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The handle http://hdl.handle.net/1887/38275 holds various files of this Leiden University dissertation

Author: Vonno, Cynthia M.C. van

Title: Achieving party unity : a sequential approach to why MPs act in concert

Issue Date: 2016-03-02

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Achieving Party Unity

A Sequen al Approach to Why MPs Act in Concert

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Cover

Paulien Varkevisser | Fotografie & vormgeving, Nijmwegen www.paulienvarkevisser.com

The illustra on is inspired by the cover of American Legisla ve Behavior: A Reader (1968), edited by Samuel C. Pa erson and published by D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc.

Typese ng

Typeset using the LYX and L

A

TEX Documenta on System.

Print

Wöhrmann Print Service

© 2016 Cynthia Maria Cornelia van Vonno. All rights reserved. No part of this publica on may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmi ed, in any for or by any means, electronic, mechanic, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the the prior permission in wri ng from the proprietor.

© 2016 Cynthia Maria Cornelia van Vonno. Alle rechten voorbehouden. Niets uit deze

uitgave mag worden verveelvoudigd, opgeslagen in een geautoma seerd gegevensbe-

stand, of openbaar gemaakt, in enige vorm of op enige wijze, hetzij elektronisch, mech-

anisch, door fotokopieën, opnamen, of op enige andere manier, zonder voorafgaande

schri elijke toestemming van de rechthebbende.

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Achieving Party Unity

A Sequen al Approach to Why MPs Act in Concert

Proefschri

ter verkrijging van

de graad van Doctor aan de Universiteit Leiden, op gezag van Rector Magnifucus prof.mr. C.J.J.M. Stolker,

volgens besluit van het College voor Promo es te verdedigen op woensdag 2 maart 2016

klokke 16:15 uur

door

Cynthia Maria Cornelia van Vonno

geboren te Alphen aan den Rijn in 1984

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Promotor

Prof.dr. R.B. Andeweg Promo ecommissie

Prof.dr. I.C. van Biezen, Universiteit Leiden Prof.dr. K. Deschouwer, Vrije Universiteit Brussel Prof.dr. R.Y. Hazan, The Hebrew School of Jerusalem Prof.dr. J.J.M. van Holsteyn, Universiteit Leiden Prof.dr. R.A. Koole, Universiteit Leiden

Prof.dr. J.J.A. Thomassen, Universiteit Twente

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Contents

List of Figures v

List of Tables vii

1 Introduc on 1

1.1 Research ques on . . . . 1

1.2 Plan of the book . . . . 7

2 Representa on in parliament by individual or by poli cal party: shi ing em- phasis 9 2.1 Representa on in theory and in prac ce . . . . 9

2.2 The individual as main representa ve actor . . . . 11

2.2.1 Parliamentarianism . . . . 11

2.2.2 The mandate-independence controversy . . . . 13

2.3 The poli cal party takes over . . . . 16

2.3.1 Party democracy . . . . 16

2.3.2 The responsible party model . . . . 19

2.4 The return to the individual? . . . . 21

2.4.1 Audience democracy . . . . 21

2.4.2 Personaliza on . . . . 23

2.5 Conclusion . . . . 25

3 Unpacking the unitary actor 27 3.1 Party group unity . . . . 27

3.1.1 Conceptualiza on . . . . 28

3.1.2 Measurement . . . . 28

3.2 Explaining party group unity . . . . 32

3.2.1 Ins tu ons and party group unity . . . . 32

3.2.2 Pathways to party group unity . . . . 34

3.2.3 Decision-making models . . . . 40

3.3 The sequen al decision-making model . . . . 43

3.3.1 MPs’ decision-making process . . . . 43

i

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Contents

3.3.2 The sequen al logic . . . . 46

3.3.3 Simplifica on . . . . 48

3.4 Conclusion . . . . 50

4 The influence of ins tu ons: MPs’ decision-making mechanisms in 15 na onal parliaments 51 4.1 The influence of ins tu ons . . . . 51

4.2 Expecta ons . . . . 54

4.2.1 Division of labor . . . . 54

4.2.2 Party agreement . . . . 56

4.2.3 Party loyalty . . . . 57

4.2.4 Party discipline . . . . 58

4.3 Analysis of the decision-making mechanisms in 15 na onal parliaments 59 4.3.1 Division of labor . . . . 64

4.3.2 Party agreement . . . . 66

4.3.3 Party loyalty . . . . 72

4.3.4 Party discipline . . . . 78

4.3.5 The sequen al decision-making process . . . . 87

4.4 Conclusion . . . . 89

5 Different pathways for different levels: representa ves’ decision-making mech- anisms at the na onal and subna onal level 91 5.1 Different pathways for different levels of government . . . . 91

