Msc. Political Science
International Relations
Kenya and its Political Elite:
The Perspective of Ekeh’s
Two Publics
Wouter Ruben van Leeuwen
Student Number: 11803703
June 2020
Supervisor: Dr. Michael Onyebuchi Eze
Second Reader: Dr. Anne Loeber
Summary
In this thesis the two publics theory by Peter Ekeh is used to analyse the behaviour of the political elite under presidents Jomo Kenyatta and Daniel arap Moi. The two publics theory claims that due to colonialism, two publics have emerged instead of one public, as in the West. Ekeh identifies the civic and primordial public. The primordial public “is closely identified with
primordial groupings, sentiments, ties, and activities that impinge on the public interest.” In
contrast is the civic public, which relates to the colonially constructed state institutions. Central in Ekeh’s theorizing is the differing moral grounds of the two publics. Where the civic public is related to in amoral terms, the primordial public is considered moral. According to Ekeh, this has led to the idea that it is legitimate to rob the civic public, as long as it is done to benefit your primordial public.
This dialectic relation was not found in the analysis of Kenya’s postcolonial political elite. Both under Kenyatta and Moi, the elite appeared to be mainly driven by self-interest. The primordial connection with the tribe was hereby used to strengthen their rule, i.e. to preserve their economic and political influence over the country. Benefits derived from the civic public were not shared fairly with their primordial public, since large parts of the Kikuyu and Kalenjin, the respective tribes of Kenyatta and Moi, remained deprived.
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Table of Contents
Chapter 1: Introduction ... 3
Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework ... 5
2.1 Theories ... 5
2.1.1 Primordialism ... 5
2.1.2 The Two Publics Theory by Peter Ekeh ... 6
2.2 Definitions ... 9
2.2.1 The Primordial Public ... 9
2.2.2 The Political Elite ... 10
Chapter 3: Literature Review ... 11
3.1 Criticism on the Two Publics Theory ... 11
3.2 Kenya and the Two Publics Theory ... 12
Chapter 4: Research Design ... 15
4.1 Case Study ... 15
4.2 Secondary Data Analysis ... 16
4.3 Political Economy Approach ... 17
4.4 Limitations ... 17
Chapter 5: The Pre-Independence Context of Kenya ... 19
5.1 The Background of Tribes in Kenya ... 19
5.2 The Emergence of Tribalism in Kenyan Politics ... 21
Chapter 6: Kenya’s first President: Jomo Kenyatta (1963-1978) ... 23
6.1 Kenyatta’s Political Elite ... 23
6.2 The Division of Land under Kenyatta ... 24
6.2.1 The Origin of Kenyatta’s Land Policies ... 24
6.2.2 The Deprived Mau Mau ... 26
6.2.3 The Opposition Against Kenyatta’s Land Policies ... 26
6.2.4 The Profiting Elite ... 27
6.3 The Fostering of Ethnic Sentiment Among the Kikuyu ... 28
6.3.1 The Assassination of Tom Mboya ... 28
6.3.2 The Abuse of Oathing ... 29
6.4 Conclusion ... 31
Chapter 7: Kenya’s Second President: Daniel arap Moi (1978-2002) ... 32
7.1 Kenyatta’s succession ... 32
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7.3 The troubled Kalenjin Identity ... 34
7.4 Moi’s Self-serving Politics ... 36
7.4.1 The Economic and Political Situation of Kenya in the Early 1990’s ... 36
7.4.2 Ethnic Violence during the 1992 Elections ... 37
7.4.3 The Economic Gains of Moi’s Elite ... 38
7.5 Conclusion ... 41
Chapter 8: Conclusions ... 42
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Chapter 1: Introduction
In 1975, the Nigerian sociologist Peter Ekeh wrote his seminal work ‘Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical Statement.’ In this article, Ekeh elaborated the idea of a split
in the African state induced by colonialism. He argued that the African citizen relates differently to the colonially constructed state and its institutions, which one has no personal connection with, and their primordial community, which one feels strongly attached to. He named them respectively the civic public and the primordial public. He emphasized that the civic public is related to in amoral terms, while the primordial public has moral foundations.
As there is no moral connection to the state and its institutions, stealing in the civic public is not frowned upon according to Ekeh. However, it is only legitimate to rob the civic public if the prime beneficiary is the primordial public. This is what he considers the unwritten law of the dialectic relation between the two publics. Moreover, Ekeh sees the existence of the two publics as the cause of corruption and tribalism.
Since Ekeh claims his theory is wider applicable in Africa, this thesis focuses on Kenya. At first sight, it seems that Ekeh’s theory fits with the Kenyan society. Many analysts have highlighted how the country has struggled with corruption and tribalism over the years (see for example Hope, 2014; Shilaho, 2018), two of the main problems Ekeh associates with his theory. Moreover, scholars also identified how Kenyan presidents have benefited their own tribe the most in the distribution of state largesse (e.g. Brockerhoff & Hewett, 1998; Wrong, 2009). This indicates that there is some moral connection of political leaders with their tribe. Therefore, this thesis tries to identify if the dialectic relation between the civic and the primordial public is witnessed in the politics of post-colonial Kenya. The focus of this research is on the political elites of Kenyatta and Moi, the subsequent presidents of the country between 1963 and 2002. This leads me to the following research question:
To what extent can the behaviour of the political elite under Jomo Kenyatta and Daniel arap Moi be explained by the two publics theory?
This research follows a political economy approach, in which societal, political and economic developments of the country under the rule of Kenyatta and Moi are incorporated. This provides an adequate overview to interpret the behaviour of the elite and see if there is a dialectic moral relation witnessed between the civic and primordial public.
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The goal of this study is twofold. First of all, by applying the two publics theory to a new case, namely Kenya, the usefulness of Ekeh’s theorizing for the wider African continent can be tested. If it applies to Kenya, the practicality of the two publics theory is further proven. Moreover, if the dialectic moral relation between the civic and primordial public is witnessed in this study, it would elucidate one of the causes of corruption and tribalism in Kenya. Consequently, this could help to combat vices in the public sector when one of its chief causes is identified.
The structure of the thesis is as follows. In the next chapter, the theories and concepts of this study are further explained. This is followed by the literature review, in which criticism towards the two publics theory is summarized and the Kenyan context in regard to Ekeh’s theory is explored. Then, my theoretical and practical considerations for this research are disclosed in a research design chapter. The actual research consists of three chapters. In the first research chapter, the precolonial context of Kenya is depicted, to show how tribes formed and how they became politically relevant. Then, a chapter is devoted to the analysis of the rule of president Kenyatta, which is followed by a chapter about the rule of president Moi. The final chapter is a thorough conclusion to provide a definitive answer to the research question.
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Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework
In this chapter, the theoretical underpinnings of this research are elaborated, starting with the theory of primordialism. Since Ekeh’s work is grounded in primordialism, it is important to understand what this theory entails to comprehend Ekeh’s theorizing. After primordialism is explained, Ekeh’s two publics theory is further elaborated. This is followed by the definitions of the most important concepts I use in my thesis, i.e., the political elite and the primordial public.
