Mumbai at the Seine?

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Master of Arts Thesis

Euroculture. Society, Politics and Culture in a Global Context.

University of Groningen, the Netherlands University of Deusto, Spain

June 2017

Mumbai at the Seine?

Lieux de Mémoire and a Transnational Memory of Terrorist Attacks.

Submitted by:

Katja Nadine Vöhringer Student number Groningen: 3024709 Student number Bilbao: 99911975 +4915785784903 / k-n-v@web.de

Supervised by:

Prof. Dr. Clemens Six, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen Dr. Aitor Ibarrola, Universidad de Deusto

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MA Programme Euroculture

Declaration

I, Katja Nadine Vöhringer, hereby declare that this thesis, entitled “Mumbai at the Seine?

Lieux de Mémoire and a Transnational Memory of Terrorist Attacks.”, submitted as

par-tial requirement for the MA Programme Euroculture, is my own original work and ex-pressed in my own words. Any use made within this text of words of other authors in any form (e.g. ideas, figures, texts, tables, etc.) are properly acknowledged in the text as well as in the bibliography.

I declare that the written (printed and bound) and the electronic copy of the submitted MA thesis are identical.

I hereby also acknowledge that I was informed about the regulations pertaining to the assessment of the MA thesis Euroculture and about the general completion rules for the Master of Arts Programme Euroculture.

Signed

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Je suis Paris.

Well-known and widely shared phrase on social media after the attacks on Paris in 2015. The original message was posted by Joachim Roncin on Twitter after the terrorist attack

on the Charlie Hebdo publishing office on the 7th_{January 2015 and said “Je suis Charlie”.}

He claimed that it is a synonym for “I am free” and “I am not afraid”.

We are all Mumbaikars now.

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1. Introduction

“Our stories always contain average, ordinary people. They are the most unsuspecting victims of all.”1

- D.J. Weaver

Watching the trailer of the film The Attacks of 26/11, a film about the terrorist attacks on Mumbai in 2008, can induce an understanding of how a whole society can become a victim of a terrorist attack. During the two-minute long trailer many people can be seen running away from the site of the terrorist attacks. They want to flee the place of terror and want to see themselves and their loved ones in safety. The close-up view of a little girl who is crying at the sight of a victim, who seems to be lying dead on the floor, is especially moving. The audience is virtually taken to several places, there seems to be chaos everywhere. People are running, yelling, screaming, and are desperate to get far away from this life-threatening situation. It becomes clear that the whole city of Mumbai,

with around 22 million dwellers, is suffering from shock.2 The dimension of a whole city

being under attack is also accommodated in the first few seconds of the trailer, when two sentences are shown to the audience. “Never in history of mankind, a more terrifying event than the attacks of 9/11 happened. But in their sheer audacity the attacks of 26/11

on Mumbai were far more shocking.”3_{Of course this is the point of view from an Indian}

filmmaker and is not representative in general, but it illustrates how Indians perceived the attacks on Mumbai. While the attacks of 9/11 might have killed more people, 2996 to be precise, the attacks of 26/11 resulted in a mutual feeling of being under attack which all

residents of Mumbai shared, everyone could have been killed by the perpetrators.4 In no

way is it the aim of this master thesis to determine which attack was worse. Without doubt, both, 9/11 and 26/11 have brought shock and anxiety to the surviving people. However, this comparison depicts that for three days during the Mumbai Attacks the

1_{D.J. Weaver, “Victims,“ Goodreads, accessed 30 September 2016,}

http://www.good-reads.com/quotes/tag/victims.

2_{Indiaonlinepages, “Population of Mumbai,” Indiaonlinepages, accessed 30 September 2016,}

http://www.indiaonlinepages.com/population/ mumbai-population.html.

3_{The Attacks of 26/11, DVD, directed by Ram Gopal Varma (2013; India: Alumbra Entertainment, 2013).} 4_{Statistic Brain, “9/11 Death Statistics,” Statistic Brain, accessed 30 September 2016,}

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6 whole city was in a state of emergency and it is very like that every inhabitant felt vic-timized and affected by the terrorist attacks. Yet, this unique feature of 26/11, as it has been highlighted in the quote from the trailer, was repeated during the attacks on Paris in 2015. The audacity of the perpetrators followed the same behavioural pattern as 26/11 and it is due to this fact, that it was claimed that the attacks followed the “Mumbai-style-scenario”.

Perhaps better than any other nation, the people of India can understand what France

went through during and after the selective terrorist attacks in Paris on the 13th November

2015. This is the case because the attacks are similar to the Mumbai Attacks 2008 in many ways. Several public places were attacked, making every inhabitant a potential victim and the special forces had to make sure that the respective cities, Mumbai and Paris, would not fall into chaos.

This research intends to offer the reader the possibility to understand how the attacks of 26/11 and Paris 2015 unfolded and how afterwards, despite the shock people suffered, the society continued to exist and overcame the insecurity and trauma of being a victim of foreign forces in their own country. The reader will understand how especially the media are conditioned by these incidents and what kind of influence the media can have on the identity-shaping processes. Additionally, s/he will be able to evaluate for him-self/herself the similarities and differences between 26/11 and the attacks on Paris 2015. The importance of collective memory is the central concern in this research. It seems as if, especially in a time of crisis, a collective memory is of importance to a society in order to return to the normality of daily life and to process the horrors of a terrorist attack.

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7 Nora invented the lieux de mémoire as a tool to remind the French nation of their identity, this thesis will question whether the lieux de mémoire can also be applied on a transna-tional level. Nora’s argument is that because a nation has a common memory through common places, myths, happenings, institutions, etc., they also share a common identity. This argument will be delved into throughout this research. The two case studies of the terrorist attacks on Mumbai and Paris show that, because the terrorist attacks are very similar, India and France experienced a similar situation and, therefore, they were com-pelled to develop a common memory and a common identity. The hypothesis is that, because terrorist tactics are becoming more similar all around the world, the memories that people share of these attacks become similar as well. This leads to a deeper under-standing and sympathy amongst the people of different countries and a common memory develops. For this reason, one needs to consider whether the concept of lieux de mémoire is just applicable on a national level. The fact that all around the globe people experience similar terrorist attacks, which results in similar memories, should also lead in the end to a shared common identity and therefore this thesis suggests that lieux de mémoire can be transferred to a global level.

This research will argue that terrorist attacks should be considered as lieux de mémoire. Further, this thesis will ask whether the terrorist attacks may not only be seen as lieux de

mémoire on a national level (every nation deals with its own terrorist attacks and develops

an identity as being a victim) but also whether the concept of lieux de mémoire can be applied on a transnational level (when a terrorist attack happens, then people from all around the world develop lieux de mémoire). Thus, the research holds the hypothesis that because terrorist attacks become more similar all around the globe, the memory of the people becomes similar as well and, as a result, they develop transnational lieux de

mé-moire for terrorist attacks. Furthermore, the research puts terrorism into a triangular

rela-tionship with transnational memory and lieux de mémoire. The media and their influence on the public form the center of this triangle. Scholars, for example Peter Waldmann, described terrorism as a communication strategy to the media. While this research sup-ports this theory, it further puts media and terrorism in a broader context and concludes that both have a significant influence on the long-term memory of people.

