(DIS)SIMILARITIES ON ESCALATION AND COMPENSATION
Master thesis, MSc. Human Resource Management University of Groningen, Faculty of Economics and Business
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ABSTRACT
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INTRODUCTION
In the recent decennia, business literature increasingly paid attention to business ethics, since scandals urged both share and stakeholders to assure themselves of doing business with trustful parties (Treviño, Weaver and Reynolds, 2006). The growth of attention for business ethics is partly caused by the many examples of unethicality in business in recent decennia. Examples are for instance the bookkeeping frauds at Enron, Ahold and Parmalat or the milk adulteration scandal in China as a major recent example.
Due to escalation of immorality, bookkeeping frauds may rapidly emerge from being quite harmless in the beginning to being very serious and consequential in the end (Gino and Bazerman, 2009). Hence, it would not be surprising if the above mentioned examples of frauds of millions and billions of dollars, initially had started off as frauds of „only‟ several thousands of dollars. Another example is the Chinese milk scandal. It is very likely that the scandal started off with low amounts of melamine added to the milk and along the way the amounts of melamine were raised to dangerous levels, with the end result of the death of six children and 29.000 infants with kidney damage (Shumei, 2009).
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individual is not seldom copied by other organizational members (Weiss, 1977). Therefore it is important to focus on individual immoral conduct.
Though it is suggested that individuals immoral behavior can escalate (Street and Street, 2006; Gino and Bazerman, 2009; Martens, Kolsoff and Eckstein Jackson, 2010), hardly any evidence is available on the conditions that really cause individuals to escalate. To make contributions to the field this research explores to what extent (dis)similarities between moral dilemmas account for the escalation of immorality on the individual level. Furthermore it will be tested to what extent this differs between individual‟s locus of control.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
Immoral behavior is generally considered as the pursuit of self-interest at expense of others (Freiman, 2010). In organizations, that can be prioritizing self-interest above interests of colleagues, department(s), or the organization as a whole; thus misleading of colleagues, theft of organizational goods, falsely leaving blame to others, intentionally not living up to certain codes and guidelines, and so on.
No matter how severe, every individual behaves immorally once in a while. Serota, Levine and Boster (2010) found for instance that individuals averagely lie once or twice a day. Individuals can behave immorally in case outcomes of immoral behavior are seemingly beneficial over those of moral behavior, or when individuals simply not want to put in the extra effort (e.g. necessary time, money, courage, risks et cetera) it takes to express moral behavior (Sachdeva, Iliev and Medin, 2009).
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individuals? When it is understood what people do in the aftermath of their immoral conduct and why they do so, chances are created to influence their future behavior.
Initial immorality and subsequent behavior
Empirical evidence found that the morality of individuals‟ choices is influenced by whether they have behaved morally or immorally in the recent past. Surprisingly, however, the field is divided about what this influence entails since evidence is found for compensation and escalation of immoral behavior. Research has shown that people behave more immorally after immoral conduct, as well as it was found that people behave more morally after immoral conduct. We will start with discussing the former.
Escalating immorality
Martens, Kosloff, and Eckstein Jackson (2010) studied the behavior of people in a bug killing experiment. It was found that people who believed they had actually killed 5 bugs in an initial phase, were more likely to continue killing (even a greater number of) bugs in a second phase than were people who believed they had killed one bug. These findings point at an important role of commitment: the more one is indulged to a certain course of action, the more committed a person gets. Subsequently, the more committed the more they become further indulged. Since Martens et al. (2010) did only found these escalating behaviors when people believed they killed bugs (rather than they knew it was a simulation of killing bugs), it is clear these findings were due to motivational causes rather than due to some kind of practice effect. Hence, commitment to ones previous behavior is very likely to stimulate escalating behaviors.
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that the killing was below his or her moral boundaries. When killing more bugs in the second phase, the individual is able to draw new conclusions about the initial killing: since the number of kills in the second phase was higher than the number of kills in the first phase, the killing in the first phase may become perceived as having been within the personal moral boundaries (Martens et al., 2010). In case the same individual would have chosen to kill less bugs instead, he or she would have admitted the immorality of the initial killing. So, in other words; stopping one‟s immoral behavior after having engaged in it for a while may be equal to admitting one was wrong. This makes people continue with their immoral behavior.
According to several authors, escalating immorality (like in the bug killing example) is caused by the fact that individuals do not like to admit that they have behaved immorally (Bandura, 1999) as admitting this disconfirms the moral self-image and feels unpleasant (Prentice, 2007; Street, Robertson and Geigner, 1997). Street et al. (1997) argue that an individual may become committed to the immoral course of action when the stress suffered from continuation will not be as high as would be the stress suffered from admitting the immoral behavior. So, commitment basically is a continuation of the immoral behavior in order to affirm the previous immoral behavior was permissible.
7 Compensating immorality
Other literature suggests that individuals, after having acted immorally, do not continue but rather compensate this with subsequent moral behavior. Zhong, Ku, Lount and Murninghan (2010) for instance found that individuals compensate for the degree of (im)morality of their previous behavior. In other words, when individuals‟ conduct has been above their moral boundaries they subsequently compensate by less moral behavior in a future situation, and when the individuals‟ conduct has been below the moral boundaries they compensate by acting more morally in a subsequent situation (Zhong et al., 2010; Jordan, Mullen, Murninghan, 2011). A study of Gino and Margolis (2011) supports this finding, since they found that people who cheated in order to earn more money, donated more money to charity compared to non-cheaters.