2.1 Theories
2.1.1 Primordialism
The primordial school of thought finds it origins in England in the work of Shils (1957). He identified that the attachment towards a family member is not merely to them as a person, but as “a possessor of certain especially significant relational qualities, which could only be
described as primordial (p. 142).” He claims that this attachment does not come forth out of
social interaction, but should rather be attributed to the tie of blood (ibid.). Geertz (1973) continues this notion and relates it to the identity of people in post-colonial Africa:
“By primordial attachment is meant one that stems from the 'givens' - or, more precisely, as
culture is inevitably involved in such matters, the assumed 'givens' - of social existence: immediate continguity and kin connection mainly, but beyond them the givenness that stems from being born into a particular religious community, speaking a particular language, or even a dialect of a language, and following particular social practices. These congruities of blood, speech, custom and so on, are seen to have an ineffable, and at times overpowering coerciveness in and of themselves (p. 259).”
Fenton (1999) summarizes Geertz argument as follows: “There is a sense of obligation to others
that is rather taken for granted and is not a matter of calculation (…) it is a kind of given, just there (and) we certainly feel that these are obligations we can scarcely escape (p. 80).”
Others were much more critical on the work of Geertz. Based on Geertz’s work Eller & Coughlan (1993) came up with three characteristics of primordialism: (1) primordial attachments are ‘given’, prior to all experience or interaction, something natural, even ‘spiritual’; (2) Primordial sentiments cannot be described in words and are coercive and overpowering, in which one necessarily feels certain attachments; (3) Primordialism is essentially a question of emotion and affect, where it is qualitatively different from other kind
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of identities where feelings do not play a role e.g. identities based on class. Nevertheless, as the authors highlight, conceptualized this way makes primordialism a set of underived and socially-unconstructed emotions that are unanalysable. According to them ‘a more unintelligible and un-sociological concept would be hard to imagine’ in which they even attributed a sense of racism to it (p. 187).
The critique of Eller & Coughlan received ample criticism. Grosby (1994) dismissed their writing as a complete misunderstanding of what primordialism is, which other scholars agreed with. It was said that Eller & Coughlan’s argument was a straw-man portrayal of primordial attachments, since they falsely assume primordial means situated before all social experience (Fenton, 1999, p. 84-85). As Geertz has highlighted, it still depends on culture how much the attachment is felt, whereby it does not completely dismiss sociological principles. Moreover, it bypasses the strong point of the theory, namely that attachments developed in the early ages are in general a strong force. As Grosby (1994) describes them: “the family, the locality, and one's
own 'people' bear, transmit, and protect life. This is why human beings have always attributed and continue to attribute sacredness to primordial objects and the attachments they form to them (p. 169).” To a certain extent these powers can be manipulated, but there is always some
ineffable part to it that cannot be altered. In other words, primordialism is therefore not a claim that someone inherits a language, tribal affiliation, religion or likewise factors genetically; rather they internalize it while they grow up. However, since one cannot choose his or her parents and therefore does not choose the environment they are born in, makes this process for a large part primordially determined (Bayar, 2009). Still, it should be noted that primordialism remains a concept that remains scientifically lacking, with unoperationalizable and untestable views (Gil-White, 1999).
To conclude, primordialism is in no way related to genetics as some critics argue, but is a connection that is fostered by the society one is born in. That is what creates this strong sense of bounding. Still, primordialists see some cultural aspects as so pervasive, that it is argued that they are ‘given’, that they possess an overpowering coerciveness that is to a certain extent ineffable.
2.1.2 The Two Publics Theory by Peter Ekeh
Partly based on the work of Shils (1957) and Geertz (1973), Peter Ekeh, a Nigerian sociologist, came up with the two publics theory. In 1975, Ekeh argued in his seminal article “Colonialism
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publics, the private and public realm, are generated differently in Africa due to colonial rule. Where in Western societies the public realm is considered homogenous, the public realm in Africa is divided in the civic public and the primordial public. The primordial public “is closely
identified with primordial groupings, sentiments, ties, and activities that impinge on the public interest (p. 92).” The primordial public has emerged due to the alienating nature of the colonial
state by failing to deliver to the needs of the masses, which caused people to rely on communal and ethnic ties to fill the gaps created by colonialism. Ekeh therefore (1975) states: “The
primordial public is moral and operates on the same moral imperatives as the private realm
(p. 92),” meaning that one has moral obligations towards the primordial public, which one works to preserve and benefit (p. 100). This moral relation is what Ekeh considers to be primordial. Namely, that this obligation is a ‘given’ that can hardly be escaped and is not a matter of calculation, but has an overpowering coerciveness in it that is to a certain extent ineffable.
On the contrasting side is the civic public, that has no moral linkages with the private realm. According to Ekeh (1975): “The civic public in Africa is amoral and lacks the generalized
moral imperatives operative in the private realm and primordial public (p. 92).” The civic
public is historically associated with colonialism and is based on state agencies. It refers to armed forces, police, public service (federal and state ministries) the executive, legislative and judicial arms of government (Onuoha, 2014, p. 322). Osaghae (2006) mentions in this regard that the civic public suffers from a crisis of ownership. Since the civic public is invented by the colonial elite and reproduced by the African elite after independence, most citizens do not have the same sense of ownership towards this structure as to the primordial public. Therefore, only grudgingly is given to the civic public, although material gain is derived from it. Moreover, corruption in the civic public is not frowned upon, as long as the benefit derived from it is shared with the primordial public. This is a central point of the two publics theory and illustrates the differing morality in the two publics. Ekeh (1975) claims in this regard that a plunderer of funds in the civic public “would not be a good man were he to channel all his lucky gains to his
private purse. He will only continue to be a good man if he channels part of the largesse from the civic public to the primordial public (p. 108)”, which makes him therefore conclude that
“The unwritten law of the dialectic is that it is legitimate to rob the civic public in order to
strengthen the primordial public (ibid.). ”
Citizens in such an environment are constantly pulled between demands from the civic and primordial public, which forms the basis of corruption. Corruption, which Ekeh defines as
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embezzlement of public funds and bribery, “arises directly from the amorality of the civic public, and the legitimation of the need to seize largesse from the civic public in order to benefit the primordial public (p. 110).” According to Ekeh corruption is completely absent in the primordial public (ibid.). Moreover, he argues that an individual, who extends the same sense of honesty and integrity with which he performs his duties in the primordial public to his duties in the civic public, can expect serious sanctions from his primordial public.
