• No results found

Ex-Post Liability Rules in Modern Patent Law

N/A
N/A
Protected

Academic year: 2022

Share "Ex-Post Liability Rules in Modern Patent Law"

Copied!
12
0
0

Bezig met laden.... (Bekijk nu de volledige tekst)

Hele tekst

(1)

EXPOST LIABILITY RULES IN MODERN PATENT LAW

(2)
(3)

EXPOST LIABILITY RULES IN MODERN PATENT LAW

Rosa Castro Bernieri

Antwerp – Oxford – Portland

(4)

Ex-Post Liability Rules in Modern Patent Law Rosa Castro Bernieri

© 2010 Intersentia

Antwerp – Oxford – Portland www.intersentia.com

ISBN 978-94-000-0105-3 D/2010/7849/98

NUR 827

No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint, microfi lm or any other means, without written permission from the publisher.

Distribution for the UK:

Hart Publishing Ltd.

16C Worcester Place Oxford OX1 2JW UK

Tel.: +44 1865 51 75 30 Email: mail@hartpub.co.uk

Distribution for Austria:

Neuer Wissenschaft licher Verlag Argentinierstraße 42/6

1040 Wien Austria

Tel.: +43 1 535 61 03 24 Email: offi ce@nwv.at

Distribution for the USA and Canada:

International Specialized Book Services 920 NE 58th Ave. Suite 300

Portland, OR 97213 USA

Tel.: +1 800 944 6190 (toll free) Tel.: +1 503 287 3093

Email: info@isbs.com

Distribution for other countries:

Intersentia Publishers Groenstraat 31 2640 Mortsel Belgium

Tel.: +32 3 680 15 50 Email: mail@intersentia.be

(5)

Intersentia v

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

My sincere recognition to my supervisors: Professor Marco Lamandini who has supported my academic and professional career; Professor Roger Van den Bergh for his guidance throughout this EDLE journey and Professor Michael Faure for his warmth encouragement and support. My gratitude also goes to the members of the Inner Committee, Professors Vincenzo Denicolò, Willen Van Boom and Klaus Heine, and to the Plenary Committee conformed by Professors Luigi Franzoni, Anselm Kamperman and Alessio Pacces, who have kindly accepted to assess my thesis.

I am also grateful to Professors and staff of the University of Bologna and Erasmus Rotterdam University and I acknowledge the fi nancial support of a Ph.D. scholarship from the University of Bologna and fi nancial support from the Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition and Tax Law for a research visit.

I am also indebted to several scholars and Professors who gave me their feedback on previous draft s, among others, to Professors Hans-Bernd Schäfer, Rochelle Dreyfuss, Lawrence Lessig, Tim Wu, Stefan Bechtold, Uma Suthersanen, Lilla’

Montagnani, Gertrui Van Overwalle, Alessandra Arcuri and Andrea Renda. I further want to acknowledge my fellow colleagues from the EDLE as well as Ph.D. students of Bologna and Hamburg for their comments. Needless to say, all errors remain my own.

My recognition goes to my friends and family for their unconditional help, especially to Franca, Jorge A., Jorge A.R., Fiorella and Andrea, to whom I am indebted for any achievement.

While acknowledging the support received from every person would be impossible, my gratitude goes to all the people that directly or indirectly facilitated me to reach this step in my academic career.

(6)
(7)

Intersentia vii

CONTENTS

Acknowledgments . . . v

List of Abbreviations . . . xi

Introduction . . . 1

Chapter I. Property and Liability Rules: Implications for Patent Rights . . . 13

1. Introduction . . . 13

2. Economics of patent protection . . . 15

2.1. Th e economic rationale of patents . . . 18

2.2. Th e economics of patent enforcement . . . 21

2.3. Th e interface between substantive and enforcement patent law . . . 22

3. Property rules and liability rules . . . 26

3.1. Property rules and liability rules in IP . . . 34

3.1.1. Descriptive studies. . . 36

3.1.2. Critics against IP liability rules . . . 43

3.1.3. Privately organized liability rules . . . 46

4. Property and liability rules in patent law . . . 47

4.1. Th e case against liability rules for patent rights . . . 49

4.2. Th e case for patent liability rules: Transaction costs . . . 50

4.2.1. Strategic behavior and patent hold-ups . . . 52

4.2.2. Patent hold-ups . . . 54

5. Th e modern patent landscape . . . 56

5.1. Multi-parties negotiation: Th e anti-commons . . . 58

5.2 Network externalities . . . 61

5.3. Uncertainty over rights . . . 62

5.4. Patent quality problems . . . 62

6. Conclusions . . . 63

Chapter II. Ex-Post Liability Rules: A Historical View . . . 65

1. Introduction . . . 65

2. Compulsory licensing in international history. . . 66

(8)