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8 will be described and by the end of this thesis it will become evident that the terrorist attacks manifest as lieux de mémoire within a society. In the discourse of academic papers this research can be considered as an addition to Pierre Nora’s work. While Nora origi-nally coined the concept of lieux de mémoire to strengthen national identity, it will be argued that if the concept of lieux de mémoire is applied on a transnational level, it does not only strengthen national identity, but also enforces a feeling of unity between nations. This means that transnational memory has the effect of decreasing geographical distances by letting people from Europe and India come together in their shared memory of the victims and have a collective identity with regard to experiencing terrorism.

The final question that this thesis attempts to clarify is why the case studies of 26/11 and the Paris Attacks 2015 have been chosen as empirical examples. In a later chapter, both attacks will be examined and it will become clear that both followed the same pat-tern. The victims experienced similar traumas and for this reason the lieux de mémoire of both attacks can be compared to each other. The main hypothesis of this research is: A common identity is developed globally because people share similar experiences after terrorist attacks. Therefore, a transnational memory is established when it comes to ter-rorist attacks. A transnational memory, for the purpose of this thesis, means that a memory is shared across borders of at least two nations.

The main theory this thesis is grounded in is the theory of lieux de mémoire by Pierre Nora, although the theory is taken out of the national context and transferred to a trans-national sphere. While this is the main theoretical framework, the definitions discussed in this analysis are based on work of a wide range of scholars. Empirical material will be elaborated on to analyze how lieux de mémoire have manifested within the society. The thesis analyzes the European Day in Remembrance of Victims of Terrorism, the movies

The Attacks of 26/11 and Taj Mahal, and newspapers in order to understand how the

respective terrorist attacks were perceived in Mumbai and Paris but also how the respec-tive other country viewed the other attack.

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2. The Triangle

2.1. Terrorism / Transnational Memory / Lieux de mémoire

While there is a wide range of academic debate on the concept of lieux de mémoire, ter-rorism and transnational memory, there seems to be a gap in the literature when it comes to setting them in correlation with each other. This master thesis suggests that the three concepts stand in a triangular correlation with each other, like it can be seen in Figure 1.

Figure 1: The triangular relationship between terrorism, transnational memory and lieux de mémoire. The first corner of the triangle are the lieux de mémoire by Pierre Nora who argues that because a social group has experienced similar happenings in the past, they share common traditions, a common memory and a shared identity. Nora states that the social group is a nation but this thesis takes a slightly different approach. Because terrorist strategies be-come more similar, which the two case studies of Mumbai 2008 and Paris 2015 will show, people have experienced similar traumas even though they do not live in the same coun-try. This leads to similar ways of remembering the attack, a common memory develops and an identity is shared amongst the people of Paris and Mumbai. The shared identity is based on the fact that both populations had to endure terrorism and have become victims of violence from which they can hardly protect themselves. This means that lieux de

mé-moire and terrorism are connected since terrorist attacks internationally have come to

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10 Terrorism is not a new phenomenon, although it received a new depth of academic,

political, media and public attention after the attacks of the 11th_{of September 2001. Philip}

Bobbitt, director of the center of National Security of the Columbia University, claims that terrorism is a part of globalization because the international system, the economy and the politics got more open. A result was reduced power of states, the movement of capital and people and the opening of borders worldwide. This created new possibilities for rorists who wanted to change the established order and after 9/11the phenomenon of

ter-rorism experienced a new wave of attention.5

Despite the new attention towards the phenomenon of terrorism, it is still difficult to define the term. This is the case because a definition of terrorism will never be free of the

interests and perception of the person who defines the term.6 Definitions are always

de-pendent on the viewer but when it comes to terrorism, the influence of the person who defines the term seems to be of unprecedented importance. The actions of the Lebanese Hisbollah, of the Palestinian Hamas, of the Spanish ETA or the Irish Republican Army are defined as terrorism but simultaneously some may view the same actions as struggle

for freedom.7 Therefore, the definition of terrorism cannot be objective. The decision to

label a certain act of violence as an act of terrorism is dependent on the view of the be-holder or on the time and place the definition was made. Furthermore, the lack of an all-embracing definition of terrorism can also be explained by examining the historical de-velopment: Throughout the long history of terrorism, there was never only one kind of

terrorism, but instead several variations that co-existed.8_{The only thing that seems to be}

common amongst all attempts to define terrorism is the fact that the definitions all include the components of violence in some way and the wish to change the current situation of

a society.9 Nevertheless, this is not precise enough and for this reason, this research will

5_{Philip Bobbitt, Terror and Consent. The Wars for the Twenty-First Century (London: Penguin Books,}

2008), 62.

6_{Holger Kaschner, Neues Risiko Terrorismus – Entgrenzung, Umgangsmöglichkeiten, Alternativen}

(Wies-baden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2008), 29.

7_{Gregor Hain, Die Sicherheit und Stabilität Indiens. Historische, politische und wirtschaftliche}

Herausfor-derungen (Baden-Baden: Namos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2015), 63.

8_{Hendrik Meyer, Terror und Innere Sicherheit – Wandel und Kontinuität staatlicher}

Terrorismusbekämp-fung (Münster: Institut für Politikwissenschaft und Graduate School of Politics, 2006), 21-22.

9_{Mario Petri, Terrorismus und Staat. Versuch einer Definition des Terrorismusphänomens und Analyse}

zur Existenz einer strategischen Konzeption staatlicher Gegenmaßnahmen am Beispiel der Roten Armee Fraktion in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (München: Martin Meidenbauer Verlagsbuchhandlung,

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11 not attempt to solve the dilemma surrounding a definition of terrorism and instead will take the European and Indian definitions of terrorism as a basis.

India has its own definition of terrorism, which can be found in the Prevention of

Ter-rorism Act (POTA). POTA was adopted in 2002 by the Indian Parliament and granted

several institutions special rights to prevent terrorist attacks. Due to a high controversy about these rights, POTA was canceled in 2004. Still, the written definition of terrorism demonstrates, that the Indian government understands terrorism as an explicit political direction or religious motivation and therefore terrorism is seen as a universal threat

against the state and its inhabitants.10 The exact wording is:

Whoever, with intent to threaten the unity, integrity, security or sovereignty of India or to strike terror in the people or any section of the people in India or in any foreign country, does any act by using bombs, dynamite or other explosive substances or inflammable substances or firearms or any other lethal weapons or poisons or noxious gases or other chemicals or by any other substance (whether biological or otherwise) of a hazardous nature, in such a manner as to cause, or likely to cause death of, or injuries to any person or persons or loss of, or damage to, or destruction of, prop-erty or disruption of any supplies or services essential to the life of the community in India or in any foreign country or causes damage or destruction of any property or equipment used or intended to be used for the defence of India or in the connection with any other purposes of the Government of India, any State Government or any of their agencies, or detains any person and threatens to kill or injure such person in order to compel the Government of India or the Government of a foreign country or any other person to do or abstain from doing any act, commits a terrorist act.11

Terroristic actions can be aimed against the state, against a social group, another religious group or another caste. The means and arms of a potential terrorist act are mentioned. Therefore, the Indian definition has to be adapted regularly to recent developments if it claims to be concrete and relevant. Looking at the Mumbai Attacks 2008, it becomes clear that the attacks fulfill the criteria of a terrorist attack according to this definition. The Paris Attacks 2015 fulfill the criteria as well. Moreover, the definition states that the state government cannot act in terrorist ways. This means that for the Indian government ter-rorism is executed by non-governmental parties and state terror is explicitly excluded.