According to Ekeh (1975) this differentiated attitude is also expressed in the African work ethics. He states that Africans are extremely hard working in the primordial public, but not in the civic public. He mentions in this regard that one does not feel guilty if he wastes time in the civic public, while the same individual would be terribly embarrassed if he wastes time or make claims for work he has not done in the primordial public (p. 111). It is also said by Ekeh that some individuals use their time at work in the civic public to rest in preparation for their tougher assignments in the primordial realm (ibid.). All in all, the dialectical tension that comes forth out of the confrontations between these two publics make Ekeh conclude that this constitutes the uniqueness of modern African politics, which entails its own set of problems (p. 108). In addition Ekeh (1975) also mentions tribalism. He sees the existence of the two publics as the underlying factor of tribal feuds. It is said that tribalism arises “where there is conflict between
segments of the African bourgeoisie regarding the proportionate share of the resources of the civic public to differentiated primordial public (p. 109).” Tribalism in this sense is basically a
struggle for resources for one’s own primordial public. Ekeh also mentions “The leaders of the
primordial public want to channel as great a share of these resources from the civic public to individuals who are in the same primordial public as they are - in part, one suspects, because a significant proportion of them will eventually find their way into the coffers of the primordial public (ibid.).”
To conclude, Ekeh’s theorizing sketches a clear dichotomous relation between the civic and primordial public. Where a citizen relates on moral grounds with their primordial grouping, they do not show a moral relation in their interaction with colonially grounded institutions. This is therefore seen by Ekeh as the cause of corruption and tribalism. In this research, it is analysed to what extent this dialectic relation is witnessed among the political elite in Kenya.
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2.2 Definitions
Based on previous theories, the most important concepts used in my research are further explained in this section. First of all, the primordial public is defined, which is followed by an explanation of what I consider the political elite.
2.2.1 The Primordial Public
Where the civic public is rather straightforward to understand, since it relates to most colonially invented state agencies, is the primordial public more difficult to understand. As earlier mentioned, Ekeh defines the primordial public as “closely identified with primordial groupings,
sentiments, ties, and activities that impinge on the public interest (p. 92).” Since this remains a
rather vague description, to test Ekeh’s theory, the definition of the primordial public needs to be operationalized.
Nevertheless, defining primordial ties remains difficult, since it depends on feelings. For the one person these feelings can be strong, while for another person they are not as strong. It therefore remains a matter of interpretation what can be perceived as a primordial grouping. Onuoha (2014) interpreted the primordial public as villages, rural communities, traditional and group associations and religious groups (p. 322). However, I consider tribes also part of Ekeh’s primordial public. The reason why I consider tribes to be part of the primordial public is twofold. First of all, other scholars acknowledge that tribes have primordial foundations. Although tribes were imposed constructs by the colonial oppressors throughout Africa (see chapter 5 for more explanation), the assumed kinship within tribes is regarded as primordial (Christie, 1998, p. 19). In general, tribes often share a history, language and social customs, that are all related to primordial sentiments. Second of all, other scholars have highlighted that there is an ineffable connection with the tribe. This is for the Kenyan case best illustrated by an example from Wrong (2009). She highlights that in a corruption scandal that hit the country some years ago, it was perceived that the head of the anti-corruption unit would not betray corrupt government officials since they all belonged to the same tribe. As Wrong emphasizes: “(He) was one of them. (He) belonged. (He) was a Kikuyu (p. 97).” In other words, it was assumed that solely his tribal affiliation would cause him to operate in solidarity with his fellow tribesmen who were looting from the civic public. This illustrates that there are primordial moral values related to the tribe. Therefore, I consider tribes to be part of the primordial public. Since tribes were at the forefront of society in postcolonial Kenya (e.g. Branch, 2011), I will focus my research on this primordial grouping. To refrain from discussing what a tribe is,
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because it is mostly undecided what exactly is constituted by a tribe or ethnic community (e.g. Shilaho, 2018, p. 30-31; Lynch 2008), I will follow the Kenyan government and recognize the same ethnic communities that are recognized by them.1
2.2.2 The Political Elite
Another important concept in this study is the political elite. Since Ekeh’s theory is central in this research, the definition of the political elite is deducted from his description of what he calls ‘the leaders of the primordial public.’ As previously already highlighted he sees them explicitly not as traditional ethnic leaders, and emphasizes that these primordial leaders have access to state resources. However, in Ekeh’s description the leaders of the primordial public seem to be all people that have leading positions in the government, which makes it too broad to conceptualize in my research. It is therefore decided to limit the amount of actors to look at and solely analyse the president and the ministers around him, who are referred to as the political elite. It is widely agreed upon that these men possessed most state power in post-independence Kenya (e.g. Branch, 2011; Shilaho, 2018), which makes it a logical group of actors to focus on. Any politician from the opposition is ruled out in this definition, since they do not possess the same access to state resources as the incumbent president and his ministers. Moreover, in the same vein actors from the lower levels of government are excluded from this definition, since they have less influence on the distribution of funds from the centre.
It should be noted however that my focus sometimes shifts to the president, since he possessed most power in post-colonial Kenya. As Shilaho (2018) explains: “The President has the
prerogative to make virtually all the appointments within the bureaucracy, top administrators in public universities, diplomatic postings, military and security forces (p. 14).”
1 Throughout my thesis ethnicity and tribalism are used interchangeably. Although I do acknowledge that there
is an academic difference between them, the Kenyan public discourse uses both words to describe the same phenomenon (e.g. Shilaho, 2018, p. 29) which makes me adhere to the same line.
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Chapter 3: Literature Review
Although Ekeh’s analysis was praised for the insightful observations it made of post-colonial Africa, his study also received criticism. In the first part of this literature review, the criticism on Ekeh’s work is discussed. In the second part, I will connect Ekeh’s writing with the Kenyan context and highlight how the topics Ekeh touches upon in his work have been previously analysed for this country.
3.1 Criticism on the Two Publics Theory
Ekeh’s analysis received both appraisal and criticism. It was said that his work marked a significant breakthrough towards post-colonial freedom in political thought and analysis, in which it acknowledged that colonialism produced enduring social formations (Osaghae, 2006). Nevertheless, questions have been asked to what extent his theory fully grasps the complexities of African society it aims to describe. The first line of criticism comes forth out of the work of Joseph (1991) that blames Ekeh for emphasizing the dichotomy between the civic and the primordial public, which in his view constitutes of a more blurred line. He highlights that the primordial realm is not the non-economic universe Ekeh idealizes, but just as much an arena characterized by the active and legitimate pursuit of material interests as the civic realm (p. 194-195).
Other critics denounce the fact that Ekeh underplays the role of personal interest and other factors that play a role in corrupt behaviour, while overstressing the role of primordial ties. As Osaghae (2006) argues: “Most cases of embezzlement, bribery, and fraud are individual
personal projects and have little to do with constitutive primordial interests (p. 240).” He
continues his argument by highlighting that a primordial identity is just one of several identities one chooses to adopt, with the choice of identity being often situational and rational. With this preposition, it is suggested that primordial attachments are not as strong or deterministic as Ekeh’s theory assumes. That is not to deny the existence of the primordial connection, but more to emphasize that is only part of the identity someone chooses to adopt. By only viewing corruption as a service to the primordial group is therefore too narrow. Although the primordial public might provide part of the incentive for corrupt behaviour, it is just one of the many reasons to commit to this practice.
