The Role of Implicit Person Theory in Explaining Moral Do-gooder Evaluation

SUSTAINABILITY: A MATTER OF MINDSET?

The Role of Implicit Person Theory in Explaining Moral Do-gooder Evaluation

Master Thesis of:

M.G. Kokhuis (2973677) m.g.kokhuis@student.rug.nl Master Marketing Management Faculty of Economics and Business

University of Groningen June 2020

First supervisor:

Dr. J.W. Bolderdijk

Second supervisor:

M.T. van der Heide MSc

Completion date:

15-06-2020

“When you enter a mindset, you enter a new world. In one world - the world of fixed traits - success is about proving you're smart or talented. Validating yourself. In the other - the world of changing

qualities - it's about stretching yourself to learn something new. Developing yourself.”

– Carol S. Dweck, 2008

Abstract

Sustainable innovations are on the rise, and the diffusion of these innovations to a great extent depends on the innovators adopting and promoting them. Prior work suggests that morally motivated innovators can ironically discourage others’ adoptions of such innovations, as they threaten the self- concept of others who don’t adopt, thereby eliciting defensive responses. Does this defensive responding apply to all observers? We introduce the concept of Implicit Person Theory to explain why some observers respond positively rather than negatively to moral do-gooders. By means of a between-subject experiment we found signals to carefully conclude that observers with an incremental theory (growth mindset) orientation respond more positively to moral do-gooders, after they

experience a threat to their self-concept. Altogether, our research contributes to existing literature by shedding light on the specific mechanisms under which moral do-gooder derogation takes place.

Key words: self-concept, morality, implicit person theory, do-gooder derogation, sustainability

Introduction

Imagine a fictious character named Sam. Sam is a Master student who currently has a week off, and since he likes to go on trips, he decides to go on a trip to Milan together with his friends. Once at the airport, they find out that their flight was cancelled due to the travel restrictions regarding the coronavirus. While Sam and his friends are standing in line of the information desk to get some clarity, a discussion arises. Some of his friends say that after the corona crisis they will start using other ways of transport, because they “do not like to wait so long at the airport”, and “there are other ways of transport that are more comfortable, such as the train”. However, some of his friends have different motivations. They say that after the corona crisis they will not fly anymore because it is simply “bad for the environment”, and they want to contribute to a more sustainable world. Sam, who generally considers himself to be “not born as morally as his friends”, experienced a feeling of discomfort and threat by his moral friends. As Sam is used to sticking to what he knows, he decides for himself that he will keep flying anyway. How come Sam felt uncomfortable and threatened by his moral friends? And, is there a way to inspire Sam to follow his friends’ moral behavior?

In the past decades, sustainable innovations are on the rise. Reducing meat consumption, recycling plastic or taking the train instead of the plane, are all considerable examples of these sustainable innovations. Although these innovations all have a different impact with regards to sustainability, they share one condition: in order for these innovations to be successful, they require people to change their behavior. Such change can be difficult since sustainable innovations often deviate from the social norm. And, as people are inclined to show behavior that is in line with others, they stick to social norms in order to not deviate from what is perceived as ‘normal’ and ‘moral’

(Young, 2008). People show this conforming behavior because they do not want to be excluded and ignored, which are threats to fundamental human needs and causes pain (Williams, Cheung, & Choi, 2000). This process of behavior change is not always a straightforward process, as some people can experience a feeling of unease, or ‘threat’, when they are confronted with others’ moral behavior.

(observers) as such, can pose a moral threat to the observers. This in turn can have a negative impact on the observers’ self-concept, which we refer to as “the totality of an individual’s thoughts and feelings having reference to himself as an object.” (Monin, Sawyer, & Marquez, 2008; Rosenberg, 1979). An example of such negative impact on one’s self-concept is Sam from the introductory scenario, who experienced a feeling of threat because of his moral friends.

Why could this moral threat to a person’s self-concept be an issue? The moral self is a central component of the self-concept (Aquino & Reed, 2002), and individuals will go to great lengths to protect their self-concept, which could translate itself into denigrating this person, also referred to as do-gooder derogation. When the individual’s self-concept is endangered, derogation is a functional response because it helps to overcome the threat and restore a positive self-image (Cramwinckel, van Dijk, Scheepers & van den Bos, 2013). In order for observers to feel a moral threat, they have to meet the condition of self-involvement. That is, their moral self-concept has to be on the line. To add, the moral do-gooder’s motivation has to be moral, not self-interested (e.g., people who eat meat because they think it is better for the environment instead of liking the taste; Bolderdijk, Brouwer &

Cornelissen, 2018).

