Theoretical Framework and Methodology

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Supervisor: Dr. J.F. Meijer

Name: Muhammad Sigit Andhi Rahman Student Number: S1941070

Address: Winschoterdiep 46, 9723 AC Groningen Email: emsigitar@yahoo.com, m.s.a.rahman@rug.nl International Relations and International Organization University of Groningen

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INTRODUCTION

The exceptional economic growth of China since three decades, the increasing military (nuclear) capabilities, and its ambition to be recognized as a great power have raised concern among many world leaders. Some third world country politicians believe that China can influence the international order to become more just.¹ In the World Trade Organization (WTO) China has shown its solidarity with developing countries since it became a member of the Group of 22 (G-22), which consists of 22 developing countries (with Brazil, China, South Africa and India as the core countries within the group), in Cancun in 2003 to bargain collectively for reduction in the use of agricultural subsidies by developed countries.² But others (western countries) worry that China might undermine the liberal international economic regime by using its influence only to block progress towards a new WTO agreement which is against its national interest.³

In the academic discourse of International Relations, change in the distribution of power among states is one of the main concerns especially for realist thinkers. The past rise of great powers (Germany and Japan) historically led to a change or transition of the international order.⁴ Sometimes the shifting of the power balance brought a peaceful change, such as the take over of hegemony by the US from Great Britain after 1945, but mostly such developments led to major wars.⁵China, with 1.3 billion people, an average of 9 percent of economic growth during the last 20 years, possessing nuclear weapons, and with

1Yong Deng and Thomas G. Moore, China Views Globalization: Toward a new Great-Power Politics? in:

Alexander T.J.Lennon and Amanda Kozlowski, Global Powers in the 21st Century. Strategies and relations, (Cambridge, 2008), 113-136.

2Ibidem.

3 Erich Follath, “The Dragon’s Embrace: China’s Soft Power Is a Threat to the West,” Spiegel Online, 28 July 2010. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,708645,00.html

4 R.L. Schweller, “Managing the rise of great powers. History and theory” in A.I. Johnston and R.S. Ross, (ed.) Engaging China. The Management of an Emerging Power (London, 1999), 1-31.

5E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919-1939:An Introduction to the Study of International Relations, (New York, 1964)

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a growing nationalism, looks like a security threat to other states in the present system.⁶ Therefore, it is important to analyse and understand China's behavior in international society. Is China a threat to the present world order or not?

In his remarks to the National Committee on United States (US)-China Relations, on September 21^st, 2005, US Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick (currently President of the World Bank) addressed the question of how the US and China should transform their relationship in the context of China's rise at the dawn of the 21stcentury. Referring to Zheng Bijian's article “China's 'Peaceful Rise' to Great Power Status” as an unofficial spokesperson of the Chinese foreign policy intention in Foreign Affairs in 2005⁷ , Zoellick suggested that the US and the world should keep the membership of the international system open for China.⁸ Zoellick also stressed the importance of urging China to become a responsible stakeholder in international society. Even though China has reversed its course from isolation towards a positive involvement in international society under Deng Xiaoping (1978- 1992), most world leaders still question how China will use its growing influence. The world community has to make sure that China's increasing power will not undermine the interest of international society. In line with the concept of Responsible Stakeholder, China has to acknowledge responsibilities to strengthen the international system that has enabled its economic success. China should commit itself not only to its national interest, but also to a global responsibility for the common good of the whole international society.

As stated, not all power transitions generate security competition or war, or overturn the old international order. Some democratic states have grown rapidly in economic or geopolitical power and accommodated themselves to the existing international order (Japan and Germany in the post war era). China, however, is not a democracy and

6 G. John Ikenberry, ‘The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive,’ Foreign Affairs, January/February 2008, See also J.S. Levy, ‘Power Transition Theory and the Rise of China’, in R. Ross and Zhu Feng (eds), China’s Ascent. Power, security, and the Future of International Politics (Ithaca, 2008), 11- 33.

7 Zheng Bijian, “China ‘Peaceful Rise’ to Great-Power Status,” Foreign Affairs Volume 84 no 5, September/October 2005

8Robert B. Zoellick, “Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?” Remarks to National Committee on US-China Relations, September 21, 2005 accessed from:

www.ncuscr.org/files/2005Gala_RobertZoellick_Whither_China1.pdf

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therefore more of a risk to world peace. Yet the Realist G.J. Ikenberry argues that the rise of China will manifest itself in a way that is very much unlike the past violent power transitions due to three reasons; 1) the present political order is harder to overturn and easier to join, 2) the incentives that China has (economic and perhaps political) for working within the existing international order, 3) at the same time, the nuclear revolution has made war among great powers less likely, even unthinkable.⁹This is in line with the argument brought by the leading thinker of the English School, the Australian IR-academic Hedley Bull. As a proponent of the Rationalism strand in the International Relations (IR) study which emphasizes concept of international society, he argues that although states form an anarchical society and there is no supra-state authority to regulate their relations, there are certain rules of conduct that states agree upon. He thus speaks of an anarchical society. A society of states exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions.¹⁰Therefore, the important question concerning China's rise will be on the use of its power and influence to strengthen (or to weaken) the existing international system. In other words, the question is whether nowadays China behaves as a more or less responsible or as an irresponsible stakeholder. The concept of responsible stakeholder will be used to analyze the behaviour of China in the international system since the Deng Xiaoping era/since the year of 1992.

Taking this concept as a key element, it looks like China until now behaves responsible to a certain extent. There is progress to note in the regional role of China, especially in its relation to other East Asian countries. When the US and the European Union (EU) turned their backs from Asian countries after the Cold War, especially in the time of the Asian financial crisis 1997-1998¹¹, China helped those countries by not depreciating its 9 Ikenberry, The Rise of China, 1.

10Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics, Columbia University Press (3rd edition), (London, 1977), 13.

