can take to protect themselves from violence and attacks. One of them is the internal security plans. The considerations of all the above mentioned aspects could provide a wider spectrum of the threats (explicit and implicit ones), and mitigate the risks. Of course there are always going to be situations that cannot be prevented, such as urban violence, when perpetrators are civilians and have purely economic motives for attacking.
The following conclusions can be made thus far:
• It is affirmed that there has been an increment in the use of aid for political purposes. This has had an impact on the security of humanitarians. Although, there is a considerable level of difficulty to prove targeted attacks.
• It is not possible to assure if the risks for humanitarians’ security in the field has increased. Yet, due to the rising number of missions, NGOs and humanitarian workers, the chances for accidents or incidents to happen are higher.
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• When reviewing security statistics it is important to distinguish between the type incidents reported. For instance, three car accidents required different attention and measures than three car-jacking incidents. Statistically the number of incidents is the same, although the consequences are not.
• Principles and values of an organization do have an impact on the security measures they take.
• The modus operandi of one organization in the field has consequences on the rest of organizations.
The global political context and the complexity of emergencies tend to blur the lines between the different mandates of all the stakeholders involved in these crises. This is important to better understand the current proposals elaborated on security management and better practices for it. In this regard PSPs have become an important actor, since their presence in the humanitarian space is increasing.
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3. PSPs and Security Management of Humanitarian Organizations
3.1. The Role of PSPs in the Humanitarian Space
As delimited in the second part of this paper, when talking about PSPs we refer to: those private security companies that offer private protection services and charge a certain amount of money (‘accordingly’) for it. The nature of services offered by these companies for protection and the contexts where they operate could engage the accountability, legality and pertinence of their actions and those of their clients.
The focus made on the contracting of PSPs is mainly due to the following reasons:
• Different philosophies regarding the use of PSPs has become another obstacle to security coordination in the field (Bolletino, 2006: 7)
• On a legal basis it raises a lot of discussions in terms of the legitimacy and accountability of these companies, due to their private nature.
• It is in the theory and in the practice that the use of private (armed) security jeopardizes the humanitarian principles.
• In contrast with other type of measures this is the only one among humanitarians that could serve as deterrence measure (van Brabandt, 2000: 69), which has legal implications.
“...the conduct of private security personnel had caused "a lot of uproar among the Afghan population". "Their behaviour has always been questioned. Many of them were involved in accidents on highways where innocent Afghan civilians were killed," (Al Jazeera News, Tuesday, August 17, 2010. Article: Karzai issues security deadline. www.english.aljazeera.net)
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Security providers offer a varied set of services beyond the mere protection. It is this simple distinction that gets omitted and increases the criticism on the hiring practices. The types of services contracted by humanitarian organizations will determine to what extent the issues currently discussed on perils and advantages will impact the action of the contracting organization and its partners in the field.
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Chart 1: Use of PSPs by humanitarian actors in 2007 (responses consolidated by organisation)
Source: The use of private security providers and services in humanitarian operations, Stoddard et al., 2008: 8
As described in the HPN report, this trend responds to situations of insecurity mainly experienced by humanitarian organizations working in countries experiencing or recently recovering from a conflict or emergency where the attacks on humanitarian personnel and goods has increased. Complementary to this finding is the categorization of services contracted. The report also highlights that the contracting PSPs for the provision of armed protection was the exception:
“Out of all field offices surveyed, a minority – 17% – reported using PSPs for armed protective services in field operations in the past year. When responses were consolidated by organization, the figure rose to 22%. In general armed services were the exception” (Stoddard et al., 2008: 9).
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contract of local providers by NGOs than by the UN. In terms of the contract of armed protection the UN does it more than the rest of NGOs.
Chart 2: Usage trends by UN and NGOs (responses consolidated by organisation)
Source: Stoddard et al., 2008: 9
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The following case is an illustrative example of how in the practice these tendencies occur. It is taken from an informal interview of the author with a logistics coordinator working for ACF, Madrid.
