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LITHUANIAN RENEWABLE ENERGY

AUCTION SYSTEM

Dovilė ALMANYTĖ Ministry of Energy

Renewable energy unit January 2019

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RES IN THE NATIONAL ENERGY STRATEGY

2020 2030

3 TWh

5 TWh

7 TWh

2025

30% 38% 45%

Most of RES energy by 2030 - wind 53% and solar 23%

▪ Gradual integration into the market

▪ Lowest burden for consumers

▪ Compettive support allocation PRINCIPLES:

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RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION

Technology Target in the LAW

Installed capacity

Production

2017 Target by 2020-2025

WIND 500 MW 533 MW 1358 GWh (55,8%)

Production:

2,4 TWh → 5 TWh Capacity:

854MW→1300-1700MW

SOLAR PV 10* MW 88** MW 68 GWh (2,8%) HYDRO 128 MW 128 MW 574 GWh (23,6%)

BIOGAS

105 MW 105 MW 360 GWh (14,8%) SOLID BIOFUEL

 2,4 TWh

 854 MW TOTAL:

*power plants up to 30 kW not included

** power plants up to 30 kW included

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RES ELECTRICITY SUPPORT DESIGN

▪ Technology neutrality, all capacities

▪ Market premium

▪ Compettive support allocation - auctions

▪ 12 years support

▪ Balancing responsibility for producers (up to 500 kW)

▪ Producers pays 100% connection costs

▪ Fixed amount of supported energy – fine for no delivery

▪ Winning criteria – lowest offered premium

▪ Selling into market or bilateral agreements - no mandatory purchace

▪ Security of discharge of obligations fee

▪ Only new installations

▪ Decommissioning MAIN FEATURES:

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SUPPORT MECHANISM AND PAYMENTS

Determined for each auction and applied for all support period.

Determined for each auction - indicates future electricity market price, used to determine the maximum premium

Maximum premium Reference price

Ceiling price

Cannot be higher than difference between the ceiling and reference prices.

Payments - depending on the day- ahead market price in the spot:

• Full premium won in the auction

• Part of the premium

• No premium at all

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REQUIREMENTS TO ENTER THE AUCTION

 Not in a process of bankruptcy or liquidation

 Paid taxes and social insurance fees

 Not criminal or have previous conviction

 No permits or connection conditions previously issued

 Confirmation to bare balancing responsibility if >=500 kW

 Confirmation about new installations

 Paid auction fee

MAIN REQUIREMENTS FOR THE COMPANY:

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REQUIREMENTS TO ENTER THE AUCTION

 Letter of intent with grid operator

 Paid obligations fee – 15 EUR/kW

 Spatial planning decrees – decision by the

municipality administration

Preconditions of connection

Request to sign letter of intentions

Signing letter of intentions

Submitting obligation fee

Participation in the auction or request of

development permit

30 c. days

10 c. days

30 c. days

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RESPONSIBILITY TO DELIVER

▪ Fixed supported amount- set in auction

▪ Production evaluated on a 3-year average

▪ 20% allowed deviation

▪ Technical issues and force major excluded

Example:

Auction winner amount per year 300 GWh.

Amount per 3 years 900 GWh.

Allowed deviation 20% =180 GWh.

Penalty 20 GWh x winning premium

KWh KWh KWh

1y 2y 3y

Case 1 Case 2

3 year average, GWh 800 700

Deviation, GWh 100 200

Deviation 11% 22%

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180 days

90 days

3+1 years

AVERAGE PROJECT TIMELINE

Letter of intentions, security fee

Auction announcement

Auction winner Permits First kWh

Permits:

1) To develop capacities- 3 years+ 1 year extension 2) To produce electricity

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NEXT STEPS. FIRST AUCTION

300 GWh VOLUME:

ANNOUNCEMENT: 2019.09.02

Auction date

2019.06.01 ANNOUNCEMENT:

Reference price Ceiling price

1

3

2019.05.01 METODOLOGIES:

Reference price Ceiling price

2

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NEXT AUCTIONS- SCHEDULE

October 2019 3 year schedule to be adopted by the Government by

Period : 2020-2022

Content: quantity, budget, dates

700 GWh?

700 GWh?

700 GWh?

2022 2021 2020

VISION:

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THANK YOU!

12

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