5.2 Expecta ons . . . . 94

5.2.1 Division of labor . . . . 94

5.2.2 Party agreement . . . . 95

5.2.3 Party loyalty . . . . 96

5.2.4 Party discipline . . . . 98

5.3 Analysis of the decision-making mechanisms in na onal and regional parliaments in nine European democracies . . . . 99

5.3.1 Division of labor . . . 101

5.3.2 Party agreement . . . 102

5.3.3 Party loyalty . . . 106

5.3.4 Party discipline . . . 110

5.3.5 The sequen al decision-making process . . . 116

5.4 Analysis of the decision-making mechanisms in the Dutch Second Cham- ber, provincial councils and municipal councils . . . 120

5.4.1 Division of labor . . . 124

5.4.2 Party agreement . . . 127

5.4.3 Party loyalty . . . 131

5.4.4 Party discipline . . . 138

5.4.5 The sequen al decision-making process . . . 145

5.5 Conclusion . . . 147

ii

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Contents

6 Changes over me: party group unity and MPs’ decision-making mechanisms

in the Dutch na onal parliament over me 151

6.1 The one- or two-arena model . . . 151

6.2 The Dutch case . . . 155

6.2.1 The electoral arena . . . 155

6.2.2 The legisla ve arena . . . 158

6.3 Party group unity over me . . . 160

6.3.1 Party group defec on . . . 161

6.3.2 Party group vo ng . . . 166

6.4 Expecta ons . . . 178

6.4.1 Division of labor . . . 178

6.4.2 Party agreement . . . 180

6.4.3 Party loyalty . . . 183

6.4.4 Party discipline . . . 183

6.5 Analysis of the decision-making mechanisms in the Dutch Second Chamber185 6.5.1 Division of labor . . . 187

6.5.2 Party agreement . . . 190

6.5.3 Party loyalty . . . 197

6.5.4 Party discipline . . . 199

6.6 Conclusion . . . 204

7 The sequen al approach evaluated 207 7.1 The decision-making mechanisms . . . 207

7.1.1 Division of labor . . . 209

7.1.2 Party agreement . . . 210

7.1.3 Party loyalty . . . 214

7.1.4 Party discipline . . . 218

7.2 Sugges ons for future research . . . 221

7.3 Implica ons . . . 228

Bibliography 231

Dutch summary 255

Acknowledgments 259

Curriculum Vitae 261

iii

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List of Figures

1.1 The study of party group unity . . . . 4 2.1 The style and focus of representa ves’ roles . . . . 13 2.2 The connec on between cons tuencies’ a tudes and a representa ve’s

roll call behavior . . . . 14 2.3 Representa onal role emphasis . . . . 16 3.1 MPs’ sequen al decision-making process . . . . 44 4.1 Party agreement (the frequency of disagreement with the party’s posi-

on on a vote in parliament) and the absolute distance MPs’ perceive between their own posi on and the posi on of their party on an 11- point ideological Le -Right scale in 15 na onal parliaments (%) . . . . . 70 4.2 Party loyalty (own opinion versus party’s posi on) and the importance

ascribed to promo ng the views and interests of the party in 15 na onal parliaments (%) . . . . 75

v

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List of Tables

4.1 Par Rep MP Survey response rates for 15 na onal parliaments . . . . . 61 4.2 Average party group unity in 15 na onal parliaments (Rice score) . . . . 62 4.3 Specialist or generalist in 15 na onal parliaments (%) . . . . 65 4.4 ‘The parliamentary party spokesperson gets to determine the party’s po-

si on on his topic’ in 15 na onal parliaments (%) . . . . 66 4.5 Party agreement (the frequency of disagreement with the party’s posi-

on on a vote in parliament) in 15 na onal parliaments (%) . . . . 68 4.6 Party agreement (the frequency of disagreement with the party’s posi-

on on a vote in parliament) in 15 na onal parliaments: mul level bi- nary logis cs regression . . . . 71 4.7 Party loyalty (own opinion versus party’s posi on) in 15 na onal parlia-

ments (%) . . . . 73 4.8 Party loyalty (own opinion versus party’s posi on) in 15 na onal parlia-

ments: mul level binary logis cs regression . . . . 77 4.9 Sa sfac on with general parliamentary party discipline in 15 na onal

parliaments (%) . . . . 79 4.10 Sa sfac on with parliamentary party discipline when it comes to s cking

to the parliamentary party line in votes in 15 na onal parliaments (%) . 80 4.11 Sa sfac on with parliamentary party discipline when it comes to taking