Case 1 reflects one of the possible scenarios, among several different ones, that humanitarian organizations find in the field related to security contracting. There is a decision-making process taking place only in headquarters, disregarding consensus on the security strategies in other regions of the country. The reason was an increase in number of security incidents related to rubbery in Addis Ababa. Hiring the local PSP seemed to be the common and most effective response under a local perspective. The fact that the same watch-men once fired were hired afterward by the PSP reflects that such expected improvement in professionalism is not necessarily true just for being a paid service. Awassa happened to be at the moment a relatively quiet rural town. Besides, the Case 1. An aid organization with a mission in Ethiopia has a base in Awassa (SNRR). In this base they have hired 10 local people to monitor the office. The headquarters of the mission in the field is located in Addis Abeba, Ethiopia. From there they took the decision to hire a local PSP to offer unarmed protection to all its sub-offices in this country due to an increase in the criminality in the capital city. Strategically this represents a costs cut in the security budget. On the administrative level it represents less time and resources invested in the contracting, insurance, payment and management of personnel. Also, the contracting of a company dedicated to security services would ensure more expertise and professionalism of protection activities. According to the HoB (Head of Base) in Awassa, Ethiopia the firing of the local personnel was of course not well accepted by the community. Up from that moment the changing of the security personnel was not under the control of the aid organization, i.e. in case one of the employees incurs in bad behaviour, the admonishment or firing decision depends on the private company for whom they directly work. It also means that in case this company for whatever reasons decides not to work in that specific place, they would leave. Perception-wise, an aid organization working together with outsourced personnel wearing uniforms is not well accepted in any community.
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efficiency of the organization’s projects in the area allowed them not to jeopardize their acceptance in the area. On a case by case basis every situation requires good knowledge and security managerial and intuitive skills. The professionalism of the humanitarian personnel behind each mission plays a main role in the success of a security strategy.
From the side of the PSPs there has been an increased interest of professionalizing the sector. The part of the sector that is interested in the humanitarian market shows concern and interest of improving the image and the accountability of these companies. This implies the better understanding and training on the humanitarian foundations of security and the dynamic and logic of acceptance, protection and deterrence. Their motivation to do so is still contended. Some say this is the result of their interest on exploring new markets and increase revenues. Others see it as a strategy to improve their image after some international scandals involving PSPs, e.g. the shooting of 17 civilians in Iraq by the North American PSP Blackwater. The speculation of PSPs entering the humanitarian space is gaining power. The HPN report makes reference to two companies that have already taken the initiative to professionalize and tailor its services to optimize ‘peace-support operations’, The BlueSky Foundation10 and the AEGIS Foundation11.
However the discrepancies of both sectors, private corporations and humanitarian organizations on issues of principle when considering military undertaking humanitarian work, are in the practice difficult to conciliate (Stoddard et al., 2008: 15-20).
Trends of usage can be charted to some extent. Yet, there are aspects such as contexts that cannot be grouped into categories. Out of the three currently most dangerous humanitarian places one cannot define a security management tendency. “In Afghanistan, most humanitarian organizations (...) are developing independent means to protect themselves, including contracting. In Somalia(...) agencies are forced to consider security provision in a more deliberate way than they otherwise would. (...) [T]he government in Khartoum has prevented international firms from operating (...) it has
10 See http://www.bsgfoundation.org/index.asp.
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meant that most aid organizations rely primarily on in-house capacity”... (Stoddard et al., 2008: 21). The concerns thus for international and regional regulations is growing too.
3.2. Security Management in Humanitarian Organizations
The afore mentioned impact on the security of humanitarian personnel during the last two decades has resulted in a series of changes and innovations of the security practices, thus affecting the security management of humanitarian organizations. Whether perception or reality, a single attack on humanitarians, targeted or not, reacts as a warning alarm to the whole sector. How the different organizations cope with security and safety varies and will likely be designed around their internal principles, values and mandates. Yet, insecurity comes both from outside an organization and from inside factors, as it was described in the previous chapter. The way how organizations perceive all the different aspects that threaten their security will determine which measures they are going to take on an operational level to mitigate insecurity risks.
An aspect also influential to the increasing importance of the security practices is the evolution of the humanitarian sector towards better practices of monitoring, evaluation and accountability of their missions. The criticism on failed interventions, like Rwanda or Srebrenica in Bosnia, has resulted in a series of evaluation measures; minimum operational standards initiatives and demand of accountability to all sectors (beneficiaries, donors, counterparts, governments). Insecurity is one of the main detonators to force a humanitarian organization to withdraw a mission. According to the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP) study on The State of the Humanitarian System, insecurity has a negative impact on the results of humanitarian work when assessing coverage12.