Consequently, Zane, Irwin and Reczek (2016) suggest that a negative perception of a moral do-gooder could cause the observer to empathize less with the advocated cause in question. This can be based on self-perception theory: people infer their beliefs from their behavior (“if I don't like this person, then I must not care so much for what he stands for”). Ultimately, this is why observers could derogate others supporting a cause, suggesting that moral do-gooders can, ironically, discourage others from following their behavior.

It is therefore imperative to understand how to deal with this feeling of self-threat, as do-gooder derogation could slow down the diffusion of sustainable innovations. So, how come some individuals derogate moral do-gooders after they feel threatened, whereas others see these situations as a chance to better themselves? While literature has documented observers’ responses to morally motivated consumers, it has neglected the mechanisms that produce these responses. It is key to gain more insight into these mechanisms in order to make observers feel inspired rather than threatened, after

To address this research gap, we aim to answer the following research question:

“How come some observers respond positively rather than negatively to moral do-gooders?”

The success of sustainable innovations to a great extent depends upon the acceptance and adoption by consumers (Noppers, Keizer, Bolderdijk, & Steg, 2014). According to the moral self- regulation theory, people strive to view themselves as moral, making this an integral part of a person’s self-concept (Osgood, Suci & Tannenbaum, 1957; Pronin, 2008; Zhong, Liljenquist & Cain 2009). This desire to view oneself morally could hamper the adoption of sustainable innovations, if this adoption elicits a threat to peoples’ self-concept (Monin & Jordan, 2009; Cramwinckel et al., 2013). Therefore, being exposed to a moral do-gooder could be particularly threatening, as his view may suggest that your behavior is not as moral as you would like it to be. One way of dealing with this threat is derogating the source of the threat (Sherman & Cohen, 2002, 2006). An example of moral threat and in turn derogation can be found in research by Monin et al. (2008), in which participants derogated another participant who refused to cooperate out of moral reasons.

Very little attention has been given to the observers’ characteristics that affect this moral do- gooder derogation. The current study therefore addresses this gap in the literature by investigating the individual difference factor of Implicit Person Theories (see figure 1). Specifically, how these theories influence the process by which people form impressions of moral do-gooders. These results could potentially have implications that can be used to make the observers respond constructively rather than destructively, after they experience a feeling of threat.

As has been noted, confrontation with a moral do-gooder elicits derogation because of a moral threat. This means that the actor’s reason for acting must be moral, and not self-interested. Therefore, in line with previous research (Zane et al. 2016; Bolderdijk et al. 2018), we hypothesize that observers only feel a threat to their self-concept when the moral do-gooder acts out of moral considerations instead of self-interested (non-moral) considerations. This leads to the following hypothesis:

H1. Observers experience moral self-threat when confronted with a moral do-gooder who acts out of moral considerations as opposed to one who acts out self-interested considerations.

There is sufficient research that documented why the feeling of threat to one’s self-concept, and consequently the do-gooder derogation, takes place (e.g., Monin, Sawyer & Marquez, 2008).

However, what exactly causes some observers to derogate moral do-gooders after experienced threat, whereas others do not? In other words, how come some observers respond constructively, and others destructively?

A potential explanation can be found in the Implicit Person Theory. Individuals tend to develop lay theories with respect to the nature of the social world to interpret, predict and control their social

Moral Outperformance

Implicit Theory (Incremental/Entity)

Do-gooder Evaluation Threat to Self-

Concept

Figure 1: Conceptual Model

beliefs regarding the malleability of one’s personal qualities. One of these theories is the Implicit Person Theory. At the core of Implicit Person Theory is the distinction between people who view their personal qualities as static and fixed (entity theorists), and those who view their personal qualities as dynamic and malleable (incremental theorists; Dweck, 2000). The former also called fixed mindset, and the latter growth mindset. What’s important to note is that the difference in mindsets translates into different frameworks for interpreting and responding to events people experience (Dweck & Leggett, 1988). To illustrate, a series of studies by Heslin and Vandewalle (2005) showed that one’s mindset can influence feedback seeking behavior from others. They found that a manager’s growth mindset positively influenced his seeking of negative feedback. In the final study, the authors found that individuals with a fixed mindset indicated that feedback would be a judgement about their talent. In contrast to those with a growth mindset, who were more likely to receive feedback that would be useful diagnostic information.

Translating this to confrontation with someone who behaves morally superior (moral

outperformance), it can be argued when a moral do-gooder acts in a moral (desired) way, an observer could perceive this feedback as an indication that his (actual) behavior is not as moral as it is

supposed to be. In line with this, we suggest that a threat to one’s self-concept is considered some form of (negative) feedback. After all, this threat implies that you could have acted morally yourself, but you chose not to do so. Finally, depending on whether you have a growth or fixed mindset, there are two ways to respond to this feedback: constructively or destructively (i.e., defensively). More specifically, we argue when an observer has adopted a growth mindset, he could perceive this threat, or negative feedback, as a possible way to improve himself and therefore responds constructively (or less defensively). In contrast to an observer with a fixed mindset, who will respond defensively to the same situation in order to restore a positive self-image.