11The Asian Financial Crisis was a period of financial crisis that gripped much of Asia beginning in July 1997, and raised fears of a worldwide economic meltdown due to financial contagion. The crisis started in Thailand with the financial collapse of the Thai baht caused by the decision of the Thai government to float the baht, cutting its peg to the USD, after exhaustive efforts to support it in the face of a severe financial over extension

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currency. If China had devalued the Renminbi/yuan (RMB), as it had done by 33 percent in 1994, it would have made its exports less costly, but also it would have undermined this effort because of its negative effect on the Southeast Asian countries' (ASEAN)¹² steps to restore their economies. In addition, China gave economic assistance of more than US$1 billion to Indonesia and another US$1 billion to Thailand, the two countries in the region most affected by the crisis.¹³

Despite the large size of its Gross National Product (only behind the US and EU’s GNP) China has not yet in political sense contributed significantly to the world according to Zoellick and others. China is still being condemned by the western world for having just good intentions in terms of human rights protection and for lack of environmental protection efforts.¹⁴ There is a need for a more detailed analysis to explain why China acts as it does and what makes China's foreign policy run. China's behavior in areas of finance where it has the biggest stake for being the manufacturer for the global economy will be used for a case study to answer this question. The financial systems in terms of investment, financial crisis and multilateral financial arrangements are mostly seen as the examples of China’s responsible behaviour. The main question that will be addressed in this thesis is:

what are the factors that explain China's behavior in the context of being a (ir)responsible stakeholder in the present international financial system?

The introduction explains the background and the main question of the research.

Chapter 1, Theoretical Framework and Methodology, tries to answer the sub question of the

that was in part real estate driven. At the time, Thailand had acquired a burden of foreign debt that made the country effectively bankrupt even before the collapse of its currency. As the crisis spread, most of Southeast Asia and Japan saw slumping currencies, devalued stock markets and other asset prices, and a precipitous rise in private debt.

12ASEAN is a geo-political and economic organization of 10 countries located in Southeast Asia, which was formed on 8 August 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.[5] Since then, membership has expanded to include Brunei, Burma (Myanmar), Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. Its aims include the acceleration of economic growth, social progress, cultural development among its members, the protection of the peace and stability of the region, and to provide opportunities for member countries to discuss differences peacefully.

13 Kishore Mahbubani, Prerequisites for Global Leadership, Ch.6 in The New Asian Hemisphere. The irresistible shift of global power to the East, (New York, 2008), 299.

14Human Right Watch http://china.hrw.org/press/review/summary_of_china_rights_developments and Global Issues http://www.globalissues.org/article/144/china-and-human-rights

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definition of the concept of Responsible Stakeholder and its relation with the theoretical stands in international relations study. This chapter consists of two parts: The concept of responsible stakeholder in the international system and the rationalism of the English School (Hedley Bull). Chapter 2, China in International Politics, presents an overview of the foundations of Chinese foreign policy. The purpose of this chapter is to give insight in what are the foundations and characteristics of Chinese foreign policy. Chapter 3 is the case study of China as being a responsible stakeholder. This chapter discusses China in the international financial system and China's monetary policy by using the analytical tools of the English School especially those of Hedley Bull. The end of this thesis is the conclusions which will answer the main question that is presented in the introduction.

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CHAPTER 1

Theoretical Framework and Methodology

The Concept of Responsible stakeholder

The term ‘responsible stakeholder’ is introduced by Robert Zoellick in the speech mentioned before. In defining the term, Zoellick stated:

All nations conduct diplomacy to promote their national interests. Responsible stakeholders go further: They recognize that the international system sustains their peaceful prosperity, so they work to sustain that system. A responsible stakeholder would be more than just a member; it is willing to protect and strengthen the international system that has enabled its success.¹⁵

The international system refers to a set of interaction between interdependent entities including states, inter-governmental organizations (IGOs), international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and multinational corporations (MNCs) forming an integrated whole.¹⁶ Xenia Dormandy, a former senior associate of Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs Harvard University, stated that such an international system could be defined as a norm-sharing mechanism that establishes and enforces behavioral standards while sharing information to support those ends. An international system could be a burden-sharing mechanism in which responsible stakeholders are willing to share responsibility and make sacrifices to achieve mutual goals.¹⁷ Steve Clemons, director of the American strategy program at the New America Foundation, and Weston S. Konishi, a senior staff member who specializes in Japan and Asia Policy issues at Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA), added that a responsible stakeholder is “A nation with its own house in order, ready to contribute to the 15 Zoellick, “Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility”, 1.

16http://fass.kingston.ac.uk/courses/undergraduate/modules/list.php?field=IN

17Xenia Dormandy, “Is India, or Will It Be, a Responsible International Stakeholder?” The Washington Quarterly, (30 3), 117.

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international common good above and beyond its own parochial national interests.”¹⁸ Therefore, an actor cannot be categorized as a responsible stakeholder if it is only concerned to its own national interest. It is worth to mention that in his speech, Zoellick linked the stability of the system to China's democratization process at home: “By virtue of its size, China's domestic problems threaten the entire system.” Zoellick stressed that the real stability of China in terms of democratic and accountable governance would be synonymous with the stability of the whole system. In other words: China's house in order that is becoming a democracy is important as branding China as a responsible stakeholder.

In more detail, according to Zoellick: “Responsible stakeholders work to expand open and free trade, sustain a functioning international market, promote and spread human rights and democracy, stem proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), are open and transparent regarding military affairs, and attempt to resolve conflicts through peaceful means.”¹⁹

Dan Blumenthal, a Resident Fellow of the American Enterprise Institute, elaborated on the expected behaviour of a responsible stakeholder.²⁰ Firstly, on the account of counter- proliferation, responsible stakeholders understand that certain regimes which are aggressive and linked to terrorist groups are the greatest proliferation threats. The great powers should use all tools of statecraft to prevent those regimes (Iran, North Korea, Myanmar) in particular from obtaining weapons of nuclear mass destruction. Secondly, with regard to the regional security, a secure, peaceful, prosperous and democratic system needs to be strengthened. In connection therewith, the principles of openness, transparency, good governance, and the peaceful resolution of disputes come into play. Thirdly, concerning energy security, responsible stakeholders should rely upon the oil market and not mercantilism²¹ for their supply. They share a responsibility for the security of supply, which 18 Steve Clemons and Weston S. Konishi, “Japan: Leading or Losing the Way Toward Responsible

Stakeholdership?”, in: Michael Schiffer and David Shorr (ed.), Power and Principles: International Leadership in a Shrinking World, (Plymouth, UK: Lexington Books, 2009), 50.

