Europeanization of the
Collective Memory?
Case Study of the Netherlands
Nynke K. Hofstra2/25/2011
2 Table of Contents Introduction……….……3 Theoretical Framework………...……9 Collective Memory………10 Europeanization………...….15
The Remembrance Policy of the European Union………20
Shift in Remembrance Policy ………...………28
Europe’s Remembrance Policy and the Netherlands………39
Developments in the Netherlands regarding the Commemoration of World War II…………46
Kamp Vught……….. 48
Kamp Westerbork………..56
Europeanization of Remembrance Centres in the Netherlands………67
Conclusions………...………71
3
Introduction
„What happens now is an attempt to release ourselves, to dispose of what made us fear in all those years of war. We want to distance ourselves from the war.‟1
It is a late afternoon in early May 1946 when people start gathering in several churches throughout the Netherlands. These meetings would go into history as the first official commemoration of the Second World War which haunted the Netherlands and the rest of Europe only a year before. Delft, an old city in the west of the Netherlands, was chosen to host the official national commemoration. The sermon was carefully written and composed and was preached not only in the New Church in Delft, but also in most other churches and market squares in the Netherlands.2 Nowadays, almost 70 years after the end of the war, the Dutch still commemorate the war on the fourth of May. Much has changed however in these decades. Whereas the first years were marked by the emphasis on remembering the resistance fighters and the soldiers, the last years are characterized by a more general commemoration of all the Dutch people who have been killed in wars and peace operations since the beginning of
the Second World War.3 How and why did the Dutch culture of commemoration change the
way it did? After explaining the process of change in these remembrance rituals, the main research question will be defined.
The development of the remembrance culture in the Netherlands can be divided in three phases. The first phase, which starts immediately after the war, was characterized by the idea that the nation should act as one in remembering the war. There was no space for individual war stories or commemoration. The Dutch citizens strived for homogeneity and solidarity, which is not surprising after years of war and division.4 It was of the utmost importance to preserve this solidarity so that a new war would not occur. Typical for this phase is, as mentioned earlier, the status of the Dutch soldiers and the resistance fighters. They were the
1
Documentary ‘De oorlog, episode nine on the remembrance after the war. The originial text in Dutch is as followed: ‘Wat thans geschiedt is een poging om ons los te maken, ons te ontdoen van wat in die oorlogsjaren ons heeft benauwd. We willen de oorlog van ons afschuiven'. F. Beelaerts van Blokland spoke these words during the first commemoration of the war in the Netherlands.
http://deoorlog.nps.nl/page/dossiers/780906/Herdenken+kort+na+de+oorlog?afl=9, accessed 21 January 2011.
2
Hendrik Hasper, Dankdienst in de kerken en op de markten en openbare pleinen van steden en dorpen ter
herdenking van Nederlands bevrijding uit de Duitsche tyrannie in het jaar onzes heeren 1945, May 1946.
3 Information on the day of national commemoration which takes place every year on the fourth of May,
http://www.4en5mei.nl/herdenken/nationale_herdenking, accessed 10 September 2010.
4
4
ones „responsible‟ for the liberation of the Netherlands and were therefore seen as the only group that should be commemorated; other groups of victims such as the Jews were simply ignored.5 This limited choice of victims that ought to be remembered, is illustrated by the official list of victims, better known as the „Erelijst der Gevallenen‟.6
The list was presented during the National Commemoration in 1960 and every day, to this very day, a page is turned so that the names of the victims will never be forgotten. It is composed of almost 18.000 names; victims of the military, navy, air force and the resistance.7 The composition of the list clearly shows the focus on the people that fought against Nazi-Germany and for freedom. Other casualties such as the (Jewish) civilians were not mentioned as it did not fit in the „myth of heroism and resistance‟.8
One should keep in mind that a total of around 250.000 people were killed as a direct consequence of the war in the Netherlands. The choice to commemorate such a select group is therefore rather remarkable.
The sixties and early seventies are characterized as the age of a new generation. Whereas the fifties focused on working together and working hard to rebuild society, the sixties were all about questioning this newly build society. The new generation, as opposed to the „old‟ generation, started questioning everything. It meant the start of the end of the Dutch pillarization. It also brought about new developments in the culture of commemoration. The myth of resistance became less of a myth as more and more people questioned the stories around the resistance fighters.9 It became clear that there was only a small resistance group and that most people did not fight the Nazi-terror. As a consequence, more space was created for other victims. For the first time since the war ended, the Jewish victims were acknowledged as the group that suffered most from Nazi-Germany.10 Several factors have contributed to this development. One important factor was the start of the Eichmann-case in Jerusalem in 1961. Since then, the interest in the Jewish side of the story grew intensively as the horrors of the extermination camps became widely known. Furthermore, it became acknowledged that most Dutch citizens had not done anything to protect the Jews from prosecution. These facts contributed to the further decline of the myth of resistance and simultaneously the intensification of recognition of Jewish suffering. This development is
5
Madelon de Keizer and Marije Plomp, Een open zenuw, 31.
6
Official list of the war victims in the Netherlands. http://www.erelijst.nl/over-erelijst, accessed 10 September 2010.
7 A total of 250.00 people died in the Netherlands because of the war. 8
Maud van de Reijt, Zestig jaar herrie om twee minuten stilte (Amsterdam 2010), 30.
9
Madelon de Keizer and Marije Plomp, Een open zenuw, 15.