12
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“In a few contexts, humanitarian access is seen to be declining, owing to insecurity and/or host government restrictions. In the most contested environments, insecurity for aid workers has increased markedly.” (Stoddard, et. al., 2009: 10) .
This demonstrates a decrease in the effectiveness of the humanitarian reach and assistance provided. One of the fundamental bases for the establishment of criteria to evaluate the humanitarian action is The Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non Governmental Organizations in Disaster Relief. The first principle of this code of conduct is that of the humanitarian imperative, stating that:
“As members of the international community, we recognize our obligation to provide humanitarian assistance wherever it is needed. Hence the need for unimpeded access to affected populations is of fundamental importance in exercising that responsibility.”(SPHERE Project Handbook, 2004: 317)13
If security is becoming one more obstacle to carry out the obligations and responsibilities of a humanitarian intervention and while doing so, reducing the effectiveness of the actions, then the accountability of humanitarian organizations is compromised. On the one hand, the accountability to the beneficiaries ceases when the access to them is limited. On the other hand, there is no accountability to the donors when the objectives are not achieved. Therefore, security management within a humanitarian organization is crucial for every single aspect of their existence, i.e. ideologically and operationally.
There is no doubt that the number of organizations, local and international, is increasing. Each of these organizations has its own different mission and their own system has adequate resources to do the job?; and, 2 – Is there capacity to reach all populations in need? (Stoddard, et. al., 2009: 15).
13
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security plans, designed according to their own values, experience, capacity and knowledge of the circumstances. The following are some of the most relevant guidelines designed recently to improve the management of security in humanitarian organizations. The idea is to compare what is happening and how organizations cope in the practice with what is assumed and elaborated only in the theory. This will provide us with a wider perspective of what could actually be improved and in which way should it be done. Moreover, the purpose is to identify whether it is possible, appropriate and realistic to standardize security plans and modus operandi of the humanitarian community in the field, specifically focusing on practices related to contracting private security.
Before getting to the specific issues concerning the PSPs, it is necessary to have a wider view on security management. It is important for this research to review the different existing proposals towards the standardization of guidelines regarding security protocols. It is also necessary to recognize which are the main definitions and operational strategies designed so far for the provision of safety and protection of humanitarian staff and assets in the field.
3.3. About Security and Management
To talk about security management in humanitarian organizations one must first define what is security inside a context of emergency, conflict or disaster. According to a Humanitarian Policy Brief by Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research of Harvard University (HPCR) on security it refers to security management as:
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Bolletino leaves out from his definition, the ability of the organizations to carry out effectively and efficiently their humanitarian missions, which should be their ultimate goal. This is further clarified by van Brabandt on the Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) report on safety and security management:
“There is indeed an incompressible element of risk in humanitarian aid work, but good security management is also a tool to help agencies enter and remain in danger zones. The loss of staff and assets, either through accident or incident, actually makes it more difficult for an agency to carry out its fundamental task”. (van Brabandt, 2001: 5).
According to Bolletino there are two main pillars for the better design of security, (1) Coordination and (2) Good security management practices.
1. Coordination:
Coordination is seen as key for the security in the field. The sharing of information and knowledge, together with efforts and expertise on the elaboration of security plans is of great value because: a) - it reduces costs of assessments. Assessments could be done jointly. Different organizations working in the same context could make use of one context assessment instead of doing one individual for each one; b) - it improves quality with more input from different professionals and experts from different areas contributing jointly to the elaboration of strategies; c) – it avoids overlapping of tasks regarding compiling and analysis of incidents, resulting also in the avoidance of preventable incidents; d) – provides with more accurate information on security status in different contexts.
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The practices of one organization affect the rest of them present in the same circumstances, rather for their best security or hampering single efforts made individually.
The Operational Security Management in Violent Environments of the Humanitarian Practice Network stresses out the importance of ‘inter-agency cooperation’ in violent environments. Van Brabandt refers to three important aspects that this cooperation enhances. First, the collective alert when any organization that experienced or narrowly avoided an attack. It is considered, until proven the opposite as a targeted attack and therefore the other organizations present in the same context suffer the same threat. To inform the incident would reduce the probabilities and could prevent other similar incidents from happening. It contributes to the analysis of insecurity and patterns of violence. Second, there is a direct interdependence mostly regarding evacuation criteria and procedures. Some organizations have the capacity to bring in support planes or ships in case a crises forces to evacuate, while others don’t. Therefore it would be beneficial to cooperate with each other to combine capacities. And third, indirect interdependence has to do with uncoordinated and individual security practices taken by different organizations operating in the same violent context. For example, if in the same context some organizations decide to hire armed security while others don’t, then those without the armed protection might remain as soft targets for attacks, delinquency or any other violent pattern being experience in this context.