19Zoellick, “Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?” 94-98.

20Dan Blumenthal, “Is China at Present (or Will China Become) a Responsible Stakeholder in the International Community?”, Reframing China Policy: The Carnegie Debates, 2-8.

21 Mercantilism is an economic theory, thought to be a form of economic nationalism, that holds that the prosperity of a nation is dependent upon its supply of capital, and that the global volume of international trade is "unchangeable". Economic assets (or capital) are represented by bullion (gold, silver, and trade value) held

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means contributing to the stability of supplier regions. Fourthly, for the sake of economic development and assistance, promotion of openness, lack of corruption, good governance, and furtherance of collective rather than purely national goods are all expected of a responsible stakeholder. Fifthly, in connection with an open and rule-based economy, responsible stakeholders work to open and liberalize new markets and abide by the rules of the international trading system. Sixthly, with regard to peacekeeping and enforcement, for responsible stakeholders it can be necessary to intervene in unstable states to counteract possible terrorist threats. Peacekeepers and enforcers have to be nation builders as well and therefore have to be sensitive to human rights. Seventhly and finally, regarding human rights and state sponsored genocide, responsible stakeholders recognize that they have a moral imperative to stop genocide and civil war, and they realize that humanitarian disasters can destabilize key parts of the world.

In relation to this thesis, there is an important feature missing in Blumenthal’s elaboration. This is related to the international financial system. A responsible stakeholder in the international financial system does not use its financial and investment policy solely for the sake of its national interest but also to uphold and strengthen the stability of the whole system. The financial and investment policy also should not be directed against the features of a responsible stakeholder mentioned by Blumenthal above. To invest in other countries which support terrorist acts or nuclear proliferation is also considered to be an irresponsible act.

It is important to see the concept of responsible stakeholder in light of the academic debate in International Relations especially between realist/neo-realist theory (Realism) and liberal institutionalists (Idealism). Michael Schiffer and David Shorr from the Stanley Foundation wrote that ‘given the context it was coined, the term was bound to be viewed as a demand placed by an established power on an emerging one.’²² Originally, the concept of

by the state, which is best increased through a positive balance of trade with other nations (exports minus imports). The theory assumes that wealth and monetary assets are identical. Mercantilism suggests that the ruling government should advance these goals by playing a protectionist role in the economy by encouraging exports and discouraging imports, notably through the use of tariffs and subsidies. The theory dominated Western European economic policies from the 16th to the late-18th century (taken from "Mercantilism". The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics).

22 Michael Schiffer and David Shorr (eds.), Power and Principles: International Leadership in a Shrinking

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responsible stakeholder was brought up by the US as a strategy to manage the rise of China and thus to encourage it to remain a status quo power within a US-led international order.

According to John Lee, a foreign-policy fellow at the Centre for Independent Studies in Sydney, this is a clever advance from old-fashioned containment or appeasement strategies.²³ Bates Gill from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace explains further how this concept emerged in the first place.²⁴ Firstly, the concept communicated to Beijing a broad set of expectations of the Washington to meet certain international standards of behavior. Secondly, the concept argues that China and the United States will have good relations if the Chinese government defines its national interest not in narrow, self-interested ways but more broadly so as to nurture and sustain the global system from which it has gained so many benefits. In doing so, China should take actions which are increasingly convergent with international norms, international institutions, regional expectations, and U.S. interests. For realists/neo-realists to brand China as a responsible stakeholder, this can thus be merely seen as a strategy to maintain the present status quo.

This also confirms that the concept of responsible stakeholder is originally a term and framework developed by the US as the hegemonic power of the current order.

On the other hand, Schiffer and Shorr argue that ‘there is nothing inherent in the concept that presumes a global hegemony or an immutable set of values.’²⁵ Adding to Dormandy, Clemons and Konishi's arguments, they believe that the concept of responsible stakeholder establishes the core principles of a liberal international order. For liberal institutionalists such as Robert Keohane, being a responsible stakeholder is in line with multilateralism in terms of norm-sharing and the transcendence of national interests.

Through multilateralism, states are seen as building accepted standards of behaviour. These standards exert their own normative pressure on states actions, contributing to the development of long-term obligations between states which stress cooperation.²⁶ Thus, for

World, Lexington Books (Plymouth, UK, 2009), 1.

23John Lee, “China Won't Be a 'Responsible Stakeholder'”, Wall Street Journal Online, February 1, 2010.

24 Bates Gill, “China becoming a Responsible Stakeholder”, Reframing China Policy: The Carnegie Debates accessed from: www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Bates_paper.pdf

25Michael Schiffer and David Shorr (eds.), Power and Principles, 1.

26Robert O. Keohane, “Reciprocity in International Relations”, International Organisation, Vol. 40, issue 1 (1986), 145.

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liberal institutionalists, the responsible stakeholder concept is not to be seen as simply an US's framework imposed upon a new rising power, but as a universal framework for all major participants as Zoellick has stated. An EU-Commission Statement on China-EU relations (2006)²⁷ is one of the few official papers expressing explicitly that the Responsible Stakeholder concept is not merely a framework created by a dominant power, but it is based on universal understanding and cooperation.

If we translate the difference between the American and European perspective into the Realism/Idealism-debate, it seems that the US's stand can be put primarily under the heading of Realism, whereas the EU's is much more of Idealist and principle-based. The next part of this chapter will discuss the rationalist approach of the English School which gives via-media or medium approach of these two approaches on the term or concept of responsible stakeholder.

Overall, a responsible stakeholder should first have its house in order and only then contribute to the international order rather than merely just benefitting from it. Domestic circumstances concerning the environment, human rights and the rule-based economy, should be in equal to those of the international order as seen by western liberalist, otherwise a country is not likely to contribute to these standards on a larger scale.

The Rationalism of The English School (Hedley Bull)

There are differences between realist and idealist/liberal institutionalist thinkers concerning the concept of responsible stakeholder. Yet, both in a certain respect fail to explain the question why a state cooperates or does not cooperate in the international system. Realist thinkers are pessimistic how the international system works. There exists a constant conflict of national interest between states. That is why, according to the realists, war is unavoidable. World politics is in their view a Hobbesian, anarchic state of nature²⁸ in 27 See EU-Commision statement on EU-China relations 2006 in Council of the European Union. Press Release 2271st Meeting General Affairs and External Relations. Brussels, 11-12 December 2006. 16291/06(Presse 353), 8.