This reasoning is based on research demonstrating that people with different mindsets respond differently to feedback. To illustrate, incrementalists (growth mindset) consider feedback helpful, because it provides a possibility to improve. Meanwhile, entitists (fixed mindset) dislike

cannot improve their skills (VandeWalle, 2003; VandeWalle & Cummings, 1997; Hong, Chiu, Dweck, Lin, & Wan 1999).

Translating this back to moral outperformance, we propose that observers with a fixed mindset will derogate the moral do-gooder who acts out of moral considerations, which will express itself in a lower evaluation of the moral do-gooder. In other words, the observers’ mindset moderates the relation between threat to self-concept and do-gooder evaluation. As argued, this effect is

explained by the fact that individuals with a fixed mindset consider moral outperformance as a form of negative feedback which threatens their self-concept. They deal with this threat by derogating the source of the threat: the moral do-gooder. This leads to the second hypothesis:

H2. Whether experienced self-threat leads to do-gooder derogation depends on the observers’

mindset. Observers with a fixed mindset tend to deal with threat by derogating morally motivated do- gooders.

Methodology

Study context

The inspiration for this research as well as the context, stems from the growing awareness around the high environmental impact of air travel. In 2019, climate activist Greta Thunberg demonstratively took the train to the Climate Action Summit in New York City. This led people to feel guilty about air travel, an activity which causes high climate impact. As a result, the term “flight shame” originated. As we want to confront participants with a person who shows morally superior behavior, we introduced this context to confront participants with a person who decided to take the train instead of the plane.

This context is fitting for two reasons: there are both cost- and sustainability considerations involved with flight shame. Reduced time and cost are important considerations for long-distance travel (Yatskiv, Budilovich & Gromule, 2017). Also, sustainability is considered to be an important consideration, as the need for public transport has gained greater attention for reducing environmental impact (Saif, Zefreh & Torok, 2019). Therefore, a moral do-gooder who takes the train instead of the plane is an excellent example of moral outperformance (someone who behaves morally superior), with both a moral (environmental) consideration, as well as a non-moral (self-interested)

consideration.

Participants and design

The study employed a between subjects design (moral do-gooder motivation: moral vs. non- moral). A sample was collected between 23/04/2020 and 06/05/2020. A survey was created with Qualtrics, which was shared via Facebook and LinkedIn. We measured the participants’ Implicit Person Theory orientation, threat to self-concept, and evaluation of the moral do-gooder. In total there were N = 238 participants that started the survey Participants were randomly assigned across two conditions (moral vs s non-moral). Most participants, 48,7% completed the survey in Italian, 30,3% in

English, with the remaining 21% in Dutch. Given a medium-small effect size of f = 0.15 and a significance threshold of ⍺ = .05 this was predicted to result in a power of β = .9.

Procedure

First, participants, completed a measure of implicit theory (see Appendix A). Participants are then asked about their travel habits to consolidate self-involvement, because this has been

demonstrated to be important to elicit threat perception (Bolderdijk et al. 2018). We did this by asking them about their favorite mode of transport (car, plane, train or boat). Answering ‘train’ to this

question would imply a feeling of self-involvement. Next, in order to assess participants’ mindsets, they were asked to rate a series of statements about personality. Hereafter the manipulation was shown, which was followed by a measure of threat to self-concept, and a measure for the do-gooder evaluation. These questions were followed with a manipulation check. Finally, participants are asked about their gender and their age, and are thanked for their participation.

Measures

Dependent variable: do-gooder evaluation

The dependent variable is the evaluation of Mark, or do-gooder evaluation. This was measured by using an existing scale by Monin et al. (2008). Participants rated Mark on 14 7-point bipolar scales anchored on stupid-intelligent, weak-strong, insecure-confident, passive-active, cruel- kind, awful-nice, cold-warm, dishonest-honest, unfair-fair, unpleasant-pleasant, dependent-

independent, stingy-generous, immature-mature, low self-esteem – high self-esteem. In order to further assess the evaluation of Mark, the participants are asked three additional questions, based on Bolderdijk’s scale (2018). Participants were asked if they would (1) like to have Mark as a friend, (2) like Mark as a colleague, (3) and respect Mark as a person. They responded to these items on a 7- point Likert scale ranging from ‘Strongly Disagree’ to ‘Strongly Agree’. With higher scores

indicating a better evaluation of Mark. The reliability of these scales was found to be excellent at ⍺ = .96.

Independent variable: moral outperformance

The manipulation had participants reading a Facebook message from a fictious moral do- gooder called Mark. They were either exposed to a moral do-gooder basing his motivation on non- moral (comfort and time consumption) grounds, or on moral (environmental) grounds. The non-moral message end with “Join me in this and save yourself a lot of time and travel more comfortably!”