Alike the escalating immorality, the compensating behaviors can be explained by use of the moral self-worth and the cognitive dissonance. Both empirical work (Zhong et al., 2010; Zhong and Liljenquist, 2006; Monin and Miller, 2001) and theoretical work of Sachdeva et al. (2009) suggest that people experienced cognitive dissonance due to the gain and loss of moral credits; behavior below the own moral boundaries therein causes a loss of moral credits, whereas behavior above these boundaries leads to a gain of moral credits. When credits are lost, they need to be added again in order to keep the moral self-worth intact („moral cleansing‟), because individuals do not like to see their moral self worth being disconfirmed (Street et al., 1997, Gino and Margolis, 2011). For the same reason conduct above the personal moral boundaries may cause relaxation of pressure to act morally in subsequent moral dilemmas (Zhong et al., 2010), since individuals have some gained credits to spill („moral licensing‟: Sachdeva et al., 2009).
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conduct will be a counter-act to the extent of morality in the previous conduct in order to maintain the moral boundaries and confirm the moral self-image. This thus implies that individuals will not continuously act above or below their moral boundaries, but in fact the morality of their behavior fluctuates around their moral self-worth.
Compensation and escalation perspective integrated
All in all, on the one hand people compensate their immoral acts by moral acts, and on the other hand escalation of immorality also occurs. In the following the domain of moral dilemmas and its effect on escalation and compensation is explored, by taking a closer look to existing literature.
An important finding is the fact that the compensation literature studied the compensatory behavior of individuals in varying moral domains. Zhong et al. (2010) used dissimilar vignettes, for instance favoring acquaintances in a job application procedure, keeping money that does not belong to you, blame others for costly damage done to a car et cetera. Gino and Margolis (2011) also gave participants the opportunity to restore their moral self-image by a good act (donating to charity) that did not uncover their bad ones (cheating in order to earn more money).
Whereas the compensatory behavior of individuals is studied in different domains, the literature on escalation mainly focuses on the people‟s behavior in similar domains. Martens et al. (2010) confronted their participants with exactly the same type of decision (i.e. bug killing) in the first and second phase of the experiment. Also Street and Street (1997) and Schulz-Hardt et al. (2009) studied escalation in the same domain, as they researched to which extent the participants became entrapped in an already failing investments.
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domains. Moreover, presumably people may still escalate in one domain, whilst compensating in another (Zhong et al., 2010). When a person for instance did not report his/her illegal practices at work, he/she may thereafter donate some money to charity, thereby restoring the damage that the initial act possibly inflicted on the moral self-image. That is, the good behavior may prevent the moral self-image from being harmed by bad behavior, in fact people may still hold a positive moral self-image since donating to charity boosted their moral credits again. Acting morally in the same domain (i.e. nevertheless reporting own illegal practices at work) would instead have uncovered the previous immorality of not reporting. Hence, bad behavior can be compensated by good behavior in a different domain, whilst simultaneously the immoral behavior may still escalate (not reporting even worse own practices at work)
The suggestion that a domain switch may encourage compensation is also supported by the work of Ashforth and Anand (2003) about compartmentalization. That is, people have different social roles in which they might behave differently. When a woman is both a manager and mother, it might occur that immoral behavior as a manager is compensated by the moral behaving mother. This suggests that, unlike the social roles, individuals have one moral self-image and that they are able to compensate their immoral acts in one domain with moral acts in another domain. At the same time it is thus possible that the manager still behaves immorally.
Hence, individuals‟ morality in a subsequent moral dilemma presumably partly depends on the similarities between the initial and subsequent moral dilemma.
10 Locus of control, compensation, and escalation Locus of control, and degree of morality
Research found that besides situational factors (like the similarities of moral domains), personality traits account for the extent of morality in individuals behavior as well (Sparks and Hunt, 1998).
One of these personality traits may be the locus of control. Locus of control refers to the extent to which people attribute life events to either external or internal causes. People with an internal locus of control are the ones who believe the things happening in life are a result from individual efforts, whereas people with an external locus of control are those who believe that things happening in life can be subscribed to fortune and misfortune, fate and powerful others (Bloomberg and Soneson, 1976). Consequently, we argue that „internals‟ feel a responsibility based upon the believe that both good and bad consequences stem from their own conduct, and „externals‟ believe their conduct is less influential for the things happening in life and thus feel less responsibility accordingly. Thus, internals and externals differ in placement of responsibility.
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of internals more than it damages an externals moral self-worth. Indeed, Zhong et al. (2009) stated that guilt lingers longer when individuals cannot blame their behavior on external incentives. In other words, when individuals can blame external incentives than they feel less responsibility and less guilt accordingly. When individuals cannot blame external incentives it means they are responsible for the outcomes of their behavior and their feelings of guilt will be stronger.
Albeit it is suggested that feelings of responsibility and guilt are a prerequisite for moral compensating behavior to take place (De Cremer, Tenbrunsel, Van Dijke, 2010), it may instead lead to escalation of immorality as well. Note that earlier we mentioned individuals are likely to commit to an immoral course of action even when they feel responsibility and remorse for what they did. Commitment to the immoral course of action, we said, could be a way for not admitting the immorality of conduct since and thereby disconfirmation of the moral self worth is (at least temporary) held off.
From the previous paragraphs we suggest that immoral behavior may be more troublesome to the moral self worth for internals. Yet, internals too will behave immorally once in a while. When that occurs we suggest internals feel more commitment to their behaviors than externals do and therefore it may be problematic to admit their own previous immoral actions. This may be reason to expect internals to escalate more in an immoral course of action in comparison to externals.
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Locus of control, the domain, and the degree of morality
So, decisive in whether internals compensate or escalate may again be the dissimilarities between the moral dilemmas. For internals the urge to prevent admitting the immorality of what they have done may be higher, due to the potential damage to the moral self-worth. Hence, there is a smaller chance they will behave morally after having behaved immorally in a similar problematic situation since that would uncover their immorality and really damage their moral self-worth. On the other hand, the immoral behavior of internals may cost more moral credits compared to similar immorality of externals. That urges internals to gain more credits as well, causing them to compensate in situations that do not uncover their previous immorality. Hence, they may show more compensating behavior in dissimilar situations.