28The concept of state of nature was posited by the 17th century English philosopher Thomas Hobbes in Leviathan. Hobbes wrote that "during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and such a war as is of every man against every man" (Leviathan,

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which there are no international norms at all. A state will and must always be preoccupied with playing the tough game of power politics. In such an anarchic and chaotic world there can be no mutual trust. The realist thinkers are able to explain why basically a state does not cooperate with other states. And if they cooperate it is merely for their international interest. In the context of responsible stakeholdership, they see this concept as only a means of the hegemonic power to maintain the order.²⁹ On the other hand, the idealist/liberal thinkers are optimistic regarding the realm of international relations. In their opinion the national interests of every state are basically harmonious. They will cooperate with one another because humans need other people and it is profitable to work together.

All relations between states are governed by common rules of mutual respect and the rule of law. War is considered to be a failure which should be avoided at all cost. The concept of Responsible Stakeholder is thus not a means to maintain order, but it is an expression of the common interest of states.³⁰

The purpose of this thesis is to understand whether China is (non)cooperative/

(ir)responsible in the context of the responsible stakeholder issue at stake. Therefore, it is important to have an approach which combines both theoretical views mentioned above and which is able to give us a framework to understand both the responsible and irresponsible behaviour of China. The Rationalism of the English School claims to be a via- media of both approaches.³¹ English School writings have long maintained that the great powers can be ‘great responsibles’ which do not always place self-interest ahead of preserving international order. However, nevertheless they usually pose the most serious

ch. XIII). In this state any person has a natural right to the liberty to do anything he wills to preserve his own life, and life is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short" (loc. cit.). He believed that in the international arena, states behave as individuals do in a state of nature. Within the state of nature there is no injustice, since there is no law, excepting certain natural precepts, the first of which is "that every man ought to endeavour peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining it" (Leviathan, ch. XIV); and the second is "that a man be willing, when others are so too, as far forth as for peace and defence of himself he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things; and be contented with so much liberty against other men as he would allow other men against himself" (Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, 1651 Edwin Curley (Ed.), Hackett Publishing, 1994)

29John Lee, “China Won't Be a 'Responsible Stakeholder'”, 1.

30Michael Schiffer and David Shorr (eds.), Power and Principles, 1.

31Martin Wight, Four seminal thinkers in international theory : Machiavelli, Grotius, Kant, and Mazzini, 2005

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threat to international society.³² Being a big power implies a greater responsibility: Great Powers can be called upon to uphold or restore international peace and security or to maintain and secure the world economy.³³There has always been unequal responsibility between the major power and everybody else. The minor powers can benefit from peace and prosperity, but they cannot contribute greatly to them, at least not on an individual basis. World Peace is contingent on peace among the great powers: if they are at war, the world will be at war.³⁴Global prosperity is also being influence by the great powers: if the big powers are in an economic depression, the rest of the international community will be dragged down with them.³⁵ John Gerard Ruggie, Dean of the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University, wrote that the commitment of the US to multilateralism, that is an open, egalitarian, reciprocal, transparent, and non discriminatory world order, has contributed to the stabilization of the world order in the post-war (World War II) period. In this era, the US policy makers had certain institutional objectives in mind, as evidenced by their stance toward the United Nations (UN), the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the European unification.³⁶ This commitment is still clearly stated in recent talks of the some US leaders. Former Republican US president candidate, Senator John McCain, stated in his address to the Los Angeles World Affairs in March 2008:

The United States cannot lead by virtue of its power alone. We must be strong politically, economically, and militarily. But we must also lead by attracting others to our cause, by demonstrating once again the virtues of freedom and democracy, by defending the rules of international civilized society and by creating the new international institutions necessary to advance the peace and freedom we cherish.³⁷

32 M. Wight, International Theory: The Three Traditions, ed. G. Wight and B. Porter, Leicester, 1991, 130

33Chantal J. Nolan (ed), Power and Responsibility in World Affairs: Reformation versus Transformation, (West Port, United States of America, 2004), 61.

34 M. Wight, International Theory, Ibidem.

35Chantal J. Nolan (ed), Ibidem.

36 John Gerrard Ruggie, ‘The False Premise of Realism’ in International Security, Vol. 20, No.1 (Summer 1995), 62-70.

37Suzanne Nossel and David Shorr, ‘Redefining American Leadership’ in Schiffer, Michael and David Shorr (eds.), Power and Principles: International Leadership in a Shrinking World, (Lexington Books, Plymouth, 2009), 13.

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Another big western actor, the European Union, shares the same commitment with the US.

Europe’s aspiration for a just world of law which is right-regarding, liberal, and democratic, extends well beyond the continent with the European Union as a beacon and benchmark for the world.³⁸This thesis uses the historical approach as an analytical tool especially based on the writings of the English School, particularly of Hedley Bull, to understand the behavior of China as one of the emerging great powers in the international financial system.

An Australian by birth, Bull (10 June 1932 – 18 May 1985) was appointed Montague Burton Professor of International Relations at Oxford University in 1977, having previously been professor at the Australian National University (ANU) for ten years. As one of the leading scholars of so called the English School,³⁹ Bull's approach differed from that of US- dominated neo-realism in terms of its methodology and the question of what is the role of norms, in particular international law, in international politics. On both accounts, the English School displays a characteristic which is similar with that of the social constructivist thinkers of the 1990’s and beginning of 21th century. In fact, the ideas from the English School has influenced the recent development of social constructivist thinkers. Both have similarity in term that both are used to better explain the actions taken by states and other major actors as well as the identities that guide these states and actors. Social constructivist thinkers study the role of norms, role of (formal and informal) institutions, the complex social learning, the intersubjective understanding and how the national interests are constructed.⁴⁰In 1966, Bull 38Ronald D. Asmus and Tod Lindberg,’Rue de la Loi: The Global Ambition of the European Project’ in Schiffer, Michael and David Shorr (eds.), Power and Principles: International Leadership in a Shrinking World, (Lexington Books, Plymouth, 2009), 79-80.