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clearly shown in the construction of many monuments for Jewish victims throughout the Netherlands.11 The first changes in the Dutch culture of remembrance were a fact. The Roma and the Sinti was the next group of victims that asked for recognition of their suffering, which they received in 1978 when the first monument was erected that commemorated the Roma and Sinti victims of the Nazi-terror.12 More changes were about to take place. In the same period, there was a noticeable shift towards a more general commemoration. Remembering the war was still seen as an instrument to prevent a new war, but there was also a growing tendency to „use‟ it as a way to promote human and freedom rights.13
The process of different groups striving for recognition continues in the 1980s. An organized group of young gay people from Amsterdam tried to get recognition for all gay people that were prosecuted for their beliefs.14 Although it has never been proved that people in the Netherlands were arrested on grounds of their sexual preferences, the group was allowed to lay a floral wreath at the National Monument on the Dam during the official ceremony. It is a good example of the way people perceived the Second World War; the memory of it was still very much alive. The end of the 1980s would turn out to be a turning point in the commemoration culture. Several events contributed to this change, of which the establishment of the National Committee of 4 and 5 May can be regarded as the most important one on national level. Before this committee was responsible for the national commemoration, there were still many difficulties and dilemmas to be resolved. One problem was the fact that there was hardly any interest in the official National Commemoration Day. The Queen would lay down a floral wreath at the National Monument on the Dam at 16.00 o‟clock on the fourth of May, but people were far more interested in the local act of remembrance at 20.00 o‟clock that same day.15 Consequence was that the national commemoration was overshadowed by the local commemorations. It was decided by royal decree in 1987, that a newly composed committee, the National Committee of 4 and 5 May should change all this. The National Commemoration should no longer be surpassed by other local acts of remembrance. Moreover, the Dutch government feared a loss of interest in commemorating the Second World War. It had been
11
Many Jewish monuments were built in the 1960s and 1970s. List of all the war monuments in the Netherlands, www.oorlogsmusea.nl, accessed 11 September 2010.
12
Wim Ramaker, Sta een ogenblik stil…: monumentenboek 1940-1945 (Kampen 1980). Interesting to mention here is the fact that this monument is the only monument in the world that commemorates the Roma and Sinti victims.
13 De Keizer and Plomp, Een open zenuw, 16. 14
The group is known by the name of ‘Amsterdamse Jongeren Aksiegroep Homoseksualiteit ‘. Van de Reijt,
Zestig jaarherrie, 59 and 66.
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almost fifty years since the war ended, so they argued, and the number of people who experienced the war was diminishing. The Committee came with the solution of connecting an up-to-date theme to the Commemoration Day every five year. An example is the topic of „Freedom, fundamental rights and security‟, which was the main theme in 2007.16
Furthermore, the National Commemoration was moved from 16.00 o‟clock to 20.00 o‟clock, stimulating or maybe pushing people to attend this commemoration instead of a local one. In addition, the ceremony was broadcasted live to attract more attention. They succeeded; hundreds of thousands of people come to the National Monument on the Dam every year to commemorate. Moreover, the fear of a declining number of people interested in the Remembrance Day was unjust; research shows that there is no change in the value that people attach to the commemoration of the war and its victims.17 The incident on the fourth of May 2010 illustrates the importance of this day for the people.18 One minute past eight that day, the moment that the two minutes of silence had just been announced, a man started to scream. People panicked and ran away, changing a peaceful commemoration into a bizarre incident. The news and newspapers were filled with it; for a day or two, the Netherlands was in shock. Although the man in question turned out to be a man with psychological problems who had no special motive for his act, the response to this individual action was enormous.19 Even 65 years after the end of the war, the act of commemoration is still very contemporary and vivid, although its form changed over the years.
The 1980s were for yet another reason crucial for the development of the remembrance policies in the Netherlands. The international stage underwent many changes in the end of the eighties. Millions of people watched on television how East and West Berliners finally broke down the wall in November 1989. Soon, the Cold War was over and Communism was no longer one of the leading ideologies. Europe had been divided for decades and as a consequence East and West Europe both had developed a different remembrance culture.20 The lack of interaction between the two caused this gap. As was mentioned earlier, the
16 Archives of the National Committee 4 and 5 May of 2007,
http://www.4en5mei.nl/4en5mei/jaarthema/jaarthema_2007, accessed 16 November 2010.
17
48 Per cent of the people regard Remembrance Day as important. Dieter Verhue and Bart Koenen, Nationaal
Vrijheidsonderzoek 2010, april 2010, 10.
18
Newspaper article of the ‘Trouw’, Eerste grote verstoring dodenherdenking Dam, 4 May 2010,
http://www.trouw.nl/nieuws/article3060470.ece/Eerste_grote_verstoring_dodenherdenking_Dam.html, accessed 11 September 2010.
19 Newspaper article of the ‘Trouw’, 4 May 2010, Opgepakte man Dam incident in de war,
‘http://www.trouw.nl/nieuws/nederland/article3060490.ece/Opgepakte_man_Damincident_in_de_war.html, accessed 11 September 2010.
7
Netherlands and other Western countries emphasized that such a horrible event should never happen again. Commemorating became an important ritual that was repeated every year. This culture of remembrance had a different character in Eastern Europe. A national day to remember the victims of the war was missing; instead the Soviet Union and its satellite states celebrated Victory Day on 9 May to commemorate the German capitulation to the Soviet Union. It was inevitable that the end of this division would have consequences for the commemoration rituals. Madelon de Keizer argues that it particularly changed how people reflected on the war.21 People became realistic in the sense that they understood that the lessons drawn from the war did not prevent new wars. The Balkan war for example, took place close by and nothing was done or could be done to prevent it. The myth that the lessons learned from the Second World War would prevent such horrible events was broken. Accordingly, World War II was seen in a different light than before; the collective memory changed. Certain issues from the war were never researched before as there was no interest in the results. These issues often concerned negative stories about how the Dutch proceeded in the war and right after the war. An example is the fate that many Dutch supporters of Nazism suffered. 130.000 People that were suspected of being a follower of Nazi Germany were locked up in old factories without enough water and food.22 After months of maltreatment and malnourishment they were set free without any form of trial. For decades, this case and other examples like it were a taboo; one simply did not talk about it. The end of the Cold War meant a careful end of these taboos. More and more research was done on these rather painful memories of the past. However, the shift in the international balance entailed more changes. Another outcome of the end of the Cold War was the fact that the Second World War was placed in a more international perspective. Before the Berlin Wall fell, commemoration was predominantly a national matter. Every European country had its own national remembrance rituals and the Netherlands was no exception. After the shift in the international relations, people were more inclined to place the war and its commemoration in an international context. The war in Yugoslavia was proof of the fact that Europe did not learn of its lessons drawn from the war. As a consequence, the commemoration of the war acquired a more international character. Moreover, it contained a warning against the dangers of war. A good example of this new disposition of remembrance is the speech given by the former major of
21 De Keizer and Plomp, Een open zenuw, 12-13. 22
8
Amsterdam Ed van Tijn. “We gathered here today, because the ghost of the „Übermensch‟ still wanders around; in this place, around the corner, and quite openly in countries such as South Africa.”23
It conveys the message of the still existing threat of war.