The European Union (EU) has also defined the crime of terrorism. This definition was agreed upon by the Parliamentary Assembly. According to this definition, terrorism is

any offence committed by individuals or groups resorting to violence or threatening to use violence against a country, its institutions, its population in general or specific individuals which, being

10_{Anthony Hauninger, Moderner Terrorismus. Definition, Motiv, Rechtfertigungen (Saarbrücken: VDM}

Verlag, 2007), 195.

11_{Without Author, “Indian Unlawful Activities Prevention Amendment Act, Act No 29, 2009,“ in Der}

Begriff des Terrorismus im Völkerrecht – Entwicklungslinien im Vertrags- und, Gewohnheitsrecht, ed.

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tivated by separatist aspirations, extremist ideological conceptions, fanaticism or irrational and sub-jective factors, is intended to create a climate of terror among official authorities, certain individuals or groups in society, or the general public.12

This definition differs from the Indian approach since it does not mention exact tools or ways to execute a terrorist attacks. Both, the Mumbai 2008 and Paris 2015 attacks are, according to the European definition, terrorist attacks.

After this explanation of terrorism within the two different contexts, the third corner of the triangle, transnational memory, will be analyzed. Because terrorism is becoming more similar with regards to the strategies used, people may sympathize more with each other and as a consequence a transnational memory is developed. For example, when the terrorist attacks on Paris happened, the people of Mumbai knew what it feels like to be in this situation because it happened to them too. The attacks on Paris are memorized by them because they feel like they share the same fate.

2.2. The Flaw of the Triangle: Transnational Memory

Why is it important for a society to build a common memory and what are the disad-vantages of a collective memory? The proposed concept of a triangular relationship con-cerning lieux de mémoire, terrorism and transnational memory is now analyzed from the aspect of memory. The concept of memory has shortcomings, for example it is subjective and a common memory excludes certain groups. To minimize these flaws, the concept of memory is explored and it will be analyzed what influences memory had on public be-havior after the Mumbai Attack 2008. At the end of this chapter the reader will be aware that while the concept of memory may be flawed, it is suitable for the triangle concept. Furthermore, it will become evident that transnational memory is a relevant aspect of the triangle.

Why would a society want to collectively remember that it has been a victim of a terrorist attack? Would it not be easier to forget? The feeling of a collective victimhood can help to overcome the stress, vulnerability, uncertainty and fear which an attack can

cause.13 For this reason, a sense of community is of importance to overcome a trauma

12_{Council of Europe, “European democracies facing up to terrorism,” Document Recommendation 1426}

(1999), accessed 30 March 2017, http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=16752&lang=en.

13_{Daniel Bar-Tal et al., “A sense of self-perceived collective victimhood in intractable conflicts,”}

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13 caused by terrorism. In the book Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity the authors describe that

[…] when members of a collectivity feel they have been subjected to a horrendous event that leaves indelible marks upon their group consciousness, marking their memory forever, and changing their future identity in fundamental and irrevocable ways […]14

then a cultural trauma is apparent. Significant in the context of this research is that this definition of cultural trauma is also valid for the lieux de mémoire. The Lieux de mémoire were developed because a past event has shaped the memory of that group forever and it further changed their future identity. Moreover, the definition of cultural trauma demon-strates that trauma is produced when they have been subjected to a cruel and violent act. Terrorist attacks evidently fit into this category. Hence, terrorist attacks can be the reason that a society develops lieux de mémoire. When a whole social group suffers, it is

natu-rally difficult to grasp this feeling.15 One way to memorize this suffering are the lieux de

mémoire by Pierre Nora because they let a society come together and be aware of its

history. Therefore, a way to overcome the shock is a collective memory. What are the disadvantages of this framework of analysis?

In the empirical cases this research will analyse, the Mumbai and Paris Attacks 2008 and 2015, a collective memory without doubt meant something positive since it helped the respective society to handle the fact that they have been a collective victim of a ter-rorist attack. Still, it has to be defined who is meant by “the respective society”. One example could be that “the respective society” are citizens affected by the trauma. How-ever, as will become clear in the following analysis, certain groups are excluded from the “respective society”.

For example, in the case of the Mumbai Attacks 2008, the respective society was con-stituted by Hindu people in India, especially in Mumbai. The Muslim population was set apart because they were subjected to additional pressure. Kudlip Nayar, a political com-mentator pointed out:

14_{Jeffrey C. Alexander et al., Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity (California: University of California}

Press, 2004), 265.

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At the moment, Muslims are feeling very insecure. They have always felt as if they were under suspicion for all attacks on India […] In every terror attack in the past, Indian Muslims were sus-pected to have played some role, so now with a clear Pakistan hand emerging in the Mumbai attacks, the Muslims are reiterating that Indian Muslims are united and they had never supported terror acts.16

In the aftermath of 26/11, Indian Muslims demonstrated solidarity with their fellow In-dian citizens and spoke out against the attacks. The apparent need to state their condem-nation of such attacks shows that they did not feel or were perceived of as part of the collective. Otherwise it would have been clear that they did not support the attacks. De-spite the fact that they were Indians, they had to defend themselves due to their faith, which they “shared” with the terrorists. During rallies, for example the 5.000 march by Indian Muslims in Mumbai in December 2008, Indian Muslims held placards that read “Our Country’s Enemies are Our Enemies,” “Killers of Innocents are Enemies of Islam,”

and a few believed “Pakistan Be Declared Terrorist State.”17 This behavior signifies an

important act of self-defense in India, which was rooted in tensions that were felt between the country’s 140 million Muslims and 900 million Hindus. Propaganda and strife in the past has led to a vicious and generalized construction of the image of the own and other

group, which strengthens prejudices.18 This can lead to discrimination of the other group,

in this case the Muslim people. The Hinduvta movement is supporting a concept that aims to make India a Hindu state. Hinduvta argues that the Hindu people have a common his-tory and that Muslims, Christians, Jews, etc., who also live in India, do not fit into this heritage. In the case of Muslims in India and the 26/11 attacks, long-term problems in Indian society and politics became increasingly evident.