Ex-Post Liability Rules in Modern Patent Law

viii Intersentia

2.1. Early patent times . . . 66

2.2. Th e fi rst compulsory licensing provisions . . . 68

2.3. Origins of the principal national patent systems . . . 73

2.3.1. U.K. . . . 73

2.3.2. U.S. . . 77

2.3.3. France . . . 79

2.3.4. Germany . . . 80

3. Ex post liability rules in the TRIPS Agreement . . . 82

3.1. Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement . . . 86

3.2. Article 44 of the TRIPS Agreement . . . 88

4. A post-TRIPS landscape . . . 91

5. Remedies for patent infringement . . . 94

5.1. Common law countries . . . 95

5.2. Civil law countries . . . 99

5.2.1. Creation of rights and choice of remedies . . . 103

5.2.2. Th e inibitoria in the industrial property context . . . 106

5.3. Th e European landscape with respect to IP remedies . . . 111

6. Conclusions . . . 116

Chapter III. Ex-Post Liability Rules: A Comparative Legal View . . . 119

1. Introduction . . . 119

2. Ex-post liability rules . . . 121

3. U.S. ex-post liability rules . . . 125

3.1. Th e eBay case . . . 127

3.2. Post eBay interpretation of the four-factor test . . . 132

3.2.1. Irreparable harm . . . 133

3.2.2. Inadequate remedies . . . 134

3.2.3. Balance of hardships . . . 136

3.2.4. Public interest . . . 137

3.3. Th e post eBay decision landscape . . . 138

3.4. Willful v. inadvertent infringement . . . 141

3.5. Preliminary Injunctions . . . 142

3.6. Other liability rules in the U.S. . . 143

4. U.K. . . . 144

4.1. Injunctions as an equitable remedy . . . 144

4.2. Discretion to award damages in lieu of injunctions . . . 146

4.3. Th e rationale of ex-post liability rules in the U.K. . . 149

4.4. Other ex-post liability rules: Compulsory licenses . . . 150

5. Italy . . . 154

5.1. Property rules: Final injunctions . . . 156

(9)

Contents

Intersentia ix

5.2. Judicial discretion: How much space? . . . 158

5.3. Preliminary injunctions . . . 161

5.4. Willful and Inadvertent infringement . . . 164

5.5. Other ex-post liability rules: Compulsory licenses . . . 165

6. Conclusions . . . 169

Chapter IV. Ex-Post Liability Rules: When Should Th ey Be Used? . . . 173

1. Introduction . . . 173

2. Patent hold-ups: Economic theory . . . 174

2.1. Economics of patent hold-ups: Th e Lemley and Shapiro model . . . 179

2.1.1. Refi nements and critics . . . 184

2.1.2. Assumptions of the models . . . 186

2.2. From patent hold-ups to patent strategic behavior . . . 191

3. Strategic behavior and ex-post liability rules . . . 192

3.1. Problems put forward by eBay v. MercExchange . . . 193

3.1.1. Strategic behavior . . . 195

3.1.2. Multi component patents . . . 195

3.1.3. Dubious quality patents . . . 196

4. Th e landscape of strategic behavior in Europe . . . 199

4.1. Incidence and eff ects of strategic behavior . . . 201

4.2. A case study: the European pharmaceutical sector . . . 205

4.2.1. Patent strategies in the European pharmaceutical sector . . . 208

4.2.2. Policy suggestions of the Final Report . . . 211

4.2.3. Beyond the European pharmaceutical sector . . . 213

5. Patent strategic behavior: Towards a broader framework . . . 215

5.1. Actors: Non-manufacturing entities, trolls, ambushes and others . . . 216

5.1.1. Defi nition and business models . . . 217

5.1.2. Evolution of patent strategic behavior . . . 224

5.2. Th e conduct: Trolling behavior. . . 228

6. Conclusions . . . 231

Chapter V. Ex-Post Liability Rules: Towards an Effi cient Design . . . 233

1. Introduction . . . 233

2. Th e Effi cient implementation of ex-post liability rules . . . 234

2.1. How could courts effi ciently apply ex-post liability rules? . . . 234

Th e balancing test in post-eBay cases . . . 235

3. A monetary substitute for a property rule . . . 237

3.1. TRIPS: Adequate compensation and adequate remuneration . . . 238

3.2. Determining the level of compensation: An impossible task? . . . 241

(10)