We therefore expect that the previous hypothesized effect of a domain switch will be stronger for internal than for externals.
H2: individuals who face a dissimilar domain will continue their immoral behavior to a lesser extent, or to a larger extent compensate their immoral behavior with more moral behavior in comparison to individuals who face a similar domain. The relationship is expected to be stronger for individuals with an internal locus of control.
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PILOT STUDY
We first developed the two moral dilemmas (hereafter: vignettes) and tested whether the immoral acts in the two dilemmas were equally serious, in order to make the choice options in the two dilemma comparable. For this purpose we performed a pilot study first.
METHOD
The vignettes were descriptions of situations that might occur once in a while at work. Namely, each vignette said the respondent was employed on a full time basis at a busy assurance office where work is hectic and stressful and on top of that overwork was necessary since they were personally assigned to an extra task that week, taking nine hours to complete. The first vignette portrays the respondent being in a situation where information should be gathered from colleagues, and thereafter a specific piece of an annual report needs to be written: “at the time the manager is looking for someone to put on that task, he runs into you. You agree taking the task, however after a while you regret you have said yes to it since you are dreading to start as it is such a bothersome, time consuming task. Colleague Jan is a fine chap who often feels highly responsible. You are almost certain that in case you call upon his responsibility, Jan is willing to do the entire extra task by himself. Nevertheless, the task will be bothersome too for Jan. However, the more of the work Jan takes over, the more it provides you leisure-time. What do you do?”
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however you are reluctant to visit the client, and besides it will cause you quite some overwork that week. Stefan is a good fellow who often feels highly responsible. You are almost certain that in case you call upon his responsibility, Stefan is willing to do the entire task by himself. That would be good for you since preferably you would like drop the task entirely. Nevertheless, it will be a bothersome task or Stefan as well. What do you do?”
A sample of 21 individuals who had a job was asked how immoral they thought it was to pass on work in both vignettes. They filled in three items regarding the seriousness of the immoral act after both the first and second vignette. These items rated the participants judgment about the morality, sociality, and fairness on a 7 point Likert scale (ranging from 1 for „very immoral/asocial/unfair‟ to 7 for „very moral/social/fair‟). The item concerning morality was “How moral or immoral you think it was to pass on work to a colleague in the above situation”. In a similar vein the individuals were asked to judge about the sociality and fairness of passing on work. For both the first vignette (α = .83) as well as the second one (α = .90) these items formed a reliable scale.
Furthermore, an item concerning compared ethicality was used. This item was measured on a 7 point Likert scale (1 = in vignette 1 passing on work is far more unethical than passing on work in vignette 2, 7 = in vignette 2 passing on work is far more unethical than passing on work in vignette 1)
RESULTS
A t-test was performed to test whether the two vignettes differed on the extent to which people judged passing on work to a colleague to be serious immoral acts. This showed no significant difference between the first vignette (M = 2.52, SD = .89) and the second vignette (M = 2.68, SD = 1.07), (t(20) = −1.23, p = 0.23).
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work is equally (un)ethical in both vignettes). Since the mean was not significantly different from this 4th option (M = −.19, p = .33), it was safe to conclude that the immoral seriousness of passing on work was perceived as similar in the two vignettes.
EXPERIMENT METHOD Participants and design
One hundred and fifty one individuals volunteered in this research by filling in the questionnaire. Nearly half of the individuals were direct and indirect contacts of the author, others were working for organizations (a municipality and a university) that were contacted by the author. The majority of the respondents was non-student (84,8%), possessed a job, and lived in the northern part of The Netherlands (foremost in Friesland and Groningen). Among the participants nearly half was male (48,3%), the average age was about 40 (min = 20, max = 65, SD = 12.6) and the average highest education was between secondary vocational education (MBO in Dutch) and higher vocational education (HBO in Dutch). Eight prices were raffled amongst the participants, namely 3 dinner vouchers (worth twenty-five euro‟s each) and 5 movie vouchers (worth ten euro‟s each). Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two conditions (no domain switch or domain switch).
Procedure
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First, participants filled in several personality questions (including locus of control). After this respondents were asked to read the vignettes closely and were told that multiple choice questions would be asked at the end of the questionnaire to examine how well they remembered details of the vignettes. Then participants read the first vignette which questioned how many of nine hours of overwork they would pass on to a colleague in that specific situation. After the first vignette, the manipulation of the domain switch followed.
In the no-domain switch condition, the similarities of the vignettes were stressed by the following text: “the next month another situation arises. The situation is actually alike the one you just made your decision about. Again the question is whether or not you will pass on work to a colleague, however now it is about the accomplishment of a bothersome dossier. Principally, the situation is identical to the previous one.” Then participants were asked to closely read the second vignette, despite the similarities.
In the domain switch condition, the dissimilarities of the vignettes were stressed by the following text: “the next month another situation arises. The situation is very different to the one you just made your decision about. Although it is again the question of whether or not you will pass on work to a colleague, this time, differently to the previous situation, it is about a bothersome dossier that has to be accomplished. So, it is a different affair than the previous one.” Then participant read the second vignette which questioned how many of 9 hours of overwork they would pass on to a (differently named) colleague in that specific situation.
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Manipulation
The manipulation of each respondent was coded as either 0 (= no domain switch condition) or 1 (=domain switch condition).