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others. Another barrier faced by other NGOs is their different capacity in terms of funds, personnel and equipment to equally match with that what is required for a proper security strategy (Bolletino, 2006: 8). In this regard there should be also some degree of common sense. If an organization does not have enough capacity to handle dangerous situations then it should not operate in violent environments.
A first initiative to coordination has been made by the UN with the creation of Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), which is the ‘primary mechanism for inter-agency coordination of humanitarian assistance’ (www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc/). It is because of indirect representation aid organizations that this coordination initiative is still not fully and properly used for its intended purposes. An obstacle for the final
institutionalization of information and knowledge is that the majority of NGOs do not participate directly in the coordination body of IASC. They are represented by InterAction (representing all US based international NGOs) or International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA), who works as an advocacy alliance for humanitarian action). These two delegate bodies to the IASC (i.e. InterAction and ICVA) might not be fully representing the ideas, opinions and beliefs of all the aid agencies. Thus, some of these unrepresented organizations remain aside from the information sharing tool.
37 2. Good security management practices
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Diagram 1: The Security Management Framework
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This approach has the same fundaments as those of project management, yet it should not be seeing as a planning process. This is due to the volatile and changing environment where security develops. It should be reviewed and practiced on a regular basis, every one of its phases. The first step is to know the mission of the agency, who is the organization, what are the objectives and goals and what capacity it has to obtain them. Second will be the identification of risks, threats and vulnerabilities, a so called context assessment. In this part it is also necessary a stakeholders analysis. With this information you will be able to identify your vulnerabilities and the threats there are to determine the level of risk there is to operate in a determined area. Moreover, determine what is the best security strategy for this particular situation and if that is coherent with the values of the organization.
Diagram 2: The Threshold of Acceptable Risk
Source: Van Brabandt, 2000: 52
According to this graph, the incidents directly affecting the staffs’ personal integrity, health, well being and mental stability are those with a higher impact on the entire welfare and safety of th
incidents to occur, the closer it is to crossing the threshold of acceptable or tolerated risk. The probability of the incidents’ occurrence is what can be reduced or mitigated through security strategies. For example, if there is a particular region where the rates of sexual aggression against women is very high there can be some protective measures that can be taken, for example by restricting certain places and hours to go out, not to go out alone, send on that particular mission more or only men than women. Other Incidents related to material things have a lesser impact on the operations of the organization and
40 ld of Acceptable Risk
Source: Van Brabandt, 2000: 52
According to this graph, the incidents directly affecting the staffs’ personal integrity, health, well being and mental stability are those with a higher impact on the entire welfare and safety of the organization. Therefore, the higher the probability of such incidents to occur, the closer it is to crossing the threshold of acceptable or tolerated risk. The probability of the incidents’ occurrence is what can be reduced or mitigated through
strategies. For example, if there is a particular region where the rates of sexual aggression against women is very high there can be some protective measures that can be taken, for example by restricting certain places and hours to go out, not to go out alone, send on that particular mission more or only men than women. Other Incidents related to material things have a lesser impact on the operations of the organization and According to this graph, the incidents directly affecting the staffs’ personal integrity, health, well being and mental stability are those with a higher impact on the e organization. Therefore, the higher the probability of such incidents to occur, the closer it is to crossing the threshold of acceptable or tolerated risk. The probability of the incidents’ occurrence is what can be reduced or mitigated through
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could be mitigated with a series of other security strategies. As shown above these are related to burglary and have higher probabilities.
Van Brabandt proposes three ideal security strategies which are acceptance, protection and deterrence. These views are summarized as follows:
• Acceptance: this strategy is based on the construction of broad based relationships with the beneficiary and local population, authorities and other relevant stakeholders. To achieve that the aid agency can do meetings and present stated messages or make them implicit. And more than words are the program impacts and perceptions. The agency should try to maintain balance in its relationships; to manage its image; to show respect and to make oneself be respected.