In the mean time, other important developments were taking place on the European level. The member states of the European Community continued to integrate and as a result the Maastricht Treaty was ratified in 1992. The European Union received its current status. It proved that international matters became more and more important. Many policies that used to be a strictly national issue became a European issue. One of the main concerns of the predecessor of the European Union, the European Community, was to preserve peace. This was one of the most important reasons for the European integration and one could say the biggest success of this integration. Over the last two decades, the European Union received more competences, turning national matters into European matters. The question one could ask is whether the remembrance policy, which was always strictly national, became a more European issue. Developments such as the establishment of a European Day of Remembrance for Victims of Stalinism and Nazism on 23 August show that the European Union seeks to influence national remembrance policies to a certain extent.24 Looking at the European level, it is not just the Union that could influence national commemoration policies. Other international organizations such as the Council of Europe, but also bilateral relations between the European countries could affect how the process of remembering is developing. Cooperation between for example remembrance centres in different countries could point out into this direction. Some scholars like Madelon de Keizer, argue that one could even speak of Europeanization of remembrance policy.25
The question whether it is possible to confirm this assumption will be analyzed in this research. The focus will be on the remembrance culture in the Netherlands which leads to the following main research question: To what extent has the collective memory regarding the Second World War in the Netherlands been Europeanized? In order to answer this, other questions will have to be answered first. First, it is important to construct a solid theoretical framework to back up the empirical analysis. This first chapter will explain the concept of collective memory and a connection will be made between remembrance culture and
23
Van de Reijt, Zestig jaar herrie, 64. The original Dutch text: ‘Wij staan hier onder meer, omdat de geest van de ‘Übermensch’ nog steeds rondwaart hier, om de hoek, en in landen als Zuid-Afrika in volle openheid…’
24
Declaration of the European Parliament on the proclamation of 23 August as European Day of Remembrance for Victims of Stalinism and Nazism.
9
collective memory. Furthermore, the theoretical framework will deal with the term Europeanization. Two types of Europeanization, bottom-up and top-down, will be described. The second chapter will focus on the European Union and its policy developments regarding the remembrance of World War II. Important in this part will be questions such as: Which elements of commemoration are emphasized? And the key question; did these EU policies set foot in the Netherlands? The next chapter will shed some light on the developments in culture of commemoration in the Netherlands in the last ten years. The emphasis will be put on certain places of memory; places where people come to remember and places where people give shape to their memory of the Second World War. The Netherlands has quite a few of these settings and it was essential therefore to make a selection. The research will concentrate on the labour and transit camps Kamp Vught and Kamp Westerbork. The reasons for this choice will be explained later on in chapter three. Attention will be paid to the bilateral relations between the Netherlands and other European countries and to the influence of European international organizations on the Dutch remembrance culture. A discussion will follow to determine to what extent the Dutch collective memory concerning the Second World War has actually been Europeanized. The conclusions will form the final chapter of the research.
Theoretical framework
„So we will never forget…‟26
On the fourth of May, the Netherlands commemorates all the victims that fell since the outburst of the Second World War. Throughout the country, people come together in local gatherings, which often start in a silent march that ends at a certain war monument. Speeches are given by the mayor or another prominent member of the community. One aspect connects these speeches; the sentence „so we will never forget‟ is an often used phrase. It illustrates the main idea behind remembrance; that is to keep the memory alive. This raises questions however. What memory and more importantly, how is this memory shaped? The concept of collective memory is useful in explaining the correlation between the memory of a group and its construction. A simple definition of collective memory is that it is the shared memory of two or more people. The term can be applied to groups, societies or even nations. This research will focus on alterations in Dutch collective memory regarding the Second World
10
War, which means that it will analyze the process of change in the remembrance culture. To do so, the term collective memory will need more clarification.
Collective memory
The concept of collective memory was first mentioned by Maurice Halbwachs in the 1925.27 He linked the concept of collective memory to social groups, which implies that a memory is collective when it is shared by social groups such as families or even nations.28 Memory, he argues, is therefore not restricted to individuals. Although the term is relatively old, it is far from a fully accepted and established term. Ever since Halbwachs wrote about the concept, it has been disputed by numerous scholars. Reinhart Koselleck is one of these academics as he argues that only individuals are able to remember.29 Another scholar who is sceptical about the possibility of a collective memory is Susan Sontag. She denies the likelihood of a group, society or nation sharing the same memory when she claims that „there is no such thing as collective memory as all memory is individual…it dies with every person‟.30
To some respect, one has to agree with them. The term collective memory suggests that two of more people, even whole nations might share the same memory. It seems impossible however for a group to remember the same past, let alone an entire state. Halbwachs acknowledged this when he argued: „It is, of course individuals who remember, not groups or institutions, but these individuals, being located in a specific group context, draw on that context to remember or recreate the past‟.31
This shows that when he discussed collective memory, he had a different idea than Sontag and Koselleck. He linked the concept to societies, meaning that individual memory is always related to a society; it is never completely independent and therefore never solely individual. As he argued: „Memory needs continuous feeding from collective sources and is sustained by social and moral props.‟32
Accordingly, memory is not a given, it is constructed by society. Therefore, one is able to speak of a collective memory.
27
Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory (Chicago 1992).
28
Klaus Eder, ‘Remembering National Memories Together: The Formation of a Transnational Identity in Europe’ in Klaus Eder and Willfried Spohn eds., Collective Memory and European identity: The effects of
integration and enlargement (Aldershot 2005), 197-220, 206.
29
Karin Tilmans, Frank van Vree and Jay Winter eds., Performing the past: Memory, history and identity in
modern Europe (Amsterdam 2010), 340.
30
Susan Rubin Suleiman, Crises of Memory and the Second World War (Harvard 2006), 6.
31
Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, 22.