Escalation
In each of the two vignettes respondents were given 10 choice options, each representing the number of hours that was passed on to the colleague, ranging from 0 (= passing on 0 hours to the colleague), till 9 (= passing on 9 hours to the colleague). The escalating behavior of the respondents was measured by subtracting the individuals score on the first vignette from their score on the second vignette. This revealed whether or not individuals‟ immorality aggravated. A positive score revealed that individuals passed on more work in the second vignette than they did in first one (i.e. escalation), and a negative score revealed that individuals passed on more work in the first vignette than they did in the second one (i.e. compensation).
Locus of control
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was added into a total score of internal locus of control. The 23 items formed a reliable scale (α = .71).
Commitment (state)
Commitment of the respondents to their choice in the first vignette was asked using a 7-item self designed measure, and included items like: “I could easily imagine that the choice I made in the first vignette, would also be my choice when I would face that situation in real-life”, “I felt dedicated to the choice I made in the first vignette”, “There was nothing wrong with the decision I made in the first vignette” and “I felt personally attached to the choice I made in the first vignette”. All items (except for the third) were reversed ones, as a low score on a 7 point Likert scale (1 = completely agree, 7 = completely disagree) indicated a high degree of commitment. The items formed a reliable scale (α = .82).
Perceived Similarities (manipulation check)
To check the successfulness of the domain switch manipulation, respondent‟s perceived similarities of the vignettes were measured. Five items constituted this measure and measured on a 7 point Likert scale (1 = completely agree, 7 = completely disagree): “There were many differences between the first and the second vignette”, “There were many similarities between the first and the second vignette” (reversed). The items formed a reliable scale (α = .92).
RESULTS
Hypotheses testing19
two vignettes than the respondents in the no-domain switch condition did. This indicates that the manipulation of this study failed.
A significant correlation was however found between the perceived similarities and the escalating behavior of the respondents (r = .34, p = <.01). This indicates that the subjective feeling of similarity did correlate with escalation. Escalating behaviors of the respondents was not significantly correlated to the respondent‟s locus of control (r = .09, p = n.s.).
We first hypothesized that initial immoral conduct would be compensated in case of a domain change condition and would escalate in case of a no-domain change condition. This was tested by using a linear regression analysis in which escalation was regressed on domain switch and internal locus of control (see table 2). The domain switch did not significantly affect escalating behavior (b = −.23, p = .26). From this analysis the hypothesis gains no support.
We also expected that individuals with an internal locus of control were more likely to compensate in the no-domain switch and escalate in the domain switch condition than individuals with an external locus of control. Again linear regression was used (see table 2). The standardized independent variable (change of domain) and the standardized moderator (internal locus of control) were entered in step 1. In step 2 the interaction term „Domain change x Internal Locus of Control‟ was entered.
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the second hypotheses again, using „perceived similarities‟ as the independent variable, instead of the domain switch. Table 3 displays the results.
To test the second hypothesis with „perceives similarities‟ as the independent variable, the standardized independent variable and the standardized moderator (internal locus of control) were entered in step 1 of the linear regression. In step 2 the interaction term „Perceived Similarities ∙ Internal Locus of Control‟ was entered. This showed a main effect of „perceived similarities‟ on „escalation‟ (b = .82, p = <.001). Given these results, there seems to be support for the escalation part of hypothesis one. That is, it seems that respondents tend to escalate when the domains of vignettes are perceived as similarly. The results did not provide any support for the second hypothesis, as a significant interaction was not found (b = .32, p = .13).
Commitment
It was expected that escalating behaviors were stronger in similar domains for internal locus of control respondents, due to a stronger commitment to their choices. Therefore, respondent‟s commitment may in fact moderate the effect of „perceived similarities‟ on „escalation‟. Another regression analysis was executed, wherein the internal locus of control was replaced by the respondents commitment to their choice in the first vignette. The standardized independent variable (perceived similarities) and the standardized moderator (commitment) were entered in step 1. In step 2 the interaction term „Perceived Similarities ∙ Commitment‟ was entered. The results of this regression analysis are shown in table 4.
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they tended to compensate. This relation was stronger for respondents with a lower commitment to their behavior in vignette 1. (see figure 1).
[insert Figure 1 here]
With „perceived similarities‟ being a substitute for the manipulation, these results support Hypothesis 1. When the vignettes are perceived as dissimilar, the plot shows that the respondents passed on less work in the second vignette than in the first one. In case of highly perceived similarities, respondents passed on about the same amount of work in the second vignette, compared to the first. So, people compensated for their previous behavior more strongly when they experienced the next situation as different rather than similar. The interaction between perceived similarities and commitment showed that this was more strongly the case for those we were lowly committed to their previous behavior rather than highly committed. This was in contrast with the second hypothesis.
DICUSSION Hypothesis 1
The first hypothesis of this research expected that in dissimilar moral domains people would compensate for their initial immoral conduct, and in similar domains the immorality of people‟s behavior would escalate. This was tested by using two vignettes in which a domain switch was manipulated: both vignettes were quite identical (except for the colleague‟s name and task description) and gave respondents the ability to pass on overwork to a colleague, whilst initially it was their task. In the manipulation after the first vignette, the vignettes were either described as being very similar, or as being very different.
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the vignettes as a parallel of the domain instead, support was found for this first hypothesis. Results show that people‟s immorality continues (significant escalation was not found) in a situation having a domain similar as the situation in which they have behaved immorally in the present past, and that people compensate their immorality in a different domain. In short, when people have recently behaved badly in a certain situation, they will continue doing this in a similar situation, yet compensate for it and become more morally in a dissimilar situation. Theoretical implications Hypothesis 1
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continuation or escalation in case they take place in different domains. In fact, a restored moral self-worth in one domain might elicit further escalation in another domain.