• Protection: measures taken to protect personnel and material resources could be to reduce exposure, reduce or increase visibility; controls; measures of avoiding the risks (dos and don’ts), protective devices (helmets and flak jackets, bomb shelters); strength in numbers (driving in convoys); use of unarmed guards.
• Deterrence: some measures considered as deterrence strategy are legal, political and economic sanctions (not to effective due to the legal & political status of most NGOs); suspension of operations/ withdrawal; or armed protection (the potential use of fire power in the face of threat introduces a qualitative difference in your security strategy. It also profoundly affects the image and perception of aid agencies in general).
42 Diagram 3: Security Strategies
Source: Van Brabandt, 2000: 57-71
“An acceptance strategy tries to reduce or remove threats by increasing the acceptance (the political and social ‘consent’) for your presence and your work in a particular context (politicians and the military call this ‘winning hearts and minds’). A protection strategy uses protective devices and procedures to reduce the vulnerability of the agency, but it does not address the threat. In technical jargon this is called ‘hardening the target’. A third approach is to deter a threat by counter-threat. This ranges from legal, economic or political sanctions to, most prominently, a counter-threat of defensive or offensive use of force” (Van Brabandt, 2000: 58).
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staff, general organizational practices and policies and the collaboration and sharing of information and analysis of incidents. Van Brabandt explains it as ‘a matter of organizational culture’. There is no accessible and reliable data base containing security related information. If incorporated on a standard database this information, the organizations may capitalize from the information and contribute to the coordination and good security management practices. A first approach for the systematization of data is UN department of Safety and Security (UNDSS). The UN has created an Integrated Security Clearance & Tracking (ISECT), being the first standardized security-related data base. Unfortunately the access to such tool is limited to those UN bodies and members.
44 Source: Van Brabandt, 2000: 76
The principled based discussion behind these practical stands will be dealt with in section 4.2.2. of this paper. For practical matters it is important to consider these two positions in here, since it has an impact on security coordination.
3.4. Remote Management
The so called remote management is considered to be an operational response to insecurity in a particular context. It consists on the withdrawing or drastically reducing international and sometimes national personnel in the field. The operations are transfer to local organizations and local staff while the leaving aid agency oversees the activities from another location. Some of the perils and risks found in such a type of project implementation are:
• The compromise of the projects’ quality and effectiveness due to a lack of training of the local staff.
• The accountability and efficiency of the projects could get affected due to the difficulties in logistics, communications, monitoring and interagency Arguments against the use of force: These tend to be inspired by ethical and/or long-term operational considerations. The ethical argument holds that humanitarian action is never compatible with the use of force. The long-term operational consideration is that, whereas in a specific context armed protection might be justifiable, it erodes the overall image of humanitarian action worldwide and may therefore lead to increased insecurity elsewhere or in the future. According to this line of reasoning, resorting too quickly or too often to armed protection undermines global efforts to restore respect for international humanitarian law and with it the immunity of aid workers.
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coordination. When doing a distance monitoring sometimes projects tend to be more accountable to donors than beneficiaries.
• The costs in terms of airfares and communications (equipment and costs) normally are higher than with a local management of operations.
46 4. The concerns raised by PSPs
4.1. The discussion on PSPs
The discussion between the advantages and the necessities of hiring PSPs and the perils and risks that such contracts imply takes place at different levels. For the matters of this paper these levels were separated in three different types:
1. The critique of the implications of the privatization of security, which provision should belong to States. This review is more generalized and concerns not only the humanitarian space but other important social sectors.
2. The principled based arguments that are linked to the nature of the humanitarianism. This could be defined as ideological perspectives but also a contested practice, i.e. ‘new humanitarianism’.
3. The issues regarding the legal implications of some actions, lack of international regulations and the impact on the accountability for the humanitarian organizations. This is a more pragmatic level. It is important to highlight that the three levels are interlinked among themselves.
4.1.1 From public service to a market of security
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developing nations reduce their public expenditures due to a decrease in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth. For many of them the only way to provide their populations with the necessary and mandatory public services was to privatize them, since they could not afford those provisions (Carbonnier, 2006: 3). Mainly health, water and security were the most deteriorated public sectors in the most vulnerable countries. Of course corruption within these governments played an important role.