11
Since Halbwechs mentioned collective memory for the first time, many other studies have been dedicated to the analysis of this term. A number of scholars came up with different types of collective memory. Jan Assman is one of these academics; he links the term to the condition of time. As a result, Assman makes the distinction between communicative and cultural memory.33 Communicative memory is what Sontag might use as a definition of memory. It is tied to time as it is marked by the fact that it is limited to a certain time frame; according to Assman it cannot last longer than around eighty years, which comes down to three generations.34 Another characteristic is that it concerns „everyday memory‟. More importantly, it does not have a fixed point in history where it relates to. An example of a fixed point could be the fall of the Berlin Wall, however, for this research it will be the Second World War. Cultural memory differs from this type in three aspects. First of all, it differentiates itself by having a fixed point from the past. Another key feature is the fact that it does not have a limited time-frame which means that cultural memory continues to exist. The third characteristic is the importance of what Assman calls figures of memory, which are shaped by cultural formation and institutional communications.35 In other words, these figures of memory take shape in museums, monuments but also commemoration rituals. Their main function is to preserve the cultural memory that is linked to a certain fixed point. A similar concept was introduced by Pierre Nora, a French sociologist, when he discussed lieux de mémoire which literally means places or sites of memory.36 The term used by Nora differs slightly from figures of memory. The so-called lieux de mémoire concern concrete sites of memory, for example a monument or an old battlefield. Abstract matters such as a silent march or other commemoration rituals are not included in Nora‟s interpretation of places of memory. The opposite is true in Assman‟s concept of figures of memory. His model incorporates the lieux de mémoire of Nora as well as intangible affairs; it includes therefore important aspects of the Dutch remembrance culture as the two minutes of silence and the silent march. Jan Assman and Pierre Nora both argue that collective memory is crystallized through lieux de mémoire and figures of memory.37 As this research focuses on certain changes in the Dutch collective memory regarding the Second World War, the lieux de mémoire and the figures of memory related to this war will be of importance.
33
Jan Assman, ‘Collective Memory and Cultural Identity’, New German Critique Vol. 65 (1995) 125-133, 126.
34 Ibidem, 127. 35
Ibidem, 129.
36
Pierre Nora, ‘Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire’ Representations Vol. 26 (1989) 7-24.
12
An important characteristic of collective memory, irrespective of the type, is the continuous process of change it finds itself in. According to Halbwachs, the process of recalling the past is constantly influenced by the society and society‟s concerns of the present, which means that a collective memory is subjected to continuous alterations.38 Accordingly, it implies that the memory is susceptible to possible manipulation. Pierre Nora agrees when he states that the memory is indeed „vulnerable to manipulation‟ and therefore in „permanent evolution.‟39
Before this process of changing memory can be explained further, it is necessary to introduce one other type of collective memory.
Recent years have shown a growing interest in the concept of collective memory. More research was done and more articles and books were written on the topic. Aleida Assman was one of the scholars who analyzed the field of collective memory. She argues that „personal memories include much more than what we, as individuals, have ourselves experienced‟.40
She disagrees therefore with Sontag on her statement on the limited possibilities of personal memory. Instead, Aleida Assman acknowledges Halbwachs reasoning when she claims that people have their „share in the larger… memory … of the society, the state, and the culture we live in‟.41
She argues that there are different frames for different types of memory. On the individual level, she mentions the individual memory. Furthermore, she lists cultural memory which is the type that Jan Assman mentioned as well. In many aspects, it is similar to this type. She adds however one important feature to Jan Assman‟s version when she makes a distinction between a „canon‟ and an „archive‟.42
A canon means in this case everything that is and should be remembered by the group, society or state. Society „chooses‟ what is important to remember. Additionally, Aleida Assman mentions the active memory of the canon which comes down to the way in which a group actively remembers.43 An example is a museum or a remembrance day. The active memory of the canon is in fact a different title for the figures of memory. Both terms indicate the group of instruments that maintains the memory of a certain past. Important to remember is that in the case of the canon, it is the group or society that „chooses‟ these instruments. Opposite to the canon is the so-called archive, which is everything that has consciously been overlooked or ignored by the public. What is important
38
Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, 29.
39
Nora, ‘Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire’, 8.
40
Aleida Assman, ‘Re-framing memory. Between individual and collective forms of constructing the past’ in
Performing the past, 35-50,40.
41
Ibidem, 40.
42
Ibidem, 43.
13
to keep in mind is that both categories are not fixed or permanent. Society‟s interest may change and as a result, what may have been regarded as crucial to remember can fall into oblivion and vice versa. Aleida Assman agrees therefore with Nora and Halbwachs when she argues that a (collective) cultural memory is susceptible to constant changes.
In her article however, she distinguishes a third type of collective memory which she calls political memory.44 To some level, it is similar to cultural memory. As is the case with the cultural type, political memory has no time limitation and can be regarded as a process of continuous changes. Furthermore, it is shaped by what she calls „durable carriers of symbols and material representations‟, which is in essence the same as figures of memory.45
Political memory however is in certain aspects fundamentally different from cultural memory. Whereas society plays the leading role in cultural memory, it is the institution in political memory that tries to influence collective memory. As was argued earlier, collective memory is subjected to changes and manipulation. The theory behind political memory explains why this is the case. Most scholars in the field of collective memory discuss the so-called bottom-up process of change; society changes and therefore the collective memory changes. This process can be identified in cultural memory. With political memory, Aleida Assman introduces the possibility of a top-down process. Not society alters the memory in a rather natural way, but the changes are deliberately brought upon by institutions, therefore stimulating or possibly even inducing an „institutionalized top-down memory‟.46 A collective memory is „created‟ using instruments such as monuments and museums. Although she mentions these instruments as well in explaining cultural memory, the use of monuments and museums in the case of political memory differs from cultural memory. The main difference is the way in which these instruments are employed. The theory of political memory implies that institutions deliberately use them to construct a certain collective memory. An example could be a national museum filled with artefacts that remind the people of the glorious eras of that particular country. As for cultural memory, it is the people and not the institutions that „choose‟ the figures of memory. Museums and monuments are not used to construct a certain collective memory; rather they are used to maintain a collective memory. Therefore, when analyzing cultural and political memory, it is important to examine in which way the figures of memory are being employed. In her article on collective memory and remembrance, Chiara
44Assman, ‘Re-framing memory. Between individual and collective forms of constructing the past’ in Performing
the past, 42.
45
Ibidem, 42.
14
Bottici adds the concept of institutional remembrance to Assman‟s political memory which explains the connection between the collective memory and remembrance as well. Bottici defines this concept as commemoration which is directly brought upon by institutions.47 Remembrance and the collective memory are connected in the sense that collective memory decides on what is commemorated. Winter and Sivan introduce the concept of „collective remembrance‟ which comes down to the active part of the collective memory; the memory determines what is to be commemorated and the outcome is active collective remembrance which is the same as the act of remembrance.48 However, remembrance can also affect collective memory when the act of commemoration is influenced by external factors such as policies of institutions. Bottici explicitly mentions the EU institutions when she refers to institutional remembrance. According to her, the EU asserts influence on the act of remembrance through „law texts, policies, official declarations and public rituals‟ which is also a form of top-down Europeanization.49
The aim behind political memory is to form an identity with the help of this shaped memory. Indeed, Aleida Assman argues that institutions use political memory „to „construct‟ an identity‟.50
In this case, a collective memory is constructed through inclusion and exclusion. In conclusion, changes in the political memory can be regarded as a top-down process, whereas changes in the cultural memory should be rather seen as a bottom-up process.