Hypothesis 2
It was also expected that the effect of domains‟ similarities on escalating behavior and compensating behaviors would be stronger for people with an internal locus of control. However locus of control did not moderate the relation between the (dis)similarities of moral domains and the escalation or compensation of people‟s previous behaviors. Since it was expected people with an internal locus of control would experience stronger feelings of commitment to their choice in vignette 1, the correlation of these variables were checked. It revealed there was a significant, but weak correlation. Probably that weak correlation explains why the moderation of internal locus of control was not established. If the „internals‟ and „externals‟ are only slightly different regarding the committed to their first choice, then it is not surprising no significant difference was found regarding the way their commitment reflects on their second choice.
Therefore the moderating effect of people‟s state of commitment itself was analyzed as well. It revealed commitment significantly moderated the relation between the (dis)similarities of moral domains and people‟s escalating behaviors. However, the shape of the interaction was different from what was expected: the results show that people do compensate more strongly in case of dissimilar domains. However, this relation was found to be stronger for individuals who where lowly committed to their choice in vignette 1, whilst this relation was expected to be stronger for highly committed individuals.
Theoretical implications hypothesis 2
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research found that escalating behaviors are more likely to be found when people were lowly committed rather than highly committed. Clearly, the correlational nature of our main finding is a limitation. For instance, a correlation was found between respondents behavior in the first vignette and the extent respondents perceived the vignettes to be similar (i.e. the more respondents passed on work in the first vignette, the less similarities they perceived between both vignettes). A similar correlation was found between the first vignette and commitment (the more work respondents passed on in the first vignette, the less they said they were committed to that decision). Respondents may have said they saw less similarities and felt less commitment as rationalizations to justify that they passed on less work in second vignette than they did in the first vignette. Hence, casual effects remain unclear. Consequently, it cannot be concluded that commitment causes people to more escalating or less compensating behaviors. Therefore additional experiments could be conducted on commitment. Commitment could for instance be manipulated when confronting participants with a current moral dilemma from a similar domain as a prior immoral dilemma. One half of the participants could be told they personally made an immoral decision in that prior dilemma, the other half could be told others made that immoral decision. Based on commitment feelings it may be expected that those who are told they personally made the prior immoral decision, are more likely to behave at least equal immorally in the present moral dilemma. Yet, those who are told others made the prior immoral decision, are more likely to behave more morally.
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are manipulated on the chance to confess their (eventual) immorality after the first vignette. Based on the above assumption it may be expected that those who behave immorally and do not confess, will escalate in their immorality in the second dilemma, and that those who behaved immorally and do confess, compensate in the second dilemma. The role of commitment could also be investigated by checking escalating differences between people who could confess wrongness of their behavior and did, and people who could confess wrongness and did not. In case a significant difference is found, it likely to be caused by commitment.
Practical Implications
Managers may watch out for continuing immorality in case workers have very homogeneous task, as it increases the chance that work related choices are perceived as similarly. On the other hand, note that immoral behaviour of a worker with very heterogeneous task may go unnoticed longer for the same reason.
Anticipatory to the proposed future research, managers may want employees to confess immorality of their behaviour before they are placed in similar situations again, as the assumption from this research is that continuation of immorality in similar domains happens at greater chance in case people have not confessed that they behaved immorally (i.e. the likelihood of people to commit to immoral behaviour for self-justifying reasons is expected to be greater in case they have not yet admitted their behaviour was wrong).
Conclusion
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29
APPENDIX A Figure and Tables
FIGURE 1 -3,0 -2,0 -1,0 0,0 1,0 2,0 3,0 Low High Esca la tio n
Perceived similarities between vignette 1 and 2
30 TABLE 1
Variable means, standard deviations, and correlations among variables
N min = 141, N max = 151. * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (p < .05). ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (p <.001). Coefficients alpha are presented in parentheses on the diagonal.
Variables M SD 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 1. Domain Change (manipulation) .02 1.00 (n/a)* 2. Perceived Similarities (manipulation check) 4.58 1.60 −.01** (.92)*
3. Behavior Vignette 1 3.32 2.12 −.01** −.30** (n/a)*
4. Behavior Vignette 2 2.77 2.53 −.10** −.08** −.44** (n/a)*
5. Escalation −.55 2.49 −.09** −.34** −.41** −.64** (n/a)*
6. Internal LOC
(locus of control) .55 .17 −.03** −.10** −.10** −.01** −.09** (.71)*
31 TABLE 2
Results of regression analysis for escalation from original manipulation
Escalation
Variable b SE b p
Step 1: Independent (.02)
Domain change (manipulation) −.23 .20 .26
Internal Locus of Control .22 .20 .28
Step 2: Interaction (.02)
Domain change −.23 .20 .26
Internal Locus of Control .23 .20 .25
Domain change ∙ Internal Locus of Control −.13 .20 .53
N min = 141, N max = 151. Unstandardized regression coefficients. * Coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level (p < .05), ** Coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level(p <.001) R2 presented
32 TABLE 3
Results of regression analysis for escalation from similarities
Escalation
Variable b SE b p
Step 1: Independent (.12)
Perceived similarities of vignettes .82 .21 .00**
Internal Locus of Control .22 .20 .29**
Step 2: Interaction (.14)
Perceived similarities of vignettes .81 .21 .00**
Internal Locus of Control .24 .20 .26**
Perceived similarities ∙ Internal Locus of Control .32 .21 .13** N min = 141, N max = 151. Unstandardized regression coefficients. * Coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level (p < .05), ** Coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level(p <.001) R2 presented
33 TABLE 4
Results of regression analysis for escalation from similarities, moderated by commitment Escalation
Variable b SE b p
Step 1: Independent (.13)
Perceived similarities of vignettes .79 .20 .00**
Commitment .34 .20 .10**
Step 2: Interaction (.17)
Perceived similarities of vignettes .91 .20 .00**
Commitment .34 .20 .09**
Perceived similarities ∙ Commitment −.58 .24 .02**
N min = 141, N max = 151. Unstandardized regression coefficients. * Coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level (p < .05), ** Coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level(p <.001) R2 presented
34
APPENDIX B Used items of questionnaire Locus of Control
(adapted from Rotter (1966), excluding 6 filler items, and translated to Dutch, forced choice response)
1.