Other research underlines that the connection with the primordial public is not as strong as Ekeh perceives it to be. Onuoha (2014) claims that for Nigeria the contemporary relation between individuals with both publics is amoral. He sees it as a consequence of continual social change,
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in which Ekeh might have been right in 1975 with his identification of moral relations, but that they no longer apply now. The state of finality in the moral relations with both publics is therefore rejected by the author. Ijewereme (2015) came to a likewise conclusion for Nigeria. He stated that “the robbery in the civil public is presently not being used to strengthen the
primordial public but rather pauperizing it (p. 40).” He therefore dismisses Ekeh’s moral
preposition as well.
To conclude, most criticism towards Ekeh’s two public theory does question the implied universality of his theory. Nevertheless, it is not that they discredit the theory as a whole. Most criticism only weakens the extent to which the theory applies and is not a denial of the existence of two publics. The moral relation Ekeh sketches out in his theory is however dismissed by multiple authors. Still, this has only been analysed for the Nigerian case. For Kenya, the theory has not been tested yet. In the next section it is discussed to what extent morality in Kenya’s civic and primordial public is analysed so far, while the gaps in current research are highlighted. 3.2 Kenya and the Two Publics Theory
For Kenya the two publics theory has never been comprehensively used to analyse moral relations in the country. The only application of the theory in Kenya is written by Ndii (2018). He acknowledges that there is an amoral relation with the civic public and a moral relation with the primordial public. He uses the money raised for weddings as an indicator of the moral relation with the primordial public, while underlining the amoral relation with the civic public: “Every day Kenyans gather to organize weddings and funerals. They contribute money. They
form committees, and appoint treasurers to keep the money. This money is seldom if ever stolen. We do not hear that a funeral or wedding did not take place because the treasurer took off with the money. (…) This is the primordial public—scrupulously honest and conscientious. This in the country with arguably the most corrupt state in the world. Same people.”
Ndii illustrates that there are two publics in Kenya with different moral values related to them. Nevertheless, a critical perspective on the theory is missing in the article. In other words, his article has no intention to falsify Ekeh’s theory, but seems more to inform the reader of the existence of the theory.
Although without referring directly to Ekeh, other scholars writing about Kenya did touch upon the same topic of morality as Ekeh. In this regard Lonsdale (2020) writes about Kenyans’ experience of ethnicity as the “first tutor in “moral economy”—by which is meant that arguable
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ethnicity—however mixed its origins—is the community in which we first learn how to compete as social beings, in which we are the most anxious for our reputation (p. 126).” Implicitly, he
agrees with Ekeh about the existence of a primordial public. Moreover, just as Ekeh, Lonsdale recognizes the profound impact colonialism had on social relations in the country: “The colonial imposition of a modern state created a structure of competition for power that had not existed before. But we must also remember the constant core of ethnic existence, namely, the internal discourses and arguments, as in all societies, about proper social relations:between men and women, the generations, and between rich and poor—in short, about their moral economy.
(ibid.).” This highlights that there is a tension between the colonially invented state and the moral communities operating in it. However, as much as Lonsdale recognizes the moral core of ethnic relations, he does not seem to agree with Ekeh that they are completely overarching: “Arguments from moral economy against selfish wealth, however, are never entirely silenced.
The cultural conflict between stateless moral economy and post-colonial state power remains at the heart of Kenya’s struggle to find its own nationhood (p. 134).” With this he indicates that selfish interests still play a role, and that moral values from one’s primordial public do not overrule all other interests. He sees it therefore as a constant struggle between diverging systems and interests.
Other authors highlighted the same sense of self-interest, where especially Kenyan politicians were blamed for. Wrong (2009) even claims that “crude personal enrichment is camouflaged
in the prettifying colours of tribal solidarity by Kenya’s political elite (p. 60).” Branch (2011)
argues in this regard that the political elites under Kenyatta and Moi succumbed to the lure of wealth, comfort and status and thereby became part of the old establishment, while ignoring the calls for redistribution (p. 17).
Although analysts identified a sense of self-interest among Kenya’s political elite, the problems that Ekeh considers to be a consequence of the two publics, have been witnessed widely in the Kenyan society. Corruption has been thriving in the Kenyan state (Hope, 2014), while tribalism is the political strategy of choice by Kenya’s politicians (Shilaho, 2018). Moreover, it has been shown that governmental power has been used to benefit one’s own ethnic group as well. In this regard the respective tribes of the incumbent presidents in Kenya received many benefits with better hospitals, roads and schools for their provinces as a consequence. For example, under the rule of Daniel arap Moi, a Kalenjin, it was found that small children living in Kalenjin territory were fifty percent less likely to die when compared to other tribes’ infant mortality rates (Brockerhoff & Hewett, 1998). Moreover, adult literacy was 78,1 percent in Bomet, a
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Kalenjin town in the Rift Valley, while this was 16,7 percent in Thika, a predominantly Kikuyu enclave (Wrong, 2009, p. 282). This indicates how one’s own tribal grouping is economically favoured by the ruling elite. Moreover, it seems to indicate that there is truth in Ekeh’s thesis for the Kenyan context.
To conclude, it is clear from previous literature analysis that there are signs that Ekeh’s two publics theory fits the Kenyan society. It seems that the civic public is largely related to in amoral terms. Nearly all analysts agree that corruption has been a menace in Kenya’s government for a long time (e.g. Hope, 2014). However, it remains unclear if there is a moral relation witnessed between the political elite and their primordial public. Since analysts have not convincingly argued that the Kenyan elite is either moral or amoral towards their tribe, this thesis analyses the subsequent elites under Kenyatta and Moi to see if the two publics theory explains their behaviour. In the next chapter it is argued explain why these political elites were chosen, while this research is also further outlined.
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Chapter 4: Research Design
In this chapter, the methodological choices are further discussed. First, the reason to choose for a case study and Kenya’s political elite as a focus point is explained. This is followed by a section where the selection of sources is discussed. Then, the political economy approach that this research employs is explained, while the chapter is concluded by highlighting the limitations of this research.
4.1 Case Study
This thesis is best conceptualized as a case study. A case study is defined by Yin (2009) as “an
empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident (p. 18).” Although this research is not necessarily a contemporary phenomenon, the
description does fit with the aim of this study. Namely, to analyse the behaviour of politicians in a holistic sense. This is also one of the advantages a case study offers. It has been said that a case study allows the questions asked to be answered with a relatively full understanding of the nature and complexity of the complete phenomenon (Pegram, 1999). Another advantage of a case study is that the phenomenon can be studied in its natural setting, which helps generate meaningful and relevant theory through actual practice and understanding (ibid.). This is also the goal for this research.
The research conducted is a case study for Kenya. There are two reasons for choosing this country. First of all, as already mentioned in the previous paragraph, a lot of the problems Ekeh identifies are witnessed in Kenya. Corruption has been a persistent problem in Kenyan society throughout the years (Hope, 2014) and tribalism has characterised politics and society ever since independence (Shilaho, 2018). Since Ekeh sees both problems as the consequence of his theory, it is a good environment to put his theory to the test. As a second reason, due to a five month internship in Nairobi I also chose to study Kenya out of personal interest.