poli cal ini a ves only with the parliamentary party’s authoriza on in 15 na onal parliaments (%) . . . . 81 4.12 Sa sfac on with parliamentary party discipline when it comes to keep-

ing internal party discussions confiden al in 15 na onal parliaments (%) 82 4.13 ‘Confiden al party discussions usually find their way to the media’ in 15

na onal parliaments (%) . . . . 83 4.14 Sa sfac on with parliamentary party discipline when it comes to s cking

to the parliamentary party group line in votes in 15 na onal parliaments:

mul level binary logis cs regression . . . . 85 4.15 The rela ve contribu on of party agreement, party loyalty and party dis-

cipline when it comes to s cking to the parliamentary party line in votes in 15 na onal parliaments (%) . . . . 88

vii

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List of Tables

5.1 2010 Par Rep MP survey response rates for na onal and regional par- liaments in nine European democracies . . . 100 5.2 Specialist or generalist in na onal and regional parliaments in nine Eu-

ropean democracies (%) . . . 103 5.3 ‘The parliamentary party spokesperson gets to determine the party’s po-

si on on his topic’ in na onal and regional parliaments in nine European democracies (%) . . . 104 5.4 Party agreement (the frequency of disagreement with the party’s posi-

on on a vote in parliament) in na onal and regional parliaments in nine European democracies (%) . . . 105 5.5 Party loyalty (own opinion versus party’s posi on) in na onal and re-

gional parliaments in nine European democracies (%) . . . 107 5.6 Party loyalty (own opinion versus party’s posi on) and compe ng prin-

cipals (voters’ opinion versus party’s posi on) in na onal and regional parliaments in nine European democracies (%) . . . 109 5.7 Sa sfac on with general parliamentary party discipline in na onal and

regional parliaments in nine European democracies (%) . . . 111 5.8 Sa sfac on with parliamentary party discipline when it comes to s cking

to the parliamentary party line in votes in na onal and regional parlia- ments in nine European democracies (%) . . . 112 5.9 Sa sfac on with parliamentary party discipline when it comes to taking

poli cal ini a ves only with the parliamentary party’s authoriza on in na onal and regional parliaments in nine European democracies (%) . . 113 5.10 Sa sfac on with parliamentary party discipline when it comes to keep-

ing internal party discussions confiden al in na onal and regional par- liaments in nine European democracies (%) . . . 114 5.11 ‘Confiden al party discussions usually find their way to the media’ in

na onal and regional parliaments in nine European democracies (%) . . 115 5.12 The rela ve contribu on of party agreement, party loyalty and party

discipline when it comes to s cking to the parliamentary party line in votes in parliament in na onal and regional parliaments in nine Euro- pean democracies (%) . . . 118 5.13 Par Rep MP Survey response rates for the Dutch Second Chamber, provin-

cial councils and municipal councils . . . 123 5.14 Specialist or generalist in the Dutch Second Chamber, provincial councils

and municipal councils (%) . . . 125 5.15 ‘The parliamentary party spokesperson gets to determine the party’s po-

si on on his topic’ in the Dutch Second Chamber, provincial councils and municipal councils (%) . . . 126 5.16 The main decision-making center in the parliamentary party group in the

Dutch Second Chamber, provincial councils and municipal councils (%) . 127 5.17 Party agreement (the frequency of disagreement with the party’s posi-

on on a vote in parliament) in the Dutch Second Chamber, provincial councils and municipal councils (%) . . . 129

viii

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List of Tables

5.18 Party agreement (the frequency of disagreement with the party’s posi- on on a vote in parliament) and ‘I feel involved in the decision making in the party group’ in the Dutch Second Chamber, provincial councils and municipal councils (%) . . . 130 5.19 Party loyalty (own opinion versus party’s posi on) in the Dutch Second

Chamber, provincial councils and municipal councils (%) . . . 132 5.20 Party loyalty (own opinion versus party’s posi on) and compe ng princi-

pals (voters’ opinion versus party’s posi on) in the Dutch Second Cham- ber, provincial councils and municipal councils (%) . . . 134 5.21 ‘There is a strong feeling of unity in the party group’ in the Dutch Second

Chamber, provincial councils and municipal councils (%) . . . 136 5.22 ‘An individual representa ve’s freedom or party unity’ in the Dutch Sec-

ond Chamber, provincial councils and municipal councils (%) . . . 136 5.23 Situa ons in which an MP who disagrees with the party’s posi on on a

vote in parliament s ll ought to vote according to the party’s posi on in the Dutch Second Chamber, provincial councils and municipal councils (% who answer affirma vely) . . . 138 5.24 Sa sfac on with general & specific aspects of parliamentary party dis-

cipline in the Dutch Second Chamber, provincial councils and municipal councils (%) . . . 139 5.25 ‘Confiden al party discussions usually find their way to the media’ in the