a. Veel van het ongeluk dat mensen overkomt, komt deels door toeval. b. Het ongeluk dat mensen overkomt, komt omdat ze fouten maken. 2.
a. Een van de belangrijkste redenen voor oorlog is dat mensen zich niet genoeg interesseren voor de politiek.
b. Er zullen altijd oorlogen zijn, ongeacht hoe zeer mensen ook hun best doen om ze te voorkomen.
3.
a. Uiteindelijk krijgen mensen het respect dat ze verdienen.
b. Jammer genoeg wordt iemands waarde vaak niet gezien, hoeveel moeite hij/zij ook doet.
4.
a. Het idee dat docenten oneerlijk zijn naar hun studenten toe, is onzin.
b. De meeste studenten hebben niet in de gaten hoezeer hun cijfers worden beïnvloed door toevalligheden.
5.
a. Zonder de juiste kansen kan niemand een goede leider worden.
35 6.
a. Hoezeer je het ook probeert, sommige mensen moeten je gewoon niet.
b. Als mensen onsympathiek overkomen, komt dat omdat ze niet snappen hoe ze met anderen moeten omgaan.
7.
a. Ik heb vaak het gevoel dat wat ik denk dat gaat gebeuren, ook echt gebeurt. b. Op het lot vertrouwen heeft nooit zo goed voor me gewerkt als het nemen van een
beslissing en daar ook naar handelen. 8.
a. Voor een echt goed voorbereide student bestaat er niet zoiets als een oneerlijk tentamen.
b. Tentamen vragen lijken vaak zo weinig met de stof van doen te hebben dat je er eigenlijk niet voor kunt studeren.
9.
a. Van je leven een succes maken is een kwestie van hard werken, geluk heeft daar weinig of niets mee te maken.
b. Een goede baan krijgen is meestal een kwestie van op het goede moment op de juiste plek zijn.
10.
a. De gemiddelde burger kan het overheidsbeleid beïnvloeden.
36 11.
a. Als ik plannen maak weet ik bijna zeker dat ze goed zullen uitpakken.
b. Het is niet altijd verstandig ver vooruit te plannen omdat veel dingen toch van het toeval afhangen.
12.
a. In mijn persoonlijke geval geldt dat iets krijgen wat ik wil, geen kwestie is van geluk. b. Heel vaak kun je gewoon een munt opgooien om te bepalen wat je zou moeten doen. 13.
a. Degene die de baas wordt is meestal degene die het geluk had als eerste op de juiste plek te zijn .
b. Het kost vaardigheid om mensen het juiste te laten doen, toeval heeft daar niets mee te maken.
14.
a. Als het gaat om de wereldproblematiek, zijn we eigenlijk allemaal het slachtoffer van krachten die we niet kunnen overzien of begrijpen.
b. Mensen kunnen gebeurtenissen op wereldschaal beïnvloeden door actief te worden op politiek en sociaal gebied.
15.
a. De meeste mensen realiseren zich niet dat hun leven vooral door toevalligheden wordt bepaald.
b. Er bestaat eigenlijk niet zoiets als „toeval‟. 16.
a. Het is moeilijk te achterhalen of iemand je leuk vindt.
37 17.
a. Op de lange duur overkomen ons net zoveel goede als slechte dingen.
b. Het meeste ongeluk wordt veroorzaakt door gebrek aan vaardigheden, onwetendheid, luiheid of alle drie
18.
a. Als we genoeg moeite doen kunnen we een eind maken aan politieke corruptie. b. Het is moeilijk voor mensen om invloed uit te oefenen op het gedrag van politici. 19.
a. Soms begrijp ik niet hoe docenten de cijfers bepalen die ze uitdelen.
b. Er is een duidelijk verband tussen hoe hard ik studeer en de cijfers die ik haal. 20.
a. Ik krijg heel vaak het gevoel dat ik weinig invloed heb op de dingen die me overkomen.
b. Ik kan gewoon niet geloven dat toeval of geluk een grote rol speelt in mijn leven. 21.
a. Mensen zijn vaak eenzaam omdat ze geen moeite doen om aardig te zijn.
b. Het heeft geen zin om heel erg je best te doen om het mensen naar de zin te maken: ze vinden je leuk of niet.
22.
a. Ik bepaal zelf wat er met me gebeurt.
38 23.
a. Ik kan soms niet begrijpen waarom politici de dingen doen die ze doen.
b. Uiteindelijk zijn de mensen zelf verantwoordelijk voor een slechte overheid, zowel landelijk als regionaal.
Vignette 1
(self created meassure)
Lees de onderstaande situatie nauwkeurig door en kies daarna wat je in deze situatie zou doen:
Je werkt op een acceptatieafdeling van een verzekeringskantoor waar het de laatste tijd erg druk is. Veel van je collega's ervaren die situatie net als jij als hectisch en stressvol. Nu moet, zoals ieder jaar rond deze tijd, de organisatie een jaarverslag afleveren. Daarvoor moet nog een stuk worden geschreven waaraan ook nog informatieverzameling vooraf gaat. Dat is altijd een vervelende aangelegenheid omdat het voor iedereen naast andere werkzaamheden moet gebeuren.