The specific group that is focused on within Kenya is the political elite. Although only the conduct of a handful of people is studied, out of the millions that have lived in Kenya since independence, there are multiple good arguments why to focus on them. First of all, the conduct of this group is the most well documented. This makes it possible to perform an in-depth analysis of their behaviour. As a second reason, analysing the government can be considered an excellent test for the theory of Ekeh. Namely, since the political elite possesses most power in the Kenyan state, they can easily decide to use this power to their advantage and not for their
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primordial grouping. Therefore, to prove the theory in this environment would ratify it in most instances. This is what Flyvberg (2011) defines as a critical case.
The specific political elites that is focussed on are the elites under the rule of Kenyatta and Moi. The reason these two political elites are chosen to focus on, is that these were the first post-independence elites of Kenya. Since Ekeh’s theory is grounded in colonialism and mostly describes the immediate post-colonial situation, this is also the era where the theory should have the most explaining power for.
4.2 Secondary Data Analysis
The type of research conducted is a secondary data analysis, defined by Bryman (2012) as “the
analysis of data by researchers who will probably not have been involved in the collection of those data, for purposes that in all likelihood were not envisaged by those responsible for the data collection (p. 312)”. The sources used were news articles, books, scientific journals, policy
papers, publications by research centres, statistics gathered by renowned institutes, and governmental publications. The data was gathered mostly through Google Scholar and the online library of the University of Amsterdam (UvA). Books were obtained from the UvA library. To guarantee that the quality of sources was up to par, the writers of used sources have been analysed and their arguments were reviewed. Moreover, different sources have been used for this research, to compare arguments and see if the drawn conclusions are valid. In this way, the quality of this research is assured.
There are multiple benefits to this type of research. First of all, Bryman (2012) notes, that this type of research is based on data sets that are often of extremely high quality, due to the rigorous criteria journals, books, and research centres employ (p. 313). It should be kept in mind however, that there are multiple downsides connected to secondary data analysis. As Bryman (2012) emphasizes, researchers of secondary literature often lack familiarity with the data they are using and the data can be highly complex (p. 315). Moreover, data has already been perceived in a way by the primary researcher, which colours the data and should be accounted for. Being the secondary researcher of data makes me part of the research as well, since my selection of materials influences the way the study is performed. As Lustick (1996) emphasizes: “Most events are consistent with more than one interpretation. One general risk of this method is selective reconstruction of the event to support a favoured theory by underplaying evidence inconsistent with the theory of supporting an alternative (p. 605).” Although it remains difficult
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to overcome this selection bias, since a research involves selection anyway, by justifying the selection of sources this problem has been tackled.
4.3 Political Economy Approach
For this research a political economy approach is taken. A political economy approach is “concerned with the interaction of political and economic processes in a society; the
distribution of power and wealth between different groups and individuals, and the processes that create, sustain and transform these relationships over time (Riley, 2000, p. 237)”. In line
with the political economy approach, Ekeh’s theorizing is concerned with wealth and power distribution between different groups in society, and the processes associated with the construction of these relations. Therefore, in this research the influences of society, politics, and economy are incorporated to study the political elite an to come to an understanding how the two publics theory fits in the Kenyan context.
The specific topics that are focused on are corruption and tribalism, according to Ekeh the two main consequences of the two publics. By describing practices related to corruption and tribalism under the regimes of Kenyatta and Moi, they can be interpreted to see if the dialectic between the civic and the primordial public really is the reason for such behaviour.
4.4 Limitations
The first limitation of this research lies in the fact that Ekeh grounds his theory in primordialism. As already highlighted before, it is a concept that remains scientifically lacking, with unoperationalizable and untestable views (Gil-White, 1999). It is primarily based on feelings that remain to a large extent ineffable. This means that it can never be quantified to what extent someone acts out of primordial sentiment or to what extent an act is self-serving, especially when these overlap. Therefore, the actions of the political elite are analysed while relying on studies of other academics. Moreover, close attention is payed to the reactions of the differentiated primordial publics in regard to the actions of their leaders. This will highlight if the acts of the political elite are perceived as moral to them and will provide an important proxy for the primordial relation.
In the same vein as the moral relation with the tribe is difficult to prove, the amoral relation with the civic public is concealed as well. Tribalism and corruption are by nature covert in Kenyan society. In general, it is widely frowned upon to admit the influence of tribalism on society, making it a taboo noun to use. Wrong (2009) denounces this stance as hypocritical
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since ethnicity is an intrinsic part of Kenyan society (p. 43). Corruption is just as concealed in the country. Although there is a some data on this topic, in general it is not easy accessible and often not quantified. It does make this research more difficult however, since tribalism and corruption remain a murky area to research. It is tried to overcome these limitations by using different commentators, analysts and scholars as sources. Nonetheless, my conclusions will often be based on the interpretation of events by secondary sources.
As a final limitation, the research will show a great focus on the Kalenjin and Kikuyu tribes. Since these were the respective tribes of Moi and Kenyatta, this choice seems justified. Nevertheless, that is not to disregard all the other tribes in Kenya and the influence they had on the country, but given that the other tribes were mostly not part of the political elite as defined in this study, makes them less emphasized throughout this thesis.
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Chapter 5: The Pre-Independence Context of Kenya
In this chapter some context is provided for the pre-independence situation of Kenya to understand the later situation in the country under the rule of Moi and Kenyatta. Since a large part of this study is aimed at analysing the relation between tribes and the political elite, it first needs to be outlined what the Kenyan tribes are and how they formed. Moreover, the constructed nature of tribes is highlighted to emphasize that they are not the static units the British envisioned tribes to be, but remain subject to change. This is followed by a contextual analysis of the political situation leading up to independence, to highlight how tribes took centre stage in politics.
5.1 The Background of Tribes in Kenya
In the post-colonial Kenya of Kenyatta and Moi, there were more than 40 officially recognized tribes. One of the most dominant tribes in this era were the Kikuyu who attributed to roughly 20% of the Kenyan population (Leys, 1975). Together with their closely related Bantu tribes, the Embu and Meru, they constituted 25% of the population. The other big tribes in Kenya were the Luo (13%), the Luhya (14%), the Kalenjin (12%) and the Kamba (11%) (Ajulu, 2002). The post-colonial identity of all tribes in Kenya was largely shaped by the colonial rule of the British. In pre-colonial Kenya, ethnic identities could be understood as ‘fluid, permeable, overlapping and complex’ (Berman, 1998; Lynch, 2006). When the British colonized Kenya, they found it difficult to understand and manage a population that did not identify with a country. The belief among the British was that Kenyans belonged to a tribe, just as Europeans to a nation, with a neatly bounded structure that formed a homogenous entity (Berman, 1998, p. 320). Therefore, tribes were used as the administrative and political units to overcome these problems. Based on language, social institutions and customary laws, tribes were formed among the population.