It seems that collective memory can be divided in three different categories. The first type, communicative memory is a collective memory that is linked to a certain time period. Moreover, it does not have a fixed point which makes communicative memory unsuitable for this research. The second type and third type, cultural and political memory, are characterized by the fact that they do have a fixed point. In addition, figures of memory are used to maintain and to shape these types of collective memory. As this research deals with the question whether and to what extent Dutch collective memory regarding the Second World War has changed, the focus will be on cultural and political memory. Expectations are that these two types, which represent the bottom-up and top-down approach, will clarify the effects of Europeanization on collective memory in the Netherlands. Before this analysis can be continued, it is important to explain the term Europeanization first.
47
Chiara Bottici, ‘European identity and the politics of remembrance’ in Performing the past, 335-359, 343.
48 Jay Winter and Emmanuel Sivan eds., War and Remembrance in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge 1999), 9. 49
Bottici, ‘European identity and the politics of remembrance’ in Performing the past, 343.
50
Assman, ‘Re-framing memory. Between individual and collective forms of constructing the past’ in
15
Europeanization
The twentieth century was a turbulent century for Europe. After years of war and division, the first steps were taken towards peace and unity with the Schuman declaration in the 1950s. The European Community of Coal and Steel had been born. The years that followed were marked by further integration and enlargement of this community. The twenty first century was no different in that aspect; the process of integration continued and consequently the European Union of 27 member states was established. It became a union with far reaching competencies, which influences the member states and its citizens profoundly. The recent years show a growing interest amongst Euro-enthusiasts as well as amongst Eurosceptics in this new Europe and European integration is one of the central objects of research. The term „Europeanization‟ plays an important role in explaining the process of integration and although more and more scholars use the term every year, there is no straightforward definition. The opposite is true in fact; Europeanization has many faces in the field of political and social sciences. It is crucial therefore to explain the most used and accepted definitions. Only then, it will be clear what Europeanization means in this particular research.
The concept of Europeanization is mainly used in clarifying the process of change in European affairs and international relations. It can range from explaining changes in domestic policies as a result of EU regulation to applying the concept to the consequences of imperialism of France and other European countries in earlier centuries. The most commonly used definition is however connected to the European Union. Simply said, Europeanization is in this case the outcome or response to policies and regulations of the European Union (hereafter the EU).51 As can be expected, this definition is oversimplified as it leaves out many other aspects and possibilities of the term. Integration as a result of multilateral relations between European countries does not fall within the scope of this definition while it is perceived as a form of Europeanization by many scholars. NGO‟s and other institutions can provoke changes on a European level as well. These examples show how complicated it is to come up with one clear definition of Europeanization. Instead of being in danger of getting tangled up in selecting one all-embracing definition, Featherstone chose to point out four different categories of Europeanization.52 In the first category, the concept is perceived as a „historic phenomenon‟. Europeanization means in this case the historical process of transporting European norms and values outside Europe, mostly as a direct result of
51
Kevin Featherstone and Claudia M. Radaelli eds., The politics of Europeanization (Oxford 2006), 3.
16
colonialism. The second type Featherstone distinguishes is „transnational cultural diffusion‟.53
It focuses predominantly on Europe itself as it deals with the „diffusion of cultural norms, ideas, identities, and patterns of behaviour on a cross-national basis within Europe‟ which means that this category concerns alternations on a cultural level rather than on the political level.54 Again, this type of Europeanization is hardly connected to the EU; the changes are generated as a result of interaction between European countries. Examples range from the perception of health and food issues to education. The next two categories differ from the two last mentioned as they are more related to the EU.
„Institutional adaptation‟ is the third type mentioned and, as one can expect, relates to the institutional nature of states.55 Europeanization is in this case the domestic changes that follow directly or indirectly from EU regulation. Although Featherstone does not mention it in his typology, top-down Europeanization comes to mind when discussing the effects of the Union on the national institutional structure of its member states. Top- down Europeanization or downloading is a concept developed by Bӧrzel; it involves the influence of the EU on the domestic institutional structure.56 Moreover, it involves the effects on national policy making processes.57 Bӧrzel does not distinguish these two domestic issues, whereas Featherstone does; his fourth category is the „adaptation of policies and policy processes‟.58
It relates to the influence that EU‟s public policies have on the member states‟ policies and policy making. Harmsen and Wilson unite the two domestic issues as well when they argue that besides these changes in the national institutional structure, institutional adaption occurs when national policy making processes are influenced by the EU.59
The classification of Featherstone illustrates the complexity of the term Europeanization. Bulmer argues that Featherstone‟s typology „already suggests competing research agendas‟.60
Indeed, it shows that the concept can be used in several research fields, which means that this classification is useful in analyzing Europeanization on different levels. Nevertheless, because
53
Featherstone and Radaelli, The politics of Europeanization, 7
54 Ibidem, 7. 55 Ibidem, 7-9. 56
Simon Bulmer, ‘Theorizing Europeanization’ in Paolo Graziano and Maarten P. Vink eds., Europeanization:
New research agendas (Basingstoke 2007), 46-58, 48.
57
Kerry Howell, ‘Developing Conceptualizations of Europeanization and European Integration: Mixing Methodologies’, Research Unit for Institutional Governance Ashcroft International Business School APU, 2002, http://aei.pitt.edu/1720/01/Howell.pdf, accessed 20 September 2010.
58 Featherstone and Radaelli, The politics of Europeanization, 9. 59
Robert Harmsen and Thomas M. Wilson eds., ‘Europeanization: Institutions, Identities and Citizenship’
Yearbook of European Studies Vol. 14 (2000), 14.