Op het moment dat je leidinggevende iemand op deze klus wil zetten, komt hij jou tegen en vraagt jou het te doen. Je zegt ja, maar ziet er eigenlijk enorm tegenop om hier mee aan de slag te gaan omdat het zo‟n vervelende klus is. Daarnaast betekent het dat je deze week meer uren zult maken dan je normtaak (de hoeveelheid uren waarvoor je op papier staat).
39
af. Niettemin denk je dat het voor Jan net zo goed ellendig werk is. Aan de andere kant, hoe meer Jan van de opdracht overneemt, hoe meer dat jou vrije tijd oplevert.
Wat doe je? Laat je Jan (een deel van) de klus doen? En zo ja, hoeveel, uitgedrukt in uren? Ik laat Jan….
0 uren van de klus doen (en doe de klus dus helemaal zelf) 1 uur van de klus doen
2 uren van de klus doen 3 uren van de klus doen 4 uren van de klus doen 5 uren van de klus doen 6 uren van de klus doen 7 uren van de klus doen 8 uren van de klus doen
9 uren van de klus doen (de hele klus dus)
Manipulation
(between subject, domain change version)
40 Manipulation
(between subject, no domain change version)
De volgende maand doet zich weer zo‟n situatie voor, eigenlijk hetzelfde als de situatie waarover je zojuist een beslissing hebt genomen. Het gaat weer over de vraag of je een collega werk van je laat overnemen, alleen dan nu wat betreft het afhandelen van een vervelend dossier. In principe is dit dus een identieke kwestie als hierboven.
Vignette 2
(self created measure)
Op de afdeling is het alom hectiek en drukte. Daar komt nog bij dat er een dossier moet worden overgenomen van een collega die onlangs met pensioen is gegaan. Ze heeft dit dossier niet kunnen afronden voor haar vertrek. Het dossier betreft een klant die door brand een grote schade heeft geclaimd bij jullie verzekeringskantoor. Omdat de klant volgens de laatste rapportages niet voldeed aan de laatste eisen omtrent brandpreventie, zal jullie maatschappij niet uitkeren. Voor de klant zal dit een financiële strop zijn die waarschijnlijk tevens zijn faillissement betekent. Iemand moet langs bij de klant om dit te vertellen en vervolgens moet er nog een rapport over deze zaak worden opgemaakt.
Op het moment dat het dossier moet worden verdeeld ben jij aanwezig en krijg jij het toegewezen. Je zegt ja, maar ziet er eigenlijk enorm tegenop om bij die klant langs te gaan. Daarnaast is het ook een tijdrovende klus je die extra werk oplevert waardoor je deze week zult moeten overwerken
41
ellendig werk is. Aan de andere kant, hoe meer Stefan van de opdracht overneemt, hoe meer dat jou vrije tijd oplevert.
Wat doe je? Laat je Stefan (een deel van) de klus doen? En zo ja, hoeveel, uitgedrukt in uren? Ik laat Stefan….
0 uren van de klus doen (en doe de klus dus helemaal zelf) 1 uur van de klus doen
2 uren van de klus doen 3 uren van de klus doen 4 uren van de klus doen 5 uren van de klus doen 6 uren van de klus doen 7 uren van de klus doen 8 uren van de klus doen
9 uren van de klus doen (de hele klus dus)
Commitment (state)
(self created measure, 7 point Likert scale)
Bij de keuze die ik heb gemaakt in de situatie van collega Jan en het jaarverslag (eerste situatie)..
1. ..kon ik me goed voorstellen dat ik die keuze in het echt ook zo zou maken. 2. ..leek het me waarschijnlijk dat ik die keuze in het echt zou maken.
3. ..kon ik het me nauwelijks voorstellen dat ik die keuze in het echt ooit zo zou maken. Geef aan in welke mate je het eens bent met de onderstaande stellingen.
42
5. Met de keuze die ik in de eerste situatie had gemaakt, was niets mis mee.
6. Ik voelde me persoonlijk verbonden met de keuzes die ik in de eerste situatie had gemaakt.
7. Ik voelde me verantwoordelijk voor mijn keuze in de eerste situatie.
Manipulation check
(self created measure, 7 point Likert scale)
Nu komen er nog wat vragen ter controle.
In de eerste situatie (collega Jan en het jaarverslag) heb ik.. 1. ..Jan gevraagd werk over te nemen.
2. ..werk op Jan afgeschoven.
In de tweede situatie (college Stefan en het dossier) heb ik.. 3. ..Stefan gevraagd werk over te nemen.
4. .werk op Stefan afgeschoven.
Perceived Similarities between domains (self created measure, 7 point Likert scale)
Geef aan in welke mate je het eens bent met de onderstaande stellingen.
1. Ik zag de tweede situatie als eenzelfde soort beslissing als de eerste situatie.
2. Ik ervoer de tweede situatie als een compleet andere beslissing dan de eerste situatie. 3. Er zaten veel verschillen tussen de eerste en de tweede situatie.