Muslims face wide spread discrimination in India often. For instance, Muslim Indians often feel like they have to prove that they are “Indian”. After the attacks this evidently got even worse, now they had to show that they are not “Muslim terrorists or Pakistani sympathizers.” Moreover, Muslim Indians generally face more social, economic and ed-ucational problems than other ethnic groups in India. Only 11% of the Indian population are Muslims, and yet 40% of the prison population are Muslims. Furthermore, they face discrimination when it comes to housing, get lower bank loans, occupy less than five

16_{Bappa Majumdar and Krittivas Mukherjee, “Muslims in India are under pressure, post-Mumbai,”}

Reu-ters, accessed 19 April 2017, http://www.livemint.com/Politics/EXKzVcpqsu62NDJiP0YJ6I/Muslims-in-India-are-under-pressure-postMumbai.html.

17_Ibid.

18_{Gyanendra Pandey, Routine Violence. Nations. Fragments. Histories (Delhi: Permanent Black, 2006),}

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15 percent of governmental jobs and are more likely to be illiterate or to suffer from an

in-ferior infrastructure.19_{These are all examples of how the Muslim population is not}

con-sidered part of the “respective society” and is therefore excluded when it comes to the collective memory after the Mumbai Attacks 2008. While the Indian Constitution is com-mitted to equality amongst its citizens and refers to the United Nations Declaration on

the Rights of Persons Belonging to National, Ethic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities

and their conviction that ensuring minority rights lessens tensions and promotes peace within a society, the Sachar report of 2005 states that the Indian Muslim population is disadvantaged in most aspects of life. This report shows, for example, that Muslims in

India are labeled “anti-national” and at the same time “appeased”.20_{They are under}

con-stant suspicion to work for the ISI, a Pakistani secret service, and due to social boycott

some had to leave their home region and migrate to other parts of India.21 The Sachar

report gives a detailed overview of the situation of Muslims in India and the overall sum-mary is that “the perception of being discriminated against is overpowering amongst a

wide cross section of Muslims resulting in collective alienation.”22_{This means that in fact}

there are two societies within the Indian society. The “respective society” in the case of 26/11 is understood as being the Hindu population and not the Muslim society.

The Mumbai Attacks 2008 had negative consequences for Muslims in India not only on a personal level but they also impacted attempts of reconciliation between India and Pakistan. These have started in 2003 and stopped after the attacks. India postponed all secretary levels talks on trade. Additionally, the cricket tour of Pakistan and the meeting of Indian Pakistan Joint Commission on Environment were cancelled. Furthermore, visa

regulations were restricted.23

These evidently discriminatory practices and sanctions on a personal but also interna-tional level show that Hindu-Muslim relation got worse after the attack. Lieux de mémoire which manifested after the attacks can be observed through, for example, the marches

19_{Wajahat Ali, “Indian Muslims: Defining their Loyalty After Mumbai Attacks,” The World Post, accessed}

01 November 2016, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/wajahat-ali/indian-muslims-defining-t_b_151320.html.

20_{Prime Minister’s High Level Committee, Cabinet Secretariat, Social, Economic and Educational Status}

of the Muslim Community of India (New Delhi: Sacher Report, November 2006), accessed 22 April 2017,

http://mhrd.gov.in/sites/upload_files/mhrd/files/sachar_comm.pdf.

21_Ibid. 22_Ibid.

23_{Umbreen Javaid, “The Mumbai Terror ‘2008’ and its Impact on the Indo-Pak Relations,” Sout Asian}

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16 that took place. The lieux de mémoire might have intensified the apparent divide since they increased the feeling of “we against them”. While the collective memory might have helped the respective society to handle their trauma, it also further divided the society itself since some people were excluded from it. This is without a doubt a negative aspect of the lieux de mémoire. The collective memory in this case is the memory of the Hindu population and illustrates how they experienced the terrorist attacks and the aftermath. The Muslim society partly had a different experience. While they were naturally affected by 26/11 as well, in the aftermath they were subjects to further exclusion of the overall Indian society. The collective memory has to be contested because while it might reflect what the Hindu society experienced, it does not include the experiences of the Muslim population.

Additionally, the concept of memory has to be questioned. (Collective) Memory is contextual, historical and it fragments moments. Therefore, it can only be understood in a larger context. What does this mean? To consider events, for instance the attacks of 26/11, as separate from their context, fragments the memory. When this happens it should be asked whose interests this serves and who defines what is included in a memory. In the present case the collective memory was mostly defined by Hindu people and this served the Hinduvta ideology since non-Hindus were excluded or at least disadvantaged. It is often in the interests of a certain group or community that certain occasions, again

here the example of terrorist attacks, are remembered in a particular way.24_{For example,}

the officials who died while trying to capture the terrorist are seen as heroes in the context of the attacks. This leads to another problem of memory. Collective memory is condi-tioned by selective remembering. Generally, it can be said that in history certain people or events are remembered by the collective while others are forgotten. Repressing

mem-ories for a long enough period of time can lead to their complete erosion.25 This in turn

makes it difficult to understand memory in a larger context. Nevertheless, memories should be understood in a larger context to become aware of the catalyst and conse-quences of the happenings. During the past 100 years secular, liberal and left-wing

24_{Alon Confino, “Collective Memory and Cultural History: Problems of Method,” AHR Forum, accessed}

01 November 2016, http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/cross_fac/ehrc/events/memory/confino_collec-tive_memory_and_cultural_history.pdf.

25_{The Telegraph, “Selective memory does exist, say scientists,” The Telegraph, accessed 02 November}

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17 rians in India have worked to construct an unified, standardized and undifferentiated

In-dian history.26_{As a consequence of this uniform memory the basis for extremist groups,}

in this case Hindu groups, was built. This leads to more separation and discrimination amongst Hindus and Muslims in India. These groups do not acknowledge Muslim people as being part of the Hindu society. Understanding the memories of the Mumbai Attacks 2008 in a larger connected context would mean that it has to be acknowledge that the Hindu-Muslim relations within India are very often problematic but that Muslims never-theless are part of India as equal citizens.

Until now it has been shown that the concept of memory has to be problematized and that in the context of 26/11 a collective national memory does not exist in practice. The mentioned collective memory in this case is shaped by the Hindu population and excludes the Muslim society. If it is not even possible to get a coherent collective memory within India, how is it then possible to define transnational memory as one of the columns of the triangle? Transnational memory means that more than one country shares a memory of a certain event with another country. In the case of this master thesis this means that more than one country share lieux de mémoire about 26/11 and the attacks on Paris 2015. The initial idea was to prove that all nation share common lieux de mémoire when it comes to both terrorist attacks. However, if the concept of memory is complicated on a national level then it is probably even more complex on a global level. Within this chapter and the Mumbai Attacks 2008 I have made a distinction between the collective memory, which was defined by the Hindu population and the separate collective memory of the Muslim population, which included constant discrimination. The idea is to also divide the trans-national memory into two parts. The first one is the global transtrans-national memory. This would mean that nations from all around the world indeed share the same memories con-cerning the terrorist attacks and developed lieux de mémoire about them. The second one is the regional transnational memory. This would mean that not all nations have devel-oped lieux de mémoire concerning the attacks but a tendency for regional lieux de

mé-moire is visible. For example, it is likely that the European states and North America

developed lieux de mémoire after the attacks on Paris since this transatlantic sphere is traditionally strong connected concerning politics, economics and culture. This means that people are “closer” together and therefore feel that they share a common fate.

