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Foreign Independent Board members in Corporate Boards of Listed Firms

Empirical evidence from firms located in BRIC countries 56

Table 16 Correlation matrix of the variables

†. Correlation is significant at level p < 0.10 level (2-tailed).

*. Correlation is significant at level p < 0.05 level (2-tailed).

**. Correlation is significant at level p <0.01 level (2-tailed).

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

Correlation 1

Sig. (2-tailed)

Correlation -,009 1

Sig. (2-tailed) ,801

Correlation -,018 ,517

**

1 Sig. (2-tailed) ,606 ,000

Correlation ,064

,005 -,024 1

Sig. (2-tailed) ,072 ,889 ,502

Correlation ,111

**

,055 ,023 ,022 1

Sig. (2-tailed) ,002 ,117 ,523 ,534

Correlation ,066

,008 -,060

,091

*

,179

**

1

Sig. (2-tailed) ,062 ,828 ,089 ,010 ,000

Correlation ,063 ,114

**

,040 ,076

*

,174

**

,142

**

1

Sig. (2-tailed) ,073 ,001 ,263 ,032 ,000 ,000

Correlation -,013 -,063

-,042 -,127

**

,007 ,067

-,185

**

1

Sig. (2-tailed) ,705 ,076 ,237 ,000 ,841 ,056 ,000

Correlation ,031 -,011 -,031 -,121

**

-,013 -,021 -,051 ,126

**

1

Sig. (2-tailed) ,379 ,751 ,380 ,001 ,706 ,557 ,148 ,000

Correlation ,031 ,413

**

,213

**

-,014 ,070

*

,014 ,111

**

,018 ,003 1

Sig. (2-tailed) ,376 ,000 ,000 ,691 ,046 ,683 ,002 ,619 ,942

Correlation ,012 ,347

**

,251

**

-,093

**

,066

-,061

,062

-,046 -,019 ,560

**

1

Sig. (2-tailed) ,745 ,000 ,000 ,008 ,062 ,085 ,082 ,195 ,592 ,000

Correlation -,054 -,050 -,011 ,034 -,004 -,127

**

-,028 -,055 -,111

**

,015 ,008 1

Sig. (2-tailed) ,127 ,156 ,763 ,337 ,917 ,000 ,429 ,122 ,002 ,662 ,828

Correlation ,176

**

,060 ,094

,175

**

,383

**

,154

**

,362

**

-,008 ,076 ,037 ,034 -,027 1

Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,217 ,050 ,000 ,000 ,001 ,000 ,876 ,116 ,438 ,485 ,573

Correlation ,213

**

,037 ,025 ,217

**

,401

**

,202

**

,498

**

-,229

**

-,049 ,056 ,030 -,108

**

,823

**

1

Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,294 ,477 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,167 ,113 ,397 ,002 ,000

9. CEO duality 10. Prior ROA 11. Prior ROE 12. Firm age 13. Employee number (ln) 14. Total assets (ln)

1. Percentage FIDs

2. ROA

3. ROE

4. Ownership

concentration

5. Foreign

subsidiary

6. Foreign listing

7. Board size

8. Board

independence

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