4. Situatie 2 betrof een heel andere situatie dan situatie 1.
43 Examination about the vignettes
(self created measure, multiple choice questions)
In welke situatie werkte je op een verzekeringkantoor? a. Situatie met jaarverslag
b. Situatie met dossier c. Beide situaties
d. Geen van beide situaties
In de tweede situatie moest je een dossier overnemen, wat was daarvan de oorzaak? a. De leidinggevende kwam mij tegen toen hij iemand zocht voor de opdracht b. Een collega ging met pensioen
c. Een collega zag op tegen het dossier en vroeg mij om het over te nemen d. Geen expliciete oorzaak, het is vanaf het begin mijn dossier geweest
Hoe heten de collega‟s uit beide situaties (jaarverslag en dossier) a. Jan en Geert
b. Geert en Kees c. Bert en Stefan d. Stefan en Jan
In de eerste situatie (jaarverslag) bestond de opdracht uit twee gedeeltes, namelijk een stuk schrijven voor het jaarverslag en..?
a. De eindredactie van het jaarverslag b. Gegevens verzamelen bij klanten
c. Bij collega‟s de nodige informatie inwinnen
d. De hele week koffie halen voor collega‟s op de afdeling
In de tweede situatie kreeg een klant de geleden schade niet uitbetaald omdat? a. Hij al failliet was voordat hij schade leed
b. Hij de brand zelf aangestoken had c. Hij onderverzekerd was
44 Hoe heet de collega uit de eerste situatie (jaarverslag)?
a. Jan b. Bert c. Geert d. Stefan e. Kees
Hoeveel uren kostte de opdracht die je in de eerste situatie van je leidinggevende kreeg? a. 7
b. 8 c. 9 d. 10
De tijd die je kwijt was (in uren) als je de hele opdracht zelf uit zou voeren, was.. a. In beide situaties gelijk
b. In situatie 1 (jaarverslag) meer dan in situatie 2 (dossier) c. In situatie 2 meer dan in situatie 1
45
APPENDIX C Items of pilot study
Instructie: lees de 2 onderstaande situaties aandachtig door en geef na iedere situatie aan
hoe moreel je het zou vinden om in dat geval werk af te schuiven. Na beide situaties volgt nog 1 vraag waarin je aan kunt geven of je de ene situatie ethischer vindt dan de ander.
1
stesituatie
Je werkt op een acceptatieafdeling van een verzekeringskantoor waar het de laatste tijd erg druk is. Veel van je collega's ervaren die situatie net als jij als hectisch en stressvol. Nu moet, zoals ieder jaar rond deze tijd, de organisatie een jaarverslag afleveren. Daarvoor moet nog een stuk worden geschreven waaraan ook nog informatieverzameling vooraf gaat. Dat is altijd een vervelende aangelegenheid omdat het voor iedereen naast andere werkzaamheden moet gebeuren.
Op het moment dat je leidinggevende iemand op deze klus wil zetten, komt hij jou tegen en vraagt jou het te doen. Je zegt ja, maar ziet er eigenlijk enorm tegenop om hier mee aan de slag te gaan omdat het zo‟n vervelende klus is. Daarnaast betekent het dat je deze week meer uren zult maken dan je normtaak (de hoeveelheid uren waarvoor je op papier staat).
46 Vragen:
1. Hoe moreel juist of onjuist vind jij het om in de bovenstaande situatie werk af te schuiven op je collega? (zet een kruisje onder jouw antwoord)
Zeer onjuist Onjuist Enigszins onjuist
Noch juist, noch onjuist
Enigszins juist
Juist Zeer juist
2. Hoe sociaal of asociaal vind jij het om in de bovenstaande situatie werk af te schuiven op je collega?
Zeer asociaal Asociaal Enigszins asociaal
Noch sociaal, noch asociaal
Enigszins sociaal
Sociaal Zeer sociaal
3. Hoe eerlijk of oneerlijk vind jij het om in de bovenstaande situatie werk af te schuiven op je collega? Zeer oneerlijk Oneerlijk Enigszins oneerlijk Noch eerlijk, noch oneerlijk Enigszins eerlijk
47
2
desituatie
Op de afdeling is het alom hectiek en drukte. Daar komt nog bij dat er een dossier moet worden overgenomen van een collega die onlangs met pensioen is gegaan. Ze heeft dit dossier niet kunnen afronden voor haar vertrek. Het dossier betreft een klant die door brand een grote schade heeft geclaimd bij jullie verzekeringskantoor. Omdat de klant volgens de laatste rapportages niet voldeed aan de laatste eisen omtrent brandpreventie, zal jullie maatschappij niet uitkeren. Voor de klant zal dit een financiële strop zijn die waarschijnlijk tevens zijn faillissement betekent. Iemand moet langs bij de klant om dit te vertellen en vervolgens moet er nog een rapport over deze zaak worden opgemaakt.
Op het moment dat het dossier moet worden verdeeld ben jij aanwezig en krijg jij het toegewezen. Je zegt ja, maar ziet er eigenlijk enorm tegenop om bij die klant langs te gaan. Daarnaast is het ook een tijdrovende klus je die extra werk oplevert waardoor je deze week zult moeten overwerken
Stefan is een prima collega en heeft een groot verantwoordelijkheidsgevoel. Als je op dit verantwoordelijkheidsgevoel aanspraak doet, dan weet je bijna zeker dat hij je hele klus (die volgens jouw schatting 9 uren kost) wel op zich neemt. Dat zou jou goed uitkomen, want het liefst wil je van deze opdracht helemaal af. Niettemin denk je dat het voor Stefan net zo goed ellendig werk is. Aan de andere kant, hoe meer Stefan van de opdracht overneemt, hoe meer dat jou vrije tijd oplevert.
Vragen:
48 Zeer onjuist Onjuist Enigszins
onjuist
Noch juist, noch onjuist
Enigszins juist
Juist Zeer juist
2. Hoe sociaal of asociaal vind jij het om in de bovenstaande situatie werk af te schuiven op je collega?
Zeer asociaal Asociaal Enigszins asociaal
Noch sociaal, noch asociaal
Enigszins sociaal
Sociaal Zeer sociaal
3. Hoe eerlijk of oneerlijk vind jij het om in de bovenstaande situatie werk af te schuiven op je collega? Zeer oneerlijk Oneerlijk Enigszins oneerlijk Noch eerlijk, noch oneerlijk Enigszins eerlijk
Eerlijk Zeer eerlijk
49 Kruis hieronder je antwoord aan.
Je collega het werk vragen te doen is….