26_{Gyanendra Pandey, Routine Violence. Nations. Fragments. Histories (Delhi: Permanent Black, 2006),}

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2.3. The Triangle: The Influence of Media

When it comes to reporting terrorist attacks the media play an important role. Hence, they have to be considered in the triangle relationship of terrorism, transnational memory and

lieux de mémoire. This chapter highlights the connections of terrorism and media.

Within western industry nations, before 9/11, terrorist strategies were mainly used by

ethnic minorities with autonomous or separatist objectives. Examples are the activities of

the North Irish and the Catalan and Basque. Another example is the movement of the 2nd

of June or the Red Brigade, which aimed for a social change within their respective coun-tries.27

Between 1970 and 2014 those terrorist groups and groups similar to them killed 5.380 people throughout 12.593 attacks. The worst year was 1979 when more than 800 terrorist attacks took place in Europe. Since then the amount of attacks has decreased. Islamic terrorist groups are, compared to the above-mentioned groups, a new phenomenon. Among the 12.593 terrorist attacks in the last 45 years, 54 were caused by Islamic terrorist groups. Nevertheless, it seems that when they attack they are more deadly than the attacks of the nationalist or separatists. While they are responsible for only 0,5% of all the attacks, they killed 5,6% of the 5.380 victims.28

Thus, the kind of terrorism caused by nationalist and separatists seems to have been replaced by a more international and more brutal kind of terrorism. The first attack of this new kind took place in 1993 when a pickup truck filled with dung and diesel fuel crashed into the World Trade Center. Further, the perpetrators of the Aum-Shinri-Kyp-cult estab-lished a new dimension of terror when they released the poisonous gas sarin in an

under-ground station in Tokyo in 1995. Ten people died and 5.000 were heavily injured.29

The attacks on New York and Washington on the 11th September 2001 were therefore

not completely unexpected. Experts were well aware of the capabilities terrorist had ac-quired, but it was unexpected in the way the attacks were executed. The death of the terrorists was planned as part of the act. This new strategy meant to be a directed massacre (not only a political signal), the damage concerning property but also people is intended

27_{Dieter S. Luetz, “Was ist Terrorismus? Definitionen, Wandel, Perspektiven,“ S+F Vierteljahresschrift}

für Sicherheit und Frieden Jahrgang 20, Heft 1 2002: 5.

28_{Hannes Munzinger and Katharina Brunner, “So hat sich der Terror in Europa verändert,“ Süddeutsche}

Zeitung, accessed 04 April 2017, http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/terrorismus-wie-sich-der-terror-in-europa-veraendert-hat-1.2746323.

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19

to increase tremendously and the perpetrators are well connected amongst each other and

can therefore attack worldwide.30_{The aim to cause more damage is justified through the}

fact that the more damage is caused, the bigger the media attention will be for the attack. Terrorist organizations use the media coverage to create panic, spread fear, make the peo-ple aware of their economic loss and make them loose confidence in their current gov-ernment and its ability to protect its citizens.31 Nowadays each terrorist attack has to es-tablish itself against many other events and because it is possible to get news from all over the world, the terrorist attack has to be the worst possible kind, otherwise the media are unlikely to report about it. The more media attention the attack receives, the more supporters the terrorist group will gain for future attacks.32 Therefore, the mass media play an important role when it comes to the development of terrorism and the damage they achieve.

Professor and expert on the field of terrorism, Peter Waldmann argues that it is not the main aim of terrorists to kill as much people as possible but rather to communicate their aims to as many people as possible. Louise Richardson, a professor at Harvard University, is also convinced that it is not the aim of terrorists to defeat the enemy but to send a message. This message usually has a symbolic significance, for example, Osama bin Laden’s reference to the Twin Towers in New York City as “icons” of U.S. “military and

economic power."33_{The anarchists of the 19}th_{century called this “propaganda of the}

ac-tion”. Waldmann phrased it in more neutral way and called it “communication strategy”. The media play an important role since they can transfer the symbolic message of the

terrorist act to as many people as possible.34 This means that in the terrorist’s view the

terrorist act was only successful if the victimized country got their message and acts ac-cordingly. It also means that the media play a relevant role in the execution of terrorism

für Sicherheit und Frieden Jahrgang 20, Heft 1 2002: 6.

31_{M. Neelamalar, P. Chitra and Arun Darwin, “The print media coverage of the 26/11 Mumbai terror}

attacks: A study on the coverage of leading Indian newspapers and its impact on people,” Journal Media

and Communication Studies (2009): 95.

32_{Mario Petri, Terrorismus und Staat. Versuch einer Definition des Terrorismusphänomens und Analyse}

zur Existenz einer strategischen Konzeption staatlicher Gegenmaßnahmen am Beispiel der Roten Armee Fraktion in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (München: Martin Meidenbauer Verlagsbuchhandlung,

2007), 27.

33_{Louise Richardson, What Terrorists Want. Containing the Threat (New York: Random House, 2006),}

71.

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20 and its aftermath. They spread the message of the terrorists and are for that reason vital to them. They also shape the ways in which the attacks are remembered.

The importance of media when it comes to terrorism should not be underestimated. Thus, the concept of the triangular relationship between terrorism, transnational memory and lieux de mémoire has to be complemented with the influence of media. Because they do have a central role, they are in the center of the triangle, as seen in Figure 2.

Figure 2: The triangular relationship between terrorism, transnational memory and lieux de mémoire completed through the influence of media.

Terrorism is a communication strategy which is transferred through media to the society. While the media transfer the message of the terrorists, they also shape how a terrorist attack is remembered and they therefore shape the transnational memory of the terrorist attack. The already mentioned examples of lieux de mémoire have also shown that they can appear in the form of media or at least the media can shape the development of lieux

de mémoire. It is apparent that media are a central aspect of terrorist activities and how

they are remembered.

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report-21

ing certain terrorist attacks. Through reporting, the media store, archive and create

mem-ories.35_{If a regular TV program is not stopped from reporting live from the scene, then}

the terrorists get the media attention they wanted to reach further supporters and to get their message spread and at the same time the terrorist attack becomes part of the “nor-mal” viewer’s memory. This is why, for example, Benjamin Netanyahu and Margaret Thatcher strongly opposed the idea of reporting terrorist acts and preferred them to not be reported. They argued that “the media is the oxygen of terrorism” and that “if a tree falls in a forest and no one is around to hear it, it would not make a sound.”36

The internationalization of terrorist groups started in the late 1960s. Members of the terrorist group PLO kidnapped an Israeli airplane and forced it to land in Rome. The media coverage was unprecedented and because of that people from all around the world became aware of the situation of Palestine refugees and the demands of the PLO. This strategy was used again by the PLO during the attack on the Olympic Games in Munich in 1972 and soon other terrorists adapted this new method. For the first time terrorist attacks were committed in countries which were not involved in the conflicts, which guar-anteed a wider media coverage. Terrorism evolved into a global problem.37 This also meant that people from countries who were not affected by this terrorist attack remember the attack and the message that was spread.