17
of this complexness, it is important to limit Featherstone‟s typology if it is to be used in this research. As the research question focuses on the Europeanization of the collective memory regarding World War II and therefore the remembrance culture, it is possible to narrow the concept down. According to article five of the Treaty establishing the European Community, the Community „shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein‟.61
If it does take action outside its competence, it should act in „accordance with the principle of subsidiarity‟.62
This means that the European Union is limited in what it can do in certain areas. Naturally, commemorating the war does not fall within the exclusive competences of the European Community. The EU is therefore not allowed to create regulation in this area, which automatically means that some types or definitions of Europeanization cannot be applied to this particular research.
Part of the typology of Featherstone should therefore be slightly adjusted. First of all, the category he calls „Europeanization as a historic phenomenon‟ does not apply to this research as this type focuses on historical processes rather than on more recent developments. The analysis in this paper focuses on changes in the collective memory in the last ten years, which could be regarded as recent. The second category does apply; it links Europeanization to transnationalism and the circulation of cultural norms, ideas and patterns of behaviour in Europe. Moreover, Featherstone argues that this type of Europeanization „affects wider social activities‟.63
One of these social activities could be remembrance rituals. The definition of Europeanization as „transnational cultural diffusion‟ is therefore particularly appropriate for this research. The two last types he mentions, institutional adaptation and adaptation of policies and policy processes can be characterized as Bӧrzels top-down Europeanization. The EU plays a central role in these last two typifications; he regards the Union as the main
61
Article 5 of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty establishing the European Community: The Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein. In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community. Any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of this Treaty.
62
The principle of subsidiarity is laid down in the Treaty on the European Union and later reconfirmed in the Treaty of Lisbon. According to art. 5, the principle of subsidiarity entails that ‘the Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein. In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community. Any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of this Treaty.’
18
institution that influences national institutional processes on the European level. This influence is a (in)direct result of EU regulation or EU membership. As was mentioned earlier, the EU has no right to impose regulation on its member states regarding commemoration rituals. The analysis of the possible top-down Europeanization in this research will therefore focus on policies of the EU that are in no way binding for the member states, but could influence them as a result of their membership. This means that instead of EU-regulation, the paper will focus on other instruments that the EU is able to employ. Examples are scholarships, funds and subsidies.
It is useful in this stage to connect the concept of collective memory to that of Europeanization. As was explained in the earlier section, political memory can be regarded as a top-down process as it is imposed from institutions from above. The question is whether this top-down process can be linked to the top-down Europeanization as has been discussed above. Before answering this question however it is important to specify the concept last mentioned. Both Bӧrzel and Featherstone regard top-down Europeanization as a process that essentially influences the institutional structure of a nation state and its policy processes. As this research focuses on changes in the remembrance culture and the collective memory it is important to expand the scope of their concept. Although Bӧrzel concentrates on the domestic institutional structure only, it is true that the EU can influence society as well. Delanty and Rumford argue that studies on Europeanization mostly focus on the state instead of society.64 Indeed, many theories on this subject tend to overlook the effects of Europe on society. Nowadays, this somewhat narrow point of view is not sufficient any longer. As Delanty and Rumford claim: „It is possible to speak of an emerging European public sphere, overlapping and shared social and cultural worlds…‟.65
It is therefore necessary to expand Bӧrzel‟s top-down Europeanization in such a way that it no longer excludes social processes. Accordingly, the concept of top-down Europeanization that will be applied in this research will focus on changes in social processes of collective memory and remembrance culture. The question to be answered now is whether the top-down process in the theory of political memory can be connected to top-down Europeanization. Aleida Assman argues that political memory is constructed; changes are deliberately brought upon society by institutions, for example the institutions of the EU. For that reason, when the theory of political memory is applied to the Union, it can be considered as top-down Europeanization. The question whether top-down
64
Gerard Delanty and Chris Rumford, Rethinking Europe: Social theory and the implications of Europeanization (London 2005), 1.
19
Europeanization actually did influence Dutch collective memory will be dealt with in the next chapter.
Cultural memory, the other type of collective memory that will be analyzed, can be linked to the concept of Europeanization as well. As was argued earlier, society „chooses‟ what it wants to remember from the past and with that, it „decides‟ on how they want to be seen by others. Jan Assman clarifies this when he states that „cultural memory preserves the store of knowledge from which a group derives an awareness of its unity and peculiarity‟.66 Every group or society has its own idea of cultural memory. These ideas can be influenced through interaction with other groups and societies; as a result, the cultural memory changes. This same process takes place in states as well. On a European level, this would mean that European states could influence each other‟s idea of cultural memory. Featherstone calls this process „transnational cultural diffusion; the diffusion of cultural norms and ideas… on a cross-national basis within Europe‟.67 How can cultural memory then be linked to Europeanization? In Bӧrzel‟s analysis of the concept, she argues that there are two types. The first one is top-down Europeanization which has already been discussed earlier in this chapter. The second category she distinguishes is bottom-up Europeanization or uploading. As is the case with top-down Europeanization, it is focused on the European Union and its member states. Uploading is the opposite of downloading in the sense that member states try to change the structure of the EU as they „upload their policy model to the EU level‟.68
This explanation of bottom-up Europeanization cannot be linked to the theory of cultural memory as it describes the connection between the EU and its member states rather than the connection between the states. Although top-down Europeanization has proved to be useful for this analysis, the notion of uploading is not. However, cultural memory can be linked to another type of Europeanization described by Featherstone. His „transnational cultural diffusion‟ explains the changes that take place in cultural ideas and patterns of behavior of groups or societies through interaction between nation states. As was mentioned earlier, cultural memory focuses on how society forms a collective memory. Cross-national interaction can influence what Aleida Assman calls the canon and archive of the memory; the Europeanization of the cultural memory of a society.
66
Jan Assman, ‘Collective Memory and Cultural Identity’, 130.
67
Featherstone, The politics of Europeanization, 7
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This chapter sought to explain the terms collective memory and Europeanization. More importantly, a connection was made between the two concepts to form the theoretical backbone in the analysis of the Dutch collective memory concerning the Second World War. The first link is between top-down Europeanization and political memory. It will help to understand the possible effects that the policies of the institutions of the EU have on the collective memory of the Netherlands. The second and last connection exists between transnational cultural diffusion and cultural memory. This link will serve as an instrument in analyzing the effects of interaction on remembrance rituals between the Netherlands and other European states on the Dutch collective memory. This type will be called bottom-up Europeanization for the purpose of this research. It should however not be confused with the definition of Bӧrzel‟s bottom-up Europeanization. The next chapter will deal with the policies of the EU regarding the commemoration of the Second World War.