39 The 'English-ness' of the school is questionable - many of its most prominent members are not English - and its intellectual origins are disputed. One view (that of Hidemi Suganami) is that its roots lie in the work of pioneering inter-war scholars like the South African Charles Manning, the founding professor of the Department of International Relations at the London School of Economics. Others (especially Tim Dunne and Brunello Vigezzi) have located them in the work of the British committee on the theory of international politics, a group created in 1959 under the chairmanship of the Cambridge historian Herbert Butterfield, with financial aid from the Rockefeller Foundation. Both positions acknowledge the central role played by the theorists Martin Wight, Hedley Bull (an Australian teaching at the Australian National University) and John Vincent. The name 'English School' was first coined by Roy Jones in an article published in the Review of International Studies in 1981 which presented what Jones called a 'case for [its] closure'. Some other descriptions - notably that of 'British institutionalists' (Hidemi Suganami) - have been suggested, but are not generally used. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/English_school_of_international_relations_theory

40www.abdn.ac.uk/pir/notes07/Level5/PI5013/Social%20Constructivism.pdf

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was already engaged in a debate with Morton Kaplan, aDistinguished Service Professor of Political Science, Emeritus, at the University of Chicago and argued against a ‘scientific’

treatment of international relations (behavioralism) and he was in favour of traditional methods: historical, legal, social and philosophical analysis. According to Bull the social- scientific method of Kaplan which tries to uncover laws and regularities of human (state) behaviors failed in understanding unique historical events and in reflecting on the moral and cultural framework which is specific to the society of states.⁴¹Searching for a social, scientific and universally applicable theory of international politics makes one biased toward finding ‘mechanistic’ laws, rather than much softer and changeable societal norms.⁴² In his book The Anarchical Society, Bull (first print 1977) accepts the anarchy of the international system as a Realist paradigm. The realist and neo-realist thinkers stated that there is no ultimate/supra national authority in the international system. Sovereign states are the main actors on world stage and they are focusing only on national interest and are characterized by selfish behavior.⁴³Bull recognizes the importance of power and national interest in international relation. Yet, different from realist and neo-realist's opinion, Bull mentions that through the course of history, states have learned in spite of the anarchic system to accept certain rules of behavior and do cooperate with one another. Therefore, Bull recognizes that there is a community of states or what he calls ‘a society of states’.

Paradoxically this makes being an ‘anarchical society’ possible. Bull wrote:

A Society of states (or international society) exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions.⁴⁴

From the above definition, this thesis purports that the “common set of rules” Bull was alluding to, manifests itself most evidently in the form of international law, which is 41 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society, 11.

42 Jill Steans and Lloyd Pettiford with Thomas Diez, Introduction to International Relations: Perspectives and Themes, (London, 2005), 190.

43Jack Donelly, “Realism”, in Burchill, Scott ...[et al.], Theories of International Relations, (London, 2009), 31- 54.

44 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society, 3.

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essentially a common code of conduct among states, and is central to the working of international society. For Bull, although the relations between states are still basically anarchical, an international order is possible. States still can get the benefit as being a society without giving up their sovereignty.⁴⁵ The five main institutions of the contemporary international society, according to Bull, are the balance of power, international law, diplomacy, war and the existence and role of great powers.⁴⁶To him, these institutions and norms such as sovereignty and non-intervention are guarantors of order. He and other English School thinkers such as Martin Wight, John Vincent and Adam Watson share belief with idealism on the possibility of progress and development in the international relations throughout the course of history.⁴⁷ However, Bull is rather sceptical of the possibility as well as the desirability of this order being fundamentally changed. His opinion is that progress and development is only possible within and by the state. For example, he mentioned that human rights have to be balanced against sovereignty and non-intervention.⁴⁸He believes that states are still the main actors in the realm of international relations. Furthermore, unlike idealism which sees national interests of states as basically harmonious, Bull acknowledges that there remains a permanent tension of interest clashes between states.

National interests, especially security issues, will always exist in the relations between states. Of course there are common rules and norms that most states obey such as diplomatic rules, but these cannot by themselves guarantee international harmony and cooperation; power, national interest and the balance of power still remain important in the anarchical society.⁴⁹

Overall, Bull sees that there are two elements existing in international society: law and power. One of international society’s key defining features is that such law, rules or norms are established by “dialogue and common consent” and they are maintained because states “recognize their common interest in maintaining these agreements”.⁵⁰ States have 45 Ibidem, 44-49.

46 Ibidem, xv and 98-222.

47 Ibidem, 21.

48^Ibidem.

49Ibidem, 112.

50Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, eds., The Expansion of International Society (Oxford: Oxford University

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learned to accept certain rules of behavior which make them able to cooperate, but still there remains a permanent tension of national interest that makes cooperation between them difficult to achieve. There is the element of power which makes it difficult for states to cooperate. This element of power is commonly understood as state sovereignty.⁵¹

Bull and fellow English thinkers are not trying to explain international relations phenomena scientifically; rather, like historians and sociologists, they are trying to understand and interpret them.⁵² They thus take a broader historical, legal, and philosophical view to understand and explain international relations. This is in their opinion actually the main task of International Relations study. This science is about discerning and exploring the complexity of all elements and the subsequent normative problems they present to state leaders. It involves exercising judgment: putting oneself in the place of state leaders to try to understand the dilemmas that they are confronted with regarding foreign policy issues. This is the reason why Bull's approach is used in this thesis. The existence of a conflict between shared values and national interest might explain the (ir)responsible behavior of China.

It is important however to mention that basically Bull differentiates between the international system and international society. Bull states:

This use of terms is not compulsory, but the distinction is a vital one, for while an international society presupposes the existence of an international system, an international system does not necessarily entail that there is an international society:

independent political communities can and do impinge on one another without accepting a common framework of rules and institutions.⁵³

Rather than using the term international financial society in this thesis which is quite alien, it uses the more common term of international financial system. This term refers to a financial arrangement consisting of institutions and regulators that act on the international level as opposed to those that act on a national or regional level. The main players are the global institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF)/The World Bank and the Bank

Press, 1985), 1.

51^Ibidem.