(Figure 2) Whereas the moral message end with “Join me in this new adventure and stop flying to make the world a better place!” (Figure 3) These statements were inspired by Bolderdijk et al. (2018) original manipulation, however, exchanging the no-packaging store for flight shame.

Figure 2: Moral Mark

Moderator: implicit theory

The measures for the moderator consisted of 8 questions. See appendix B for the full

questions. Participants responded to these on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from ‘Strongly Disagree’

to ‘Strongly Agree’. First, we assessed the participants’ Implicit Person Theory orientation, based on an existing scale by Levy and Dweck (1997). The measure consisted of four items assessing

incremental- and four items assessing entity orientation. Participants were exposed to items such as

“Everyone, no matter who they are, can significantly change their basic characteristics”. For this scale, summing responses gives the total score, with higher scores indicating an incremental orientation (McConnell, 2001). Reliability of these items was found to be excellent at ⍺ = .80.

Figure 3: Self-interested Mark

Mediator: self-threat

Then, to assess threat to self-concept (TTSC), we used an existing scale by Cramwinckel et al. (2013). Based on 14 items such as “happy” and “comfortable”, participants were asked to evaluate how they felt at that moment. With higher scores indicating a higher threat to one’s self-concept. The reliability was, again, found to be excellent at ⍺ = .88.

Manipulation Check

After participants read Mark’s Facebook post, they were asked why Mark decided to stop flying. The manipulation check consisted of 3 items: (1) “it is better for the environment”, (2) “he wants to save money and time”, (3) “now he is afraid of flying.” The manipulation check was placed at the end of the survey, so as not to bias other responses.

Plan of analysis

The model is a moderated mediation and will be assessed as such using a Conditional Process Analysis (Hayes, 2013), model 14. The mediator is threat to self-concept, with the relationship between threat to self-concept (mediator) and do-gooder evaluation (dependent variable) being moderated by the observers’ mindset (growth vs. fixed).

Results

From the N = 238 participants that have started the survey, n = 37 did not continue because they answered ‘no’ to the question whether they were going to fly again after the corona crisis. As these participants answered ‘no’, they were not considered involved and therefore not suitable for this this research. After all, they have already decided not to fly again after the corona crisis. In addition, 36 participants did not answer the manipulation check correctly. It was chosen, however, to include these 36 participants. Not including these participants would imply an unbalanced distribution for the independent variable (exposure to moral vs. non-moral Mark). Therefore, we have decided run two analyses – one with participants who failed the manipulation check, and one without participants who failed the manipulation check.

Next, n = 10 participants that finished the questionnaire under five minutes were excluded.

Based on their response time it is assumed that their responses are not reliable. Hence, N = 191 participants were included in the analysis (see Table 1). A total of n = 88 male (46,1%), and n = 103 (53,9%) female participants were included in this study. The mean age of participants was

M = 30,7 (min: 18; max: 69) years. The incremental theory (n = 161; 84,3%) was much more common than entity (n = 30; 15,7%).

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics

Participants (N = 191)

M SD

Age 30.7 12.7

Gender (%)

Men 46.1

Women 53.9

Nationality (%)

English 28.3

Dutch 18.8

Italian 52.9

Implicit Theory Incremental

Entity

161 30

Preliminary analysis

In order to briefly describe the patterns within our data with respect to the hypotheses, we have included a series of preliminary findings (distributions and means) below.

There were 2 participants that completed the dependent variable, but not the independent variable, these did not differ on any measures. Therefore, the data was assumed to be missing completely at random, and list-wise deletion applied. Participants were randomly assigned across the two conditions (non-moral [n = 96] vs moral [n = 95]).

Additionally, it was found that the data for both threat to self-concept (TTSC), and moral do- gooder evaluation, were not normally distributed (see appendix A).

Next, on the mediator of threat to self-concept participants in the non-moral condition rated on average M = 2.93 (SD = 0.85) on the 7-point scale. Participants in the moral condition rated on average M = 2.99 (SD = 0.80) on the 7-point scale. Indicating that participants felt less of a threat after they were exposed to the non-moral condition as opposed to the moral condition.

Furthermore, on the 7-point scale participants with an entity theory rated on the dependent variable (do-gooder evaluation) on average M = 5.33 (SD = 0.17), and incrementalists (growth

mindset) rated on average M = 4.77 (SD = 0.10). Indicating that entitists (fixed mindset) evaluated the moral do-gooder more positively.

As for the conditional process analysis, assumptions were tested and no violation identified, therefore the analyses were continued.