Moreover, the British decided that tribes should live in their own territories. Their policies allocated tribes to different reserves, in which the land was owned by the community. This segregation in reserves was a highly disruptive event with the past. Precolonial communities usually competed for as much land as they could maintain, with only sections of ethnic groups, not the whole ethnic group, that competed for it (Lonsdale, 2020, p. 126). Therefore, the policies installed by the British solidified the grounds of tribes. This made the Kikuyu’s home Central Province, the Luhya lived in Western Province, the Luo resided in the Lake Victoria area, the
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Kamba lived in Eastern Province, and the Kalenjin inhabited the Rift Valley2. By prohibiting trespassing on grounds not owned by one’s tribe even further aggravated the division between ethnic communities.
However, the arbitrary segregation in tribes did not grasp the full complexity of these social formations. The British wrongly believed that people belonged to tribes. The opposite was even true; tribes were often created to function within the colonial framework (Parsons, 2012, p. 67). For example, the Meru tribe was formed out of five closely related subgroups and four slightly more distinct communities. Similarly, the Kikuyu started out as a ‘diverse collection of pioneer immigrants’ in which Kikuyu referred more to agricultural expertise than a bounded tribe (ibid., p. 71). Especially the creation of the Luhya and Kalenjin has often been attributed to colonialism. The Luhya are considered to be an ethnic group created by colonial anthropologists, missionaries, and administrators, that originally consisted of 16 distinct tribes (Ndegwa, 1997). It was the combination of reasonable cultural similarity with colonial administrative convenience and the Luhya’s own sense of need for wider levels of organization that caused them to unite (Southall, 1970, p. 320). In a similar vein the Kalenjin found their origin. Originally, the Kalenjin consisted of many sub-groups like the Nandi, Kipsigis, Tugen, Marakwet, Pokot and others, that were by no means an aligned entity (Lynch, 2011). Lynch (2006) emphasized that the Kalenjin were not even regarded as a single tribe in the 1940’s. Only in the 1960’s the tribe became a self-recognized ethnic group that formed itself out of political necessity, since they could exert more influence as one grouping.
The creation of tribes by colonialism was therefore a complete break with the past. Consequently, it also had its effects on society as Lynch (2006) highlights: “the process of
cataloguing, demarcating and administering Africans as members of supposedly bounded ‘tribes’ often helped foster a sense of ethnic consciousness, whilst it also encouraged Africans to think and act ethnically (p. 236).” Nevertheless, since these ethnic identities were for a large
part invented, they were often still a rather empty shell. Ranger (1994) notes in this regard that the tribe “formed bounded walls, but without content. It was all very well to write of (…) ‘the
Kikuyu’, but to give meaning to that identity was a much more complex and contested business.”
Therefore, given that the structure was largely new, it created the avenues to mould and
2 Although the other tribes also had their own territories, for this thesis these are the most important to be
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renegotiate the perception of it. I therefore argue that this provided space for post-colonial politicians in Kenya to shape ethnic identities for their own interest.
5.2 The Emergence of Tribalism in Kenyan Politics
Leading up to independence in Kenya, the struggle for post-independence leadership took place between different opposing factions. In this section I will outline how this struggle evolved and show how tribal interests took centre stage in Kenyan politics.
The first anti-colonial struggles in Kenya find their origin in the early 1920’s when different ethnic factions opposed the rule of the British for their own interests. It was only in the years after World War II that various struggles against colonialism resulted in a nationalist anticolonial movement, the Kenya African Union (KAU), which formed the ‘political home for the urbanised, proletarianised and educated sections of society’ (Ajulu, 2002, p. 256). However, the internal unity of this grouping was not as strong as it looked, since the created image of a united movement did not take into account the dissension within it (Mutie et al., 2015, p. 55). This was because the anticolonial movement was in essence a coalition of different ethnic big men with opposing interests. It proved to be an indication for the later political struggles in the country. As Ajulu (2002) highlights, since the foundation for a national political organisation was lacking, the already entrenched nature of tribal associations was bound to be the predominant feature of political organisations (p. 257).
As a result, when the British removed all restrictions on political parties a surge in regional, ethnic and clan based political organisations was witnessed in the country (ibid.) In this sense, ethnic identities were immediately constructed as instruments of negotiating access to national state power. However, since no Kenyan tribe accounted for the majority of the population, it was necessary to draw on the support of at least two or three communities to win the general elections (Cheeseman et al., 2020, p. 7). Therefore, the parties jostling for the president’s office had to refrain from making exclusively ethnic appeals. Moreover, it made it necessary to form coalitions that established the practice of ethnic bloc voting.
As a consequence of the mixed ethnic nature, the two contending parties in the first elections had a nationalist character, but were driven by tribal interests. First there was the Kenya African National Union (KANU), a coalition of the Kikuyu, Luo, Kamba and sections of Luhya that came forth out of the former KAU (Ajulu, 2002, p. 257). In practice however, KANU was mostly a Kikuyu-Luo elite alliance that was led by Jomo Kenyatta, a Kikuyu, with a Luo, Oginga Odinga, as the second man. Opposed to KANU was the Kenya African Democratic
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Union (KADU), a coalition of smaller tribes with the Kalenjin and some minority Luhya communities in it (Mati, 2019, p. 9). One of KADU’s main incentives to form was established out of fear to lose land if KANU became dominant. It was expected that a KANU dominance would result in land being disproportionately shared among sympathizers of this alliance. Therefore, they advocated for Majimboism, a federalist division of the country, in which local autonomy would be maintained in regional assemblies (Branch, 2011, p. 13). Eventually in 1963, KANU won the first national elections. This caused most members of KADU to abandon their party and join the leading party, according to Ajulu (2002) in search for patronage opportunities.
As it shows, ethnicity gained credence as a political strategy upon independence. Given the way society was structured during colonialism, this was a logical response. With ethnic identities ingrained in the lives of Kenyans, it proved to be the most feasible way to gain an electorate. Still, it should be emphasized that campaigning along ethnic lines was in fact a strategy and based on calculated decisions. As Shilaho (2018) argues, in the formative stage of Kenya’s state, nationalism was still a force Kenyans identified with. This is highlighted by the election of Tom Mboya in the East Constituency of Nairobi in 1961, which proved that not all voters were swayed by an ethnic logic. Mboya, a Luo, won the elections from dr. Munyua Wayaiki, a Kikuyu, while 67% of the voters were from Kikuyu origin. This made Shilaho (2018) conclude that Mboya was elected based on an evaluation of his leadership qualities and not his ethnicity. Nevertheless, over the years tribalism grew in strength. In the next chapters I argue that it was a calculated decision by the political elite to follow this strategy, since ethnic politics secured the support of their constituency. It was an instrumental usage of tribal sentiment that only served the political elites cause. Therefore, tribalism in this sense was used as a ploy or distortion that was used to conceal the exploitative role of the elite (Mefeje, 1971). To demonstrate this, the next two chapters examine the rule of Kenya’s first president Jomo Kenyatta and Kenya’s second president Daniel arap Moi who used tribalism for their personal economic and political profits.