52Robert Jackson and Georg Sørensen, Introduction to International Relations, Oxford University Press, p. 55

53Hedley Bull, “The European International Order,” in Hedley Bull on International Society, ed. Kai Alderson and Andrew Hurrell (Houndmills: Macmillan Press, 1980), 172.

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for International Settlements (BIS), national agencies and government departments (e.g., central banks and finance ministries) and private institutions acting on the global scale (e.g., banks and hedge funds).

Summary

A responsible stakeholder can be defined as a (big power) state which has its house in order and thus is able to contribute to the international order rather than merely just benefitting from it. Domestic circumstances concerning the environment, human rights and the rule-based economy, should be in equal to those of the international order; otherwise a country is not likely to contribute to these standards on a larger scale. These two aspects:

house in order and contribution to international order differentiate a responsible behavior from an irresponsible one.

The English school thinkers (Hedley Bull) give logical explanations to the concept of responsible stakeholder. They offer an approach between the pessimistic views of the realist thinkers and the optimistic view of the idealists/liberal institutionalists. Although states act in an anarchical system, they are potentially capable to behave responsibly. It is possible for a state to behave beyond its national interest and to contribute to the benefit of the whole system without giving out its sovereignty to a higher (supra state) authority. Yet, it is not enough to use the social scientific method as proposed by Morton Kaplan (behavioralist) to understand the (ir)responsible behavior of a state. The traditionalist's method of historical, legal, sociological and philosophical analyses is more suitable to understand the behavior of a state in the current international system. Those analyses enable us to understand why a state (state leaders) behaves in certain ways. It is important to understand the norms, principles and values of the state leaders and the socio-political conditions where they live in. The next chapter discusses this in order to understand the general principles in China’s foreign policy.

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CHAPTER 2

China in International Politics

The purpose of this chapter is to give a background to and an understanding of China’s view on being a (responsible) stakeholder in world affairs and the general principles of its foreign policy. In line with the approach of Hedley Bull on international relations mentioned in the previous chapter, the cultural, historical, and sociological discussion of China’s politics along with the dynamics of the international society will be important and beneficial for that purpose. Those are determinant elements in the formulation of foreign policy in general.

AIthough for Zoellick the US logic of the idea that China has so richly benefited from international order for over the last three decades that it therefore has the responsibility to strengthen and sustain that order, may appear self-evident , it is not necessarily so to the Chinese. By learning from the history of foreign abuses and exploitation, many Chinese may conclude that the international community is not filled with responsible stakeholders and that China can be only sceptical of the concept. Who defines “responsible”? A stake in whose “order”?⁵⁴

It is more common for Asian and especially Chinese scholars and policy makers to use the term ‘global leadership’ instead of using the term Responsible Stakeholder. In this respect, according Jia Qingguo, Professor of the School of International Studies of Peking University, global leadership means that a state should be able to come up with a vision that appeals not only to itself but also to the international community.⁵⁵ Kishore Mahbubani, the Dean of Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at National University of Singapore, mentions just recently in his book, The New Asian Hemisphere, in which he states that there are five 54Bates Gill and Michael Schiffer, ”A Rising China’s Rising Responsibilities”, in Michael Schiffer and David Shorr (ed.), Power and Principles: International Leadership in a Shrinking World, (Plymouth, UK: Lexington Books, 2009), 100.

55 Jia Qingguo, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization. China's Experiment in Multilateral Leadership”, in:

Iwashita Akihiro (ed.), Eager Eyes Fixed Eurasia. Russia and Its Eastern Edge, (Hokkaido University, 2007), 1.

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principles as prerequisites for being a global leader: democracy, rule of law, social justice, partnership and pragmatism.⁵⁶ According to him the first three are the classical western principles that should be added with the last two in order to sustain the current order. By partnership he means that the great powers should overcome their cultural constraints and historical hostilities to engage the world in a new fashion and win-win relations. Pragmatism is not a philosophy of finding and suggesting absolute truth, but a wisdom and an attitude of being more open/flexible toward (different perspectives of) the truth.⁵⁷ These two principles differentiate the Asian (Chinese) view to the Western one on being a global leader. In other words, these are the differences between the concept of leadership and responsible stakeholdership.⁵⁸ In the following paragraph, it will be clear how the historical, cultural and sociological conditions of China have shaped the view of China on being global leader.

Four Contradiction in China’s Foreign Policy

Wu Xinbo, a professor at the Center for American Studies, Fudan University mentions that there are four variables or contradictions that continue to constrain China’s foreign policy behavior in the post-Cold War era: self-image of being a great power versus still being a poor country, ‘open-door’ incentive versus the sovereignty concern, principles versus pragmatism, and bilateralism versus multilateralism.⁵⁹

In terms of the first contradiction, self-images of great power versus poor country, there is an internal discussion among Chinese political leaders and academics concerning China’s involvement in the multilateral arrangement. Some want China to become more involved in global affairs especially policy makers from rich provinces on the east China coast, but others prefer China to focus first on its domestic problems. Chinese leaders and the Chinese public in general believe that China is a great nation for its long history (Middle Kingdom), its contributions to the progress of civilization, its vast territory and population and its significant geographic location. Since mid of 19^th century until 1949 China lost its 56Kishore Mahbubani, The New Asian Hemisphere, 235-279.

57^Ibidem.

58 Ibidem.

59 Wu Xinbo,“Four Contradictions Constraining China’s Foreign Policy Behavior,” in Journal of Contemporary China (2001), 10(27), 293.