Ex-Post Liability Rules in Modern Patent Law

x Intersentia

3.3. Remuneration for compulsory licenses aft er the TRIPS Agreement . . 243

3.4. Patent infringement: Th e goals of damages substituting injunctions . . . 245

3.4.1. Post-eBay application . . . 247

3.4.2. Law and economics of damage remedies . . . 252

4. Other costs of patent liability rules . . . 253

4.1. Interference with bargaining outcomes . . . 253

4.2. Ex-post liability rules and legal uncertainty . . . 253

5. Cost-benefi t analysis of the rules . . . 254

5.1. A comparative overview of costs and benefi ts of rules . . . 255

6. Conclusions . . . 258

Chapter VI. Conclusions . . . 261

1. Th e research question . . . 262

2. Findings of the research . . . 263

2.1. Chapter I . . . 263

2.2. Chapter II . . . 264

2.3. Chapter III . . . 266

2.4. Chapter IV . . . 267

2.5. Chapter V . . . 268

3. Impact and applications of this research . . . 269

3.1. Lessons from the entitlements literature to the patent fi eld . . . 269

3.2. Patent policy: Effi ciency and other goals of public interest . . . 270

3.3. Intellectual property as property . . . 272

3.4. Rules of interpretation: Th e role of courts and agencies . . . 278

3.5. Th e design of patent liability rules . . . 279

4. Future research . . . 282

4.1. Other IP rights: Copyright, trademarks and unfair competition law . . . 282

4.2. Public choice applications . . . 283

4.3. Antitrust and IP interface . . . 284

4.4. Further national, international and European harmonization . . . 286

List of References. . . 289

Appendix . . . 309

(11)

Intersentia xi

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACTA Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement

BIRPI International Bureaux for the Protection of Intellectual

Property

CAFC U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

CC (Italian) Civil Code

CPC (Italian) Civil Procedural Code

CPI (Italian) Industrial Property Code

EPLA European Patent Litigation Agreement

EPO European Patent Offi ce

GADI Giurisprudenza Annotata di Diritto Industriale

GATT General Agreement on Tariff s and Trade

IP Intellectual Property

Paris Convention Paris Convention on the Protection of Industrial

R&D Research and Development

TRIPS Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights

USPTO United States Patent and Trademarks Offi ce

WIPO World Intellectual Property Organization

WTO World Trade Organization

(12)

Referenties

GERELATEERDE DOCUMENTEN

Deze stof/dit mengsel voldoet niet aan de PBT-criteria van de REACH-verordening, annex XIII Deze stof/dit mengsel voldoet niet aan de zPzB-criteria van de REACH-verordening, annex

A second property of the network is that the new nodes will attach with a higher probability to nodes that have themselves already received many connections (i.e. there

(1977) found the same contrasr results with one-dimensional gratings and two-dimensional grat- ings obtained by adding the vertical and horizontal sinusoida

Een Europees merken- of modellengemach- tigde (Engels: European trademark/design attorney) is een persoon die gekwalificeerd is om je als deposant te vertegenwoordigen voor

In alle landen waar je geen octrooi hebt aangevraagd of de aanvraag hebt laten vallen, behoort jouw vinding tot het publiek domein en geldt terug de vrije concurrentie (in

De reeds vermelde Codex Hoger Onderwijs (het vroegere Dienstverleningsdecreet) bepaalt dat de samen- werkingsovereenkomst tussen onderzoeksorganisatie en bedrijf een regeling

In addition the risk is risk assessment is based on a subclass level, either an average per variable should be used to research the average risk within an industry in comparison to

Variable Definition Obs. Mean Std.dev Min. ExtR values are generally higher in small organizations than in large organization. AbsR value seems to be more dependent on the type