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Chapter 6: Kenya’s first President: Jomo Kenyatta (1963-1978)
In this chapter, it is explained that under the rule of Jomo Kenyatta ethnicity was mostly instrumentalized for the political elite, to keep a hold on power and gain economically from it. First, the political elite under Kenyatta’s rule is described. Here it is highlighted how the elite predominantly favoured the Kikuyu. Nevertheless, only a certain part of the Kikuyu community was favoured by the political elite, at the expense of the majority of the tribe, which is also explained. This is followed by a section in which the political elite’s tactics to foster the primordial heritage are identified as self-serving, after which it is demonstrated how the elite enriched themselves through land allocation.
6.1 Kenyatta’s Political Elite
After Kenyatta ascended to the presidency in 1963, aged 72, the power of the state was at first shared with the Luo community. Vice-president Oginga Odinga and Secretary-General Tom Mboya were prominent Luo spokesmen in the government. Kenyatta’s first cabinet consisted of 23,5% ministers of Luo origin and roughly 30% of his Kikuyu kinsmen (Khapoya, 1980). Nevertheless, as Mutie et al. (2015) notes, the Luo were mostly discriminated against. After this led to a break between the Kikuyu and Luo factions, the Luo lost their favoured position in government. With the Luo out of the cabinet, Kenyatta effectively colonised state power with his Kikuyu kinsmen (Omolo, 2002). Allegedly, Kenyatta told ministers complaining about the favoured position of his kinsmen: “My people have milk in the morning, your tribes the milk in the afternoon (Wrong, 2009, p. 51).”
Leys (1975) summarized the most important actors in Kenyatta’s later cabinet. He made the distinction between an inner and an outer court. The inner court consisted of a small group of politicians from Kenyatta’s home district Kiambu who were, not coincidentally, mostly part of Kenyatta’s family. The inner court consisted of his brother-in-law Mbiyu Koinange, who was the Minister of State in the President’s office; Njoroge Mungai, Kenyatta’s cousin and Minister of Foreign Affairs; and Charles Njonjo, the Attorney-General. As Leys notes, it was rare for Kenyatta to travel or appear without one of these three men (p. 246). The outer-court were ministers who were also well connected to Kenyatta, but not as close as the earlier mentioned ministers. They showcased two distinct elements: they were either a Kikuyu, Embu or Meru leader, or they were the leader of one of the three tribes allied with the Kikuyu, like Daniel arap Moi, the Kalenjin leader who would later become Kenyatta’s successor. The outer court controlled other important ministries like Defence, Finance and Planning, Local Government,
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Lands and Settlements, etcetera. Still, the non-Kikuyu ministers were usually less influential, where it was noted that Moi’s function as Vice-President was largely ceremonial (Omolo, 2002). Moreover, within the Kikuyu community, the greatest power was in the hands of men from Kiambu, a small area of Central Province.
In the lower echelons of government, the same Kikuyu trend was witnessed. Many scholars have commented on the way Kikuyu’s were favoured in their access to governmental jobs, loans and state investments (Ajulu, 2002; Omolo, 2002; Branch, 2011; Shilaho, 2018). Kenyatta even increased the number of people employed by the government between 1965 and 1969 with 6% per year to facilitate more Kikuyu to enter in these well paid jobs (Leys, 1975, p. 249), As a consequence, two-thirds of the senior civil service jobs were allocated to Kikuyu (Throup, 2020). Therefore, during Kenyatta’s rule, Central Province and its inhabitants were clearly better off than other provinces although it should be noted that the Kiambu area profited the most (Cheeseman & Branch, 2006).
Still, I contest that a primordial loyalty from the Kikuyu elite towards their wider Kikuyu community should be seen as the reason for the relatively advantaged role the Kikuyu had under Kenyatta. In the next section I will underline why Kenyatta’s elite was not the protector of a wider Kikuyu interest but mainly profited a small elite. Especially the land policies under Kenyatta were there to protect the interest of the political elite, which I will firstly highlight in the next section.
6.2 The Division of Land under Kenyatta
In this section, a closer look is taken at the issue of land under Kenyatta’s regime. First, the colonial allocation of land will be explained, after which the subsequent postcolonial policies of Kenyatta are outlined. Second, the position of the former Mau Mau rebellions under Kenyatta is discussed, in which it is argued that Kenyatta did not show loyalty to these fellow tribesmen. Moreover, the politicians who defended the case for the Mau Mau and other landless Kenyans were fiercely resisted by the government. Lastly, it is highlighted how Kenyatta and his cronies were the prime beneficiary of the division of land in the postcolonial situation.
6.2.1 The Origin of Kenyatta’s Land Policies
The land policies under Kenyatta were directly related to the land issues that arose during colonialism. As earlier mentioned, tribes were under colonialism allocated to their own territories. Especially in the Kikuyu reserve this tribal segregation was perceived to be
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problematic. The Kikuyu population was placed in a reserve that was too small for its increasing amount of people, and therefore land was highly contested. Where it was in pre-colonial times possible to negotiate with neighbouring communities for land, colonialism made this practice impossible (Leys, 1975, Wrong, 2009). Moreover, much of the land the Kikuyu previously owned was taken by the white settlers, who grabbed the fertile grounds around Nairobi. This had multiple consequences. First of all, since many Kikuyu could not own land it provided the incentive to become active in the settlers’ economy. By adapting to the new customs of the British, the Kikuyu population became one of the best integrated communities in the colonial economy of Kenya. Many Kikuyu were employed on the farms of white settlers, while others moved to Nairobi to try their luck (Wrong, 2009, p. 105-106). Some even started businesses in as far the oppressor allowed it (Leys, 1975, p. 200). As a result, by the beginning of the 1960’s the Kenyan bourgeoisie was mostly Kikuyu (ibid.).
However, only a small portion of the Kikuyu really profited from the colonial rule. Grievances remained among Kikuyu squatters and slumdwellers, who were still not able to own land. This eventually culminated in the Mau Mau rebellion, a revolt in the 1950’s that was a reaction from the poor, primarily Kikuyu, for their deprivation of land. However, the Kikuyu close to the government were opposed to the Mau Mau and fought with the British Home Guard. This made the Mau Mau Rebellion essentially a civil war between Kikuyu factions that did and did not profit from the British rule (Harbeson, 1971, p. 233).
Eventually, the Mau Mau Rebellion proved to be the advent towards independence. However, after independence the redistribution of land proved to be far from fair. First of all, it happened at the expense of other communities for the benefit of the Kikuyu. Namely, Kenyatta stated in the independence negotiations that the Kikuyu must be allowed to take up land in the Rift Valley, an area that was mostly regarded by the Kalenjin, Maasai and other tribes living in this area as rightfully theirs. The general thought among them was that after the colonialists left, their tribesmen could take back the lost land. Nevertheless, the reality proved completely different. After Kenyatta allowed other tribes to buy the white settlers’ land, it led to a huge invasion of Kikuyus in provinces that were formerly non-Kikuyu, and made Odinga dub these acts as ‘reckless land grabbing’ (Mutie et al., 2015). As Wrong (2009) described this Kikuyu dominated process: “Borrowing money from Kikuyu banks and Kikuyu businessmen, tapping
into the expertise of Kikuyu lawyers, the president’s fellow tribespeople rushed to buy the land of the departing whites (p. 112).” In total, 45 percent of the land sold in this period was
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6.2.2 The Deprived Mau Mau
However, not all Kikuyu people profited from the land resettlement schemes. After independence was achieved, land for the landless proved not to be a priority for the new government. Especially Kikuyu leaders most affiliated with the Mau Mau fighters saw it as a commitment of honour that they should be granted a piece of land, since they shed their blood for the country (Leys, 1975, p. 214-215). Nevertheless, the political elite supported the capitalist accumulation of land and by doing so abandoned any moral obligations towards their fellow Kikuyu without land. Especially ironic in this context, is that the Kikuyu who profited from the land resettlement scheme, were primarily the collaborators of the British regime the Mau Mau fought against (Wrong, 2009). Since all land was sold and not freely distributed, the Kikuyu on the side of the Home Guard had the funds to acquire these plots, while the former rebellions could only watch this practice unfold.