Terrorism is a communication strategy and to get the media “to listen” the opponent has to be provoked, panic has to be spread. The terrorists aim to generate an overreaction of the opponent, which in turn would make the terrorists look like victims and lead further supporters to join the terrorist group. The terrorist act itself consists of three elements: 1. The terrorist act by violence or the threat of a potential terrorist act, 2. A strong emo-tional reaction by the opponent group, which feels threatened, and the supporters, who feel spitefulness and 3. Consequently, to these emotions terrorist acts are supposed to trigger certain behaviors, such as protection and vengeance measures or the support of

the terrorist group.38 According to the terrorists, a terrorist attack is successful if three

35_{Joanne Garde-Hansen, Media and Memory (Edinburgh: Edinburgh Scholarship Online, 2011), 51.} 36_{Zohar Kampf, “News-Media and Terrorism: Changing Relationship, Changing Definitions,” Sociology}

Compass (2014): 2.

37_{Anthony Hauninger, Moderner Terrorismus. Definition, Motiv, Rechtfertigungen (Saarbrücken: VDM}

Verlag, 2007), 29.

38_{Eugen Walter, Terror and Resistance. A study of Political Violence (New York: Oxford University Press,}

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22 kinds of groups are included: the terrorists, the victims and the people to whom the ter-rorists want to transfer their message.

Terrorists are satisfied with a limited amount of victims since it is their main aim to spread their message to the rest of the people. The victims are just means to an end, a way to get the attention of the rest of the population. Therefore, terrorism can also be defined as a special case of provocation. Sociologist Rainer Paris defined provocation as “a de-liberately surmounted, surprising norm break, which should lead the others into an open conflict and lead to a reaction that morally discredless and unmasks him, especially in the

eyes of others.”39_{If, socially as well as politically, people do not react to such a}

provoca-tion, then the aim of the provocation failed. However, past terrorist attacks have shown that avoiding a reaction seems to be impossible. The purpose of a provocation is to un-mask the enemy. The terrorists try to intimate a change of roles. If the attacked enemy reacts to the terrorist act and attacks the terrorists, a change of role happens, from the victim to the attacker and vice versa. Dr. Abdul Aziz Rantisi, member of Hamas, said “You think we are the aggressors. That is the number one misunderstanding. We are not;

we are the victims.”40

The place where the terrorist attack takes place is also relevant for the question whether the message of the terrorists will be heard or not. For example, in Columbia, a country that is shaped by violence perpetrated by guerrilla groups, a terrorist attack might get less attention than the terrorists plan to get. Because western countries are mostly not used to violence anymore a sudden outburst of violence gets a lot of attention. Big, modern cities are targets in particular since they are giant places, in which a disruption of the normal

order instantly becomes a media spectacle.41

Waldmann also argues that the problem in reporting terrorist attacks lies in the fact

that when news are spread, they mostly concern the perpetrators and not the victims.42 As

a consequence the message of the terrorists is further spread and the victims, who are mostly not mentioned by name but are diminished to a number of people who died, be-come the method. The higher the number the people who died, the higher is the media

39_{Rainer Paris, “Der kurze Atem der Provokation“, Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie}

41 (1989), 40.

40_{Louise Richardson, What Terrorists Want. Containing the Threat (New York: Randon House, 2006), 44.} 41_{Lee Eubank and Leonard Weinberg, “Does Democracy encourage Terrorism?”, Terrorism and Political}

Violence 6 (1994) 4, 426.

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23 attention by the rest of the population, which the terrorist use to get their message spread. The amount of people killed is therefore relevant to the terrorist only in the sense that they want media attention.

To get the names and personalities of the victims known seems to be an effort, which the French population took on after the attacks on Paris in November 2015. While the news focused on the terrorists and their aims during the attack, in the aftermath people placed great emphasis on honoring the victims. The monuments which were built had the names of the victims engraved. The newspaper Le Monde published a homepage where photos of the victims can be seen and a text of describing their personalities is published

by their loved ones.43 Through this effort of changing the emphasis of media coverage

from the attackers to the victims, the attempt to not let the media be a communicator for the terrorists becomes evident. Therefore, the media only serve as a communication tool for the terrorists in a limited manner. However, history has shown that this is rarely hap-pening since the news want to report everything they can to gain as many viewers as possible.

This chapter has argued that the media play a central role in the triangle concept be-cause they can influence how a terrorist attack is remembered. In the following chapters the theoretical framework will be applied on the case studies of 26/11 and the attacks on Paris in 2015.

43_{The website can be found here:}

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24

3. Mumbai 2008

“Some of them were not dead yet, you could hear the sounds of their last moment. We had to step over those people to move ahead.”44

- Unknown

As mentioned, the thesis argues that terrorism, transnational memory and the lieux de

mémoire stand in a triangular relationship. This chapter will look at two aspects of the

triangle. First, terrorism will be further examined through a detailed analysis of the Mum-bai Attacks 2008. A clearly laid out comparison between 26/11and the Paris Attacks 2015 can be seen in table 1 on page 39. Afterwards, public reactions to the attacks and how the media responded will be discussed. As will become evident, the findings support the above mentioned arguments on the influence media has on the production of memories.

3.1. Timeline of the Attack

On the 22nd or 23rd November 2008, ten Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorists (LeT – “Army of

Righteous”) hijacked an Indian fishing boat and murdered the whole crew. With the aid

of the boat the terrorists were successful in arriving in the southern part of Mumbai.45

They were heavily armed with guns, grenades and bombs. The group then divided itself

into smaller groups, consisting of two or three people.46

On Thursday the 26th November 2008, Mumbai was attacked at ten different locations.

Amongst others, these places were the Leopold Café, the Taj Mahal hotel, the Tower hotel, the Cama and Albless hospital near the Metro cinema, the Chhatrapati Shivaji Ter-minus / Victoria TerTer-minus railway station, Fiat taxis in Wadi Bundar and Vile Parle and the Chabad-Lubavitch Jewish center in Colaba. Within a short time, there were up to 17

explosions, attacks perpetrated with guns and attacks which included hostage-takings.47

44_{Fareen, “Survivor Stories,“ FireFly Daily, accessed 21 March 2017,}

http://www.fireflydaily.com/these-survivorstories-from-the-2611-mumbai-attack-will-give-you-goosebumps/.

45_{C. Christine Fair, “The 2008 Mumbai Attack”, in The Evolution of the Global Terrorist Threat. From}

9/11 to Osama bin Laden´s Death, ed. Bruce Hoffman and Fernando Reinares (Columbia: Columbia

Uni-versity Press, 2014), 582.