Privatization in this sense does not necessarily mean that the services are better or worse, but it contains the profit-interest factor for the new service providers. The access to the services then remains for those who have to money to pay for it. When talking about water, health or security during wartime privatization becomes a double sided sword. In the article “Privatization and Outsourcing in Wartime: The Humanitarian Challenges”, Gilles Carbonnier addresses these issues and the consequences of privatizing in crisis situations. Water, health and security cannot be neglected to populations during wartime, or else that would represent a serious breach of International Humanitarian Law. Carbonnier argues that if for example the water supply in a war torn country is in private hands, most likely this private company would not be able to provide water if, the fees they charge for the service cannot be collected, therefore causing an investment potential loss. For this case he suggests some regulatory changes like insurance and some regulations and clauses while contracting these services.
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Privatization might be a very good and profitable option for businesses of any kind. Nonetheless, under the actual lack of regulations and parameters it is counterproductive to allow the market decide upon services and goods that not only are responsibility of states to provide, but also that the access to them is a fundamental human right. The market dynamics of supply and demand to regulate competition do not play, and should not play, any role during crisis times. Vulnerable populations are entitled of the right to security. Thus the rule of supply should be based on need and not on purchasing power. State regulations on what used to be public services still have to be done and implemented to ensure access to the populations. There are always going to be market influential forces driving the commercialization of basic services, but just like arms, drugs and prostitution; water, health and security should still remain to some extent under the supervision of states.
Yet, this position is not realistic given the actual circumstances that faced many countries. This will ultimately depend on what states can or cannot offer to the organizations in terms of protection. Not only referring to those recovering or experiencing conflict, also those ‘peaceful’ states like in Central America, where urban criminality is a general threat for everyone, to count with private security is seen as a must. Hiring protection should be part of your modus operandi. In the case of countries with an active conflict the presence of militaries should in theory safeguard the populations. The practice though shows different when even state military forces contract private security to escort convoys (e.g. Afghanistan, Iraq).
The paradox explained by Singer (2003) in his article “Humanitarian principles, private military agents: some implications of the privatized military industry for the humanitarian community” is then focused on the fact of who can afford security.
“While PMFs14 protect their clients-aid workers and aid facilities,
unprotected local groups, such as the poor or refugees, may face increased
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risks. The privatization of security risks reinforces internal divisions in weak states between those who enjoy security and those who do not”. (Singer, 2003: 13)
According to Singer (2003) there could be also a mismatch between the different backgrounds and interests between the two sectors: humanitarian and the for profit security. “Firms come in with expectations shaped by their military background and often have trouble understanding not only individual NGOs, but the humanitarian endeavor as a whole”. (Singer, 2006: 8). Such counter mandates might limit the actions of both of the contractual parties. While the aid organization is there to assist the most needed and vulnerable populations, the PSP has the capacity even to kill any outsider from the organization given a directly deterrence mandate. An example of this is the controversial case of the former private security company Blackwater shooting death 17 Iraqi civilians on September, 2007 (see The New York Times, Nov. 14, 2007;
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/14/world/middleeast/14blackwater). The reality is that clients only exert influence over the firm during its employment, and only to the extent of their relative buying power. Principled and legal concerns are linked directly with those of the privatization.
4.1.2 Humanitarian Principles and PSPs
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principles, other actors (PSPs among them) pursue development and democratization tasks together with the provision of aid.
This comprehensive analysis presented by Shannon highlights the threat of PSPs on humanitarianism with this ‘invasion’, as she calls it. This case is not referring to the working together dynamic but to the incursion of the private military and security companies into the humanitarian space. The carrying out humanitarian tasks together with regime-change and securitization tasks not only pushes out those humanitarians acting under principle based guidelines but also erodes those principles away from any type of assistance they offer.
“…the principles of impartiality, neutrality, and independence that have typically characterized humanitarian action should be set aside in order to harness aid to the “higher” goals of peace, security, and development’ (de Torrenté, 2004)”. (in Shannon, 2009: 3)
When transformed into a political tool then humanitarian assistance becomes conditioned aid, a peace-making mechanism. On an issues paper written by Stockton (2002) for the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) he calls this hypothesis of international policy in Afghanistan an ‘aid induced pacification’. “Pillar Two Management Plan consists on: “1) the transfer of de facto authority from the UN and the international assistance community to the de jure authorities of Afghanistan, and 2) the simultaneous popular legitimization of those authorities to be in part achieved through the provision of effective international assistance” (Stockton, 2002: 24).