The remembrance policy of the European Union
„EU accused of 'hijacking' Remembrance Sunday‟69
On 9 March 2010, the European Commission initiated a proposal in order to establish a European Heritage Label. The idea behind this proposal is to designate sites with this label which have played an important role in European history, particularly the history of the EU. According to the Commission, it is the „symbolic value for European integration‟ that is crucial in appointing the label to heritage sites.70 Sites such as the old residence of Robert Schuman are appointed as important monuments in an attempt to stimulate a sense of belonging to Europe.71 The proposal however caused quite some commotion. Reason for this upheaval is the choice of some of the designated sites; a few war cemeteries and memorials have been selected to receive the European Heritage Label once the proposal is accepted. The British newspaper The Telegraph responded to this news with the headline „EU accused of 'hijacking' Remembrance Sunday‟.72
The article blames the Union for „imposing its view on
69
British newspaper article of the ‘Telegraph’, EU accused of hijacking Remembrance Sunday, 27 October 2010, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/eu/8090347/EU-accused-of-hijacking-Remembrance-Sunday.html, accessed 10 December 2010.
70
Information of the European Heritage Label on the website of the European Commission, Culture. http://ec.europa.eu/culture/our-programmes-and-actions/doc2519_en.htm, accessed 10 December 2010.
71 Proposal for a Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a European Union action
for the European Heritage Label.
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:0076:FIN:EN:PDF, accessed 1 January 2011.
21
history on war sites‟ as it would want to use British war monuments to show how European integration has prevented war for the last 65 years.73 According to the newspaper, the EU is exceeding its power on the expense of British taxpayers. Despite this criticism, the EU is pursuing a more active stance towards the act of remembrance. Whereas commemoration used to be primarily a matter of national interest, nowadays it seems to becoming a matter of European interest as well. This chapter will deal with the question of to what extent the EU is engaged in remembrance policy. Moreover, it will discuss the effects of this policy field on the collective memory of the Netherlands.
It is safe to assume that the event of the Second World War played an important role in the establishment of the European Community and later the European Union. Europe was devastated by the time the war ended in 1945. Society was disrupted as millions of people lost their life. The economy in each country was destroyed as the greater part of shops, businesses and other industries were either closed down or partly functioning. The continent of Europe was exhausted; after years and years of war, peace and prosperity stood high on the political agenda. As a consequence, governments were more willing to make compromises than before 1939. This readiness was illustrated by Robert Schuman, former foreign minister of France when he presented his proposal for the establishment for a supranational organization between European states on 9 May 1950.74 The Schuman Declaration is considered as the founding document of the European Community. In his declaration, Schuman refers to the war when he argues that such a supranational organization will make „any war … not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible‟.75 It appears that the war was indeed an important argument to establish a European supranational community. Another document that appoints the Second World War as one of the main reasons to create the European Community and later on the EU is the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community. The founding principles of this Treaty of Rome explicitly mentions peace as an important motive when it states that it is necessary for the member states to „pool their resources to preserve and strengthen peace and liberty, and call upon the other peoples of Europe who share their ideal to join in their efforts‟.76 Although economic and political motives are the main priorities on EU‟s agenda,
73
Newspaper article of the ‘Telegraph’, EU accused of hijacking Remembrance Sunday.
74
The Schuman Declaration of 9 May 1950, http://europa.eu/abc/symbols/9-may/decl_en.htm, accessed 1 January 2011.
75 Ibidem. 76
Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Rome 25 March 1957,
22
the memory of the Second World War and the subsequent desire to create and maintain a peaceful and stable Europe has been firmly rooted in the principles of the EU ever since. The question that should be answered in this stage is what kind of policy the EU pursues in the field of remembrance. As has been shown, World War II and the resulting wish for peace have played an important role in the establishment of the Union. War between the member states became an unlikely event and as a consequence, Europe could finally develop its economic situation which it did. The European Community and later on the EU became more and more an economic power in the world. European integration occurred for the greater part on an economical as well as on a political level. The Union is quite successful in these aspects; it is often regarded as the most thriving supranational organization in the world. However, the issue of legitimacy threatens to throw a spanner in the works. Many scholars have argued that the EU is lacking sufficient public support for its policies. This concern grew even further when the Maastricht Treaty was signed, changing the nature of the EU by giving it more competences. Fusch and Schlenker even argued that the Maastricht Treaty was a „turning point in the process of European integration‟.77
The fact that the EU attained more competences meant also that the impact of the Union on the citizens increased. Therefore, in the line of Fuchs and Schlenker‟s argument, the citizens are more likely to assess the EU and its policy. The problem is however the gap between the EU institutions and the citizens; it is too wide. Consequently, the people that need to support the process of European integration are hesitant in doing so as the distance to the EU is too big. Daniela Obradovic argues that the „European enterprise must develop policy legitimacy: not so much to function … but to achieve the purposes that depend upon the support of its population, and to maintain its political system intact in the face of challenge or serious policy failure‟.78
The need for public support and to decrease the legitimacy deficit was also acknowledged by the Union itself. The gap between the EU and its citizens had to be reduced; the people had to feel more attached to Europe. This would become an important aim in the policy objectives of the EU which was noticeable in the increase of cultural policy. The first cultural programme was launched by the
77
Dieter Fuchs and Andrea Schlenker, Background paper Team 12: ‘The EU-Enlargement, Cultural Diversity and National Identity’, EU-Consent: Work package V Democracy, Legitimacy and Identities: Citizens on the
Construction of Europe, Conference in Lodz (April 2006) 1-21, 2.
78
23
European Commission in 1996 and was called Kaléidoscope.79 One of the objectives in the Declaration that established the programme, is to „promote the idea of citizenship of the European Union‟ which illustrates the will of the EU to bring the citizen closer to the Union.80
Ever since, the cultural policy has grown each year.
One of the fields of cultural policy is the field of remembrance. Although it is a relatively new policy area of the EU, the Commission, in cooperation with the Parliament, is adopting a course in which it places the EU in a role of keeper of remembrance in Europe. As was illustrated by the newspaper article, some believe that the EU is exceeding its power in pursuing these policies. According to others however, it is important for Europe to remember its past and the EU could contribute to this. Former member of the Commission Franz Fischler even argued that the Union has a „moral duty‟ to commemorate the Second World War as today‟s „peacefully united Europe has its roots in this war‟.81
Even though feelings are mixed regarding the EU‟s remembrance policy, it seems that the Union has chosen to actively support remembrance in Europe. The question is to what extent it is pursuing this course of action.