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leading position as Middle Kingdom due to imperialistic policy of western nationals and Japan. The formation of Communist China in 1949 restored its old status of important nation. It is assumed that China’s greatness is also rooted in its permanent membership in the UN Security Council and in its nuclear capability.⁶⁰ Yet, both political elites and ordinary Chinese also understand that although China's prosperity is improving fast since Open Door Policy, it is still a poor country; its levels of economic development and technological capabilities are still far behind those of western countries and some of its Asian neighbours, such as Japan or South Korea. Accession to the WTO in 2001 for example, had major effects to China in terms of economic liberalization, industrialization in coastal areas, and export sectors. Farmers in Chinese rural areas are less lucky. They are actually subsidizing the industrial, coastal infrastructure.⁶¹ Hu Jintao's, the current President of the People's Republic of China,⁶²mantra is nevertheless a harmonious society and according to him, liberalization has reached its limit. China, starting from 2002, should focus its efforts on how addressing agricultural and welfare distribution problems.⁶³ This is principally the main concern and creates reluctance for Chinese leaders to become an active major power. Most likely therefore there will be no dramatic change in Chinese policies in the near future.⁶⁴

The second contradiction is the ‘open-door’ incentive on foreign policy versus the sovereignty principle. The open-door policy initiated in 1978 by Deng Xiaoping has enabled China access to the markets, technology, and capital of the developed countries and has greatly augmented China’s national capability. In return, it requires China to maintain good political and economic relations with other countries especially the developed ones, which means that China has to be responsive to their concerns. Beijing effectively has to cooperative with them in international affairs. However, Beijing’s behavior in this regard is 60 Ibidem.

61 Alex Van Kemenade, Analyst of The Economist. Personal Interview. 12 May 2010.

62 Hu Jintao (born 21 December 1942) is the current President of the People's Republic of China. He began to hold the titles of General Secretary of the Communist Party of China since 2002, President of the People's Republic of China since 2003, and Chairman of the Central Military Commission since 2004, succeeding Jiang Zemin as the top leader of fourth generation leadership of the People's Republic of China.

63Ibidem.

64 Rob Anderson, First Secretary of The Embassy of the Netherlands in China. Personal Interview. 12 May 2010.

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constrained by a strong concern over its state sovereignty.⁶⁵ There are two major factors that have shaped China's sovereignty concern. The first is China's historical experience in modern times. During the ‘century of humiliation’ dating back from the first Opium War in 1839 to the expulsion of foreign powers from China's mainland and the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, China suffered from political, economic, and military aggression by the Western powers and Japan, and this experience has caused the Chinese to cherish their sovereignty intact.⁶⁶China wants to be recognized as one of the great powers especially in Asian region and to regain China's rightful place in the world.⁶⁷ For China to regain this title, it must remain united. The Chinese have learned from their history that the Middle Kingdom, that is the ancient Chinese kingdom, was weak when divided.⁶⁸Second, China is concerned over its territorial integrity with regard to Tibet, Xinjiang, and especially Taiwan. Beijing is very sensitive to any precedent that may legitimize these regions' separation from China or lead to foreign intervention.⁶⁹ The Taiwan question is viewed by Beijing as an entirely internal affair, although other powers in the region, especially the US, have their own commitments, stakes and interests concerning Taiwan. The constant element of Chinese foreign policy during the Cold War, from 1949 to 1991, was the desire to participate in the bipolar (East-West) international system only to the extent necessary to preserve and enhance China's autonomy. China pragmatically would lean to one side (the Soviet Union) and then to the other (The United States), and it would seek friends in the Third World, but its continual security imperative was (and remains) the absolute preservation to its sovereignty.⁷⁰ During the Cold War, China was forced to be creative in defending its security and in seeking support from other countries. China's solution was to play in the international system for its own benefit by siding with one or the other superpowers when necessary, courting the Third World when isolated, and acting as a great

65Wu Xinbo, Four Contradictions, 295.

66 Ibidem.

67Judith F. Kornberg And John R. Faust, China in World Politics, 15.

68Martin Stuart-Fox, “Southeast Asia and China: The Role of History and Culture in Shaping Future Relations,”

in Contemporary Southeast Asia 26, no.1 (2004), 116-139.

69 Wu Xinbo, Four Contradictions, 295.

70 Judith F. Kornberg And John R. Faust, China in World Politics, 15.

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power on itself when it was in Beijing's interest. All these factors continue to influence China in the present post Cold War period.⁷¹

The third contradiction is the principle versus pragmatism. The paradox of the moral and idealistic elements in China’s foreign policy thinking draw mainly from three sources:

the traditional Chinese Confusian ideal of a world of universal harmony; the humiliating experience in its modern history which causes China to long for a just and democratic (more equal in political terms) world order; and the legacy of Marxism–Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought which advocates for a world free of aggression and exploitation of capitalism, imperialism, and colonialism: a world free of power politics, bloc politics and hegemonism.⁷² Mao Zedong Thought is a variant of Marxism derived from the teachings of the late Chinese leader Mao Zedong (1949-1976) widely applied as the political and military guiding ideology in the Communist Party of China (CPC). Mao Zedong Thought is defined in the CPC's Constitution as "Marxism-Leninism applied in a Chinese context", synthesized by Mao Zedong and China's "first-generation leaders". It asserts that class struggle continues even if the proletariat has already overthrown the bourgeoisie. Maoism provided the CPC's first comprehensive theoretical guideline with regards to how to continue the socialist revolution, the creation of a socialist society, socialist military construction, and highlights various contradictions in society to be addressed by what is termed a ‘socialist construction’.⁷³ While it continues to be lauded as the major force that defeated

‘imperialism and feudalism’ and created a ‘New China’ by the Communist Party of China, the ideology survives only in name on the Communist Party's Constitution; Deng Xiaoping abolished most Maoist practices in 1978, advancing a guiding ideology called "Socialism with Chinese characteristics.”⁷⁴ As the standard for its international contact, China cites the

71 Wu Xinbo, Four Contradictions, 296.

72 Ibidem, 297.

73 Xinhua: Constitution of the Communist Party of China.

74"Socialism with Chinese characteristics" is an official term for the economy of the People's Republic of China which as of 2009 consists of the state having ownership of a large fraction of the Chinese economy, while at the same time having all entities participate within a market economy. This is a form of a socialist market economy and differs from market socialism and mixed economy in that while the state retained ownership of large enterprises, it should not use this ownership to intervene to change prices which are set by the market.