Main analyses

To analyze the difference between exposure to a moral vs. a non-moral do-gooder to threat to self-concept, a Kruskal-Wallis H test was performed. Results showed that there was no significant difference in threat to self-concept between the different experimental groups (non-moral vs. moral:

see figure 4), X²(1) = 0.39, p = .53. With M = 2.93 (SD = 0.85) for the non-moral condition, and M = 2.99 (SD = 0.80) for the moral condition. Similar results were found after excluding the 36

participants who failed the manipulation check.¹ Therefore, the results do not support hypothesis 1.

That is, regardless of the condition (moral vs. non-moral), participants in the non-moral condition did not feel a higher threat to their self-concept as opposed to participants in the moral condition.

Figure 4: Means of participant's threat to self-concept. Error bars denote 95% confidence intervals.

Next, in order to test for hypothesis 2, a moderated-mediation analysis was conducted by means of Conditional Process Analysis (Hayes, 2013), model 14. Results show that the type of justification Mark uses (b = -0.057 p = 0.64) did not have a statistically significant relation to threat to self-concept (F (1, 187) = 0.23 p = .64, R² = 0.0012). Thereby confirming the Kruskal-Wallis H test performed earlier.

Furthermore, the results suggested that the amount of threat participants experienced to their self-concept (b = 0.302, p = 0.29) did not have a significant relation on their evaluation of the moral do-gooder (F (4, 184) = 1.67 p = 0.16, R² = 0.035).

1 Results of the additional analysis show X²(1) = 2.206, p = 0.14. With M = 2.83 (SD = 0.86) for the non-moral condition,

Then, the effect of do-gooder evaluation seems to depend on mindset (see figure 6).

Indicating that participants with a growth mindset evaluated, on average, the moral do-gooder more positively. However, we cannot conclude this, as the interaction effect (b = - 0.312 p = 0.32) between threat to self-concept mindset was insignificant. Finally, the index of moderated mediation (0.017) was found to be insignificant at (CI = -0.71; 0.13), which suggests that moderated mediation does not take place. Altogether, based on the above analyses, there was not sufficient empirical support for hypothesis 2. In other words, regardless of their mindset, observers did not evaluate the moral do- gooder differently. Similar results were found after excluding the participants who failed the manipulation check².

Figure 6: Interaction effect of threat to self-concept and do-gooder evaluation (growth- vs. fixed mindset)

Discussion

The aim of this paper was to provide answers to the question “How come some observers respond positively rather than negatively to moral do-gooders?” The research design was based on research by Zane et al. (2016), who found support for the notion that moral do-gooders with a moral motivation can elicit both irritation and denigration. The current research extends this research by introducing the moderating role of Implicit Person Theory. It was hypothesized that the kind of implicit theory a person holds, influences how observers deal with a moral threat to their self-concept. This in turn affects their evaluation of the moral do-gooder. By means of a between-subjects experimental design, participants’ evaluations of moral do-gooders were measured. These predictions were tested in a relatively novel context– flight shame. The results did not provide sufficient empirical evidence to support the hypotheses.

Threat to self-concept

Prior research suggested that observers can feel a threat to their self-concept after being exposed to a moral do-gooder who acts out of moral considerations (Zane et al., 2016; Bolderdijk et al., 2018). The current results, however, are not in line with these findings. That is, regardless of the condition participants were exposed to (moral vs. non-moral), the threat to their self-concept, and in turn their reaction towards the observer, did not significantly differ.

How can this be justified? Bolderdijk et al. (2018) suggest that observers’ self-concept is only threatened when participants are self-involved in the situation, and a possible explanation for the current findings could be that participants lacked self-involvement in this situation. Participants likely lacked self-involvement because Mark advocated train travel as an alternative. This sustainable innovation was potentially novel to the observers, and they never have considered adopting it, as evidenced by participants: in total 116 participants (73%) chose the plane as their favorite mode of transport. Therefore, explained by the lack of involvement, Mark did not produce a threat to their self- concept.

Next, 37 people were excluded from the research after they answered “no” to the question

“when the crisis is over, do you intend to fly again for your holidays?” This implies that a great deal of people already started to consider flying as something that is harmful, or replaceable by other ways of transport. This finding allows us to carefully conclude that Mark’s suggestion to take the train instead of the plane was not perceived as being unusual, and participants might have felt encouraged or inspired. A potential explanation can be found in research by Lin-Healy and Small (2013), who found that people who act out of moral considerations are usually perceived as more benevolent and admirable than those who are perceived to act out of self-interest. To add, observers might have perceived Mark’s decision to take the train as something they could easily do themselves. In other words, seeing Mark potentially increased the observers’ sense of self efficacy: the confidence in one’s capabilities to perform well in a given situation (Bandura, 1995).

Altogether, in order to explain the discrepant results with respect to our first hypothesis, we suggest two possible explanations. The first one is that participants did not feel threatened by Mark’s moral behavior because they were not involved with the alternative he advocated. Considering trains as an alternative to flying is a relatively novel sustainable innovation, and observers have potentially not yet considered this as an alternative option. Second, it is possible that participants did not perceive Mark as morally as we intended him to be, and rather felt inspired or encouraged, although the results did not statistically support this.