46_Ibid.

47_{Hein G. Kiessling, ISI and R&AW – Die Geheimdienste Pakistans und Indiens. Konkurrierende}

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25 A detailed sequence is depicted in Figure 3. According to the police, 171 people were

killed by the terrorists and 239 injured.48_{That this scenario is relevant to jihadism today}

is obvious. In August 2014 two young German Muslims preached about the “Mumbai scenario” in the Al-Rahman-Mosque in Aachen, Germany. They asked the religious com-munity, what would happen if they would have a similar opportunity to attack in hotels, trains, at train stations and highlighted how easy it would be to organize such an attack

since authorities are helpless in fighting their cause.49 This illustrates that there is a

trans-national memory on the side of the terrorists. While the Mumbai Attacks happened in India, the events are relevant for potential terrorists in Germany and other countries since they function as a role model for potential future attacks. The ten perpetrators of Mumbai were not related to the potential perpetrators in Germany yet they share a common refer-ence point – the attacks on Mumbai in 2008.

The perpetrators of the Mumbai Attacks were all arrested or killed by the police by the

29th November. Nine out of the ten perpetrators were killed during attempts to capture

them. Ajmal Amir Kasab was the only one who could be captured and was given a trial afterwards. He was accused of killing 166 people and injuring 304 people during the attacks. In 2012, he was sentenced to death and was hanged in Yerwada Jail in Pune. The

execution was the first in India since 2004 and only the third one in the past 20 years.50

Figure 3: Timeline of the Mumbai Attacks 2008.

48_Ibid.

49_{Bruno Schirra, ISIS. Der globale Dschihad. Wie der “Islamische Staat” den Terror nach Europa trägt}

(Berlin: Econ Verlag, 2015), 302.

50_{Jason Burke, “Mumbai terror attacks: surviving gunman hanged in India,” The Guardian, accessed 06}

September 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/nov/21/mumbai-terror-attacks-gunman-hanged. Train station Boat hijacked Chabad Center Leopold Cafe 22nd/23rd Nov. 26th Nov. 21:15 21:20 21:24 21:35 22:15

Trident Oberoi Hotel

Taj Mahal Palace & Tower Hotel

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26

3.2. Assassins and Reasoning

The group Deccan Mujahideen claims to be the organizer of these attacks. Deccan is the Hindi name for South and it refers to the Deccan Plateau, a region in South India.

Muja-hideen means Struggle in Arabic and is used by militant groups referring to fighters or

terrorists.51 The fighters were all in their early 20s and spoke both Hindi and Urdu, the

national languages of India and Pakistan. Before the attacks on Mumbai in 2008 the group was not known to security analysts. The scope of the attacks leads officials to doubt that the Deccan Mujahideen committed the crime. Rather, it is assumed that the well-known LeT group, an Islamic extremist group, which has already carried out more attacks in

India, was behind the attacks.52 It is their aim to establish an Islamic State in South Asia

and to “free” the Muslims living in the Indian region of Kashmir. Further, it is the aim to

reunite Kashmir and Pakistan since mostly Muslim people live in Kashmir.53 LeT’s

head-quarter is situated in Muridke, Punjab, thirty kilometres from Lahore. Furthermore, the organization has offices in all major cities in Pakistan. These offices aim to recruit people

as well as gain financial supporters.54 The recruiters tend to be better educated than the

average Pakistani, most of the jihadists made contacts with the LeT on a college campus.

They are in their late teens or in their early twenties.55 Jihad can be separated into two

separate kinds of jihad. The greater jihad is the inner struggle of every person to live according to sharia (Allah’s will for humanity as it is written down in the Quran). In addition to sharia, Muslims should follow hadith (the sayings and actions of the

proph-ets).56 The lesser jihad contains war with the aim that all Muslims can live under rulers

who follow sharia.57 This is what students on campus were recruited for. For non-Muslim

people jihad is often translated with “holy war”.58_{A fighter who dies during jihad is a}

51_{William Sherman, “Who are the Deccan Mujahideen? Attacks bear al Qaeda hallmarks, but so far no}

link,” Daily News, accessed 02 September 2016, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/deccan-muja-hideen-attacks-bear-al-qaeda-hallmarks-no-link-article-1.334125.

52_{Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium, “Deccan Mujahideen,” TRAC, accessed 02 September}

2016, http://www.trackingterrorism.org /group/deccan-mujahideen.

53_{Randall D. Law, Terrorism. A History (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016), 330.}

55_{Ibid., 579.}

56_{Randall D. Law, Terrorism. A History (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016), 272.} 57_{Ibid., 273.}

58_{Souad Mekhennet, Claudia Sautter and Michael Hanfeld, Die Kinder des Dschihad. Die neue Generation}

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27

witness, also called shahid. They are idolized by other jihadists.59

LeT emerged as the military wing of the Markaz Daawat ul Irshad, which was founded

in 1986 by two Pakistani engineering professors.60_{The ISI, a Pakistani secret service,}

supported the LeT for a long time through providing training. Until today, analysts are

convinced that Pakistani intelligence agencies are supporting LeT.61 Pakistan has raised

and supported jihadi groups for a long time to secure external and internal security

objec-tives.62 In 2001, Pakistan banned LeT due to rising tension with India. This happened as

a consequence of two attacks carried out by LeT. One took place in the regional legisla-ture in Indian Kashmir and almost forty people died as a result. The second one occurred at the Indian parliament in New Delhi, where eight policemen and one gardener were killed. India accused Pakistan of sponsoring terrorism. People from all around the world feared that a war between the two nuclear-powers could start, however Pakistan conceded

and consequently forbade the terrorist group.63

Yet, because the LeT is still functioning and executing attacks on and in India, the peace process between India and Pakistan have been undermined continuously. The In-dian point of view is that Pakistan is protecting the group in case its abilities are needed later onwards in a war against India. At the same time, Pakistani officials are pointing out the fact that the LeT has become independent of the government (specifically the ISI)

because it has become socially accepted due to its pro-Kashmir cause.64

Encounters with the LeT mostly follow the same pattern. The well trained and highly motivated fighters attack the enemy on their own territory. The attacking group consists of a small number of people but is successful in killing and taking hostages within a short

time. The battles often last more than 20 hours.65 The attacks on Mumbai 2008 were

similar to previous attacks by LeT. It seemed as though the primary targets (e.g. the Cama and Albless Hospital, the Chabad Centre, the Taj Mahal Hotel) were carefully selected beforehand, while other places of attacks (e.g. the taxis) were selected by the way because

59_{Jan-Heiner Tück, Sterben für Gott – Töten für Gott? Religion, Martyrium und Gewalt (Freiburg im}

Breis-gau: Verlag Herder GmbH, 2016), 11.