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“Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence’ formulated already in 1955 during the Conference of Non Aligned Nations in Bandung, Indonesia. The five principles are as follows:⁷⁵

1. Mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity 2. Nonaggression

3. Noninterference in each other’s internal affairs 4. Equality and mutual benefit

5. Peaceful coexistence

However, under certain circumstances, Beijing has to turn to pragmatism, which, as a compromise to its principles, provides a more realistic approach to a certain issue at stake and which can best serve China’s interests. Being pragmatic also means to prefer mutual and fair economic gains above normative issues such as human rights and democracy, to use peaceful resolution and common security by the principle of non intervention;⁷⁶ and to put environmental and energy sustainability considerations on the agenda, while at the same time emphasizing the internal needs and capabilities. As Deng Xiaoping stated, it does not matter whether a cat is black or white; if it catches mice, it is a good cat. ⁷⁷ The mutual benefit for self and others is thus in the end the main consideration in contrary to its normative and ideological assumptions.⁷⁸

China’s understanding on the principles mentioned above is different from the principle-based and legal approach in western perspective; China puts its priority in maintaining its good relations with all other states out of idealistic and pragmatic (economy) reasons. This can also be explained by analysing Chinese culture and the development of the judicial system in China. From a cultural perspective, the importance of maintaining friendly relations and avoiding loss of face (being humiliated in public) in Chinese culture explains 75Judith Kornberg and John R. Faust, China in World Politics: Policies, Processes, Prospects, (London, 2005), 14.

76Yang Jiemian, “Cross-Straits Relations in New International Setting”, American Foreign Policy Interests, Vol.

26, issue 5 (2004), 403-407.

77 Kishore Mahbubani, The New Asian Hemisphere. The Irresistible Shift of Global Power to the East, Public Affairs (New York, 2008), 279.

78 Ibidem.

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why most Chinese are not fond of public dispute settlement a (inter) national court. They prefer to settle their disputes informally.⁷⁹ The Chinese also started to build their independent judicial system quite late. Between 1958 and 1978 there was no judicial system separated from the Communist Party of China (CPC) in China. There were no judges, lawyers or prosecutors outside the state party government officials. Until now CPC officials still have a decisive influence in legal processes in Chinese courts.⁸⁰ These domestic conditions have influenced how China perceives its foreign relation by emphasizing on the relation itself more than on the legal principles.⁸¹ It is obviously a pragmatic stance.

The pragmatic notion of internal interest is also expressed in the concept of China's Peaceful Rise. This is a phrase that has been used by officials and scholars in China to describe the country's foreign policy approach in the early 21^st century. It seeks to characterize China as a responsible world leader: it emphasizes soft power⁸² and vows that China is committed to its internal issues and improving the welfare of its own people before interfering with world affairs. The term suggests that China seeks to avoid unnecessary international confrontation.⁸³ Because of the negative connotation of the word “rise” this lately has been changed to the word “development”. Chinese analysts and policy-makers believe that economic globalization creates the open economic system, which is essential for China's growth. Although pressuring China to live up to its assumed international commitments, the globalized (western) world also offers China opportunities to express its discontent, to take measures to defend its economic interests and even to assert a possible leading role in global governance if wanted.

Concerning equality or fairness, in China’s view, restructuring of the current world order to become more equal and just, is an important aspect of being a responsible stakeholder. The (un)fairness of the World Trade Organization (WTO) which benefits the 79 Van Kemenade. Personal Interview.Beijing.12 May 2010

80 Siebe Schuur, Personal Interview, Economic Section of The Embassy of the Netherlands in China. Beijing. 12 May 2010.

81Ibidem.

82Soft power is the ability to obtain what one wants through co-option and attraction. It is in contradistinction to 'hard power', which is the use of coercion.

83Esther Pan, “The Promise and Pitfalls of China's Peaceful Rise”, Publications of Council on Foreign Relations, April 2006, accessed from: http://www.cfr.org/publication/10446/.

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developed countries is often addressed by China’s officials. Shi Guangsheng, China's Foreign Trade Minister, stated that the WTO has failed to reflect the interests and demands of developing countries in a more adequate fashion.⁸⁴ In the WTO ministerial meeting in Cancun (September 2003) Lu Fuyuan, The Chinese Minister of Commerce, gave rhetorical markers that indicate China's determination to prevent the Doha talks⁸⁵ from resulting in further substantial obligations concerning Chinese liberalization.⁸⁶ China claimed that it has significantly liberalized and opened its market before its accession to the WTO. This can be interpreted as China's ambiguity in supporting full trade liberalization. Yet, it can also be seen as China's concern about fairness regarding the position of the developed against the developing countries. According to China, the obligations of developing countries to liberalize their markets are not balanced yet and their gains from free world trade are not equal yet to those of the rich countries. However, it nevertheless seems that China is pleased with the current state of WTO-negotiations; the existence of Special Safeguard Mechanism⁸⁷ in the WTO, which has kept Chinese farmers protected and China does not

84 Yong Deng and Thomas G. Moore, “China Views Globalization: Toward a new Great-Power Politics?” in The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 27, issue 3 (2004), 124.

85The November 2001 declaration of the Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar, provides the mandate for negotiations on a range of subjects and other work. The negotiations include those on agriculture and services, which began in early 2000. In Doha, Ministers also approved a linked decision on implementation — problems developing countries face in implementing the current WTO agreements. Ministerial discussions have taken place in Cancún in 2003, Geneva in 2004, Hong Kong in 2005 and Geneva in 2006 and 2008. See a brief summary of these negotiations

http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/negotiations_summary_e.htm

86Ibidem.

87Safeguards are defined as “contingency restrictions on imports taken temporarily to deal with special circumstances such as a surge in imports.” They are not a new concept. Safeguards that applied to all products were included in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and there is a Safeguards Agreement in the Uruguay Round Agreement that created the WTO. The provisions can be used if a domestic industry is injured or threatened with injury caused by a surge in imports accompanied by a price fall. A price decline alone does not qualify. The restrictions can be on quantity imported like a quota or an increase in tariffs above the bound rate. An injury test is required, and negotiations for compensation must be pursued. These

safeguards can be applied on agricultural products, but the current Agriculture Agreement has a Special Agricultural Safeguard (SSG). This safeguard can be triggered by import surges or price declines without a need to prove injury or negotiate compensation. It can only be applied to products that had quotas and other quantitative restrictions converted to tariffs under the Uruguay Agreement.

http://www.truthabouttrade.org/content/view/12199/51/

Theoretical Framework and Methodology

Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER 1

Theoretical Framework and Methodology

CHAPTER 2

China in International Politics