Implicit Theories

Next, we hypothesized that whether experienced self-threat leads to do-gooder derogation, depends on the observers’ mindset. More specifically, in response to experienced self-threat, entitists (fixed mindset) would deal with this threat by derogating the morally motivated do-gooder.

Inconsistent with the theorizing, the findings suggest that participants with a fixed mindset did not derogate Mark as a response to their experienced threat. However, we did find that participants with a growth mindset evaluated Mark more positively, as opposed to participants with a fixed mindset. This

experience moral threat. Yet these results are not statistically significant, which requires caution in drawing conclusions. Altogether, the results do not give sufficient empirical support for hypothesis 2.

How come hypothesis 2 was not correct? A potential explanation as to why there was no significant difference between the two mindsets, can be found in the nature of the Facebook post. We assume that participants did not see the Facebook post as a form of negative feedback. Why would this be case? Incrementalists (growth mindset) are convinced they can improve themselves, so they welcome opportunities to learn and develop their skills. Entitists (fixed mindset) on the other hand show defensive reactions when they are given an opportunity to learn and practice new skills (Park and John, 2014). Since no statistically significant effects were found between threat to self-concept and moral do-gooder evaluation, we assume that the manipulation was not perceived as a form of (negative) feedback. Participants simply did not perceive the post as a possibility to learn and practice new skills. As a consequence, entitists did not have to put their defensive mechanisms into operation, thereby explaining why they did not derogate the source of the threat: Mark.

Altogether, the absence of a moderating effect of implicit theory on the relationship between threat to self-concept and moral do-gooder evaluation, as well as the absence of a significant

difference in moral do-gooder evaluation between the two theory groups (growth vs. fixed), could potentially be explained by the nature of the manipulation: Mark’s post was simply not perceived as a form of negative feedback. This ensured that the entitists’ self-concept was not on the line, therefore no do-gooder derogation occurred. Taken together, the above factors provide potential alternative explanations for the absence of significant effects of mindset orientation on moral do-gooder evaluation.

Limitations and future research

Participants who took part in this research were only confronted with an online, and fictious version Mark. We assume that the participants’ reaction in with a real person in day-to-day life would differ, because there are many factors such as gender, age, etc., that could influence the observers’

reaction towards a moral do-gooder. All these factors were held constant in this manipulation.

Therefore, the external validity of these results to real-life situations is questionable.

Next, Mark did not evoke a feeling of threat to the participants, potentially explained by the nature of the manipulation. In this situation, participants were exposed to Mark’s Facebook post, which they were asked to read carefully. The effect may have dampened, as participants see many Facebook posts every day (Clement, 2020). Therefore, we assume that people skip over these posts very quickly, and as a consequence do not read the whole message. This is in line with the large number of participants who failed to answer the manipulation check correctly.

Next, many participants chose not to fly anymore after the corona crisis. This implies that Mark’s decision to take the train instead of the plane was not too moral at all – there were more people who had already considered this. We therefore assume that participants in our sample were not involved with the domain of flight shame. As suggested by the many people who indicated that they will fly again when the corona crisis is over. We expect that participants in countries that have higher involvement with flight shame, such as Sweden, which is second on the worldwide sustainability ranking, will respond more favourably with respect to our hypothesis (Phillis et. al, 2011).

Looking at the influence of implicit theories, the following can be argued. Since the majority of participants were from Europe, the balance between incrementalists and entitists was uneven. Most participants in this study were Europeans that live in a modern Western culture. And Europeans have been found to be characterized, on average, higher openness to experience (Schmitt et al. 2007). This has potentially contributed to the uneven distribution of the two mindsets. We suggest that by

replicating the study in East Asian countries, where openness to experience is on average lower, results will potentially be more in favour of our hypothesis. This potentially caused the results to be

Altogether, we argue that our theory still holds, however in other circumstances. Future research in different countries with a more balanced distribution between incrementalists and entitists, and a manipulation that actually evokes a feeling of self-threat, should potentially provide more favourable results with respect to our hypothesis.

Finally, we obtained our results by measuring the participants’ mindset orientation. Future research could examine whether these mindsets can be manipulated, in order to make observers respond more positively towards moral do-gooders. For example, research by Park and John (2014) showed that by letting participants read a short article prior to a task, presenting them with views consistent with entity or incremental theory, these participants actually adopted this orientation in the subsequent task. This, for example, could raise a novel research question: “can we manipulate observers into adapting a growth mindset to make them rate moral do-gooders more positively?” In short, this suggests that manipulating people into a mindset (growth vs. fixed) can actually change their behavior in situations.