60_{Ibid., 576.} 61_{Ibid., 577.} 62_{Ibid., 571.}

63_{Randall D. Law, Terrorism. A History (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016), 330.}

64_{Ian Talbot, Pakistan. A New History (London: C.Hurst & Co (Publishers) Ltd., 2012), 43.}

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28 they were easy targets. All the targets had little or no security services and consisted explicitly of civilians. The luxury hotels are a sign of India’s wealth, the Leopold Cáfe is frequently visited by young Indians and tourists and the train station is a daily passing

point for lower- and middle-class Indians going to work and going back home.66 All

tar-gets were therefore likely to be packed with people which increased the likelihood of killing a large amount of people.

Mumbai was selected as the target city by the LeT for several reasons. Firstly, Mumbai is a rich city and it is estimated that 14 million people live there, which makes it the third biggest city of the world. Secondly, Mumbai is the financial centre of India. Third, it is famous for its massive film industry and an opulent lifestyle. The inhabitants have a lib-eral and westernized lifestyle. Fourthly, the city is very cosmopolitan. Fifthly, media cov-erage on Mumbai is well established. Sixthly, the city is the home of the Shiv Sena or-ganization, a hindu-national party. And finally, Mumbai has always been the center stage of Hindu-Muslim tensions. For example, in December 1992 und January 1993 around 900 people were killed due to a conflict which arose after the destruction of an antique mosque by Hindus because they claimed the mosque was built upon the birthplace of

Lord Ram.67

The Mumbai Attacks 2008 served several goals. The LeT wanted to assure that the group is capable of attacking India on a large scale, gain further financial supporters and jihadists through that. The prevention of peace proceedings between Pakistan and India,

which should have taken place, were also an aim.68 The overall aim of freeing the

Mus-lims in Kashmir and annex Kashmir to Pakistan was also a reason for attacking Mumbai.

3.3. Reactions to the Attack

The aftermath of 26/11 included widespread reactions among politicians and media. It will be analysed through the following examples to what extent these reactions shaped the memory of the terrorist attack itself.

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29 3.3.1. Politics

The attacks of 26/11 naturally had political dimensions. Since the diplomatic relationship between India and Pakistan has always been tense due to the fact that both countries claim that the region of Kashmir is part of their national land, the terrorist attack had an even worse effect on the relationship between both countries and it seemed, for a short time, that they would go to war with each other. In reaction to the terrorist attacks on Mumbai 2008, more than one million Indian and Pakistani troops built-up at the Line of Control (LoC) of Kashmir. Internationally, fear that an India-Pakistan war would start but this

time also with nuclear weapons, increased continuously.69 After ten months, the Indian

troops left the LoC because the Indian government under Premiere Minister Manmohan Singh decided to not let the conflict escalate even though there was evidence that the LeT terrorists were educated in two camps close to Muzaffarabad in Azad Kashmir and

Kara-chi by ex-members of the Pakistani military.70 Furthermore, David Coleman Headley, a

US citizen with Pakistani roots, testified after he had been captured that he travelled to India five times, observed important places and then gave this information to the LeT.

Moreover, the LeT has established a network in Mumbai since August 1999.71 This made

it easier for the group to attack the city since it had extensive knowledge about structures within Mumbai. David Coleman also said that the Pakistani secret service Inter-Services

Intelligence (ISI) helped the LeT with the preparations of the attack on Mumbai.72_In

addition, the ISI planned to accuse al-Qaeda of carrying out the attacks and invented proof for this, so that LeT would not be in the focus of investigations. In the end, LeT declined that “help” and saw the attacks as an easy way to attract attention and find new supporters

due to the worldwide media attention.73

The relationship between India and Pakistan has always been highly influenced by the topic of terrorism but at the same time the expectations of both parties to improve the situation, has also been very low. Due to the attacks on Mumbai 2008, the issue of Islamic

69_{Subrata K. Mitra, Politics in India. Structure, process and policy (New York: Routledge, 2011), 8.} 70_{Hein G. Kiessling, ISI and R&AW – Die Geheimdienste Pakistans und Indiens. Konkurrierende}

Atom-mächte, ihre Politik und der internationale Terrorismus. (Berlin: Verlag Dr. Köster, 2011), 276.

Uni-versity Press, 2014), 580f.

72_{Hein G. Kiessling, ISI and R&AW – Die Geheimdienste Pakistans und Indiens. Konkurrierende}

Atom-mächte, ihre Politik und der internationale Terrorismus (Berlin: Verlag Dr. Köster, 2011), 279.

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30 and Pakistani terrorism in India rose to higher levels of attention once again but the

prob-lem was not expected to be solved.74_{Pakistans Prime Minister Gilani promised to}

inves-tigate the accusations of Director-General of ISI helping LeT to execute the attacks on

Mumbai.75 The results claim that the ISI was not connected to the terrorist attacks on

Mumbai.

3.3.2. Media

LeT has conducted many attacks in India, also in Mumbai (numbers vary from a few

dozen to hundreds of attacks), but none has received as much media attention as 26/11.76

The intensive media coverage by the Indian media produced increasing focus on this ter-rorist attacks in international media. All major papers around the world published articles

covering the attacks.77 The media play an important role when it comes to remembering

a terrorist attack. For example, newspaper help to create a common identity within the attacked social group. The Mumbai Attacks 2008 is a good example of the importance the newspaper played when it comes to creating a strong communal feeling of “us”. At the same time, a strong separation from “the other” is communicated. This means that when a society has to endure violence it explains this in terms of a collective agent, “the

other”.78_{These agents are often other social groups.}

Examining newspaper articles published in the days after the Mumbai Attacks, it is visible that the headlines followed a pattern similar to the American newspapers after 9/11. A strong “us against them” feeling was communicated and the role of a victim was taken up. The Times of India titled “It is war on Mumbai.” Other headlines were “Terror

invades Mumbai”, “FEAR” and “Bombed, not bowed.”79_{The last headline in particular}

stressed the togetherness and solidarity amongst the people of Mumbai. Since one of the

74_{Ian Talbot, Pakistan. A New History (London: C.Hurst & Co (Publishers) Ltd., 2012), 220.} 75_{Ibid., 220.}

77_{For example The New York Times: Somini Sengupta, “Mumbai’s Longest Night, With an Abyss of}

Terror,” The New York Times, accessed 20 April 2017, http://www.ny-times.com/2008/11/28/world/asia/28scene.html.

78_{Veena Das, On Not Becoming a “Terrorist”. Problems of Memory, Agency and Community in the Sri}

Lankan Conflict, (London: University of California Press Ltd., 2000), 120.

79_{M. Neelamalar, P. Chitra and Arun Darwin, “The print media coverage of the 26/11 Mumbai terror}

at-tacks: A study on the coverage of leading Indian newspapers and its impact on people,” Journal Media

Mumbai at the Seine?

Master of Arts Thesis

Euroculture. Society, Politics and Culture in a Global Context.

Mumbai at the Seine?

Lieux de Mémoire and a Transnational Memory of Terrorist Attacks.

Submitted by:

Supervised by:

MA Programme Euroculture

Declaration

Table of Contents

Je suis Paris.

We are all Mumbaikars now.

1. Introduction

2. The Triangle

3. Mumbai 2008