In accordance with the argument of top-down Europeanization, explained in the previous chapter, it follows that the remembrance policy of the EU falls under this header. Chiara Bottici argues that what she calls institutional remembrance is abundant at the level of the EU.82 In order to be able to analyze the effects that EU remembrance policy had on the Dutch collective memory, it is necessary to provide an overview of this particular policy. This section will focus in particular on what Bottici understands by institutional remembrance; „law texts, policies, official declarations and public rituals‟ initiated by the Union.83
The European Parliament was the first of the institutions to point out to the importance of the act of commemoration when it introduced the resolution on European and international
79
Information on the Kaleidoscope program of the European Commission,
http://ec.europa.eu/culture/archive/culture2000/historique/kaleidoscope_en.html, accessed 15 December 2010.
80
Decision No 719/96/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 March 1996 establishing a
program to support artistic and cultural activities having a European dimension (Kaleidoscope),
Official Journal L 099, 20/04/1996 P. 0020 - 0026
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31996D0719:EN:HTML, accessed 2 January 2011.
81
Speech Dr. Franz Fischler at the commemoration at the Mauthausen concentration camp, 7 May 2000. http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/00/170&format=HTML&aged=1&language =EN&guiLanguage=en, accessed 15 September 2010.
82
Bottici, ‘European identity and the politics of remembrance’ in Performing the past, 343.
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protection for Nazi concentration camps as historical monuments on 11 February 1993.84 This would turn out to be the first of many steps in the process of creating a policy concerning the Second World War. The next resolution of the Parliament followed two years later in 1995; the EP proposed a day to commemorate the Holocaust.85 The main reason pointed out for establishing such a European Day of Remembrance of the Holocaust was the fact that an increase of cases of „racism, anti-Semitism and xenophobia‟ had occurred.86
Several of the member states had experienced a rise of incidents related to these three issues and according to the Parliament it was the responsibility of Europe to act on these negative developments. Another motive could be the outbreak of the Yugoslav war in 1991. It illustrated that Europe was not the peaceful continent which it had been for all those decades. Peace was something that could not be taken for granted but had to be actively pursued. Moreover, it showed once again that the rise in racism and xenophobia were actual threats to the preservation of peace. The aim of the proposal was to combat these threats first of all by creating a European Day of Remembrance of the Holocaust in all the member states. Secondly, the proposal was intended to encourage the members to organize different activities that would preserve the memory of the Second World War. An important element in the resolution was to educate young people in particular, to secure knowledge about the war and the „dangers of totalitarian and racist ideologies‟ which is yet again a tool to fight racism and anti-Semitism.87
Two aspects stick out while analyzing this resolution; a strong emphasis is put on the threats of racism, xenophobia and anti-Semitism as the main motivation to organize an annual Holocaust remembrance day. It even contains a separate clausal in which the Parliament urges the European Council to initiate a plan to fight these threats in general. A second issue which is being emphasized is the crucial role that education plays in preserving the memory of the war and, according to the EP, in the battle against racism, xenophobia and anti-Semitism. The Parliament reinforced the resolution when it issued a declaration in March 2000 stating that the Council and the Commission should encourage the European Day of Holocaust Remembrance.88 It was the Parliament‟s response to the Declaration of the Stockholm
84
Resolution on European and international protection for Nazi concentration camps as historical monuments. Official Journal of the European Union C 72, 15 March 1993, p. 118.
85 Resolution on a day to commemorate the Holocaust. Official Journal C 166 , 03 July 1995 P. 0132. 86
Ibidem, A., B., C., F., G.
87
Resolution on a day to commemorate the Holocaust.
25
International Forum on the Holocaust that was issued in January of that same year.89 This declaration was signed by 28 states including EU and non-EU member states which together form the Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research.90 The Stockholm declaration not only calls for the „commitment to commemorate the victims of the Holocaust‟ by initiating a day of remembrance in every member state but it also points out to the responsibility of the international community to fight the „evils of genocide, ethnic cleansing, racism, anti-Semitism and xenophobia‟.91
Similar references to these threats and the need of a remembrance day can be found in the Parliament‟s declaration issued two months later. 27 January was chosen as the date to commemorate the Holocaust and its victims as it was this day that in 1945 the concentration camp Auschwitz-Birkenau was liberated by the Russians.92 Both declarations were supported by the United Nations when it adopted a resolution on the Holocaust Remembrance in 2005, appointing 27 January as well as the date for the annual International Holocaust Remembrance Day.93
27 January 2005 was marked by the sixtieth anniversary of the liberation of the Auschwitz camp. The European Parliament took advantage of this opportunity to issue a resolution in which it underlines once more the importance of remembering the Holocaust as well as the need to fight racism and anti-Semitism.94 According to the resolution, these threats form a danger for the continuation of European and international values of democracy and human rights and for the process of European integration. Furthermore, it states that remembrance and education should be used as instruments to combat these dangers; a solution that was
89 Declaration of the Stockholm International Forum on the Holocaust.
http://www.holocausttaskforce.org/about-the-itf/stockholm-declaration.html, accessed 3 January 2011.
90
TheTask Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research was initiated by the former Swedish prime minister in 1998. It is an intergovernmental organization ‘whose purpose is to place political and social leaders' support behind the need for Holocaust education, remembrance, and research both nationally and internationally’. The main aim of the institution is to preserve the
commemoration of the Holocaust in each of the member states. The nation states affiliated with the Task Force are expected to support national programmes that stimulate the education, remembrance and research on the Holocaust. Information on the Task Force, http://www.holocausttaskforce.org/about-the-itf.html, accessed 21 January 2011.
91 Declaration of the Stockholm International Forum on the Holocaust, article 3 and 6. 92
Message of European Commission President Romano Prodi to the International Forum on Holocaust in Stockholm on 27 January 2000 on the occasion of the 55th anniversary of the Auschwitz Camp liberation, 27 January 2000.
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/00/84&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&g uiLanguage=en, accessed 3 January 2011.
93 United Nations Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on the Holocaust Remembrance, (A/RES/60/7, 1
November 2005).
94