Accordingly, it can ensure that observers view a threat to their self-concept as something they can learn from, instead as a reason to derogate moral do-gooders. This in turn could make the

diffusion of sustainable innovations easier.

Theoretical & practical implications

The present research, to our knowledge, is the first one to introduce the implicit self-theory (mindsets) to the growing domain of morality. It thereby extends current research in the domain of morality, as it introduces a novel theoretical account which may help to explain do-gooder derogation.

Thereby paving the way for future research to further cast light on the effects of mindsets on moral do-gooder derogation. As argued, our findings can lead to several novel research questions, for example “can we manipulate observers into adapting a growth mindset to make them rate moral do- gooders more positively?” The answers to these questions can have significant managerial impact. To illustrate, companies and policy makers can potentially use these findings to promote consumers to behave more sustainably. An example of this can be slogans in campaigns to promote a growth mindset: “You can do this”, or “You have the power to make the world a greener place.”, which can potentially inspire consumers. However, future research is needed to demonstrate this.

Next, our research again indicates that the conditions under which moral do-gooder

derogation takes place are very specific. We found, in line with previous research (e.g., Bolderdijk et al. 2018; Zane et al. 2016) an important condition that has to be met in order to lead moral do-gooder derogation. In this case, we found that observers have to be involved in the situation in order to experience a threat to their self-concept. Participants in our study did not consider the train as an alternative to flying, because of its novelty. This suggest they were not involved; hence they did not experience a threat to their self-concept. As a consequence, no moral do-gooder derogation took place.

With regards to the diffusion of sustainable innovations, our findings are of great importance, and policy makers as well as marketeers can potentially benefit from these findings. For example, marketeers could position products or services as innovations that, because of their novelty, consumers did not consider buying before (they are not involved). Our research suggests that consumers will - due to their non-involvement - not feel a threat with respect to their self-concept.

This could potentially make them more likely to adopt these products or services.

Conclusion

The results in this paper provide empirical support for the notion that moral do-gooders with moral considerations do not always evoke a feeling of threat to people’s self-concept. The moral do- gooder with moral considerations did not produce a significantly higher threat, as opposed to the moral do-gooder with self-interested considerations. Two explanations were suggested for this finding: 1) Participants were not involved in the situation and 2) Mark was not the moral do-gooder he was intended to be.

Next, the proposed moderating effect of a mindset on the relationship between threat to self- concept and moral do-gooder evaluation, was not significant. Explained by the nature of the

manipulation: the moral do-gooder’s action was not perceived as negative feedback. However, it was found that observers with a growth mindset evaluated Mark more positively than observers with a fixed mindset. So, it can be carefully concluded that there are signs which illustrate that observers with a growth mindset are more prone to respond positively towards moral do-gooders. We hope that by casting light on the effects of mindsets on moral behavior, we have paved the way for future research to make moral do-gooders be sources of inspiration, rather than irritation.

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Appendix A

Measure: Moderator

Please rate the following statements on a scale from 1 to 7.

Strongly disagree

(1)

Disagree (2)

Somewhat disagree

(3)

Neither agree nor

disagree (4)

Somewhat

agree (5) Agree

(6) Strongly agree (7)

The kind of person someone is, is something inherent

about them, and it can't be changed very

much

o o o o o o o

People can do things differently, but the

important parts of who they are can't

really be changed

o o o o o o o

Everyone is a certain kind of person, and there is not much that

they can do to really

change that

o o o o o o o

You can't teach an old dog new tricks.

People can't really change their deepest

attributes

o o o o o o o

Everyone, no matter who they are, can significantly change

their basic

characteristics

o o o o o o o

People can substantially change

the kind of person

they are

o o o o o o o

No matter what kind of person someone is,

they can always

change very much

o o o o o o o

People can change even their most basic

qualities

o o o o o o o

Travel Habits (1)

How often a year do you go abroad for holidays or work?

o

o

o

o

Travel Habits (2)

What is your favorite mode of transport when you travel long distances?

o

o

o

o

Travel Habits (3)

Covid_19 The corona crisis is having a huge impact on air transport, lots of flights have been cancelled due to travel restrictions and health considerations.

When the crisis is over, do you intend to fly again for your holidays?

o

o

Measure: Moral do-gooder evaluation (1)

The following is a series of attitude scales. Evaluate Mark in terms of the adjective on each scale.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

stupid

o o o o o o o

weak

o o o o o o o

insecure

o o o o o o o

passive

o o o o o o o

cruel

o o o o o o o

awful

o o o o o o o

cold

o o o o o o o

dishonest

o o o o o o o

unfair

o o o o o o o

unpleasant

o o o o o o o

dependent

o o o o o o o

stingy

o o o o o o o

immature

o o o o o o o

low self-

esteem

o o o o o o o

Measure: Moral do-gooder evaluation (2)

Indicate on a scale from 1 to 7 what you think about Mark.