Dutch Second Chamber, provincial councils and municipal councils (%) . 141 5.26 The likelihood of immediate nega ve sanc ons when a representa ve

repeatedly does not vote with the party line in the Dutch Second Cham- ber, provincial councils and municipal councils (%) . . . 142 5.27 The likelihood of delayed nega ve sanc ons when a representa ve re-

peatedly does not vote with the party line in the Dutch Second Chamber, provincial councils and municipal councils (%) . . . 143 5.28 The rela ve contribu on of party agreement, party loyalty and party dis-

cipline when it comes to s cking to the parliamentary party line in votes in the Dutch Second Chamber, provincial councils and municipal councils (%) . . . 146 6.1 Average electoral vola lity and second order personal votes in the Sec-

ond Chamber of the Dutch Parliament 1946-2012 . . . 155 6.2 MPs who entered the Second Chamber of the Dutch Parliament on the

basis of preference votes who otherwise would have not have done so on the basis of their list posi on and the number of votes obtained by their poli cal party 1946-2012 . . . 157 6.3 Parliamentary party group defec ons in the Second Chamber of the Dutch

Parliament 1946-2015 . . . 164 6.4 Percentage of votes in which party group unity was not complete in the

Second Chamber of the Dutch Parliament 1946-2010 (%) . . . 171

ix

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List of Tables

6.5 Percentage of votes in which party group unity was not complete in the Second Chamber of the Dutch Parliament 1946-2010: CDA, PvdA and VVD averages only (%) . . . 172 6.6 Average party group unity in the Second Chamber of the Dutch Parlia-

ment 1946-2010 (Rice score) . . . 174 6.7 Average party group unity in the Second Chamber of the Dutch Parlia-

ment 1946-2010: CDA, PvdA and VVD only (Rice score) . . . 175 6.8 Number of dissen ng MPs in the Second Chamber of the Dutch Parlia-

ment 1946-2010 . . . 176 6.9 Use of parliamentary rights in the Second Chamber of the Dutch Na onal

Parliament 1956-2012 . . . 179 6.10 Dutch Parliamentary Studies and Par Rep MP Survey response rates for

the Second Chamber of the Dutch Parliament . . . 187 6.11 ‘As an MP you usually vote according to the advice of the parliamentary

party spokesperson when it comes to bills that you did not deal with yourself for the party group’ in the Second Chamber of the Dutch Parlia- ment 1972-2006 (%) . . . 188 6.12 The main decision-making center in the parliamentary party group in the

Second Chamber of the Dutch Parliament 1979-2010 (%) . . . 189 6.13 Party group ideological homogeneity on the Le -Right scale in the Sec-

ond Chamber of the Dutch Parliament 1972-2010: CDA, PvdA and VVD only (coefficient of agreement) . . . 191 6.14 Perceived ideological distance on the Le -Right scale in the Second Cham-

ber of the Dutch Parliament 1972-2010 (%) . . . 193 6.15 Perceived ideological distance on the Le -Right scale in the Second Cham-

ber of the Dutch Parliament 1972-2010: CDA, PvdA and VVD only (%) . 194 6.16 Perceived ideological distance on the Le -Right scale in the Second Cham-

ber of the Dutch Parliament: government-opposi on (%) . . . 195 6.17 Perceived ideological distance on the Le -Right scale in the Second Cham-

ber of the Dutch Parliament: party group size (%) . . . 196 6.18 Party group loyalty (own opinion versus party group’s posi on) in the

Second Chamber of the Dutch Parliament 1972-2010 (%) . . . 198 6.19 Party group loyalty (own opinion versus party group’s posi on) in the

Second Chamber of the Dutch Parliament 1972-2010: CDA, PvdA and VVD only (%) . . . 200 6.20 Party group loyalty (own opinion versus party group’s posi on) in the

Second Chamber of the Dutch Parliament 1972-2010: government-opposi on (%) . . . 201 6.21 Sa sfac on with general party discipline in the Second Chamber of the

Dutch Parliament 2001-2010 (%) . . . 202 6.22 Sa sfac on with specific aspects of party discipline in the Second Cham-

ber of the Dutch Parliament 2001-2010 (%) . . . 203 7.1 Division of labor: summary of expecta ons and findings . . . 211

x

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List of Tables

7.2 Party agreement: summary of expecta ons and findings . . . 213 7.3 Party loyalty: summary of expecta ons and findings . . . 217 7.4 Party discipline: summary of expecta ons and findings . . . 219

xi

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