Furthermore, any concessions Kenyatta made to the Mau Mau insurgents came forth out of political considerations. In this regard, Branch (2011) interpreted Kenyatta’s concern with the former Mau Mau fighters as solely a concern with his own position: “Kenyatta feared driving
such groups (meaning former Mau Mau insurgents) into the forest where he would lose control of them. From there, in his nightmares, the discontented Kikuyu could join up with unhappy junior rank-and-file in the armed forces or some other such militant section of Kenyan society. ‘In any case, even without the army link they would, if driven underground, be poised to assassinate ministers and senior public servants (p. 90).” This accentuated that although from
the same tribe, any solidarity from Kenyatta or his elite with the Mau Mau was not witnessed. Out of fear for a new revolt, Kenyatta tried to please the Mau Mau in some way, which should not be interpreted as tribal solidarity.
6.2.3 The Opposition Against Kenyatta’s Land Policies
Given Kenyatta’s disregard of the poor Kikuyu community members, there were multiple Kikuyu politicians who advocated for them. However, since such politicians were seen as a threat to the power of the ruling elite they were opposed by Kenyatta and his men. For example, Bildad Kaggia, a Kikuyu former Mau Mau fighter and a political ally of Odinga in his struggle for the free distribution of land, was a politician who advocated for the poor. In an infamous speech, Kenyatta made fun of Kaggia for not having any land to show for his independence struggle, while fellow Kikuyu politicians gained great wealth (Shilaho, 2018, p. 73). As a result, Kaggia was deemed highly unpopular among his fellow Kikuyu politicians since he refused to
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exploit his ethnicity to enrich himself and associated himself with an ‘uncircumcised Luo’ like Odinga (ibid.). Since he was never able to garner wide support for his visions, the ruling regime never felt seriously threatened by him.
However, where Kaggia only got ridiculed, other Kikuyu politicians opposed to Kenyatta’s policies awaited a more deadly fate. Josiah Mwangi Kariuki, an extremely wealthy Kikuyu landowner and junior minister in Kenyatta’s government, became an opposing force against the political elite, due to his criticism towards the political leaders of not being good ‘Big Men’ (Cheeseman & Branch, 2006). His criticism was based on the elite’s neglect of their responsibility to support the advancement of others, where he was especially critical of the distribution of land by the political elite. He found “the ownership of vast tracts of land by individuals, while thousands of others were without land, socially and morally unjust and unacceptable (Branch, 2006, p. 108).” These beliefs made Kariuki a strong voice in the public debate. Lynch (2008a) even remarked that he was a part from Kenyatta the only politician who had grassroots supporters all over the country, mainly due to his large contributions in all districts of Kenya. Given the threat Kariuki posed towards the ruling elite, it was no wonder that Kariuki was eventually assassinated. Although never explicitly proven, his murder is widely regarded to be ordered by Kenyatta’s political elite (Lynch, 2008a).
6.2.4 The Profiting Elite
The criticism of Kariuki expressed a wider sentiment in the country, since the political elite became extremely wealthy from the land resettlement schemes at the expense of the ordinary Kenyan. Although it remains hidden to what extent Kenyatta himself profited from the land resettlement, there is no doubt that his family and the predominantly Kikuyu governmental elite hugely gained from it. Kenyatta’s wife, brother and close governmental allies, like later presidents Daniel arap Moi and Mwai Kibaki, all gained large pieces of land under this act (Kamau, 2009). Branch (2011) highlights that Kenyatta allegedly bought new farms for himself and his relatives on each trip to Nakuru (p. 103). Most of the land the Kenyatta family therefore has nowadays, was acquired in the 60’s and 70’s. One estimation of the total family property claims it to be approximately 500.000 acres, about the size of the Nyanza province (Angelo, 2019, p. 262). Questions have been asked about the legality of these transactions, where it has been found that the president grossly abused his power to attain these properties (Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, 2013). Especially wry in this context are the millions of
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Kenyans, among them many Kikuyu, that remain landless, while the Kenyatta family became the largest landowner of the country (Slye, 2017, p. 286).
Given the apparent disregard of the wider Kikuyu community, one would expect that the support for Kenyatta would diminish. As the popularity of Kariuki at the end of Kenyatta’s rule illustrates, this sentiment was most certainly witnessed. However, due to the strategic usage of ethnic sentiment over the years, Kenyatta’s elite maintained their position of power, which I will further explain in the next section.
6.3 The Fostering of Ethnic Sentiment Among the Kikuyu
In this section I will go back to the beginning of the Kenyatta years and highlight how Kenyatta and his allies strategically used ethnic sentiments among their Kikuyu kinsmen to maintain their hold on power over the years. I discuss multiple instances when Kenyatta’s government was under threat but used tribal solidarity to strengthen their rule. Most noteworthy in this regard was the assassination of Tom Mboya, an astute Luo politician that caused politics to become further ethnicized. This is followed by a section where I discuss the practice of oathing, a Kikuyu ritual that was abused by the political elite to maintain loyalty of their Kikuyu kinsmen.
6.3.1 The Assassination of Tom Mboya
The assassination of Tom Mboya finds its origin in the struggle for power between different factions within the leading KANU party. At first, Mboya was on the side of Kenyatta and his men, that were against the socialist ideals of the group around Oginga Odinga. Odinga, who was then the Vice-President of Kenya, was by Kenyatta’s allies seen as a threat to their hold on power, since his ideals of redistribution were creating an alternative political power base not reliant on ethnicity (Shilaho, 2018). The influence of the Kikuyu clan proved strong enough to bully Odinga out of the leading party in 1966.
With Odinga out of the leading party, Mboya became the prime Luo politician within KANU. Nevertheless, for the Kikuyu politicians, Mboya was another threat from Luo side. Rising in ranks and with the ability to amass supporters from a wider grouping than solely his Luo constituency, made him the prime candidate for Kenyatta’s succession (Shilaho, 2018). The assassination of Tom Mboya in 1969 served the Kikuyu elite around Kenyatta therefore well. According to the US state department the murder was also orchestrated by Kikuyu ministers close to Kenyatta (Branch, 2011, p. 83).