Strongly disagree

(1)

Disagree (2)

Somewhat disagree

(3)

Neither agree nor

disagree (4)

Somewhat

agree (5) Agree (6) Strongly agree (7)

I would like Mark

as friend

o o o o o o o

I would like Mark

as a

colleague

o o o o o o o

I would respect Mark as a

person

o o o o o o o

Measure: Threat to self-concept

Indicate on a scale from 1 to 7 how you feel after having seen Mark.

I feel...

Strongly disagree

(1)

Disagree (2)

Somewhat disagree

(3)

Neither agree nor

disagree (4)

Somewhat

agree (5) Agree (6) Strongly agree (7)

happy with

myself

o o o o o o o

satisfied

with myself

o o o o o o o

good

o o o o o o o

happy

o o o o o o o

comfortable

o o o o o o o

confident

o o o o o o o

determined

o o o o o o o

disappointed

with myself

o o o o o o o

annoyed

with myself

o o o o o o o

disgusted

with myself

o o o o o o o

angry with

myself

o o o o o o o

dissatisfied

with myself

o o o o o o o

self-critical

o o o o o o o

guilty

o o o o o o o

Measure: manipulation check

In the section dedicated to travel habits, you have indicated that you will fly again when the corona crisis will be over. How do you feel about your decision after seeing Mark's post?

Why has Mark decided to stop flying?

o

o

o

Appendix B

Figure 1: Distribution responses (DV)

Figure 2: Distribution response (mediator)

Presentation MSc Thesis

"SUSTAINABILITY: A MATTER OF MINDSET?"

Supervisor: Dr. J.W. Bolderdijk

2nd supervisor: M.T. van der Heide MSc

By Max Kokhuis

July 7th '20

TOPICS

BACKGROUND

Causing them to hamper the adaptation of sustainable

innovations Because they threaten the

observer's self-concept, which results in

defensiveness Moral innovators can

discourage adaptation of innovations

RESEARCH QUESTION

"How come some observers respond positively rather than negatively to moral do- gooders?"

Introduction of Mindsets

I argue that people evaluate moral do-gooders differently depending on their mindset (growth vs. fixed)

Moral outperformance

Threat to self-concept

Do-gooder evaluation Implicit theory (incremental/entity) H1. Observers experience moral

self-threat when confronted with a moral do-gooder who acts out of moral considerations, as opposed to one who acts out of self- interested considerations.

H2. Whether experienced self- threat leads to do-gooder derogation depends on the observers' mindset. Observers with a fixed mindset tend to deal with threat by derogating morally motivated do-gooders.

MODEL &

HYPOTHESES

METHOD

MEASURES

IV: MORAL

OUTPERFORMANCE

Fictitious Facebook message

MEDIATOR: SELF- THREAT

14 item scale by

Cramwinkcel et al. (2013)

MODERATOR: IMPLICIT THEORY

8 questions by Levy and Dweck (1997)

DV: DO-GOODER EVALUATION

14 items by Monin et al. (2008), and 3 additional questions

H1.

KRUSKAL-WALLIS H TEST WAS INSIGNIFCANT.

INDICATING THAT MORALLY MOTIVATED DO-GOODERS NOT LEAD TO A HIGHER FEELING OF THREAT.

H2.

CONDITIONAL PROCESS ANALYSIS DID NOT SHOW SIGNIFICANT RELATIONSHIPS. DO-GOODER

EVALUATION DOES NOT SEEM TO DEPEND ON MINDSET.

N = 238

RESULTS

Threat to self-concept (non-moral

vs. moral) Interaction mindset and threat to

self-concept

DISCUSSION

PARTICIPANTS DID NOT FEEL THREATENED

They potentially lacked self-involvement

MARK WAS NOT PERCEIVED AS MORAL DO-GOODER His decision to take the train was not strange at all (37 people chose to do the same thing)

THE FACEBOOK POST WAS NOT PERCEIVED AS NEGATIVE

FEEDBACK

Participants did not have to put their defensive mechanisms into operation

LIMITATIONS & FUTURE RESEARCH

ONLINE AND FICTITIOUS External validity is questionable, people skipped over the post (manipulation check)

PEOPLE IN EUROPE ARE OPEN-MINDED

Explaining the imbalance between the two mindsets (growth vs. fixed)

MANIPULATING MINDSET IN FUTURE STUDIES

Park & John (2014) show that mindsets can be manipulated, making observers respond more positively

Results are beneficial for positioning products

& services. Market them as cool innovations.

First to introduce mindsets to the domain of moral

consumer behavior.

Raises novel research questions.

Shows that the conditions of moral do-

gooder derogation are very specific.

IMPLICATIONS

THEORETICAL & PRACTICAL